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1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
2 /*
3 * Security plug functions
4 *
5 * Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com>
6 * Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
7 * Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com>
8 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
9 */
10
11 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "LSM: " fmt
12
13 #include <linux/bpf.h>
14 #include <linux/capability.h>
15 #include <linux/dcache.h>
16 #include <linux/export.h>
17 #include <linux/init.h>
18 #include <linux/kernel.h>
19 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
20 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
21 #include <linux/integrity.h>
22 #include <linux/ima.h>
23 #include <linux/evm.h>
24 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
25 #include <linux/mman.h>
26 #include <linux/mount.h>
27 #include <linux/personality.h>
28 #include <linux/backing-dev.h>
29 #include <linux/string.h>
30 #include <linux/msg.h>
31 #include <net/flow.h>
32
33 #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
34
35 /* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */
36 #define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info)
37
38 /*
39 * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the
40 * security_locked_down() LSM hook. Placing this array here allows
41 * all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing
42 * purposes.
43 */
44 const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
45 [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none",
46 [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading",
47 [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port",
48 [LOCKDOWN_EFI_TEST] = "/dev/efi_test access",
49 [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images",
50 [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation",
51 [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access",
52 [LOCKDOWN_IOPORT] = "raw io port access",
53 [LOCKDOWN_MSR] = "raw MSR access",
54 [LOCKDOWN_ACPI_TABLES] = "modifying ACPI tables",
55 [LOCKDOWN_PCMCIA_CIS] = "direct PCMCIA CIS storage",
56 [LOCKDOWN_TIOCSSERIAL] = "reconfiguration of serial port IO",
57 [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_PARAMETERS] = "unsafe module parameters",
58 [LOCKDOWN_MMIOTRACE] = "unsafe mmio",
59 [LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access",
60 [LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access",
61 [LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM",
62 [LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM",
63 [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
64 [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
65 [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
66 [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ_KERNEL] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
67 [LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to read kernel RAM",
68 [LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf",
69 [LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs",
70 [LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access",
71 [LOCKDOWN_XFRM_SECRET] = "xfrm SA secret",
72 [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
73 };
74
75 struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init;
76 static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(blocking_lsm_notifier_chain);
77
78 static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache;
79 static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache;
80
81 char *lsm_names;
82 static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init;
83
84 /* Boot-time LSM user choice */
85 static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order;
86 static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm;
87
88 static __initconst const char * const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM;
89
90 /* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */
91 static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms;
92 static __initdata struct lsm_info *exclusive;
93
94 static __initdata bool debug;
95 #define init_debug(...) \
96 do { \
97 if (debug) \
98 pr_info(__VA_ARGS__); \
99 } while (0)
100
101 static bool __init is_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm)
102 {
103 if (!lsm->enabled)
104 return false;
105
106 return *lsm->enabled;
107 }
108
109 /* Mark an LSM's enabled flag. */
110 static int lsm_enabled_true __initdata = 1;
111 static int lsm_enabled_false __initdata = 0;
112 static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled)
113 {
114 /*
115 * When an LSM hasn't configured an enable variable, we can use
116 * a hard-coded location for storing the default enabled state.
117 */
118 if (!lsm->enabled) {
119 if (enabled)
120 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
121 else
122 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
123 } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true) {
124 if (!enabled)
125 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
126 } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) {
127 if (enabled)
128 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
129 } else {
130 *lsm->enabled = enabled;
131 }
132 }
133
134 /* Is an LSM already listed in the ordered LSMs list? */
135 static bool __init exists_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
136 {
137 struct lsm_info **check;
138
139 for (check = ordered_lsms; *check; check++)
140 if (*check == lsm)
141 return true;
142
143 return false;
144 }
145
146 /* Append an LSM to the list of ordered LSMs to initialize. */
147 static int last_lsm __initdata;
148 static void __init append_ordered_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm, const char *from)
149 {
150 /* Ignore duplicate selections. */
151 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
152 return;
153
154 if (WARN(last_lsm == LSM_COUNT, "%s: out of LSM slots!?\n", from))
155 return;
156
157 /* Enable this LSM, if it is not already set. */
158 if (!lsm->enabled)
159 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
160 ordered_lsms[last_lsm++] = lsm;
161
162 init_debug("%s ordering: %s (%sabled)\n", from, lsm->name,
163 is_enabled(lsm) ? "en" : "dis");
164 }
165
166 /* Is an LSM allowed to be initialized? */
167 static bool __init lsm_allowed(struct lsm_info *lsm)
168 {
169 /* Skip if the LSM is disabled. */
170 if (!is_enabled(lsm))
171 return false;
172
173 /* Not allowed if another exclusive LSM already initialized. */
174 if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && exclusive) {
175 init_debug("exclusive disabled: %s\n", lsm->name);
176 return false;
177 }
178
179 return true;
180 }
181
182 static void __init lsm_set_blob_size(int *need, int *lbs)
183 {
184 int offset;
185
186 if (*need > 0) {
187 offset = *lbs;
188 *lbs += *need;
189 *need = offset;
190 }
191 }
192
193 static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
194 {
195 if (!needed)
196 return;
197
198 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_cred, &blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
199 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_file, &blob_sizes.lbs_file);
200 /*
201 * The inode blob gets an rcu_head in addition to
202 * what the modules might need.
203 */
204 if (needed->lbs_inode && blob_sizes.lbs_inode == 0)
205 blob_sizes.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct rcu_head);
206 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
207 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
208 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
209 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
210 lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task);
211 }
212
213 /* Prepare LSM for initialization. */
214 static void __init prepare_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
215 {
216 int enabled = lsm_allowed(lsm);
217
218 /* Record enablement (to handle any following exclusive LSMs). */
219 set_enabled(lsm, enabled);
220
221 /* If enabled, do pre-initialization work. */
222 if (enabled) {
223 if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE) && !exclusive) {
224 exclusive = lsm;
225 init_debug("exclusive chosen: %s\n", lsm->name);
226 }
227
228 lsm_set_blob_sizes(lsm->blobs);
229 }
230 }
231
232 /* Initialize a given LSM, if it is enabled. */
233 static void __init initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
234 {
235 if (is_enabled(lsm)) {
236 int ret;
237
238 init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name);
239 ret = lsm->init();
240 WARN(ret, "%s failed to initialize: %d\n", lsm->name, ret);
241 }
242 }
243
244 /* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */
245 static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
246 {
247 struct lsm_info *lsm;
248 char *sep, *name, *next;
249
250 /* LSM_ORDER_FIRST is always first. */
251 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
252 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_FIRST)
253 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "first");
254 }
255
256 /* Process "security=", if given. */
257 if (chosen_major_lsm) {
258 struct lsm_info *major;
259
260 /*
261 * To match the original "security=" behavior, this
262 * explicitly does NOT fallback to another Legacy Major
263 * if the selected one was separately disabled: disable
264 * all non-matching Legacy Major LSMs.
265 */
266 for (major = __start_lsm_info; major < __end_lsm_info;
267 major++) {
268 if ((major->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) &&
269 strcmp(major->name, chosen_major_lsm) != 0) {
270 set_enabled(major, false);
271 init_debug("security=%s disabled: %s\n",
272 chosen_major_lsm, major->name);
273 }
274 }
275 }
276
277 sep = kstrdup(order, GFP_KERNEL);
278 next = sep;
279 /* Walk the list, looking for matching LSMs. */
280 while ((name = strsep(&next, ",")) != NULL) {
281 bool found = false;
282
283 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
284 if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE &&
285 strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
286 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
287 found = true;
288 }
289 }
290
291 if (!found)
292 init_debug("%s ignored: %s\n", origin, name);
293 }
294
295 /* Process "security=", if given. */
296 if (chosen_major_lsm) {
297 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
298 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
299 continue;
300 if (strcmp(lsm->name, chosen_major_lsm) == 0)
301 append_ordered_lsm(lsm, "security=");
302 }
303 }
304
305 /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */
306 for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
307 if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
308 continue;
309 set_enabled(lsm, false);
310 init_debug("%s disabled: %s\n", origin, lsm->name);
311 }
312
313 kfree(sep);
314 }
315
316 static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred);
317 static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task);
318
319 static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result);
320
321 static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
322 {
323 struct lsm_info **lsm;
324
325 ordered_lsms = kcalloc(LSM_COUNT + 1, sizeof(*ordered_lsms),
326 GFP_KERNEL);
327
328 if (chosen_lsm_order) {
329 if (chosen_major_lsm) {
330 pr_info("security= is ignored because it is superseded by lsm=\n");
331 chosen_major_lsm = NULL;
332 }
333 ordered_lsm_parse(chosen_lsm_order, "cmdline");
334 } else
335 ordered_lsm_parse(builtin_lsm_order, "builtin");
336
337 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
338 prepare_lsm(*lsm);
339
340 init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred);
341 init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file);
342 init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode);
343 init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);
344 init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg);
345 init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock);
346 init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task);
347
348 /*
349 * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs
350 */
351 if (blob_sizes.lbs_file)
352 lsm_file_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_file_cache",
353 blob_sizes.lbs_file, 0,
354 SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
355 if (blob_sizes.lbs_inode)
356 lsm_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("lsm_inode_cache",
357 blob_sizes.lbs_inode, 0,
358 SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
359
360 lsm_early_cred((struct cred *) current->cred);
361 lsm_early_task(current);
362 for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++)
363 initialize_lsm(*lsm);
364
365 kfree(ordered_lsms);
366 }
367
368 int __init early_security_init(void)
369 {
370 struct lsm_info *lsm;
371
372 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
373 INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&security_hook_heads.NAME);
374 #include "linux/lsm_hook_defs.h"
375 #undef LSM_HOOK
376
377 for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) {
378 if (!lsm->enabled)
379 lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
380 prepare_lsm(lsm);
381 initialize_lsm(lsm);
382 }
383
384 return 0;
385 }
386
387 /**
388 * security_init - initializes the security framework
389 *
390 * This should be called early in the kernel initialization sequence.
391 */
392 int __init security_init(void)
393 {
394 struct lsm_info *lsm;
395
396 pr_info("Security Framework initializing\n");
397
398 /*
399 * Append the names of the early LSM modules now that kmalloc() is
400 * available
401 */
402 for (lsm = __start_early_lsm_info; lsm < __end_early_lsm_info; lsm++) {
403 if (lsm->enabled)
404 lsm_append(lsm->name, &lsm_names);
405 }
406
407 /* Load LSMs in specified order. */
408 ordered_lsm_init();
409
410 return 0;
411 }
412
413 /* Save user chosen LSM */
414 static int __init choose_major_lsm(char *str)
415 {
416 chosen_major_lsm = str;
417 return 1;
418 }
419 __setup("security=", choose_major_lsm);
420
421 /* Explicitly choose LSM initialization order. */
422 static int __init choose_lsm_order(char *str)
423 {
424 chosen_lsm_order = str;
425 return 1;
426 }
427 __setup("lsm=", choose_lsm_order);
428
429 /* Enable LSM order debugging. */
430 static int __init enable_debug(char *str)
431 {
432 debug = true;
433 return 1;
434 }
435 __setup("lsm.debug", enable_debug);
436
437 static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm)
438 {
439 const char *last;
440
441 if (WARN_ON(!list || !lsm))
442 return false;
443 last = strrchr(list, ',');
444 if (last)
445 /* Pass the comma, strcmp() will check for '\0' */
446 last++;
447 else
448 last = list;
449 return !strcmp(last, lsm);
450 }
451
452 static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
453 {
454 char *cp;
455
456 if (*result == NULL) {
457 *result = kstrdup(new, GFP_KERNEL);
458 if (*result == NULL)
459 return -ENOMEM;
460 } else {
461 /* Check if it is the last registered name */
462 if (match_last_lsm(*result, new))
463 return 0;
464 cp = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s,%s", *result, new);
465 if (cp == NULL)
466 return -ENOMEM;
467 kfree(*result);
468 *result = cp;
469 }
470 return 0;
471 }
472
473 /**
474 * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
475 * @hooks: the hooks to add
476 * @count: the number of hooks to add
477 * @lsm: the name of the security module
478 *
479 * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
480 */
481 void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
482 const char *lsm)
483 {
484 int i;
485
486 for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
487 hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
488 hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
489 }
490
491 /*
492 * Don't try to append during early_security_init(), we'll come back
493 * and fix this up afterwards.
494 */
495 if (slab_is_available()) {
496 if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
497 panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
498 }
499 }
500
501 int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
502 {
503 return blocking_notifier_call_chain(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain,
504 event, data);
505 }
506 EXPORT_SYMBOL(call_blocking_lsm_notifier);
507
508 int register_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
509 {
510 return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain,
511 nb);
512 }
513 EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_blocking_lsm_notifier);
514
515 int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
516 {
517 return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&blocking_lsm_notifier_chain,
518 nb);
519 }
520 EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier);
521
522 /**
523 * lsm_cred_alloc - allocate a composite cred blob
524 * @cred: the cred that needs a blob
525 * @gfp: allocation type
526 *
527 * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules
528 *
529 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
530 */
531 static int lsm_cred_alloc(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
532 {
533 if (blob_sizes.lbs_cred == 0) {
534 cred->security = NULL;
535 return 0;
536 }
537
538 cred->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_cred, gfp);
539 if (cred->security == NULL)
540 return -ENOMEM;
541 return 0;
542 }
543
544 /**
545 * lsm_early_cred - during initialization allocate a composite cred blob
546 * @cred: the cred that needs a blob
547 *
548 * Allocate the cred blob for all the modules
549 */
550 static void __init lsm_early_cred(struct cred *cred)
551 {
552 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, GFP_KERNEL);
553
554 if (rc)
555 panic("%s: Early cred alloc failed.\n", __func__);
556 }
557
558 /**
559 * lsm_file_alloc - allocate a composite file blob
560 * @file: the file that needs a blob
561 *
562 * Allocate the file blob for all the modules
563 *
564 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
565 */
566 static int lsm_file_alloc(struct file *file)
567 {
568 if (!lsm_file_cache) {
569 file->f_security = NULL;
570 return 0;
571 }
572
573 file->f_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_file_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
574 if (file->f_security == NULL)
575 return -ENOMEM;
576 return 0;
577 }
578
579 /**
580 * lsm_inode_alloc - allocate a composite inode blob
581 * @inode: the inode that needs a blob
582 *
583 * Allocate the inode blob for all the modules
584 *
585 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
586 */
587 int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
588 {
589 if (!lsm_inode_cache) {
590 inode->i_security = NULL;
591 return 0;
592 }
593
594 inode->i_security = kmem_cache_zalloc(lsm_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
595 if (inode->i_security == NULL)
596 return -ENOMEM;
597 return 0;
598 }
599
600 /**
601 * lsm_task_alloc - allocate a composite task blob
602 * @task: the task that needs a blob
603 *
604 * Allocate the task blob for all the modules
605 *
606 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
607 */
608 static int lsm_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task)
609 {
610 if (blob_sizes.lbs_task == 0) {
611 task->security = NULL;
612 return 0;
613 }
614
615 task->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_task, GFP_KERNEL);
616 if (task->security == NULL)
617 return -ENOMEM;
618 return 0;
619 }
620
621 /**
622 * lsm_ipc_alloc - allocate a composite ipc blob
623 * @kip: the ipc that needs a blob
624 *
625 * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules
626 *
627 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
628 */
629 static int lsm_ipc_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *kip)
630 {
631 if (blob_sizes.lbs_ipc == 0) {
632 kip->security = NULL;
633 return 0;
634 }
635
636 kip->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_ipc, GFP_KERNEL);
637 if (kip->security == NULL)
638 return -ENOMEM;
639 return 0;
640 }
641
642 /**
643 * lsm_msg_msg_alloc - allocate a composite msg_msg blob
644 * @mp: the msg_msg that needs a blob
645 *
646 * Allocate the ipc blob for all the modules
647 *
648 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
649 */
650 static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp)
651 {
652 if (blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg == 0) {
653 mp->security = NULL;
654 return 0;
655 }
656
657 mp->security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg, GFP_KERNEL);
658 if (mp->security == NULL)
659 return -ENOMEM;
660 return 0;
661 }
662
663 /**
664 * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob
665 * @task: the task that needs a blob
666 *
667 * Allocate the task blob for all the modules
668 */
669 static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task)
670 {
671 int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
672
673 if (rc)
674 panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__);
675 }
676
677 /**
678 * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob
679 * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob
680 *
681 * Allocate the superblock blob for all the modules
682 *
683 * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
684 */
685 static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
686 {
687 if (blob_sizes.lbs_superblock == 0) {
688 sb->s_security = NULL;
689 return 0;
690 }
691
692 sb->s_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_superblock, GFP_KERNEL);
693 if (sb->s_security == NULL)
694 return -ENOMEM;
695 return 0;
696 }
697
698 /*
699 * The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and
700 * can be accessed with:
701 *
702 * LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>)
703 *
704 * The macros below define static constants for the default value of each
705 * LSM hook.
706 */
707 #define LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) (NAME##_default)
708 #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_void(DEFAULT, NAME)
709 #define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_int(DEFAULT, NAME) \
710 static const int __maybe_unused LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) = (DEFAULT);
711 #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
712 DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_##RET(DEFAULT, NAME)
713
714 #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
715 #undef LSM_HOOK
716
717 /*
718 * Hook list operation macros.
719 *
720 * call_void_hook:
721 * This is a hook that does not return a value.
722 *
723 * call_int_hook:
724 * This is a hook that returns a value.
725 */
726
727 #define call_void_hook(FUNC, ...) \
728 do { \
729 struct security_hook_list *P; \
730 \
731 hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \
732 P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
733 } while (0)
734
735 #define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \
736 int RC = IRC; \
737 do { \
738 struct security_hook_list *P; \
739 \
740 hlist_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \
741 RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
742 if (RC != 0) \
743 break; \
744 } \
745 } while (0); \
746 RC; \
747 })
748
749 /* Security operations */
750
751 int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
752 {
753 return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr);
754 }
755
756 int security_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
757 const struct cred *to)
758 {
759 return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to);
760 }
761
762 int security_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
763 const struct cred *to)
764 {
765 return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, 0, from, to);
766 }
767
768 int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
769 const struct cred *to, struct file *file)
770 {
771 return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, 0, from, to, file);
772 }
773
774 int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
775 {
776 return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, 0, child, mode);
777 }
778
779 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
780 {
781 return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, 0, parent);
782 }
783
784 int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
785 kernel_cap_t *effective,
786 kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
787 kernel_cap_t *permitted)
788 {
789 return call_int_hook(capget, 0, target,
790 effective, inheritable, permitted);
791 }
792
793 int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
794 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
795 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
796 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
797 {
798 return call_int_hook(capset, 0, new, old,
799 effective, inheritable, permitted);
800 }
801
802 int security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
803 struct user_namespace *ns,
804 int cap,
805 unsigned int opts)
806 {
807 return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts);
808 }
809
810 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
811 {
812 return call_int_hook(quotactl, 0, cmds, type, id, sb);
813 }
814
815 int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
816 {
817 return call_int_hook(quota_on, 0, dentry);
818 }
819
820 int security_syslog(int type)
821 {
822 return call_int_hook(syslog, 0, type);
823 }
824
825 int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
826 {
827 return call_int_hook(settime, 0, ts, tz);
828 }
829
830 int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
831 {
832 struct security_hook_list *hp;
833 int cap_sys_admin = 1;
834 int rc;
835
836 /*
837 * The module will respond with a positive value if
838 * it thinks the __vm_enough_memory() call should be
839 * made with the cap_sys_admin set. If all of the modules
840 * agree that it should be set it will. If any module
841 * thinks it should not be set it won't.
842 */
843 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) {
844 rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
845 if (rc <= 0) {
846 cap_sys_admin = 0;
847 break;
848 }
849 }
850 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
851 }
852
853 int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
854 {
855 return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, 0, bprm);
856 }
857
858 int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
859 {
860 return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, 0, bprm, file);
861 }
862
863 int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
864 {
865 int ret;
866
867 ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm);
868 if (ret)
869 return ret;
870 return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
871 }
872
873 void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
874 {
875 call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm);
876 }
877
878 void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
879 {
880 call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm);
881 }
882
883 int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc)
884 {
885 return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, 0, fc, src_fc);
886 }
887
888 int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
889 struct fs_parameter *param)
890 {
891 struct security_hook_list *hp;
892 int trc;
893 int rc = -ENOPARAM;
894
895 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.fs_context_parse_param,
896 list) {
897 trc = hp->hook.fs_context_parse_param(fc, param);
898 if (trc == 0)
899 rc = 0;
900 else if (trc != -ENOPARAM)
901 return trc;
902 }
903 return rc;
904 }
905
906 int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
907 {
908 int rc = lsm_superblock_alloc(sb);
909
910 if (unlikely(rc))
911 return rc;
912 rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb);
913 if (unlikely(rc))
914 security_sb_free(sb);
915 return rc;
916 }
917
918 void security_sb_delete(struct super_block *sb)
919 {
920 call_void_hook(sb_delete, sb);
921 }
922
923 void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb)
924 {
925 call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb);
926 kfree(sb->s_security);
927 sb->s_security = NULL;
928 }
929
930 void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts)
931 {
932 if (!*mnt_opts)
933 return;
934 call_void_hook(sb_free_mnt_opts, *mnt_opts);
935 *mnt_opts = NULL;
936 }
937 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_free_mnt_opts);
938
939 int security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
940 {
941 return call_int_hook(sb_eat_lsm_opts, 0, options, mnt_opts);
942 }
943 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_eat_lsm_opts);
944
945 int security_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb,
946 void *mnt_opts)
947 {
948 return call_int_hook(sb_mnt_opts_compat, 0, sb, mnt_opts);
949 }
950 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_mnt_opts_compat);
951
952 int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb,
953 void *mnt_opts)
954 {
955 return call_int_hook(sb_remount, 0, sb, mnt_opts);
956 }
957 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_remount);
958
959 int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb)
960 {
961 return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, 0, sb);
962 }
963
964 int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
965 {
966 return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, 0, m, sb);
967 }
968
969 int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
970 {
971 return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, 0, dentry);
972 }
973
974 int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
975 const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
976 {
977 return call_int_hook(sb_mount, 0, dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
978 }
979
980 int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
981 {
982 return call_int_hook(sb_umount, 0, mnt, flags);
983 }
984
985 int security_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, const struct path *new_path)
986 {
987 return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, 0, old_path, new_path);
988 }
989
990 int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
991 void *mnt_opts,
992 unsigned long kern_flags,
993 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
994 {
995 return call_int_hook(sb_set_mnt_opts,
996 mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0, sb,
997 mnt_opts, kern_flags, set_kern_flags);
998 }
999 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts);
1000
1001 int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
1002 struct super_block *newsb,
1003 unsigned long kern_flags,
1004 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
1005 {
1006 return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb,
1007 kern_flags, set_kern_flags);
1008 }
1009 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts);
1010
1011 int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path)
1012 {
1013 return call_int_hook(move_mount, 0, from_path, to_path);
1014 }
1015
1016 int security_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
1017 unsigned int obj_type)
1018 {
1019 return call_int_hook(path_notify, 0, path, mask, obj_type);
1020 }
1021
1022 int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
1023 {
1024 int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode);
1025
1026 if (unlikely(rc))
1027 return rc;
1028 rc = call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode);
1029 if (unlikely(rc))
1030 security_inode_free(inode);
1031 return rc;
1032 }
1033
1034 static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
1035 {
1036 /*
1037 * The rcu head is at the start of the inode blob
1038 */
1039 kmem_cache_free(lsm_inode_cache, head);
1040 }
1041
1042 void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
1043 {
1044 integrity_inode_free(inode);
1045 call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode);
1046 /*
1047 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
1048 * a call to security_inode_permission() can be made
1049 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
1050 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
1051 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
1052 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
1053 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
1054 */
1055 if (inode->i_security)
1056 call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)inode->i_security,
1057 inode_free_by_rcu);
1058 }
1059
1060 int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
1061 const struct qstr *name,
1062 const char **xattr_name, void **ctx,
1063 u32 *ctxlen)
1064 {
1065 struct security_hook_list *hp;
1066 int rc;
1067
1068 /*
1069 * Only one module will provide a security context.
1070 */
1071 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security, list) {
1072 rc = hp->hook.dentry_init_security(dentry, mode, name,
1073 xattr_name, ctx, ctxlen);
1074 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security))
1075 return rc;
1076 }
1077 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security);
1078 }
1079 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
1080
1081 int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
1082 struct qstr *name,
1083 const struct cred *old, struct cred *new)
1084 {
1085 return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, 0, dentry, mode,
1086 name, old, new);
1087 }
1088 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as);
1089
1090 int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
1091 const struct qstr *qstr,
1092 const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data)
1093 {
1094 struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1];
1095 struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr;
1096 int ret;
1097
1098 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1099 return 0;
1100
1101 if (!initxattrs)
1102 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode,
1103 dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL);
1104 memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs));
1105 lsm_xattr = new_xattrs;
1106 ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr,
1107 &lsm_xattr->name,
1108 &lsm_xattr->value,
1109 &lsm_xattr->value_len);
1110 if (ret)
1111 goto out;
1112
1113 evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1;
1114 ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr);
1115 if (ret)
1116 goto out;
1117 ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
1118 out:
1119 for (xattr = new_xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++)
1120 kfree(xattr->value);
1121 return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret;
1122 }
1123 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security);
1124
1125 int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
1126 const struct qstr *name,
1127 const struct inode *context_inode)
1128 {
1129 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security_anon, 0, inode, name,
1130 context_inode);
1131 }
1132
1133 int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
1134 const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
1135 void **value, size_t *len)
1136 {
1137 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1138 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1139 return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir,
1140 qstr, name, value, len);
1141 }
1142 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_old_inode_init_security);
1143
1144 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
1145 int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
1146 unsigned int dev)
1147 {
1148 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
1149 return 0;
1150 return call_int_hook(path_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
1151 }
1152 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod);
1153
1154 int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
1155 {
1156 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
1157 return 0;
1158 return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
1159 }
1160 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir);
1161
1162 int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1163 {
1164 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
1165 return 0;
1166 return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry);
1167 }
1168
1169 int security_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1170 {
1171 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
1172 return 0;
1173 return call_int_hook(path_unlink, 0, dir, dentry);
1174 }
1175 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink);
1176
1177 int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
1178 const char *old_name)
1179 {
1180 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
1181 return 0;
1182 return call_int_hook(path_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name);
1183 }
1184
1185 int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
1186 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1187 {
1188 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry))))
1189 return 0;
1190 return call_int_hook(path_link, 0, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
1191 }
1192
1193 int security_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
1194 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
1195 unsigned int flags)
1196 {
1197 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) ||
1198 (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry)))))
1199 return 0;
1200
1201 return call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
1202 new_dentry, flags);
1203 }
1204 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename);
1205
1206 int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
1207 {
1208 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
1209 return 0;
1210 return call_int_hook(path_truncate, 0, path);
1211 }
1212
1213 int security_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
1214 {
1215 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
1216 return 0;
1217 return call_int_hook(path_chmod, 0, path, mode);
1218 }
1219
1220 int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
1221 {
1222 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
1223 return 0;
1224 return call_int_hook(path_chown, 0, path, uid, gid);
1225 }
1226
1227 int security_path_chroot(const struct path *path)
1228 {
1229 return call_int_hook(path_chroot, 0, path);
1230 }
1231 #endif
1232
1233 int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
1234 {
1235 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
1236 return 0;
1237 return call_int_hook(inode_create, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
1238 }
1239 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create);
1240
1241 int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
1242 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1243 {
1244 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry))))
1245 return 0;
1246 return call_int_hook(inode_link, 0, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
1247 }
1248
1249 int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1250 {
1251 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
1252 return 0;
1253 return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, 0, dir, dentry);
1254 }
1255
1256 int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
1257 const char *old_name)
1258 {
1259 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
1260 return 0;
1261 return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name);
1262 }
1263
1264 int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
1265 {
1266 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
1267 return 0;
1268 return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
1269 }
1270 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir);
1271
1272 int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1273 {
1274 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
1275 return 0;
1276 return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry);
1277 }
1278
1279 int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
1280 {
1281 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
1282 return 0;
1283 return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
1284 }
1285
1286 int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
1287 struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
1288 unsigned int flags)
1289 {
1290 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) ||
1291 (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry)))))
1292 return 0;
1293
1294 if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
1295 int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry,
1296 old_dir, old_dentry);
1297 if (err)
1298 return err;
1299 }
1300
1301 return call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry,
1302 new_dir, new_dentry);
1303 }
1304
1305 int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
1306 {
1307 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
1308 return 0;
1309 return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, 0, dentry);
1310 }
1311
1312 int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
1313 bool rcu)
1314 {
1315 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1316 return 0;
1317 return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, 0, dentry, inode, rcu);
1318 }
1319
1320 int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
1321 {
1322 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1323 return 0;
1324 return call_int_hook(inode_permission, 0, inode, mask);
1325 }
1326
1327 int security_inode_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
1328 struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
1329 {
1330 int ret;
1331
1332 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
1333 return 0;
1334 ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, dentry, attr);
1335 if (ret)
1336 return ret;
1337 return evm_inode_setattr(mnt_userns, dentry, attr);
1338 }
1339 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr);
1340
1341 int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
1342 {
1343 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
1344 return 0;
1345 return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, 0, path);
1346 }
1347
1348 int security_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
1349 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1350 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1351 {
1352 int ret;
1353
1354 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
1355 return 0;
1356 /*
1357 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call,
1358 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so.
1359 */
1360 ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, 1, mnt_userns, dentry, name, value,
1361 size, flags);
1362
1363 if (ret == 1)
1364 ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
1365 if (ret)
1366 return ret;
1367 ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
1368 if (ret)
1369 return ret;
1370 return evm_inode_setxattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name, value, size);
1371 }
1372
1373 void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1374 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1375 {
1376 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
1377 return;
1378 call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
1379 evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
1380 }
1381
1382 int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1383 {
1384 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
1385 return 0;
1386 return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, 0, dentry, name);
1387 }
1388
1389 int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
1390 {
1391 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
1392 return 0;
1393 return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, 0, dentry);
1394 }
1395
1396 int security_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
1397 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1398 {
1399 int ret;
1400
1401 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
1402 return 0;
1403 /*
1404 * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call,
1405 * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so.
1406 */
1407 ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, mnt_userns, dentry, name);
1408 if (ret == 1)
1409 ret = cap_inode_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name);
1410 if (ret)
1411 return ret;
1412 ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
1413 if (ret)
1414 return ret;
1415 return evm_inode_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name);
1416 }
1417
1418 int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
1419 {
1420 return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, 0, dentry);
1421 }
1422
1423 int security_inode_killpriv(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
1424 struct dentry *dentry)
1425 {
1426 return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, mnt_userns, dentry);
1427 }
1428
1429 int security_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
1430 struct inode *inode, const char *name,
1431 void **buffer, bool alloc)
1432 {
1433 struct security_hook_list *hp;
1434 int rc;
1435
1436 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1437 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity);
1438 /*
1439 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name.
1440 */
1441 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) {
1442 rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(mnt_userns, inode, name, buffer, alloc);
1443 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity))
1444 return rc;
1445 }
1446 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity);
1447 }
1448
1449 int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1450 {
1451 struct security_hook_list *hp;
1452 int rc;
1453
1454 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1455 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity);
1456 /*
1457 * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name.
1458 */
1459 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) {
1460 rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size,
1461 flags);
1462 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity))
1463 return rc;
1464 }
1465 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity);
1466 }
1467
1468 int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
1469 {
1470 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1471 return 0;
1472 return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, 0, inode, buffer, buffer_size);
1473 }
1474 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
1475
1476 void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
1477 {
1478 call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
1479 }
1480
1481 int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
1482 {
1483 return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, 0, src, new);
1484 }
1485 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up);
1486
1487 int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
1488 {
1489 struct security_hook_list *hp;
1490 int rc;
1491
1492 /*
1493 * The implementation can return 0 (accept the xattr), 1 (discard the
1494 * xattr), -EOPNOTSUPP if it does not know anything about the xattr or
1495 * any other error code incase of an error.
1496 */
1497 hlist_for_each_entry(hp,
1498 &security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up_xattr, list) {
1499 rc = hp->hook.inode_copy_up_xattr(name);
1500 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr))
1501 return rc;
1502 }
1503
1504 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr);
1505 }
1506 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
1507
1508 int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
1509 struct kernfs_node *kn)
1510 {
1511 return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, 0, kn_dir, kn);
1512 }
1513
1514 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
1515 {
1516 int ret;
1517
1518 ret = call_int_hook(file_permission, 0, file, mask);
1519 if (ret)
1520 return ret;
1521
1522 return fsnotify_perm(file, mask);
1523 }
1524
1525 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
1526 {
1527 int rc = lsm_file_alloc(file);
1528
1529 if (rc)
1530 return rc;
1531 rc = call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file);
1532 if (unlikely(rc))
1533 security_file_free(file);
1534 return rc;
1535 }
1536
1537 void security_file_free(struct file *file)
1538 {
1539 void *blob;
1540
1541 call_void_hook(file_free_security, file);
1542
1543 blob = file->f_security;
1544 if (blob) {
1545 file->f_security = NULL;
1546 kmem_cache_free(lsm_file_cache, blob);
1547 }
1548 }
1549
1550 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
1551 {
1552 return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, 0, file, cmd, arg);
1553 }
1554 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl);
1555
1556 static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
1557 {
1558 /*
1559 * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect
1560 * it to imply PROT_EXEC? If not, nothing to talk about...
1561 */
1562 if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ)
1563 return prot;
1564 if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
1565 return prot;
1566 /*
1567 * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it.
1568 */
1569 if (!file)
1570 return prot | PROT_EXEC;
1571 /*
1572 * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need
1573 * NOMMU_MAP_EXEC (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case
1574 */
1575 if (!path_noexec(&file->f_path)) {
1576 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU
1577 if (file->f_op->mmap_capabilities) {
1578 unsigned caps = file->f_op->mmap_capabilities(file);
1579 if (!(caps & NOMMU_MAP_EXEC))
1580 return prot;
1581 }
1582 #endif
1583 return prot | PROT_EXEC;
1584 }
1585 /* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */
1586 return prot;
1587 }
1588
1589 int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
1590 unsigned long flags)
1591 {
1592 int ret;
1593 ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot,
1594 mmap_prot(file, prot), flags);
1595 if (ret)
1596 return ret;
1597 return ima_file_mmap(file, prot);
1598 }
1599
1600 int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
1601 {
1602 return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, 0, addr);
1603 }
1604
1605 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
1606 unsigned long prot)
1607 {
1608 int ret;
1609
1610 ret = call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
1611 if (ret)
1612 return ret;
1613 return ima_file_mprotect(vma, prot);
1614 }
1615
1616 int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
1617 {
1618 return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd);
1619 }
1620
1621 int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
1622 {
1623 return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, 0, file, cmd, arg);
1624 }
1625
1626 void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
1627 {
1628 call_void_hook(file_set_fowner, file);
1629 }
1630
1631 int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
1632 struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
1633 {
1634 return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, 0, tsk, fown, sig);
1635 }
1636
1637 int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
1638 {
1639 return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file);
1640 }
1641
1642 int security_file_open(struct file *file)
1643 {
1644 int ret;
1645
1646 ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file);
1647 if (ret)
1648 return ret;
1649
1650 return fsnotify_perm(file, MAY_OPEN);
1651 }
1652
1653 int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
1654 {
1655 int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task);
1656
1657 if (rc)
1658 return rc;
1659 rc = call_int_hook(task_alloc, 0, task, clone_flags);
1660 if (unlikely(rc))
1661 security_task_free(task);
1662 return rc;
1663 }
1664
1665 void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
1666 {
1667 call_void_hook(task_free, task);
1668
1669 kfree(task->security);
1670 task->security = NULL;
1671 }
1672
1673 int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
1674 {
1675 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp);
1676
1677 if (rc)
1678 return rc;
1679
1680 rc = call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp);
1681 if (unlikely(rc))
1682 security_cred_free(cred);
1683 return rc;
1684 }
1685
1686 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
1687 {
1688 /*
1689 * There is a failure case in prepare_creds() that
1690 * may result in a call here with ->security being NULL.
1691 */
1692 if (unlikely(cred->security == NULL))
1693 return;
1694
1695 call_void_hook(cred_free, cred);
1696
1697 kfree(cred->security);
1698 cred->security = NULL;
1699 }
1700
1701 int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
1702 {
1703 int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(new, gfp);
1704
1705 if (rc)
1706 return rc;
1707
1708 rc = call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp);
1709 if (unlikely(rc))
1710 security_cred_free(new);
1711 return rc;
1712 }
1713
1714 void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
1715 {
1716 call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
1717 }
1718
1719 void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
1720 {
1721 *secid = 0;
1722 call_void_hook(cred_getsecid, c, secid);
1723 }
1724 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
1725
1726 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
1727 {
1728 return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
1729 }
1730
1731 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
1732 {
1733 return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode);
1734 }
1735
1736 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
1737 {
1738 int ret;
1739
1740 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
1741 if (ret)
1742 return ret;
1743 return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
1744 }
1745
1746 int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
1747 bool contents)
1748 {
1749 int ret;
1750
1751 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents);
1752 if (ret)
1753 return ret;
1754 return ima_read_file(file, id, contents);
1755 }
1756 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
1757
1758 int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
1759 enum kernel_read_file_id id)
1760 {
1761 int ret;
1762
1763 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_read_file, 0, file, buf, size, id);
1764 if (ret)
1765 return ret;
1766 return ima_post_read_file(file, buf, size, id);
1767 }
1768 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
1769
1770 int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
1771 {
1772 int ret;
1773
1774 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents);
1775 if (ret)
1776 return ret;
1777 return ima_load_data(id, contents);
1778 }
1779 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data);
1780
1781 int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
1782 enum kernel_load_data_id id,
1783 char *description)
1784 {
1785 int ret;
1786
1787 ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id,
1788 description);
1789 if (ret)
1790 return ret;
1791 return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id, description);
1792 }
1793 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data);
1794
1795 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1796 int flags)
1797 {
1798 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, 0, new, old, flags);
1799 }
1800
1801 int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1802 int flags)
1803 {
1804 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgid, 0, new, old, flags);
1805 }
1806
1807 int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
1808 {
1809 return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgroups, 0, new, old);
1810 }
1811
1812 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
1813 {
1814 return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, 0, p, pgid);
1815 }
1816
1817 int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
1818 {
1819 return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, 0, p);
1820 }
1821
1822 int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
1823 {
1824 return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
1825 }
1826
1827 void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
1828 {
1829 *secid = 0;
1830 call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid);
1831 }
1832 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj);
1833
1834 void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
1835 {
1836 *secid = 0;
1837 call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid);
1838 }
1839 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);
1840
1841 int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
1842 {
1843 return call_int_hook(task_setnice, 0, p, nice);
1844 }
1845
1846 int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
1847 {
1848 return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, 0, p, ioprio);
1849 }
1850
1851 int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
1852 {
1853 return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, 0, p);
1854 }
1855
1856 int security_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
1857 unsigned int flags)
1858 {
1859 return call_int_hook(task_prlimit, 0, cred, tcred, flags);
1860 }
1861
1862 int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
1863 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
1864 {
1865 return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, 0, p, resource, new_rlim);
1866 }
1867
1868 int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
1869 {
1870 return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, 0, p);
1871 }
1872
1873 int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
1874 {
1875 return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, 0, p);
1876 }
1877
1878 int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
1879 {
1880 return call_int_hook(task_movememory, 0, p);
1881 }
1882
1883 int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
1884 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
1885 {
1886 return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, cred);
1887 }
1888
1889 int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
1890 unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
1891 {
1892 int thisrc;
1893 int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl);
1894 struct security_hook_list *hp;
1895
1896 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) {
1897 thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
1898 if (thisrc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl)) {
1899 rc = thisrc;
1900 if (thisrc != 0)
1901 break;
1902 }
1903 }
1904 return rc;
1905 }
1906
1907 void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
1908 {
1909 call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode);
1910 }
1911
1912 int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
1913 {
1914 return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
1915 }
1916
1917 void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
1918 {
1919 *secid = 0;
1920 call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
1921 }
1922
1923 int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
1924 {
1925 int rc = lsm_msg_msg_alloc(msg);
1926
1927 if (unlikely(rc))
1928 return rc;
1929 rc = call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg);
1930 if (unlikely(rc))
1931 security_msg_msg_free(msg);
1932 return rc;
1933 }
1934
1935 void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg)
1936 {
1937 call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg);
1938 kfree(msg->security);
1939 msg->security = NULL;
1940 }
1941
1942 int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
1943 {
1944 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(msq);
1945
1946 if (unlikely(rc))
1947 return rc;
1948 rc = call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq);
1949 if (unlikely(rc))
1950 security_msg_queue_free(msq);
1951 return rc;
1952 }
1953
1954 void security_msg_queue_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
1955 {
1956 call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq);
1957 kfree(msq->security);
1958 msq->security = NULL;
1959 }
1960
1961 int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
1962 {
1963 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, 0, msq, msqflg);
1964 }
1965
1966 int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
1967 {
1968 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, 0, msq, cmd);
1969 }
1970
1971 int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq,
1972 struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
1973 {
1974 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, 0, msq, msg, msqflg);
1975 }
1976
1977 int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
1978 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
1979 {
1980 return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, 0, msq, msg, target, type, mode);
1981 }
1982
1983 int security_shm_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
1984 {
1985 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(shp);
1986
1987 if (unlikely(rc))
1988 return rc;
1989 rc = call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp);
1990 if (unlikely(rc))
1991 security_shm_free(shp);
1992 return rc;
1993 }
1994
1995 void security_shm_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
1996 {
1997 call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp);
1998 kfree(shp->security);
1999 shp->security = NULL;
2000 }
2001
2002 int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
2003 {
2004 return call_int_hook(shm_associate, 0, shp, shmflg);
2005 }
2006
2007 int security_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
2008 {
2009 return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, 0, shp, cmd);
2010 }
2011
2012 int security_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
2013 {
2014 return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, 0, shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
2015 }
2016
2017 int security_sem_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
2018 {
2019 int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(sma);
2020
2021 if (unlikely(rc))
2022 return rc;
2023 rc = call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma);
2024 if (unlikely(rc))
2025 security_sem_free(sma);
2026 return rc;
2027 }
2028
2029 void security_sem_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
2030 {
2031 call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma);
2032 kfree(sma->security);
2033 sma->security = NULL;
2034 }
2035
2036 int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
2037 {
2038 return call_int_hook(sem_associate, 0, sma, semflg);
2039 }
2040
2041 int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
2042 {
2043 return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, 0, sma, cmd);
2044 }
2045
2046 int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
2047 unsigned nsops, int alter)
2048 {
2049 return call_int_hook(sem_semop, 0, sma, sops, nsops, alter);
2050 }
2051
2052 void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
2053 {
2054 if (unlikely(inode && IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
2055 return;
2056 call_void_hook(d_instantiate, dentry, inode);
2057 }
2058 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate);
2059
2060 int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, char *name,
2061 char **value)
2062 {
2063 struct security_hook_list *hp;
2064
2065 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) {
2066 if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
2067 continue;
2068 return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value);
2069 }
2070 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr);
2071 }
2072
2073 int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,
2074 size_t size)
2075 {
2076 struct security_hook_list *hp;
2077
2078 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) {
2079 if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm))
2080 continue;
2081 return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size);
2082 }
2083 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr);
2084 }
2085
2086 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
2087 {
2088 return call_int_hook(netlink_send, 0, sk, skb);
2089 }
2090
2091 int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
2092 {
2093 return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, 0, name);
2094 }
2095 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
2096
2097 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
2098 {
2099 struct security_hook_list *hp;
2100 int rc;
2101
2102 /*
2103 * Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this
2104 * LSM hook is not "stackable").
2105 */
2106 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {
2107 rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
2108 if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx))
2109 return rc;
2110 }
2111
2112 return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(secid_to_secctx);
2113 }
2114 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
2115
2116 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
2117 {
2118 *secid = 0;
2119 return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
2120 }
2121 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
2122
2123 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
2124 {
2125 call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
2126 }
2127 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
2128
2129 void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
2130 {
2131 call_void_hook(inode_invalidate_secctx, inode);
2132 }
2133 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx);
2134
2135 int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
2136 {
2137 return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
2138 }
2139 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
2140
2141 int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
2142 {
2143 return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
2144 }
2145 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
2146
2147 int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
2148 {
2149 return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
2150 }
2151 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
2152
2153 #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE
2154 int security_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
2155 const struct cred *cred,
2156 struct watch_notification *n)
2157 {
2158 return call_int_hook(post_notification, 0, w_cred, cred, n);
2159 }
2160 #endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */
2161
2162 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
2163 int security_watch_key(struct key *key)
2164 {
2165 return call_int_hook(watch_key, 0, key);
2166 }
2167 #endif
2168
2169 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
2170
2171 int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
2172 {
2173 return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, 0, sock, other, newsk);
2174 }
2175 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect);
2176
2177 int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
2178 {
2179 return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, 0, sock, other);
2180 }
2181 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send);
2182
2183 int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
2184 {
2185 return call_int_hook(socket_create, 0, family, type, protocol, kern);
2186 }
2187
2188 int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2189 int type, int protocol, int kern)
2190 {
2191 return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, 0, sock, family, type,
2192 protocol, kern);
2193 }
2194
2195 int security_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb)
2196 {
2197 return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, 0, socka, sockb);
2198 }
2199 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair);
2200
2201 int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
2202 {
2203 return call_int_hook(socket_bind, 0, sock, address, addrlen);
2204 }
2205
2206 int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
2207 {
2208 return call_int_hook(socket_connect, 0, sock, address, addrlen);
2209 }
2210
2211 int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
2212 {
2213 return call_int_hook(socket_listen, 0, sock, backlog);
2214 }
2215
2216 int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
2217 {
2218 return call_int_hook(socket_accept, 0, sock, newsock);
2219 }
2220
2221 int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
2222 {
2223 return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, 0, sock, msg, size);
2224 }
2225
2226 int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
2227 int size, int flags)
2228 {
2229 return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, 0, sock, msg, size, flags);
2230 }
2231
2232 int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
2233 {
2234 return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, 0, sock);
2235 }
2236
2237 int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
2238 {
2239 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, 0, sock);
2240 }
2241
2242 int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
2243 {
2244 return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname);
2245 }
2246
2247 int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
2248 {
2249 return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname);
2250 }
2251
2252 int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
2253 {
2254 return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, 0, sock, how);
2255 }
2256
2257 int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
2258 {
2259 return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, 0, sk, skb);
2260 }
2261 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
2262
2263 int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
2264 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
2265 {
2266 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
2267 optval, optlen, len);
2268 }
2269
2270 int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
2271 {
2272 return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
2273 skb, secid);
2274 }
2275 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
2276
2277 int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
2278 {
2279 return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
2280 }
2281
2282 void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
2283 {
2284 call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
2285 }
2286
2287 void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
2288 {
2289 call_void_hook(sk_clone_security, sk, newsk);
2290 }
2291 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone);
2292
2293 void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi_common *flic)
2294 {
2295 call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &flic->flowic_secid);
2296 }
2297 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow);
2298
2299 void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
2300 struct flowi_common *flic)
2301 {
2302 call_void_hook(req_classify_flow, req, flic);
2303 }
2304 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow);
2305
2306 void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
2307 {
2308 call_void_hook(sock_graft, sk, parent);
2309 }
2310 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft);
2311
2312 int security_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk,
2313 struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req)
2314 {
2315 return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, 0, sk, skb, req);
2316 }
2317 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request);
2318
2319 void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
2320 const struct request_sock *req)
2321 {
2322 call_void_hook(inet_csk_clone, newsk, req);
2323 }
2324
2325 void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
2326 struct sk_buff *skb)
2327 {
2328 call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb);
2329 }
2330 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established);
2331
2332 int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
2333 {
2334 return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid);
2335 }
2336 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
2337
2338 void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
2339 {
2340 call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc);
2341 }
2342 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc);
2343
2344 void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
2345 {
2346 call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec);
2347 }
2348 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec);
2349
2350 int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
2351 {
2352 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, 0, security);
2353 }
2354 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security);
2355
2356 void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
2357 {
2358 call_void_hook(tun_dev_free_security, security);
2359 }
2360 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security);
2361
2362 int security_tun_dev_create(void)
2363 {
2364 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create, 0);
2365 }
2366 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create);
2367
2368 int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
2369 {
2370 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, 0, security);
2371 }
2372 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue);
2373
2374 int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
2375 {
2376 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, 0, sk, security);
2377 }
2378 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach);
2379
2380 int security_tun_dev_open(void *security)
2381 {
2382 return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, 0, security);
2383 }
2384 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open);
2385
2386 int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sk_buff *skb)
2387 {
2388 return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, 0, asoc, skb);
2389 }
2390 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request);
2391
2392 int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
2393 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
2394 {
2395 return call_int_hook(sctp_bind_connect, 0, sk, optname,
2396 address, addrlen);
2397 }
2398 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_bind_connect);
2399
2400 void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk,
2401 struct sock *newsk)
2402 {
2403 call_void_hook(sctp_sk_clone, asoc, sk, newsk);
2404 }
2405 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_sk_clone);
2406
2407 int security_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
2408 struct sk_buff *skb)
2409 {
2410 return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_established, 0, asoc, skb);
2411 }
2412 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_established);
2413
2414 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
2415
2416 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
2417
2418 int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey)
2419 {
2420 return call_int_hook(ib_pkey_access, 0, sec, subnet_prefix, pkey);
2421 }
2422 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_pkey_access);
2423
2424 int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec, const char *dev_name, u8 port_num)
2425 {
2426 return call_int_hook(ib_endport_manage_subnet, 0, sec, dev_name, port_num);
2427 }
2428 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_endport_manage_subnet);
2429
2430 int security_ib_alloc_security(void **sec)
2431 {
2432 return call_int_hook(ib_alloc_security, 0, sec);
2433 }
2434 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_alloc_security);
2435
2436 void security_ib_free_security(void *sec)
2437 {
2438 call_void_hook(ib_free_security, sec);
2439 }
2440 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_free_security);
2441 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */
2442
2443 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
2444
2445 int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
2446 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx,
2447 gfp_t gfp)
2448 {
2449 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, 0, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp);
2450 }
2451 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc);
2452
2453 int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
2454 struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
2455 {
2456 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, 0, old_ctx, new_ctxp);
2457 }
2458
2459 void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
2460 {
2461 call_void_hook(xfrm_policy_free_security, ctx);
2462 }
2463 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free);
2464
2465 int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
2466 {
2467 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, 0, ctx);
2468 }
2469
2470 int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
2471 struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
2472 {
2473 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, 0, x, sec_ctx);
2474 }
2475 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc);
2476
2477 int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
2478 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
2479 {
2480 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, secid);
2481 }
2482
2483 int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
2484 {
2485 return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, 0, x);
2486 }
2487 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete);
2488
2489 void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
2490 {
2491 call_void_hook(xfrm_state_free_security, x);
2492 }
2493
2494 int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid)
2495 {
2496 return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, fl_secid);
2497 }
2498
2499 int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
2500 struct xfrm_policy *xp,
2501 const struct flowi_common *flic)
2502 {
2503 struct security_hook_list *hp;
2504 int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match);
2505
2506 /*
2507 * Since this function is expected to return 0 or 1, the judgment
2508 * becomes difficult if multiple LSMs supply this call. Fortunately,
2509 * we can use the first LSM's judgment because currently only SELinux
2510 * supplies this call.
2511 *
2512 * For speed optimization, we explicitly break the loop rather than
2513 * using the macro
2514 */
2515 hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
2516 list) {
2517 rc = hp->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, flic);
2518 break;
2519 }
2520 return rc;
2521 }
2522
2523 int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
2524 {
2525 return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, secid, 1);
2526 }
2527
2528 void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi_common *flic)
2529 {
2530 int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &flic->flowic_secid,
2531 0);
2532
2533 BUG_ON(rc);
2534 }
2535 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow);
2536
2537 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
2538
2539 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
2540
2541 int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
2542 unsigned long flags)
2543 {
2544 return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags);
2545 }
2546
2547 void security_key_free(struct key *key)
2548 {
2549 call_void_hook(key_free, key);
2550 }
2551
2552 int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
2553 enum key_need_perm need_perm)
2554 {
2555 return call_int_hook(key_permission, 0, key_ref, cred, need_perm);
2556 }
2557
2558 int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
2559 {
2560 *_buffer = NULL;
2561 return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, 0, key, _buffer);
2562 }
2563
2564 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
2565
2566 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
2567
2568 int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
2569 {
2570 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
2571 }
2572
2573 int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
2574 {
2575 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
2576 }
2577
2578 void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
2579 {
2580 call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
2581 }
2582
2583 int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
2584 {
2585 return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
2586 }
2587 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
2588
2589 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
2590 int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size)
2591 {
2592 return call_int_hook(bpf, 0, cmd, attr, size);
2593 }
2594 int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
2595 {
2596 return call_int_hook(bpf_map, 0, map, fmode);
2597 }
2598 int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
2599 {
2600 return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, 0, prog);
2601 }
2602 int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
2603 {
2604 return call_int_hook(bpf_map_alloc_security, 0, map);
2605 }
2606 int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
2607 {
2608 return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_alloc_security, 0, aux);
2609 }
2610 void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
2611 {
2612 call_void_hook(bpf_map_free_security, map);
2613 }
2614 void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
2615 {
2616 call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux);
2617 }
2618 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */
2619
2620 int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
2621 {
2622 return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what);
2623 }
2624 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down);
2625
2626 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
2627 int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
2628 {
2629 return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, 0, attr, type);
2630 }
2631
2632 int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
2633 {
2634 return call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, 0, event);
2635 }
2636
2637 void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
2638 {
2639 call_void_hook(perf_event_free, event);
2640 }
2641
2642 int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
2643 {
2644 return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, 0, event);
2645 }
2646
2647 int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
2648 {
2649 return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, 0, event);
2650 }
2651 #endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */
2652
2653 #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
2654 int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
2655 {
2656 return call_int_hook(uring_override_creds, 0, new);
2657 }
2658
2659 int security_uring_sqpoll(void)
2660 {
2661 return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll, 0);
2662 }
2663 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */