2 * IEEE 802.11 RSN / WPA Authenticator
3 * Copyright (c) 2004-2018, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6 * See README for more details.
9 #include "utils/includes.h"
11 #include "utils/common.h"
12 #include "utils/eloop.h"
13 #include "utils/state_machine.h"
14 #include "utils/bitfield.h"
15 #include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
16 #include "crypto/aes.h"
17 #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
18 #include "crypto/aes_siv.h"
19 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
20 #include "crypto/sha1.h"
21 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
22 #include "crypto/sha384.h"
23 #include "crypto/random.h"
24 #include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm.h"
25 #include "ap_config.h"
26 #include "ieee802_11.h"
28 #include "pmksa_cache_auth.h"
29 #include "wpa_auth_i.h"
30 #include "wpa_auth_ie.h"
32 #define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct wpa_state_machine
33 #define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "WPA"
34 #define STATE_MACHINE_ADDR sm->addr
37 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
38 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
39 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp
, size_t pmk_len
, struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
,
40 u8
*data
, size_t data_len
);
42 static int wpa_aead_decrypt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
,
43 u8
*buf
, size_t buf_len
, u16
*_key_data_len
);
44 static struct wpabuf
* fils_prepare_plainbuf(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
45 const struct wpabuf
*hlp
);
46 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
47 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
48 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
49 struct wpa_group
*group
);
50 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
51 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
52 struct wpa_group
*group
);
53 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
54 struct wpa_group
*group
);
55 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*snonce
,
56 const u8
*pmk
, unsigned int pmk_len
,
58 static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
59 struct wpa_group
*group
);
60 static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
61 struct wpa_group
*group
);
62 static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
63 struct wpa_group
*group
);
64 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
);
66 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first
= 100; /* ms */
67 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq
= 1000; /* ms */
68 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
= 500; /* ms */
69 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_no_retrans
= 4000; /* ms */
71 /* TODO: make these configurable */
72 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
= 43200;
73 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
= 70;
74 static const int dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
= 60;
77 static inline int wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(
78 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
80 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->mic_failure_report
)
81 return wpa_auth
->cb
->mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
);
86 static inline void wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(
87 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
89 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->psk_failure_report
)
90 wpa_auth
->cb
->psk_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
);
94 static inline void wpa_auth_set_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
95 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
,
98 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->set_eapol
)
99 wpa_auth
->cb
->set_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, var
, value
);
103 static inline int wpa_auth_get_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
104 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
)
106 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_eapol
== NULL
)
108 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, var
);
112 static inline const u8
* wpa_auth_get_psk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
114 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
,
115 const u8
*prev_psk
, size_t *psk_len
)
117 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_psk
== NULL
)
119 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_psk(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, p2p_dev_addr
,
124 static inline int wpa_auth_get_msk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
125 const u8
*addr
, u8
*msk
, size_t *len
)
127 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_msk
== NULL
)
129 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_msk(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, msk
, len
);
133 static inline int wpa_auth_set_key(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
135 enum wpa_alg alg
, const u8
*addr
, int idx
,
136 u8
*key
, size_t key_len
)
138 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->set_key
== NULL
)
140 return wpa_auth
->cb
->set_key(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, vlan_id
, alg
, addr
, idx
,
145 static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
146 const u8
*addr
, int idx
, u8
*seq
)
148 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_seqnum
== NULL
)
150 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_seqnum(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, idx
, seq
);
155 wpa_auth_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
156 const u8
*data
, size_t data_len
, int encrypt
)
158 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->send_eapol
== NULL
)
160 return wpa_auth
->cb
->send_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, data
, data_len
,
166 static inline int wpa_auth_start_ampe(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
169 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->start_ampe
== NULL
)
171 return wpa_auth
->cb
->start_ampe(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
);
173 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
176 int wpa_auth_for_each_sta(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
177 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
),
180 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_sta
== NULL
)
182 return wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_sta(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
186 int wpa_auth_for_each_auth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
187 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_authenticator
*a
, void *ctx
),
190 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_auth
== NULL
)
192 return wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_auth(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
196 void wpa_auth_logger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
197 logger_level level
, const char *txt
)
199 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->logger
== NULL
)
201 wpa_auth
->cb
->logger(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, level
, txt
);
205 void wpa_auth_vlogger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
206 logger_level level
, const char *fmt
, ...)
212 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->logger
== NULL
)
215 maxlen
= os_strlen(fmt
) + 100;
216 format
= os_malloc(maxlen
);
221 vsnprintf(format
, maxlen
, fmt
, ap
);
224 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, addr
, level
, format
);
230 static void wpa_sta_disconnect(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
231 const u8
*addr
, u16 reason
)
233 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->disconnect
== NULL
)
235 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_sta_disconnect STA " MACSTR
" (reason %u)",
236 MAC2STR(addr
), reason
);
237 wpa_auth
->cb
->disconnect(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, reason
);
241 static void wpa_rekey_gmk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
243 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
245 if (random_get_bytes(wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
)) {
246 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
249 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "GMK rekeyd");
250 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK",
251 wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
254 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
255 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
256 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
261 static void wpa_rekey_gtk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
263 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
264 struct wpa_group
*group
, *next
;
266 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying GTK");
267 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
269 wpa_group_get(wpa_auth
, group
);
271 group
->GTKReKey
= TRUE
;
273 group
->changed
= FALSE
;
274 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
275 } while (group
->changed
);
278 wpa_group_put(wpa_auth
, group
);
282 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
283 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
,
284 0, wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
289 static void wpa_rekey_ptk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
291 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
292 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
294 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying PTK");
295 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
300 static int wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
302 if (sm
->pmksa
== ctx
)
308 static void wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
,
311 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= ctx
;
312 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb
, entry
);
316 static int wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
317 struct wpa_group
*group
)
319 u8 buf
[ETH_ALEN
+ 8 + sizeof(unsigned long)];
323 if (random_get_bytes(group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
) < 0)
325 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK", group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
328 * Counter = PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter",
329 * Local MAC Address || Time)
331 os_memcpy(buf
, wpa_auth
->addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
332 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
);
333 ptr
= (unsigned long) group
;
334 os_memcpy(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
+ 8, &ptr
, sizeof(ptr
));
335 if (random_get_bytes(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
)) < 0)
338 if (sha1_prf(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
), "Init Counter", buf
, sizeof(buf
),
339 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) < 0)
341 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Key Counter",
342 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
348 static struct wpa_group
* wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
349 int vlan_id
, int delay_init
)
351 struct wpa_group
*group
;
353 group
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_group
));
357 group
->GTKAuthenticator
= TRUE
;
358 group
->vlan_id
= vlan_id
;
359 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
361 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
362 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
363 "for secure operations - update keys later when "
364 "the first station connects");
368 * Set initial GMK/Counter value here. The actual values that will be
369 * used in negotiations will be set once the first station tries to
370 * connect. This allows more time for collecting additional randomness
371 * on embedded devices.
373 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
374 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
382 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Delay group state machine start "
383 "until Beacon frames have been configured");
384 /* Initialization is completed in wpa_init_keys(). */
386 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
387 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
388 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
396 * wpa_init - Initialize WPA authenticator
397 * @addr: Authenticator address
398 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
399 * @cb: Callback functions for WPA authenticator
400 * Returns: Pointer to WPA authenticator data or %NULL on failure
402 struct wpa_authenticator
* wpa_init(const u8
*addr
,
403 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
,
404 const struct wpa_auth_callbacks
*cb
,
407 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
;
409 wpa_auth
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_authenticator
));
410 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
412 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
413 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
415 wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
= cb_ctx
;
417 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
418 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
423 wpa_auth
->group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, 0, 1);
424 if (wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
) {
425 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
430 wpa_auth
->pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_init(wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb
,
432 if (wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
) {
433 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "PMKSA cache initialization failed.");
434 os_free(wpa_auth
->group
);
435 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
440 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
441 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= wpa_ft_pmk_cache_init();
442 if (wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
== NULL
) {
443 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT PMK cache initialization failed.");
444 os_free(wpa_auth
->group
);
445 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
446 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
450 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
452 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
453 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
454 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
457 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
458 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
, 0,
459 wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
463 if (WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
)) {
464 int count
= WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_end
) -
465 WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
) + 1;
469 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
= bitfield_alloc(count
);
471 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
477 int wpa_init_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
479 struct wpa_group
*group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
481 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Start group state machine to set initial "
483 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
484 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
485 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
486 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
493 * wpa_deinit - Deinitialize WPA authenticator
494 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
496 void wpa_deinit(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
498 struct wpa_group
*group
, *prev
;
500 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
501 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
503 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
505 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
506 wpa_ft_pmk_cache_deinit(wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
);
507 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= NULL
;
508 wpa_ft_deinit(wpa_auth
);
509 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
512 bitfield_free(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
513 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
516 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
518 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
530 * wpa_reconfig - Update WPA authenticator configuration
531 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
532 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
534 int wpa_reconfig(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
535 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
)
537 struct wpa_group
*group
;
538 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
541 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
542 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
543 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
548 * Reinitialize GTK to make sure it is suitable for the new
551 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
552 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
554 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
555 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
556 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
562 struct wpa_state_machine
*
563 wpa_auth_sta_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
564 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
)
566 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
;
568 if (wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
571 sm
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_state_machine
));
574 os_memcpy(sm
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
576 os_memcpy(sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, p2p_dev_addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
578 sm
->wpa_auth
= wpa_auth
;
579 sm
->group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
580 wpa_group_get(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
586 int wpa_auth_sta_associated(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
587 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
589 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
592 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
593 if (sm
->ft_completed
) {
594 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
595 "FT authentication already completed - do not "
596 "start 4-way handshake");
597 /* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
598 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
;
602 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
605 if (sm
->fils_completed
) {
606 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
607 "FILS authentication already completed - do not start 4-way handshake");
608 /* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
609 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
;
613 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
616 os_memset(&sm
->key_replay
, 0, sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
617 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
618 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
621 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
622 "start authentication");
626 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
627 return 1; /* should not really happen */
629 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
630 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
634 void wpa_auth_sta_no_wpa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
636 /* WPA/RSN was not used - clear WPA state. This is needed if the STA
637 * reassociates back to the same AP while the previous entry for the
638 * STA has not yet been removed. */
642 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
= 0;
646 static void wpa_free_sta_sm(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
649 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
)) {
651 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "P2P: Free assigned IP "
652 "address %u.%u.%u.%u from " MACSTR
,
653 sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
654 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
656 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_start
);
657 bitfield_clear(sm
->wpa_auth
->ip_pool
,
658 WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) - start
);
660 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
661 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
662 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
663 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
665 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
666 os_free(sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
);
667 wpabuf_free(sm
->ft_pending_req_ies
);
668 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
669 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
671 wpa_group_put(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
676 void wpa_auth_sta_deinit(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
681 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
&& sm
->has_GTK
) {
682 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
683 "strict rekeying - force GTK rekey since STA "
685 if (eloop_deplete_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk
,
686 sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
) == -1)
687 eloop_register_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
,
691 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
692 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
693 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
694 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
695 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
696 wpa_ft_sta_deinit(sm
);
697 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
698 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
699 /* Must not free state machine while wpa_sm_step() is running.
700 * Freeing will be completed in the end of wpa_sm_step(). */
701 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Registering pending STA state "
702 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
703 sm
->pending_deinit
= 1;
709 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
714 sm
->PTKRequest
= TRUE
;
719 static int wpa_replay_counter_valid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
720 const u8
*replay_counter
)
723 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
726 if (os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
727 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0)
734 static void wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
735 const u8
*replay_counter
)
738 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
740 (replay_counter
== NULL
||
741 os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
742 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0))
743 ctr
[i
].valid
= FALSE
;
748 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
749 static int ft_check_msg_2_of_4(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
750 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
751 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse
*kde
)
753 struct wpa_ie_data ie
;
754 struct rsn_mdie
*mdie
;
756 if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(kde
->rsn_ie
, kde
->rsn_ie_len
, &ie
) < 0 ||
757 ie
.num_pmkid
!= 1 || ie
.pmkid
== NULL
) {
758 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No PMKR1Name in "
759 "FT 4-way handshake message 2/4");
763 os_memcpy(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, ie
.pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
764 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from Supplicant",
765 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, PMKID_LEN
);
767 if (!kde
->mdie
|| !kde
->ftie
) {
768 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No %s in FT 4-way handshake "
769 "message 2/4", kde
->mdie
? "FTIE" : "MDIE");
773 mdie
= (struct rsn_mdie
*) (kde
->mdie
+ 2);
774 if (kde
->mdie
[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie
) ||
775 os_memcmp(wpa_auth
->conf
.mobility_domain
, mdie
->mobility_domain
,
776 MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN
) != 0) {
777 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: MDIE mismatch");
781 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
782 (kde
->ftie
[1] != sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1] ||
783 os_memcmp(kde
->ftie
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
784 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) != 0)) {
785 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE mismatch");
786 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
787 kde
->ftie
, kde
->ftie_len
);
788 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in (Re)AssocResp",
789 sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
, 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
795 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
798 static int wpa_receive_error_report(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
799 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int group
)
801 /* Supplicant reported a Michael MIC error */
802 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
803 "received EAPOL-Key Error Request "
804 "(STA detected Michael MIC failure (group=%d))",
807 if (group
&& wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
808 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
809 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
810 "group cipher is not TKIP");
811 } else if (!group
&& sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
812 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
813 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
814 "pairwise cipher is not TKIP");
816 if (wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
) > 0)
817 return 1; /* STA entry was removed */
818 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
819 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
823 * Error report is not a request for a new key handshake, but since
824 * Authenticator may do it, let's change the keys now anyway.
826 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
831 static int wpa_try_alt_snonce(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*data
,
836 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
839 os_memset(&PTK
, 0, sizeof(PTK
));
841 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
842 !wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
843 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
844 sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, pmk
, &pmk_len
);
847 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
848 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
849 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, pmk
, pmk_len
);
850 sm
->xxkey_len
= pmk_len
;
852 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
855 pmk_len
= sm
->pmk_len
;
858 if (wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, sm
->alt_SNonce
, pmk
, pmk_len
, &PTK
) < 0)
861 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, pmk_len
, &PTK
,
862 data
, data_len
) == 0) {
867 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
868 wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
873 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
874 "WPA: Earlier SNonce did not result in matching MIC");
878 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
879 "WPA: Earlier SNonce resulted in matching MIC");
880 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= 0;
881 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, sm
->alt_SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
882 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
883 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
889 void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
890 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
891 u8
*data
, size_t data_len
)
893 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
894 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
895 u16 key_info
, key_data_length
;
896 enum { PAIRWISE_2
, PAIRWISE_4
, GROUP_2
, REQUEST
} msg
;
898 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
900 size_t keyhdrlen
, mic_len
;
903 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
905 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
, "WPA: RX EAPOL data", data
, data_len
);
907 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
);
908 keyhdrlen
= sizeof(*key
) + mic_len
+ 2;
910 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + keyhdrlen
) {
911 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Ignore too short EAPOL-Key frame");
915 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
916 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
917 mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
918 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
919 key_data
= mic
+ mic_len
+ 2;
920 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(mic
+ mic_len
);
921 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received EAPOL-Key from " MACSTR
922 " key_info=0x%x type=%u mic_len=%u key_data_length=%u",
923 MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), key_info
, key
->type
,
924 (unsigned int) mic_len
, key_data_length
);
925 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
,
926 "WPA: EAPOL-Key header (ending before Key MIC)",
928 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key Key MIC",
930 if (key_data_length
> data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) - keyhdrlen
) {
931 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key frame - "
932 "key_data overflow (%d > %lu)",
934 (unsigned long) (data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
939 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
940 if (key
->type
== EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
942 * Some deployed station implementations seem to send
943 * msg 4/4 with incorrect type value in WPA2 mode.
945 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Workaround: Allow EAPOL-Key "
946 "with unexpected WPA type in RSN mode");
947 } else if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
) {
948 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
949 "unexpected type %d in RSN mode",
954 if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
955 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
956 "unexpected type %d in WPA mode",
962 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Key Nonce", key
->key_nonce
,
964 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Replay Counter",
965 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
967 /* FIX: verify that the EAPOL-Key frame was encrypted if pairwise keys
970 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
) {
971 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Ignore SMK message");
975 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
978 } else if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) {
980 msgtxt
= "2/2 Group";
981 } else if (key_data_length
== 0 ||
982 (mic_len
== 0 && (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
) &&
983 key_data_length
== AES_BLOCK_SIZE
)) {
985 msgtxt
= "4/4 Pairwise";
988 msgtxt
= "2/4 Pairwise";
991 if (msg
== REQUEST
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_2
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_4
||
993 u16 ver
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
;
994 if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_CCMP
||
995 sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_GCMP
) {
996 if (wpa_use_cmac(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
997 !wpa_use_akm_defined(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
998 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
999 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1001 "advertised support for "
1002 "AES-128-CMAC, but did not "
1007 if (!wpa_use_cmac(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1008 !wpa_use_akm_defined(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1009 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
) {
1010 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1012 "did not use HMAC-SHA1-AES "
1018 if (wpa_use_akm_defined(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1019 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED
) {
1020 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
1021 "did not use EAPOL-Key descriptor version 0 as required for AKM-defined cases");
1026 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1027 if (sm
->req_replay_counter_used
&&
1028 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->req_replay_counter
,
1029 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) <= 0) {
1030 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
1031 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1032 "replayed counter");
1037 if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) &&
1038 !wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->key_replay
, key
->replay_counter
)) {
1041 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
1042 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
1043 key
->replay_counter
) &&
1044 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
1045 os_memcmp(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) != 0)
1048 * Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP
1049 * WZC) update SNonce for each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This
1050 * breaks the workaround on accepting any of the
1051 * pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated
1052 * even if we have already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4.
1054 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1055 "Process SNonce update from STA "
1056 "based on retransmitted EAPOL-Key "
1058 sm
->update_snonce
= 1;
1059 os_memcpy(sm
->alt_SNonce
, sm
->SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1060 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= TRUE
;
1061 os_memcpy(sm
->alt_replay_counter
,
1062 sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1063 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1064 goto continue_processing
;
1067 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_4
&& sm
->alt_snonce_valid
&&
1068 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
1069 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->alt_replay_counter
,
1070 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0) {
1072 * Supplicant may still be using the old SNonce since
1073 * there was two EAPOL-Key 2/4 messages and they had
1074 * different SNonce values.
1076 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1077 "Try to process received EAPOL-Key 4/4 based on old Replay Counter and SNonce from an earlier EAPOL-Key 1/4");
1078 goto continue_processing
;
1081 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
1082 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
1083 key
->replay_counter
) &&
1084 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
) {
1085 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1086 "ignore retransmitted EAPOL-Key %s - "
1087 "SNonce did not change", msgtxt
);
1089 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1090 "received EAPOL-Key %s with "
1091 "unexpected replay counter", msgtxt
);
1093 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
1094 if (!sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
)
1096 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "pending replay counter",
1097 sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1098 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1100 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "received replay counter",
1101 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1105 continue_processing
:
1107 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& mic_len
== 0 &&
1108 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
)) {
1109 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1110 "WPA: Encr Key Data bit not set even though AEAD cipher is supposed to be used - drop frame");
1113 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1117 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
&&
1118 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
&&
1119 (!sm
->update_snonce
||
1120 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)) {
1121 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1122 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 in "
1123 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1127 random_add_randomness(key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1128 if (sm
->group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
) {
1130 * The system did not have enough entropy to generate
1131 * strong random numbers. Reject the first 4-way
1132 * handshake(s) and collect some entropy based on the
1133 * information from it. Once enough entropy is
1134 * available, the next atempt will trigger GMK/Key
1135 * Counter update and the station will be allowed to
1138 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Reject 4-way handshake to "
1139 "collect more entropy for random number "
1141 random_mark_pool_ready();
1142 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1143 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
1148 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
||
1150 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1151 "received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 in "
1152 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1158 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
!= WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
1159 || !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1160 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1161 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/2 in "
1162 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1163 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
1171 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1172 "received EAPOL-Key frame (%s)", msgtxt
);
1174 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) {
1175 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1176 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key Ack set");
1180 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1181 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)) {
1182 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1183 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC not set");
1188 if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1189 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)) {
1190 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1191 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC set");
1194 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1196 sm
->MICVerified
= FALSE
;
1197 if (sm
->PTK_valid
&& !sm
->update_snonce
) {
1199 wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
, &sm
->PTK
,
1201 (msg
!= PAIRWISE_4
|| !sm
->alt_snonce_valid
||
1202 wpa_try_alt_snonce(sm
, data
, data_len
))) {
1203 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1204 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1209 wpa_aead_decrypt(sm
, &sm
->PTK
, data
, data_len
,
1210 &key_data_length
) < 0) {
1211 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1212 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1215 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1216 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
1217 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1218 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1221 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1222 if (sm
->MICVerified
) {
1223 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 1;
1224 os_memcpy(sm
->req_replay_counter
, key
->replay_counter
,
1225 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1227 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1228 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1234 * TODO: should decrypt key data field if encryption was used;
1235 * even though MAC address KDE is not normally encrypted,
1236 * supplicant is allowed to encrypt it.
1238 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
1239 if (wpa_receive_error_report(
1241 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) > 0)
1242 return; /* STA entry was removed */
1243 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
) {
1244 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1245 "received EAPOL-Key Request for new "
1247 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
1248 } else if (key_data_length
> 0 &&
1249 wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
,
1253 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1254 "received EAPOL-Key Request for GTK "
1256 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1257 wpa_rekey_gtk(wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1260 /* Do not allow the same key replay counter to be reused. */
1261 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
,
1262 key
->replay_counter
);
1264 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
) {
1266 * Maintain a copy of the pending EAPOL-Key frames in
1267 * case the EAPOL-Key frame was retransmitted. This is
1268 * needed to allow EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 reply to another
1269 * pending msg 1/4 to update the SNonce to work around
1270 * unexpected supplicant behavior.
1272 os_memcpy(sm
->prev_key_replay
, sm
->key_replay
,
1273 sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
1275 os_memset(sm
->prev_key_replay
, 0,
1276 sizeof(sm
->prev_key_replay
));
1280 * Make sure old valid counters are not accepted anymore and
1281 * do not get copied again.
1283 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
, NULL
);
1286 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
1287 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
= os_memdup(data
, data_len
);
1288 if (sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
== NULL
)
1290 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
= data_len
;
1292 sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
);
1293 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= TRUE
;
1294 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1295 sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
);
1296 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1301 static int wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8
*gmk
, const char *label
, const u8
*addr
,
1302 const u8
*gnonce
, u8
*gtk
, size_t gtk_len
)
1304 u8 data
[ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
+ 8 + WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN
];
1308 /* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion",
1309 * AA || GNonce || Time || random data)
1310 * The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and
1311 * GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation
1312 * is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be
1315 os_memset(data
, 0, sizeof(data
));
1316 os_memcpy(data
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
1317 os_memcpy(data
+ ETH_ALEN
, gnonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1318 pos
= data
+ ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
;
1319 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos
);
1321 if (random_get_bytes(pos
, gtk_len
) < 0)
1324 #ifdef CONFIG_SHA384
1325 if (sha384_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
),
1328 #else /* CONFIG_SHA384 */
1329 #ifdef CONFIG_SHA256
1330 if (sha256_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
),
1333 #else /* CONFIG_SHA256 */
1334 if (sha1_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
),
1337 #endif /* CONFIG_SHA256 */
1338 #endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */
1344 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
1346 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
1347 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
1349 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1350 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "EAPOL-Key timeout");
1351 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= TRUE
;
1356 void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1357 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1358 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1359 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1360 int keyidx
, int encr
, int force_version
)
1362 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1363 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1364 size_t len
, mic_len
, keyhdrlen
;
1366 int key_data_len
, pad_len
= 0;
1368 int version
, pairwise
;
1370 u8
*key_mic
, *key_data
;
1372 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
);
1373 keyhdrlen
= sizeof(*key
) + mic_len
+ 2;
1375 len
= sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_hdr
) + keyhdrlen
;
1378 version
= force_version
;
1379 else if (wpa_use_akm_defined(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1380 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED
;
1381 else if (wpa_use_cmac(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1382 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
;
1383 else if (sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
)
1384 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
;
1386 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4
;
1388 pairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1390 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Send EAPOL(version=%d secure=%d mic=%d "
1391 "ack=%d install=%d pairwise=%d kde_len=%lu keyidx=%d "
1394 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
) ? 1 : 0,
1395 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) ? 1 : 0,
1396 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) ? 1 : 0,
1397 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
) ? 1 : 0,
1398 pairwise
, (unsigned long) kde_len
, keyidx
, encr
);
1400 key_data_len
= kde_len
;
1402 if ((version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1403 wpa_use_aes_key_wrap(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1404 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) && encr
) {
1405 pad_len
= key_data_len
% 8;
1407 pad_len
= 8 - pad_len
;
1408 key_data_len
+= pad_len
+ 8;
1411 len
+= key_data_len
;
1412 if (!mic_len
&& encr
)
1413 len
+= AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
1415 hdr
= os_zalloc(len
);
1418 hdr
->version
= wpa_auth
->conf
.eapol_version
;
1419 hdr
->type
= IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY
;
1420 hdr
->length
= host_to_be16(len
- sizeof(*hdr
));
1421 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1422 key_mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
1423 key_data
= ((u8
*) (hdr
+ 1)) + keyhdrlen
;
1425 key
->type
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
1426 EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
: EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
;
1427 key_info
|= version
;
1428 if (encr
&& sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1429 key_info
|= WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
;
1430 if (sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1431 key_info
|= keyidx
<< WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_INDEX_SHIFT
;
1432 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_info
, key_info
);
1434 alg
= pairwise
? sm
->pairwise
: wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
;
1435 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& !pairwise
)
1436 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, 0);
1438 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, wpa_cipher_key_len(alg
));
1440 for (i
= RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
- 1; i
> 0; i
--) {
1441 sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
= sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].valid
;
1442 os_memcpy(sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1443 sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].counter
,
1444 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1446 inc_byte_array(sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1447 os_memcpy(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1448 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1449 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Replay Counter",
1450 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1451 sm
->key_replay
[0].valid
= TRUE
;
1454 os_memcpy(key
->key_nonce
, nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1457 os_memcpy(key
->key_rsc
, key_rsc
, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
1460 os_memcpy(key_data
, kde
, kde_len
);
1461 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, kde_len
);
1463 } else if (!mic_len
&& kde
) {
1467 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ kde_len
);
1468 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1471 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: KEK",
1472 sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1473 /* AES-SIV AAD from EAPOL protocol version field (inclusive) to
1474 * to Key Data (exclusive). */
1475 aad
[0] = (u8
*) hdr
;
1476 aad_len
[0] = key_mic
+ 2 - (u8
*) hdr
;
1477 if (aes_siv_encrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
, kde
, kde_len
,
1478 1, aad
, aad_len
, key_mic
+ 2) < 0) {
1479 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: AES-SIV encryption failed");
1483 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Encrypted Key Data from SIV",
1484 key_mic
+ 2, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ kde_len
);
1485 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1486 } else if (encr
&& kde
) {
1487 buf
= os_zalloc(key_data_len
);
1493 os_memcpy(pos
, kde
, kde_len
);
1499 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1501 if (version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1502 wpa_use_aes_key_wrap(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1503 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
1504 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1505 "WPA: Encrypt Key Data using AES-WRAP (KEK length %u)",
1506 (unsigned int) sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1507 if (aes_wrap(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
,
1508 (key_data_len
- 8) / 8, buf
, key_data
)) {
1513 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, key_data_len
);
1514 #ifndef CONFIG_NO_RC4
1515 } else if (sm
->PTK
.kek_len
== 16) {
1518 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1519 "WPA: Encrypt Key Data using RC4");
1520 os_memcpy(key
->key_iv
,
1521 sm
->group
->Counter
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
- 16, 16);
1522 inc_byte_array(sm
->group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1523 os_memcpy(ek
, key
->key_iv
, 16);
1524 os_memcpy(ek
+ 16, sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1525 os_memcpy(key_data
, buf
, key_data_len
);
1526 rc4_skip(ek
, 32, 256, key_data
, key_data_len
);
1527 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, key_data_len
);
1528 #endif /* CONFIG_NO_RC4 */
1537 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) {
1538 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
|| !mic_len
) {
1539 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1540 "PTK not valid when sending EAPOL-Key "
1546 if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm
->PTK
.kck
, sm
->PTK
.kck_len
,
1547 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, version
,
1548 (u8
*) hdr
, len
, key_mic
) < 0) {
1552 #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
1554 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
> 0.0 &&
1556 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
) {
1557 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1558 "Corrupting group EAPOL-Key Key MIC");
1561 #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
1564 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_inc_EapolFramesTx
,
1566 wpa_auth_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, (u8
*) hdr
, len
,
1572 static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1573 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1574 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1575 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1576 int keyidx
, int encr
)
1579 int pairwise
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
;
1585 __wpa_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
, key_info
, key_rsc
, nonce
, kde
, kde_len
,
1588 ctr
= pairwise
? sm
->TimeoutCtr
: sm
->GTimeoutCtr
;
1589 if (ctr
== 1 && wpa_auth
->conf
.tx_status
)
1590 timeout_ms
= pairwise
? eapol_key_timeout_first
:
1591 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
;
1593 timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
1594 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries
&&
1595 (!pairwise
|| (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)))
1596 timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_no_retrans
;
1597 if (pairwise
&& ctr
== 1 && !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
))
1598 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 1;
1599 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
1600 "counter %u)", timeout_ms
, ctr
);
1601 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000, (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
1602 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1606 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp
, size_t pmk_len
, struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
,
1607 u8
*data
, size_t data_len
)
1609 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1610 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1613 u8 mic
[WPA_EAPOL_KEY_MIC_MAX_LEN
], *mic_pos
;
1614 size_t mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(akmp
, pmk_len
);
1616 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + sizeof(*key
))
1619 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
1620 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1621 mic_pos
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
1622 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
1623 os_memcpy(mic
, mic_pos
, mic_len
);
1624 os_memset(mic_pos
, 0, mic_len
);
1625 if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK
->kck
, PTK
->kck_len
, akmp
,
1626 key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
,
1627 data
, data_len
, mic_pos
) ||
1628 os_memcmp_const(mic
, mic_pos
, mic_len
) != 0)
1630 os_memcpy(mic_pos
, mic
, mic_len
);
1635 void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1637 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1638 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1639 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE
, sm
->addr
, 0, NULL
,
1641 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1642 "RSN: PTK removal from the driver failed");
1643 sm
->pairwise_set
= FALSE
;
1644 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
1648 int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, enum wpa_event event
)
1655 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1656 "event %d notification", event
);
1661 /* PTKs are derived through AMPE */
1662 if (wpa_auth_start_ampe(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
)) {
1667 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
1672 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1675 case WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
:
1678 * When using WPS, we may end up here if the STA
1679 * manages to re-associate without the previous STA
1680 * entry getting removed. Consequently, we need to make
1681 * sure that the WPA state machines gets initialized
1682 * properly at this point.
1684 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA state machine had not been "
1685 "started - initialize now");
1688 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
1689 return 1; /* should not really happen */
1691 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1694 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
1696 * Reauthentication cancels the pending group key
1697 * update for this STA.
1699 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1700 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1701 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= TRUE
;
1703 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1706 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1707 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Retry PTK configuration "
1708 "after association");
1709 wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm
);
1711 /* Using FT protocol, not WPA auth state machine */
1712 sm
->ft_completed
= 1;
1714 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1716 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1717 case WPA_ASSOC_FILS
:
1719 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1720 "FILS: TK configuration after association");
1722 sm
->fils_completed
= 1;
1724 #else /* CONFIG_FILS */
1726 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1727 case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
:
1728 sm
->tk_already_set
= FALSE
;
1732 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1733 sm
->ft_completed
= 0;
1734 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1736 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1737 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
&& event
== WPA_AUTH
)
1739 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1741 if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1742 (event
== WPA_AUTH
|| event
== WPA_ASSOC
))
1744 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1747 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1748 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1750 if (event
!= WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
)
1754 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
1756 * wpa_sm_step() is already running - avoid recursive call to
1757 * it by making the existing loop process the new update.
1762 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
1766 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
)
1768 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
, wpa_ptk
);
1770 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
1771 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
1772 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
1776 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
1777 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1778 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1779 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
1780 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
1781 if (1 /* Unicast cipher supported AND (ESS OR ((IBSS or WDS) and
1782 * Local AA > Remote AA)) */) {
1785 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 0);
1787 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 0);
1789 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1790 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
||
1791 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
) {
1792 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1793 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 0);
1798 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
)
1800 u16 reason
= sm
->disconnect_reason
;
1802 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
, wpa_ptk
);
1803 sm
->Disconnect
= FALSE
;
1804 sm
->disconnect_reason
= 0;
1806 reason
= WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
;
1807 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, reason
);
1811 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
)
1813 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
, wpa_ptk
);
1814 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1818 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
)
1820 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
, wpa_ptk
);
1821 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1822 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1823 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portControl_Auto
,
1825 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 1);
1826 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1830 static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1831 struct wpa_group
*group
)
1833 if (group
->first_sta_seen
)
1836 * System has run bit further than at the time hostapd was started
1837 * potentially very early during boot up. This provides better chances
1838 * of collecting more randomness on embedded systems. Re-initialize the
1839 * GMK and Counter here to improve their strength if there was not
1840 * enough entropy available immediately after system startup.
1842 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Re-initialize GMK/Counter on first "
1844 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
1845 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
1846 "to proceed - reject first 4-way handshake");
1847 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1849 group
->first_sta_seen
= TRUE
;
1850 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= FALSE
;
1853 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0 ||
1854 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0 ||
1855 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
1856 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: GMK/GTK setup failed");
1857 group
->first_sta_seen
= FALSE
;
1858 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1863 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
)
1865 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
, wpa_ptk
);
1867 wpa_group_ensure_init(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
1868 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1871 * Definition of ANonce selection in IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 is somewhat
1872 * ambiguous. The Authenticator state machine uses a counter that is
1873 * incremented by one for each 4-way handshake. However, the security
1874 * analysis of 4-way handshake points out that unpredictable nonces
1875 * help in preventing precomputation attacks. Instead of the state
1876 * machine definition, use an unpredictable nonce value here to provide
1877 * stronger protection against potential precomputation attacks.
1879 if (random_get_bytes(sm
->ANonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
)) {
1880 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: Failed to get random data for "
1882 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1885 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Assign ANonce", sm
->ANonce
,
1887 /* IEEE 802.11i does not clear TimeoutCtr here, but this is more
1888 * logical place than INITIALIZE since AUTHENTICATION2 can be
1889 * re-entered on ReAuthenticationRequest without going through
1895 static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1897 if (random_get_bytes(sm
->ANonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
)) {
1898 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
,
1899 "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
1900 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1903 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm
->ANonce
,
1910 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
)
1912 u8 msk
[2 * PMK_LEN
];
1913 size_t len
= 2 * PMK_LEN
;
1915 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
, wpa_ptk
);
1916 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1918 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1920 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from PMKSA cache");
1921 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
);
1922 sm
->pmk_len
= sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
;
1924 } else if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
) {
1925 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1926 "DPP: No PMKSA cache entry for STA - reject connection");
1927 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1928 sm
->disconnect_reason
= WLAN_REASON_INVALID_PMKID
;
1930 #endif /* CONFIG_DPP */
1931 } else if (wpa_auth_get_msk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, msk
, &len
) == 0) {
1932 unsigned int pmk_len
;
1934 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1935 pmk_len
= PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
;
1938 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from EAPOL state machine "
1939 "(MSK len=%lu PMK len=%u)", (unsigned long) len
,
1941 if (len
< pmk_len
) {
1942 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1943 "WPA: MSK not long enough (%u) to create PMK (%u)",
1944 (unsigned int) len
, (unsigned int) pmk_len
);
1945 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1948 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, msk
, pmk_len
);
1949 sm
->pmk_len
= pmk_len
;
1950 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1951 if (len
>= 2 * PMK_LEN
) {
1952 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
1953 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, msk
, SHA384_MAC_LEN
);
1954 sm
->xxkey_len
= SHA384_MAC_LEN
;
1956 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, msk
+ PMK_LEN
, PMK_LEN
);
1957 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1960 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1962 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Could not get PMK, get_msk: %p",
1963 sm
->wpa_auth
->cb
->get_msk
);
1964 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1967 os_memset(msk
, 0, sizeof(msk
));
1969 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
1970 /* IEEE 802.11i does not set keyRun to FALSE, but not doing this
1971 * will break reauthentication since EAPOL state machines may not be
1972 * get into AUTHENTICATING state that clears keyRun before WPA state
1973 * machine enters AUTHENTICATION2 state and goes immediately to INITPMK
1974 * state and takes PMK from the previously used AAA Key. This will
1975 * eventually fail in 4-Way Handshake because Supplicant uses PMK
1976 * derived from the new AAA Key. Setting keyRun = FALSE here seems to
1977 * be good workaround for this issue. */
1978 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
, 0);
1982 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
)
1987 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
, wpa_ptk
);
1988 psk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, NULL
,
1991 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, psk
, psk_len
);
1992 sm
->pmk_len
= psk_len
;
1993 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1994 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
1995 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1996 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1999 if (wpa_auth_uses_sae(sm
) && sm
->pmksa
) {
2000 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "SAE: PMK from PMKSA cache");
2001 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
);
2002 sm
->pmk_len
= sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
;
2004 #endif /* CONFIG_SAE */
2005 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
2009 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
)
2011 u8 buf
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
], *pmkid
= NULL
;
2012 size_t pmkid_len
= 0;
2014 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
, wpa_ptk
);
2015 sm
->PTKRequest
= FALSE
;
2016 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
2017 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= FALSE
;
2020 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
) {
2021 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2022 * immediately following this. */
2026 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2027 "sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
2029 * TODO: Could add PMKID even with WPA2-PSK, but only if there is only
2030 * one possible PSK for this STA.
2032 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&&
2033 (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
2034 (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
&& sm
->pmksa
) ||
2035 wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) &&
2036 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
!= WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
) {
2038 pmkid_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
2039 pmkid
[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC
;
2040 pmkid
[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
2041 RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid
[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID
);
2043 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2044 "RSN: Message 1/4 PMKID from PMKSA entry",
2045 sm
->pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
2046 os_memcpy(&pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
2047 sm
->pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
2048 } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2049 /* No KCK available to derive PMKID */
2050 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2051 "RSN: No KCK available to derive PMKID for message 1/4");
2054 } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2055 if (sm
->pmkid_set
) {
2056 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2057 "RSN: Message 1/4 PMKID from SAE",
2058 sm
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
2059 os_memcpy(&pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
2060 sm
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
2062 /* No PMKID available */
2063 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2064 "RSN: No SAE PMKID available for message 1/4");
2067 #endif /* CONFIG_SAE */
2070 * Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was
2071 * available with pre-calculated PMKID.
2073 rsn_pmkid(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmk_len
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2074 sm
->addr
, &pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
2076 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2077 "RSN: Message 1/4 PMKID derived from PMK",
2078 &pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
], PMKID_LEN
);
2081 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2082 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
, NULL
,
2083 sm
->ANonce
, pmkid
, pmkid_len
, 0, 0);
2087 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*snonce
,
2088 const u8
*pmk
, unsigned int pmk_len
,
2089 struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
)
2091 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2092 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2093 return wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm
, pmk
, ptk
);
2094 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2096 return wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk
, pmk_len
, "Pairwise key expansion",
2097 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, sm
->ANonce
, snonce
,
2098 ptk
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pairwise
);
2104 int fils_auth_pmk_to_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
2105 size_t pmk_len
, const u8
*snonce
, const u8
*anonce
,
2106 const u8
*dhss
, size_t dhss_len
,
2107 struct wpabuf
*g_sta
, struct wpabuf
*g_ap
)
2109 u8 ick
[FILS_ICK_MAX_LEN
];
2112 u8 fils_ft
[FILS_FT_MAX_LEN
];
2113 size_t fils_ft_len
= 0;
2115 res
= fils_pmk_to_ptk(pmk
, pmk_len
, sm
->addr
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2116 snonce
, anonce
, dhss
, dhss_len
,
2117 &sm
->PTK
, ick
, &ick_len
,
2118 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pairwise
,
2119 fils_ft
, &fils_ft_len
);
2122 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
2123 sm
->tk_already_set
= FALSE
;
2125 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2127 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2128 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
= &wpa_auth
->conf
;
2129 u8 pmk_r0
[PMK_LEN_MAX
], pmk_r0_name
[WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
];
2130 int use_sha384
= wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
2131 size_t pmk_r0_len
= use_sha384
? SHA384_MAC_LEN
: PMK_LEN
;
2133 if (wpa_derive_pmk_r0(fils_ft
, fils_ft_len
,
2134 conf
->ssid
, conf
->ssid_len
,
2135 conf
->mobility_domain
,
2136 conf
->r0_key_holder
,
2137 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
2138 sm
->addr
, pmk_r0
, pmk_r0_name
,
2142 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS+FT: PMK-R0",
2143 pmk_r0
, pmk_r0_len
);
2144 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS+FT: PMKR0Name",
2145 pmk_r0_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2146 wpa_ft_store_pmk_fils(sm
, pmk_r0
, pmk_r0_name
);
2147 os_memset(fils_ft
, 0, sizeof(fils_ft
));
2149 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2151 res
= fils_key_auth_sk(ick
, ick_len
, snonce
, anonce
,
2152 sm
->addr
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2153 g_sta
? wpabuf_head(g_sta
) : NULL
,
2154 g_sta
? wpabuf_len(g_sta
) : 0,
2155 g_ap
? wpabuf_head(g_ap
) : NULL
,
2156 g_ap
? wpabuf_len(g_ap
) : 0,
2157 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
,
2158 sm
->fils_key_auth_ap
,
2159 &sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2160 os_memset(ick
, 0, sizeof(ick
));
2162 /* Store nonces for (Re)Association Request/Response frame processing */
2163 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, snonce
, FILS_NONCE_LEN
);
2164 os_memcpy(sm
->ANonce
, anonce
, FILS_NONCE_LEN
);
2170 static int wpa_aead_decrypt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
,
2171 u8
*buf
, size_t buf_len
, u16
*_key_data_len
)
2173 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
2174 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
2181 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) buf
;
2182 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
2183 pos
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
2184 key_data_len
= WPA_GET_BE16(pos
);
2185 if (key_data_len
< AES_BLOCK_SIZE
||
2186 key_data_len
> buf_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) - sizeof(*key
) - 2) {
2187 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2188 "No room for AES-SIV data in the frame");
2191 pos
+= 2; /* Pointing at the Encrypted Key Data field */
2193 tmp
= os_malloc(key_data_len
);
2197 /* AES-SIV AAD from EAPOL protocol version field (inclusive) to
2198 * to Key Data (exclusive). */
2200 aad_len
[0] = pos
- buf
;
2201 if (aes_siv_decrypt(ptk
->kek
, ptk
->kek_len
, pos
, key_data_len
,
2202 1, aad
, aad_len
, tmp
) < 0) {
2203 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2204 "Invalid AES-SIV data in the frame");
2205 bin_clear_free(tmp
, key_data_len
);
2209 /* AEAD decryption and validation completed successfully */
2210 key_data_len
-= AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2211 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Decrypted Key Data",
2214 /* Replace Key Data field with the decrypted version */
2215 os_memcpy(pos
, tmp
, key_data_len
);
2216 pos
-= 2; /* Key Data Length field */
2217 WPA_PUT_BE16(pos
, key_data_len
);
2218 bin_clear_free(tmp
, key_data_len
);
2220 *_key_data_len
= key_data_len
;
2225 const u8
* wpa_fils_validate_fils_session(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
2226 const u8
*ies
, size_t ies_len
,
2227 const u8
*fils_session
)
2230 const u8
*session
= NULL
;
2232 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2233 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2234 "FILS: Not a FILS AKM - reject association");
2238 /* Verify Session element */
2240 end
= ((const u8
*) ie
) + ies_len
;
2241 while (ie
+ 1 < end
) {
2242 if (ie
+ 2 + ie
[1] > end
)
2244 if (ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
&&
2245 ie
[1] >= 1 + FILS_SESSION_LEN
&&
2246 ie
[2] == WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_SESSION
) {
2254 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2255 "FILS: %s: Could not find FILS Session element in Assoc Req - reject",
2260 if (!fils_session
) {
2261 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2262 "FILS: %s: Could not find FILS Session element in STA entry - reject",
2267 if (os_memcmp(fils_session
, session
+ 3, FILS_SESSION_LEN
) != 0) {
2268 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Session mismatch");
2269 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Expected FILS Session",
2270 fils_session
, FILS_SESSION_LEN
);
2271 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Received FILS Session",
2272 session
+ 3, FILS_SESSION_LEN
);
2279 int wpa_fils_validate_key_confirm(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*ies
,
2282 struct ieee802_11_elems elems
;
2284 if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(ies
, ies_len
, &elems
, 1) == ParseFailed
) {
2285 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2286 "FILS: Failed to parse decrypted elements");
2290 if (!elems
.fils_session
) {
2291 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: No FILS Session element");
2295 if (!elems
.fils_key_confirm
) {
2296 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: No FILS Key Confirm element");
2300 if (elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
!= sm
->fils_key_auth_len
) {
2301 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2302 "FILS: Unexpected Key-Auth length %d (expected %d)",
2303 elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
,
2304 (int) sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2308 if (os_memcmp(elems
.fils_key_confirm
, sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
,
2309 sm
->fils_key_auth_len
) != 0) {
2310 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Key-Auth mismatch");
2311 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Received Key-Auth",
2312 elems
.fils_key_confirm
, elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
);
2313 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Expected Key-Auth",
2314 sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
, sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2322 int fils_decrypt_assoc(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*fils_session
,
2323 const struct ieee80211_mgmt
*mgmt
, size_t frame_len
,
2324 u8
*pos
, size_t left
)
2327 const u8
*end
, *ie_start
, *ie
, *session
, *crypt
;
2331 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
2332 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2333 "FILS: No KEK to decrypt Assocication Request frame");
2337 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2338 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2339 "FILS: Not a FILS AKM - reject association");
2343 end
= ((const u8
*) mgmt
) + frame_len
;
2344 fc
= le_to_host16(mgmt
->frame_control
);
2345 stype
= WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(fc
);
2346 if (stype
== WLAN_FC_STYPE_REASSOC_REQ
)
2347 ie_start
= mgmt
->u
.reassoc_req
.variable
;
2349 ie_start
= mgmt
->u
.assoc_req
.variable
;
2353 * Find FILS Session element which is the last unencrypted element in
2356 session
= wpa_fils_validate_fils_session(sm
, ie
, end
- ie
,
2359 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Session validation failed");
2363 crypt
= session
+ 2 + session
[1];
2365 if (end
- crypt
< AES_BLOCK_SIZE
) {
2366 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2367 "FILS: Too short frame to include AES-SIV data");
2371 /* AES-SIV AAD vectors */
2373 /* The STA's MAC address */
2375 aad_len
[0] = ETH_ALEN
;
2376 /* The AP's BSSID */
2378 aad_len
[1] = ETH_ALEN
;
2379 /* The STA's nonce */
2380 aad
[2] = sm
->SNonce
;
2381 aad_len
[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2382 /* The AP's nonce */
2383 aad
[3] = sm
->ANonce
;
2384 aad_len
[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2386 * The (Re)Association Request frame from the Capability Information
2387 * field to the FILS Session element (both inclusive).
2389 aad
[4] = (const u8
*) &mgmt
->u
.assoc_req
.capab_info
;
2390 aad_len
[4] = crypt
- aad
[4];
2392 if (aes_siv_decrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
, crypt
, end
- crypt
,
2393 5, aad
, aad_len
, pos
+ (crypt
- ie_start
)) < 0) {
2394 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2395 "FILS: Invalid AES-SIV data in the frame");
2398 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Decrypted Association Request elements",
2399 pos
, left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
);
2401 if (wpa_fils_validate_key_confirm(sm
, pos
, left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
) < 0) {
2402 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Key Confirm validation failed");
2406 return left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2410 int fils_encrypt_assoc(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*buf
,
2411 size_t current_len
, size_t max_len
,
2412 const struct wpabuf
*hlp
)
2414 u8
*end
= buf
+ max_len
;
2415 u8
*pos
= buf
+ current_len
;
2416 struct ieee80211_mgmt
*mgmt
;
2417 struct wpabuf
*plain
;
2421 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
)
2424 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2425 "FILS: Association Response frame before FILS processing",
2428 mgmt
= (struct ieee80211_mgmt
*) buf
;
2430 /* AES-SIV AAD vectors */
2432 /* The AP's BSSID */
2434 aad_len
[0] = ETH_ALEN
;
2435 /* The STA's MAC address */
2437 aad_len
[1] = ETH_ALEN
;
2438 /* The AP's nonce */
2439 aad
[2] = sm
->ANonce
;
2440 aad_len
[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2441 /* The STA's nonce */
2442 aad
[3] = sm
->SNonce
;
2443 aad_len
[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2445 * The (Re)Association Response frame from the Capability Information
2446 * field (the same offset in both Association and Reassociation
2447 * Response frames) to the FILS Session element (both inclusive).
2449 aad
[4] = (const u8
*) &mgmt
->u
.assoc_resp
.capab_info
;
2450 aad_len
[4] = pos
- aad
[4];
2452 /* The following elements will be encrypted with AES-SIV */
2453 plain
= fils_prepare_plainbuf(sm
, hlp
);
2455 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Plain buffer prep failed");
2459 if (pos
+ wpabuf_len(plain
) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE
> end
) {
2460 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2461 "FILS: Not enough room for FILS elements");
2466 wpa_hexdump_buf_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Association Response plaintext",
2469 if (aes_siv_encrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
,
2470 wpabuf_head(plain
), wpabuf_len(plain
),
2471 5, aad
, aad_len
, pos
) < 0) {
2476 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2477 "FILS: Encrypted Association Response elements",
2478 pos
, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ wpabuf_len(plain
));
2479 current_len
+= wpabuf_len(plain
) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2482 sm
->fils_completed
= 1;
2488 static struct wpabuf
* fils_prepare_plainbuf(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
2489 const struct wpabuf
*hlp
)
2491 struct wpabuf
*plain
;
2492 u8
*len
, *tmp
, *tmp2
;
2494 u8
*gtk
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2496 struct wpa_group
*gsm
;
2498 plain
= wpabuf_alloc(1000);
2502 /* TODO: FILS Public Key */
2504 /* FILS Key Confirmation */
2505 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
); /* Element ID */
2506 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, 1 + sm
->fils_key_auth_len
); /* Length */
2507 /* Element ID Extension */
2508 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_KEY_CONFIRM
);
2509 wpabuf_put_data(plain
, sm
->fils_key_auth_ap
, sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2511 /* FILS HLP Container */
2513 wpabuf_put_buf(plain
, hlp
);
2515 /* TODO: FILS IP Address Assignment */
2519 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
); /* Element ID */
2520 len
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 1);
2521 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXT_KEY_DELIVERY
);
2522 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
,
2523 wpabuf_put(plain
, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
));
2525 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2526 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2527 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
||
2528 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
) {
2530 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2531 * of GTK in the BSS.
2533 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gtk_len
) < 0) {
2539 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
2541 tmp
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 0);
2542 tmp2
= wpa_add_kde(tmp
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2544 wpabuf_put(plain
, tmp2
- tmp
);
2547 tmp
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 0);
2548 tmp2
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, tmp
);
2549 wpabuf_put(plain
, tmp2
- tmp
);
2551 *len
= (u8
*) wpabuf_put(plain
, 0) - len
- 1;
2556 int fils_set_tk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2561 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
2562 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: No valid PTK available to set TK");
2565 if (sm
->tk_already_set
) {
2566 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: TK already set to the driver");
2570 alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm
->pairwise
);
2571 klen
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->pairwise
);
2573 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Configure TK to the driver");
2574 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, alg
, sm
->addr
, 0,
2575 sm
->PTK
.tk
, klen
)) {
2576 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Failed to set TK to the driver");
2579 sm
->tk_already_set
= TRUE
;
2585 u8
* hostapd_eid_assoc_fils_session(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*buf
,
2586 const u8
*fils_session
, struct wpabuf
*hlp
)
2588 struct wpabuf
*plain
;
2592 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
; /* Element ID */
2593 *pos
++ = 1 + FILS_SESSION_LEN
; /* Length */
2594 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_SESSION
; /* Element ID Extension */
2595 os_memcpy(pos
, fils_session
, FILS_SESSION_LEN
);
2596 pos
+= FILS_SESSION_LEN
;
2598 plain
= fils_prepare_plainbuf(sm
, hlp
);
2600 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Plain buffer prep failed");
2604 os_memcpy(pos
, wpabuf_head(plain
), wpabuf_len(plain
));
2605 pos
+= wpabuf_len(plain
);
2607 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "%s: plain buf_len: %u", __func__
,
2608 (unsigned int) wpabuf_len(plain
));
2610 sm
->fils_completed
= 1;
2614 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
2617 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
)
2619 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2621 int ok
= 0, psk_found
= 0;
2622 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
2625 const u8
*eapol_key_ie
, *key_data
, *mic
;
2626 u16 key_data_length
;
2627 size_t mic_len
, eapol_key_ie_len
;
2628 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
2629 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
2630 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
2632 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
2633 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2634 sm
->update_snonce
= FALSE
;
2635 os_memset(&PTK
, 0, sizeof(PTK
));
2637 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
);
2639 /* WPA with IEEE 802.1X: use the derived PMK from EAP
2640 * WPA-PSK: iterate through possible PSKs and select the one matching
2643 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
2644 !wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2645 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2646 sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, pmk
, &pmk_len
);
2650 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2651 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2652 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, pmk
, pmk_len
);
2653 sm
->xxkey_len
= pmk_len
;
2655 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2658 pmk_len
= sm
->pmk_len
;
2661 if (wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, sm
->SNonce
, pmk
, pmk_len
, &PTK
) < 0)
2665 wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, pmk_len
, &PTK
,
2666 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
,
2667 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
) == 0) {
2674 wpa_aead_decrypt(sm
, &PTK
, sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
,
2675 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
, NULL
) == 0) {
2679 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
2681 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
2682 wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2687 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2688 "invalid MIC in msg 2/4 of 4-Way Handshake");
2690 wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2695 * Note: last_rx_eapol_key length fields have already been validated in
2698 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
;
2699 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
2700 mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
2701 key_data
= mic
+ mic_len
+ 2;
2702 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(mic
+ mic_len
);
2703 if (key_data_length
> sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
2704 sizeof(*key
) - mic_len
- 2)
2707 if (wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
, &kde
) < 0) {
2708 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2709 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 with invalid Key Data contents");
2713 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.rsn_ie
;
2714 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.rsn_ie_len
;
2715 } else if (kde
.osen
) {
2716 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.osen
;
2717 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.osen_len
;
2719 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.wpa_ie
;
2720 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.wpa_ie_len
;
2722 ft
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
2723 if (sm
->wpa_ie
== NULL
||
2724 wpa_compare_rsn_ie(ft
, sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
,
2725 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
)) {
2726 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2727 "WPA IE from (Re)AssocReq did not match with msg 2/4");
2729 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in AssocReq",
2730 sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
);
2732 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in msg 2/4",
2733 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
);
2734 /* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
2735 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2736 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
2739 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2740 if (ft
&& ft_check_msg_2_of_4(wpa_auth
, sm
, &kde
) < 0) {
2741 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2742 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
2745 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2747 if (kde
.ip_addr_req
&& kde
.ip_addr_req
[0] &&
2748 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
&& WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0) {
2750 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2751 "P2P: IP address requested in EAPOL-Key exchange");
2752 idx
= bitfield_get_first_zero(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
2754 u32 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_start
);
2755 bitfield_set(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
, idx
);
2756 WPA_PUT_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
, start
+ idx
);
2757 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2758 "P2P: Assigned IP address %u.%u.%u.%u to "
2759 MACSTR
, sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
2760 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
2764 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2766 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2767 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2769 * Verify that PMKR1Name from EAPOL-Key message 2/4 matches
2770 * with the value we derived.
2772 if (os_memcmp_const(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
,
2773 WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
) != 0) {
2774 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2775 "PMKR1Name mismatch in FT 4-way "
2777 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from "
2779 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2780 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Derived PMKR1Name",
2781 sm
->pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2785 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2787 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
2788 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
2790 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2791 /* PSK may have changed from the previous choice, so update
2792 * state machine data based on whatever PSK was selected here.
2794 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
2795 sm
->pmk_len
= PMK_LEN
;
2798 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
2800 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
2801 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
2805 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
)
2807 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
, wpa_ptk
);
2812 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2814 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2816 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
) {
2818 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2819 return 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
+ len
;
2826 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2828 struct wpa_igtk_kde igtk
;
2829 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2830 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
2831 size_t len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2833 if (!sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
)
2836 igtk
.keyid
[0] = gsm
->GN_igtk
;
2838 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
!= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
||
2839 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, rsc
) < 0)
2840 os_memset(igtk
.pn
, 0, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
2842 os_memcpy(igtk
.pn
, rsc
, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
2843 os_memcpy(igtk
.igtk
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
2844 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
||
2845 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
) {
2847 * Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of
2850 if (random_get_bytes(igtk
.igtk
, len
) < 0)
2853 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK
,
2854 (const u8
*) &igtk
, WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
+ len
,
2860 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2862 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2868 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2873 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2876 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)
2878 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
], *_rsc
, *gtk
, *kde
, *pos
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2879 size_t gtk_len
, kde_len
;
2880 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2882 int wpa_ie_len
, secure
, keyidx
, encr
= 0;
2884 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
2885 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
2888 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries
&&
2889 sm
->TimeoutCtr
> 1) {
2890 /* Do not allow retransmission of EAPOL-Key msg 3/4 */
2893 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
) {
2894 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2895 * immediately following this. */
2899 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
2900 GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
2902 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
2903 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
2904 /* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
2905 wpa_ie
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
2906 wpa_ie_len
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
2907 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&&
2908 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
) &&
2909 wpa_ie_len
> wpa_ie
[1] + 2 && wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN
) {
2910 /* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE and possible MDIE */
2911 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2912 if (wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN
)
2913 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2914 wpa_ie_len
= wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2916 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2917 "sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
2918 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
2919 /* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
2921 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2922 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2923 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
||
2924 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
) {
2926 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2927 * of GTK in the BSS.
2929 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gtk_len
) < 0)
2937 /* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
2943 if (sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
) {
2945 * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
2946 * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
2947 * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
2948 * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
2949 * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
2950 * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
2952 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2953 "STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - "
2954 "set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
2959 kde_len
= wpa_ie_len
+ ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
2961 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gtk_len
;
2962 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2963 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2964 kde_len
+= 2 + PMKID_LEN
; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
2965 kde_len
+= 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
2967 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2969 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0)
2970 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 3 * 4;
2971 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2972 kde
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
2977 os_memcpy(pos
, wpa_ie
, wpa_ie_len
);
2979 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2980 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2985 res
= wpa_insert_pmkid(kde
, &elen
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
);
2987 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert "
2988 "PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
2995 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2998 hdr
[0] = keyidx
& 0x03;
3000 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
3003 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
3005 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
3006 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
3008 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
;
3010 conf
= &sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
;
3011 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
3012 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
>= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) {
3013 os_memcpy(pos
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
3014 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
3015 res
= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1];
3017 int use_sha384
= wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
3019 res
= wpa_write_ftie(conf
, use_sha384
,
3020 conf
->r0_key_holder
,
3021 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
3023 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
,
3027 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE "
3028 "into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
3034 /* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
3035 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
3037 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE
;
3038 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->reassociation_deadline
);
3041 /* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
3042 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
3044 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME
;
3045 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->r0_key_lifetime
);
3048 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
3050 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0) {
3052 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
3053 os_memcpy(addr
+ 4, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_mask
, 4);
3054 os_memcpy(addr
+ 8, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_go
, 4);
3055 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, WFA_KEY_DATA_IP_ADDR_ALLOC
,
3056 addr
, sizeof(addr
), NULL
, 0);
3058 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
3060 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
3061 (secure
? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
: 0) |
3062 (wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
) ?
3063 WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
: 0) |
3064 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
|
3065 WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
,
3066 _rsc
, sm
->ANonce
, kde
, pos
- kde
, keyidx
, encr
);
3071 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
)
3073 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
, wpa_ptk
);
3074 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
3076 enum wpa_alg alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm
->pairwise
);
3077 int klen
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->pairwise
);
3078 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, alg
, sm
->addr
, 0,
3079 sm
->PTK
.tk
, klen
)) {
3080 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
3081 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
3084 /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
3085 sm
->pairwise_set
= TRUE
;
3087 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_ptk_rekey
) {
3088 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
3089 eloop_register_timeout(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.
3090 wpa_ptk_rekey
, 0, wpa_rekey_ptk
,
3094 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
3095 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
||
3096 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
) {
3097 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
3098 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 1);
3102 if (0 /* IBSS == TRUE */) {
3104 if (sm
->keycount
== 2) {
3105 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
3106 WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 1);
3109 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
,
3112 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
, 0);
3113 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyDone
, 1);
3114 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
3115 sm
->PInitAKeys
= TRUE
;
3118 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3119 "pairwise key handshake completed (%s)",
3120 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
3122 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
3123 wpa_ft_push_pmk_r1(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
3124 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
3130 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
3133 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
3134 else if (sm
->Disconnect
3135 /* || FIX: dot11RSNAConfigSALifetime timeout */) {
3136 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3137 "WPA_PTK: sm->Disconnect");
3138 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3140 else if (sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
)
3141 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
3142 else if (sm
->AuthenticationRequest
)
3143 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
);
3144 else if (sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
)
3145 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
3146 else if (sm
->PTKRequest
) {
3147 if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm
) < 0)
3148 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
3150 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3151 } else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
) {
3152 case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE
:
3154 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT
:
3155 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
3157 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECTED
:
3158 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
3160 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION
:
3161 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
3163 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION2
:
3164 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
3165 wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
3166 WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
) > 0)
3167 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
);
3168 else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
3169 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
3170 /* FIX: && 802.1X::keyRun */)
3171 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
);
3172 else if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
)
3173 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
);
3175 case WPA_PTK_INITPMK
:
3176 if (wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
3177 WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
) > 0) {
3178 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3180 } else if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
&& sm
->pmksa
) {
3181 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3182 #endif /* CONFIG_DPP */
3184 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
3185 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3186 "INITPMK - keyAvailable = false");
3187 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3190 case WPA_PTK_INITPSK
:
3191 if (wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
,
3193 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3195 } else if (wpa_auth_uses_sae(sm
) && sm
->pmksa
) {
3196 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3197 #endif /* CONFIG_SAE */
3199 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3200 "no PSK configured for the STA");
3201 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
3202 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3205 case WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
:
3206 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3207 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
3208 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
3209 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
3210 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
) {
3211 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
3213 sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3214 "PTKSTART: Retry limit %u reached",
3215 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
);
3216 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3217 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3218 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3220 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
:
3221 if (sm
->MICVerified
)
3222 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
);
3223 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3224 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
3225 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
3226 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3227 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3229 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
:
3230 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
3232 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
:
3233 if (sm
->update_snonce
)
3234 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
3235 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3236 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
3237 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
);
3238 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
3239 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
||
3240 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries
&&
3241 sm
->TimeoutCtr
> 1)) {
3242 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
3244 sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3245 "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %u reached",
3246 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
);
3247 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3248 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3249 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
3251 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
:
3257 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
)
3259 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3261 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
3262 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
3263 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
3265 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
3269 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
)
3271 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
3272 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3274 u8
*kde_buf
= NULL
, *pos
, hdr
[2];
3276 u8
*gtk
, dummy_gtk
[32];
3278 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3281 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries
&&
3282 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
> 1) {
3283 /* Do not allow retransmission of EAPOL-Key group msg 1/2 */
3286 if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
> sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
) {
3287 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
3288 * immediately following this. */
3292 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
3293 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
3294 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
3295 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
3296 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
3297 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
)
3298 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
3299 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3300 "sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake");
3302 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
3303 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
||
3304 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
) {
3306 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
3307 * of GTK in the BSS.
3309 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gsm
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3313 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
3314 kde_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gsm
->GTK_len
+
3315 ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
3316 kde_buf
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
3317 if (kde_buf
== NULL
)
3320 kde
= pos
= kde_buf
;
3321 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
3323 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
3325 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
3326 kde_len
= pos
- kde
;
3329 kde_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
3332 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
3333 WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
|
3334 (wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
) ?
3335 WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
: 0) |
3337 (!sm
->Pair
? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
: 0),
3338 rsc
, NULL
, kde
, kde_len
, gsm
->GN
, 1);
3344 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
)
3346 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3347 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
3348 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
3349 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
3350 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3351 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
3352 /* FIX: MLME.SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
3353 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3354 "group key handshake completed (%s)",
3355 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
3360 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
)
3362 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3363 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
3364 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
3365 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3366 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
3367 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3368 "group key handshake failed (%s) after %u tries",
3369 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN",
3370 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
);
3374 SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP
)
3376 if (sm
->Init
|| sm
->PtkGroupInit
) {
3377 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3378 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= FALSE
;
3379 } else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
) {
3380 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_IDLE
:
3381 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
||
3382 (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&& sm
->PInitAKeys
))
3383 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
3385 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
:
3386 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3387 !sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
3388 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
);
3389 else if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
>
3390 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
||
3391 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries
&&
3392 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
> 1))
3393 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
);
3394 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3395 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
3397 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_KEYERROR
:
3398 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3400 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYESTABLISHED
:
3401 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3407 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3408 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3412 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3413 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3414 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "Group key expansion",
3415 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
3416 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3418 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GTK",
3419 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
);
3421 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3422 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
3424 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3425 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3426 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3427 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "IGTK key expansion",
3428 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
3429 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
) < 0)
3431 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "IGTK",
3432 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3434 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3440 static void wpa_group_gtk_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3441 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3443 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3444 "GTK_INIT (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3445 group
->changed
= FALSE
; /* GInit is not cleared here; avoid loop */
3446 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
;
3449 os_memset(group
->GTK
, 0, sizeof(group
->GTK
));
3452 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3455 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3456 /* GTK[GN] = CalcGTK() */
3457 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3461 static int wpa_group_update_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
3463 if (ctx
!= NULL
&& ctx
!= sm
->group
)
3466 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
) {
3467 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3468 "Not in PTKINITDONE; skip Group Key update");
3469 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3472 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
3474 * This should not really happen, so add a debug log entry.
3475 * Since we clear the GKeyDoneStations before the loop, the
3476 * station needs to be counted here anyway.
3478 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3479 "GUpdateStationKeys was already set when "
3480 "marking station for GTK rekeying");
3483 /* Do not rekey GTK/IGTK when STA is in WNM-Sleep Mode */
3484 if (sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
3487 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
++;
3488 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= TRUE
;
3495 #ifdef CONFIG_WNM_AP
3496 /* update GTK when exiting WNM-Sleep Mode */
3497 void wpa_wnmsleep_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3499 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
3502 wpa_group_update_sta(sm
, NULL
);
3506 void wpa_set_wnmsleep(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int flag
)
3509 sm
->is_wnmsleep
= !!flag
;
3513 int wpa_wnmsleep_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
3515 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3520 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] |
3523 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_GTK
;
3524 *pos
++ = 11 + gsm
->GTK_len
;
3525 /* Key ID in B0-B1 of Key Info */
3526 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN
& 0x03);
3528 *pos
++ = gsm
->GTK_len
;
3529 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, pos
) != 0)
3532 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
3533 pos
+= gsm
->GTK_len
;
3535 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3537 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3538 gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
3544 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3545 int wpa_wnmsleep_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
3547 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3549 size_t len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3553 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] | Key[16]
3555 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK
;
3556 *pos
++ = 2 + 6 + len
;
3557 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN_igtk
);
3559 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, pos
) != 0)
3563 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3566 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3568 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3569 gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3573 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3574 #endif /* CONFIG_WNM_AP */
3577 static void wpa_group_setkeys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3578 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3582 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3583 "SETKEYS (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3584 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
3585 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
;
3586 group
->GTKReKey
= FALSE
;
3588 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
3590 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3591 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
3592 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
3593 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
3594 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3595 /* "GKeyDoneStations = GNoStations" is done in more robust way by
3596 * counting the STAs that are marked with GUpdateStationKeys instead of
3597 * including all STAs that could be in not-yet-completed state. */
3598 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3600 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
) {
3601 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: Unexpected "
3602 "GKeyDoneStations=%d when starting new GTK rekey",
3603 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
3604 group
->GKeyDoneStations
= 0;
3606 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_update_sta
, group
);
3607 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: GKeyDoneStations=%d",
3608 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
3612 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3613 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3617 if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
,
3618 wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
),
3619 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN
,
3620 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3623 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3624 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
3628 alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3629 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3632 wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
, alg
,
3633 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN_igtk
,
3634 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
) < 0)
3637 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3643 static int wpa_group_disconnect_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
3645 if (sm
->group
== ctx
) {
3646 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Mark STA " MACSTR
3647 " for discconnection due to fatal failure",
3649 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
3656 static void wpa_group_fatal_failure(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3657 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3659 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state FATAL_FAILURE");
3660 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
3661 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
;
3662 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_disconnect_cb
, group
);
3666 static int wpa_group_setkeysdone(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3667 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3669 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3670 "SETKEYSDONE (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3671 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
3672 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
;
3674 if (wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
3675 wpa_group_fatal_failure(wpa_auth
, group
);
3683 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3684 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3687 wpa_group_gtk_init(wpa_auth
, group
);
3688 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
) {
3689 /* Do not allow group operations */
3690 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
&&
3691 group
->GTKAuthenticator
) {
3692 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
3693 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
&&
3695 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
3696 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
) {
3697 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
== 0)
3698 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
3699 else if (group
->GTKReKey
)
3700 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
3705 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3710 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
3711 /* This should not happen, but if it does, make sure we do not
3712 * end up freeing the state machine too early by exiting the
3713 * recursive call. */
3714 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: wpa_sm_step() called recursively");
3718 sm
->in_step_loop
= 1;
3720 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
3723 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
3724 sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
= FALSE
;
3726 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK
);
3727 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
3729 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK_GROUP
);
3730 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
3732 wpa_group_sm_step(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
3733 } while (sm
->changed
|| sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
);
3734 sm
->in_step_loop
= 0;
3736 if (sm
->pending_deinit
) {
3737 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Completing pending STA state "
3738 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
3739 wpa_free_sta_sm(sm
);
3746 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
3748 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= eloop_ctx
;
3753 void wpa_auth_sm_notify(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3757 eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
3761 void wpa_gtk_rekey(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3764 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3766 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3769 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
3771 for (i
= 0; i
< 2; i
++) {
3773 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
3775 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3776 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
3777 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
3778 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
3779 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3780 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3781 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
3786 static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int val
)
3788 return val
? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
3792 #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
3793 #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
3794 ((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff
3796 int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
3799 char pmkid_txt
[PMKID_LEN
* 2 + 1];
3800 #ifdef CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH
3801 const int preauth
= 1;
3802 #else /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
3803 const int preauth
= 0;
3804 #endif /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
3806 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3809 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3810 "dot11RSNAOptionImplemented=TRUE\n"
3811 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationImplemented=%s\n"
3812 "dot11RSNAEnabled=%s\n"
3813 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationEnabled=%s\n",
3814 wpa_bool_txt(preauth
),
3815 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
),
3816 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.rsn_preauth
));
3817 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3821 wpa_snprintf_hex(pmkid_txt
, sizeof(pmkid_txt
),
3822 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, PMKID_LEN
);
3825 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3826 "dot11RSNAConfigVersion=%u\n"
3827 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseKeysSupported=9999\n"
3828 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipher */
3829 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyMethod */
3830 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime */
3831 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyPackets */
3832 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict=%u\n"
3833 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount=%u\n"
3834 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount=%u\n"
3835 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipherSize=%u\n"
3836 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=%u\n"
3837 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=%u\n"
3838 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfPTKSAReplayCounters=0\n"
3839 "dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=%u\n"
3840 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3841 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3842 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3843 "dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed=%s\n"
3844 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3845 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3846 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3847 "dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked=%u\n"
3848 "dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures=%u\n"
3849 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n",
3851 !!wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
,
3852 wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
,
3853 wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
,
3854 wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
) * 8,
3855 dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
,
3856 dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
,
3857 dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
,
3858 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected
),
3859 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected
),
3860 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected
),
3862 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested
),
3863 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested
),
3864 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested
),
3865 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
,
3866 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
);
3867 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3871 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseCiphersTable */
3872 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable */
3875 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
, "hostapdWPAGroupState=%d\n",
3876 wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
);
3877 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3885 int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
3893 /* TODO: FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF entry for broadcast/multicast stats */
3895 /* dot11RSNAStatsEntry */
3897 pairwise
= wpa_cipher_to_suite(sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
3898 WPA_PROTO_RSN
: WPA_PROTO_WPA
,
3904 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3905 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsIndex */
3906 "dot11RSNAStatsSTAAddress=" MACSTR
"\n"
3907 "dot11RSNAStatsVersion=1\n"
3908 "dot11RSNAStatsSelectedPairwiseCipher=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3909 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPICVErrors */
3910 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures=%u\n"
3911 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures=%u\n"
3912 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
3913 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors */
3914 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPReplays */,
3916 RSN_SUITE_ARG(pairwise
),
3917 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
,
3918 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
);
3919 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3924 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3925 "hostapdWPAPTKState=%d\n"
3926 "hostapdWPAPTKGroupState=%d\n",
3928 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
3929 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3937 void wpa_auth_countermeasures_start(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3940 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
++;
3944 int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3946 return sm
&& sm
->pairwise_set
;
3950 int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3952 return sm
->pairwise
;
3956 int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3960 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
;
3964 int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3972 int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3974 if (!sm
|| !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
3976 return sm
->tk_already_set
;
3980 int wpa_auth_sta_fils_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3982 if (!sm
|| !wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
3984 return sm
->tk_already_set
;
3988 int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
3989 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
)
3991 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->pmksa
!= entry
)
3998 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
3999 wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4001 return sm
? sm
->pmksa
: NULL
;
4005 void wpa_auth_sta_local_mic_failure_report(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4008 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
++;
4012 const u8
* wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, size_t *len
)
4014 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4016 *len
= wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
4017 return wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
4021 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
4022 unsigned int pmk_len
,
4023 int session_timeout
, struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
4025 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
||
4026 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
4029 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
4030 if (pmk_len
> PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
)
4031 pmk_len
= PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
;
4032 } else if (pmk_len
> PMK_LEN
) {
4036 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(sm
->wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, pmk_len
, NULL
,
4037 sm
->PTK
.kck
, sm
->PTK
.kck_len
,
4038 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, session_timeout
,
4039 eapol
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
4046 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_preauth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4047 const u8
*pmk
, size_t len
, const u8
*sta_addr
,
4048 int session_timeout
,
4049 struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
4051 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4054 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, len
, NULL
,
4057 sta_addr
, session_timeout
, eapol
,
4058 WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X
))
4065 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_sae(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
4066 const u8
*pmk
, const u8
*pmkid
)
4068 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
4071 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
, pmkid
,
4073 wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, 0, NULL
,
4081 void wpa_auth_add_sae_pmkid(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmkid
)
4083 os_memcpy(sm
->pmkid
, pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
4088 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add2(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
4089 const u8
*pmk
, size_t pmk_len
, const u8
*pmkid
,
4090 int session_timeout
, int akmp
)
4092 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
4095 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, pmk_len
, pmkid
,
4096 NULL
, 0, wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, session_timeout
,
4104 void wpa_auth_pmksa_remove(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4107 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
;
4109 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
)
4111 pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, sta_addr
, NULL
);
4113 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Remove PMKSA cache entry for "
4114 MACSTR
" based on request", MAC2STR(sta_addr
));
4115 pmksa_cache_free_entry(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmksa
);
4120 int wpa_auth_pmksa_list(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
,
4123 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
4125 return pmksa_cache_auth_list(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, buf
, len
);
4129 void wpa_auth_pmksa_flush(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
4131 if (wpa_auth
&& wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
4132 pmksa_cache_auth_flush(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
4136 #ifdef CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL
4139 int wpa_auth_pmksa_list_mesh(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
4140 char *buf
, size_t len
)
4142 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
4145 return pmksa_cache_auth_list_mesh(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, addr
, buf
, len
);
4149 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
4150 wpa_auth_pmksa_create_entry(const u8
*aa
, const u8
*spa
, const u8
*pmk
,
4151 const u8
*pmkid
, int expiration
)
4153 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
;
4154 struct os_reltime now
;
4156 entry
= pmksa_cache_auth_create_entry(pmk
, PMK_LEN
, pmkid
, NULL
, 0, aa
,
4157 spa
, 0, NULL
, WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE
);
4161 os_get_reltime(&now
);
4162 entry
->expiration
= now
.sec
+ expiration
;
4167 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_entry(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4168 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
)
4172 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
4175 ret
= pmksa_cache_auth_add_entry(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, entry
);
4177 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4178 "RSN: Failed to store external PMKSA cache for "
4179 MACSTR
, MAC2STR(entry
->spa
));
4184 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
4185 #endif /* CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL */
4188 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
4189 wpa_auth_pmksa_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*sta_addr
,
4192 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
4194 return pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, sta_addr
, pmkid
);
4198 void wpa_auth_pmksa_set_to_sm(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
,
4199 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
4200 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4207 os_memcpy(pmk
, pmksa
->pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
4208 os_memcpy(pmkid
, pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
4209 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
4214 * Remove and free the group from wpa_authenticator. This is triggered by a
4215 * callback to make sure nobody is currently iterating the group list while it
4218 static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4219 struct wpa_group
*group
)
4221 struct wpa_group
*prev
= wpa_auth
->group
;
4223 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Remove group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
4227 if (prev
->next
== group
) {
4228 /* This never frees the special first group as needed */
4229 prev
->next
= group
->next
;
4239 /* Increase the reference counter for group */
4240 static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4241 struct wpa_group
*group
)
4243 /* Skip the special first group */
4244 if (wpa_auth
->group
== group
)
4247 group
->references
++;
4251 /* Decrease the reference counter and maybe free the group */
4252 static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4253 struct wpa_group
*group
)
4255 /* Skip the special first group */
4256 if (wpa_auth
->group
== group
)
4259 group
->references
--;
4260 if (group
->references
)
4262 wpa_group_free(wpa_auth
, group
);
4267 * Add a group that has its references counter set to zero. Caller needs to
4268 * call wpa_group_get() on the return value to mark the entry in use.
4270 static struct wpa_group
*
4271 wpa_auth_add_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
4273 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4275 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
)
4278 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Add group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
4280 group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
, 0);
4284 group
->next
= wpa_auth
->group
->next
;
4285 wpa_auth
->group
->next
= group
;
4292 * Enforce that the group state machine for the VLAN is running, increase
4293 * reference counter as interface is up. References might have been increased
4294 * even if a negative value is returned.
4295 * Returns: -1 on error (group missing, group already failed); otherwise, 0
4297 int wpa_auth_ensure_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
4299 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4301 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4304 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
4306 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
4308 group
= group
->next
;
4311 if (group
== NULL
) {
4312 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
4317 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4318 "WPA: Ensure group state machine running for VLAN ID %d",
4321 wpa_group_get(wpa_auth
, group
);
4322 group
->num_setup_iface
++;
4324 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
4332 * Decrease reference counter, expected to be zero afterwards.
4333 * returns: -1 on error (group not found, group in fail state)
4334 * -2 if wpa_group is still referenced
4337 int wpa_auth_release_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
4339 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4342 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4345 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
4347 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
4349 group
= group
->next
;
4355 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4356 "WPA: Try stopping group state machine for VLAN ID %d",
4359 if (group
->num_setup_iface
<= 0) {
4360 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
,
4361 "WPA: wpa_auth_release_group called more often than wpa_auth_ensure_group for VLAN ID %d, skipping.",
4365 group
->num_setup_iface
--;
4367 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
4370 if (group
->references
> 1) {
4371 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4372 "WPA: Cannot stop group state machine for VLAN ID %d as references are still hold",
4377 wpa_group_put(wpa_auth
, group
);
4383 int wpa_auth_sta_set_vlan(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int vlan_id
)
4385 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4387 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4390 group
= sm
->wpa_auth
->group
;
4392 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
4394 group
= group
->next
;
4397 if (group
== NULL
) {
4398 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(sm
->wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
4403 if (sm
->group
== group
)
4406 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
4409 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Moving STA " MACSTR
" to use group state "
4410 "machine for VLAN ID %d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), vlan_id
);
4412 wpa_group_get(sm
->wpa_auth
, group
);
4413 wpa_group_put(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
4420 void wpa_auth_eapol_key_tx_status(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4421 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int ack
)
4423 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| sm
== NULL
)
4425 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key TX status for STA " MACSTR
4426 " ack=%d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), ack
);
4427 if (sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
&& ack
) {
4429 * Some deployed supplicant implementations update their SNonce
4430 * for each EAPOL-Key 2/4 message even within the same 4-way
4431 * handshake and then fail to use the first SNonce when
4432 * deriving the PTK. This results in unsuccessful 4-way
4433 * handshake whenever the relatively short initial timeout is
4434 * reached and EAPOL-Key 1/4 is retransmitted. Try to work
4435 * around this by increasing the timeout now that we know that
4436 * the station has received the frame.
4438 int timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
4439 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Increase initial EAPOL-Key 1/4 "
4440 "timeout by %u ms because of acknowledged frame",
4442 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
4443 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000,
4444 (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
4445 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
4448 #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
4449 if (sm
->eapol_status_cb
) {
4450 sm
->eapol_status_cb(sm
->eapol_status_cb_ctx1
,
4451 sm
->eapol_status_cb_ctx2
);
4452 sm
->eapol_status_cb
= NULL
;
4454 #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
4458 int wpa_auth_uses_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4462 return wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
4466 int wpa_auth_uses_ft_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4470 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE
;
4475 int wpa_auth_get_ip_addr(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*addr
)
4477 if (sm
== NULL
|| WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0)
4479 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
4482 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
4485 int wpa_auth_radius_das_disconnect_pmksa(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4486 struct radius_das_attrs
*attr
)
4488 return pmksa_cache_auth_radius_das_disconnect(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, attr
);
4492 void wpa_auth_reconfig_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
4494 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4498 for (group
= wpa_auth
->group
; group
; group
= group
->next
)
4499 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
4505 struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data
{
4506 struct wpa_authenticator
*auth
;
4508 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
;
4514 static int wpa_auth_fils_iter(struct wpa_authenticator
*a
, void *ctx
)
4516 struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data
*data
= ctx
;
4518 if (a
== data
->auth
|| !a
->conf
.fils_cache_id_set
||
4519 os_memcmp(a
->conf
.fils_cache_id
, data
->cache_id
,
4520 FILS_CACHE_ID_LEN
) != 0)
4522 data
->pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_get(a
->pmksa
, data
->spa
, data
->pmkid
);
4523 return data
->pmksa
!= NULL
;
4527 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
4528 wpa_auth_pmksa_get_fils_cache_id(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4529 const u8
*sta_addr
, const u8
*pmkid
)
4531 struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data idata
;
4533 if (!wpa_auth
->conf
.fils_cache_id_set
)
4535 idata
.auth
= wpa_auth
;
4536 idata
.cache_id
= wpa_auth
->conf
.fils_cache_id
;
4538 idata
.spa
= sta_addr
;
4539 idata
.pmkid
= pmkid
;
4540 wpa_auth_for_each_auth(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth_fils_iter
, &idata
);
4545 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
4546 int wpa_auth_write_fte(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int use_sha384
,
4547 u8
*buf
, size_t len
)
4549 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
= &wpa_auth
->conf
;
4551 return wpa_write_ftie(conf
, use_sha384
, conf
->r0_key_holder
,
4552 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
4553 NULL
, NULL
, buf
, len
, NULL
, 0);
4555 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
4558 void wpa_auth_get_fils_aead_params(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
4559 u8
*fils_anonce
, u8
*fils_snonce
,
4560 u8
*fils_kek
, size_t *fils_kek_len
)
4562 os_memcpy(fils_anonce
, sm
->ANonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
4563 os_memcpy(fils_snonce
, sm
->SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
4564 os_memcpy(fils_kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek
, WPA_KEK_MAX_LEN
);
4565 *fils_kek_len
= sm
->PTK
.kek_len
;
4568 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
4571 #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
4573 int wpa_auth_resend_m1(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int change_anonce
,
4574 void (*cb
)(void *ctx1
, void *ctx2
),
4575 void *ctx1
, void *ctx2
)
4577 const u8
*anonce
= sm
->ANonce
;
4578 u8 anonce_buf
[WPA_NONCE_LEN
];
4580 if (change_anonce
) {
4581 if (random_get_bytes(anonce_buf
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
))
4583 anonce
= anonce_buf
;
4586 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
4587 "sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake (TESTING)");
4588 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
4589 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
, NULL
,
4590 anonce
, NULL
, 0, 0, 0);
4595 int wpa_auth_resend_m3(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
4596 void (*cb
)(void *ctx1
, void *ctx2
),
4597 void *ctx1
, void *ctx2
)
4599 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
], *_rsc
, *gtk
, *kde
, *pos
;
4600 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
4602 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
4603 size_t gtk_len
, kde_len
;
4604 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
4606 int wpa_ie_len
, secure
, keyidx
, encr
= 0;
4608 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
4609 GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
4613 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
4614 /* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
4615 wpa_ie
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
4616 wpa_ie_len
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
4617 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&&
4618 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
) &&
4619 wpa_ie_len
> wpa_ie
[1] + 2 && wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN
) {
4620 /* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE and possible MDIE */
4621 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
4622 if (wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN
)
4623 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
4624 wpa_ie_len
= wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
4626 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
4627 "sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake (TESTING)");
4628 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
4629 /* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
4631 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
4632 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
4637 /* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
4643 if (sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
) {
4645 * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
4646 * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
4647 * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
4648 * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
4649 * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
4650 * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
4652 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
4653 "STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - "
4654 "set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
4659 kde_len
= wpa_ie_len
+ ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
4661 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gtk_len
;
4662 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
4663 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
4664 kde_len
+= 2 + PMKID_LEN
; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
4665 kde_len
+= 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
4667 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
4668 kde
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
4673 os_memcpy(pos
, wpa_ie
, wpa_ie_len
);
4675 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
4676 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
4681 res
= wpa_insert_pmkid(kde
, &elen
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
);
4683 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert "
4684 "PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
4691 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
4694 hdr
[0] = keyidx
& 0x03;
4696 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
4699 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
4701 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
4702 if (pos
- opos
>= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
) {
4703 /* skip KDE header and keyid */
4704 opos
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2;
4705 os_memset(opos
, 0, 6); /* clear PN */
4707 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
4709 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
4710 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
4712 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
;
4714 conf
= &sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
;
4715 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
4716 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
>= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) {
4717 os_memcpy(pos
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
4718 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
4719 res
= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1];
4721 int use_sha384
= wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
4723 res
= wpa_write_ftie(conf
, use_sha384
,
4724 conf
->r0_key_holder
,
4725 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
4727 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
,
4731 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE "
4732 "into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
4738 /* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
4739 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
4741 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE
;
4742 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->reassociation_deadline
);
4745 /* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
4746 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
4748 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME
;
4749 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->r0_key_lifetime
);
4752 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
4754 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
4755 (secure
? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
: 0) |
4756 (wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
) ?
4757 WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
: 0) |
4758 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
|
4759 WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
,
4760 _rsc
, sm
->ANonce
, kde
, pos
- kde
, keyidx
, encr
);
4766 int wpa_auth_resend_group_m1(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
4767 void (*cb
)(void *ctx1
, void *ctx2
),
4768 void *ctx1
, void *ctx2
)
4770 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
4771 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
4773 u8
*kde_buf
= NULL
, *pos
, hdr
[2];
4774 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
4776 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
4780 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
4781 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
4783 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
4784 "sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake (TESTING)");
4786 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
4787 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
4788 kde_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gsm
->GTK_len
+
4789 ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
4790 kde_buf
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
4791 if (kde_buf
== NULL
)
4794 kde
= pos
= kde_buf
;
4795 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
4797 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
4799 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
4801 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
4803 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
) {
4804 /* skip KDE header and keyid */
4805 opos
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2;
4806 os_memset(opos
, 0, 6); /* clear PN */
4808 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
4809 kde_len
= pos
- kde
;
4812 kde_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
4815 sm
->eapol_status_cb
= cb
;
4816 sm
->eapol_status_cb_ctx1
= ctx1
;
4817 sm
->eapol_status_cb_ctx2
= ctx2
;
4819 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
4820 WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
|
4821 (wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
) ?
4822 WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
: 0) |
4824 (!sm
->Pair
? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
: 0),
4825 rsc
, NULL
, kde
, kde_len
, gsm
->GN
, 1);
4832 int wpa_auth_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
4836 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
4837 return eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
4840 #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */