2 * IEEE 802.11 RSN / WPA Authenticator
3 * Copyright (c) 2004-2015, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6 * See README for more details.
9 #include "utils/includes.h"
11 #include "utils/common.h"
12 #include "utils/eloop.h"
13 #include "utils/state_machine.h"
14 #include "utils/bitfield.h"
15 #include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
16 #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
17 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
18 #include "crypto/sha1.h"
19 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
20 #include "crypto/random.h"
21 #include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm.h"
22 #include "ap_config.h"
23 #include "ieee802_11.h"
25 #include "pmksa_cache_auth.h"
26 #include "wpa_auth_i.h"
27 #include "wpa_auth_ie.h"
29 #define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct wpa_state_machine
30 #define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "WPA"
31 #define STATE_MACHINE_ADDR sm->addr
34 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
35 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
36 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp
, struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
, u8
*data
,
38 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
39 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
40 struct wpa_group
*group
);
41 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
42 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
43 struct wpa_group
*group
);
44 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
45 struct wpa_group
*group
);
46 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*snonce
,
47 const u8
*pmk
, unsigned int pmk_len
,
49 static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
50 struct wpa_group
*group
);
51 static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
52 struct wpa_group
*group
);
53 static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
54 struct wpa_group
*group
);
56 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
= 4;
57 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
= 4;
58 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first
= 100; /* ms */
59 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq
= 1000; /* ms */
60 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
= 500; /* ms */
62 /* TODO: make these configurable */
63 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
= 43200;
64 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
= 70;
65 static const int dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
= 60;
68 static inline int wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(
69 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
71 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.mic_failure_report
)
72 return wpa_auth
->cb
.mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
);
77 static inline void wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(
78 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
80 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.psk_failure_report
)
81 wpa_auth
->cb
.psk_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
);
85 static inline void wpa_auth_set_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
86 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
,
89 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.set_eapol
)
90 wpa_auth
->cb
.set_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, var
, value
);
94 static inline int wpa_auth_get_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
95 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
)
97 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_eapol
== NULL
)
99 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, var
);
103 static inline const u8
* wpa_auth_get_psk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
105 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
,
108 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_psk
== NULL
)
110 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_psk(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, p2p_dev_addr
,
115 static inline int wpa_auth_get_msk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
116 const u8
*addr
, u8
*msk
, size_t *len
)
118 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_msk
== NULL
)
120 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_msk(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, msk
, len
);
124 static inline int wpa_auth_set_key(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
126 enum wpa_alg alg
, const u8
*addr
, int idx
,
127 u8
*key
, size_t key_len
)
129 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.set_key
== NULL
)
131 return wpa_auth
->cb
.set_key(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, vlan_id
, alg
, addr
, idx
,
136 static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
137 const u8
*addr
, int idx
, u8
*seq
)
139 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.get_seqnum
== NULL
)
141 return wpa_auth
->cb
.get_seqnum(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, idx
, seq
);
146 wpa_auth_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
147 const u8
*data
, size_t data_len
, int encrypt
)
149 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.send_eapol
== NULL
)
151 return wpa_auth
->cb
.send_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, data
, data_len
,
157 static inline int wpa_auth_start_ampe(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
160 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.start_ampe
== NULL
)
162 return wpa_auth
->cb
.start_ampe(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
);
164 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
167 int wpa_auth_for_each_sta(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
168 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
),
171 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_sta
== NULL
)
173 return wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_sta(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
177 int wpa_auth_for_each_auth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
178 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_authenticator
*a
, void *ctx
),
181 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_auth
== NULL
)
183 return wpa_auth
->cb
.for_each_auth(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
187 void wpa_auth_logger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
188 logger_level level
, const char *txt
)
190 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.logger
== NULL
)
192 wpa_auth
->cb
.logger(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
, level
, txt
);
196 void wpa_auth_vlogger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
197 logger_level level
, const char *fmt
, ...)
203 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.logger
== NULL
)
206 maxlen
= os_strlen(fmt
) + 100;
207 format
= os_malloc(maxlen
);
212 vsnprintf(format
, maxlen
, fmt
, ap
);
215 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, addr
, level
, format
);
221 static void wpa_sta_disconnect(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
224 if (wpa_auth
->cb
.disconnect
== NULL
)
226 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_sta_disconnect STA " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(addr
));
227 wpa_auth
->cb
.disconnect(wpa_auth
->cb
.ctx
, addr
,
228 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
232 static int wpa_use_aes_cmac(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
235 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
236 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
238 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
239 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
240 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
242 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
243 if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
)
249 static void wpa_rekey_gmk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
251 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
253 if (random_get_bytes(wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
)) {
254 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
257 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "GMK rekeyd");
258 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK",
259 wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
262 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
263 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
264 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
269 static void wpa_rekey_gtk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
271 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
272 struct wpa_group
*group
, *next
;
274 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying GTK");
275 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
277 wpa_group_get(wpa_auth
, group
);
279 group
->GTKReKey
= TRUE
;
281 group
->changed
= FALSE
;
282 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
283 } while (group
->changed
);
286 wpa_group_put(wpa_auth
, group
);
290 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
291 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
,
292 0, wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
297 static void wpa_rekey_ptk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
299 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
300 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
302 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying PTK");
303 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
308 static int wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
310 if (sm
->pmksa
== ctx
)
316 static void wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
,
319 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= ctx
;
320 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb
, entry
);
324 static int wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
325 struct wpa_group
*group
)
327 u8 buf
[ETH_ALEN
+ 8 + sizeof(unsigned long)];
331 if (random_get_bytes(group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
) < 0)
333 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK", group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
336 * Counter = PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter",
337 * Local MAC Address || Time)
339 os_memcpy(buf
, wpa_auth
->addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
340 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
);
341 ptr
= (unsigned long) group
;
342 os_memcpy(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
+ 8, &ptr
, sizeof(ptr
));
343 if (random_get_bytes(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
)) < 0)
346 if (sha1_prf(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
), "Init Counter", buf
, sizeof(buf
),
347 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) < 0)
349 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Key Counter",
350 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
356 static struct wpa_group
* wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
357 int vlan_id
, int delay_init
)
359 struct wpa_group
*group
;
361 group
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_group
));
365 group
->GTKAuthenticator
= TRUE
;
366 group
->vlan_id
= vlan_id
;
367 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
369 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
370 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
371 "for secure operations - update keys later when "
372 "the first station connects");
376 * Set initial GMK/Counter value here. The actual values that will be
377 * used in negotiations will be set once the first station tries to
378 * connect. This allows more time for collecting additional randomness
379 * on embedded devices.
381 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
382 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
390 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Delay group state machine start "
391 "until Beacon frames have been configured");
392 /* Initialization is completed in wpa_init_keys(). */
394 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
395 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
396 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
404 * wpa_init - Initialize WPA authenticator
405 * @addr: Authenticator address
406 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
407 * @cb: Callback functions for WPA authenticator
408 * Returns: Pointer to WPA authenticator data or %NULL on failure
410 struct wpa_authenticator
* wpa_init(const u8
*addr
,
411 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
,
412 struct wpa_auth_callbacks
*cb
)
414 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
;
416 wpa_auth
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_authenticator
));
417 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
419 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
420 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
421 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->cb
, cb
, sizeof(*cb
));
423 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
424 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
429 wpa_auth
->group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, 0, 1);
430 if (wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
) {
431 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
436 wpa_auth
->pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_init(wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb
,
438 if (wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
) {
439 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "PMKSA cache initialization failed.");
440 os_free(wpa_auth
->group
);
441 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
446 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
447 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= wpa_ft_pmk_cache_init();
448 if (wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
== NULL
) {
449 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT PMK cache initialization failed.");
450 os_free(wpa_auth
->group
);
451 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
452 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
456 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
458 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
459 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
460 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
463 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
464 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
, 0,
465 wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
469 if (WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
)) {
470 int count
= WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_end
) -
471 WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
) + 1;
475 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
= bitfield_alloc(count
);
477 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
483 int wpa_init_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
485 struct wpa_group
*group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
487 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Start group state machine to set initial "
489 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
490 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
491 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
492 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
499 * wpa_deinit - Deinitialize WPA authenticator
500 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
502 void wpa_deinit(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
504 struct wpa_group
*group
, *prev
;
506 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
507 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
509 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
510 while (wpa_auth
->stsl_negotiations
)
511 wpa_stsl_remove(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth
->stsl_negotiations
);
512 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
514 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
516 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
517 wpa_ft_pmk_cache_deinit(wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
);
518 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= NULL
;
519 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
522 bitfield_free(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
523 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
526 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
528 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
540 * wpa_reconfig - Update WPA authenticator configuration
541 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
542 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
544 int wpa_reconfig(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
545 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
)
547 struct wpa_group
*group
;
548 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
551 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
552 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
553 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
558 * Reinitialize GTK to make sure it is suitable for the new
561 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
562 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
564 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
565 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
566 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
572 struct wpa_state_machine
*
573 wpa_auth_sta_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
574 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
)
576 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
;
578 if (wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
581 sm
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_state_machine
));
584 os_memcpy(sm
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
586 os_memcpy(sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, p2p_dev_addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
588 sm
->wpa_auth
= wpa_auth
;
589 sm
->group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
590 wpa_group_get(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
596 int wpa_auth_sta_associated(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
597 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
599 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
602 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
603 if (sm
->ft_completed
) {
604 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
605 "FT authentication already completed - do not "
606 "start 4-way handshake");
607 /* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
608 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
;
611 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
614 os_memset(&sm
->key_replay
, 0, sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
615 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
616 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
619 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
620 "start authentication");
624 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
625 return 1; /* should not really happen */
627 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
628 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
632 void wpa_auth_sta_no_wpa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
634 /* WPA/RSN was not used - clear WPA state. This is needed if the STA
635 * reassociates back to the same AP while the previous entry for the
636 * STA has not yet been removed. */
640 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
= 0;
644 static void wpa_free_sta_sm(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
647 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
)) {
649 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "P2P: Free assigned IP "
650 "address %u.%u.%u.%u from " MACSTR
,
651 sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
652 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
654 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_start
);
655 bitfield_clear(sm
->wpa_auth
->ip_pool
,
656 WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) - start
);
658 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
659 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
660 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
661 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
663 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
664 os_free(sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
);
665 wpabuf_free(sm
->ft_pending_req_ies
);
666 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
667 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
669 wpa_group_put(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
674 void wpa_auth_sta_deinit(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
679 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
&& sm
->has_GTK
) {
680 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
681 "strict rekeying - force GTK rekey since STA "
683 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
);
684 eloop_register_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
,
688 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
689 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
690 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
691 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
692 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
693 /* Must not free state machine while wpa_sm_step() is running.
694 * Freeing will be completed in the end of wpa_sm_step(). */
695 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Registering pending STA state "
696 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
697 sm
->pending_deinit
= 1;
703 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
708 sm
->PTKRequest
= TRUE
;
713 static int wpa_replay_counter_valid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
714 const u8
*replay_counter
)
717 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
720 if (os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
721 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0)
728 static void wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
729 const u8
*replay_counter
)
732 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
734 (replay_counter
== NULL
||
735 os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
736 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0))
737 ctr
[i
].valid
= FALSE
;
742 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
743 static int ft_check_msg_2_of_4(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
744 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
745 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse
*kde
)
747 struct wpa_ie_data ie
;
748 struct rsn_mdie
*mdie
;
750 if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(kde
->rsn_ie
, kde
->rsn_ie_len
, &ie
) < 0 ||
751 ie
.num_pmkid
!= 1 || ie
.pmkid
== NULL
) {
752 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No PMKR1Name in "
753 "FT 4-way handshake message 2/4");
757 os_memcpy(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, ie
.pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
758 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from Supplicant",
759 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, PMKID_LEN
);
761 if (!kde
->mdie
|| !kde
->ftie
) {
762 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No %s in FT 4-way handshake "
763 "message 2/4", kde
->mdie
? "FTIE" : "MDIE");
767 mdie
= (struct rsn_mdie
*) (kde
->mdie
+ 2);
768 if (kde
->mdie
[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie
) ||
769 os_memcmp(wpa_auth
->conf
.mobility_domain
, mdie
->mobility_domain
,
770 MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN
) != 0) {
771 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: MDIE mismatch");
775 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
776 (kde
->ftie
[1] != sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1] ||
777 os_memcmp(kde
->ftie
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
778 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) != 0)) {
779 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE mismatch");
780 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
781 kde
->ftie
, kde
->ftie_len
);
782 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in (Re)AssocResp",
783 sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
, 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
789 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
792 static int wpa_receive_error_report(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
793 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int group
)
795 /* Supplicant reported a Michael MIC error */
796 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
797 "received EAPOL-Key Error Request "
798 "(STA detected Michael MIC failure (group=%d))",
801 if (group
&& wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
802 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
803 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
804 "group cipher is not TKIP");
805 } else if (!group
&& sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
806 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
807 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
808 "pairwise cipher is not TKIP");
810 if (wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
) > 0)
811 return 1; /* STA entry was removed */
812 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
813 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
817 * Error report is not a request for a new key handshake, but since
818 * Authenticator may do it, let's change the keys now anyway.
820 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
825 static int wpa_try_alt_snonce(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*data
,
830 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
831 unsigned int pmk_len
;
834 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
835 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
836 sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, pmk
);
842 pmk_len
= sm
->pmk_len
;
845 wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, sm
->alt_SNonce
, pmk
, pmk_len
, &PTK
);
847 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, &PTK
, data
, data_len
)
853 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
858 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
859 "WPA: Earlier SNonce did not result in matching MIC");
863 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
864 "WPA: Earlier SNonce resulted in matching MIC");
865 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= 0;
866 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, sm
->alt_SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
867 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
868 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
874 void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
875 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
876 u8
*data
, size_t data_len
)
878 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
879 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
880 u16 key_info
, key_data_length
;
881 enum { PAIRWISE_2
, PAIRWISE_4
, GROUP_2
, REQUEST
,
882 SMK_M1
, SMK_M3
, SMK_ERROR
} msg
;
884 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
886 const u8
*eapol_key_ie
, *key_data
;
887 size_t eapol_key_ie_len
, keyhdrlen
, mic_len
;
890 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
892 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
, "WPA: RX EAPOL data", data
, data_len
);
894 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
895 keyhdrlen
= sizeof(*key
) + mic_len
+ 2;
897 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + keyhdrlen
) {
898 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Ignore too short EAPOL-Key frame");
902 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
903 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
904 mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
905 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
906 key_data
= mic
+ mic_len
+ 2;
907 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(mic
+ mic_len
);
908 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received EAPOL-Key from " MACSTR
909 " key_info=0x%x type=%u mic_len=%u key_data_length=%u",
910 MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), key_info
, key
->type
,
911 (unsigned int) mic_len
, key_data_length
);
912 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
,
913 "WPA: EAPOL-Key header (ending before Key MIC)",
915 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key Key MIC",
917 if (key_data_length
> data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) - keyhdrlen
) {
918 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key frame - "
919 "key_data overflow (%d > %lu)",
921 (unsigned long) (data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
926 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
927 if (key
->type
== EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
929 * Some deployed station implementations seem to send
930 * msg 4/4 with incorrect type value in WPA2 mode.
932 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Workaround: Allow EAPOL-Key "
933 "with unexpected WPA type in RSN mode");
934 } else if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
) {
935 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
936 "unexpected type %d in RSN mode",
941 if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
942 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
943 "unexpected type %d in WPA mode",
949 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Key Nonce", key
->key_nonce
,
951 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Replay Counter",
952 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
954 /* FIX: verify that the EAPOL-Key frame was encrypted if pairwise keys
957 if ((key_info
& (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) ==
958 (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) {
959 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
961 msgtxt
= "SMK Error";
966 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
) {
969 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
972 } else if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) {
974 msgtxt
= "2/2 Group";
975 } else if (key_data_length
== 0) {
977 msgtxt
= "4/4 Pairwise";
980 msgtxt
= "2/4 Pairwise";
983 /* TODO: key_info type validation for PeerKey */
984 if (msg
== REQUEST
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_2
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_4
||
986 u16 ver
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
;
987 if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_CCMP
||
988 sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_GCMP
) {
989 if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
990 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
!= WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
&&
991 !wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
992 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
993 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
995 "advertised support for "
996 "AES-128-CMAC, but did not "
1001 if (!wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
1002 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
) {
1003 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1005 "did not use HMAC-SHA1-AES "
1011 if (wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1012 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED
) {
1013 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
1014 "did not use EAPOL-Key descriptor version 0 as required for AKM-defined cases");
1019 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1020 if (sm
->req_replay_counter_used
&&
1021 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->req_replay_counter
,
1022 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) <= 0) {
1023 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
1024 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1025 "replayed counter");
1030 if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) &&
1031 !wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->key_replay
, key
->replay_counter
)) {
1034 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
1035 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
1036 key
->replay_counter
) &&
1037 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
1038 os_memcmp(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) != 0)
1041 * Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP
1042 * WZC) update SNonce for each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This
1043 * breaks the workaround on accepting any of the
1044 * pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated
1045 * even if we have already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4.
1047 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1048 "Process SNonce update from STA "
1049 "based on retransmitted EAPOL-Key "
1051 sm
->update_snonce
= 1;
1052 os_memcpy(sm
->alt_SNonce
, sm
->SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1053 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= TRUE
;
1054 os_memcpy(sm
->alt_replay_counter
,
1055 sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1056 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1057 goto continue_processing
;
1060 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_4
&& sm
->alt_snonce_valid
&&
1061 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
1062 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->alt_replay_counter
,
1063 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0) {
1065 * Supplicant may still be using the old SNonce since
1066 * there was two EAPOL-Key 2/4 messages and they had
1067 * different SNonce values.
1069 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1070 "Try to process received EAPOL-Key 4/4 based on old Replay Counter and SNonce from an earlier EAPOL-Key 1/4");
1071 goto continue_processing
;
1074 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
1075 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
1076 key
->replay_counter
) &&
1077 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
) {
1078 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1079 "ignore retransmitted EAPOL-Key %s - "
1080 "SNonce did not change", msgtxt
);
1082 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1083 "received EAPOL-Key %s with "
1084 "unexpected replay counter", msgtxt
);
1086 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
1087 if (!sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
)
1089 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "pending replay counter",
1090 sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1091 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1093 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "received replay counter",
1094 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1098 continue_processing
:
1101 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
&&
1102 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
&&
1103 (!sm
->update_snonce
||
1104 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)) {
1105 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1106 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 in "
1107 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1111 random_add_randomness(key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1112 if (sm
->group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
) {
1114 * The system did not have enough entropy to generate
1115 * strong random numbers. Reject the first 4-way
1116 * handshake(s) and collect some entropy based on the
1117 * information from it. Once enough entropy is
1118 * available, the next atempt will trigger GMK/Key
1119 * Counter update and the station will be allowed to
1122 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Reject 4-way handshake to "
1123 "collect more entropy for random number "
1125 random_mark_pool_ready();
1126 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1129 if (wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
, &kde
) < 0) {
1130 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1131 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 with "
1132 "invalid Key Data contents");
1136 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.rsn_ie
;
1137 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.rsn_ie_len
;
1138 } else if (kde
.osen
) {
1139 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.osen
;
1140 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.osen_len
;
1142 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.wpa_ie
;
1143 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.wpa_ie_len
;
1145 ft
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&&
1146 wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
1147 if (sm
->wpa_ie
== NULL
||
1148 wpa_compare_rsn_ie(ft
,
1149 sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
,
1150 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
)) {
1151 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1152 "WPA IE from (Re)AssocReq did not "
1153 "match with msg 2/4");
1155 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in AssocReq",
1156 sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
);
1158 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in msg 2/4",
1159 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
);
1160 /* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
1161 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1164 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1165 if (ft
&& ft_check_msg_2_of_4(wpa_auth
, sm
, &kde
) < 0) {
1166 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1169 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1171 if (kde
.ip_addr_req
&& kde
.ip_addr_req
[0] &&
1172 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
&& WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0) {
1174 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "P2P: IP address requested in "
1175 "EAPOL-Key exchange");
1176 idx
= bitfield_get_first_zero(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
1178 u32 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(wpa_auth
->conf
.
1180 bitfield_set(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
, idx
);
1181 WPA_PUT_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
, start
+ idx
);
1182 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "P2P: Assigned IP "
1183 "address %u.%u.%u.%u to " MACSTR
,
1184 sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
1185 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
1189 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
1192 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
||
1194 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1195 "received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 in "
1196 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1202 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
!= WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
1203 || !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1204 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1205 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/2 in "
1206 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1207 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
1211 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1215 if (!wpa_auth
->conf
.peerkey
) {
1216 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "RSN: SMK M1/M3/Error, but "
1217 "PeerKey use disabled - ignoring message");
1220 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1221 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1222 "received EAPOL-Key msg SMK in "
1223 "invalid state - dropped");
1227 #else /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1231 return; /* STSL disabled - ignore SMK messages */
1232 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1237 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1238 "received EAPOL-Key frame (%s)", msgtxt
);
1240 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) {
1241 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1242 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key Ack set");
1246 if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)) {
1247 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1248 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC not set");
1252 sm
->MICVerified
= FALSE
;
1253 if (sm
->PTK_valid
&& !sm
->update_snonce
) {
1254 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, &sm
->PTK
, data
,
1256 (msg
!= PAIRWISE_4
|| !sm
->alt_snonce_valid
||
1257 wpa_try_alt_snonce(sm
, data
, data_len
))) {
1258 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1259 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1262 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
1263 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1264 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1267 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1268 if (sm
->MICVerified
) {
1269 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 1;
1270 os_memcpy(sm
->req_replay_counter
, key
->replay_counter
,
1271 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1273 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1274 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1280 * TODO: should decrypt key data field if encryption was used;
1281 * even though MAC address KDE is not normally encrypted,
1282 * supplicant is allowed to encrypt it.
1284 if (msg
== SMK_ERROR
) {
1285 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1286 wpa_smk_error(wpa_auth
, sm
, key_data
, key_data_length
);
1287 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1289 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
1290 if (wpa_receive_error_report(
1292 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) > 0)
1293 return; /* STA entry was removed */
1294 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
) {
1295 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1296 "received EAPOL-Key Request for new "
1298 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
1299 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1300 } else if (msg
== SMK_M1
) {
1301 wpa_smk_m1(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
, key_data
,
1303 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1304 } else if (key_data_length
> 0 &&
1305 wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
,
1309 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1310 "received EAPOL-Key Request for GTK "
1312 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1313 wpa_rekey_gtk(wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1316 /* Do not allow the same key replay counter to be reused. */
1317 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
,
1318 key
->replay_counter
);
1320 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
) {
1322 * Maintain a copy of the pending EAPOL-Key frames in
1323 * case the EAPOL-Key frame was retransmitted. This is
1324 * needed to allow EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 reply to another
1325 * pending msg 1/4 to update the SNonce to work around
1326 * unexpected supplicant behavior.
1328 os_memcpy(sm
->prev_key_replay
, sm
->key_replay
,
1329 sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
1331 os_memset(sm
->prev_key_replay
, 0,
1332 sizeof(sm
->prev_key_replay
));
1336 * Make sure old valid counters are not accepted anymore and
1337 * do not get copied again.
1339 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
, NULL
);
1342 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1343 if (msg
== SMK_M3
) {
1344 wpa_smk_m3(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
, key_data
, key_data_length
);
1347 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1349 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
1350 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
= os_malloc(data_len
);
1351 if (sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
== NULL
)
1353 os_memcpy(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
, data
, data_len
);
1354 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
= data_len
;
1356 sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
);
1357 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= TRUE
;
1358 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1359 sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
);
1360 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1365 static int wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8
*gmk
, const char *label
, const u8
*addr
,
1366 const u8
*gnonce
, u8
*gtk
, size_t gtk_len
)
1368 u8 data
[ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
+ 8 + 16];
1372 /* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion",
1373 * AA || GNonce || Time || random data)
1374 * The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and
1375 * GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation
1376 * is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be
1379 os_memcpy(data
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
1380 os_memcpy(data
+ ETH_ALEN
, gnonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1381 pos
= data
+ ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
;
1382 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos
);
1384 if (random_get_bytes(pos
, 16) < 0)
1387 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1388 sha256_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
);
1389 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1390 if (sha1_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
)
1393 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1399 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
1401 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
1402 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
1404 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1405 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "EAPOL-Key timeout");
1406 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= TRUE
;
1411 void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1412 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1413 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1414 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1415 int keyidx
, int encr
, int force_version
)
1417 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1418 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1419 size_t len
, mic_len
, keyhdrlen
;
1421 int key_data_len
, pad_len
= 0;
1423 int version
, pairwise
;
1425 u8
*key_mic
, *key_data
;
1427 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
1428 keyhdrlen
= sizeof(*key
) + mic_len
+ 2;
1430 len
= sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_hdr
) + keyhdrlen
;
1433 version
= force_version
;
1434 else if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1435 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1436 wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1437 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED
;
1438 else if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
))
1439 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
;
1440 else if (sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
)
1441 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
;
1443 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4
;
1445 pairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1447 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Send EAPOL(version=%d secure=%d mic=%d "
1448 "ack=%d install=%d pairwise=%d kde_len=%lu keyidx=%d "
1451 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
) ? 1 : 0,
1452 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) ? 1 : 0,
1453 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) ? 1 : 0,
1454 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
) ? 1 : 0,
1455 pairwise
, (unsigned long) kde_len
, keyidx
, encr
);
1457 key_data_len
= kde_len
;
1459 if ((version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1460 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1461 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1462 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) && encr
) {
1463 pad_len
= key_data_len
% 8;
1465 pad_len
= 8 - pad_len
;
1466 key_data_len
+= pad_len
+ 8;
1469 len
+= key_data_len
;
1471 hdr
= os_zalloc(len
);
1474 hdr
->version
= wpa_auth
->conf
.eapol_version
;
1475 hdr
->type
= IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY
;
1476 hdr
->length
= host_to_be16(len
- sizeof(*hdr
));
1477 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1478 key_mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
1479 key_data
= ((u8
*) (hdr
+ 1)) + keyhdrlen
;
1481 key
->type
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
1482 EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
: EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
;
1483 key_info
|= version
;
1484 if (encr
&& sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1485 key_info
|= WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
;
1486 if (sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1487 key_info
|= keyidx
<< WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_INDEX_SHIFT
;
1488 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_info
, key_info
);
1490 alg
= pairwise
? sm
->pairwise
: wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
;
1491 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, wpa_cipher_key_len(alg
));
1492 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
)
1493 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, 0);
1495 /* FIX: STSL: what to use as key_replay_counter? */
1496 for (i
= RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
- 1; i
> 0; i
--) {
1497 sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
= sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].valid
;
1498 os_memcpy(sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1499 sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].counter
,
1500 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1502 inc_byte_array(sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1503 os_memcpy(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1504 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1505 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Replay Counter",
1506 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1507 sm
->key_replay
[0].valid
= TRUE
;
1510 os_memcpy(key
->key_nonce
, nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1513 os_memcpy(key
->key_rsc
, key_rsc
, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
1516 os_memcpy(key_data
, kde
, kde_len
);
1517 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, kde_len
);
1518 } else if (encr
&& kde
) {
1519 buf
= os_zalloc(key_data_len
);
1525 os_memcpy(pos
, kde
, kde_len
);
1531 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1533 if (version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1534 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1535 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1536 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
1537 if (aes_wrap(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
,
1538 (key_data_len
- 8) / 8, buf
, key_data
)) {
1543 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, key_data_len
);
1544 #ifndef CONFIG_NO_RC4
1545 } else if (sm
->PTK
.kek_len
== 16) {
1547 os_memcpy(key
->key_iv
,
1548 sm
->group
->Counter
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
- 16, 16);
1549 inc_byte_array(sm
->group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1550 os_memcpy(ek
, key
->key_iv
, 16);
1551 os_memcpy(ek
+ 16, sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1552 os_memcpy(key_data
, buf
, key_data_len
);
1553 rc4_skip(ek
, 32, 256, key_data
, key_data_len
);
1554 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, key_data_len
);
1555 #endif /* CONFIG_NO_RC4 */
1564 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) {
1565 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1566 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1567 "PTK not valid when sending EAPOL-Key "
1573 wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm
->PTK
.kck
, sm
->PTK
.kck_len
,
1574 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, version
,
1575 (u8
*) hdr
, len
, key_mic
);
1576 #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
1578 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
> 0.0 &&
1580 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
) {
1581 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1582 "Corrupting group EAPOL-Key Key MIC");
1585 #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
1588 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_inc_EapolFramesTx
,
1590 wpa_auth_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, (u8
*) hdr
, len
,
1596 static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1597 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1598 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1599 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1600 int keyidx
, int encr
)
1603 int pairwise
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
;
1609 __wpa_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
, key_info
, key_rsc
, nonce
, kde
, kde_len
,
1612 ctr
= pairwise
? sm
->TimeoutCtr
: sm
->GTimeoutCtr
;
1613 if (ctr
== 1 && wpa_auth
->conf
.tx_status
)
1614 timeout_ms
= pairwise
? eapol_key_timeout_first
:
1615 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
;
1617 timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
1618 if (pairwise
&& ctr
== 1 && !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
))
1619 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 1;
1620 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
1621 "counter %d)", timeout_ms
, ctr
);
1622 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000, (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
1623 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1627 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp
, struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
, u8
*data
,
1630 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1631 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1634 u8 mic
[WPA_EAPOL_KEY_MIC_MAX_LEN
], *mic_pos
;
1635 size_t mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(akmp
);
1637 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + sizeof(*key
))
1640 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
1641 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1642 mic_pos
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
1643 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
1644 os_memcpy(mic
, mic_pos
, mic_len
);
1645 os_memset(mic_pos
, 0, mic_len
);
1646 if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK
->kck
, PTK
->kck_len
, akmp
,
1647 key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
,
1648 data
, data_len
, mic_pos
) ||
1649 os_memcmp_const(mic
, mic_pos
, mic_len
) != 0)
1651 os_memcpy(mic_pos
, mic
, mic_len
);
1656 void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1658 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1659 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1660 wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE
, sm
->addr
, 0, NULL
, 0);
1661 sm
->pairwise_set
= FALSE
;
1662 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
1666 int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, enum wpa_event event
)
1673 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1674 "event %d notification", event
);
1679 /* PTKs are derived through AMPE */
1680 if (wpa_auth_start_ampe(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
)) {
1685 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
1690 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1693 case WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
:
1696 * When using WPS, we may end up here if the STA
1697 * manages to re-associate without the previous STA
1698 * entry getting removed. Consequently, we need to make
1699 * sure that the WPA state machines gets initialized
1700 * properly at this point.
1702 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA state machine had not been "
1703 "started - initialize now");
1706 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
1707 return 1; /* should not really happen */
1709 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1712 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
1714 * Reauthentication cancels the pending group key
1715 * update for this STA.
1717 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1718 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1719 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= TRUE
;
1721 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1724 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1725 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Retry PTK configuration "
1726 "after association");
1727 wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm
);
1729 /* Using FT protocol, not WPA auth state machine */
1730 sm
->ft_completed
= 1;
1732 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1734 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1737 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1738 sm
->ft_completed
= 0;
1739 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1741 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1742 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
&& event
== WPA_AUTH
)
1744 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1747 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1748 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1750 if (event
!= WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
)
1754 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
1756 * wpa_sm_step() is already running - avoid recursive call to
1757 * it by making the existing loop process the new update.
1762 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
1766 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
)
1768 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
, wpa_ptk
);
1770 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
1771 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
1772 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
1776 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
1777 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1778 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1779 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
1780 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
1781 if (1 /* Unicast cipher supported AND (ESS OR ((IBSS or WDS) and
1782 * Local AA > Remote AA)) */) {
1785 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 0);
1787 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 0);
1789 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1790 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1791 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 0);
1796 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
)
1798 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
, wpa_ptk
);
1799 sm
->Disconnect
= FALSE
;
1800 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
1804 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
)
1806 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
, wpa_ptk
);
1807 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1811 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
)
1813 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
, wpa_ptk
);
1814 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1815 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1816 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portControl_Auto
,
1818 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 1);
1819 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1823 static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1824 struct wpa_group
*group
)
1826 if (group
->first_sta_seen
)
1829 * System has run bit further than at the time hostapd was started
1830 * potentially very early during boot up. This provides better chances
1831 * of collecting more randomness on embedded systems. Re-initialize the
1832 * GMK and Counter here to improve their strength if there was not
1833 * enough entropy available immediately after system startup.
1835 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Re-initialize GMK/Counter on first "
1837 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
1838 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
1839 "to proceed - reject first 4-way handshake");
1840 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1842 group
->first_sta_seen
= TRUE
;
1843 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= FALSE
;
1846 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0 ||
1847 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0 ||
1848 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
1849 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: GMK/GTK setup failed");
1850 group
->first_sta_seen
= FALSE
;
1851 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1856 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
)
1858 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
, wpa_ptk
);
1860 wpa_group_ensure_init(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
1861 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1864 * Definition of ANonce selection in IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 is somewhat
1865 * ambiguous. The Authenticator state machine uses a counter that is
1866 * incremented by one for each 4-way handshake. However, the security
1867 * analysis of 4-way handshake points out that unpredictable nonces
1868 * help in preventing precomputation attacks. Instead of the state
1869 * machine definition, use an unpredictable nonce value here to provide
1870 * stronger protection against potential precomputation attacks.
1872 if (random_get_bytes(sm
->ANonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
)) {
1873 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: Failed to get random data for "
1875 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1878 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Assign ANonce", sm
->ANonce
,
1880 /* IEEE 802.11i does not clear TimeoutCtr here, but this is more
1881 * logical place than INITIALIZE since AUTHENTICATION2 can be
1882 * re-entered on ReAuthenticationRequest without going through
1888 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
)
1890 u8 msk
[2 * PMK_LEN
];
1891 size_t len
= 2 * PMK_LEN
;
1893 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
, wpa_ptk
);
1894 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1896 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1898 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from PMKSA cache");
1899 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
);
1900 sm
->pmk_len
= sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
;
1901 } else if (wpa_auth_get_msk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, msk
, &len
) == 0) {
1902 unsigned int pmk_len
;
1904 if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
& WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192
)
1905 pmk_len
= PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
;
1908 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from EAPOL state machine "
1909 "(MSK len=%lu PMK len=%u)", (unsigned long) len
,
1911 if (len
< pmk_len
) {
1912 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1913 "WPA: MSK not long enough (%u) to create PMK (%u)",
1914 (unsigned int) len
, (unsigned int) pmk_len
);
1915 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1918 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, msk
, pmk_len
);
1919 sm
->pmk_len
= pmk_len
;
1920 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1921 if (len
>= 2 * PMK_LEN
) {
1922 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, msk
+ PMK_LEN
, PMK_LEN
);
1923 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1925 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1927 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Could not get PMK, get_msk: %p",
1928 sm
->wpa_auth
->cb
.get_msk
);
1929 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1932 os_memset(msk
, 0, sizeof(msk
));
1934 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
1935 /* IEEE 802.11i does not set keyRun to FALSE, but not doing this
1936 * will break reauthentication since EAPOL state machines may not be
1937 * get into AUTHENTICATING state that clears keyRun before WPA state
1938 * machine enters AUTHENTICATION2 state and goes immediately to INITPMK
1939 * state and takes PMK from the previously used AAA Key. This will
1940 * eventually fail in 4-Way Handshake because Supplicant uses PMK
1941 * derived from the new AAA Key. Setting keyRun = FALSE here seems to
1942 * be good workaround for this issue. */
1943 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
, 0);
1947 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
)
1950 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
, wpa_ptk
);
1951 psk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, NULL
);
1953 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
1954 sm
->pmk_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1955 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1956 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
1957 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1958 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1960 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
1964 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
)
1966 u8 buf
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
], *pmkid
= NULL
;
1967 size_t pmkid_len
= 0;
1969 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
, wpa_ptk
);
1970 sm
->PTKRequest
= FALSE
;
1971 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
1972 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= FALSE
;
1975 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
1976 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
1977 * immediately following this. */
1981 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1982 "sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
1984 * TODO: Could add PMKID even with WPA2-PSK, but only if there is only
1985 * one possible PSK for this STA.
1987 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&&
1988 wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1989 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
!= WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
) {
1991 pmkid_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
1992 pmkid
[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC
;
1993 pmkid
[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
1994 RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid
[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID
);
1996 os_memcpy(&pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
1997 sm
->pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
1998 } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1999 /* No KCK available to derive PMKID */
2003 * Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was
2004 * available with pre-calculated PMKID.
2006 rsn_pmkid(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmk_len
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2007 sm
->addr
, &pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
2008 wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
));
2011 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2012 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
, NULL
,
2013 sm
->ANonce
, pmkid
, pmkid_len
, 0, 0);
2017 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*snonce
,
2018 const u8
*pmk
, unsigned int pmk_len
,
2019 struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
)
2021 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2022 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2023 return wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm
, pmk
, ptk
);
2024 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2026 return wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk
, pmk_len
, "Pairwise key expansion",
2027 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, sm
->ANonce
, snonce
,
2028 ptk
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pairwise
);
2032 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
)
2035 int ok
= 0, psk_found
= 0;
2036 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
2037 unsigned int pmk_len
;
2039 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
2040 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2041 sm
->update_snonce
= FALSE
;
2043 /* WPA with IEEE 802.1X: use the derived PMK from EAP
2044 * WPA-PSK: iterate through possible PSKs and select the one matching
2047 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2048 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2049 sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, pmk
);
2056 pmk_len
= sm
->pmk_len
;
2059 wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, sm
->SNonce
, pmk
, pmk_len
, &PTK
);
2061 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, &PTK
,
2062 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
,
2063 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
) == 0) {
2068 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2073 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2074 "invalid MIC in msg 2/4 of 4-Way Handshake");
2076 wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2080 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2081 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2083 * Verify that PMKR1Name from EAPOL-Key message 2/4 matches
2084 * with the value we derived.
2086 if (os_memcmp_const(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
,
2087 WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
) != 0) {
2088 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2089 "PMKR1Name mismatch in FT 4-way "
2091 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from "
2093 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2094 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Derived PMKR1Name",
2095 sm
->pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2099 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2101 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
2102 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
2104 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2105 /* PSK may have changed from the previous choice, so update
2106 * state machine data based on whatever PSK was selected here.
2108 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
2109 sm
->pmk_len
= PMK_LEN
;
2112 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
2114 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
2115 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
2119 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
)
2121 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
, wpa_ptk
);
2126 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2128 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2130 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
) {
2132 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2133 return 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
+ len
;
2140 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2142 struct wpa_igtk_kde igtk
;
2143 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2144 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
2145 size_t len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2147 if (!sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
)
2150 igtk
.keyid
[0] = gsm
->GN_igtk
;
2152 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
!= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
||
2153 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, rsc
) < 0)
2154 os_memset(igtk
.pn
, 0, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
2156 os_memcpy(igtk
.pn
, rsc
, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
2157 os_memcpy(igtk
.igtk
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
2158 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2160 * Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of
2163 if (random_get_bytes(igtk
.igtk
, len
) < 0)
2166 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK
,
2167 (const u8
*) &igtk
, WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
+ len
,
2173 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2175 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2181 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2186 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2189 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)
2191 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
], *_rsc
, *gtk
, *kde
, *pos
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2192 size_t gtk_len
, kde_len
;
2193 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2195 int wpa_ie_len
, secure
, keyidx
, encr
= 0;
2197 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
2198 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
2201 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
2202 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2203 * immediately following this. */
2207 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
2208 GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
2210 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
2211 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
2212 /* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
2213 wpa_ie
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
2214 wpa_ie_len
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
2215 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&&
2216 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
) &&
2217 wpa_ie_len
> wpa_ie
[1] + 2 && wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN
) {
2218 /* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE and possible MDIE */
2219 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2220 if (wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN
)
2221 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2222 wpa_ie_len
= wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2224 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2225 "sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
2226 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
2227 /* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
2229 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2230 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2231 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2233 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2234 * of GTK in the BSS.
2236 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gtk_len
) < 0)
2244 /* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
2250 if (sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
) {
2252 * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
2253 * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
2254 * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
2255 * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
2256 * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
2257 * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
2259 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2260 "STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - "
2261 "set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
2266 kde_len
= wpa_ie_len
+ ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
2268 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gtk_len
;
2269 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2270 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2271 kde_len
+= 2 + PMKID_LEN
; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
2272 kde_len
+= 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
2274 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2276 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0)
2277 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 3 * 4;
2278 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2279 kde
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
2284 os_memcpy(pos
, wpa_ie
, wpa_ie_len
);
2286 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2287 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2292 res
= wpa_insert_pmkid(kde
, &elen
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
);
2294 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert "
2295 "PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
2302 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2305 hdr
[0] = keyidx
& 0x03;
2307 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2310 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
2312 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2313 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2315 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
;
2317 conf
= &sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
;
2318 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
2319 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
>= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) {
2320 os_memcpy(pos
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
2321 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
2322 res
= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1];
2324 res
= wpa_write_ftie(conf
, conf
->r0_key_holder
,
2325 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
2327 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
,
2331 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE "
2332 "into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
2338 /* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
2339 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
2341 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE
;
2342 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->reassociation_deadline
);
2345 /* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
2346 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
2348 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME
;
2349 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->r0_key_lifetime
* 60);
2352 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2354 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0) {
2356 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
2357 os_memcpy(addr
+ 4, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_mask
, 4);
2358 os_memcpy(addr
+ 8, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_go
, 4);
2359 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, WFA_KEY_DATA_IP_ADDR_ALLOC
,
2360 addr
, sizeof(addr
), NULL
, 0);
2362 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2364 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2365 (secure
? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
: 0) | WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
|
2366 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
|
2367 WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
,
2368 _rsc
, sm
->ANonce
, kde
, pos
- kde
, keyidx
, encr
);
2373 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
)
2375 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
, wpa_ptk
);
2376 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2378 enum wpa_alg alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm
->pairwise
);
2379 int klen
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->pairwise
);
2380 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, alg
, sm
->addr
, 0,
2381 sm
->PTK
.tk
, klen
)) {
2382 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2385 /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2386 sm
->pairwise_set
= TRUE
;
2388 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_ptk_rekey
) {
2389 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
2390 eloop_register_timeout(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.
2391 wpa_ptk_rekey
, 0, wpa_rekey_ptk
,
2395 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2396 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2397 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 1);
2401 if (0 /* IBSS == TRUE */) {
2403 if (sm
->keycount
== 2) {
2404 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2405 WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 1);
2408 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
,
2411 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
, 0);
2412 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyDone
, 1);
2413 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
2414 sm
->PInitAKeys
= TRUE
;
2417 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2418 "pairwise key handshake completed (%s)",
2419 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
2421 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2422 wpa_ft_push_pmk_r1(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2423 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2429 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2432 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
2433 else if (sm
->Disconnect
2434 /* || FIX: dot11RSNAConfigSALifetime timeout */) {
2435 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2436 "WPA_PTK: sm->Disconnect");
2437 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2439 else if (sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
)
2440 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
2441 else if (sm
->AuthenticationRequest
)
2442 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
);
2443 else if (sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
)
2444 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
2445 else if (sm
->PTKRequest
)
2446 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2447 else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
) {
2448 case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE
:
2450 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT
:
2451 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
2453 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECTED
:
2454 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
2456 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION
:
2457 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
2459 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION2
:
2460 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
2461 wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2462 WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
) > 0)
2463 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
);
2464 else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)
2465 /* FIX: && 802.1X::keyRun */)
2466 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
);
2468 case WPA_PTK_INITPMK
:
2469 if (wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2470 WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
) > 0)
2471 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2473 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2474 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2475 "INITPMK - keyAvailable = false");
2476 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2479 case WPA_PTK_INITPSK
:
2480 if (wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
,
2482 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2484 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2485 "no PSK configured for the STA");
2486 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2487 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2490 case WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
:
2491 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2492 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
2493 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2494 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
2495 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
2496 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2497 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2498 "PTKSTART: Retry limit %d reached",
2499 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
);
2500 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2501 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2502 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2504 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
:
2505 if (sm
->MICVerified
)
2506 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
);
2507 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2508 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
2509 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2510 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2511 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
2513 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
:
2514 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
2516 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
:
2517 if (sm
->update_snonce
)
2518 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
2519 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2520 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
2521 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
);
2522 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
2523 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
) {
2524 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
2525 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2526 "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %d "
2528 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
);
2529 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
2530 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2531 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
2533 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
:
2539 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
)
2541 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2543 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
2544 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
2545 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
2547 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
2551 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
)
2553 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
2554 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2556 u8
*kde_buf
= NULL
, *pos
, hdr
[2];
2558 u8
*gtk
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2560 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2563 if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
> (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
) {
2564 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2565 * immediately following this. */
2569 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
2570 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
2571 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
2572 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
2573 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
2574 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
)
2575 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
2576 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2577 "sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake");
2579 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2580 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2582 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2583 * of GTK in the BSS.
2585 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gsm
->GTK_len
) < 0)
2589 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
2590 kde_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gsm
->GTK_len
+
2591 ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
2592 kde_buf
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
2593 if (kde_buf
== NULL
)
2596 kde
= pos
= kde_buf
;
2597 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
2599 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2601 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
2602 kde_len
= pos
- kde
;
2605 kde_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2608 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2609 WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
|
2611 (!sm
->Pair
? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
: 0),
2612 rsc
, gsm
->GNonce
, kde
, kde_len
, gsm
->GN
, 1);
2618 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
)
2620 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2621 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2622 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
2623 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
2624 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
2625 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
2626 /* FIX: MLME.SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2627 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2628 "group key handshake completed (%s)",
2629 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
2634 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
)
2636 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
, wpa_ptk_group
);
2637 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
2638 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
2639 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
2640 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
2644 SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP
)
2646 if (sm
->Init
|| sm
->PtkGroupInit
) {
2647 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
2648 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= FALSE
;
2649 } else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
) {
2650 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_IDLE
:
2651 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
||
2652 (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&& sm
->PInitAKeys
))
2653 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
2655 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
:
2656 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
2657 !sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
2658 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
);
2659 else if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
>
2660 (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
)
2661 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
);
2662 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
2663 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
2665 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_KEYERROR
:
2666 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
2668 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYESTABLISHED
:
2669 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
2675 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2676 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2680 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2681 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2682 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "Group key expansion",
2683 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
2684 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
2686 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GTK",
2687 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
);
2689 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2690 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
2692 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2693 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2694 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
2695 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "IGTK key expansion",
2696 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
2697 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
) < 0)
2699 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "IGTK",
2700 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
2702 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2708 static void wpa_group_gtk_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2709 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2711 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2712 "GTK_INIT (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
2713 group
->changed
= FALSE
; /* GInit is not cleared here; avoid loop */
2714 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
;
2717 os_memset(group
->GTK
, 0, sizeof(group
->GTK
));
2720 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2723 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2724 /* GTK[GN] = CalcGTK() */
2725 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
2729 static int wpa_group_update_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
2731 if (ctx
!= NULL
&& ctx
!= sm
->group
)
2734 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
) {
2735 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2736 "Not in PTKINITDONE; skip Group Key update");
2737 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
2740 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
2742 * This should not really happen, so add a debug log entry.
2743 * Since we clear the GKeyDoneStations before the loop, the
2744 * station needs to be counted here anyway.
2746 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2747 "GUpdateStationKeys was already set when "
2748 "marking station for GTK rekeying");
2751 /* Do not rekey GTK/IGTK when STA is in WNM-Sleep Mode */
2752 if (sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
2755 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
++;
2756 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= TRUE
;
2764 /* update GTK when exiting WNM-Sleep Mode */
2765 void wpa_wnmsleep_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2767 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
2770 wpa_group_update_sta(sm
, NULL
);
2774 void wpa_set_wnmsleep(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int flag
)
2777 sm
->is_wnmsleep
= !!flag
;
2781 int wpa_wnmsleep_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2783 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2788 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] |
2791 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_GTK
;
2792 *pos
++ = 11 + gsm
->GTK_len
;
2793 /* Key ID in B0-B1 of Key Info */
2794 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN
& 0x03);
2796 *pos
++ = gsm
->GTK_len
;
2797 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, pos
) != 0)
2800 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
2801 pos
+= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2803 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2805 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2806 gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
2812 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2813 int wpa_wnmsleep_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2815 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2817 size_t len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2821 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] | Key[16]
2823 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK
;
2824 *pos
++ = 2 + 6 + len
;
2825 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN_igtk
);
2827 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, pos
) != 0)
2831 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
2834 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2836 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2837 gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
2841 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2842 #endif /* CONFIG_WNM */
2845 static void wpa_group_setkeys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2846 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2850 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2851 "SETKEYS (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
2852 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
2853 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
;
2854 group
->GTKReKey
= FALSE
;
2856 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
2858 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2859 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
2860 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
2861 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
2862 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2863 /* "GKeyDoneStations = GNoStations" is done in more robust way by
2864 * counting the STAs that are marked with GUpdateStationKeys instead of
2865 * including all STAs that could be in not-yet-completed state. */
2866 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
2868 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
) {
2869 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: Unexpected "
2870 "GKeyDoneStations=%d when starting new GTK rekey",
2871 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
2872 group
->GKeyDoneStations
= 0;
2874 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_update_sta
, group
);
2875 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: GKeyDoneStations=%d",
2876 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
2880 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2881 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2885 if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
,
2886 wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
),
2887 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN
,
2888 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
2891 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2892 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
2896 alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2897 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2900 wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
, alg
,
2901 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN_igtk
,
2902 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
) < 0)
2905 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2911 static int wpa_group_disconnect_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
2913 if (sm
->group
== ctx
) {
2914 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Mark STA " MACSTR
2915 " for discconnection due to fatal failure",
2917 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
2924 static void wpa_group_fatal_failure(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2925 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2927 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state FATAL_FAILURE");
2928 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
2929 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
;
2930 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_disconnect_cb
, group
);
2934 static int wpa_group_setkeysdone(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2935 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2937 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2938 "SETKEYSDONE (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
2939 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
2940 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
;
2942 if (wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
2943 wpa_group_fatal_failure(wpa_auth
, group
);
2951 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
2952 struct wpa_group
*group
)
2955 wpa_group_gtk_init(wpa_auth
, group
);
2956 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
) {
2957 /* Do not allow group operations */
2958 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
&&
2959 group
->GTKAuthenticator
) {
2960 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
2961 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
&&
2963 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
2964 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
) {
2965 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
== 0)
2966 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
2967 else if (group
->GTKReKey
)
2968 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
2973 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2978 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
2979 /* This should not happen, but if it does, make sure we do not
2980 * end up freeing the state machine too early by exiting the
2981 * recursive call. */
2982 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: wpa_sm_step() called recursively");
2986 sm
->in_step_loop
= 1;
2988 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
2991 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
2992 sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
= FALSE
;
2994 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK
);
2995 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
2997 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK_GROUP
);
2998 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
3000 wpa_group_sm_step(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
3001 } while (sm
->changed
|| sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
);
3002 sm
->in_step_loop
= 0;
3004 if (sm
->pending_deinit
) {
3005 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Completing pending STA state "
3006 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
3007 wpa_free_sta_sm(sm
);
3014 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
3016 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= eloop_ctx
;
3021 void wpa_auth_sm_notify(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3025 eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
3029 void wpa_gtk_rekey(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3032 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3034 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3037 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
3039 for (i
= 0; i
< 2; i
++) {
3041 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
3043 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3044 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
3045 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
3046 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
3047 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3048 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3049 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
3054 static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int val
)
3056 return val
? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
3060 #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
3061 #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
3062 ((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff
3064 int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
3067 char pmkid_txt
[PMKID_LEN
* 2 + 1];
3068 #ifdef CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH
3069 const int preauth
= 1;
3070 #else /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
3071 const int preauth
= 0;
3072 #endif /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
3074 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3077 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3078 "dot11RSNAOptionImplemented=TRUE\n"
3079 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationImplemented=%s\n"
3080 "dot11RSNAEnabled=%s\n"
3081 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationEnabled=%s\n",
3082 wpa_bool_txt(preauth
),
3083 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
),
3084 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.rsn_preauth
));
3085 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3089 wpa_snprintf_hex(pmkid_txt
, sizeof(pmkid_txt
),
3090 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, PMKID_LEN
);
3093 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3094 "dot11RSNAConfigVersion=%u\n"
3095 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseKeysSupported=9999\n"
3096 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipher */
3097 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyMethod */
3098 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime */
3099 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyPackets */
3100 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict=%u\n"
3101 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount=%u\n"
3102 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount=%u\n"
3103 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipherSize=%u\n"
3104 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=%u\n"
3105 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=%u\n"
3106 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfPTKSAReplayCounters=0\n"
3107 "dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=%u\n"
3108 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3109 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3110 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3111 "dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed=%s\n"
3112 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3113 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3114 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3115 "dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked=%u\n"
3116 "dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures=%u\n"
3117 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n",
3119 !!wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
,
3120 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount
,
3121 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount
,
3122 wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
) * 8,
3123 dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
,
3124 dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
,
3125 dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
,
3126 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected
),
3127 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected
),
3128 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected
),
3130 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested
),
3131 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested
),
3132 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested
),
3133 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
,
3134 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
);
3135 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3139 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseCiphersTable */
3140 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable */
3143 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
, "hostapdWPAGroupState=%d\n",
3144 wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
);
3145 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3153 int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
3161 /* TODO: FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF entry for broadcast/multicast stats */
3163 /* dot11RSNAStatsEntry */
3165 pairwise
= wpa_cipher_to_suite(sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
3166 WPA_PROTO_RSN
: WPA_PROTO_WPA
,
3172 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3173 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsIndex */
3174 "dot11RSNAStatsSTAAddress=" MACSTR
"\n"
3175 "dot11RSNAStatsVersion=1\n"
3176 "dot11RSNAStatsSelectedPairwiseCipher=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3177 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPICVErrors */
3178 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures=%u\n"
3179 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures=%u\n"
3180 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
3181 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors */
3182 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPReplays */,
3184 RSN_SUITE_ARG(pairwise
),
3185 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
,
3186 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
);
3187 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3192 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3193 "hostapdWPAPTKState=%d\n"
3194 "hostapdWPAPTKGroupState=%d\n",
3196 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
3197 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3205 void wpa_auth_countermeasures_start(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3208 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
++;
3212 int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3214 return sm
&& sm
->pairwise_set
;
3218 int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3220 return sm
->pairwise
;
3224 int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3228 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
;
3232 int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3240 int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
3241 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
)
3243 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->pmksa
!= entry
)
3250 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
3251 wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3253 return sm
? sm
->pmksa
: NULL
;
3257 void wpa_auth_sta_local_mic_failure_report(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3260 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
++;
3264 const u8
* wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, size_t *len
)
3266 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3268 *len
= wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
3269 return wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
3273 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
3274 unsigned int pmk_len
,
3275 int session_timeout
, struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
3277 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
||
3278 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
3281 if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
& WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192
) {
3282 if (pmk_len
> PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
)
3283 pmk_len
= PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
;
3284 } else if (pmk_len
> PMK_LEN
) {
3288 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(sm
->wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, pmk_len
, NULL
,
3289 sm
->PTK
.kck
, sm
->PTK
.kck_len
,
3290 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, session_timeout
,
3291 eapol
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
3298 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_preauth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3299 const u8
*pmk
, size_t len
, const u8
*sta_addr
,
3300 int session_timeout
,
3301 struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
3303 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3306 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, len
, NULL
,
3309 sta_addr
, session_timeout
, eapol
,
3310 WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X
))
3317 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_sae(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
3318 const u8
*pmk
, const u8
*pmkid
)
3320 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
3323 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
, pmkid
,
3325 wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, 0, NULL
,
3333 void wpa_auth_pmksa_remove(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3336 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
;
3338 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
)
3340 pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, sta_addr
, NULL
);
3342 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Remove PMKSA cache entry for "
3343 MACSTR
" based on request", MAC2STR(sta_addr
));
3344 pmksa_cache_free_entry(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmksa
);
3349 int wpa_auth_pmksa_list(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
,
3352 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3354 return pmksa_cache_auth_list(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, buf
, len
);
3358 void wpa_auth_pmksa_flush(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3360 if (wpa_auth
&& wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3361 pmksa_cache_auth_flush(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
3365 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
3366 wpa_auth_pmksa_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*sta_addr
)
3368 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
3370 return pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, sta_addr
, NULL
);
3374 void wpa_auth_pmksa_set_to_sm(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
,
3375 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
3376 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3383 os_memcpy(pmk
, pmksa
->pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
3384 os_memcpy(pmkid
, pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
3385 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
3390 * Remove and free the group from wpa_authenticator. This is triggered by a
3391 * callback to make sure nobody is currently iterating the group list while it
3394 static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3395 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3397 struct wpa_group
*prev
= wpa_auth
->group
;
3399 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Remove group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
3403 if (prev
->next
== group
) {
3404 /* This never frees the special first group as needed */
3405 prev
->next
= group
->next
;
3415 /* Increase the reference counter for group */
3416 static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3417 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3419 /* Skip the special first group */
3420 if (wpa_auth
->group
== group
)
3423 group
->references
++;
3427 /* Decrease the reference counter and maybe free the group */
3428 static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3429 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3431 /* Skip the special first group */
3432 if (wpa_auth
->group
== group
)
3435 group
->references
--;
3436 if (group
->references
)
3438 wpa_group_free(wpa_auth
, group
);
3443 * Add a group that has its references counter set to zero. Caller needs to
3444 * call wpa_group_get() on the return value to mark the entry in use.
3446 static struct wpa_group
*
3447 wpa_auth_add_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
3449 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3451 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
)
3454 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Add group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
3456 group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
, 0);
3460 group
->next
= wpa_auth
->group
->next
;
3461 wpa_auth
->group
->next
= group
;
3468 * Enforce that the group state machine for the VLAN is running, increase
3469 * reference counter as interface is up. References might have been increased
3470 * even if a negative value is returned.
3471 * Returns: -1 on error (group missing, group already failed); otherwise, 0
3473 int wpa_auth_ensure_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
3475 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3477 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3480 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
3482 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
3484 group
= group
->next
;
3487 if (group
== NULL
) {
3488 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
3493 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
3494 "WPA: Ensure group state machine running for VLAN ID %d",
3497 wpa_group_get(wpa_auth
, group
);
3498 group
->num_setup_iface
++;
3500 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
3508 * Decrease reference counter, expected to be zero afterwards.
3509 * returns: -1 on error (group not found, group in fail state)
3510 * -2 if wpa_group is still referenced
3513 int wpa_auth_release_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
3515 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3518 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3521 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
3523 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
3525 group
= group
->next
;
3531 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
3532 "WPA: Try stopping group state machine for VLAN ID %d",
3535 if (group
->num_setup_iface
<= 0) {
3536 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
,
3537 "WPA: wpa_auth_release_group called more often than wpa_auth_ensure_group for VLAN ID %d, skipping.",
3541 group
->num_setup_iface
--;
3543 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
3546 if (group
->references
> 1) {
3547 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
3548 "WPA: Cannot stop group state machine for VLAN ID %d as references are still hold",
3553 wpa_group_put(wpa_auth
, group
);
3559 int wpa_auth_sta_set_vlan(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int vlan_id
)
3561 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3563 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3566 group
= sm
->wpa_auth
->group
;
3568 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
3570 group
= group
->next
;
3573 if (group
== NULL
) {
3574 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(sm
->wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
3579 if (sm
->group
== group
)
3582 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
3585 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Moving STA " MACSTR
" to use group state "
3586 "machine for VLAN ID %d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), vlan_id
);
3588 wpa_group_get(sm
->wpa_auth
, group
);
3589 wpa_group_put(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
3596 void wpa_auth_eapol_key_tx_status(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3597 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int ack
)
3599 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| sm
== NULL
)
3601 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key TX status for STA " MACSTR
3602 " ack=%d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), ack
);
3603 if (sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
&& ack
) {
3605 * Some deployed supplicant implementations update their SNonce
3606 * for each EAPOL-Key 2/4 message even within the same 4-way
3607 * handshake and then fail to use the first SNonce when
3608 * deriving the PTK. This results in unsuccessful 4-way
3609 * handshake whenever the relatively short initial timeout is
3610 * reached and EAPOL-Key 1/4 is retransmitted. Try to work
3611 * around this by increasing the timeout now that we know that
3612 * the station has received the frame.
3614 int timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
3615 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Increase initial EAPOL-Key 1/4 "
3616 "timeout by %u ms because of acknowledged frame",
3618 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
3619 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000,
3620 (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
3621 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
3626 int wpa_auth_uses_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3630 return wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
3634 int wpa_auth_uses_ft_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3638 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE
;
3643 int wpa_auth_get_ip_addr(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*addr
)
3645 if (sm
== NULL
|| WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0)
3647 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
3650 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
3653 int wpa_auth_radius_das_disconnect_pmksa(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3654 struct radius_das_attrs
*attr
)
3656 return pmksa_cache_auth_radius_das_disconnect(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, attr
);
3660 void wpa_auth_reconfig_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3662 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3666 for (group
= wpa_auth
->group
; group
; group
= group
->next
)
3667 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);