2 * IEEE 802.11 RSN / WPA Authenticator
3 * Copyright (c) 2004-2015, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6 * See README for more details.
9 #include "utils/includes.h"
11 #include "utils/common.h"
12 #include "utils/eloop.h"
13 #include "utils/state_machine.h"
14 #include "utils/bitfield.h"
15 #include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
16 #include "crypto/aes.h"
17 #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
18 #include "crypto/aes_siv.h"
19 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
20 #include "crypto/sha1.h"
21 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
22 #include "crypto/random.h"
23 #include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm.h"
24 #include "ap_config.h"
25 #include "ieee802_11.h"
27 #include "pmksa_cache_auth.h"
28 #include "wpa_auth_i.h"
29 #include "wpa_auth_ie.h"
31 #define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct wpa_state_machine
32 #define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "WPA"
33 #define STATE_MACHINE_ADDR sm->addr
36 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
37 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
38 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp
, size_t pmk_len
, struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
,
39 u8
*data
, size_t data_len
);
41 static int wpa_aead_decrypt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
,
42 u8
*buf
, size_t buf_len
, u16
*_key_data_len
);
43 static struct wpabuf
* fils_prepare_plainbuf(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
44 const struct wpabuf
*hlp
);
45 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
46 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
47 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
48 struct wpa_group
*group
);
49 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
50 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
51 struct wpa_group
*group
);
52 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
53 struct wpa_group
*group
);
54 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*snonce
,
55 const u8
*pmk
, unsigned int pmk_len
,
57 static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
58 struct wpa_group
*group
);
59 static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
60 struct wpa_group
*group
);
61 static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
62 struct wpa_group
*group
);
63 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
);
65 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first
= 100; /* ms */
66 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq
= 1000; /* ms */
67 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
= 500; /* ms */
69 /* TODO: make these configurable */
70 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
= 43200;
71 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
= 70;
72 static const int dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
= 60;
75 static inline int wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(
76 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
78 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->mic_failure_report
)
79 return wpa_auth
->cb
->mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
);
84 static inline void wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(
85 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
87 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->psk_failure_report
)
88 wpa_auth
->cb
->psk_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
);
92 static inline void wpa_auth_set_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
93 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
,
96 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->set_eapol
)
97 wpa_auth
->cb
->set_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, var
, value
);
101 static inline int wpa_auth_get_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
102 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
)
104 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_eapol
== NULL
)
106 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, var
);
110 static inline const u8
* wpa_auth_get_psk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
112 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
,
115 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_psk
== NULL
)
117 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_psk(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, p2p_dev_addr
,
122 static inline int wpa_auth_get_msk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
123 const u8
*addr
, u8
*msk
, size_t *len
)
125 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_msk
== NULL
)
127 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_msk(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, msk
, len
);
131 static inline int wpa_auth_set_key(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
133 enum wpa_alg alg
, const u8
*addr
, int idx
,
134 u8
*key
, size_t key_len
)
136 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->set_key
== NULL
)
138 return wpa_auth
->cb
->set_key(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, vlan_id
, alg
, addr
, idx
,
143 static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
144 const u8
*addr
, int idx
, u8
*seq
)
146 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_seqnum
== NULL
)
148 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_seqnum(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, idx
, seq
);
153 wpa_auth_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
154 const u8
*data
, size_t data_len
, int encrypt
)
156 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->send_eapol
== NULL
)
158 return wpa_auth
->cb
->send_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, data
, data_len
,
164 static inline int wpa_auth_start_ampe(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
167 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->start_ampe
== NULL
)
169 return wpa_auth
->cb
->start_ampe(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
);
171 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
174 int wpa_auth_for_each_sta(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
175 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
),
178 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_sta
== NULL
)
180 return wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_sta(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
184 int wpa_auth_for_each_auth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
185 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_authenticator
*a
, void *ctx
),
188 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_auth
== NULL
)
190 return wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_auth(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
194 void wpa_auth_logger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
195 logger_level level
, const char *txt
)
197 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->logger
== NULL
)
199 wpa_auth
->cb
->logger(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, level
, txt
);
203 void wpa_auth_vlogger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
204 logger_level level
, const char *fmt
, ...)
210 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->logger
== NULL
)
213 maxlen
= os_strlen(fmt
) + 100;
214 format
= os_malloc(maxlen
);
219 vsnprintf(format
, maxlen
, fmt
, ap
);
222 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, addr
, level
, format
);
228 static void wpa_sta_disconnect(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
229 const u8
*addr
, u16 reason
)
231 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->disconnect
== NULL
)
233 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_sta_disconnect STA " MACSTR
" (reason %u)",
234 MAC2STR(addr
), reason
);
235 wpa_auth
->cb
->disconnect(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, reason
);
239 static int wpa_use_aes_cmac(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
242 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
243 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
245 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
246 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
247 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
249 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
250 if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
)
256 static void wpa_rekey_gmk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
258 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
260 if (random_get_bytes(wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
)) {
261 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
264 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "GMK rekeyd");
265 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK",
266 wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
269 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
270 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
271 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
276 static void wpa_rekey_gtk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
278 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
279 struct wpa_group
*group
, *next
;
281 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying GTK");
282 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
284 wpa_group_get(wpa_auth
, group
);
286 group
->GTKReKey
= TRUE
;
288 group
->changed
= FALSE
;
289 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
290 } while (group
->changed
);
293 wpa_group_put(wpa_auth
, group
);
297 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
298 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
,
299 0, wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
304 static void wpa_rekey_ptk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
306 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
307 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
309 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying PTK");
310 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
315 static int wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
317 if (sm
->pmksa
== ctx
)
323 static void wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
,
326 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= ctx
;
327 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb
, entry
);
331 static int wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
332 struct wpa_group
*group
)
334 u8 buf
[ETH_ALEN
+ 8 + sizeof(unsigned long)];
338 if (random_get_bytes(group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
) < 0)
340 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK", group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
343 * Counter = PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter",
344 * Local MAC Address || Time)
346 os_memcpy(buf
, wpa_auth
->addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
347 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
);
348 ptr
= (unsigned long) group
;
349 os_memcpy(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
+ 8, &ptr
, sizeof(ptr
));
350 if (random_get_bytes(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
)) < 0)
353 if (sha1_prf(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
), "Init Counter", buf
, sizeof(buf
),
354 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) < 0)
356 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Key Counter",
357 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
363 static struct wpa_group
* wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
364 int vlan_id
, int delay_init
)
366 struct wpa_group
*group
;
368 group
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_group
));
372 group
->GTKAuthenticator
= TRUE
;
373 group
->vlan_id
= vlan_id
;
374 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
376 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
377 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
378 "for secure operations - update keys later when "
379 "the first station connects");
383 * Set initial GMK/Counter value here. The actual values that will be
384 * used in negotiations will be set once the first station tries to
385 * connect. This allows more time for collecting additional randomness
386 * on embedded devices.
388 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
389 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
397 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Delay group state machine start "
398 "until Beacon frames have been configured");
399 /* Initialization is completed in wpa_init_keys(). */
401 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
402 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
403 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
411 * wpa_init - Initialize WPA authenticator
412 * @addr: Authenticator address
413 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
414 * @cb: Callback functions for WPA authenticator
415 * Returns: Pointer to WPA authenticator data or %NULL on failure
417 struct wpa_authenticator
* wpa_init(const u8
*addr
,
418 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
,
419 const struct wpa_auth_callbacks
*cb
,
422 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
;
424 wpa_auth
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_authenticator
));
425 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
427 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
428 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
430 wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
= cb_ctx
;
432 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
433 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
438 wpa_auth
->group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, 0, 1);
439 if (wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
) {
440 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
445 wpa_auth
->pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_init(wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb
,
447 if (wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
) {
448 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "PMKSA cache initialization failed.");
449 os_free(wpa_auth
->group
);
450 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
455 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
456 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= wpa_ft_pmk_cache_init();
457 if (wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
== NULL
) {
458 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT PMK cache initialization failed.");
459 os_free(wpa_auth
->group
);
460 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
461 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
465 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
467 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
468 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
469 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
472 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
473 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
, 0,
474 wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
478 if (WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
)) {
479 int count
= WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_end
) -
480 WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
) + 1;
484 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
= bitfield_alloc(count
);
486 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
492 int wpa_init_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
494 struct wpa_group
*group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
496 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Start group state machine to set initial "
498 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
499 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
500 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
501 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
508 * wpa_deinit - Deinitialize WPA authenticator
509 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
511 void wpa_deinit(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
513 struct wpa_group
*group
, *prev
;
515 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
516 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
518 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
520 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
521 wpa_ft_pmk_cache_deinit(wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
);
522 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= NULL
;
523 wpa_ft_deinit(wpa_auth
);
524 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
527 bitfield_free(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
528 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
531 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
533 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
545 * wpa_reconfig - Update WPA authenticator configuration
546 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
547 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
549 int wpa_reconfig(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
550 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
)
552 struct wpa_group
*group
;
553 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
556 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
557 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
558 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
563 * Reinitialize GTK to make sure it is suitable for the new
566 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
567 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
569 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
570 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
571 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
577 struct wpa_state_machine
*
578 wpa_auth_sta_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
579 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
)
581 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
;
583 if (wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
586 sm
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_state_machine
));
589 os_memcpy(sm
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
591 os_memcpy(sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, p2p_dev_addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
593 sm
->wpa_auth
= wpa_auth
;
594 sm
->group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
595 wpa_group_get(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
601 int wpa_auth_sta_associated(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
602 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
604 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
607 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
608 if (sm
->ft_completed
) {
609 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
610 "FT authentication already completed - do not "
611 "start 4-way handshake");
612 /* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
613 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
;
617 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
620 if (sm
->fils_completed
) {
621 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
622 "FILS authentication already completed - do not start 4-way handshake");
623 /* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
624 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
;
628 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
631 os_memset(&sm
->key_replay
, 0, sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
632 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
633 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
636 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
637 "start authentication");
641 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
642 return 1; /* should not really happen */
644 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
645 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
649 void wpa_auth_sta_no_wpa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
651 /* WPA/RSN was not used - clear WPA state. This is needed if the STA
652 * reassociates back to the same AP while the previous entry for the
653 * STA has not yet been removed. */
657 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
= 0;
661 static void wpa_free_sta_sm(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
664 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
)) {
666 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "P2P: Free assigned IP "
667 "address %u.%u.%u.%u from " MACSTR
,
668 sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
669 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
671 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_start
);
672 bitfield_clear(sm
->wpa_auth
->ip_pool
,
673 WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) - start
);
675 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
676 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
677 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
678 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
680 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
681 os_free(sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
);
682 wpabuf_free(sm
->ft_pending_req_ies
);
683 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
684 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
686 wpa_group_put(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
691 void wpa_auth_sta_deinit(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
696 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
&& sm
->has_GTK
) {
697 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
698 "strict rekeying - force GTK rekey since STA "
700 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
);
701 eloop_register_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
,
705 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
706 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
707 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
708 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
709 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
710 wpa_ft_sta_deinit(sm
);
711 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
712 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
713 /* Must not free state machine while wpa_sm_step() is running.
714 * Freeing will be completed in the end of wpa_sm_step(). */
715 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Registering pending STA state "
716 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
717 sm
->pending_deinit
= 1;
723 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
728 sm
->PTKRequest
= TRUE
;
733 static int wpa_replay_counter_valid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
734 const u8
*replay_counter
)
737 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
740 if (os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
741 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0)
748 static void wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
749 const u8
*replay_counter
)
752 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
754 (replay_counter
== NULL
||
755 os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
756 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0))
757 ctr
[i
].valid
= FALSE
;
762 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
763 static int ft_check_msg_2_of_4(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
764 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
765 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse
*kde
)
767 struct wpa_ie_data ie
;
768 struct rsn_mdie
*mdie
;
770 if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(kde
->rsn_ie
, kde
->rsn_ie_len
, &ie
) < 0 ||
771 ie
.num_pmkid
!= 1 || ie
.pmkid
== NULL
) {
772 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No PMKR1Name in "
773 "FT 4-way handshake message 2/4");
777 os_memcpy(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, ie
.pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
778 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from Supplicant",
779 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, PMKID_LEN
);
781 if (!kde
->mdie
|| !kde
->ftie
) {
782 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No %s in FT 4-way handshake "
783 "message 2/4", kde
->mdie
? "FTIE" : "MDIE");
787 mdie
= (struct rsn_mdie
*) (kde
->mdie
+ 2);
788 if (kde
->mdie
[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie
) ||
789 os_memcmp(wpa_auth
->conf
.mobility_domain
, mdie
->mobility_domain
,
790 MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN
) != 0) {
791 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: MDIE mismatch");
795 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
796 (kde
->ftie
[1] != sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1] ||
797 os_memcmp(kde
->ftie
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
798 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) != 0)) {
799 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE mismatch");
800 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
801 kde
->ftie
, kde
->ftie_len
);
802 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in (Re)AssocResp",
803 sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
, 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
809 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
812 static int wpa_receive_error_report(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
813 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int group
)
815 /* Supplicant reported a Michael MIC error */
816 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
817 "received EAPOL-Key Error Request "
818 "(STA detected Michael MIC failure (group=%d))",
821 if (group
&& wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
822 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
823 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
824 "group cipher is not TKIP");
825 } else if (!group
&& sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
826 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
827 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
828 "pairwise cipher is not TKIP");
830 if (wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
) > 0)
831 return 1; /* STA entry was removed */
832 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
833 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
837 * Error report is not a request for a new key handshake, but since
838 * Authenticator may do it, let's change the keys now anyway.
840 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
845 static int wpa_try_alt_snonce(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*data
,
850 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
851 unsigned int pmk_len
;
853 os_memset(&PTK
, 0, sizeof(PTK
));
855 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
856 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
857 sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, pmk
);
863 pmk_len
= sm
->pmk_len
;
866 if (wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, sm
->alt_SNonce
, pmk
, pmk_len
, &PTK
) < 0)
869 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, pmk_len
, &PTK
,
870 data
, data_len
) == 0) {
875 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
880 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
881 "WPA: Earlier SNonce did not result in matching MIC");
885 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
886 "WPA: Earlier SNonce resulted in matching MIC");
887 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= 0;
888 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, sm
->alt_SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
889 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
890 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
896 void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
897 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
898 u8
*data
, size_t data_len
)
900 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
901 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
902 u16 key_info
, key_data_length
;
903 enum { PAIRWISE_2
, PAIRWISE_4
, GROUP_2
, REQUEST
,
904 SMK_M1
, SMK_M3
, SMK_ERROR
} msg
;
906 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
908 size_t keyhdrlen
, mic_len
;
911 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
913 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
, "WPA: RX EAPOL data", data
, data_len
);
915 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
);
916 keyhdrlen
= sizeof(*key
) + mic_len
+ 2;
918 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + keyhdrlen
) {
919 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Ignore too short EAPOL-Key frame");
923 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
924 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
925 mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
926 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
927 key_data
= mic
+ mic_len
+ 2;
928 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(mic
+ mic_len
);
929 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received EAPOL-Key from " MACSTR
930 " key_info=0x%x type=%u mic_len=%u key_data_length=%u",
931 MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), key_info
, key
->type
,
932 (unsigned int) mic_len
, key_data_length
);
933 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
,
934 "WPA: EAPOL-Key header (ending before Key MIC)",
936 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key Key MIC",
938 if (key_data_length
> data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) - keyhdrlen
) {
939 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key frame - "
940 "key_data overflow (%d > %lu)",
942 (unsigned long) (data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
947 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
948 if (key
->type
== EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
950 * Some deployed station implementations seem to send
951 * msg 4/4 with incorrect type value in WPA2 mode.
953 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Workaround: Allow EAPOL-Key "
954 "with unexpected WPA type in RSN mode");
955 } else if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
) {
956 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
957 "unexpected type %d in RSN mode",
962 if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
963 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
964 "unexpected type %d in WPA mode",
970 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Key Nonce", key
->key_nonce
,
972 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Replay Counter",
973 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
975 /* FIX: verify that the EAPOL-Key frame was encrypted if pairwise keys
978 if ((key_info
& (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) ==
979 (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
| WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
)) {
980 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
982 msgtxt
= "SMK Error";
987 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
) {
990 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
993 } else if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) {
995 msgtxt
= "2/2 Group";
996 } else if (key_data_length
== 0 ||
997 (mic_len
== 0 && (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
) &&
998 key_data_length
== AES_BLOCK_SIZE
)) {
1000 msgtxt
= "4/4 Pairwise";
1003 msgtxt
= "2/4 Pairwise";
1006 /* TODO: key_info type validation for PeerKey */
1007 if (msg
== REQUEST
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_2
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_4
||
1009 u16 ver
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
;
1010 if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_CCMP
||
1011 sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_GCMP
) {
1012 if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
1013 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
!= WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
&&
1014 !wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1015 !wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1016 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
1017 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1019 "advertised support for "
1020 "AES-128-CMAC, but did not "
1025 if (!wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
) &&
1026 !wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1027 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
!= WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
&&
1028 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
!= WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
&&
1029 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
) {
1030 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1032 "did not use HMAC-SHA1-AES "
1038 if ((wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1039 wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1040 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
||
1041 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
) &&
1042 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED
) {
1043 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
1044 "did not use EAPOL-Key descriptor version 0 as required for AKM-defined cases");
1049 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1050 if (sm
->req_replay_counter_used
&&
1051 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->req_replay_counter
,
1052 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) <= 0) {
1053 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
1054 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1055 "replayed counter");
1060 if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) &&
1061 !wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->key_replay
, key
->replay_counter
)) {
1064 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
1065 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
1066 key
->replay_counter
) &&
1067 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
1068 os_memcmp(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) != 0)
1071 * Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP
1072 * WZC) update SNonce for each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This
1073 * breaks the workaround on accepting any of the
1074 * pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated
1075 * even if we have already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4.
1077 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1078 "Process SNonce update from STA "
1079 "based on retransmitted EAPOL-Key "
1081 sm
->update_snonce
= 1;
1082 os_memcpy(sm
->alt_SNonce
, sm
->SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1083 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= TRUE
;
1084 os_memcpy(sm
->alt_replay_counter
,
1085 sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1086 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1087 goto continue_processing
;
1090 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_4
&& sm
->alt_snonce_valid
&&
1091 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
1092 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->alt_replay_counter
,
1093 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0) {
1095 * Supplicant may still be using the old SNonce since
1096 * there was two EAPOL-Key 2/4 messages and they had
1097 * different SNonce values.
1099 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1100 "Try to process received EAPOL-Key 4/4 based on old Replay Counter and SNonce from an earlier EAPOL-Key 1/4");
1101 goto continue_processing
;
1104 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
1105 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
1106 key
->replay_counter
) &&
1107 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
) {
1108 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1109 "ignore retransmitted EAPOL-Key %s - "
1110 "SNonce did not change", msgtxt
);
1112 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1113 "received EAPOL-Key %s with "
1114 "unexpected replay counter", msgtxt
);
1116 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
1117 if (!sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
)
1119 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "pending replay counter",
1120 sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1121 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1123 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "received replay counter",
1124 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1128 continue_processing
:
1130 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& mic_len
== 0 &&
1131 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
)) {
1132 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1133 "WPA: Encr Key Data bit not set even though AEAD cipher is supposed to be used - drop frame");
1136 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1140 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
&&
1141 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
&&
1142 (!sm
->update_snonce
||
1143 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)) {
1144 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1145 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 in "
1146 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1150 random_add_randomness(key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1151 if (sm
->group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
) {
1153 * The system did not have enough entropy to generate
1154 * strong random numbers. Reject the first 4-way
1155 * handshake(s) and collect some entropy based on the
1156 * information from it. Once enough entropy is
1157 * available, the next atempt will trigger GMK/Key
1158 * Counter update and the station will be allowed to
1161 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Reject 4-way handshake to "
1162 "collect more entropy for random number "
1164 random_mark_pool_ready();
1165 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1166 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
1171 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
||
1173 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1174 "received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 in "
1175 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1181 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
!= WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
1182 || !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1183 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1184 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/2 in "
1185 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1186 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
1190 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1194 if (!wpa_auth
->conf
.peerkey
) {
1195 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "RSN: SMK M1/M3/Error, but "
1196 "PeerKey use disabled - ignoring message");
1199 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1200 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1201 "received EAPOL-Key msg SMK in "
1202 "invalid state - dropped");
1206 #else /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1210 return; /* STSL disabled - ignore SMK messages */
1211 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1216 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1217 "received EAPOL-Key frame (%s)", msgtxt
);
1219 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) {
1220 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1221 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key Ack set");
1225 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1226 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)) {
1227 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1228 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC not set");
1233 if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1234 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)) {
1235 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1236 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC set");
1239 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1241 sm
->MICVerified
= FALSE
;
1242 if (sm
->PTK_valid
&& !sm
->update_snonce
) {
1244 wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
, &sm
->PTK
,
1246 (msg
!= PAIRWISE_4
|| !sm
->alt_snonce_valid
||
1247 wpa_try_alt_snonce(sm
, data
, data_len
))) {
1248 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1249 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1254 wpa_aead_decrypt(sm
, &sm
->PTK
, data
, data_len
,
1255 &key_data_length
) < 0) {
1256 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1257 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1260 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1261 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
1262 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1263 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1266 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1267 if (sm
->MICVerified
) {
1268 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 1;
1269 os_memcpy(sm
->req_replay_counter
, key
->replay_counter
,
1270 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1272 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1273 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1279 * TODO: should decrypt key data field if encryption was used;
1280 * even though MAC address KDE is not normally encrypted,
1281 * supplicant is allowed to encrypt it.
1283 if (msg
== SMK_ERROR
) {
1284 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1285 wpa_smk_error(wpa_auth
, sm
, key_data
, key_data_length
);
1286 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1288 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
1289 if (wpa_receive_error_report(
1291 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) > 0)
1292 return; /* STA entry was removed */
1293 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
) {
1294 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1295 "received EAPOL-Key Request for new "
1297 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
1298 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1299 } else if (msg
== SMK_M1
) {
1300 wpa_smk_m1(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
, key_data
,
1302 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1303 } else if (key_data_length
> 0 &&
1304 wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
,
1308 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1309 "received EAPOL-Key Request for GTK "
1311 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1312 wpa_rekey_gtk(wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1315 /* Do not allow the same key replay counter to be reused. */
1316 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
,
1317 key
->replay_counter
);
1319 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
) {
1321 * Maintain a copy of the pending EAPOL-Key frames in
1322 * case the EAPOL-Key frame was retransmitted. This is
1323 * needed to allow EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 reply to another
1324 * pending msg 1/4 to update the SNonce to work around
1325 * unexpected supplicant behavior.
1327 os_memcpy(sm
->prev_key_replay
, sm
->key_replay
,
1328 sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
1330 os_memset(sm
->prev_key_replay
, 0,
1331 sizeof(sm
->prev_key_replay
));
1335 * Make sure old valid counters are not accepted anymore and
1336 * do not get copied again.
1338 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
, NULL
);
1341 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1342 if (msg
== SMK_M3
) {
1343 wpa_smk_m3(wpa_auth
, sm
, key
, key_data
, key_data_length
);
1346 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1348 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
1349 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
= os_memdup(data
, data_len
);
1350 if (sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
== NULL
)
1352 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
= data_len
;
1354 sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
);
1355 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= TRUE
;
1356 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1357 sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
);
1358 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1363 static int wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8
*gmk
, const char *label
, const u8
*addr
,
1364 const u8
*gnonce
, u8
*gtk
, size_t gtk_len
)
1366 u8 data
[ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
+ 8 + 16];
1370 /* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion",
1371 * AA || GNonce || Time || random data)
1372 * The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and
1373 * GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation
1374 * is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be
1377 os_memcpy(data
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
1378 os_memcpy(data
+ ETH_ALEN
, gnonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1379 pos
= data
+ ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
;
1380 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos
);
1382 if (random_get_bytes(pos
, 16) < 0)
1385 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1386 sha256_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
);
1387 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1388 if (sha1_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
), gtk
, gtk_len
)
1391 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1397 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
1399 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
1400 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
1402 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1403 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "EAPOL-Key timeout");
1404 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= TRUE
;
1409 void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1410 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1411 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1412 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1413 int keyidx
, int encr
, int force_version
)
1415 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1416 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1417 size_t len
, mic_len
, keyhdrlen
;
1419 int key_data_len
, pad_len
= 0;
1421 int version
, pairwise
;
1423 u8
*key_mic
, *key_data
;
1425 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
);
1426 keyhdrlen
= sizeof(*key
) + mic_len
+ 2;
1428 len
= sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_hdr
) + keyhdrlen
;
1431 version
= force_version
;
1432 else if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1433 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
||
1434 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
||
1435 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1436 wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1437 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED
;
1438 else if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm
))
1439 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
;
1440 else if (sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
)
1441 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
;
1443 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4
;
1445 pairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1447 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Send EAPOL(version=%d secure=%d mic=%d "
1448 "ack=%d install=%d pairwise=%d kde_len=%lu keyidx=%d "
1451 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
) ? 1 : 0,
1452 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) ? 1 : 0,
1453 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) ? 1 : 0,
1454 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
) ? 1 : 0,
1455 pairwise
, (unsigned long) kde_len
, keyidx
, encr
);
1457 key_data_len
= kde_len
;
1459 if ((version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1460 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
||
1461 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
||
1462 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1463 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1464 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) && encr
) {
1465 pad_len
= key_data_len
% 8;
1467 pad_len
= 8 - pad_len
;
1468 key_data_len
+= pad_len
+ 8;
1471 len
+= key_data_len
;
1472 if (!mic_len
&& encr
)
1473 len
+= AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
1475 hdr
= os_zalloc(len
);
1478 hdr
->version
= wpa_auth
->conf
.eapol_version
;
1479 hdr
->type
= IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY
;
1480 hdr
->length
= host_to_be16(len
- sizeof(*hdr
));
1481 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1482 key_mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
1483 key_data
= ((u8
*) (hdr
+ 1)) + keyhdrlen
;
1485 key
->type
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
1486 EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
: EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
;
1487 key_info
|= version
;
1488 if (encr
&& sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1489 key_info
|= WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
;
1490 if (sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1491 key_info
|= keyidx
<< WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_INDEX_SHIFT
;
1492 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_info
, key_info
);
1494 alg
= pairwise
? sm
->pairwise
: wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
;
1495 if ((key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
) ||
1496 (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& !pairwise
))
1497 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, 0);
1499 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, wpa_cipher_key_len(alg
));
1501 /* FIX: STSL: what to use as key_replay_counter? */
1502 for (i
= RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
- 1; i
> 0; i
--) {
1503 sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
= sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].valid
;
1504 os_memcpy(sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1505 sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].counter
,
1506 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1508 inc_byte_array(sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1509 os_memcpy(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1510 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1511 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Replay Counter",
1512 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1513 sm
->key_replay
[0].valid
= TRUE
;
1516 os_memcpy(key
->key_nonce
, nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1519 os_memcpy(key
->key_rsc
, key_rsc
, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
1522 os_memcpy(key_data
, kde
, kde_len
);
1523 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, kde_len
);
1525 } else if (!mic_len
) {
1529 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ kde_len
);
1530 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1533 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: KEK",
1534 sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1535 /* AES-SIV AAD from EAPOL protocol version field (inclusive) to
1536 * to Key Data (exclusive). */
1537 aad
[0] = (u8
*) hdr
;
1538 aad_len
[0] = key_mic
+ 2 - (u8
*) hdr
;
1539 if (aes_siv_encrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
, kde
, kde_len
,
1540 1, aad
, aad_len
, key_mic
+ 2) < 0) {
1541 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: AES-SIV encryption failed");
1545 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Encrypted Key Data from SIV",
1546 key_mic
+ 2, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ kde_len
);
1547 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1548 } else if (encr
&& kde
) {
1549 buf
= os_zalloc(key_data_len
);
1555 os_memcpy(pos
, kde
, kde_len
);
1561 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1563 if (version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1564 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
||
1565 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
||
1566 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
||
1567 wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1568 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
1569 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1570 "WPA: Encrypt Key Data using AES-WRAP (KEK length %u)",
1571 (unsigned int) sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1572 if (aes_wrap(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
,
1573 (key_data_len
- 8) / 8, buf
, key_data
)) {
1578 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, key_data_len
);
1579 #ifndef CONFIG_NO_RC4
1580 } else if (sm
->PTK
.kek_len
== 16) {
1583 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1584 "WPA: Encrypt Key Data using RC4");
1585 os_memcpy(key
->key_iv
,
1586 sm
->group
->Counter
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
- 16, 16);
1587 inc_byte_array(sm
->group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1588 os_memcpy(ek
, key
->key_iv
, 16);
1589 os_memcpy(ek
+ 16, sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1590 os_memcpy(key_data
, buf
, key_data_len
);
1591 rc4_skip(ek
, 32, 256, key_data
, key_data_len
);
1592 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, key_data_len
);
1593 #endif /* CONFIG_NO_RC4 */
1602 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) {
1603 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
|| !mic_len
) {
1604 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1605 "PTK not valid when sending EAPOL-Key "
1611 wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm
->PTK
.kck
, sm
->PTK
.kck_len
,
1612 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, version
,
1613 (u8
*) hdr
, len
, key_mic
);
1614 #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
1616 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
> 0.0 &&
1618 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
) {
1619 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1620 "Corrupting group EAPOL-Key Key MIC");
1623 #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
1626 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_inc_EapolFramesTx
,
1628 wpa_auth_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, (u8
*) hdr
, len
,
1634 static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1635 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1636 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1637 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1638 int keyidx
, int encr
)
1641 int pairwise
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
;
1647 __wpa_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
, key_info
, key_rsc
, nonce
, kde
, kde_len
,
1650 ctr
= pairwise
? sm
->TimeoutCtr
: sm
->GTimeoutCtr
;
1651 if (ctr
== 1 && wpa_auth
->conf
.tx_status
)
1652 timeout_ms
= pairwise
? eapol_key_timeout_first
:
1653 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
;
1655 timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
1656 if (pairwise
&& ctr
== 1 && !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
))
1657 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 1;
1658 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
1659 "counter %u)", timeout_ms
, ctr
);
1660 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000, (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
1661 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1665 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp
, size_t pmk_len
, struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
,
1666 u8
*data
, size_t data_len
)
1668 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1669 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1672 u8 mic
[WPA_EAPOL_KEY_MIC_MAX_LEN
], *mic_pos
;
1673 size_t mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(akmp
, pmk_len
);
1675 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + sizeof(*key
))
1678 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
1679 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1680 mic_pos
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
1681 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
1682 os_memcpy(mic
, mic_pos
, mic_len
);
1683 os_memset(mic_pos
, 0, mic_len
);
1684 if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK
->kck
, PTK
->kck_len
, akmp
,
1685 key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
,
1686 data
, data_len
, mic_pos
) ||
1687 os_memcmp_const(mic
, mic_pos
, mic_len
) != 0)
1689 os_memcpy(mic_pos
, mic
, mic_len
);
1694 void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1696 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1697 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1698 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE
, sm
->addr
, 0, NULL
,
1700 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1701 "RSN: PTK removal from the driver failed");
1702 sm
->pairwise_set
= FALSE
;
1703 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
1707 int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, enum wpa_event event
)
1714 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1715 "event %d notification", event
);
1720 /* PTKs are derived through AMPE */
1721 if (wpa_auth_start_ampe(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
)) {
1726 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
1731 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1734 case WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
:
1737 * When using WPS, we may end up here if the STA
1738 * manages to re-associate without the previous STA
1739 * entry getting removed. Consequently, we need to make
1740 * sure that the WPA state machines gets initialized
1741 * properly at this point.
1743 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA state machine had not been "
1744 "started - initialize now");
1747 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
1748 return 1; /* should not really happen */
1750 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1753 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
1755 * Reauthentication cancels the pending group key
1756 * update for this STA.
1758 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1759 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1760 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= TRUE
;
1762 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1765 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1766 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Retry PTK configuration "
1767 "after association");
1768 wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm
);
1770 /* Using FT protocol, not WPA auth state machine */
1771 sm
->ft_completed
= 1;
1773 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1775 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1776 case WPA_ASSOC_FILS
:
1778 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1779 "FILS: TK configuration after association");
1781 sm
->fils_completed
= 1;
1783 #else /* CONFIG_FILS */
1785 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1788 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1789 sm
->ft_completed
= 0;
1790 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1792 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1793 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
&& event
== WPA_AUTH
)
1795 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1797 if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1798 (event
== WPA_AUTH
|| event
== WPA_ASSOC
))
1800 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1803 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1804 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1806 if (event
!= WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
)
1810 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
1812 * wpa_sm_step() is already running - avoid recursive call to
1813 * it by making the existing loop process the new update.
1818 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
1822 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
)
1824 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
, wpa_ptk
);
1826 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
1827 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
1828 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
1832 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
1833 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1834 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1835 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
1836 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
1837 if (1 /* Unicast cipher supported AND (ESS OR ((IBSS or WDS) and
1838 * Local AA > Remote AA)) */) {
1841 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 0);
1843 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 0);
1845 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1846 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
||
1847 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
) {
1848 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1849 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 0);
1854 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
)
1856 u16 reason
= sm
->disconnect_reason
;
1858 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
, wpa_ptk
);
1859 sm
->Disconnect
= FALSE
;
1860 sm
->disconnect_reason
= 0;
1862 reason
= WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
;
1863 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, reason
);
1867 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
)
1869 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
, wpa_ptk
);
1870 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1874 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
)
1876 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
, wpa_ptk
);
1877 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1878 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1879 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portControl_Auto
,
1881 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 1);
1882 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1886 static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1887 struct wpa_group
*group
)
1889 if (group
->first_sta_seen
)
1892 * System has run bit further than at the time hostapd was started
1893 * potentially very early during boot up. This provides better chances
1894 * of collecting more randomness on embedded systems. Re-initialize the
1895 * GMK and Counter here to improve their strength if there was not
1896 * enough entropy available immediately after system startup.
1898 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Re-initialize GMK/Counter on first "
1900 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
1901 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
1902 "to proceed - reject first 4-way handshake");
1903 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1905 group
->first_sta_seen
= TRUE
;
1906 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= FALSE
;
1909 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0 ||
1910 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0 ||
1911 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
1912 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: GMK/GTK setup failed");
1913 group
->first_sta_seen
= FALSE
;
1914 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1919 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
)
1921 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
, wpa_ptk
);
1923 wpa_group_ensure_init(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
1924 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1927 * Definition of ANonce selection in IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 is somewhat
1928 * ambiguous. The Authenticator state machine uses a counter that is
1929 * incremented by one for each 4-way handshake. However, the security
1930 * analysis of 4-way handshake points out that unpredictable nonces
1931 * help in preventing precomputation attacks. Instead of the state
1932 * machine definition, use an unpredictable nonce value here to provide
1933 * stronger protection against potential precomputation attacks.
1935 if (random_get_bytes(sm
->ANonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
)) {
1936 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: Failed to get random data for "
1938 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1941 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Assign ANonce", sm
->ANonce
,
1943 /* IEEE 802.11i does not clear TimeoutCtr here, but this is more
1944 * logical place than INITIALIZE since AUTHENTICATION2 can be
1945 * re-entered on ReAuthenticationRequest without going through
1951 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
)
1953 u8 msk
[2 * PMK_LEN
];
1954 size_t len
= 2 * PMK_LEN
;
1956 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
, wpa_ptk
);
1957 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1959 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1961 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from PMKSA cache");
1962 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
);
1963 sm
->pmk_len
= sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
;
1965 } else if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
) {
1966 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1967 "DPP: No PMKSA cache entry for STA - reject connection");
1968 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1969 sm
->disconnect_reason
= WLAN_REASON_INVALID_PMKID
;
1971 #endif /* CONFIG_DPP */
1972 } else if (wpa_auth_get_msk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, msk
, &len
) == 0) {
1973 unsigned int pmk_len
;
1975 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1976 pmk_len
= PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
;
1979 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from EAPOL state machine "
1980 "(MSK len=%lu PMK len=%u)", (unsigned long) len
,
1982 if (len
< pmk_len
) {
1983 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1984 "WPA: MSK not long enough (%u) to create PMK (%u)",
1985 (unsigned int) len
, (unsigned int) pmk_len
);
1986 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1989 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, msk
, pmk_len
);
1990 sm
->pmk_len
= pmk_len
;
1991 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1992 if (len
>= 2 * PMK_LEN
) {
1993 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, msk
+ PMK_LEN
, PMK_LEN
);
1994 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
1996 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1998 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Could not get PMK, get_msk: %p",
1999 sm
->wpa_auth
->cb
->get_msk
);
2000 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
2003 os_memset(msk
, 0, sizeof(msk
));
2005 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
2006 /* IEEE 802.11i does not set keyRun to FALSE, but not doing this
2007 * will break reauthentication since EAPOL state machines may not be
2008 * get into AUTHENTICATING state that clears keyRun before WPA state
2009 * machine enters AUTHENTICATION2 state and goes immediately to INITPMK
2010 * state and takes PMK from the previously used AAA Key. This will
2011 * eventually fail in 4-Way Handshake because Supplicant uses PMK
2012 * derived from the new AAA Key. Setting keyRun = FALSE here seems to
2013 * be good workaround for this issue. */
2014 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
, 0);
2018 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
)
2021 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
, wpa_ptk
);
2022 psk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, NULL
);
2024 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
2025 sm
->pmk_len
= PMK_LEN
;
2026 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2027 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
2028 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
2029 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2031 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
2035 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
)
2037 u8 buf
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
], *pmkid
= NULL
;
2038 size_t pmkid_len
= 0;
2040 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
, wpa_ptk
);
2041 sm
->PTKRequest
= FALSE
;
2042 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
2043 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= FALSE
;
2046 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
) {
2047 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2048 * immediately following this. */
2052 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2053 "sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
2055 * TODO: Could add PMKID even with WPA2-PSK, but only if there is only
2056 * one possible PSK for this STA.
2058 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&&
2059 wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
2060 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
!= WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
) {
2062 pmkid_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
2063 pmkid
[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC
;
2064 pmkid
[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
2065 RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid
[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID
);
2067 os_memcpy(&pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
2068 sm
->pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
2069 } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2070 /* No KCK available to derive PMKID */
2074 * Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was
2075 * available with pre-calculated PMKID.
2077 rsn_pmkid(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmk_len
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2078 sm
->addr
, &pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
2079 wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
));
2082 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2083 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
, NULL
,
2084 sm
->ANonce
, pmkid
, pmkid_len
, 0, 0);
2088 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*snonce
,
2089 const u8
*pmk
, unsigned int pmk_len
,
2090 struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
)
2092 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2093 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2094 return wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm
, pmk
, ptk
);
2095 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2097 return wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk
, pmk_len
, "Pairwise key expansion",
2098 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, sm
->ANonce
, snonce
,
2099 ptk
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pairwise
);
2105 int fils_auth_pmk_to_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
2106 size_t pmk_len
, const u8
*snonce
, const u8
*anonce
,
2107 struct wpabuf
*g_sta
, struct wpabuf
*g_ap
)
2109 u8 ick
[FILS_ICK_MAX_LEN
];
2112 u8 fils_ft
[FILS_FT_MAX_LEN
];
2113 size_t fils_ft_len
= 0;
2115 res
= fils_pmk_to_ptk(pmk
, pmk_len
, sm
->addr
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2116 snonce
, anonce
, &sm
->PTK
, ick
, &ick_len
,
2117 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pairwise
,
2118 fils_ft
, &fils_ft_len
);
2121 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
2123 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2125 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2126 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
= &wpa_auth
->conf
;
2127 u8 pmk_r0
[PMK_LEN
], pmk_r0_name
[WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
];
2129 if (wpa_derive_pmk_r0(fils_ft
, fils_ft_len
,
2130 conf
->ssid
, conf
->ssid_len
,
2131 conf
->mobility_domain
,
2132 conf
->r0_key_holder
,
2133 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
2134 sm
->addr
, pmk_r0
, pmk_r0_name
) < 0)
2137 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS+FT: PMK-R0", pmk_r0
, PMK_LEN
);
2138 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS+FT: PMKR0Name",
2139 pmk_r0_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2140 wpa_ft_store_pmk_r0(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, pmk_r0
, pmk_r0_name
,
2142 os_memset(fils_ft
, 0, sizeof(fils_ft
));
2144 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2146 res
= fils_key_auth_sk(ick
, ick_len
, snonce
, anonce
,
2147 sm
->addr
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2148 g_sta
? wpabuf_head(g_sta
) : NULL
,
2149 g_sta
? wpabuf_len(g_sta
) : 0,
2150 g_ap
? wpabuf_head(g_ap
) : NULL
,
2151 g_ap
? wpabuf_len(g_ap
) : 0,
2152 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
,
2153 sm
->fils_key_auth_ap
,
2154 &sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2155 os_memset(ick
, 0, sizeof(ick
));
2157 /* Store nonces for (Re)Association Request/Response frame processing */
2158 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, snonce
, FILS_NONCE_LEN
);
2159 os_memcpy(sm
->ANonce
, anonce
, FILS_NONCE_LEN
);
2165 static int wpa_aead_decrypt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
,
2166 u8
*buf
, size_t buf_len
, u16
*_key_data_len
)
2168 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
2169 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
2176 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) buf
;
2177 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
2178 pos
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
2179 key_data_len
= WPA_GET_BE16(pos
);
2180 if (key_data_len
< AES_BLOCK_SIZE
||
2181 key_data_len
> buf_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) - sizeof(*key
) - 2) {
2182 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2183 "No room for AES-SIV data in the frame");
2186 pos
+= 2; /* Pointing at the Encrypted Key Data field */
2188 tmp
= os_malloc(key_data_len
);
2192 /* AES-SIV AAD from EAPOL protocol version field (inclusive) to
2193 * to Key Data (exclusive). */
2195 aad_len
[0] = pos
- buf
;
2196 if (aes_siv_decrypt(ptk
->kek
, ptk
->kek_len
, pos
, key_data_len
,
2197 1, aad
, aad_len
, tmp
) < 0) {
2198 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2199 "Invalid AES-SIV data in the frame");
2200 bin_clear_free(tmp
, key_data_len
);
2204 /* AEAD decryption and validation completed successfully */
2205 key_data_len
-= AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2206 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Decrypted Key Data",
2209 /* Replace Key Data field with the decrypted version */
2210 os_memcpy(pos
, tmp
, key_data_len
);
2211 pos
-= 2; /* Key Data Length field */
2212 WPA_PUT_BE16(pos
, key_data_len
);
2213 bin_clear_free(tmp
, key_data_len
);
2215 *_key_data_len
= key_data_len
;
2220 const u8
* wpa_fils_validate_fils_session(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
2221 const u8
*ies
, size_t ies_len
,
2222 const u8
*fils_session
)
2225 const u8
*session
= NULL
;
2227 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2228 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2229 "FILS: Not a FILS AKM - reject association");
2233 /* Verify Session element */
2235 end
= ((const u8
*) ie
) + ies_len
;
2236 while (ie
+ 1 < end
) {
2237 if (ie
+ 2 + ie
[1] > end
)
2239 if (ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
&&
2240 ie
[1] >= 1 + FILS_SESSION_LEN
&&
2241 ie
[2] == WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_SESSION
) {
2249 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2250 "FILS: %s: Could not find FILS Session element in Assoc Req - reject",
2255 if (!fils_session
) {
2256 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2257 "FILS: %s: Could not find FILS Session element in STA entry - reject",
2262 if (os_memcmp(fils_session
, session
+ 3, FILS_SESSION_LEN
) != 0) {
2263 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Session mismatch");
2264 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Expected FILS Session",
2265 fils_session
, FILS_SESSION_LEN
);
2266 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Received FILS Session",
2267 session
+ 3, FILS_SESSION_LEN
);
2274 int wpa_fils_validate_key_confirm(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*ies
,
2277 struct ieee802_11_elems elems
;
2279 if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(ies
, ies_len
, &elems
, 1) == ParseFailed
) {
2280 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2281 "FILS: Failed to parse decrypted elements");
2285 if (!elems
.fils_session
) {
2286 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: No FILS Session element");
2290 if (!elems
.fils_key_confirm
) {
2291 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: No FILS Key Confirm element");
2295 if (elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
!= sm
->fils_key_auth_len
) {
2296 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2297 "FILS: Unexpected Key-Auth length %d (expected %d)",
2298 elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
,
2299 (int) sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2303 if (os_memcmp(elems
.fils_key_confirm
, sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
,
2304 sm
->fils_key_auth_len
) != 0) {
2305 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Key-Auth mismatch");
2306 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Received Key-Auth",
2307 elems
.fils_key_confirm
, elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
);
2308 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Expected Key-Auth",
2309 sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
, sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2317 int fils_decrypt_assoc(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*fils_session
,
2318 const struct ieee80211_mgmt
*mgmt
, size_t frame_len
,
2319 u8
*pos
, size_t left
)
2322 const u8
*end
, *ie_start
, *ie
, *session
, *crypt
;
2326 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
2327 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2328 "FILS: No KEK to decrypt Assocication Request frame");
2332 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2333 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2334 "FILS: Not a FILS AKM - reject association");
2338 end
= ((const u8
*) mgmt
) + frame_len
;
2339 fc
= le_to_host16(mgmt
->frame_control
);
2340 stype
= WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(fc
);
2341 if (stype
== WLAN_FC_STYPE_REASSOC_REQ
)
2342 ie_start
= mgmt
->u
.reassoc_req
.variable
;
2344 ie_start
= mgmt
->u
.assoc_req
.variable
;
2348 * Find FILS Session element which is the last unencrypted element in
2351 session
= wpa_fils_validate_fils_session(sm
, ie
, end
- ie
,
2354 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Session validation failed");
2358 crypt
= session
+ 2 + session
[1];
2360 if (end
- crypt
< AES_BLOCK_SIZE
) {
2361 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2362 "FILS: Too short frame to include AES-SIV data");
2366 /* AES-SIV AAD vectors */
2368 /* The STA's MAC address */
2370 aad_len
[0] = ETH_ALEN
;
2371 /* The AP's BSSID */
2373 aad_len
[1] = ETH_ALEN
;
2374 /* The STA's nonce */
2375 aad
[2] = sm
->SNonce
;
2376 aad_len
[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2377 /* The AP's nonce */
2378 aad
[3] = sm
->ANonce
;
2379 aad_len
[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2381 * The (Re)Association Request frame from the Capability Information
2382 * field to the FILS Session element (both inclusive).
2384 aad
[4] = (const u8
*) &mgmt
->u
.assoc_req
.capab_info
;
2385 aad_len
[4] = crypt
- aad
[4];
2387 if (aes_siv_decrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
, crypt
, end
- crypt
,
2388 5, aad
, aad_len
, pos
+ (crypt
- ie_start
)) < 0) {
2389 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2390 "FILS: Invalid AES-SIV data in the frame");
2393 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Decrypted Association Request elements",
2394 pos
, left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
);
2396 if (wpa_fils_validate_key_confirm(sm
, pos
, left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
) < 0) {
2397 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Key Confirm validation failed");
2401 return left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2405 int fils_encrypt_assoc(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*buf
,
2406 size_t current_len
, size_t max_len
,
2407 const struct wpabuf
*hlp
)
2409 u8
*end
= buf
+ max_len
;
2410 u8
*pos
= buf
+ current_len
;
2411 struct ieee80211_mgmt
*mgmt
;
2412 struct wpabuf
*plain
;
2416 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
)
2419 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2420 "FILS: Association Response frame before FILS processing",
2423 mgmt
= (struct ieee80211_mgmt
*) buf
;
2425 /* AES-SIV AAD vectors */
2427 /* The AP's BSSID */
2429 aad_len
[0] = ETH_ALEN
;
2430 /* The STA's MAC address */
2432 aad_len
[1] = ETH_ALEN
;
2433 /* The AP's nonce */
2434 aad
[2] = sm
->ANonce
;
2435 aad_len
[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2436 /* The STA's nonce */
2437 aad
[3] = sm
->SNonce
;
2438 aad_len
[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2440 * The (Re)Association Response frame from the Capability Information
2441 * field (the same offset in both Association and Reassociation
2442 * Response frames) to the FILS Session element (both inclusive).
2444 aad
[4] = (const u8
*) &mgmt
->u
.assoc_resp
.capab_info
;
2445 aad_len
[4] = pos
- aad
[4];
2447 /* The following elements will be encrypted with AES-SIV */
2448 plain
= fils_prepare_plainbuf(sm
, hlp
);
2450 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Plain buffer prep failed");
2454 if (pos
+ wpabuf_len(plain
) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE
> end
) {
2455 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2456 "FILS: Not enough room for FILS elements");
2461 wpa_hexdump_buf_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Association Response plaintext",
2464 if (aes_siv_encrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
,
2465 wpabuf_head(plain
), wpabuf_len(plain
),
2466 5, aad
, aad_len
, pos
) < 0) {
2471 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2472 "FILS: Encrypted Association Response elements",
2473 pos
, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ wpabuf_len(plain
));
2474 current_len
+= wpabuf_len(plain
) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2477 sm
->fils_completed
= 1;
2483 static struct wpabuf
* fils_prepare_plainbuf(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
2484 const struct wpabuf
*hlp
)
2486 struct wpabuf
*plain
;
2487 u8
*len
, *tmp
, *tmp2
;
2489 u8
*gtk
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2491 struct wpa_group
*gsm
;
2493 plain
= wpabuf_alloc(1000);
2497 /* TODO: FILS Public Key */
2499 /* FILS Key Confirmation */
2500 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
); /* Element ID */
2501 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, 1 + sm
->fils_key_auth_len
); /* Length */
2502 /* Element ID Extension */
2503 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_KEY_CONFIRM
);
2504 wpabuf_put_data(plain
, sm
->fils_key_auth_ap
, sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2506 /* FILS HLP Container */
2508 wpabuf_put_buf(plain
, hlp
);
2510 /* TODO: FILS IP Address Assignment */
2514 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
); /* Element ID */
2515 len
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 1);
2516 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXT_KEY_DELIVERY
);
2517 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
,
2518 wpabuf_put(plain
, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
));
2520 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2521 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2522 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2524 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2525 * of GTK in the BSS.
2527 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gtk_len
) < 0) {
2533 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
2535 tmp
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 0);
2536 tmp2
= wpa_add_kde(tmp
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2538 wpabuf_put(plain
, tmp2
- tmp
);
2541 tmp
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 0);
2542 tmp2
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, tmp
);
2543 wpabuf_put(plain
, tmp2
- tmp
);
2545 *len
= (u8
*) wpabuf_put(plain
, 0) - len
- 1;
2550 int fils_set_tk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2555 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
)
2558 alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm
->pairwise
);
2559 klen
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->pairwise
);
2561 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Configure TK to the driver");
2562 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, alg
, sm
->addr
, 0,
2563 sm
->PTK
.tk
, klen
)) {
2564 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Failed to set TK to the driver");
2572 u8
* hostapd_eid_assoc_fils_session(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*buf
,
2573 const u8
*fils_session
, struct wpabuf
*hlp
)
2575 struct wpabuf
*plain
;
2579 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
; /* Element ID */
2580 *pos
++ = 1 + FILS_SESSION_LEN
; /* Length */
2581 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_SESSION
; /* Element ID Extension */
2582 os_memcpy(pos
, fils_session
, FILS_SESSION_LEN
);
2583 pos
+= FILS_SESSION_LEN
;
2585 plain
= fils_prepare_plainbuf(sm
, hlp
);
2587 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Plain buffer prep failed");
2591 os_memcpy(pos
, wpabuf_head(plain
), wpabuf_len(plain
));
2592 pos
+= wpabuf_len(plain
);
2594 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "%s: plain buf_len: %u", __func__
,
2595 (unsigned int) wpabuf_len(plain
));
2597 sm
->fils_completed
= 1;
2601 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
2604 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
)
2606 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2608 int ok
= 0, psk_found
= 0;
2609 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
2610 unsigned int pmk_len
;
2612 const u8
*eapol_key_ie
, *key_data
, *mic
;
2613 u16 key_data_length
;
2614 size_t mic_len
, eapol_key_ie_len
;
2615 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
2616 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
2617 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
2619 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
2620 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2621 sm
->update_snonce
= FALSE
;
2622 os_memset(&PTK
, 0, sizeof(PTK
));
2624 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
);
2626 /* WPA with IEEE 802.1X: use the derived PMK from EAP
2627 * WPA-PSK: iterate through possible PSKs and select the one matching
2630 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2631 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2632 sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, pmk
);
2639 pmk_len
= sm
->pmk_len
;
2642 if (wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, sm
->SNonce
, pmk
, pmk_len
, &PTK
) < 0)
2646 wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, pmk_len
, &PTK
,
2647 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
,
2648 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
) == 0) {
2655 wpa_aead_decrypt(sm
, &PTK
, sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
,
2656 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
, NULL
) == 0) {
2660 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
2662 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2667 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2668 "invalid MIC in msg 2/4 of 4-Way Handshake");
2670 wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2675 * Note: last_rx_eapol_key length fields have already been validated in
2678 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
;
2679 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
2680 mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
2681 key_data
= mic
+ mic_len
+ 2;
2682 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(mic
+ mic_len
);
2683 if (key_data_length
> sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
2684 sizeof(*key
) - mic_len
- 2)
2687 if (wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
, &kde
) < 0) {
2688 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2689 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 with invalid Key Data contents");
2693 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.rsn_ie
;
2694 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.rsn_ie_len
;
2695 } else if (kde
.osen
) {
2696 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.osen
;
2697 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.osen_len
;
2699 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.wpa_ie
;
2700 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.wpa_ie_len
;
2702 ft
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
2703 if (sm
->wpa_ie
== NULL
||
2704 wpa_compare_rsn_ie(ft
, sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
,
2705 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
)) {
2706 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2707 "WPA IE from (Re)AssocReq did not match with msg 2/4");
2709 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in AssocReq",
2710 sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
);
2712 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in msg 2/4",
2713 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
);
2714 /* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
2715 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2716 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
2719 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2720 if (ft
&& ft_check_msg_2_of_4(wpa_auth
, sm
, &kde
) < 0) {
2721 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2722 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
2725 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2727 if (kde
.ip_addr_req
&& kde
.ip_addr_req
[0] &&
2728 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
&& WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0) {
2730 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2731 "P2P: IP address requested in EAPOL-Key exchange");
2732 idx
= bitfield_get_first_zero(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
2734 u32 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_start
);
2735 bitfield_set(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
, idx
);
2736 WPA_PUT_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
, start
+ idx
);
2737 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2738 "P2P: Assigned IP address %u.%u.%u.%u to "
2739 MACSTR
, sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
2740 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
2744 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2746 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2747 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2749 * Verify that PMKR1Name from EAPOL-Key message 2/4 matches
2750 * with the value we derived.
2752 if (os_memcmp_const(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
,
2753 WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
) != 0) {
2754 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2755 "PMKR1Name mismatch in FT 4-way "
2757 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from "
2759 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2760 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Derived PMKR1Name",
2761 sm
->pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2765 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2767 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
2768 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
2770 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2771 /* PSK may have changed from the previous choice, so update
2772 * state machine data based on whatever PSK was selected here.
2774 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
2775 sm
->pmk_len
= PMK_LEN
;
2778 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
2780 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
2781 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
2785 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
)
2787 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
, wpa_ptk
);
2792 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2794 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2796 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
) {
2798 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2799 return 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
+ len
;
2806 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2808 struct wpa_igtk_kde igtk
;
2809 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2810 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
2811 size_t len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
2813 if (!sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
)
2816 igtk
.keyid
[0] = gsm
->GN_igtk
;
2818 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
!= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
||
2819 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, rsc
) < 0)
2820 os_memset(igtk
.pn
, 0, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
2822 os_memcpy(igtk
.pn
, rsc
, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
2823 os_memcpy(igtk
.igtk
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
2824 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2826 * Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of
2829 if (random_get_bytes(igtk
.igtk
, len
) < 0)
2832 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK
,
2833 (const u8
*) &igtk
, WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
+ len
,
2839 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2841 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2847 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
2852 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2855 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)
2857 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
], *_rsc
, *gtk
, *kde
, *pos
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2858 size_t gtk_len
, kde_len
;
2859 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
2861 int wpa_ie_len
, secure
, keyidx
, encr
= 0;
2863 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
2864 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
2867 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
) {
2868 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2869 * immediately following this. */
2873 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
2874 GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
2876 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
2877 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
2878 /* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
2879 wpa_ie
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
2880 wpa_ie_len
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
2881 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&&
2882 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
) &&
2883 wpa_ie_len
> wpa_ie
[1] + 2 && wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN
) {
2884 /* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE and possible MDIE */
2885 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2886 if (wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN
)
2887 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2888 wpa_ie_len
= wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
2890 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2891 "sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
2892 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
2893 /* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
2895 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2896 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2897 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
2899 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2900 * of GTK in the BSS.
2902 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gtk_len
) < 0)
2910 /* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
2916 if (sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
) {
2918 * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
2919 * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
2920 * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
2921 * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
2922 * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
2923 * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
2925 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2926 "STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - "
2927 "set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
2932 kde_len
= wpa_ie_len
+ ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
2934 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gtk_len
;
2935 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2936 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2937 kde_len
+= 2 + PMKID_LEN
; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
2938 kde_len
+= 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
2940 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2942 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0)
2943 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 3 * 4;
2944 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2945 kde
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
2950 os_memcpy(pos
, wpa_ie
, wpa_ie_len
);
2952 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2953 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2958 res
= wpa_insert_pmkid(kde
, &elen
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
);
2960 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert "
2961 "PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
2968 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2971 hdr
[0] = keyidx
& 0x03;
2973 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2976 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
2978 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2979 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2981 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
;
2983 conf
= &sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
;
2984 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
2985 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
>= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) {
2986 os_memcpy(pos
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
2987 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
2988 res
= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1];
2990 res
= wpa_write_ftie(conf
, conf
->r0_key_holder
,
2991 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
2993 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
,
2997 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE "
2998 "into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
3004 /* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
3005 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
3007 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE
;
3008 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->reassociation_deadline
);
3011 /* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
3012 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
3014 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME
;
3015 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->r0_key_lifetime
* 60);
3018 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
3020 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0) {
3022 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
3023 os_memcpy(addr
+ 4, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_mask
, 4);
3024 os_memcpy(addr
+ 8, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_go
, 4);
3025 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, WFA_KEY_DATA_IP_ADDR_ALLOC
,
3026 addr
, sizeof(addr
), NULL
, 0);
3028 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
3030 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
3031 (secure
? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
: 0) |
3032 (wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
) ?
3033 WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
: 0) |
3034 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
|
3035 WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
,
3036 _rsc
, sm
->ANonce
, kde
, pos
- kde
, keyidx
, encr
);
3041 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
)
3043 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
, wpa_ptk
);
3044 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
3046 enum wpa_alg alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm
->pairwise
);
3047 int klen
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->pairwise
);
3048 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, alg
, sm
->addr
, 0,
3049 sm
->PTK
.tk
, klen
)) {
3050 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
3051 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
3054 /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
3055 sm
->pairwise_set
= TRUE
;
3057 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_ptk_rekey
) {
3058 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
3059 eloop_register_timeout(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.
3060 wpa_ptk_rekey
, 0, wpa_rekey_ptk
,
3064 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
3065 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
||
3066 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
) {
3067 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
3068 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 1);
3072 if (0 /* IBSS == TRUE */) {
3074 if (sm
->keycount
== 2) {
3075 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
3076 WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 1);
3079 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
,
3082 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
, 0);
3083 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyDone
, 1);
3084 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
3085 sm
->PInitAKeys
= TRUE
;
3088 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3089 "pairwise key handshake completed (%s)",
3090 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
3092 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
3093 wpa_ft_push_pmk_r1(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
3094 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
3100 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
3103 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
3104 else if (sm
->Disconnect
3105 /* || FIX: dot11RSNAConfigSALifetime timeout */) {
3106 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3107 "WPA_PTK: sm->Disconnect");
3108 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3110 else if (sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
)
3111 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
3112 else if (sm
->AuthenticationRequest
)
3113 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
);
3114 else if (sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
)
3115 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
3116 else if (sm
->PTKRequest
)
3117 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3118 else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
) {
3119 case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE
:
3121 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT
:
3122 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
3124 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECTED
:
3125 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
3127 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION
:
3128 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
3130 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION2
:
3131 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
3132 wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
3133 WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
) > 0)
3134 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
);
3135 else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
3136 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
3137 /* FIX: && 802.1X::keyRun */)
3138 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
);
3139 else if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
)
3140 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
);
3142 case WPA_PTK_INITPMK
:
3143 if (wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
3144 WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
) > 0) {
3145 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3147 } else if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
&& sm
->pmksa
) {
3148 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3149 #endif /* CONFIG_DPP */
3151 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
3152 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3153 "INITPMK - keyAvailable = false");
3154 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3157 case WPA_PTK_INITPSK
:
3158 if (wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
,
3160 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3162 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3163 "no PSK configured for the STA");
3164 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
3165 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3168 case WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
:
3169 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3170 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
3171 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
3172 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
3173 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
) {
3174 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
3176 sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3177 "PTKSTART: Retry limit %u reached",
3178 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
);
3179 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3180 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3181 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3183 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
:
3184 if (sm
->MICVerified
)
3185 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
);
3186 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3187 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
3188 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
3189 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3190 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3192 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
:
3193 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
3195 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
:
3196 if (sm
->update_snonce
)
3197 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
3198 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3199 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
3200 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
);
3201 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
3202 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
) {
3203 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
3205 sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3206 "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %u reached",
3207 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
);
3208 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3209 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3210 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
3212 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
:
3218 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
)
3220 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3222 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
3223 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
3224 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
3226 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
3230 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
)
3232 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
3233 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3235 u8
*kde_buf
= NULL
, *pos
, hdr
[2];
3237 u8
*gtk
, dummy_gtk
[32];
3239 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3242 if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
> sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
) {
3243 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
3244 * immediately following this. */
3248 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
3249 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
3250 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
3251 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
3252 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
3253 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
)
3254 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
3255 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3256 "sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake");
3258 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
3259 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
) {
3261 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
3262 * of GTK in the BSS.
3264 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gsm
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3268 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
3269 kde_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gsm
->GTK_len
+
3270 ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
);
3271 kde_buf
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
3272 if (kde_buf
== NULL
)
3275 kde
= pos
= kde_buf
;
3276 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
3278 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
3280 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
3281 kde_len
= pos
- kde
;
3284 kde_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
3287 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
3288 WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
|
3289 (wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
) ?
3290 WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
: 0) |
3292 (!sm
->Pair
? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
: 0),
3293 rsc
, NULL
, kde
, kde_len
, gsm
->GN
, 1);
3299 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
)
3301 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3302 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
3303 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
3304 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
3305 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3306 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
3307 /* FIX: MLME.SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
3308 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3309 "group key handshake completed (%s)",
3310 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
3315 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
)
3317 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3318 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
3319 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
3320 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3321 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
3322 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3323 "group key handshake failed (%s) after %u tries",
3324 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN",
3325 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
);
3329 SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP
)
3331 if (sm
->Init
|| sm
->PtkGroupInit
) {
3332 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3333 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= FALSE
;
3334 } else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
) {
3335 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_IDLE
:
3336 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
||
3337 (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&& sm
->PInitAKeys
))
3338 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
3340 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
:
3341 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3342 !sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
3343 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
);
3344 else if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
>
3345 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
)
3346 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
);
3347 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3348 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
3350 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_KEYERROR
:
3351 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3353 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYESTABLISHED
:
3354 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3360 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3361 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3365 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3366 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3367 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "Group key expansion",
3368 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
3369 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3371 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GTK",
3372 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
);
3374 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3375 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
3377 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3378 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3379 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3380 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "IGTK key expansion",
3381 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
3382 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
) < 0)
3384 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "IGTK",
3385 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3387 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3393 static void wpa_group_gtk_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3394 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3396 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3397 "GTK_INIT (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3398 group
->changed
= FALSE
; /* GInit is not cleared here; avoid loop */
3399 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
;
3402 os_memset(group
->GTK
, 0, sizeof(group
->GTK
));
3405 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3408 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3409 /* GTK[GN] = CalcGTK() */
3410 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3414 static int wpa_group_update_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
3416 if (ctx
!= NULL
&& ctx
!= sm
->group
)
3419 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
) {
3420 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3421 "Not in PTKINITDONE; skip Group Key update");
3422 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3425 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
3427 * This should not really happen, so add a debug log entry.
3428 * Since we clear the GKeyDoneStations before the loop, the
3429 * station needs to be counted here anyway.
3431 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3432 "GUpdateStationKeys was already set when "
3433 "marking station for GTK rekeying");
3436 /* Do not rekey GTK/IGTK when STA is in WNM-Sleep Mode */
3437 if (sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
3440 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
++;
3441 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= TRUE
;
3448 #ifdef CONFIG_WNM_AP
3449 /* update GTK when exiting WNM-Sleep Mode */
3450 void wpa_wnmsleep_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3452 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
3455 wpa_group_update_sta(sm
, NULL
);
3459 void wpa_set_wnmsleep(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int flag
)
3462 sm
->is_wnmsleep
= !!flag
;
3466 int wpa_wnmsleep_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
3468 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3473 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] |
3476 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_GTK
;
3477 *pos
++ = 11 + gsm
->GTK_len
;
3478 /* Key ID in B0-B1 of Key Info */
3479 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN
& 0x03);
3481 *pos
++ = gsm
->GTK_len
;
3482 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, pos
) != 0)
3485 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
3486 pos
+= gsm
->GTK_len
;
3488 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3490 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3491 gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
3497 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3498 int wpa_wnmsleep_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
3500 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3502 size_t len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3506 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] | Key[16]
3508 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK
;
3509 *pos
++ = 2 + 6 + len
;
3510 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN_igtk
);
3512 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, pos
) != 0)
3516 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3519 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3521 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3522 gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3526 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3527 #endif /* CONFIG_WNM_AP */
3530 static void wpa_group_setkeys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3531 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3535 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3536 "SETKEYS (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3537 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
3538 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
;
3539 group
->GTKReKey
= FALSE
;
3541 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
3543 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3544 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
3545 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
3546 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
3547 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3548 /* "GKeyDoneStations = GNoStations" is done in more robust way by
3549 * counting the STAs that are marked with GUpdateStationKeys instead of
3550 * including all STAs that could be in not-yet-completed state. */
3551 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3553 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
) {
3554 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: Unexpected "
3555 "GKeyDoneStations=%d when starting new GTK rekey",
3556 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
3557 group
->GKeyDoneStations
= 0;
3559 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_update_sta
, group
);
3560 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: GKeyDoneStations=%d",
3561 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
3565 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3566 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3570 if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
,
3571 wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
),
3572 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN
,
3573 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3576 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3577 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
3581 alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3582 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3585 wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
, alg
,
3586 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN_igtk
,
3587 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
) < 0)
3590 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3596 static int wpa_group_disconnect_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
3598 if (sm
->group
== ctx
) {
3599 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Mark STA " MACSTR
3600 " for discconnection due to fatal failure",
3602 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
3609 static void wpa_group_fatal_failure(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3610 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3612 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state FATAL_FAILURE");
3613 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
3614 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
;
3615 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_disconnect_cb
, group
);
3619 static int wpa_group_setkeysdone(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3620 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3622 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3623 "SETKEYSDONE (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3624 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
3625 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
;
3627 if (wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
3628 wpa_group_fatal_failure(wpa_auth
, group
);
3636 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3637 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3640 wpa_group_gtk_init(wpa_auth
, group
);
3641 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
) {
3642 /* Do not allow group operations */
3643 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
&&
3644 group
->GTKAuthenticator
) {
3645 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
3646 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
&&
3648 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
3649 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
) {
3650 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
== 0)
3651 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
3652 else if (group
->GTKReKey
)
3653 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
3658 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3663 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
3664 /* This should not happen, but if it does, make sure we do not
3665 * end up freeing the state machine too early by exiting the
3666 * recursive call. */
3667 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: wpa_sm_step() called recursively");
3671 sm
->in_step_loop
= 1;
3673 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
3676 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
3677 sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
= FALSE
;
3679 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK
);
3680 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
3682 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK_GROUP
);
3683 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
3685 wpa_group_sm_step(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
3686 } while (sm
->changed
|| sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
);
3687 sm
->in_step_loop
= 0;
3689 if (sm
->pending_deinit
) {
3690 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Completing pending STA state "
3691 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
3692 wpa_free_sta_sm(sm
);
3699 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
3701 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= eloop_ctx
;
3706 void wpa_auth_sm_notify(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3710 eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
3714 void wpa_gtk_rekey(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3717 struct wpa_group
*group
;
3719 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3722 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
3724 for (i
= 0; i
< 2; i
++) {
3726 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
3728 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3729 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
3730 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
3731 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
3732 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3733 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3734 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
3739 static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int val
)
3741 return val
? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
3745 #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
3746 #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
3747 ((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff
3749 int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
3752 char pmkid_txt
[PMKID_LEN
* 2 + 1];
3753 #ifdef CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH
3754 const int preauth
= 1;
3755 #else /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
3756 const int preauth
= 0;
3757 #endif /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
3759 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3762 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3763 "dot11RSNAOptionImplemented=TRUE\n"
3764 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationImplemented=%s\n"
3765 "dot11RSNAEnabled=%s\n"
3766 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationEnabled=%s\n",
3767 wpa_bool_txt(preauth
),
3768 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
),
3769 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.rsn_preauth
));
3770 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3774 wpa_snprintf_hex(pmkid_txt
, sizeof(pmkid_txt
),
3775 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, PMKID_LEN
);
3778 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3779 "dot11RSNAConfigVersion=%u\n"
3780 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseKeysSupported=9999\n"
3781 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipher */
3782 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyMethod */
3783 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime */
3784 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyPackets */
3785 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict=%u\n"
3786 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount=%u\n"
3787 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount=%u\n"
3788 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipherSize=%u\n"
3789 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=%u\n"
3790 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=%u\n"
3791 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfPTKSAReplayCounters=0\n"
3792 "dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=%u\n"
3793 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3794 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3795 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3796 "dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed=%s\n"
3797 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3798 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3799 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3800 "dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked=%u\n"
3801 "dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures=%u\n"
3802 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n",
3804 !!wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
,
3805 wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
,
3806 wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
,
3807 wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
) * 8,
3808 dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
,
3809 dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
,
3810 dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
,
3811 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected
),
3812 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected
),
3813 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected
),
3815 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested
),
3816 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested
),
3817 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested
),
3818 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
,
3819 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
);
3820 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3824 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseCiphersTable */
3825 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable */
3828 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
, "hostapdWPAGroupState=%d\n",
3829 wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
);
3830 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3838 int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
3846 /* TODO: FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF entry for broadcast/multicast stats */
3848 /* dot11RSNAStatsEntry */
3850 pairwise
= wpa_cipher_to_suite(sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
3851 WPA_PROTO_RSN
: WPA_PROTO_WPA
,
3857 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3858 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsIndex */
3859 "dot11RSNAStatsSTAAddress=" MACSTR
"\n"
3860 "dot11RSNAStatsVersion=1\n"
3861 "dot11RSNAStatsSelectedPairwiseCipher=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
3862 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPICVErrors */
3863 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures=%u\n"
3864 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures=%u\n"
3865 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
3866 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors */
3867 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPReplays */,
3869 RSN_SUITE_ARG(pairwise
),
3870 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
,
3871 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
);
3872 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3877 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
3878 "hostapdWPAPTKState=%d\n"
3879 "hostapdWPAPTKGroupState=%d\n",
3881 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
3882 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
3890 void wpa_auth_countermeasures_start(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
3893 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
++;
3897 int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3899 return sm
&& sm
->pairwise_set
;
3903 int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3905 return sm
->pairwise
;
3909 int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3913 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
;
3917 int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3925 int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
3926 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
)
3928 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->pmksa
!= entry
)
3935 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
3936 wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3938 return sm
? sm
->pmksa
: NULL
;
3942 void wpa_auth_sta_local_mic_failure_report(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3945 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
++;
3949 const u8
* wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, size_t *len
)
3951 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3953 *len
= wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
3954 return wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
3958 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
3959 unsigned int pmk_len
,
3960 int session_timeout
, struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
3962 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
||
3963 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
3966 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
3967 if (pmk_len
> PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
)
3968 pmk_len
= PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
;
3969 } else if (pmk_len
> PMK_LEN
) {
3973 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(sm
->wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, pmk_len
, NULL
,
3974 sm
->PTK
.kck
, sm
->PTK
.kck_len
,
3975 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, session_timeout
,
3976 eapol
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
3983 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_preauth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3984 const u8
*pmk
, size_t len
, const u8
*sta_addr
,
3985 int session_timeout
,
3986 struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
3988 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
3991 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, len
, NULL
,
3994 sta_addr
, session_timeout
, eapol
,
3995 WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X
))
4002 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_sae(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
4003 const u8
*pmk
, const u8
*pmkid
)
4005 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
4008 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
, pmkid
,
4010 wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, 0, NULL
,
4018 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add2(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
4019 const u8
*pmk
, size_t pmk_len
, const u8
*pmkid
,
4020 int session_timeout
, int akmp
)
4022 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
4025 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, pmk_len
, pmkid
,
4026 NULL
, 0, wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, session_timeout
,
4034 void wpa_auth_pmksa_remove(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4037 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
;
4039 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
)
4041 pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, sta_addr
, NULL
);
4043 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Remove PMKSA cache entry for "
4044 MACSTR
" based on request", MAC2STR(sta_addr
));
4045 pmksa_cache_free_entry(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmksa
);
4050 int wpa_auth_pmksa_list(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
,
4053 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
4055 return pmksa_cache_auth_list(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, buf
, len
);
4059 void wpa_auth_pmksa_flush(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
4061 if (wpa_auth
&& wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
4062 pmksa_cache_auth_flush(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
4066 #ifdef CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL
4069 int wpa_auth_pmksa_list_mesh(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
4070 char *buf
, size_t len
)
4072 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
4075 return pmksa_cache_auth_list_mesh(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, addr
, buf
, len
);
4079 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
4080 wpa_auth_pmksa_create_entry(const u8
*aa
, const u8
*spa
, const u8
*pmk
,
4081 const u8
*pmkid
, int expiration
)
4083 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
;
4084 struct os_reltime now
;
4086 entry
= pmksa_cache_auth_create_entry(pmk
, PMK_LEN
, pmkid
, NULL
, 0, aa
,
4087 spa
, 0, NULL
, WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE
);
4091 os_get_reltime(&now
);
4092 entry
->expiration
= now
.sec
+ expiration
;
4097 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_entry(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4098 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
)
4102 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
4105 ret
= pmksa_cache_auth_add_entry(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, entry
);
4107 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4108 "RSN: Failed to store external PMKSA cache for "
4109 MACSTR
, MAC2STR(entry
->spa
));
4114 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
4115 #endif /* CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL */
4118 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
4119 wpa_auth_pmksa_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*sta_addr
,
4122 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
4124 return pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, sta_addr
, pmkid
);
4128 void wpa_auth_pmksa_set_to_sm(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
,
4129 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
4130 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4137 os_memcpy(pmk
, pmksa
->pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
4138 os_memcpy(pmkid
, pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
4139 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
4144 * Remove and free the group from wpa_authenticator. This is triggered by a
4145 * callback to make sure nobody is currently iterating the group list while it
4148 static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4149 struct wpa_group
*group
)
4151 struct wpa_group
*prev
= wpa_auth
->group
;
4153 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Remove group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
4157 if (prev
->next
== group
) {
4158 /* This never frees the special first group as needed */
4159 prev
->next
= group
->next
;
4169 /* Increase the reference counter for group */
4170 static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4171 struct wpa_group
*group
)
4173 /* Skip the special first group */
4174 if (wpa_auth
->group
== group
)
4177 group
->references
++;
4181 /* Decrease the reference counter and maybe free the group */
4182 static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4183 struct wpa_group
*group
)
4185 /* Skip the special first group */
4186 if (wpa_auth
->group
== group
)
4189 group
->references
--;
4190 if (group
->references
)
4192 wpa_group_free(wpa_auth
, group
);
4197 * Add a group that has its references counter set to zero. Caller needs to
4198 * call wpa_group_get() on the return value to mark the entry in use.
4200 static struct wpa_group
*
4201 wpa_auth_add_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
4203 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4205 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
)
4208 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Add group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
4210 group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
, 0);
4214 group
->next
= wpa_auth
->group
->next
;
4215 wpa_auth
->group
->next
= group
;
4222 * Enforce that the group state machine for the VLAN is running, increase
4223 * reference counter as interface is up. References might have been increased
4224 * even if a negative value is returned.
4225 * Returns: -1 on error (group missing, group already failed); otherwise, 0
4227 int wpa_auth_ensure_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
4229 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4231 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4234 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
4236 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
4238 group
= group
->next
;
4241 if (group
== NULL
) {
4242 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
4247 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4248 "WPA: Ensure group state machine running for VLAN ID %d",
4251 wpa_group_get(wpa_auth
, group
);
4252 group
->num_setup_iface
++;
4254 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
4262 * Decrease reference counter, expected to be zero afterwards.
4263 * returns: -1 on error (group not found, group in fail state)
4264 * -2 if wpa_group is still referenced
4267 int wpa_auth_release_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
4269 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4272 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4275 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
4277 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
4279 group
= group
->next
;
4285 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4286 "WPA: Try stopping group state machine for VLAN ID %d",
4289 if (group
->num_setup_iface
<= 0) {
4290 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
,
4291 "WPA: wpa_auth_release_group called more often than wpa_auth_ensure_group for VLAN ID %d, skipping.",
4295 group
->num_setup_iface
--;
4297 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
4300 if (group
->references
> 1) {
4301 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4302 "WPA: Cannot stop group state machine for VLAN ID %d as references are still hold",
4307 wpa_group_put(wpa_auth
, group
);
4313 int wpa_auth_sta_set_vlan(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int vlan_id
)
4315 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4317 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4320 group
= sm
->wpa_auth
->group
;
4322 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
4324 group
= group
->next
;
4327 if (group
== NULL
) {
4328 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(sm
->wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
4333 if (sm
->group
== group
)
4336 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
4339 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Moving STA " MACSTR
" to use group state "
4340 "machine for VLAN ID %d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), vlan_id
);
4342 wpa_group_get(sm
->wpa_auth
, group
);
4343 wpa_group_put(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
4350 void wpa_auth_eapol_key_tx_status(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4351 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int ack
)
4353 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| sm
== NULL
)
4355 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key TX status for STA " MACSTR
4356 " ack=%d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), ack
);
4357 if (sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
&& ack
) {
4359 * Some deployed supplicant implementations update their SNonce
4360 * for each EAPOL-Key 2/4 message even within the same 4-way
4361 * handshake and then fail to use the first SNonce when
4362 * deriving the PTK. This results in unsuccessful 4-way
4363 * handshake whenever the relatively short initial timeout is
4364 * reached and EAPOL-Key 1/4 is retransmitted. Try to work
4365 * around this by increasing the timeout now that we know that
4366 * the station has received the frame.
4368 int timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
4369 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Increase initial EAPOL-Key 1/4 "
4370 "timeout by %u ms because of acknowledged frame",
4372 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
4373 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000,
4374 (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
4375 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
4380 int wpa_auth_uses_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4384 return wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
4388 int wpa_auth_uses_ft_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4392 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE
;
4397 int wpa_auth_get_ip_addr(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*addr
)
4399 if (sm
== NULL
|| WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0)
4401 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
4404 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
4407 int wpa_auth_radius_das_disconnect_pmksa(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4408 struct radius_das_attrs
*attr
)
4410 return pmksa_cache_auth_radius_das_disconnect(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, attr
);
4414 void wpa_auth_reconfig_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
4416 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4420 for (group
= wpa_auth
->group
; group
; group
= group
->next
)
4421 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
4427 struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data
{
4428 struct wpa_authenticator
*auth
;
4430 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
;
4436 static int wpa_auth_fils_iter(struct wpa_authenticator
*a
, void *ctx
)
4438 struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data
*data
= ctx
;
4440 if (a
== data
->auth
|| !a
->conf
.fils_cache_id_set
||
4441 os_memcmp(a
->conf
.fils_cache_id
, data
->cache_id
,
4442 FILS_CACHE_ID_LEN
) != 0)
4444 data
->pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_get(a
->pmksa
, data
->spa
, data
->pmkid
);
4445 return data
->pmksa
!= NULL
;
4449 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
4450 wpa_auth_pmksa_get_fils_cache_id(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4451 const u8
*sta_addr
, const u8
*pmkid
)
4453 struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data idata
;
4455 if (!wpa_auth
->conf
.fils_cache_id_set
)
4457 idata
.auth
= wpa_auth
;
4458 idata
.cache_id
= wpa_auth
->conf
.fils_cache_id
;
4460 idata
.spa
= sta_addr
;
4461 idata
.pmkid
= pmkid
;
4462 wpa_auth_for_each_auth(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth_fils_iter
, &idata
);
4467 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
4468 int wpa_auth_write_fte(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, u8
*buf
, size_t len
)
4470 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
= &wpa_auth
->conf
;
4472 return wpa_write_ftie(conf
, conf
->r0_key_holder
,
4473 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
4474 NULL
, NULL
, buf
, len
, NULL
, 0);
4476 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
4479 void wpa_auth_get_fils_aead_params(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
4480 u8
*fils_anonce
, u8
*fils_snonce
,
4481 u8
*fils_kek
, size_t *fils_kek_len
)
4483 os_memcpy(fils_anonce
, sm
->ANonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
4484 os_memcpy(fils_snonce
, sm
->SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
4485 os_memcpy(fils_kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek
, WPA_KEK_MAX_LEN
);
4486 *fils_kek_len
= sm
->PTK
.kek_len
;
4489 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */