2 * IEEE 802.11 RSN / WPA Authenticator
3 * Copyright (c) 2004-2015, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6 * See README for more details.
9 #include "utils/includes.h"
11 #include "utils/common.h"
12 #include "utils/eloop.h"
13 #include "utils/state_machine.h"
14 #include "utils/bitfield.h"
15 #include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
16 #include "crypto/aes.h"
17 #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
18 #include "crypto/aes_siv.h"
19 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
20 #include "crypto/sha1.h"
21 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
22 #include "crypto/random.h"
23 #include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm.h"
24 #include "ap_config.h"
25 #include "ieee802_11.h"
27 #include "pmksa_cache_auth.h"
28 #include "wpa_auth_i.h"
29 #include "wpa_auth_ie.h"
31 #define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct wpa_state_machine
32 #define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "WPA"
33 #define STATE_MACHINE_ADDR sm->addr
36 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
37 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
38 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp
, struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
, u8
*data
,
41 static int wpa_aead_decrypt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
,
42 u8
*buf
, size_t buf_len
, u16
*_key_data_len
);
43 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
44 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
45 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
46 struct wpa_group
*group
);
47 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
48 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
49 struct wpa_group
*group
);
50 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
51 struct wpa_group
*group
);
52 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*snonce
,
53 const u8
*pmk
, unsigned int pmk_len
,
55 static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
56 struct wpa_group
*group
);
57 static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
58 struct wpa_group
*group
);
59 static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
60 struct wpa_group
*group
);
61 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
);
63 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first
= 100; /* ms */
64 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq
= 1000; /* ms */
65 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
= 500; /* ms */
67 /* TODO: make these configurable */
68 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
= 43200;
69 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
= 70;
70 static const int dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
= 60;
73 static inline int wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(
74 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
76 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->mic_failure_report
)
77 return wpa_auth
->cb
->mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
);
82 static inline void wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(
83 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
85 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->psk_failure_report
)
86 wpa_auth
->cb
->psk_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
);
90 static inline void wpa_auth_set_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
91 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
,
94 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->set_eapol
)
95 wpa_auth
->cb
->set_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, var
, value
);
99 static inline int wpa_auth_get_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
100 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
)
102 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_eapol
== NULL
)
104 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, var
);
108 static inline const u8
* wpa_auth_get_psk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
110 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
,
113 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_psk
== NULL
)
115 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_psk(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, p2p_dev_addr
,
120 static inline int wpa_auth_get_msk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
121 const u8
*addr
, u8
*msk
, size_t *len
)
123 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_msk
== NULL
)
125 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_msk(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, msk
, len
);
129 static inline int wpa_auth_set_key(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
131 enum wpa_alg alg
, const u8
*addr
, int idx
,
132 u8
*key
, size_t key_len
)
134 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->set_key
== NULL
)
136 return wpa_auth
->cb
->set_key(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, vlan_id
, alg
, addr
, idx
,
141 static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
142 const u8
*addr
, int idx
, u8
*seq
)
144 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_seqnum
== NULL
)
146 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_seqnum(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, idx
, seq
);
151 wpa_auth_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
152 const u8
*data
, size_t data_len
, int encrypt
)
154 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->send_eapol
== NULL
)
156 return wpa_auth
->cb
->send_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, data
, data_len
,
162 static inline int wpa_auth_start_ampe(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
165 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->start_ampe
== NULL
)
167 return wpa_auth
->cb
->start_ampe(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
);
169 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
172 int wpa_auth_for_each_sta(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
173 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
),
176 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_sta
== NULL
)
178 return wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_sta(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
182 int wpa_auth_for_each_auth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
183 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_authenticator
*a
, void *ctx
),
186 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_auth
== NULL
)
188 return wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_auth(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
192 void wpa_auth_logger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
193 logger_level level
, const char *txt
)
195 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->logger
== NULL
)
197 wpa_auth
->cb
->logger(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, level
, txt
);
201 void wpa_auth_vlogger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
202 logger_level level
, const char *fmt
, ...)
208 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->logger
== NULL
)
211 maxlen
= os_strlen(fmt
) + 100;
212 format
= os_malloc(maxlen
);
217 vsnprintf(format
, maxlen
, fmt
, ap
);
220 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, addr
, level
, format
);
226 static void wpa_sta_disconnect(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
229 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->disconnect
== NULL
)
231 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_sta_disconnect STA " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(addr
));
232 wpa_auth
->cb
->disconnect(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
,
233 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
237 static int wpa_use_aes_cmac(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
240 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
241 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
243 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
244 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
245 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
247 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
248 if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
)
254 static void wpa_rekey_gmk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
256 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
258 if (random_get_bytes(wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
)) {
259 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
262 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "GMK rekeyd");
263 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK",
264 wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
267 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
268 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
269 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
274 static void wpa_rekey_gtk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
276 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
277 struct wpa_group
*group
, *next
;
279 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying GTK");
280 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
282 wpa_group_get(wpa_auth
, group
);
284 group
->GTKReKey
= TRUE
;
286 group
->changed
= FALSE
;
287 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
288 } while (group
->changed
);
291 wpa_group_put(wpa_auth
, group
);
295 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
296 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
,
297 0, wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
302 static void wpa_rekey_ptk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
304 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
305 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
307 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying PTK");
308 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
313 static int wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
315 if (sm
->pmksa
== ctx
)
321 static void wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
,
324 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= ctx
;
325 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb
, entry
);
329 static int wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
330 struct wpa_group
*group
)
332 u8 buf
[ETH_ALEN
+ 8 + sizeof(unsigned long)];
336 if (random_get_bytes(group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
) < 0)
338 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK", group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
341 * Counter = PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter",
342 * Local MAC Address || Time)
344 os_memcpy(buf
, wpa_auth
->addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
345 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
);
346 ptr
= (unsigned long) group
;
347 os_memcpy(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
+ 8, &ptr
, sizeof(ptr
));
348 if (random_get_bytes(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
)) < 0)
351 if (sha1_prf(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
), "Init Counter", buf
, sizeof(buf
),
352 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) < 0)
354 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Key Counter",
355 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
361 static struct wpa_group
* wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
362 int vlan_id
, int delay_init
)
364 struct wpa_group
*group
;
366 group
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_group
));
370 group
->GTKAuthenticator
= TRUE
;
371 group
->vlan_id
= vlan_id
;
372 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
374 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
375 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
376 "for secure operations - update keys later when "
377 "the first station connects");
381 * Set initial GMK/Counter value here. The actual values that will be
382 * used in negotiations will be set once the first station tries to
383 * connect. This allows more time for collecting additional randomness
384 * on embedded devices.
386 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
387 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
395 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Delay group state machine start "
396 "until Beacon frames have been configured");
397 /* Initialization is completed in wpa_init_keys(). */
399 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
400 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
401 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
409 * wpa_init - Initialize WPA authenticator
410 * @addr: Authenticator address
411 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
412 * @cb: Callback functions for WPA authenticator
413 * Returns: Pointer to WPA authenticator data or %NULL on failure
415 struct wpa_authenticator
* wpa_init(const u8
*addr
,
416 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
,
417 const struct wpa_auth_callbacks
*cb
,
420 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
;
422 wpa_auth
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_authenticator
));
423 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
425 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
426 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
428 wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
= cb_ctx
;
430 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
431 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
436 wpa_auth
->group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, 0, 1);
437 if (wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
) {
438 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
443 wpa_auth
->pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_init(wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb
,
445 if (wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
) {
446 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "PMKSA cache initialization failed.");
447 os_free(wpa_auth
->group
);
448 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
453 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
454 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= wpa_ft_pmk_cache_init();
455 if (wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
== NULL
) {
456 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT PMK cache initialization failed.");
457 os_free(wpa_auth
->group
);
458 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
459 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
463 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
465 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
466 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
467 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
470 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
471 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
, 0,
472 wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
476 if (WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
)) {
477 int count
= WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_end
) -
478 WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
) + 1;
482 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
= bitfield_alloc(count
);
484 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
490 int wpa_init_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
492 struct wpa_group
*group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
494 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Start group state machine to set initial "
496 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
497 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
498 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
499 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
506 * wpa_deinit - Deinitialize WPA authenticator
507 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
509 void wpa_deinit(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
511 struct wpa_group
*group
, *prev
;
513 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
514 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
516 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
518 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
519 wpa_ft_pmk_cache_deinit(wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
);
520 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= NULL
;
521 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
524 bitfield_free(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
525 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
528 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
530 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
542 * wpa_reconfig - Update WPA authenticator configuration
543 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
544 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
546 int wpa_reconfig(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
547 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
)
549 struct wpa_group
*group
;
550 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
553 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
554 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
555 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
560 * Reinitialize GTK to make sure it is suitable for the new
563 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
564 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
566 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
567 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
568 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
574 struct wpa_state_machine
*
575 wpa_auth_sta_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
576 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
)
578 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
;
580 if (wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
583 sm
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_state_machine
));
586 os_memcpy(sm
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
588 os_memcpy(sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, p2p_dev_addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
590 sm
->wpa_auth
= wpa_auth
;
591 sm
->group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
592 wpa_group_get(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
598 int wpa_auth_sta_associated(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
599 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
601 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
604 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
605 if (sm
->ft_completed
) {
606 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
607 "FT authentication already completed - do not "
608 "start 4-way handshake");
609 /* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
610 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
;
614 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
617 if (sm
->fils_completed
) {
618 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
619 "FILS authentication already completed - do not start 4-way handshake");
620 /* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
621 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
;
625 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
628 os_memset(&sm
->key_replay
, 0, sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
629 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
630 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
633 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
634 "start authentication");
638 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
639 return 1; /* should not really happen */
641 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
642 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
646 void wpa_auth_sta_no_wpa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
648 /* WPA/RSN was not used - clear WPA state. This is needed if the STA
649 * reassociates back to the same AP while the previous entry for the
650 * STA has not yet been removed. */
654 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
= 0;
658 static void wpa_free_sta_sm(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
661 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
)) {
663 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "P2P: Free assigned IP "
664 "address %u.%u.%u.%u from " MACSTR
,
665 sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
666 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
668 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_start
);
669 bitfield_clear(sm
->wpa_auth
->ip_pool
,
670 WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) - start
);
672 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
673 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
674 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
675 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
677 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
678 os_free(sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
);
679 wpabuf_free(sm
->ft_pending_req_ies
);
680 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
681 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
683 wpa_group_put(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
688 void wpa_auth_sta_deinit(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
693 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
&& sm
->has_GTK
) {
694 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
695 "strict rekeying - force GTK rekey since STA "
697 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
);
698 eloop_register_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
,
702 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
703 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
704 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
705 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
706 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
707 /* Must not free state machine while wpa_sm_step() is running.
708 * Freeing will be completed in the end of wpa_sm_step(). */
709 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Registering pending STA state "
710 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
711 sm
->pending_deinit
= 1;
717 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
722 sm
->PTKRequest
= TRUE
;
727 static int wpa_replay_counter_valid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
728 const u8
*replay_counter
)
731 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
734 if (os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
735 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0)
742 static void wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
743 const u8
*replay_counter
)
746 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
748 (replay_counter
== NULL
||
749 os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
750 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0))
751 ctr
[i
].valid
= FALSE
;
756 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
757 static int ft_check_msg_2_of_4(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
758 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
759 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse
*kde
)
761 struct wpa_ie_data ie
;
762 struct rsn_mdie
*mdie
;
764 if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(kde
->rsn_ie
, kde
->rsn_ie_len
, &ie
) < 0 ||
765 ie
.num_pmkid
!= 1 || ie
.pmkid
== NULL
) {
766 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No PMKR1Name in "
767 "FT 4-way handshake message 2/4");
771 os_memcpy(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, ie
.pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
772 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from Supplicant",
773 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, PMKID_LEN
);
775 if (!kde
->mdie
|| !kde
->ftie
) {
776 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No %s in FT 4-way handshake "
777 "message 2/4", kde
->mdie
? "FTIE" : "MDIE");
781 mdie
= (struct rsn_mdie
*) (kde
->mdie
+ 2);
782 if (kde
->mdie
[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie
) ||
783 os_memcmp(wpa_auth
->conf
.mobility_domain
, mdie
->mobility_domain
,
784 MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN
) != 0) {
785 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: MDIE mismatch");
789 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
790 (kde
->ftie
[1] != sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1] ||
791 os_memcmp(kde
->ftie
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
792 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) != 0)) {
793 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE mismatch");
794 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
795 kde
->ftie
, kde
->ftie_len
);
796 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in (Re)AssocResp",
797 sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
, 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
803 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
806 static int wpa_receive_error_report(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
807 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int group
)
809 /* Supplicant reported a Michael MIC error */
810 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
811 "received EAPOL-Key Error Request "
812 "(STA detected Michael MIC failure (group=%d))",
815 if (group
&& wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
816 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
817 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
818 "group cipher is not TKIP");
819 } else if (!group
&& sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
820 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
821 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
822 "pairwise cipher is not TKIP");
824 if (wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
) > 0)
825 return 1; /* STA entry was removed */
826 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
827 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
831 * Error report is not a request for a new key handshake, but since
832 * Authenticator may do it, let's change the keys now anyway.
834 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
839 static int wpa_try_alt_snonce(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*data
,
844 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
845 unsigned int pmk_len
;
847 os_memset(&PTK
, 0, sizeof(PTK
));
849 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
850 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
851 sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, pmk
);
857 pmk_len
= sm
->pmk_len
;
860 if (wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, sm
->alt_SNonce
, pmk
, pmk_len
, &PTK
) < 0)
863 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, &PTK
, data
, data_len
)
869 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
874 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
875 "WPA: Earlier SNonce did not result in matching MIC");
879 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
880 "WPA: Earlier SNonce resulted in matching MIC");
881 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= 0;
882 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, sm
->alt_SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
883 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
884 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
890 void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
891 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
892 u8
*data
, size_t data_len
)
894 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
895 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
896 u16 key_info
, key_data_length
;
897 enum { PAIRWISE_2
, PAIRWISE_4
, GROUP_2
, REQUEST
,
898 SMK_M1
, SMK_M3
, SMK_ERROR
} msg
;
900 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
902 size_t keyhdrlen
, mic_len
;
905 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
907 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
, "WPA: RX EAPOL data", data
, data_len
);
909 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
910 keyhdrlen
= sizeof(*key
) + mic_len
+ 2;
912 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + keyhdrlen
) {
913 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Ignore too short EAPOL-Key frame");
917 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
918 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
919 mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
920 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
921 key_data
= mic
+ mic_len
+ 2;
922 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(mic
+ mic_len
);
923 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received EAPOL-Key from " MACSTR
924 " key_info=0x%x type=%u mic_len=%u key_data_length=%u",
925 MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), key_info
, key
->type
,
926 (unsigned int) mic_len
, key_data_length
);
927 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
,
928 "WPA: EAPOL-Key header (ending before Key MIC)",
930 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key Key MIC",
932 if (key_data_length
> data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) - keyhdrlen
) {
933 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key frame - "
934 "key_data overflow (%d > %lu)",
936 (unsigned long) (data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
941 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
942 if (key
->type
== EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
944 * Some deployed station implementations seem to send
945 * msg 4/4 with incorrect type value in WPA2 mode.
947 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Workaround: Allow EAPOL-Key "
948 "with unexpected WPA type in RSN mode");
949 } else if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
) {
950 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
951 "unexpected type %d in RSN mode",
956 if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
957 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
958 "unexpected type %d in WPA mode",
964 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Key Nonce", key
->key_nonce
,
966 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Replay Counter",
967 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
969 /* FIX: verify that the EAPOL-Key frame was encrypted if pairwise keys
972 if ((key_info
& (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) ==
973 (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) {
974 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
976 msgtxt
= "SMK Error";
981 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
) {
984 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
987 } else if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) {
989 msgtxt
= "2/2 Group";
990 } else if (key_data_length
== 0 ||
991 (mic_len
== 0 && (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
) &&
992 key_data_length
== AES_BLOCK_SIZE
)) {
994 msgtxt
= "4/4 Pairwise";
997 msgtxt
= "2/4 Pairwise";
1000 /* TODO: key_info type validation for PeerKey */
1001 if (msg
== REQUEST
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_2
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_4
||
1003 u16 ver
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
;
1004 if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_CCMP
||
1005 sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_GCMP
) {
1006 if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
1007 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
!= WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
&&
1008 !wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1009 !wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1010 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
1011 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1013 "advertised support for "
1014 "AES-128-CMAC, but did not "
1019 if (!wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
1020 !wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1021 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
!= WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
&&
1022 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
) {
1023 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1025 "did not use HMAC-SHA1-AES "
1031 if ((wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1032 wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1033 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
) &&
1034 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED
) {
1035 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
1036 "did not use EAPOL-Key descriptor version 0 as required for AKM-defined cases");
1041 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1042 if (sm
->req_replay_counter_used
&&
1043 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->req_replay_counter
,
1044 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) <= 0) {
1045 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
1046 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1047 "replayed counter");
1052 if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) &&
1053 !wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->key_replay
, key
->replay_counter
)) {
1056 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
1057 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
1058 key
->replay_counter
) &&
1059 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
1060 os_memcmp(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) != 0)
1063 * Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP
1064 * WZC) update SNonce for each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This
1065 * breaks the workaround on accepting any of the
1066 * pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated
1067 * even if we have already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4.
1069 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1070 "Process SNonce update from STA "
1071 "based on retransmitted EAPOL-Key "
1073 sm
->update_snonce
= 1;
1074 os_memcpy(sm
->alt_SNonce
, sm
->SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1075 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= TRUE
;
1076 os_memcpy(sm
->alt_replay_counter
,
1077 sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1078 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1079 goto continue_processing
;
1082 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_4
&& sm
->alt_snonce_valid
&&
1083 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
1084 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->alt_replay_counter
,
1085 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0) {
1087 * Supplicant may still be using the old SNonce since
1088 * there was two EAPOL-Key 2/4 messages and they had
1089 * different SNonce values.
1091 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1092 "Try to process received EAPOL-Key 4/4 based on old Replay Counter and SNonce from an earlier EAPOL-Key 1/4");
1093 goto continue_processing
;
1096 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
1097 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
1098 key
->replay_counter
) &&
1099 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
) {
1100 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1101 "ignore retransmitted EAPOL-Key %s - "
1102 "SNonce did not change", msgtxt
);
1104 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1105 "received EAPOL-Key %s with "
1106 "unexpected replay counter", msgtxt
);
1108 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
1109 if (!sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
)
1111 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "pending replay counter",
1112 sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1113 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1115 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "received replay counter",
1116 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1120 continue_processing
:
1122 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& mic_len
== 0 &&
1123 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
)) {
1124 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1125 "WPA: Encr Key Data bit not set even though AEAD cipher is supposed to be used - drop frame");
1128 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1132 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
&&
1133 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
&&
1134 (!sm
->update_snonce
||
1135 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)) {
1136 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1137 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 in "
1138 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1142 random_add_randomness(key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1143 if (sm
->group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
) {
1145 * The system did not have enough entropy to generate
1146 * strong random numbers. Reject the first 4-way
1147 * handshake(s) and collect some entropy based on the
1148 * information from it. Once enough entropy is
1149 * available, the next atempt will trigger GMK/Key
1150 * Counter update and the station will be allowed to
1153 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Reject 4-way handshake to "
1154 "collect more entropy for random number "
1156 random_mark_pool_ready();
1157 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1162 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
||
1164 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1165 "received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 in "
1166 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1172 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
!= WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
1173 || !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1174 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1175 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/2 in "
1176 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1177 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
1181 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1185 if (!wpa_auth
->conf
.peerkey
) {
1186 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "RSN: SMK M1/M3/Error, but "
1187 "PeerKey use disabled - ignoring message");
1190 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1191 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1192 "received EAPOL-Key msg SMK in "
1193 "invalid state - dropped");
1197 #else /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1201 return; /* STSL disabled - ignore SMK messages */
1202 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1207 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1208 "received EAPOL-Key frame (%s)", msgtxt
);
1210 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) {
1211 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1212 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key Ack set");
1216 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1217 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)) {
1218 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1219 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC not set");
1224 if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1225 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)) {
1226 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1227 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC set");
1230 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1232 sm
->MICVerified
= FALSE
;
1233 if (sm
->PTK_valid
&& !sm
->update_snonce
) {
1235 wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, &sm
->PTK
, data
,
1237 (msg
!= PAIRWISE_4
|| !sm
->alt_snonce_valid
||
1238 wpa_try_alt_snonce(sm
, data
, data_len
))) {
1239 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1240 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1245 wpa_aead_decrypt(sm
, &sm
->PTK
, data
, data_len
,
1246 &key_data_length
) < 0) {
1247 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1248 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1251 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1252 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
1253 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1254 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1257 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1258 if (sm
->MICVerified
) {
1259 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 1;
1260 os_memcpy(sm
->req_replay_counter
, key
->replay_counter
,
1261 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1263 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1264 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1270 * TODO: should decrypt key data field if encryption was used;
1271 * even though MAC address KDE is not normally encrypted,
1272 * supplicant is allowed to encrypt it.
1274 if (msg
== SMK_ERROR
) {
1275 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1276 wpa_smk_error(wpa_auth
, sm
, key_data
, key_data_length
);
1277 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1279 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
1280 if (wpa_receive_error_report(
1282 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) > 0)
1283 return; /* STA entry was removed */
1284 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
) {
1285 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1286 "received EAPOL-Key Request for new "
1288 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
1289 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1290 } else if (msg
== SMK_M1
) {
1291 wpa_smk_m1(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
, key_data
,
1293 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1294 } else if (key_data_length
> 0 &&
1295 wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
,
1299 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1300 "received EAPOL-Key Request for GTK "
1302 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1303 wpa_rekey_gtk(wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1306 /* Do not allow the same key replay counter to be reused. */
1307 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
,
1308 key
->replay_counter
);
1310 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
) {
1312 * Maintain a copy of the pending EAPOL-Key frames in
1313 * case the EAPOL-Key frame was retransmitted. This is
1314 * needed to allow EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 reply to another
1315 * pending msg 1/4 to update the SNonce to work around
1316 * unexpected supplicant behavior.
1318 os_memcpy(sm
->prev_key_replay
, sm
->key_replay
,
1319 sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
1321 os_memset(sm
->prev_key_replay
, 0,
1322 sizeof(sm
->prev_key_replay
));
1326 * Make sure old valid counters are not accepted anymore and
1327 * do not get copied again.
1329 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
, NULL
);
1332 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1333 if (msg
== SMK_M3
) {
1334 wpa_smk_m3(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
, key_data
, key_data_length
);
1337 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1339 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
1340 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
= os_memdup(data
, data_len
);
1341 if (sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
== NULL
)
1343 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
= data_len
;
1345 sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
);
1346 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= TRUE
;
1347 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1348 sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
);
1349 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1354 static int wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8
*gmk
, const char *label
, const u8
*addr
,
1355 const u8
*gnonce
, u8
*gtk
, size_t gtk_len
)
1357 u8 data
[ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
+ 8 + 16];
1361 /* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion",
1362 * AA || GNonce || Time || random data)
1363 * The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and
1364 * GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation
1365 * is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be
1368 os_memcpy(data
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
1369 os_memcpy(data
+ ETH_ALEN
, gnonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1370 pos
= data
+ ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
;
1371 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos
);
1373 if (random_get_bytes(pos
, 16) < 0)
1376 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1377 sha256_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
);
1378 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1379 if (sha1_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
)
1382 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1388 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
1390 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
1391 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
1393 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1394 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "EAPOL-Key timeout");
1395 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= TRUE
;
1400 void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1401 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1402 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1403 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1404 int keyidx
, int encr
, int force_version
)
1406 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1407 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1408 size_t len
, mic_len
, keyhdrlen
;
1410 int key_data_len
, pad_len
= 0;
1412 int version
, pairwise
;
1414 u8
*key_mic
, *key_data
;
1416 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
1417 keyhdrlen
= sizeof(*key
) + mic_len
+ 2;
1419 len
= sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_hdr
) + keyhdrlen
;
1422 version
= force_version
;
1423 else if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1424 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
||
1425 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1426 wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1427 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED
;
1428 else if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
))
1429 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
;
1430 else if (sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
)
1431 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
;
1433 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4
;
1435 pairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1437 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Send EAPOL(version=%d secure=%d mic=%d "
1438 "ack=%d install=%d pairwise=%d kde_len=%lu keyidx=%d "
1441 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
) ? 1 : 0,
1442 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) ? 1 : 0,
1443 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) ? 1 : 0,
1444 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
) ? 1 : 0,
1445 pairwise
, (unsigned long) kde_len
, keyidx
, encr
);
1447 key_data_len
= kde_len
;
1449 if ((version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1450 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
||
1451 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1452 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1453 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) && encr
) {
1454 pad_len
= key_data_len
% 8;
1456 pad_len
= 8 - pad_len
;
1457 key_data_len
+= pad_len
+ 8;
1460 len
+= key_data_len
;
1461 if (!mic_len
&& encr
)
1462 len
+= AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
1464 hdr
= os_zalloc(len
);
1467 hdr
->version
= wpa_auth
->conf
.eapol_version
;
1468 hdr
->type
= IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY
;
1469 hdr
->length
= host_to_be16(len
- sizeof(*hdr
));
1470 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1471 key_mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
1472 key_data
= ((u8
*) (hdr
+ 1)) + keyhdrlen
;
1474 key
->type
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
1475 EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
: EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
;
1476 key_info
|= version
;
1477 if (encr
&& sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1478 key_info
|= WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
;
1479 if (sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1480 key_info
|= keyidx
<< WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_INDEX_SHIFT
;
1481 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_info
, key_info
);
1483 alg
= pairwise
? sm
->pairwise
: wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
;
1484 if ((key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
) ||
1485 (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& !pairwise
))
1486 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, 0);
1488 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, wpa_cipher_key_len(alg
));
1490 /* FIX: STSL: what to use as key_replay_counter? */
1491 for (i
= RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
- 1; i
> 0; i
--) {
1492 sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
= sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].valid
;
1493 os_memcpy(sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1494 sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].counter
,
1495 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1497 inc_byte_array(sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1498 os_memcpy(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1499 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1500 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Replay Counter",
1501 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1502 sm
->key_replay
[0].valid
= TRUE
;
1505 os_memcpy(key
->key_nonce
, nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1508 os_memcpy(key
->key_rsc
, key_rsc
, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
1511 os_memcpy(key_data
, kde
, kde_len
);
1512 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, kde_len
);
1514 } else if (!mic_len
) {
1518 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ kde_len
);
1519 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1522 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: KEK",
1523 sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1524 /* AES-SIV AAD from EAPOL protocol version field (inclusive) to
1525 * to Key Data (exclusive). */
1526 aad
[0] = (u8
*) hdr
;
1527 aad_len
[0] = key_mic
+ 2 - (u8
*) hdr
;
1528 if (aes_siv_encrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
, kde
, kde_len
,
1529 1, aad
, aad_len
, key_mic
+ 2) < 0) {
1530 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: AES-SIV encryption failed");
1534 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Encrypted Key Data from SIV",
1535 key_mic
+ 2, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ kde_len
);
1536 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1537 } else if (encr
&& kde
) {
1538 buf
= os_zalloc(key_data_len
);
1544 os_memcpy(pos
, kde
, kde_len
);
1550 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1552 if (version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1553 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
||
1554 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1555 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1556 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
1557 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1558 "WPA: Encrypt Key Data using AES-WRAP (KEK length %u)",
1559 (unsigned int) sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1560 if (aes_wrap(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
,
1561 (key_data_len
- 8) / 8, buf
, key_data
)) {
1566 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, key_data_len
);
1567 #ifndef CONFIG_NO_RC4
1568 } else if (sm
->PTK
.kek_len
== 16) {
1571 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1572 "WPA: Encrypt Key Data using RC4");
1573 os_memcpy(key
->key_iv
,
1574 sm
->group
->Counter
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
- 16, 16);
1575 inc_byte_array(sm
->group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1576 os_memcpy(ek
, key
->key_iv
, 16);
1577 os_memcpy(ek
+ 16, sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1578 os_memcpy(key_data
, buf
, key_data_len
);
1579 rc4_skip(ek
, 32, 256, key_data
, key_data_len
);
1580 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, key_data_len
);
1581 #endif /* CONFIG_NO_RC4 */
1590 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) {
1591 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
|| !mic_len
) {
1592 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1593 "PTK not valid when sending EAPOL-Key "
1599 wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm
->PTK
.kck
, sm
->PTK
.kck_len
,
1600 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, version
,
1601 (u8
*) hdr
, len
, key_mic
);
1602 #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
1604 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
> 0.0 &&
1606 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
) {
1607 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1608 "Corrupting group EAPOL-Key Key MIC");
1611 #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
1614 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_inc_EapolFramesTx
,
1616 wpa_auth_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, (u8
*) hdr
, len
,
1622 static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1623 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1624 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1625 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1626 int keyidx
, int encr
)
1629 int pairwise
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
;
1635 __wpa_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
, key_info
, key_rsc
, nonce
, kde
, kde_len
,
1638 ctr
= pairwise
? sm
->TimeoutCtr
: sm
->GTimeoutCtr
;
1639 if (ctr
== 1 && wpa_auth
->conf
.tx_status
)
1640 timeout_ms
= pairwise
? eapol_key_timeout_first
:
1641 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
;
1643 timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
1644 if (pairwise
&& ctr
== 1 && !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
))
1645 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 1;
1646 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
1647 "counter %u)", timeout_ms
, ctr
);
1648 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000, (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
1649 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1653 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp
, struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
, u8
*data
,
1656 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1657 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1660 u8 mic
[WPA_EAPOL_KEY_MIC_MAX_LEN
], *mic_pos
;
1661 size_t mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(akmp
);
1663 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + sizeof(*key
))
1666 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
1667 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1668 mic_pos
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
1669 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
1670 os_memcpy(mic
, mic_pos
, mic_len
);
1671 os_memset(mic_pos
, 0, mic_len
);
1672 if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK
->kck
, PTK
->kck_len
, akmp
,
1673 key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
,
1674 data
, data_len
, mic_pos
) ||
1675 os_memcmp_const(mic
, mic_pos
, mic_len
) != 0)
1677 os_memcpy(mic_pos
, mic
, mic_len
);
1682 void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1684 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1685 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1686 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE
, sm
->addr
, 0, NULL
,
1688 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1689 "RSN: PTK removal from the driver failed");
1690 sm
->pairwise_set
= FALSE
;
1691 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
1695 int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, enum wpa_event event
)
1702 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1703 "event %d notification", event
);
1708 /* PTKs are derived through AMPE */
1709 if (wpa_auth_start_ampe(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
)) {
1714 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
1719 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1722 case WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
:
1725 * When using WPS, we may end up here if the STA
1726 * manages to re-associate without the previous STA
1727 * entry getting removed. Consequently, we need to make
1728 * sure that the WPA state machines gets initialized
1729 * properly at this point.
1731 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA state machine had not been "
1732 "started - initialize now");
1735 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
1736 return 1; /* should not really happen */
1738 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1741 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
1743 * Reauthentication cancels the pending group key
1744 * update for this STA.
1746 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1747 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1748 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= TRUE
;
1750 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1753 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1754 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Retry PTK configuration "
1755 "after association");
1756 wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm
);
1758 /* Using FT protocol, not WPA auth state machine */
1759 sm
->ft_completed
= 1;
1761 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1763 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1766 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1767 sm
->ft_completed
= 0;
1768 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1770 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1771 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
&& event
== WPA_AUTH
)
1773 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1775 if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1776 (event
== WPA_AUTH
|| event
== WPA_ASSOC
))
1778 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1781 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1782 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1784 if (event
!= WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
)
1788 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
1790 * wpa_sm_step() is already running - avoid recursive call to
1791 * it by making the existing loop process the new update.
1796 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
1800 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
)
1802 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
, wpa_ptk
);
1804 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
1805 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
1806 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
1810 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
1811 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1812 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1813 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
1814 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
1815 if (1 /* Unicast cipher supported AND (ESS OR ((IBSS or WDS) and
1816 * Local AA > Remote AA)) */) {
1819 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 0);
1821 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 0);
1823 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1824 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
) {
1825 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1826 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 0);
1831 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
)
1833 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
, wpa_ptk
);
1834 sm
->Disconnect
= FALSE
;
1835 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1839 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
)
1841 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
, wpa_ptk
);
1842 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1846 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
)
1848 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
, wpa_ptk
);
1849 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1850 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1851 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portControl_Auto
,
1853 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 1);
1854 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1858 static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1859 struct wpa_group
*group
)
1861 if (group
->first_sta_seen
)
1864 * System has run bit further than at the time hostapd was started
1865 * potentially very early during boot up. This provides better chances
1866 * of collecting more randomness on embedded systems. Re-initialize the
1867 * GMK and Counter here to improve their strength if there was not
1868 * enough entropy available immediately after system startup.
1870 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Re-initialize GMK/Counter on first "
1872 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
1873 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
1874 "to proceed - reject first 4-way handshake");
1875 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1877 group
->first_sta_seen
= TRUE
;
1878 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= FALSE
;
1881 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0 ||
1882 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0 ||
1883 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
1884 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: GMK/GTK setup failed");
1885 group
->first_sta_seen
= FALSE
;
1886 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1891 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
)
1893 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
, wpa_ptk
);
1895 wpa_group_ensure_init(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
1896 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1899 * Definition of ANonce selection in IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 is somewhat
1900 * ambiguous. The Authenticator state machine uses a counter that is
1901 * incremented by one for each 4-way handshake. However, the security
1902 * analysis of 4-way handshake points out that unpredictable nonces
1903 * help in preventing precomputation attacks. Instead of the state
1904 * machine definition, use an unpredictable nonce value here to provide
1905 * stronger protection against potential precomputation attacks.
1907 if (random_get_bytes(sm
->ANonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
)) {
1908 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: Failed to get random data for "
1910 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1913 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Assign ANonce", sm
->ANonce
,
1915 /* IEEE 802.11i does not clear TimeoutCtr here, but this is more
1916 * logical place than INITIALIZE since AUTHENTICATION2 can be
1917 * re-entered on ReAuthenticationRequest without going through
1923 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
)
1925 u8 msk
[2 * PMK_LEN
];
1926 size_t len
= 2 * PMK_LEN
;
1928 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
, wpa_ptk
);
1929 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1931 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1933 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from PMKSA cache");
1934 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
);
1935 sm
->pmk_len
= sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
;
1936 } else if (wpa_auth_get_msk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, msk
, &len
) == 0) {
1937 unsigned int pmk_len
;
1939 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1940 pmk_len
= PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
;
1943 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from EAPOL state machine "
1944 "(MSK len=%lu PMK len=%u)", (unsigned long) len
,
1946 if (len
< pmk_len
) {
1947 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1948 "WPA: MSK not long enough (%u) to create PMK (%u)",
1949 (unsigned int) len
, (unsigned int) pmk_len
);
1950 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1953 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, msk
, pmk_len
);
1954 sm
->pmk_len
= pmk_len
;
1955 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1956 if (len
>= 2 * PMK_LEN
) {
1957 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, msk
+ PMK_LEN
, PMK_LEN
);
1958 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1960 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1962 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Could not get PMK, get_msk: %p",
1963 sm
->wpa_auth
->cb
->get_msk
);
1964 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1967 os_memset(msk
, 0, sizeof(msk
));
1969 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
1970 /* IEEE 802.11i does not set keyRun to FALSE, but not doing this
1971 * will break reauthentication since EAPOL state machines may not be
1972 * get into AUTHENTICATING state that clears keyRun before WPA state
1973 * machine enters AUTHENTICATION2 state and goes immediately to INITPMK
1974 * state and takes PMK from the previously used AAA Key. This will
1975 * eventually fail in 4-Way Handshake because Supplicant uses PMK
1976 * derived from the new AAA Key. Setting keyRun = FALSE here seems to
1977 * be good workaround for this issue. */
1978 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
, 0);
1982 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
)
1985 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
, wpa_ptk
);
1986 psk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, NULL
);
1988 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
1989 sm
->pmk_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1990 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1991 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
1992 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1993 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1995 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
1999 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
)
2001 u8 buf
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
], *pmkid
= NULL
;
2002 size_t pmkid_len
= 0;
2004 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
, wpa_ptk
);
2005 sm
->PTKRequest
= FALSE
;
2006 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
2007 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= FALSE
;
2010 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
) {
2011 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2012 * immediately following this. */
2016 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2017 "sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
2019 * TODO: Could add PMKID even with WPA2-PSK, but only if there is only
2020 * one possible PSK for this STA.
2022 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&&
2023 wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
2024 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
!= WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
) {
2026 pmkid_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
2027 pmkid
[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC
;
2028 pmkid
[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
2029 RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid
[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID
);
2031 os_memcpy(&pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
2032 sm
->pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
2033 } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2034 /* No KCK available to derive PMKID */
2038 * Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was
2039 * available with pre-calculated PMKID.
2041 rsn_pmkid(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmk_len
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2042 sm
->addr
, &pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
2043 wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
));
2046 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2047 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
, NULL
,
2048 sm
->ANonce
, pmkid
, pmkid_len
, 0, 0);
2052 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*snonce
,
2053 const u8
*pmk
, unsigned int pmk_len
,
2054 struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
)
2056 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2057 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2058 return wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm
, pmk
, ptk
);
2059 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2061 return wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk
, pmk_len
, "Pairwise key expansion",
2062 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, sm
->ANonce
, snonce
,
2063 ptk
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pairwise
);
2069 int fils_auth_pmk_to_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
2070 size_t pmk_len
, const u8
*snonce
, const u8
*anonce
)
2072 u8 ick
[FILS_ICK_MAX_LEN
];
2076 res
= fils_pmk_to_ptk(pmk
, pmk_len
, sm
->addr
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2077 snonce
, anonce
, &sm
->PTK
, ick
, &ick_len
,
2078 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pairwise
);
2081 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
2083 res
= fils_key_auth_sk(ick
, ick_len
, snonce
, anonce
,
2084 sm
->addr
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2085 NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0, /* TODO: SK+PFS */
2086 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
,
2087 sm
->fils_key_auth_ap
,
2088 &sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2089 os_memset(ick
, 0, sizeof(ick
));
2091 /* Store nonces for (Re)Association Request/Response frame processing */
2092 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, snonce
, FILS_NONCE_LEN
);
2093 os_memcpy(sm
->ANonce
, anonce
, FILS_NONCE_LEN
);
2099 static int wpa_aead_decrypt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
,
2100 u8
*buf
, size_t buf_len
, u16
*_key_data_len
)
2102 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
2103 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
2110 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) buf
;
2111 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
2112 pos
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
2113 key_data_len
= WPA_GET_BE16(pos
);
2114 if (key_data_len
< AES_BLOCK_SIZE
||
2115 key_data_len
> buf_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) - sizeof(*key
) - 2) {
2116 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2117 "No room for AES-SIV data in the frame");
2120 pos
+= 2; /* Pointing at the Encrypted Key Data field */
2122 tmp
= os_malloc(key_data_len
);
2126 /* AES-SIV AAD from EAPOL protocol version field (inclusive) to
2127 * to Key Data (exclusive). */
2129 aad_len
[0] = pos
- buf
;
2130 if (aes_siv_decrypt(ptk
->kek
, ptk
->kek_len
, pos
, key_data_len
,
2131 1, aad
, aad_len
, tmp
) < 0) {
2132 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2133 "Invalid AES-SIV data in the frame");
2134 bin_clear_free(tmp
, key_data_len
);
2138 /* AEAD decryption and validation completed successfully */
2139 key_data_len
-= AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2140 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Decrypted Key Data",
2143 /* Replace Key Data field with the decrypted version */
2144 os_memcpy(pos
, tmp
, key_data_len
);
2145 pos
-= 2; /* Key Data Length field */
2146 WPA_PUT_BE16(pos
, key_data_len
);
2147 bin_clear_free(tmp
, key_data_len
);
2149 *_key_data_len
= key_data_len
;
2154 int fils_decrypt_assoc(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*fils_session
,
2155 const struct ieee80211_mgmt
*mgmt
, size_t frame_len
,
2156 u8
*pos
, size_t left
)
2159 const u8
*end
, *ie_start
, *ie
, *session
, *crypt
;
2160 struct ieee802_11_elems elems
;
2164 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
2165 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2166 "FILS: No KEK to decrypt Assocication Request frame");
2170 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2171 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2172 "FILS: Not a FILS AKM - reject association");
2176 end
= ((const u8
*) mgmt
) + frame_len
;
2177 fc
= le_to_host16(mgmt
->frame_control
);
2178 stype
= WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(fc
);
2179 if (stype
== WLAN_FC_STYPE_REASSOC_REQ
)
2180 ie_start
= mgmt
->u
.reassoc_req
.variable
;
2182 ie_start
= mgmt
->u
.assoc_req
.variable
;
2186 * Find FILS Session element which is the last unencrypted element in
2190 while (ie
+ 1 < end
) {
2191 if (ie
+ 2 + ie
[1] > end
)
2193 if (ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
&&
2194 ie
[1] >= 1 + FILS_SESSION_LEN
&&
2195 ie
[2] == WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_SESSION
) {
2203 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2204 "FILS: Could not find FILS Session element in Association Request frame - reject");
2207 if (os_memcmp(fils_session
, session
+ 3, FILS_SESSION_LEN
) != 0) {
2208 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Session mismatch");
2209 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Expected FILS Session",
2210 fils_session
, FILS_SESSION_LEN
);
2211 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Received FILS Session",
2212 session
+ 3, FILS_SESSION_LEN
);
2215 crypt
= session
+ 2 + session
[1];
2217 if (end
- crypt
< AES_BLOCK_SIZE
) {
2218 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2219 "FILS: Too short frame to include AES-SIV data");
2223 /* AES-SIV AAD vectors */
2225 /* The STA's MAC address */
2227 aad_len
[0] = ETH_ALEN
;
2228 /* The AP's BSSID */
2230 aad_len
[1] = ETH_ALEN
;
2231 /* The STA's nonce */
2232 aad
[2] = sm
->SNonce
;
2233 aad_len
[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2234 /* The AP's nonce */
2235 aad
[3] = sm
->ANonce
;
2236 aad_len
[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2238 * The (Re)Association Request frame from the Capability Information
2239 * field to the FILS Session element (both inclusive).
2241 aad
[4] = (const u8
*) &mgmt
->u
.assoc_req
.capab_info
;
2242 aad_len
[4] = crypt
- aad
[4];
2244 if (aes_siv_decrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
, crypt
, end
- crypt
,
2245 5, aad
, aad_len
, pos
+ (crypt
- ie_start
)) < 0) {
2246 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2247 "FILS: Invalid AES-SIV data in the frame");
2250 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Decrypted Association Request elements",
2251 pos
, left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
);
2253 if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos
, left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
, &elems
, 1) ==
2255 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2256 "FILS: Failed to parse decrypted elements");
2259 if (!elems
.fils_key_confirm
) {
2260 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: No FILS Key Confirm element");
2263 if (elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
!= sm
->fils_key_auth_len
) {
2264 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2265 "FILS: Unexpected Key-Auth length %d (expected %d)",
2266 elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
,
2267 (int) sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2270 if (os_memcmp(elems
.fils_key_confirm
, sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
,
2271 sm
->fils_key_auth_len
) != 0) {
2272 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Key-Auth mismatch");
2273 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Received Key-Auth",
2274 elems
.fils_key_confirm
,
2275 elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
);
2276 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Expected Key-Auth",
2277 sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
, sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2281 return left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2285 int fils_encrypt_assoc(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*buf
,
2286 size_t current_len
, size_t max_len
,
2287 const struct wpabuf
*hlp
)
2289 u8
*end
= buf
+ max_len
;
2290 u8
*pos
= buf
+ current_len
;
2291 struct ieee80211_mgmt
*mgmt
;
2292 struct wpabuf
*plain
;
2293 u8
*len
, *tmp
, *tmp2
;
2295 u8
*gtk
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2297 struct wpa_group
*gsm
;
2301 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
)
2304 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2305 "FILS: Association Response frame before FILS processing",
2308 mgmt
= (struct ieee80211_mgmt
*) buf
;
2310 /* AES-SIV AAD vectors */
2312 /* The AP's BSSID */
2314 aad_len
[0] = ETH_ALEN
;
2315 /* The STA's MAC address */
2317 aad_len
[1] = ETH_ALEN
;
2318 /* The AP's nonce */
2319 aad
[2] = sm
->ANonce
;
2320 aad_len
[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2321 /* The STA's nonce */
2322 aad
[3] = sm
->SNonce
;
2323 aad_len
[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2325 * The (Re)Association Response frame from the Capability Information
2326 * field (the same offset in both Association and Reassociation
2327 * Response frames) to the FILS Session element (both inclusive).
2329 aad
[4] = (const u8
*) &mgmt
->u
.assoc_resp
.capab_info
;
2330 aad_len
[4] = pos
- aad
[4];
2332 /* The following elements will be encrypted with AES-SIV */
2334 plain
= wpabuf_alloc(1000);
2338 /* TODO: FILS Public Key */
2340 /* FILS Key Confirmation */
2341 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
); /* Element ID */
2342 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, 1 + sm
->fils_key_auth_len
); /* Length */
2343 /* Element ID Extension */
2344 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_KEY_CONFIRM
);
2345 wpabuf_put_data(plain
, sm
->fils_key_auth_ap
, sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2347 /* FILS HLP Container */
2349 wpabuf_put_buf(plain
, hlp
);
2351 /* TODO: FILS IP Address Assignment */
2355 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
); /* Element ID */
2356 len
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 1);
2357 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXT_KEY_DELIVERY
);
2358 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
,
2359 wpabuf_put(plain
, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
));
2361 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2362 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2363 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2365 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2366 * of GTK in the BSS.
2368 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gtk_len
) < 0) {
2374 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
2376 tmp
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 0);
2377 tmp2
= wpa_add_kde(tmp
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2379 wpabuf_put(plain
, tmp2
- tmp
);
2382 tmp
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 0);
2383 tmp2
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, tmp
);
2384 wpabuf_put(plain
, tmp2
- tmp
);
2386 *len
= (u8
*) wpabuf_put(plain
, 0) - len
- 1;
2388 if (pos
+ wpabuf_len(plain
) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE
> end
) {
2389 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2390 "FILS: Not enough room for FILS elements");
2395 wpa_hexdump_buf_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Association Response plaintext",
2398 if (aes_siv_encrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
,
2399 wpabuf_head(plain
), wpabuf_len(plain
),
2400 5, aad
, aad_len
, pos
) < 0) {
2405 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2406 "FILS: Encrypted Association Response elements",
2407 pos
, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ wpabuf_len(plain
));
2408 current_len
+= wpabuf_len(plain
) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2411 sm
->fils_completed
= 1;
2417 int fils_set_tk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2422 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
)
2425 alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm
->pairwise
);
2426 klen
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->pairwise
);
2428 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Configure TK to the driver");
2429 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, alg
, sm
->addr
, 0,
2430 sm
->PTK
.tk
, klen
)) {
2431 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Failed to set TK to the driver");
2438 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
2441 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
)
2443 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2445 int ok
= 0, psk_found
= 0;
2446 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
2447 unsigned int pmk_len
;
2449 const u8
*eapol_key_ie
, *key_data
, *mic
;
2450 u16 key_data_length
;
2451 size_t mic_len
, eapol_key_ie_len
;
2452 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
2453 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
2454 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
2456 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
2457 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2458 sm
->update_snonce
= FALSE
;
2459 os_memset(&PTK
, 0, sizeof(PTK
));
2461 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
2463 /* WPA with IEEE 802.1X: use the derived PMK from EAP
2464 * WPA-PSK: iterate through possible PSKs and select the one matching
2467 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2468 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2469 sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, pmk
);
2476 pmk_len
= sm
->pmk_len
;
2479 if (wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, sm
->SNonce
, pmk
, pmk_len
, &PTK
) < 0)
2483 wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, &PTK
,
2484 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
,
2485 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
) == 0) {
2492 wpa_aead_decrypt(sm
, &PTK
, sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
,
2493 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
, NULL
) == 0) {
2497 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
2499 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2504 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2505 "invalid MIC in msg 2/4 of 4-Way Handshake");
2507 wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2512 * Note: last_rx_eapol_key length fields have already been validated in
2515 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
;
2516 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
2517 mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
2518 key_data
= mic
+ mic_len
+ 2;
2519 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(mic
+ mic_len
);
2520 if (key_data_length
> sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
2521 sizeof(*key
) - mic_len
- 2)
2524 if (wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
, &kde
) < 0) {
2525 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2526 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 with invalid Key Data contents");
2530 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.rsn_ie
;
2531 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.rsn_ie_len
;
2532 } else if (kde
.osen
) {
2533 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.osen
;
2534 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.osen_len
;
2536 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.wpa_ie
;
2537 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.wpa_ie_len
;
2539 ft
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
2540 if (sm
->wpa_ie
== NULL
||
2541 wpa_compare_rsn_ie(ft
, sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
,
2542 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
)) {
2543 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2544 "WPA IE from (Re)AssocReq did not match with msg 2/4");
2546 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in AssocReq",
2547 sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
);
2549 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in msg 2/4",
2550 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
);
2551 /* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
2552 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2555 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2556 if (ft
&& ft_check_msg_2_of_4(wpa_auth
, sm
, &kde
) < 0) {
2557 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2560 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2562 if (kde
.ip_addr_req
&& kde
.ip_addr_req
[0] &&
2563 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
&& WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0) {
2565 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2566 "P2P: IP address requested in EAPOL-Key exchange");
2567 idx
= bitfield_get_first_zero(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
2569 u32 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_start
);
2570 bitfield_set(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
, idx
);
2571 WPA_PUT_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
, start
+ idx
);
2572 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2573 "P2P: Assigned IP address %u.%u.%u.%u to "
2574 MACSTR
, sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
2575 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
2579 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2581 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2582 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2584 * Verify that PMKR1Name from EAPOL-Key message 2/4 matches
2585 * with the value we derived.
2587 if (os_memcmp_const(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
,
2588 WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
) != 0) {
2589 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2590 "PMKR1Name mismatch in FT 4-way "
2592 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from "
2594 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2595 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Derived PMKR1Name",
2596 sm
->pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2600 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2602 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
2603 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
2605 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2606 /* PSK may have changed from the previous choice, so update
2607 * state machine data based on whatever PSK was selected here.
2609 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
2610 sm
->pmk_len
= PMK_LEN
;
2613 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
2615 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
2616 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
2620 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
)
2622 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
, wpa_ptk
);
2627 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2629 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2631 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
) {
2633 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2634 return 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
+ len
;
2641 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2643 struct wpa_igtk_kde igtk
;
2644 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2645 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
2646 size_t len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2648 if (!sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
)
2651 igtk
.keyid
[0] = gsm
->GN_igtk
;
2653 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
!= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
||
2654 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, rsc
) < 0)
2655 os_memset(igtk
.pn
, 0, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
2657 os_memcpy(igtk
.pn
, rsc
, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
2658 os_memcpy(igtk
.igtk
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
2659 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2661 * Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of
2664 if (random_get_bytes(igtk
.igtk
, len
) < 0)
2667 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK
,
2668 (const u8
*) &igtk
, WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
+ len
,
2674 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2676 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2682 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2687 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2690 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)
2692 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
], *_rsc
, *gtk
, *kde
, *pos
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2693 size_t gtk_len
, kde_len
;
2694 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2696 int wpa_ie_len
, secure
, keyidx
, encr
= 0;
2698 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
2699 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
2702 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
) {
2703 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2704 * immediately following this. */
2708 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
2709 GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
2711 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
2712 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
2713 /* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
2714 wpa_ie
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
2715 wpa_ie_len
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
2716 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&&
2717 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
) &&
2718 wpa_ie_len
> wpa_ie
[1] + 2 && wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN
) {
2719 /* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE and possible MDIE */
2720 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2721 if (wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN
)
2722 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2723 wpa_ie_len
= wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2725 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2726 "sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
2727 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
2728 /* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
2730 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2731 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2732 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2734 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2735 * of GTK in the BSS.
2737 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gtk_len
) < 0)
2745 /* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
2751 if (sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
) {
2753 * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
2754 * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
2755 * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
2756 * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
2757 * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
2758 * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
2760 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2761 "STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - "
2762 "set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
2767 kde_len
= wpa_ie_len
+ ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
2769 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gtk_len
;
2770 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2771 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2772 kde_len
+= 2 + PMKID_LEN
; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
2773 kde_len
+= 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
2775 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2777 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0)
2778 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 3 * 4;
2779 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2780 kde
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
2785 os_memcpy(pos
, wpa_ie
, wpa_ie_len
);
2787 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2788 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2793 res
= wpa_insert_pmkid(kde
, &elen
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
);
2795 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert "
2796 "PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
2803 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2806 hdr
[0] = keyidx
& 0x03;
2808 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2811 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
2813 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2814 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2816 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
;
2818 conf
= &sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
;
2819 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
2820 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
>= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) {
2821 os_memcpy(pos
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
2822 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
2823 res
= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1];
2825 res
= wpa_write_ftie(conf
, conf
->r0_key_holder
,
2826 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
2828 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
,
2832 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE "
2833 "into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
2839 /* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
2840 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
2842 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE
;
2843 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->reassociation_deadline
);
2846 /* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
2847 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
2849 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME
;
2850 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->r0_key_lifetime
* 60);
2853 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2855 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0) {
2857 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
2858 os_memcpy(addr
+ 4, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_mask
, 4);
2859 os_memcpy(addr
+ 8, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_go
, 4);
2860 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, WFA_KEY_DATA_IP_ADDR_ALLOC
,
2861 addr
, sizeof(addr
), NULL
, 0);
2863 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2865 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2866 (secure
? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
: 0) |
2867 (wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ? WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
: 0) |
2868 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
|
2869 WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
,
2870 _rsc
, sm
->ANonce
, kde
, pos
- kde
, keyidx
, encr
);
2875 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
)
2877 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
, wpa_ptk
);
2878 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2880 enum wpa_alg alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm
->pairwise
);
2881 int klen
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->pairwise
);
2882 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, alg
, sm
->addr
, 0,
2883 sm
->PTK
.tk
, klen
)) {
2884 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2887 /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2888 sm
->pairwise_set
= TRUE
;
2890 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_ptk_rekey
) {
2891 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
2892 eloop_register_timeout(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.
2893 wpa_ptk_rekey
, 0, wpa_rekey_ptk
,
2897 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
2898 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
) {
2899 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2900 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 1);
2904 if (0 /* IBSS == TRUE */) {
2906 if (sm
->keycount
== 2) {
2907 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2908 WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 1);
2911 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
,
2914 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
, 0);
2915 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyDone
, 1);
2916 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
2917 sm
->PInitAKeys
= TRUE
;
2920 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2921 "pairwise key handshake completed (%s)",
2922 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
2924 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2925 wpa_ft_push_pmk_r1(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2926 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2932 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2935 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
2936 else if (sm
->Disconnect
2937 /* || FIX: dot11RSNAConfigSALifetime timeout */) {
2938 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2939 "WPA_PTK: sm->Disconnect");
2940 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2942 else if (sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
)
2943 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
2944 else if (sm
->AuthenticationRequest
)
2945 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
);
2946 else if (sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
)
2947 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
2948 else if (sm
->PTKRequest
)
2949 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2950 else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
) {
2951 case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE
:
2953 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT
:
2954 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
2956 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECTED
:
2957 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
2959 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION
:
2960 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
2962 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION2
:
2963 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
2964 wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2965 WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
) > 0)
2966 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
);
2967 else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
2968 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
2969 /* FIX: && 802.1X::keyRun */)
2970 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
);
2972 case WPA_PTK_INITPMK
:
2973 if (wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2974 WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
) > 0)
2975 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2977 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2978 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2979 "INITPMK - keyAvailable = false");
2980 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2983 case WPA_PTK_INITPSK
:
2984 if (wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
,
2986 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2988 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2989 "no PSK configured for the STA");
2990 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2991 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2994 case WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
:
2995 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2996 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
2997 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2998 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
2999 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
) {
3000 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
3002 sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3003 "PTKSTART: Retry limit %u reached",
3004 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
);
3005 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3006 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3007 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3009 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
:
3010 if (sm
->MICVerified
)
3011 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
);
3012 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3013 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
3014 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
3015 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3016 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3018 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
:
3019 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
3021 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
:
3022 if (sm
->update_snonce
)
3023 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
3024 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3025 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
3026 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
);
3027 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
3028 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
) {
3029 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
3031 sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3032 "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %u reached",
3033 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
);
3034 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3035 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3036 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
3038 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
:
3044 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
)
3046 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3048 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
3049 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
3050 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
3052 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
3056 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
)
3058 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
3059 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3061 u8
*kde_buf
= NULL
, *pos
, hdr
[2];
3063 u8
*gtk
, dummy_gtk
[32];
3065 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3068 if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
> sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
) {
3069 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
3070 * immediately following this. */
3074 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
3075 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
3076 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
3077 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
3078 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
3079 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
)
3080 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
3081 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3082 "sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake");
3084 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
3085 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
3087 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
3088 * of GTK in the BSS.
3090 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gsm
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3094 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
3095 kde_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gsm
->GTK_len
+
3096 ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
3097 kde_buf
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
3098 if (kde_buf
== NULL
)
3101 kde
= pos
= kde_buf
;
3102 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
3104 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
3106 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
3107 kde_len
= pos
- kde
;
3110 kde_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
3113 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
3114 WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
|
3115 (wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ? WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
: 0) |
3117 (!sm
->Pair
? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
: 0),
3118 rsc
, NULL
, kde
, kde_len
, gsm
->GN
, 1);
3124 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
)
3126 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3127 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
3128 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
3129 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
3130 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3131 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
3132 /* FIX: MLME.SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
3133 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3134 "group key handshake completed (%s)",
3135 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
3140 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
)
3142 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3143 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
3144 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
3145 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3146 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
3147 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3148 "group key handshake failed (%s) after %u tries",
3149 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN",
3150 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
);
3154 SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP
)
3156 if (sm
->Init
|| sm
->PtkGroupInit
) {
3157 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3158 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= FALSE
;
3159 } else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
) {
3160 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_IDLE
:
3161 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
||
3162 (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&& sm
->PInitAKeys
))
3163 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
3165 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
:
3166 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3167 !sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
3168 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
);
3169 else if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
>
3170 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
)
3171 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
);
3172 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3173 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
3175 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_KEYERROR
:
3176 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3178 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYESTABLISHED
:
3179 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3185 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3186 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3190 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3191 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3192 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "Group key expansion",
3193 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
3194 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3196 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GTK",
3197 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
);
3199 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3200 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
3202 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3203 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3204 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3205 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "IGTK key expansion",
3206 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
3207 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
) < 0)
3209 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "IGTK",
3210 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3212 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3218 static void wpa_group_gtk_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3219 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3221 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3222 "GTK_INIT (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3223 group
->changed
= FALSE
; /* GInit is not cleared here; avoid loop */
3224 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
;
3227 os_memset(group
->GTK
, 0, sizeof(group
->GTK
));
3230 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3233 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3234 /* GTK[GN] = CalcGTK() */
3235 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3239 static int wpa_group_update_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
3241 if (ctx
!= NULL
&& ctx
!= sm
->group
)
3244 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
) {
3245 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3246 "Not in PTKINITDONE; skip Group Key update");
3247 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3250 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
3252 * This should not really happen, so add a debug log entry.
3253 * Since we clear the GKeyDoneStations before the loop, the
3254 * station needs to be counted here anyway.
3256 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3257 "GUpdateStationKeys was already set when "
3258 "marking station for GTK rekeying");
3261 /* Do not rekey GTK/IGTK when STA is in WNM-Sleep Mode */
3262 if (sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
3265 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
++;
3266 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= TRUE
;
3274 /* update GTK when exiting WNM-Sleep Mode */
3275 void wpa_wnmsleep_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3277 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
3280 wpa_group_update_sta(sm
, NULL
);
3284 void wpa_set_wnmsleep(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int flag
)
3287 sm
->is_wnmsleep
= !!flag
;
3291 int wpa_wnmsleep_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
3293 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3298 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] |
3301 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_GTK
;
3302 *pos
++ = 11 + gsm
->GTK_len
;
3303 /* Key ID in B0-B1 of Key Info */
3304 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN
& 0x03);
3306 *pos
++ = gsm
->GTK_len
;
3307 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, pos
) != 0)
3310 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
3311 pos
+= gsm
->GTK_len
;
3313 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3315 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3316 gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
3322 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3323 int wpa_wnmsleep_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
3325 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3327 size_t len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3331 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] | Key[16]
3333 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK
;
3334 *pos
++ = 2 + 6 + len
;
3335 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN_igtk
);
3337 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, pos
) != 0)
3341 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3344 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3346 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3347 gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3351 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3352 #endif /* CONFIG_WNM */
3355 static void wpa_group_setkeys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3356 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3360 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3361 "SETKEYS (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3362 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
3363 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
;
3364 group
->GTKReKey
= FALSE
;
3366 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
3368 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3369 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
3370 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
3371 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
3372 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3373 /* "GKeyDoneStations = GNoStations" is done in more robust way by
3374 * counting the STAs that are marked with GUpdateStationKeys instead of
3375 * including all STAs that could be in not-yet-completed state. */
3376 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3378 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
) {
3379 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: Unexpected "
3380 "GKeyDoneStations=%d when starting new GTK rekey",
3381 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
3382 group
->GKeyDoneStations
= 0;
3384 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_update_sta
, group
);
3385 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: GKeyDoneStations=%d",
3386 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
3390 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3391 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3395 if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
,
3396 wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
),
3397 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN
,
3398 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3401 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3402 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
3406 alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3407 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3410 wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
, alg
,
3411 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN_igtk
,
3412 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
) < 0)
3415 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3421 static int wpa_group_disconnect_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
3423 if (sm
->group
== ctx
) {
3424 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Mark STA " MACSTR
3425 " for discconnection due to fatal failure",
3427 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
3434 static void wpa_group_fatal_failure(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3435 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3437 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state FATAL_FAILURE");
3438 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
3439 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
;
3440 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_disconnect_cb
, group
);
3444 static int wpa_group_setkeysdone(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3445 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3447 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3448 "SETKEYSDONE (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3449 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
3450 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
;
3452 if (wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
3453 wpa_group_fatal_failure(wpa_auth
, group
);
3461 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3462 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3465 wpa_group_gtk_init(wpa_auth
, group
);
3466 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
) {
3467 /* Do not allow group operations */
3468 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
&&
3469 group
->GTKAuthenticator
) {
3470 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
3471 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
&&
3473 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
3474 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
) {
3475 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
== 0)
3476 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
3477 else if (group
->GTKReKey
)
3478 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
3483 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3488 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
3489 /* This should not happen, but if it does, make sure we do not
3490 * end up freeing the state machine too early by exiting the
3491 * recursive call. */
3492 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: wpa_sm_step() called recursively");
3496 sm
->in_step_loop
= 1;
3498 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
3501 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
3502 sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
= FALSE
;
3504 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK
);
3505 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
3507 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK_GROUP
);
3508 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
3510 wpa_group_sm_step(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
3511 } while (sm
->changed
|| sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
);
3512 sm
->in_step_loop
= 0;
3514 if (sm
->pending_deinit
) {
3515 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Completing pending STA state "
3516 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
3517 wpa_free_sta_sm(sm
);
3524 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
3526 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= eloop_ctx
;
3531 void wpa_auth_sm_notify(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3535 eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
3539 void wpa_gtk_rekey(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3542 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3544 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3547 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
3549 for (i
= 0; i
< 2; i
++) {
3551 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
3553 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3554 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
3555 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
3556 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
3557 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3558 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3559 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
3564 static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int val
)
3566 return val
? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
3570 #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
3571 #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
3572 ((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff
3574 int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
3577 char pmkid_txt
[PMKID_LEN
* 2 + 1];
3578 #ifdef CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH
3579 const int preauth
= 1;
3580 #else /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
3581 const int preauth
= 0;
3582 #endif /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
3584 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3587 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3588 "dot11RSNAOptionImplemented=TRUE\n"
3589 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationImplemented=%s\n"
3590 "dot11RSNAEnabled=%s\n"
3591 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationEnabled=%s\n",
3592 wpa_bool_txt(preauth
),
3593 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
),
3594 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.rsn_preauth
));
3595 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3599 wpa_snprintf_hex(pmkid_txt
, sizeof(pmkid_txt
),
3600 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, PMKID_LEN
);
3603 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3604 "dot11RSNAConfigVersion=%u\n"
3605 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseKeysSupported=9999\n"
3606 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipher */
3607 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyMethod */
3608 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime */
3609 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyPackets */
3610 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict=%u\n"
3611 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount=%u\n"
3612 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount=%u\n"
3613 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipherSize=%u\n"
3614 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=%u\n"
3615 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=%u\n"
3616 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfPTKSAReplayCounters=0\n"
3617 "dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=%u\n"
3618 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3619 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3620 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3621 "dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed=%s\n"
3622 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3623 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3624 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3625 "dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked=%u\n"
3626 "dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures=%u\n"
3627 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n",
3629 !!wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
,
3630 wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
,
3631 wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
,
3632 wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
) * 8,
3633 dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
,
3634 dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
,
3635 dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
,
3636 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected
),
3637 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected
),
3638 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected
),
3640 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested
),
3641 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested
),
3642 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested
),
3643 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
,
3644 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
);
3645 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3649 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseCiphersTable */
3650 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable */
3653 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
, "hostapdWPAGroupState=%d\n",
3654 wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
);
3655 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3663 int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
3671 /* TODO: FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF entry for broadcast/multicast stats */
3673 /* dot11RSNAStatsEntry */
3675 pairwise
= wpa_cipher_to_suite(sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
3676 WPA_PROTO_RSN
: WPA_PROTO_WPA
,
3682 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3683 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsIndex */
3684 "dot11RSNAStatsSTAAddress=" MACSTR
"\n"
3685 "dot11RSNAStatsVersion=1\n"
3686 "dot11RSNAStatsSelectedPairwiseCipher=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3687 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPICVErrors */
3688 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures=%u\n"
3689 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures=%u\n"
3690 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
3691 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors */
3692 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPReplays */,
3694 RSN_SUITE_ARG(pairwise
),
3695 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
,
3696 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
);
3697 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3702 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3703 "hostapdWPAPTKState=%d\n"
3704 "hostapdWPAPTKGroupState=%d\n",
3706 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
3707 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3715 void wpa_auth_countermeasures_start(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3718 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
++;
3722 int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3724 return sm
&& sm
->pairwise_set
;
3728 int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3730 return sm
->pairwise
;
3734 int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3738 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
;
3742 int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3750 int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
3751 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
)
3753 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->pmksa
!= entry
)
3760 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
3761 wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3763 return sm
? sm
->pmksa
: NULL
;
3767 void wpa_auth_sta_local_mic_failure_report(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3770 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
++;
3774 const u8
* wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, size_t *len
)
3776 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3778 *len
= wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
3779 return wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
3783 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
3784 unsigned int pmk_len
,
3785 int session_timeout
, struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
3787 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
||
3788 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
3791 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
3792 if (pmk_len
> PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
)
3793 pmk_len
= PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
;
3794 } else if (pmk_len
> PMK_LEN
) {
3798 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(sm
->wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, pmk_len
, NULL
,
3799 sm
->PTK
.kck
, sm
->PTK
.kck_len
,
3800 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, session_timeout
,
3801 eapol
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
3808 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_preauth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3809 const u8
*pmk
, size_t len
, const u8
*sta_addr
,
3810 int session_timeout
,
3811 struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
3813 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3816 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, len
, NULL
,
3819 sta_addr
, session_timeout
, eapol
,
3820 WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X
))
3827 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_sae(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
3828 const u8
*pmk
, const u8
*pmkid
)
3830 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
3833 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
, pmkid
,
3835 wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, 0, NULL
,
3843 void wpa_auth_pmksa_remove(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3846 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
;
3848 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
)
3850 pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, sta_addr
, NULL
);
3852 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Remove PMKSA cache entry for "
3853 MACSTR
" based on request", MAC2STR(sta_addr
));
3854 pmksa_cache_free_entry(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmksa
);
3859 int wpa_auth_pmksa_list(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
,
3862 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3864 return pmksa_cache_auth_list(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, buf
, len
);
3868 void wpa_auth_pmksa_flush(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3870 if (wpa_auth
&& wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3871 pmksa_cache_auth_flush(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
3875 #ifdef CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL
3878 int wpa_auth_pmksa_list_mesh(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
3879 char *buf
, size_t len
)
3881 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3884 return pmksa_cache_auth_list_mesh(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, addr
, buf
, len
);
3888 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
3889 wpa_auth_pmksa_create_entry(const u8
*aa
, const u8
*spa
, const u8
*pmk
,
3890 const u8
*pmkid
, int expiration
)
3892 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
;
3893 struct os_reltime now
;
3895 entry
= pmksa_cache_auth_create_entry(pmk
, PMK_LEN
, pmkid
, NULL
, 0, aa
,
3896 spa
, 0, NULL
, WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE
);
3900 os_get_reltime(&now
);
3901 entry
->expiration
= now
.sec
+ expiration
;
3906 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_entry(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3907 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
)
3911 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3914 ret
= pmksa_cache_auth_add_entry(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, entry
);
3916 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
3917 "RSN: Failed to store external PMKSA cache for "
3918 MACSTR
, MAC2STR(entry
->spa
));
3923 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
3924 #endif /* CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL */
3927 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
3928 wpa_auth_pmksa_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*sta_addr
,
3931 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3933 return pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, sta_addr
, pmkid
);
3937 void wpa_auth_pmksa_set_to_sm(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
,
3938 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
3939 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3946 os_memcpy(pmk
, pmksa
->pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
3947 os_memcpy(pmkid
, pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
3948 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
3953 * Remove and free the group from wpa_authenticator. This is triggered by a
3954 * callback to make sure nobody is currently iterating the group list while it
3957 static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3958 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3960 struct wpa_group
*prev
= wpa_auth
->group
;
3962 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Remove group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
3966 if (prev
->next
== group
) {
3967 /* This never frees the special first group as needed */
3968 prev
->next
= group
->next
;
3978 /* Increase the reference counter for group */
3979 static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3980 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3982 /* Skip the special first group */
3983 if (wpa_auth
->group
== group
)
3986 group
->references
++;
3990 /* Decrease the reference counter and maybe free the group */
3991 static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3992 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3994 /* Skip the special first group */
3995 if (wpa_auth
->group
== group
)
3998 group
->references
--;
3999 if (group
->references
)
4001 wpa_group_free(wpa_auth
, group
);
4006 * Add a group that has its references counter set to zero. Caller needs to
4007 * call wpa_group_get() on the return value to mark the entry in use.
4009 static struct wpa_group
*
4010 wpa_auth_add_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
4012 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4014 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
)
4017 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Add group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
4019 group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
, 0);
4023 group
->next
= wpa_auth
->group
->next
;
4024 wpa_auth
->group
->next
= group
;
4031 * Enforce that the group state machine for the VLAN is running, increase
4032 * reference counter as interface is up. References might have been increased
4033 * even if a negative value is returned.
4034 * Returns: -1 on error (group missing, group already failed); otherwise, 0
4036 int wpa_auth_ensure_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
4038 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4040 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4043 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
4045 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
4047 group
= group
->next
;
4050 if (group
== NULL
) {
4051 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
4056 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4057 "WPA: Ensure group state machine running for VLAN ID %d",
4060 wpa_group_get(wpa_auth
, group
);
4061 group
->num_setup_iface
++;
4063 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
4071 * Decrease reference counter, expected to be zero afterwards.
4072 * returns: -1 on error (group not found, group in fail state)
4073 * -2 if wpa_group is still referenced
4076 int wpa_auth_release_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
4078 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4081 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4084 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
4086 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
4088 group
= group
->next
;
4094 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4095 "WPA: Try stopping group state machine for VLAN ID %d",
4098 if (group
->num_setup_iface
<= 0) {
4099 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
,
4100 "WPA: wpa_auth_release_group called more often than wpa_auth_ensure_group for VLAN ID %d, skipping.",
4104 group
->num_setup_iface
--;
4106 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
4109 if (group
->references
> 1) {
4110 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4111 "WPA: Cannot stop group state machine for VLAN ID %d as references are still hold",
4116 wpa_group_put(wpa_auth
, group
);
4122 int wpa_auth_sta_set_vlan(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int vlan_id
)
4124 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4126 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4129 group
= sm
->wpa_auth
->group
;
4131 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
4133 group
= group
->next
;
4136 if (group
== NULL
) {
4137 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(sm
->wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
4142 if (sm
->group
== group
)
4145 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
4148 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Moving STA " MACSTR
" to use group state "
4149 "machine for VLAN ID %d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), vlan_id
);
4151 wpa_group_get(sm
->wpa_auth
, group
);
4152 wpa_group_put(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
4159 void wpa_auth_eapol_key_tx_status(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4160 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int ack
)
4162 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| sm
== NULL
)
4164 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key TX status for STA " MACSTR
4165 " ack=%d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), ack
);
4166 if (sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
&& ack
) {
4168 * Some deployed supplicant implementations update their SNonce
4169 * for each EAPOL-Key 2/4 message even within the same 4-way
4170 * handshake and then fail to use the first SNonce when
4171 * deriving the PTK. This results in unsuccessful 4-way
4172 * handshake whenever the relatively short initial timeout is
4173 * reached and EAPOL-Key 1/4 is retransmitted. Try to work
4174 * around this by increasing the timeout now that we know that
4175 * the station has received the frame.
4177 int timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
4178 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Increase initial EAPOL-Key 1/4 "
4179 "timeout by %u ms because of acknowledged frame",
4181 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
4182 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000,
4183 (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
4184 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
4189 int wpa_auth_uses_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4193 return wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
4197 int wpa_auth_uses_ft_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4201 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE
;
4206 int wpa_auth_get_ip_addr(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*addr
)
4208 if (sm
== NULL
|| WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0)
4210 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
4213 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
4216 int wpa_auth_radius_das_disconnect_pmksa(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4217 struct radius_das_attrs
*attr
)
4219 return pmksa_cache_auth_radius_das_disconnect(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, attr
);
4223 void wpa_auth_reconfig_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
4225 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4229 for (group
= wpa_auth
->group
; group
; group
= group
->next
)
4230 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
4236 struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data
{
4237 struct wpa_authenticator
*auth
;
4239 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
;
4245 static int wpa_auth_fils_iter(struct wpa_authenticator
*a
, void *ctx
)
4247 struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data
*data
= ctx
;
4249 if (a
== data
->auth
|| !a
->conf
.fils_cache_id_set
||
4250 os_memcmp(a
->conf
.fils_cache_id
, data
->cache_id
,
4251 FILS_CACHE_ID_LEN
) != 0)
4253 data
->pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_get(a
->pmksa
, data
->spa
, data
->pmkid
);
4254 return data
->pmksa
!= NULL
;
4258 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
4259 wpa_auth_pmksa_get_fils_cache_id(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4260 const u8
*sta_addr
, const u8
*pmkid
)
4262 struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data idata
;
4264 if (!wpa_auth
->conf
.fils_cache_id_set
)
4266 idata
.auth
= wpa_auth
;
4267 idata
.cache_id
= wpa_auth
->conf
.fils_cache_id
;
4269 idata
.spa
= sta_addr
;
4270 idata
.pmkid
= pmkid
;
4271 wpa_auth_for_each_auth(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth_fils_iter
, &idata
);
4275 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */