2 * IEEE 802.11 RSN / WPA Authenticator
3 * Copyright (c) 2004-2019, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6 * See README for more details.
9 #include "utils/includes.h"
11 #include "utils/common.h"
12 #include "utils/eloop.h"
13 #include "utils/state_machine.h"
14 #include "utils/bitfield.h"
15 #include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
16 #include "common/ocv.h"
17 #include "crypto/aes.h"
18 #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
19 #include "crypto/aes_siv.h"
20 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
21 #include "crypto/sha1.h"
22 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
23 #include "crypto/sha384.h"
24 #include "crypto/random.h"
25 #include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm.h"
26 #include "drivers/driver.h"
27 #include "ap_config.h"
28 #include "ieee802_11.h"
30 #include "pmksa_cache_auth.h"
31 #include "wpa_auth_i.h"
32 #include "wpa_auth_ie.h"
34 #define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct wpa_state_machine
35 #define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "WPA"
36 #define STATE_MACHINE_ADDR sm->addr
39 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
40 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
41 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp
, size_t pmk_len
, struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
,
42 u8
*data
, size_t data_len
);
44 static int wpa_aead_decrypt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
,
45 u8
*buf
, size_t buf_len
, u16
*_key_data_len
);
46 static struct wpabuf
* fils_prepare_plainbuf(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
47 const struct wpabuf
*hlp
);
48 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
49 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
);
50 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
51 struct wpa_group
*group
);
52 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
);
53 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
54 struct wpa_group
*group
);
55 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
56 struct wpa_group
*group
);
57 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*snonce
,
58 const u8
*pmk
, unsigned int pmk_len
,
60 static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
61 struct wpa_group
*group
);
62 static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
63 struct wpa_group
*group
);
64 static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
65 struct wpa_group
*group
);
66 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
);
68 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first
= 100; /* ms */
69 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq
= 1000; /* ms */
70 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
= 500; /* ms */
71 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_no_retrans
= 4000; /* ms */
73 /* TODO: make these configurable */
74 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
= 43200;
75 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
= 70;
76 static const int dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
= 60;
79 static inline int wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(
80 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
82 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->mic_failure_report
)
83 return wpa_auth
->cb
->mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
);
88 static inline void wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(
89 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
)
91 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->psk_failure_report
)
92 wpa_auth
->cb
->psk_failure_report(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
);
96 static inline void wpa_auth_set_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
97 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
,
100 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->set_eapol
)
101 wpa_auth
->cb
->set_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, var
, value
);
105 static inline int wpa_auth_get_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
106 const u8
*addr
, wpa_eapol_variable var
)
108 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_eapol
== NULL
)
110 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, var
);
114 static inline const u8
* wpa_auth_get_psk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
116 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
,
117 const u8
*prev_psk
, size_t *psk_len
,
120 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_psk
== NULL
)
122 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_psk(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, p2p_dev_addr
,
123 prev_psk
, psk_len
, vlan_id
);
127 static inline int wpa_auth_get_msk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
128 const u8
*addr
, u8
*msk
, size_t *len
)
130 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_msk
== NULL
)
132 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_msk(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, msk
, len
);
136 static inline int wpa_auth_set_key(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
138 enum wpa_alg alg
, const u8
*addr
, int idx
,
139 u8
*key
, size_t key_len
)
141 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->set_key
== NULL
)
143 return wpa_auth
->cb
->set_key(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, vlan_id
, alg
, addr
, idx
,
148 static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
149 const u8
*addr
, int idx
, u8
*seq
)
151 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->get_seqnum
== NULL
)
153 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_seqnum(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, idx
, seq
);
158 wpa_auth_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
159 const u8
*data
, size_t data_len
, int encrypt
)
161 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->send_eapol
== NULL
)
163 return wpa_auth
->cb
->send_eapol(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, data
, data_len
,
169 static inline int wpa_auth_start_ampe(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
172 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->start_ampe
== NULL
)
174 return wpa_auth
->cb
->start_ampe(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
);
176 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
179 int wpa_auth_for_each_sta(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
180 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
),
183 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_sta
== NULL
)
185 return wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_sta(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
189 int wpa_auth_for_each_auth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
190 int (*cb
)(struct wpa_authenticator
*a
, void *ctx
),
193 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_auth
== NULL
)
195 return wpa_auth
->cb
->for_each_auth(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, cb
, cb_ctx
);
199 void wpa_auth_logger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
200 logger_level level
, const char *txt
)
202 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->logger
== NULL
)
204 wpa_auth
->cb
->logger(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, level
, txt
);
208 void wpa_auth_vlogger(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
209 logger_level level
, const char *fmt
, ...)
215 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->logger
== NULL
)
218 maxlen
= os_strlen(fmt
) + 100;
219 format
= os_malloc(maxlen
);
224 vsnprintf(format
, maxlen
, fmt
, ap
);
227 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, addr
, level
, format
);
233 static void wpa_sta_disconnect(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
234 const u8
*addr
, u16 reason
)
236 if (wpa_auth
->cb
->disconnect
== NULL
)
238 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_sta_disconnect STA " MACSTR
" (reason %u)",
239 MAC2STR(addr
), reason
);
240 wpa_auth
->cb
->disconnect(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, reason
);
245 static int wpa_channel_info(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
246 struct wpa_channel_info
*ci
)
248 if (!wpa_auth
->cb
->channel_info
)
250 return wpa_auth
->cb
->channel_info(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, ci
);
252 #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
255 static int wpa_auth_update_vlan(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
256 const u8
*addr
, int vlan_id
)
258 if (!wpa_auth
->cb
->update_vlan
)
260 return wpa_auth
->cb
->update_vlan(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, addr
, vlan_id
);
264 static void wpa_rekey_gmk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
266 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
268 if (random_get_bytes(wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
)) {
269 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
272 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "GMK rekeyd");
273 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK",
274 wpa_auth
->group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
277 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
278 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
279 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
284 static void wpa_rekey_gtk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
286 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
287 struct wpa_group
*group
, *next
;
289 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, NULL
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying GTK");
290 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
292 wpa_group_get(wpa_auth
, group
);
294 group
->GTKReKey
= TRUE
;
296 group
->changed
= FALSE
;
297 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
298 } while (group
->changed
);
301 wpa_group_put(wpa_auth
, group
);
305 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
306 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
,
307 0, wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
312 static void wpa_rekey_ptk(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
314 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
315 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
317 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "rekeying PTK");
318 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
323 void wpa_auth_set_ptk_rekey_timer(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
325 if (sm
&& sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_ptk_rekey
) {
326 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Start PTK rekeying timer for "
327 MACSTR
" (%d seconds)", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
),
328 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_ptk_rekey
);
329 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
330 eloop_register_timeout(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_ptk_rekey
, 0,
331 wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
336 static int wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
338 if (sm
->pmksa
== ctx
)
344 static void wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
,
347 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= ctx
;
348 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb
, entry
);
352 static int wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
353 struct wpa_group
*group
)
355 u8 buf
[ETH_ALEN
+ 8 + sizeof(unsigned long)];
359 if (random_get_bytes(group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
) < 0)
361 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GMK", group
->GMK
, WPA_GMK_LEN
);
364 * Counter = PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter",
365 * Local MAC Address || Time)
367 os_memcpy(buf
, wpa_auth
->addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
368 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
);
369 ptr
= (unsigned long) group
;
370 os_memcpy(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
+ 8, &ptr
, sizeof(ptr
));
372 os_memset(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
, 0xab, 8);
373 os_memset(buf
+ ETH_ALEN
+ 8, 0xcd, sizeof(ptr
));
374 #endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
375 if (random_get_bytes(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
)) < 0)
378 if (sha1_prf(rkey
, sizeof(rkey
), "Init Counter", buf
, sizeof(buf
),
379 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) < 0)
381 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Key Counter",
382 group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
388 static struct wpa_group
* wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
389 int vlan_id
, int delay_init
)
391 struct wpa_group
*group
;
393 group
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_group
));
397 group
->GTKAuthenticator
= TRUE
;
398 group
->vlan_id
= vlan_id
;
399 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
401 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
402 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
403 "for secure operations - update keys later when "
404 "the first station connects");
408 * Set initial GMK/Counter value here. The actual values that will be
409 * used in negotiations will be set once the first station tries to
410 * connect. This allows more time for collecting additional randomness
411 * on embedded devices.
413 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
414 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
422 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Delay group state machine start "
423 "until Beacon frames have been configured");
424 /* Initialization is completed in wpa_init_keys(). */
426 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
427 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
428 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
436 * wpa_init - Initialize WPA authenticator
437 * @addr: Authenticator address
438 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
439 * @cb: Callback functions for WPA authenticator
440 * Returns: Pointer to WPA authenticator data or %NULL on failure
442 struct wpa_authenticator
* wpa_init(const u8
*addr
,
443 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
,
444 const struct wpa_auth_callbacks
*cb
,
447 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
;
449 wpa_auth
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_authenticator
));
450 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
452 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
453 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
455 wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
= cb_ctx
;
457 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
458 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
463 wpa_auth
->group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, 0, 1);
464 if (wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
) {
465 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
470 wpa_auth
->pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_init(wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb
,
472 if (wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
) {
473 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "PMKSA cache initialization failed.");
474 os_free(wpa_auth
->group
);
475 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
480 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
481 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= wpa_ft_pmk_cache_init();
482 if (wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
== NULL
) {
483 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT PMK cache initialization failed.");
484 os_free(wpa_auth
->group
);
485 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
486 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
490 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
492 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
) {
493 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_gmk_rekey
, 0,
494 wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
497 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
) {
498 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_rekey
, 0,
499 wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
503 if (WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
)) {
504 int count
= WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_end
) -
505 WPA_GET_BE32(conf
->ip_addr_start
) + 1;
509 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
= bitfield_alloc(count
);
511 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
517 int wpa_init_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
519 struct wpa_group
*group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
521 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Start group state machine to set initial "
523 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
524 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
525 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
526 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
533 * wpa_deinit - Deinitialize WPA authenticator
534 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
536 void wpa_deinit(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
538 struct wpa_group
*group
, *prev
;
540 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gmk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
541 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
543 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
545 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
546 wpa_ft_pmk_cache_deinit(wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
);
547 wpa_auth
->ft_pmk_cache
= NULL
;
548 wpa_ft_deinit(wpa_auth
);
549 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
552 bitfield_free(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
553 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
556 os_free(wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
);
558 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
570 * wpa_reconfig - Update WPA authenticator configuration
571 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
572 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
574 int wpa_reconfig(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
575 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
)
577 struct wpa_group
*group
;
578 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
581 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth
->conf
, conf
, sizeof(*conf
));
582 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth
)) {
583 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
588 * Reinitialize GTK to make sure it is suitable for the new
591 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
592 group
->GTK_len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
);
594 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
595 group
->GInit
= FALSE
;
596 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth
, group
);
602 struct wpa_state_machine
*
603 wpa_auth_sta_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
604 const u8
*p2p_dev_addr
)
606 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
;
608 if (wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
611 sm
= os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_state_machine
));
614 os_memcpy(sm
->addr
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
616 os_memcpy(sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, p2p_dev_addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
618 sm
->wpa_auth
= wpa_auth
;
619 sm
->group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
620 wpa_group_get(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
626 int wpa_auth_sta_associated(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
627 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
629 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
632 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
633 if (sm
->ft_completed
) {
634 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
635 "FT authentication already completed - do not "
636 "start 4-way handshake");
637 /* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
638 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
;
642 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
645 if (sm
->fils_completed
) {
646 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
647 "FILS authentication already completed - do not start 4-way handshake");
648 /* Go to PTKINITDONE state to allow GTK rekeying */
649 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
;
653 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
656 os_memset(&sm
->key_replay
, 0, sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
657 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
658 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
661 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
662 "start authentication");
666 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
667 return 1; /* should not really happen */
669 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
670 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
674 void wpa_auth_sta_no_wpa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
676 /* WPA/RSN was not used - clear WPA state. This is needed if the STA
677 * reassociates back to the same AP while the previous entry for the
678 * STA has not yet been removed. */
682 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
= 0;
686 static void wpa_free_sta_sm(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
689 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
)) {
691 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "P2P: Free assigned IP "
692 "address %u.%u.%u.%u from " MACSTR
,
693 sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
694 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
696 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_start
);
697 bitfield_clear(sm
->wpa_auth
->ip_pool
,
698 WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) - start
);
700 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
701 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
702 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
703 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
705 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
706 os_free(sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
);
707 wpabuf_free(sm
->ft_pending_req_ies
);
708 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
709 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
711 wpa_group_put(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
713 wpabuf_clear_free(sm
->dpp_z
);
714 #endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
715 bin_clear_free(sm
, sizeof(*sm
));
719 void wpa_auth_sta_deinit(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
724 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
&& sm
->has_GTK
) {
725 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
726 "strict rekeying - force GTK rekey since STA "
728 if (eloop_deplete_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk
,
729 sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
) == -1)
730 eloop_register_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk
, sm
->wpa_auth
,
734 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
735 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
736 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
737 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
738 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
739 wpa_ft_sta_deinit(sm
);
740 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
741 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
742 /* Must not free state machine while wpa_sm_step() is running.
743 * Freeing will be completed in the end of wpa_sm_step(). */
744 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Registering pending STA state "
745 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
746 sm
->pending_deinit
= 1;
752 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
757 sm
->PTKRequest
= TRUE
;
762 static int wpa_replay_counter_valid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
763 const u8
*replay_counter
)
766 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
769 if (os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
770 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0)
777 static void wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter
*ctr
,
778 const u8
*replay_counter
)
781 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
783 (replay_counter
== NULL
||
784 os_memcmp(replay_counter
, ctr
[i
].counter
,
785 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0))
786 ctr
[i
].valid
= FALSE
;
791 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
792 static int ft_check_msg_2_of_4(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
793 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
794 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse
*kde
)
796 struct wpa_ie_data ie
;
797 struct rsn_mdie
*mdie
;
799 if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(kde
->rsn_ie
, kde
->rsn_ie_len
, &ie
) < 0 ||
800 ie
.num_pmkid
!= 1 || ie
.pmkid
== NULL
) {
801 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No PMKR1Name in "
802 "FT 4-way handshake message 2/4");
806 os_memcpy(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, ie
.pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
807 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from Supplicant",
808 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, PMKID_LEN
);
810 if (!kde
->mdie
|| !kde
->ftie
) {
811 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: No %s in FT 4-way handshake "
812 "message 2/4", kde
->mdie
? "FTIE" : "MDIE");
816 mdie
= (struct rsn_mdie
*) (kde
->mdie
+ 2);
817 if (kde
->mdie
[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie
) ||
818 os_memcmp(wpa_auth
->conf
.mobility_domain
, mdie
->mobility_domain
,
819 MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN
) != 0) {
820 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: MDIE mismatch");
824 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
825 (kde
->ftie
[1] != sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1] ||
826 os_memcmp(kde
->ftie
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
827 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) != 0)) {
828 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE mismatch");
829 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
830 kde
->ftie
, kde
->ftie_len
);
831 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: FTIE in (Re)AssocResp",
832 sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
, 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
838 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
841 static int wpa_receive_error_report(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
842 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int group
)
844 /* Supplicant reported a Michael MIC error */
845 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
846 "received EAPOL-Key Error Request "
847 "(STA detected Michael MIC failure (group=%d))",
850 if (group
&& wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
851 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
852 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
853 "group cipher is not TKIP");
854 } else if (!group
&& sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
) {
855 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
856 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
857 "pairwise cipher is not TKIP");
859 if (wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
) > 0)
860 return 1; /* STA entry was removed */
861 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
862 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
++;
866 * Error report is not a request for a new key handshake, but since
867 * Authenticator may do it, let's change the keys now anyway.
869 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
874 static int wpa_try_alt_snonce(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*data
,
879 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
883 os_memset(&PTK
, 0, sizeof(PTK
));
885 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
886 !wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
887 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
888 sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, pmk
, &pmk_len
,
892 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
893 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
894 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, pmk
, pmk_len
);
895 sm
->xxkey_len
= pmk_len
;
897 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
900 pmk_len
= sm
->pmk_len
;
903 if (wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, sm
->alt_SNonce
, pmk
, pmk_len
, &PTK
) < 0)
906 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, pmk_len
, &PTK
,
907 data
, data_len
) == 0) {
908 if (sm
->PMK
!= pmk
) {
909 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, pmk
, pmk_len
);
910 sm
->pmk_len
= pmk_len
;
916 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
917 wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
922 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
923 "WPA: Earlier SNonce did not result in matching MIC");
927 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
928 "WPA: Earlier SNonce resulted in matching MIC");
929 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= 0;
931 if (vlan_id
&& wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
932 wpa_auth_update_vlan(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, vlan_id
) < 0)
935 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, sm
->alt_SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
936 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
937 forced_memzero(&PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
938 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
944 void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
945 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
946 u8
*data
, size_t data_len
)
948 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
949 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
950 u16 key_info
, key_data_length
;
951 enum { PAIRWISE_2
, PAIRWISE_4
, GROUP_2
, REQUEST
} msg
;
953 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
955 size_t keyhdrlen
, mic_len
;
958 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| !wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
|| sm
== NULL
)
960 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
, "WPA: RX EAPOL data", data
, data_len
);
962 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
);
963 keyhdrlen
= sizeof(*key
) + mic_len
+ 2;
965 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + keyhdrlen
) {
966 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Ignore too short EAPOL-Key frame");
970 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
971 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
972 mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
973 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
974 key_data
= mic
+ mic_len
+ 2;
975 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(mic
+ mic_len
);
976 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received EAPOL-Key from " MACSTR
977 " key_info=0x%x type=%u mic_len=%u key_data_length=%u",
978 MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), key_info
, key
->type
,
979 (unsigned int) mic_len
, key_data_length
);
980 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
,
981 "WPA: EAPOL-Key header (ending before Key MIC)",
983 wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key Key MIC",
985 if (key_data_length
> data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) - keyhdrlen
) {
986 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key frame - "
987 "key_data overflow (%d > %lu)",
989 (unsigned long) (data_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
994 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
995 if (key
->type
== EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
997 * Some deployed station implementations seem to send
998 * msg 4/4 with incorrect type value in WPA2 mode.
1000 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Workaround: Allow EAPOL-Key "
1001 "with unexpected WPA type in RSN mode");
1002 } else if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
) {
1003 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
1004 "unexpected type %d in RSN mode",
1009 if (key
->type
!= EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
) {
1010 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
1011 "unexpected type %d in WPA mode",
1017 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Key Nonce", key
->key_nonce
,
1019 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Received Replay Counter",
1020 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1022 /* FIX: verify that the EAPOL-Key frame was encrypted if pairwise keys
1025 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE
) {
1026 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Ignore SMK message");
1030 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1033 } else if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) {
1035 msgtxt
= "2/2 Group";
1036 } else if (key_data_length
== 0 ||
1037 (mic_len
== 0 && (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
) &&
1038 key_data_length
== AES_BLOCK_SIZE
)) {
1040 msgtxt
= "4/4 Pairwise";
1043 msgtxt
= "2/4 Pairwise";
1046 if (msg
== REQUEST
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_2
|| msg
== PAIRWISE_4
||
1048 u16 ver
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
;
1049 if (sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_CCMP
||
1050 sm
->pairwise
== WPA_CIPHER_GCMP
) {
1051 if (wpa_use_cmac(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1052 !wpa_use_akm_defined(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1053 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
1054 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1056 "advertised support for "
1057 "AES-128-CMAC, but did not "
1062 if (!wpa_use_cmac(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1063 !wpa_use_akm_defined(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1064 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
) {
1065 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1067 "did not use HMAC-SHA1-AES "
1073 if (wpa_use_akm_defined(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1074 ver
!= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED
) {
1075 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
1076 "did not use EAPOL-Key descriptor version 0 as required for AKM-defined cases");
1081 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1082 if (sm
->req_replay_counter_used
&&
1083 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->req_replay_counter
,
1084 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) <= 0) {
1085 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_WARNING
,
1086 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1087 "replayed counter");
1092 if (!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) &&
1093 !wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->key_replay
, key
->replay_counter
)) {
1096 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
1097 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
1098 key
->replay_counter
) &&
1099 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
1100 os_memcmp(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
) != 0)
1103 * Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP
1104 * WZC) update SNonce for each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This
1105 * breaks the workaround on accepting any of the
1106 * pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated
1107 * even if we have already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4.
1109 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1110 "Process SNonce update from STA "
1111 "based on retransmitted EAPOL-Key "
1113 sm
->update_snonce
= 1;
1114 os_memcpy(sm
->alt_SNonce
, sm
->SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1115 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= TRUE
;
1116 os_memcpy(sm
->alt_replay_counter
,
1117 sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1118 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1119 goto continue_processing
;
1122 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_4
&& sm
->alt_snonce_valid
&&
1123 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
&&
1124 os_memcmp(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->alt_replay_counter
,
1125 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
) == 0) {
1127 * Supplicant may still be using the old SNonce since
1128 * there was two EAPOL-Key 2/4 messages and they had
1129 * different SNonce values.
1131 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1132 "Try to process received EAPOL-Key 4/4 based on old Replay Counter and SNonce from an earlier EAPOL-Key 1/4");
1133 goto continue_processing
;
1136 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
&&
1137 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm
->prev_key_replay
,
1138 key
->replay_counter
) &&
1139 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
== WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
) {
1140 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1141 "ignore retransmitted EAPOL-Key %s - "
1142 "SNonce did not change", msgtxt
);
1144 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1145 "received EAPOL-Key %s with "
1146 "unexpected replay counter", msgtxt
);
1148 for (i
= 0; i
< RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
; i
++) {
1149 if (!sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
)
1151 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "pending replay counter",
1152 sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1153 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1155 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "received replay counter",
1156 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1160 continue_processing
:
1162 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& mic_len
== 0 &&
1163 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
)) {
1164 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1165 "WPA: Encr Key Data bit not set even though AEAD cipher is supposed to be used - drop frame");
1168 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1172 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
&&
1173 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
&&
1174 (!sm
->update_snonce
||
1175 sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)) {
1176 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1177 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 in "
1178 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1182 random_add_randomness(key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1183 if (sm
->group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
) {
1185 * The system did not have enough entropy to generate
1186 * strong random numbers. Reject the first 4-way
1187 * handshake(s) and collect some entropy based on the
1188 * information from it. Once enough entropy is
1189 * available, the next atempt will trigger GMK/Key
1190 * Counter update and the station will be allowed to
1193 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Reject 4-way handshake to "
1194 "collect more entropy for random number "
1196 random_mark_pool_ready();
1197 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1198 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
1203 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
||
1205 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1206 "received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 in "
1207 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1213 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
!= WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
1214 || !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
1215 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1216 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/2 in "
1217 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1218 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
1226 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1227 "received EAPOL-Key frame (%s)", msgtxt
);
1229 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) {
1230 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1231 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key Ack set");
1235 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1236 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)) {
1237 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1238 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC not set");
1243 if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1244 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)) {
1245 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1246 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC set");
1249 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1251 sm
->MICVerified
= FALSE
;
1252 if (sm
->PTK_valid
&& !sm
->update_snonce
) {
1254 wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
, &sm
->PTK
,
1256 (msg
!= PAIRWISE_4
|| !sm
->alt_snonce_valid
||
1257 wpa_try_alt_snonce(sm
, data
, data_len
))) {
1258 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1259 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1261 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
,
1262 "TEST: Ignore Key MIC failure for fuzz testing");
1264 #endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
1269 wpa_aead_decrypt(sm
, &sm
->PTK
, data
, data_len
,
1270 &key_data_length
) < 0) {
1271 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1272 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1274 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
,
1275 "TEST: Ignore Key MIC failure for fuzz testing");
1277 #endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
1280 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1283 #endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
1284 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
1285 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1286 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1289 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
) {
1290 if (sm
->MICVerified
) {
1291 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 1;
1292 os_memcpy(sm
->req_replay_counter
, key
->replay_counter
,
1293 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1295 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1296 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1302 * TODO: should decrypt key data field if encryption was used;
1303 * even though MAC address KDE is not normally encrypted,
1304 * supplicant is allowed to encrypt it.
1306 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR
) {
1307 if (wpa_receive_error_report(
1309 !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
)) > 0)
1310 return; /* STA entry was removed */
1311 } else if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
) {
1312 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1313 "received EAPOL-Key Request for new "
1315 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm
);
1316 } else if (key_data_length
> 0 &&
1317 wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
,
1321 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1322 "received EAPOL-Key Request for GTK "
1324 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1325 wpa_rekey_gtk(wpa_auth
, NULL
);
1328 /* Do not allow the same key replay counter to be reused. */
1329 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
,
1330 key
->replay_counter
);
1332 if (msg
== PAIRWISE_2
) {
1334 * Maintain a copy of the pending EAPOL-Key frames in
1335 * case the EAPOL-Key frame was retransmitted. This is
1336 * needed to allow EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 reply to another
1337 * pending msg 1/4 to update the SNonce to work around
1338 * unexpected supplicant behavior.
1340 os_memcpy(sm
->prev_key_replay
, sm
->key_replay
,
1341 sizeof(sm
->key_replay
));
1343 os_memset(sm
->prev_key_replay
, 0,
1344 sizeof(sm
->prev_key_replay
));
1348 * Make sure old valid counters are not accepted anymore and
1349 * do not get copied again.
1351 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm
->key_replay
, NULL
);
1354 os_free(sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
);
1355 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
= os_memdup(data
, data_len
);
1356 if (sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
== NULL
)
1358 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
= data_len
;
1360 sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
);
1361 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= TRUE
;
1362 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1363 sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST
);
1364 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, key
->key_nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1369 static int wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8
*gmk
, const char *label
, const u8
*addr
,
1370 const u8
*gnonce
, u8
*gtk
, size_t gtk_len
)
1372 u8 data
[ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
+ 8 + WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN
];
1376 /* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion",
1377 * AA || GNonce || Time || random data)
1378 * The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and
1379 * GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation
1380 * is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be
1383 os_memset(data
, 0, sizeof(data
));
1384 os_memcpy(data
, addr
, ETH_ALEN
);
1385 os_memcpy(data
+ ETH_ALEN
, gnonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1386 pos
= data
+ ETH_ALEN
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
;
1387 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos
);
1389 os_memset(pos
, 0xef, 8);
1390 #endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
1392 if (random_get_bytes(pos
, gtk_len
) < 0)
1395 #ifdef CONFIG_SHA384
1396 if (sha384_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
),
1399 #else /* CONFIG_SHA384 */
1400 #ifdef CONFIG_SHA256
1401 if (sha256_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
),
1404 #else /* CONFIG_SHA256 */
1405 if (sha1_prf(gmk
, WPA_GMK_LEN
, label
, data
, sizeof(data
),
1408 #endif /* CONFIG_SHA256 */
1409 #endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */
1411 forced_memzero(data
, sizeof(data
));
1417 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
1419 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= eloop_ctx
;
1420 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= timeout_ctx
;
1422 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
1423 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
, "EAPOL-Key timeout");
1424 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= TRUE
;
1429 void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1430 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1431 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1432 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1433 int keyidx
, int encr
, int force_version
)
1435 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1436 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1437 size_t len
, mic_len
, keyhdrlen
;
1439 int key_data_len
, pad_len
= 0;
1441 int version
, pairwise
;
1443 u8
*key_mic
, *key_data
;
1445 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
);
1446 keyhdrlen
= sizeof(*key
) + mic_len
+ 2;
1448 len
= sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_hdr
) + keyhdrlen
;
1451 version
= force_version
;
1452 else if (wpa_use_akm_defined(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1453 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED
;
1454 else if (wpa_use_cmac(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
1455 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
;
1456 else if (sm
->pairwise
!= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP
)
1457 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
;
1459 version
= WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4
;
1461 pairwise
= !!(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
);
1463 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Send EAPOL(version=%d secure=%d mic=%d "
1464 "ack=%d install=%d pairwise=%d kde_len=%lu keyidx=%d "
1467 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
) ? 1 : 0,
1468 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) ? 1 : 0,
1469 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
) ? 1 : 0,
1470 (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
) ? 1 : 0,
1471 pairwise
, (unsigned long) kde_len
, keyidx
, encr
);
1473 key_data_len
= kde_len
;
1475 if ((version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1476 wpa_use_aes_key_wrap(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1477 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) && encr
) {
1478 pad_len
= key_data_len
% 8;
1480 pad_len
= 8 - pad_len
;
1481 key_data_len
+= pad_len
+ 8;
1484 len
+= key_data_len
;
1485 if (!mic_len
&& encr
)
1486 len
+= AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
1488 hdr
= os_zalloc(len
);
1491 hdr
->version
= wpa_auth
->conf
.eapol_version
;
1492 hdr
->type
= IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY
;
1493 hdr
->length
= host_to_be16(len
- sizeof(*hdr
));
1494 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1495 key_mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
1496 key_data
= ((u8
*) (hdr
+ 1)) + keyhdrlen
;
1498 key
->type
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
1499 EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN
: EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA
;
1500 key_info
|= version
;
1501 if (encr
&& sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1502 key_info
|= WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA
;
1503 if (sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
)
1504 key_info
|= keyidx
<< WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_INDEX_SHIFT
;
1505 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_info
, key_info
);
1507 alg
= pairwise
? sm
->pairwise
: wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
;
1508 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& !pairwise
)
1509 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, 0);
1511 WPA_PUT_BE16(key
->key_length
, wpa_cipher_key_len(alg
));
1513 for (i
= RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES
- 1; i
> 0; i
--) {
1514 sm
->key_replay
[i
].valid
= sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].valid
;
1515 os_memcpy(sm
->key_replay
[i
].counter
,
1516 sm
->key_replay
[i
- 1].counter
,
1517 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1519 inc_byte_array(sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1520 os_memcpy(key
->replay_counter
, sm
->key_replay
[0].counter
,
1521 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1522 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Replay Counter",
1523 key
->replay_counter
, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN
);
1524 sm
->key_replay
[0].valid
= TRUE
;
1527 os_memcpy(key
->key_nonce
, nonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1530 os_memcpy(key
->key_rsc
, key_rsc
, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
1533 os_memcpy(key_data
, kde
, kde_len
);
1534 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, kde_len
);
1536 } else if (!mic_len
&& kde
) {
1540 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ kde_len
);
1541 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1544 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: KEK",
1545 sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1546 /* AES-SIV AAD from EAPOL protocol version field (inclusive) to
1547 * to Key Data (exclusive). */
1548 aad
[0] = (u8
*) hdr
;
1549 aad_len
[0] = key_mic
+ 2 - (u8
*) hdr
;
1550 if (aes_siv_encrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
, kde
, kde_len
,
1551 1, aad
, aad_len
, key_mic
+ 2) < 0) {
1552 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: AES-SIV encryption failed");
1556 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Encrypted Key Data from SIV",
1557 key_mic
+ 2, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ kde_len
);
1558 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1559 } else if (encr
&& kde
) {
1560 buf
= os_zalloc(key_data_len
);
1566 os_memcpy(pos
, kde
, kde_len
);
1572 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1574 if (version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES
||
1575 wpa_use_aes_key_wrap(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1576 version
== WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC
) {
1577 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1578 "WPA: Encrypt Key Data using AES-WRAP (KEK length %u)",
1579 (unsigned int) sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1580 if (aes_wrap(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
,
1581 (key_data_len
- 8) / 8, buf
, key_data
)) {
1586 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, key_data_len
);
1587 #ifndef CONFIG_NO_RC4
1588 } else if (sm
->PTK
.kek_len
== 16) {
1591 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1592 "WPA: Encrypt Key Data using RC4");
1593 os_memcpy(key
->key_iv
,
1594 sm
->group
->Counter
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN
- 16, 16);
1595 inc_byte_array(sm
->group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
1596 os_memcpy(ek
, key
->key_iv
, 16);
1597 os_memcpy(ek
+ 16, sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
);
1598 os_memcpy(key_data
, buf
, key_data_len
);
1599 rc4_skip(ek
, 32, 256, key_data
, key_data_len
);
1600 WPA_PUT_BE16(key_mic
+ mic_len
, key_data_len
);
1601 #endif /* CONFIG_NO_RC4 */
1610 if (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
) {
1611 if (!sm
->PTK_valid
|| !mic_len
) {
1612 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1613 "PTK not valid when sending EAPOL-Key "
1619 if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm
->PTK
.kck
, sm
->PTK
.kck_len
,
1620 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, version
,
1621 (u8
*) hdr
, len
, key_mic
) < 0) {
1625 #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
1627 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
> 0.0 &&
1629 wpa_auth
->conf
.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability
) {
1630 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
1631 "Corrupting group EAPOL-Key Key MIC");
1634 #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
1637 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_inc_EapolFramesTx
,
1639 wpa_auth_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, (u8
*) hdr
, len
,
1645 static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1646 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int key_info
,
1647 const u8
*key_rsc
, const u8
*nonce
,
1648 const u8
*kde
, size_t kde_len
,
1649 int keyidx
, int encr
)
1652 int pairwise
= key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
;
1658 __wpa_send_eapol(wpa_auth
, sm
, key_info
, key_rsc
, nonce
, kde
, kde_len
,
1661 ctr
= pairwise
? sm
->TimeoutCtr
: sm
->GTimeoutCtr
;
1662 if (ctr
== 1 && wpa_auth
->conf
.tx_status
)
1663 timeout_ms
= pairwise
? eapol_key_timeout_first
:
1664 eapol_key_timeout_first_group
;
1666 timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
1667 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries
&&
1668 (!pairwise
|| (key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
)))
1669 timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_no_retrans
;
1670 if (pairwise
&& ctr
== 1 && !(key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
))
1671 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 1;
1674 #endif /* TEST_FUZZ */
1675 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
1676 "counter %u)", timeout_ms
, ctr
);
1677 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000, (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
1678 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
1682 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(int akmp
, size_t pmk_len
, struct wpa_ptk
*PTK
,
1683 u8
*data
, size_t data_len
)
1685 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
1686 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
1689 u8 mic
[WPA_EAPOL_KEY_MIC_MAX_LEN
], *mic_pos
;
1690 size_t mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(akmp
, pmk_len
);
1692 if (data_len
< sizeof(*hdr
) + sizeof(*key
))
1695 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) data
;
1696 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
1697 mic_pos
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
1698 key_info
= WPA_GET_BE16(key
->key_info
);
1699 os_memcpy(mic
, mic_pos
, mic_len
);
1700 os_memset(mic_pos
, 0, mic_len
);
1701 if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK
->kck
, PTK
->kck_len
, akmp
,
1702 key_info
& WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK
,
1703 data
, data_len
, mic_pos
) ||
1704 os_memcmp_const(mic
, mic_pos
, mic_len
) != 0)
1706 os_memcpy(mic_pos
, mic
, mic_len
);
1711 void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1713 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1714 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1715 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE
, sm
->addr
, 0, NULL
,
1717 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1718 "RSN: PTK removal from the driver failed");
1719 sm
->pairwise_set
= FALSE
;
1720 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
1724 int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, enum wpa_event event
)
1731 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
1732 "event %d notification", event
);
1737 /* PTKs are derived through AMPE */
1738 if (wpa_auth_start_ampe(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
)) {
1743 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
1748 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1749 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1750 os_memset(sm
->PMK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PMK
));
1752 os_memset(sm
->xxkey
, 0, sizeof(sm
->xxkey
));
1754 os_memset(sm
->pmk_r1
, 0, sizeof(sm
->pmk_r1
));
1756 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1759 case WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
:
1762 * When using WPS, we may end up here if the STA
1763 * manages to re-associate without the previous STA
1764 * entry getting removed. Consequently, we need to make
1765 * sure that the WPA state machines gets initialized
1766 * properly at this point.
1768 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA state machine had not been "
1769 "started - initialize now");
1772 if (wpa_sm_step(sm
) == 1)
1773 return 1; /* should not really happen */
1775 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1778 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
1780 * Reauthentication cancels the pending group key
1781 * update for this STA.
1783 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1784 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1785 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= TRUE
;
1787 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= TRUE
;
1790 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1791 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Retry PTK configuration "
1792 "after association");
1793 wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm
);
1795 /* Using FT protocol, not WPA auth state machine */
1796 sm
->ft_completed
= 1;
1797 wpa_auth_set_ptk_rekey_timer(sm
);
1799 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1801 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1802 case WPA_ASSOC_FILS
:
1804 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
1805 "FILS: TK configuration after association");
1807 sm
->fils_completed
= 1;
1809 #else /* CONFIG_FILS */
1811 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1812 case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
:
1813 sm
->tk_already_set
= FALSE
;
1817 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
1818 sm
->ft_completed
= 0;
1819 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
1821 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1822 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
&& event
== WPA_AUTH
)
1824 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1826 if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
1827 (event
== WPA_AUTH
|| event
== WPA_ASSOC
))
1829 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
1832 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1833 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1835 if (event
!= WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL
)
1839 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
1841 * wpa_sm_step() is already running - avoid recursive call to
1842 * it by making the existing loop process the new update.
1847 return wpa_sm_step(sm
);
1851 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
)
1853 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
, wpa_ptk
);
1855 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
1856 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
1857 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
1861 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
1862 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
1863 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
1864 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
1865 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
1866 if (1 /* Unicast cipher supported AND (ESS OR ((IBSS or WDS) and
1867 * Local AA > Remote AA)) */) {
1870 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 0);
1872 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 0);
1874 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
1875 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
||
1876 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
) {
1877 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
1878 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 0);
1883 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
)
1885 u16 reason
= sm
->disconnect_reason
;
1887 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
, wpa_ptk
);
1888 sm
->Disconnect
= FALSE
;
1889 sm
->disconnect_reason
= 0;
1891 reason
= WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
;
1892 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, reason
);
1896 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
)
1898 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
, wpa_ptk
);
1899 sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1903 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
)
1905 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
, wpa_ptk
);
1906 os_memset(&sm
->PTK
, 0, sizeof(sm
->PTK
));
1907 sm
->PTK_valid
= FALSE
;
1908 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portControl_Auto
,
1910 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled
, 1);
1911 sm
->AuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1915 static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
1916 struct wpa_group
*group
)
1918 if (group
->first_sta_seen
)
1921 * System has run bit further than at the time hostapd was started
1922 * potentially very early during boot up. This provides better chances
1923 * of collecting more randomness on embedded systems. Re-initialize the
1924 * GMK and Counter here to improve their strength if there was not
1925 * enough entropy available immediately after system startup.
1927 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Re-initialize GMK/Counter on first "
1929 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
1930 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
1931 "to proceed - reject first 4-way handshake");
1932 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1934 group
->first_sta_seen
= TRUE
;
1935 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= FALSE
;
1938 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0 ||
1939 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0 ||
1940 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
1941 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO
, "WPA: GMK/GTK setup failed");
1942 group
->first_sta_seen
= FALSE
;
1943 group
->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy
= TRUE
;
1948 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
)
1950 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
, wpa_ptk
);
1952 wpa_group_ensure_init(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
1953 sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
= FALSE
;
1956 * Definition of ANonce selection in IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 is somewhat
1957 * ambiguous. The Authenticator state machine uses a counter that is
1958 * incremented by one for each 4-way handshake. However, the security
1959 * analysis of 4-way handshake points out that unpredictable nonces
1960 * help in preventing precomputation attacks. Instead of the state
1961 * machine definition, use an unpredictable nonce value here to provide
1962 * stronger protection against potential precomputation attacks.
1964 if (random_get_bytes(sm
->ANonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
)) {
1965 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: Failed to get random data for "
1967 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1970 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Assign ANonce", sm
->ANonce
,
1972 /* IEEE 802.11i does not clear TimeoutCtr here, but this is more
1973 * logical place than INITIALIZE since AUTHENTICATION2 can be
1974 * re-entered on ReAuthenticationRequest without going through
1980 static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
1982 if (random_get_bytes(sm
->ANonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
)) {
1983 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
,
1984 "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
1985 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
1988 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm
->ANonce
,
1995 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
)
1997 u8 msk
[2 * PMK_LEN
];
1998 size_t len
= 2 * PMK_LEN
;
2000 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
, wpa_ptk
);
2001 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2003 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2005 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from PMKSA cache");
2006 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
);
2007 sm
->pmk_len
= sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
;
2009 } else if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
) {
2010 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2011 "DPP: No PMKSA cache entry for STA - reject connection");
2012 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
2013 sm
->disconnect_reason
= WLAN_REASON_INVALID_PMKID
;
2015 #endif /* CONFIG_DPP */
2016 } else if (wpa_auth_get_msk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, msk
, &len
) == 0) {
2017 unsigned int pmk_len
;
2019 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2020 pmk_len
= PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
;
2023 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: PMK from EAPOL state machine "
2024 "(MSK len=%lu PMK len=%u)", (unsigned long) len
,
2026 if (len
< pmk_len
) {
2027 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2028 "WPA: MSK not long enough (%u) to create PMK (%u)",
2029 (unsigned int) len
, (unsigned int) pmk_len
);
2030 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
2033 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, msk
, pmk_len
);
2034 sm
->pmk_len
= pmk_len
;
2035 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2036 if (len
>= 2 * PMK_LEN
) {
2037 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2038 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, msk
, SHA384_MAC_LEN
);
2039 sm
->xxkey_len
= SHA384_MAC_LEN
;
2041 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, msk
+ PMK_LEN
, PMK_LEN
);
2042 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
2045 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2047 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Could not get PMK, get_msk: %p",
2048 sm
->wpa_auth
->cb
->get_msk
);
2049 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
2052 forced_memzero(msk
, sizeof(msk
));
2054 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
2055 /* IEEE 802.11i does not set keyRun to FALSE, but not doing this
2056 * will break reauthentication since EAPOL state machines may not be
2057 * get into AUTHENTICATING state that clears keyRun before WPA state
2058 * machine enters AUTHENTICATION2 state and goes immediately to INITPMK
2059 * state and takes PMK from the previously used AAA Key. This will
2060 * eventually fail in 4-Way Handshake because Supplicant uses PMK
2061 * derived from the new AAA Key. Setting keyRun = FALSE here seems to
2062 * be good workaround for this issue. */
2063 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
, 0);
2067 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
)
2072 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
, wpa_ptk
);
2073 psk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, NULL
,
2076 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, psk
, psk_len
);
2077 sm
->pmk_len
= psk_len
;
2078 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2079 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, psk
, PMK_LEN
);
2080 sm
->xxkey_len
= PMK_LEN
;
2081 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2084 if (wpa_auth_uses_sae(sm
) && sm
->pmksa
) {
2085 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "SAE: PMK from PMKSA cache");
2086 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
);
2087 sm
->pmk_len
= sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
;
2088 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2089 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk
, sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
);
2090 sm
->xxkey_len
= sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
;
2091 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2093 #endif /* CONFIG_SAE */
2094 sm
->req_replay_counter_used
= 0;
2098 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
)
2100 u8 buf
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
], *pmkid
= NULL
;
2101 size_t pmkid_len
= 0;
2103 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
, wpa_ptk
);
2104 sm
->PTKRequest
= FALSE
;
2105 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
2106 sm
->alt_snonce_valid
= FALSE
;
2109 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
) {
2110 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2111 * immediately following this. */
2115 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2116 "sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
2118 * For infrastructure BSS cases, it is better for the AP not to include
2119 * the PMKID KDE in EAPOL-Key msg 1/4 since it could be used to initiate
2120 * offline search for the passphrase/PSK without having to be able to
2121 * capture a 4-way handshake from a STA that has access to the network.
2123 * For IBSS cases, addition of PMKID KDE could be considered even with
2124 * WPA2-PSK cases that use multiple PSKs, but only if there is a single
2125 * possible PSK for this STA. However, this should not be done unless
2126 * there is support for using that information on the supplicant side.
2127 * The concern about exposing PMKID unnecessarily in infrastructure BSS
2128 * cases would also apply here, but at least in the IBSS case, this
2129 * would cover a potential real use case.
2131 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&&
2132 (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
2133 (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
&& sm
->pmksa
) ||
2134 wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) &&
2135 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
!= WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
) {
2137 pmkid_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
2138 pmkid
[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC
;
2139 pmkid
[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ PMKID_LEN
;
2140 RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid
[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID
);
2142 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2143 "RSN: Message 1/4 PMKID from PMKSA entry",
2144 sm
->pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
2145 os_memcpy(&pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
2146 sm
->pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
2147 } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2148 /* No KCK available to derive PMKID */
2149 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2150 "RSN: No KCK available to derive PMKID for message 1/4");
2153 } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2154 if (sm
->pmkid_set
) {
2155 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2156 "RSN: Message 1/4 PMKID from FILS/ERP",
2157 sm
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
2158 os_memcpy(&pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
2159 sm
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
2161 /* No PMKID available */
2162 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2163 "RSN: No FILS/ERP PMKID available for message 1/4");
2166 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
2167 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2168 } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
2170 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2171 "FT: No PMKID in message 1/4 when using FT protocol");
2174 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2176 } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2177 if (sm
->pmkid_set
) {
2178 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2179 "RSN: Message 1/4 PMKID from SAE",
2180 sm
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
2181 os_memcpy(&pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
2182 sm
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
2184 /* No PMKID available */
2185 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2186 "RSN: No SAE PMKID available for message 1/4");
2189 #endif /* CONFIG_SAE */
2192 * Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was
2193 * available with pre-calculated PMKID.
2195 rsn_pmkid(sm
->PMK
, sm
->pmk_len
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2196 sm
->addr
, &pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
],
2198 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2199 "RSN: Message 1/4 PMKID derived from PMK",
2200 &pmkid
[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
], PMKID_LEN
);
2203 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
2204 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
, NULL
,
2205 sm
->ANonce
, pmkid
, pmkid_len
, 0, 0);
2209 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*snonce
,
2210 const u8
*pmk
, unsigned int pmk_len
,
2211 struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
)
2216 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2217 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2218 if (sm
->ft_completed
) {
2219 u8 ptk_name
[WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
];
2221 return wpa_pmk_r1_to_ptk(sm
->pmk_r1
, sm
->pmk_r1_len
,
2222 sm
->SNonce
, sm
->ANonce
,
2223 sm
->addr
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2229 return wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm
, ptk
);
2231 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2234 if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
&& sm
->dpp_z
) {
2235 z
= wpabuf_head(sm
->dpp_z
);
2236 z_len
= wpabuf_len(sm
->dpp_z
);
2238 #endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
2240 return wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk
, pmk_len
, "Pairwise key expansion",
2241 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, sm
->ANonce
, snonce
,
2242 ptk
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pairwise
, z
, z_len
);
2248 int fils_auth_pmk_to_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
2249 size_t pmk_len
, const u8
*snonce
, const u8
*anonce
,
2250 const u8
*dhss
, size_t dhss_len
,
2251 struct wpabuf
*g_sta
, struct wpabuf
*g_ap
)
2253 u8 ick
[FILS_ICK_MAX_LEN
];
2256 u8 fils_ft
[FILS_FT_MAX_LEN
];
2257 size_t fils_ft_len
= 0;
2259 res
= fils_pmk_to_ptk(pmk
, pmk_len
, sm
->addr
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2260 snonce
, anonce
, dhss
, dhss_len
,
2261 &sm
->PTK
, ick
, &ick_len
,
2262 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pairwise
,
2263 fils_ft
, &fils_ft_len
);
2266 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
2267 sm
->tk_already_set
= FALSE
;
2269 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2271 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2272 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
= &wpa_auth
->conf
;
2273 u8 pmk_r0
[PMK_LEN_MAX
], pmk_r0_name
[WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
];
2274 int use_sha384
= wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
2275 size_t pmk_r0_len
= use_sha384
? SHA384_MAC_LEN
: PMK_LEN
;
2277 if (wpa_derive_pmk_r0(fils_ft
, fils_ft_len
,
2278 conf
->ssid
, conf
->ssid_len
,
2279 conf
->mobility_domain
,
2280 conf
->r0_key_holder
,
2281 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
2282 sm
->addr
, pmk_r0
, pmk_r0_name
,
2286 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS+FT: PMK-R0",
2287 pmk_r0
, pmk_r0_len
);
2288 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS+FT: PMKR0Name",
2289 pmk_r0_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
2290 wpa_ft_store_pmk_fils(sm
, pmk_r0
, pmk_r0_name
);
2291 forced_memzero(fils_ft
, sizeof(fils_ft
));
2293 res
= wpa_derive_pmk_r1_name(pmk_r0_name
, conf
->r1_key_holder
,
2294 sm
->addr
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
,
2296 forced_memzero(pmk_r0
, PMK_LEN_MAX
);
2299 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS+FT: PMKR1Name", sm
->pmk_r1_name
,
2301 sm
->pmk_r1_name_valid
= 1;
2303 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2305 res
= fils_key_auth_sk(ick
, ick_len
, snonce
, anonce
,
2306 sm
->addr
, sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
,
2307 g_sta
? wpabuf_head(g_sta
) : NULL
,
2308 g_sta
? wpabuf_len(g_sta
) : 0,
2309 g_ap
? wpabuf_head(g_ap
) : NULL
,
2310 g_ap
? wpabuf_len(g_ap
) : 0,
2311 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
,
2312 sm
->fils_key_auth_ap
,
2313 &sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2314 forced_memzero(ick
, sizeof(ick
));
2316 /* Store nonces for (Re)Association Request/Response frame processing */
2317 os_memcpy(sm
->SNonce
, snonce
, FILS_NONCE_LEN
);
2318 os_memcpy(sm
->ANonce
, anonce
, FILS_NONCE_LEN
);
2324 static int wpa_aead_decrypt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, struct wpa_ptk
*ptk
,
2325 u8
*buf
, size_t buf_len
, u16
*_key_data_len
)
2327 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
2328 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
2335 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) buf
;
2336 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
2337 pos
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
2338 key_data_len
= WPA_GET_BE16(pos
);
2339 if (key_data_len
< AES_BLOCK_SIZE
||
2340 key_data_len
> buf_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) - sizeof(*key
) - 2) {
2341 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2342 "No room for AES-SIV data in the frame");
2345 pos
+= 2; /* Pointing at the Encrypted Key Data field */
2347 tmp
= os_malloc(key_data_len
);
2351 /* AES-SIV AAD from EAPOL protocol version field (inclusive) to
2352 * to Key Data (exclusive). */
2354 aad_len
[0] = pos
- buf
;
2355 if (aes_siv_decrypt(ptk
->kek
, ptk
->kek_len
, pos
, key_data_len
,
2356 1, aad
, aad_len
, tmp
) < 0) {
2357 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2358 "Invalid AES-SIV data in the frame");
2359 bin_clear_free(tmp
, key_data_len
);
2363 /* AEAD decryption and validation completed successfully */
2364 key_data_len
-= AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2365 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Decrypted Key Data",
2368 /* Replace Key Data field with the decrypted version */
2369 os_memcpy(pos
, tmp
, key_data_len
);
2370 pos
-= 2; /* Key Data Length field */
2371 WPA_PUT_BE16(pos
, key_data_len
);
2372 bin_clear_free(tmp
, key_data_len
);
2374 *_key_data_len
= key_data_len
;
2379 const u8
* wpa_fils_validate_fils_session(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
2380 const u8
*ies
, size_t ies_len
,
2381 const u8
*fils_session
)
2384 const u8
*session
= NULL
;
2386 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2387 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2388 "FILS: Not a FILS AKM - reject association");
2392 /* Verify Session element */
2394 end
= ((const u8
*) ie
) + ies_len
;
2395 while (ie
+ 1 < end
) {
2396 if (ie
+ 2 + ie
[1] > end
)
2398 if (ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
&&
2399 ie
[1] >= 1 + FILS_SESSION_LEN
&&
2400 ie
[2] == WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_SESSION
) {
2408 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2409 "FILS: %s: Could not find FILS Session element in Assoc Req - reject",
2414 if (!fils_session
) {
2415 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2416 "FILS: %s: Could not find FILS Session element in STA entry - reject",
2421 if (os_memcmp(fils_session
, session
+ 3, FILS_SESSION_LEN
) != 0) {
2422 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Session mismatch");
2423 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Expected FILS Session",
2424 fils_session
, FILS_SESSION_LEN
);
2425 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Received FILS Session",
2426 session
+ 3, FILS_SESSION_LEN
);
2433 int wpa_fils_validate_key_confirm(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*ies
,
2436 struct ieee802_11_elems elems
;
2438 if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(ies
, ies_len
, &elems
, 1) == ParseFailed
) {
2439 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2440 "FILS: Failed to parse decrypted elements");
2444 if (!elems
.fils_session
) {
2445 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: No FILS Session element");
2449 if (!elems
.fils_key_confirm
) {
2450 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: No FILS Key Confirm element");
2454 if (elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
!= sm
->fils_key_auth_len
) {
2455 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2456 "FILS: Unexpected Key-Auth length %d (expected %d)",
2457 elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
,
2458 (int) sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2462 if (os_memcmp(elems
.fils_key_confirm
, sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
,
2463 sm
->fils_key_auth_len
) != 0) {
2464 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Key-Auth mismatch");
2465 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Received Key-Auth",
2466 elems
.fils_key_confirm
, elems
.fils_key_confirm_len
);
2467 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Expected Key-Auth",
2468 sm
->fils_key_auth_sta
, sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2476 int fils_decrypt_assoc(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*fils_session
,
2477 const struct ieee80211_mgmt
*mgmt
, size_t frame_len
,
2478 u8
*pos
, size_t left
)
2481 const u8
*end
, *ie_start
, *ie
, *session
, *crypt
;
2485 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
2486 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2487 "FILS: No KEK to decrypt Assocication Request frame");
2491 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2492 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2493 "FILS: Not a FILS AKM - reject association");
2497 end
= ((const u8
*) mgmt
) + frame_len
;
2498 fc
= le_to_host16(mgmt
->frame_control
);
2499 stype
= WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(fc
);
2500 if (stype
== WLAN_FC_STYPE_REASSOC_REQ
)
2501 ie_start
= mgmt
->u
.reassoc_req
.variable
;
2503 ie_start
= mgmt
->u
.assoc_req
.variable
;
2507 * Find FILS Session element which is the last unencrypted element in
2510 session
= wpa_fils_validate_fils_session(sm
, ie
, end
- ie
,
2513 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Session validation failed");
2517 crypt
= session
+ 2 + session
[1];
2519 if (end
- crypt
< AES_BLOCK_SIZE
) {
2520 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2521 "FILS: Too short frame to include AES-SIV data");
2525 /* AES-SIV AAD vectors */
2527 /* The STA's MAC address */
2529 aad_len
[0] = ETH_ALEN
;
2530 /* The AP's BSSID */
2532 aad_len
[1] = ETH_ALEN
;
2533 /* The STA's nonce */
2534 aad
[2] = sm
->SNonce
;
2535 aad_len
[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2536 /* The AP's nonce */
2537 aad
[3] = sm
->ANonce
;
2538 aad_len
[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2540 * The (Re)Association Request frame from the Capability Information
2541 * field to the FILS Session element (both inclusive).
2543 aad
[4] = (const u8
*) &mgmt
->u
.assoc_req
.capab_info
;
2544 aad_len
[4] = crypt
- aad
[4];
2546 if (aes_siv_decrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
, crypt
, end
- crypt
,
2547 5, aad
, aad_len
, pos
+ (crypt
- ie_start
)) < 0) {
2548 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2549 "FILS: Invalid AES-SIV data in the frame");
2552 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Decrypted Association Request elements",
2553 pos
, left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
);
2555 if (wpa_fils_validate_key_confirm(sm
, pos
, left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
) < 0) {
2556 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Key Confirm validation failed");
2560 return left
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2564 int fils_encrypt_assoc(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*buf
,
2565 size_t current_len
, size_t max_len
,
2566 const struct wpabuf
*hlp
)
2568 u8
*end
= buf
+ max_len
;
2569 u8
*pos
= buf
+ current_len
;
2570 struct ieee80211_mgmt
*mgmt
;
2571 struct wpabuf
*plain
;
2575 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
)
2578 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2579 "FILS: Association Response frame before FILS processing",
2582 mgmt
= (struct ieee80211_mgmt
*) buf
;
2584 /* AES-SIV AAD vectors */
2586 /* The AP's BSSID */
2588 aad_len
[0] = ETH_ALEN
;
2589 /* The STA's MAC address */
2591 aad_len
[1] = ETH_ALEN
;
2592 /* The AP's nonce */
2593 aad
[2] = sm
->ANonce
;
2594 aad_len
[2] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2595 /* The STA's nonce */
2596 aad
[3] = sm
->SNonce
;
2597 aad_len
[3] = FILS_NONCE_LEN
;
2599 * The (Re)Association Response frame from the Capability Information
2600 * field (the same offset in both Association and Reassociation
2601 * Response frames) to the FILS Session element (both inclusive).
2603 aad
[4] = (const u8
*) &mgmt
->u
.assoc_resp
.capab_info
;
2604 aad_len
[4] = pos
- aad
[4];
2606 /* The following elements will be encrypted with AES-SIV */
2607 plain
= fils_prepare_plainbuf(sm
, hlp
);
2609 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Plain buffer prep failed");
2613 if (pos
+ wpabuf_len(plain
) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE
> end
) {
2614 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2615 "FILS: Not enough room for FILS elements");
2616 wpabuf_clear_free(plain
);
2620 wpa_hexdump_buf_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Association Response plaintext",
2623 if (aes_siv_encrypt(sm
->PTK
.kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek_len
,
2624 wpabuf_head(plain
), wpabuf_len(plain
),
2625 5, aad
, aad_len
, pos
) < 0) {
2626 wpabuf_clear_free(plain
);
2630 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
,
2631 "FILS: Encrypted Association Response elements",
2632 pos
, AES_BLOCK_SIZE
+ wpabuf_len(plain
));
2633 current_len
+= wpabuf_len(plain
) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE
;
2634 wpabuf_clear_free(plain
);
2636 sm
->fils_completed
= 1;
2642 static struct wpabuf
* fils_prepare_plainbuf(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
2643 const struct wpabuf
*hlp
)
2645 struct wpabuf
*plain
;
2646 u8
*len
, *tmp
, *tmp2
;
2648 u8
*gtk
, dummy_gtk
[32];
2650 struct wpa_group
*gsm
;
2652 plain
= wpabuf_alloc(1000);
2656 /* TODO: FILS Public Key */
2658 /* FILS Key Confirmation */
2659 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
); /* Element ID */
2660 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, 1 + sm
->fils_key_auth_len
); /* Length */
2661 /* Element ID Extension */
2662 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_KEY_CONFIRM
);
2663 wpabuf_put_data(plain
, sm
->fils_key_auth_ap
, sm
->fils_key_auth_len
);
2665 /* FILS HLP Container */
2667 wpabuf_put_buf(plain
, hlp
);
2669 /* TODO: FILS IP Address Assignment */
2673 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
); /* Element ID */
2674 len
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 1);
2675 wpabuf_put_u8(plain
, WLAN_EID_EXT_KEY_DELIVERY
);
2676 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
,
2677 wpabuf_put(plain
, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
));
2679 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
2680 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
2681 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
||
2682 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
) {
2684 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2685 * of GTK in the BSS.
2687 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gtk_len
) < 0) {
2688 wpabuf_clear_free(plain
);
2693 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
2695 tmp
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 0);
2696 tmp2
= wpa_add_kde(tmp
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
2698 wpabuf_put(plain
, tmp2
- tmp
);
2701 tmp
= wpabuf_put(plain
, 0);
2702 tmp2
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, tmp
);
2703 wpabuf_put(plain
, tmp2
- tmp
);
2705 *len
= (u8
*) wpabuf_put(plain
, 0) - len
- 1;
2708 if (wpa_auth_uses_ocv(sm
)) {
2709 struct wpa_channel_info ci
;
2712 if (wpa_channel_info(sm
->wpa_auth
, &ci
) != 0) {
2713 wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING
,
2714 "FILS: Failed to get channel info for OCI element");
2715 wpabuf_clear_free(plain
);
2719 pos
= wpabuf_put(plain
, OCV_OCI_EXTENDED_LEN
);
2720 if (ocv_insert_extended_oci(&ci
, pos
) < 0) {
2721 wpabuf_clear_free(plain
);
2725 #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
2731 int fils_set_tk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
2736 if (!sm
|| !sm
->PTK_valid
) {
2737 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: No valid PTK available to set TK");
2740 if (sm
->tk_already_set
) {
2741 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: TK already set to the driver");
2745 alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm
->pairwise
);
2746 klen
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->pairwise
);
2748 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Configure TK to the driver");
2749 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, alg
, sm
->addr
, 0,
2750 sm
->PTK
.tk
, klen
)) {
2751 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Failed to set TK to the driver");
2754 sm
->tk_already_set
= TRUE
;
2760 u8
* hostapd_eid_assoc_fils_session(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*buf
,
2761 const u8
*fils_session
, struct wpabuf
*hlp
)
2763 struct wpabuf
*plain
;
2767 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_EXTENSION
; /* Element ID */
2768 *pos
++ = 1 + FILS_SESSION_LEN
; /* Length */
2769 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_EXT_FILS_SESSION
; /* Element ID Extension */
2770 os_memcpy(pos
, fils_session
, FILS_SESSION_LEN
);
2771 pos
+= FILS_SESSION_LEN
;
2773 plain
= fils_prepare_plainbuf(sm
, hlp
);
2775 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "FILS: Plain buffer prep failed");
2779 os_memcpy(pos
, wpabuf_head(plain
), wpabuf_len(plain
));
2780 pos
+= wpabuf_len(plain
);
2782 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "%s: plain buf_len: %u", __func__
,
2783 (unsigned int) wpabuf_len(plain
));
2784 wpabuf_clear_free(plain
);
2785 sm
->fils_completed
= 1;
2789 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
2793 int get_sta_tx_parameters(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int ap_max_chanwidth
,
2794 int ap_seg1_idx
, int *bandwidth
, int *seg1_idx
)
2796 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2798 if (!wpa_auth
->cb
->get_sta_tx_params
)
2800 return wpa_auth
->cb
->get_sta_tx_params(wpa_auth
->cb_ctx
, sm
->addr
,
2801 ap_max_chanwidth
, ap_seg1_idx
,
2802 bandwidth
, seg1_idx
);
2804 #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
2807 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
)
2809 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
2811 int ok
= 0, psk_found
= 0;
2812 const u8
*pmk
= NULL
;
2815 const u8
*eapol_key_ie
, *key_data
, *mic
;
2816 u16 key_data_length
;
2817 size_t mic_len
, eapol_key_ie_len
;
2818 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
2819 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
2820 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
2823 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
2824 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
2825 sm
->update_snonce
= FALSE
;
2826 os_memset(&PTK
, 0, sizeof(PTK
));
2828 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
);
2830 /* WPA with IEEE 802.1X: use the derived PMK from EAP
2831 * WPA-PSK: iterate through possible PSKs and select the one matching
2834 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
2835 !wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2836 pmk
= wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2837 sm
->p2p_dev_addr
, pmk
, &pmk_len
,
2842 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2843 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2844 os_memcpy(sm
->xxkey
, pmk
, pmk_len
);
2845 sm
->xxkey_len
= pmk_len
;
2847 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2850 pmk_len
= sm
->pmk_len
;
2853 if ((!pmk
|| !pmk_len
) && sm
->pmksa
) {
2854 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Use PMK from PMKSA cache");
2855 pmk
= sm
->pmksa
->pmk
;
2856 pmk_len
= sm
->pmksa
->pmk_len
;
2859 if (wpa_derive_ptk(sm
, sm
->SNonce
, pmk
, pmk_len
, &PTK
) < 0)
2863 wpa_verify_key_mic(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, pmk_len
, &PTK
,
2864 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
,
2865 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
) == 0) {
2866 if (sm
->PMK
!= pmk
) {
2867 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, pmk
, pmk_len
);
2868 sm
->pmk_len
= pmk_len
;
2876 wpa_aead_decrypt(sm
, &PTK
, sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
,
2877 sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
, NULL
) == 0) {
2881 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
2883 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
2884 wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
2889 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
2890 "invalid MIC in msg 2/4 of 4-Way Handshake");
2892 wpa_auth_psk_failure_report(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
2897 * Note: last_rx_eapol_key length fields have already been validated in
2900 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
;
2901 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
2902 mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
2903 key_data
= mic
+ mic_len
+ 2;
2904 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(mic
+ mic_len
);
2905 if (key_data_length
> sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
2906 sizeof(*key
) - mic_len
- 2)
2909 if (wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
, &kde
) < 0) {
2910 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2911 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 with invalid Key Data contents");
2915 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.rsn_ie
;
2916 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.rsn_ie_len
;
2917 } else if (kde
.osen
) {
2918 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.osen
;
2919 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.osen_len
;
2921 eapol_key_ie
= kde
.wpa_ie
;
2922 eapol_key_ie_len
= kde
.wpa_ie_len
;
2924 ft
= sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
2925 if (sm
->wpa_ie
== NULL
||
2926 wpa_compare_rsn_ie(ft
, sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
,
2927 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
)) {
2928 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2929 "WPA IE from (Re)AssocReq did not match with msg 2/4");
2931 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in AssocReq",
2932 sm
->wpa_ie
, sm
->wpa_ie_len
);
2934 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA IE in msg 2/4",
2935 eapol_key_ie
, eapol_key_ie_len
);
2936 /* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
2937 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2938 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
2942 if (wpa_auth_uses_ocv(sm
)) {
2943 struct wpa_channel_info ci
;
2947 if (wpa_channel_info(wpa_auth
, &ci
) != 0) {
2948 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2949 "Failed to get channel info to validate received OCI in EAPOL-Key 2/4");
2953 if (get_sta_tx_parameters(sm
,
2954 channel_width_to_int(ci
.chanwidth
),
2955 ci
.seg1_idx
, &tx_chanwidth
,
2959 if (ocv_verify_tx_params(kde
.oci
, kde
.oci_len
, &ci
,
2960 tx_chanwidth
, tx_seg1_idx
) != 0) {
2961 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
2966 #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
2967 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2968 if (ft
&& ft_check_msg_2_of_4(wpa_auth
, sm
, &kde
) < 0) {
2969 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
2970 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
2973 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
2975 if (kde
.ip_addr_req
&& kde
.ip_addr_req
[0] &&
2976 wpa_auth
->ip_pool
&& WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0) {
2978 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2979 "P2P: IP address requested in EAPOL-Key exchange");
2980 idx
= bitfield_get_first_zero(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
);
2982 u32 start
= WPA_GET_BE32(wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_start
);
2983 bitfield_set(wpa_auth
->ip_pool
, idx
);
2984 WPA_PUT_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
, start
+ idx
);
2985 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
2986 "P2P: Assigned IP address %u.%u.%u.%u to "
2987 MACSTR
, sm
->ip_addr
[0], sm
->ip_addr
[1],
2988 sm
->ip_addr
[2], sm
->ip_addr
[3],
2992 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2994 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
2995 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
2997 * Verify that PMKR1Name from EAPOL-Key message 2/4 matches
2998 * with the value we derived.
3000 if (os_memcmp_const(sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
,
3001 WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
) != 0) {
3002 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3003 "PMKR1Name mismatch in FT 4-way "
3005 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: PMKR1Name from "
3007 sm
->sup_pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
3008 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG
, "FT: Derived PMKR1Name",
3009 sm
->pmk_r1_name
, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN
);
3013 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
3015 if (vlan_id
&& wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
3016 wpa_auth_update_vlan(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, vlan_id
) < 0) {
3017 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
3018 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
3022 sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
= 0;
3023 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
);
3025 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
3026 /* PSK may have changed from the previous choice, so update
3027 * state machine data based on whatever PSK was selected here.
3029 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
3030 sm
->pmk_len
= PMK_LEN
;
3033 sm
->MICVerified
= TRUE
;
3035 os_memcpy(&sm
->PTK
, &PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
3036 forced_memzero(&PTK
, sizeof(PTK
));
3037 sm
->PTK_valid
= TRUE
;
3041 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
)
3043 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
, wpa_ptk
);
3048 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3050 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3052 if (sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
) {
3054 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3055 return 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
+ len
;
3062 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
3064 struct wpa_igtk_kde igtk
;
3065 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3066 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
3067 size_t len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3069 if (!sm
->mgmt_frame_prot
)
3072 igtk
.keyid
[0] = gsm
->GN_igtk
;
3074 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
!= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
||
3075 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, rsc
) < 0)
3076 os_memset(igtk
.pn
, 0, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
3078 os_memcpy(igtk
.pn
, rsc
, sizeof(igtk
.pn
));
3079 os_memcpy(igtk
.igtk
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3080 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
||
3081 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
) {
3083 * Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of
3086 if (random_get_bytes(igtk
.igtk
, len
) < 0)
3089 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK
,
3090 (const u8
*) &igtk
, WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
+ len
,
3096 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3098 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3104 static u8
* ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
3109 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3112 static int ocv_oci_len(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3115 if (wpa_auth_uses_ocv(sm
))
3116 return OCV_OCI_KDE_LEN
;
3117 #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
3121 static int ocv_oci_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
**argpos
)
3124 struct wpa_channel_info ci
;
3126 if (!wpa_auth_uses_ocv(sm
))
3129 if (wpa_channel_info(sm
->wpa_auth
, &ci
) != 0) {
3130 wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING
,
3131 "Failed to get channel info for OCI element");
3135 return ocv_insert_oci_kde(&ci
, argpos
);
3136 #else /* CONFIG_OCV */
3138 #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
3142 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
)
3144 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
], *_rsc
, *gtk
, *kde
, *pos
, dummy_gtk
[32];
3145 size_t gtk_len
, kde_len
;
3146 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3148 int wpa_ie_len
, secure
, keyidx
, encr
= 0;
3150 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk
);
3151 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
3154 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries
&&
3155 sm
->TimeoutCtr
> 1) {
3156 /* Do not allow retransmission of EAPOL-Key msg 3/4 */
3159 if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
> sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
) {
3160 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
3161 * immediately following this. */
3165 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
3166 GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
3168 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
3169 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
3170 /* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
3171 wpa_ie
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
3172 wpa_ie_len
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
3173 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&&
3174 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
) &&
3175 wpa_ie_len
> wpa_ie
[1] + 2 && wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN
) {
3176 /* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE and possible MDIE */
3177 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
3178 if (wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN
)
3179 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
3180 wpa_ie_len
= wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
3182 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3183 "sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
3184 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
3185 /* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
3187 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
3188 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
3189 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
||
3190 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
) {
3192 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
3193 * of GTK in the BSS.
3195 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gtk_len
) < 0)
3203 /* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
3209 if (sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
) {
3211 * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
3212 * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
3213 * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
3214 * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
3215 * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
3216 * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
3218 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3219 "STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - "
3220 "set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
3225 kde_len
= wpa_ie_len
+ ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
) + ocv_oci_len(sm
);
3227 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gtk_len
;
3228 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
3229 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
3230 kde_len
+= 2 + PMKID_LEN
; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
3231 kde_len
+= 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
3233 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
3235 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0)
3236 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 3 * 4;
3237 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
3238 kde
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
3243 os_memcpy(pos
, wpa_ie
, wpa_ie_len
);
3245 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
3246 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
3251 res
= wpa_insert_pmkid(kde
, &elen
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
);
3253 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert "
3254 "PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
3261 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
3264 hdr
[0] = keyidx
& 0x03;
3266 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
3269 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
3270 if (ocv_oci_add(sm
, &pos
) < 0) {
3275 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
3276 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
3278 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
;
3280 conf
= &sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
;
3281 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
3282 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
>= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) {
3283 os_memcpy(pos
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
3284 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
3285 res
= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1];
3287 int use_sha384
= wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
3289 res
= wpa_write_ftie(conf
, use_sha384
,
3290 conf
->r0_key_holder
,
3291 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
3293 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
,
3297 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE "
3298 "into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
3304 /* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
3305 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
3307 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE
;
3308 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->reassociation_deadline
);
3311 /* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
3312 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
3314 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME
;
3315 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->r0_key_lifetime
);
3318 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
3320 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) > 0) {
3322 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
3323 os_memcpy(addr
+ 4, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_mask
, 4);
3324 os_memcpy(addr
+ 8, sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.ip_addr_go
, 4);
3325 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, WFA_KEY_DATA_IP_ADDR_ALLOC
,
3326 addr
, sizeof(addr
), NULL
, 0);
3328 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
3330 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
3331 (secure
? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
: 0) |
3332 (wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
) ?
3333 WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
: 0) |
3334 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
|
3335 WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
,
3336 _rsc
, sm
->ANonce
, kde
, pos
- kde
, keyidx
, encr
);
3341 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
)
3343 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
, wpa_ptk
);
3344 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
3346 enum wpa_alg alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm
->pairwise
);
3347 int klen
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->pairwise
);
3348 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm
->wpa_auth
, 0, alg
, sm
->addr
, 0,
3349 sm
->PTK
.tk
, klen
)) {
3350 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
3351 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID
);
3354 /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
3355 sm
->pairwise_set
= TRUE
;
3357 wpa_auth_set_ptk_rekey_timer(sm
);
3359 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
3360 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
||
3361 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
) {
3362 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
3363 WPA_EAPOL_authorized
, 1);
3367 if (0 /* IBSS == TRUE */) {
3369 if (sm
->keycount
== 2) {
3370 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
3371 WPA_EAPOL_portValid
, 1);
3374 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_portValid
,
3377 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
, 0);
3378 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, WPA_EAPOL_keyDone
, 1);
3379 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
3380 sm
->PInitAKeys
= TRUE
;
3383 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3384 "pairwise key handshake completed (%s)",
3385 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
3387 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
3388 wpa_ft_push_pmk_r1(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
);
3389 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
3395 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
3398 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
3399 else if (sm
->Disconnect
3400 /* || FIX: dot11RSNAConfigSALifetime timeout */) {
3401 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3402 "WPA_PTK: sm->Disconnect");
3403 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3405 else if (sm
->DeauthenticationRequest
)
3406 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
3407 else if (sm
->AuthenticationRequest
)
3408 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION
);
3409 else if (sm
->ReAuthenticationRequest
)
3410 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
3411 else if (sm
->PTKRequest
) {
3412 if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm
) < 0)
3413 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
3415 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3416 } else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
) {
3417 case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE
:
3419 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT
:
3420 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECTED
);
3422 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECTED
:
3423 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITIALIZE
);
3425 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION
:
3426 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, AUTHENTICATION2
);
3428 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION2
:
3429 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
3430 wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
3431 WPA_EAPOL_keyRun
) > 0)
3432 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
);
3433 else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) ||
3434 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE
3435 /* FIX: && 802.1X::keyRun */)
3436 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPSK
);
3437 else if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
)
3438 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, INITPMK
);
3440 case WPA_PTK_INITPMK
:
3441 if (wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
,
3442 WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable
) > 0) {
3443 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3445 } else if (sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP
&& sm
->pmksa
) {
3446 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3447 #endif /* CONFIG_DPP */
3449 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
3450 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3451 "INITPMK - keyAvailable = false");
3452 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3455 case WPA_PTK_INITPSK
:
3456 if (wpa_auth_get_psk(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, sm
->p2p_dev_addr
,
3457 NULL
, NULL
, NULL
)) {
3458 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3460 } else if (wpa_auth_uses_sae(sm
) && sm
->pmksa
) {
3461 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3462 #endif /* CONFIG_SAE */
3464 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3465 "no PSK configured for the STA");
3466 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
3467 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3470 case WPA_PTK_PTKSTART
:
3471 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3472 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
3473 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
3474 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
3475 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
) {
3476 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
3478 sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3479 "PTKSTART: Retry limit %u reached",
3480 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
);
3481 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3482 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3483 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3485 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
:
3486 if (sm
->MICVerified
)
3487 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
);
3488 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3489 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
)
3490 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
3491 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3492 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKSTART
);
3494 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2
:
3495 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
3497 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING
:
3498 if (sm
->update_snonce
)
3499 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING
);
3500 else if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3501 sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
3502 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITDONE
);
3503 else if (sm
->TimeoutCtr
>
3504 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
||
3505 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries
&&
3506 sm
->TimeoutCtr
> 1)) {
3507 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
++;
3509 sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3510 "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %u reached",
3511 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
);
3512 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, DISCONNECT
);
3513 } else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3514 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK
, PTKINITNEGOTIATING
);
3516 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
:
3522 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
)
3524 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3526 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
3527 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
3528 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
3530 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
3534 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
)
3536 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
3537 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3539 u8
*kde_buf
= NULL
, *pos
, hdr
[2];
3541 u8
*gtk
, dummy_gtk
[32];
3543 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3546 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries
&&
3547 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
> 1) {
3548 /* Do not allow retransmission of EAPOL-Key group msg 1/2 */
3551 if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
> sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
) {
3552 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
3553 * immediately following this. */
3557 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
)
3558 sm
->PInitAKeys
= FALSE
;
3559 sm
->TimeoutEvt
= FALSE
;
3560 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
3561 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
3562 if (gsm
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
)
3563 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, rsc
);
3564 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3565 "sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake");
3567 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
3568 if (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_gtk
||
3569 sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN
) {
3571 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
3572 * of GTK in the BSS.
3574 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk
, gsm
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3578 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
3579 kde_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gsm
->GTK_len
+
3580 ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
) + ocv_oci_len(sm
);
3581 kde_buf
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
3582 if (kde_buf
== NULL
)
3585 kde
= pos
= kde_buf
;
3586 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
3588 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
3590 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
3591 if (ocv_oci_add(sm
, &pos
) < 0) {
3595 kde_len
= pos
- kde
;
3598 kde_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
3601 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
3602 WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
|
3603 (wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
) ?
3604 WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
: 0) |
3606 (!sm
->Pair
? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
: 0),
3607 rsc
, NULL
, kde
, kde_len
, gsm
->GN
, 1);
3613 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
)
3616 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
= sm
->wpa_auth
;
3617 const u8
*key_data
, *mic
;
3618 struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*hdr
;
3619 struct wpa_eapol_key
*key
;
3620 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde
;
3622 u16 key_data_length
;
3623 #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
3625 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3626 sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
= FALSE
;
3629 mic_len
= wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
);
3632 * Note: last_rx_eapol_key length fields have already been validated in
3635 hdr
= (struct ieee802_1x_hdr
*) sm
->last_rx_eapol_key
;
3636 key
= (struct wpa_eapol_key
*) (hdr
+ 1);
3637 mic
= (u8
*) (key
+ 1);
3638 key_data
= mic
+ mic_len
+ 2;
3639 key_data_length
= WPA_GET_BE16(mic
+ mic_len
);
3640 if (key_data_length
> sm
->last_rx_eapol_key_len
- sizeof(*hdr
) -
3641 sizeof(*key
) - mic_len
- 2)
3644 if (wpa_parse_kde_ies(key_data
, key_data_length
, &kde
) < 0) {
3645 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3646 "received EAPOL-Key group msg 2/2 with invalid Key Data contents");
3650 if (wpa_auth_uses_ocv(sm
)) {
3651 struct wpa_channel_info ci
;
3655 if (wpa_channel_info(wpa_auth
, &ci
) != 0) {
3656 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3657 "Failed to get channel info to validate received OCI in EAPOL-Key group 1/2");
3661 if (get_sta_tx_parameters(sm
,
3662 channel_width_to_int(ci
.chanwidth
),
3663 ci
.seg1_idx
, &tx_chanwidth
,
3667 if (ocv_verify_tx_params(kde
.oci
, kde
.oci_len
, &ci
,
3668 tx_chanwidth
, tx_seg1_idx
) != 0) {
3669 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3674 #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */
3676 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
3677 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
3678 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3679 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
= 0;
3680 /* FIX: MLME.SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
3681 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3682 "group key handshake completed (%s)",
3683 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN");
3688 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
)
3690 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
, wpa_ptk_group
);
3691 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
)
3692 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
--;
3693 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3694 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
3695 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_INFO
,
3696 "group key handshake failed (%s) after %u tries",
3697 sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
? "WPA" : "RSN",
3698 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
);
3702 SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP
)
3704 if (sm
->Init
|| sm
->PtkGroupInit
) {
3705 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3706 sm
->PtkGroupInit
= FALSE
;
3707 } else switch (sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
) {
3708 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_IDLE
:
3709 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
||
3710 (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&& sm
->PInitAKeys
))
3711 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
3713 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
:
3714 if (sm
->EAPOLKeyReceived
&& !sm
->EAPOLKeyRequest
&&
3715 !sm
->EAPOLKeyPairwise
&& sm
->MICVerified
)
3716 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYESTABLISHED
);
3717 else if (sm
->GTimeoutCtr
>
3718 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
||
3719 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_disable_eapol_key_retries
&&
3720 sm
->GTimeoutCtr
> 1))
3721 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, KEYERROR
);
3722 else if (sm
->TimeoutEvt
)
3723 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, REKEYNEGOTIATING
);
3725 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_KEYERROR
:
3726 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3728 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYESTABLISHED
:
3729 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP
, IDLE
);
3735 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3736 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3740 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3741 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3742 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "Group key expansion",
3743 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
3744 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3746 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "GTK",
3747 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
);
3749 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3750 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
3752 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3753 os_memcpy(group
->GNonce
, group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3754 inc_byte_array(group
->Counter
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
3755 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group
->GMK
, "IGTK key expansion",
3756 wpa_auth
->addr
, group
->GNonce
,
3757 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
) < 0)
3759 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "IGTK",
3760 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3762 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3768 static void wpa_group_gtk_init(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3769 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3771 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3772 "GTK_INIT (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3773 group
->changed
= FALSE
; /* GInit is not cleared here; avoid loop */
3774 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
;
3777 os_memset(group
->GTK
, 0, sizeof(group
->GTK
));
3780 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3783 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3784 /* GTK[GN] = CalcGTK() */
3785 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3789 static int wpa_group_update_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
3791 if (ctx
!= NULL
&& ctx
!= sm
->group
)
3794 if (sm
->wpa_ptk_state
!= WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE
) {
3795 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3796 "Not in PTKINITDONE; skip Group Key update");
3797 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= FALSE
;
3800 if (sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
) {
3802 * This should not really happen, so add a debug log entry.
3803 * Since we clear the GKeyDoneStations before the loop, the
3804 * station needs to be counted here anyway.
3806 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
3807 "GUpdateStationKeys was already set when "
3808 "marking station for GTK rekeying");
3811 /* Do not rekey GTK/IGTK when STA is in WNM-Sleep Mode */
3812 if (sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
3815 sm
->group
->GKeyDoneStations
++;
3816 sm
->GUpdateStationKeys
= TRUE
;
3823 #ifdef CONFIG_WNM_AP
3824 /* update GTK when exiting WNM-Sleep Mode */
3825 void wpa_wnmsleep_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
3827 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->is_wnmsleep
)
3830 wpa_group_update_sta(sm
, NULL
);
3834 void wpa_set_wnmsleep(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int flag
)
3837 sm
->is_wnmsleep
= !!flag
;
3841 int wpa_wnmsleep_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
3843 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3848 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] |
3851 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_GTK
;
3852 *pos
++ = 11 + gsm
->GTK_len
;
3853 /* Key ID in B0-B1 of Key Info */
3854 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN
& 0x03);
3856 *pos
++ = gsm
->GTK_len
;
3857 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN
, pos
) != 0)
3860 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
3861 pos
+= gsm
->GTK_len
;
3863 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3865 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: GTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3866 gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1], gsm
->GTK_len
);
3872 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3873 int wpa_wnmsleep_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*pos
)
3875 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
3877 size_t len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3881 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] | Key[16]
3883 *pos
++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK
;
3884 *pos
++ = 2 + 6 + len
;
3885 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos
, gsm
->GN_igtk
);
3887 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm
->wpa_auth
, NULL
, gsm
->GN_igtk
, pos
) != 0)
3891 os_memcpy(pos
, gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3894 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3896 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "WNM: IGTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
3897 gsm
->IGTK
[gsm
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
);
3901 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3902 #endif /* CONFIG_WNM_AP */
3905 static void wpa_group_setkeys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3906 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3910 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3911 "SETKEYS (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3912 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
3913 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
;
3914 group
->GTKReKey
= FALSE
;
3916 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
3918 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3919 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
3920 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
3921 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
3922 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3923 /* "GKeyDoneStations = GNoStations" is done in more robust way by
3924 * counting the STAs that are marked with GUpdateStationKeys instead of
3925 * including all STAs that could be in not-yet-completed state. */
3926 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
3928 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
) {
3929 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: Unexpected "
3930 "GKeyDoneStations=%d when starting new GTK rekey",
3931 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
3932 group
->GKeyDoneStations
= 0;
3934 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_update_sta
, group
);
3935 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "wpa_group_setkeys: GKeyDoneStations=%d",
3936 group
->GKeyDoneStations
);
3940 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3941 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3945 if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
,
3946 wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
),
3947 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN
,
3948 group
->GTK
[group
->GN
- 1], group
->GTK_len
) < 0)
3951 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
3952 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.ieee80211w
!= NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION
) {
3956 alg
= wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3957 len
= wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.group_mgmt_cipher
);
3960 wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth
, group
->vlan_id
, alg
,
3961 broadcast_ether_addr
, group
->GN_igtk
,
3962 group
->IGTK
[group
->GN_igtk
- 4], len
) < 0)
3965 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
3971 static int wpa_group_disconnect_cb(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, void *ctx
)
3973 if (sm
->group
== ctx
) {
3974 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Mark STA " MACSTR
3975 " for discconnection due to fatal failure",
3977 sm
->Disconnect
= TRUE
;
3984 static void wpa_group_fatal_failure(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3985 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3987 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state FATAL_FAILURE");
3988 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
3989 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
;
3990 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth
, wpa_group_disconnect_cb
, group
);
3994 static int wpa_group_setkeysdone(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
3995 struct wpa_group
*group
)
3997 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
3998 "SETKEYSDONE (VLAN-ID %d)", group
->vlan_id
);
3999 group
->changed
= TRUE
;
4000 group
->wpa_group_state
= WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
;
4002 if (wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
) < 0) {
4003 wpa_group_fatal_failure(wpa_auth
, group
);
4011 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4012 struct wpa_group
*group
)
4015 wpa_group_gtk_init(wpa_auth
, group
);
4016 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
) {
4017 /* Do not allow group operations */
4018 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT
&&
4019 group
->GTKAuthenticator
) {
4020 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
4021 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE
&&
4023 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
4024 } else if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS
) {
4025 if (group
->GKeyDoneStations
== 0)
4026 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth
, group
);
4027 else if (group
->GTKReKey
)
4028 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth
, group
);
4033 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4038 if (sm
->in_step_loop
) {
4039 /* This should not happen, but if it does, make sure we do not
4040 * end up freeing the state machine too early by exiting the
4041 * recursive call. */
4042 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "WPA: wpa_sm_step() called recursively");
4046 sm
->in_step_loop
= 1;
4048 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
4051 sm
->changed
= FALSE
;
4052 sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
= FALSE
;
4054 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK
);
4055 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
4057 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK_GROUP
);
4058 if (sm
->pending_deinit
)
4060 wpa_group_sm_step(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
4061 } while (sm
->changed
|| sm
->wpa_auth
->group
->changed
);
4062 sm
->in_step_loop
= 0;
4064 if (sm
->pending_deinit
) {
4065 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Completing pending STA state "
4066 "machine deinit for " MACSTR
, MAC2STR(sm
->addr
));
4067 wpa_free_sta_sm(sm
);
4074 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx
, void *timeout_ctx
)
4076 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
= eloop_ctx
;
4081 void wpa_auth_sm_notify(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4085 eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_sm_call_step
, sm
, NULL
);
4089 void wpa_gtk_rekey(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
4092 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4094 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4097 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
4099 for (i
= 0; i
< 2; i
++) {
4101 group
->GM
= group
->GN
;
4103 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
4104 tmp
= group
->GM_igtk
;
4105 group
->GM_igtk
= group
->GN_igtk
;
4106 group
->GN_igtk
= tmp
;
4107 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
4108 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth
, group
);
4109 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
4114 static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int val
)
4116 return val
? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
4120 #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
4121 #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
4122 ((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff
4124 int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
4127 char pmkid_txt
[PMKID_LEN
* 2 + 1];
4128 #ifdef CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH
4129 const int preauth
= 1;
4130 #else /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
4131 const int preauth
= 0;
4132 #endif /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
4134 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4137 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
4138 "dot11RSNAOptionImplemented=TRUE\n"
4139 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationImplemented=%s\n"
4140 "dot11RSNAEnabled=%s\n"
4141 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationEnabled=%s\n",
4142 wpa_bool_txt(preauth
),
4143 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
),
4144 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth
->conf
.rsn_preauth
));
4145 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
4149 wpa_snprintf_hex(pmkid_txt
, sizeof(pmkid_txt
),
4150 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, PMKID_LEN
);
4153 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
4154 "dot11RSNAConfigVersion=%u\n"
4155 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseKeysSupported=9999\n"
4156 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipher */
4157 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyMethod */
4158 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime */
4159 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyPackets */
4160 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict=%u\n"
4161 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount=%u\n"
4162 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount=%u\n"
4163 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipherSize=%u\n"
4164 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=%u\n"
4165 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=%u\n"
4166 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfPTKSAReplayCounters=0\n"
4167 "dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=%u\n"
4168 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
4169 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
4170 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
4171 "dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed=%s\n"
4172 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
4173 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
4174 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
4175 "dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked=%u\n"
4176 "dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures=%u\n"
4177 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n",
4179 !!wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_strict_rekey
,
4180 wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group_update_count
,
4181 wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_pairwise_update_count
,
4182 wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa_group
) * 8,
4183 dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime
,
4184 dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold
,
4185 dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout
,
4186 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected
),
4187 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected
),
4188 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected
),
4190 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested
),
4191 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested
),
4192 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested
),
4193 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
,
4194 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures
);
4195 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
4199 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseCiphersTable */
4200 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable */
4203 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
, "hostapdWPAGroupState=%d\n",
4204 wpa_auth
->group
->wpa_group_state
);
4205 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
4213 int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, char *buf
, size_t buflen
)
4221 /* TODO: FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF entry for broadcast/multicast stats */
4223 /* dot11RSNAStatsEntry */
4225 pairwise
= wpa_cipher_to_suite(sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
?
4226 WPA_PROTO_RSN
: WPA_PROTO_WPA
,
4232 buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
4233 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsIndex */
4234 "dot11RSNAStatsSTAAddress=" MACSTR
"\n"
4235 "dot11RSNAStatsVersion=1\n"
4236 "dot11RSNAStatsSelectedPairwiseCipher=" RSN_SUITE
"\n"
4237 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPICVErrors */
4238 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures=%u\n"
4239 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures=%u\n"
4240 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
4241 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors */
4242 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPReplays */,
4244 RSN_SUITE_ARG(pairwise
),
4245 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
,
4246 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures
);
4247 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
4252 ret
= os_snprintf(buf
+ len
, buflen
- len
,
4253 "hostapdWPAPTKState=%d\n"
4254 "hostapdWPAPTKGroupState=%d\n",
4256 sm
->wpa_ptk_group_state
);
4257 if (os_snprintf_error(buflen
- len
, ret
))
4265 void wpa_auth_countermeasures_start(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
4268 wpa_auth
->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked
++;
4272 int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4274 return sm
&& sm
->pairwise_set
;
4278 int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4280 return sm
->pairwise
;
4284 const u8
* wpa_auth_get_pmk(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int *len
)
4293 int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4297 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
;
4301 int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4309 int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4311 if (!sm
|| !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
4313 return sm
->tk_already_set
;
4317 int wpa_auth_sta_fils_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4319 if (!sm
|| !wpa_key_mgmt_fils(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
4321 return sm
->tk_already_set
;
4325 int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
4326 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
)
4328 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->pmksa
!= entry
)
4335 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
4336 wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4338 return sm
? sm
->pmksa
: NULL
;
4342 void wpa_auth_sta_local_mic_failure_report(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4345 sm
->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures
++;
4349 const u8
* wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, size_t *len
)
4351 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4353 *len
= wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
4354 return wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
4358 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
4359 unsigned int pmk_len
,
4360 int session_timeout
, struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
4362 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa
!= WPA_VERSION_WPA2
||
4363 sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
4366 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
4367 if (pmk_len
>= 2 * PMK_LEN
&& wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
4368 wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
) &&
4369 !wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
4370 /* Cache MPMK/XXKey instead of initial part from MSK */
4371 pmk
= pmk
+ PMK_LEN
;
4374 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
4375 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
4376 if (pmk_len
> PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
)
4377 pmk_len
= PMK_LEN_SUITE_B_192
;
4378 } else if (pmk_len
> PMK_LEN
) {
4382 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "RSN: Cache PMK", pmk
, pmk_len
);
4383 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(sm
->wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, pmk_len
, NULL
,
4384 sm
->PTK
.kck
, sm
->PTK
.kck_len
,
4385 sm
->wpa_auth
->addr
, sm
->addr
, session_timeout
,
4386 eapol
, sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
))
4393 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_preauth(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4394 const u8
*pmk
, size_t len
, const u8
*sta_addr
,
4395 int session_timeout
,
4396 struct eapol_state_machine
*eapol
)
4398 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4401 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "RSN: Cache PMK from preauth", pmk
, len
);
4402 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, len
, NULL
,
4405 sta_addr
, session_timeout
, eapol
,
4406 WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X
))
4413 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_sae(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
4414 const u8
*pmk
, const u8
*pmkid
)
4416 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
4419 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "RSN: Cache PMK from SAE", pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
4420 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, PMK_LEN
, pmkid
,
4422 wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, 0, NULL
,
4430 void wpa_auth_add_sae_pmkid(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmkid
)
4432 os_memcpy(sm
->pmkid
, pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
4437 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add2(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
4438 const u8
*pmk
, size_t pmk_len
, const u8
*pmkid
,
4439 int session_timeout
, int akmp
)
4441 if (wpa_auth
->conf
.disable_pmksa_caching
)
4444 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG
, "RSN: Cache PMK (2)", pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
4445 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmk
, pmk_len
, pmkid
,
4446 NULL
, 0, wpa_auth
->addr
, addr
, session_timeout
,
4454 void wpa_auth_pmksa_remove(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4457 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
;
4459 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->pmksa
== NULL
)
4461 pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, sta_addr
, NULL
);
4463 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Remove PMKSA cache entry for "
4464 MACSTR
" based on request", MAC2STR(sta_addr
));
4465 pmksa_cache_free_entry(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, pmksa
);
4470 int wpa_auth_pmksa_list(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, char *buf
,
4473 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
4475 return pmksa_cache_auth_list(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, buf
, len
);
4479 void wpa_auth_pmksa_flush(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
4481 if (wpa_auth
&& wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
4482 pmksa_cache_auth_flush(wpa_auth
->pmksa
);
4486 #ifdef CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL
4489 int wpa_auth_pmksa_list_mesh(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*addr
,
4490 char *buf
, size_t len
)
4492 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
4495 return pmksa_cache_auth_list_mesh(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, addr
, buf
, len
);
4499 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
4500 wpa_auth_pmksa_create_entry(const u8
*aa
, const u8
*spa
, const u8
*pmk
,
4501 const u8
*pmkid
, int expiration
)
4503 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
;
4504 struct os_reltime now
;
4506 entry
= pmksa_cache_auth_create_entry(pmk
, PMK_LEN
, pmkid
, NULL
, 0, aa
,
4507 spa
, 0, NULL
, WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE
);
4511 os_get_reltime(&now
);
4512 entry
->expiration
= now
.sec
+ expiration
;
4517 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_entry(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4518 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*entry
)
4522 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
4525 ret
= pmksa_cache_auth_add_entry(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, entry
);
4527 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4528 "RSN: Failed to store external PMKSA cache for "
4529 MACSTR
, MAC2STR(entry
->spa
));
4534 #endif /* CONFIG_MESH */
4535 #endif /* CONFIG_PMKSA_CACHE_EXTERNAL */
4538 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
4539 wpa_auth_pmksa_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, const u8
*sta_addr
,
4542 if (!wpa_auth
|| !wpa_auth
->pmksa
)
4544 return pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, sta_addr
, pmkid
);
4548 void wpa_auth_pmksa_set_to_sm(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
,
4549 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
4550 struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4557 os_memcpy(pmk
, pmksa
->pmk
, PMK_LEN
);
4558 os_memcpy(pmkid
, pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
4559 os_memcpy(wpa_auth
->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed
, pmksa
->pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
4564 * Remove and free the group from wpa_authenticator. This is triggered by a
4565 * callback to make sure nobody is currently iterating the group list while it
4568 static void wpa_group_free(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4569 struct wpa_group
*group
)
4571 struct wpa_group
*prev
= wpa_auth
->group
;
4573 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Remove group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
4577 if (prev
->next
== group
) {
4578 /* This never frees the special first group as needed */
4579 prev
->next
= group
->next
;
4589 /* Increase the reference counter for group */
4590 static void wpa_group_get(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4591 struct wpa_group
*group
)
4593 /* Skip the special first group */
4594 if (wpa_auth
->group
== group
)
4597 group
->references
++;
4601 /* Decrease the reference counter and maybe free the group */
4602 static void wpa_group_put(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4603 struct wpa_group
*group
)
4605 /* Skip the special first group */
4606 if (wpa_auth
->group
== group
)
4609 group
->references
--;
4610 if (group
->references
)
4612 wpa_group_free(wpa_auth
, group
);
4617 * Add a group that has its references counter set to zero. Caller needs to
4618 * call wpa_group_get() on the return value to mark the entry in use.
4620 static struct wpa_group
*
4621 wpa_auth_add_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
4623 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4625 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| wpa_auth
->group
== NULL
)
4628 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Add group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
4630 group
= wpa_group_init(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
, 0);
4634 group
->next
= wpa_auth
->group
->next
;
4635 wpa_auth
->group
->next
= group
;
4642 * Enforce that the group state machine for the VLAN is running, increase
4643 * reference counter as interface is up. References might have been increased
4644 * even if a negative value is returned.
4645 * Returns: -1 on error (group missing, group already failed); otherwise, 0
4647 int wpa_auth_ensure_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
4649 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4651 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4654 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
4656 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
4658 group
= group
->next
;
4661 if (group
== NULL
) {
4662 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
4667 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4668 "WPA: Ensure group state machine running for VLAN ID %d",
4671 wpa_group_get(wpa_auth
, group
);
4672 group
->num_setup_iface
++;
4674 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
4682 * Decrease reference counter, expected to be zero afterwards.
4683 * returns: -1 on error (group not found, group in fail state)
4684 * -2 if wpa_group is still referenced
4687 int wpa_auth_release_group(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int vlan_id
)
4689 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4692 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4695 group
= wpa_auth
->group
;
4697 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
4699 group
= group
->next
;
4705 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4706 "WPA: Try stopping group state machine for VLAN ID %d",
4709 if (group
->num_setup_iface
<= 0) {
4710 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
,
4711 "WPA: wpa_auth_release_group called more often than wpa_auth_ensure_group for VLAN ID %d, skipping.",
4715 group
->num_setup_iface
--;
4717 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
4720 if (group
->references
> 1) {
4721 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
,
4722 "WPA: Cannot stop group state machine for VLAN ID %d as references are still hold",
4727 wpa_group_put(wpa_auth
, group
);
4733 int wpa_auth_sta_set_vlan(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int vlan_id
)
4735 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4737 if (sm
== NULL
|| sm
->wpa_auth
== NULL
)
4740 group
= sm
->wpa_auth
->group
;
4742 if (group
->vlan_id
== vlan_id
)
4744 group
= group
->next
;
4747 if (group
== NULL
) {
4748 group
= wpa_auth_add_group(sm
->wpa_auth
, vlan_id
);
4753 if (sm
->group
== group
)
4756 if (group
->wpa_group_state
== WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE
)
4759 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Moving STA " MACSTR
" to use group state "
4760 "machine for VLAN ID %d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), vlan_id
);
4762 wpa_group_get(sm
->wpa_auth
, group
);
4763 wpa_group_put(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->group
);
4770 void wpa_auth_eapol_key_tx_status(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4771 struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int ack
)
4773 if (wpa_auth
== NULL
|| sm
== NULL
)
4775 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: EAPOL-Key TX status for STA " MACSTR
4776 " ack=%d", MAC2STR(sm
->addr
), ack
);
4777 if (sm
->pending_1_of_4_timeout
&& ack
) {
4779 * Some deployed supplicant implementations update their SNonce
4780 * for each EAPOL-Key 2/4 message even within the same 4-way
4781 * handshake and then fail to use the first SNonce when
4782 * deriving the PTK. This results in unsuccessful 4-way
4783 * handshake whenever the relatively short initial timeout is
4784 * reached and EAPOL-Key 1/4 is retransmitted. Try to work
4785 * around this by increasing the timeout now that we know that
4786 * the station has received the frame.
4788 int timeout_ms
= eapol_key_timeout_subseq
;
4789 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG
, "WPA: Increase initial EAPOL-Key 1/4 "
4790 "timeout by %u ms because of acknowledged frame",
4792 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
4793 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms
/ 1000,
4794 (timeout_ms
% 1000) * 1000,
4795 wpa_send_eapol_timeout
, wpa_auth
, sm
);
4798 #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
4799 if (sm
->eapol_status_cb
) {
4800 sm
->eapol_status_cb(sm
->eapol_status_cb_ctx1
,
4801 sm
->eapol_status_cb_ctx2
);
4802 sm
->eapol_status_cb
= NULL
;
4804 #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
4808 int wpa_auth_uses_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4812 return wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
4816 int wpa_auth_uses_ft_sae(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
)
4820 return sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
== WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE
;
4825 int wpa_auth_get_ip_addr(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u8
*addr
)
4827 if (sm
== NULL
|| WPA_GET_BE32(sm
->ip_addr
) == 0)
4829 os_memcpy(addr
, sm
->ip_addr
, 4);
4832 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
4835 int wpa_auth_radius_das_disconnect_pmksa(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4836 struct radius_das_attrs
*attr
)
4838 return pmksa_cache_auth_radius_das_disconnect(wpa_auth
->pmksa
, attr
);
4842 void wpa_auth_reconfig_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
4844 struct wpa_group
*group
;
4848 for (group
= wpa_auth
->group
; group
; group
= group
->next
)
4849 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth
, group
);
4855 struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data
{
4856 struct wpa_authenticator
*auth
;
4858 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*pmksa
;
4864 static int wpa_auth_fils_iter(struct wpa_authenticator
*a
, void *ctx
)
4866 struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data
*data
= ctx
;
4868 if (a
== data
->auth
|| !a
->conf
.fils_cache_id_set
||
4869 os_memcmp(a
->conf
.fils_cache_id
, data
->cache_id
,
4870 FILS_CACHE_ID_LEN
) != 0)
4872 data
->pmksa
= pmksa_cache_auth_get(a
->pmksa
, data
->spa
, data
->pmkid
);
4873 return data
->pmksa
!= NULL
;
4877 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry
*
4878 wpa_auth_pmksa_get_fils_cache_id(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
,
4879 const u8
*sta_addr
, const u8
*pmkid
)
4881 struct wpa_auth_fils_iter_data idata
;
4883 if (!wpa_auth
->conf
.fils_cache_id_set
)
4885 idata
.auth
= wpa_auth
;
4886 idata
.cache_id
= wpa_auth
->conf
.fils_cache_id
;
4888 idata
.spa
= sta_addr
;
4889 idata
.pmkid
= pmkid
;
4890 wpa_auth_for_each_auth(wpa_auth
, wpa_auth_fils_iter
, &idata
);
4895 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
4896 int wpa_auth_write_fte(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
, int use_sha384
,
4897 u8
*buf
, size_t len
)
4899 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
= &wpa_auth
->conf
;
4901 return wpa_write_ftie(conf
, use_sha384
, conf
->r0_key_holder
,
4902 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
4903 NULL
, NULL
, buf
, len
, NULL
, 0);
4905 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
4908 void wpa_auth_get_fils_aead_params(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
4909 u8
*fils_anonce
, u8
*fils_snonce
,
4910 u8
*fils_kek
, size_t *fils_kek_len
)
4912 os_memcpy(fils_anonce
, sm
->ANonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
4913 os_memcpy(fils_snonce
, sm
->SNonce
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
);
4914 os_memcpy(fils_kek
, sm
->PTK
.kek
, WPA_KEK_MAX_LEN
);
4915 *fils_kek_len
= sm
->PTK
.kek_len
;
4919 void wpa_auth_add_fils_pmk_pmkid(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const u8
*pmk
,
4920 size_t pmk_len
, const u8
*pmkid
)
4922 os_memcpy(sm
->PMK
, pmk
, pmk_len
);
4923 sm
->pmk_len
= pmk_len
;
4924 os_memcpy(sm
->pmkid
, pmkid
, PMKID_LEN
);
4928 #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */
4931 void wpa_auth_set_auth_alg(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, u16 auth_alg
)
4934 sm
->auth_alg
= auth_alg
;
4939 void wpa_auth_set_dpp_z(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, const struct wpabuf
*z
)
4942 wpabuf_clear_free(sm
->dpp_z
);
4943 sm
->dpp_z
= z
? wpabuf_dup(z
) : NULL
;
4946 #endif /* CONFIG_DPP2 */
4949 #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
4951 int wpa_auth_resend_m1(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
, int change_anonce
,
4952 void (*cb
)(void *ctx1
, void *ctx2
),
4953 void *ctx1
, void *ctx2
)
4955 const u8
*anonce
= sm
->ANonce
;
4956 u8 anonce_buf
[WPA_NONCE_LEN
];
4958 if (change_anonce
) {
4959 if (random_get_bytes(anonce_buf
, WPA_NONCE_LEN
))
4961 anonce
= anonce_buf
;
4964 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
4965 "sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake (TESTING)");
4966 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
4967 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
, NULL
,
4968 anonce
, NULL
, 0, 0, 0);
4973 int wpa_auth_resend_m3(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
4974 void (*cb
)(void *ctx1
, void *ctx2
),
4975 void *ctx1
, void *ctx2
)
4977 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
], *_rsc
, *gtk
, *kde
, *pos
;
4978 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
4980 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
4981 size_t gtk_len
, kde_len
;
4982 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
4984 int wpa_ie_len
, secure
, keyidx
, encr
= 0;
4986 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
4987 GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
4991 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
4992 /* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
4993 wpa_ie
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie
;
4994 wpa_ie_len
= sm
->wpa_auth
->wpa_ie_len
;
4995 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA
&&
4996 (sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
.wpa
& WPA_PROTO_RSN
) &&
4997 wpa_ie_len
> wpa_ie
[1] + 2 && wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN
) {
4998 /* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE and possible MDIE */
4999 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
5000 if (wpa_ie
[0] == WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN
)
5001 wpa_ie
= wpa_ie
+ wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
5002 wpa_ie_len
= wpa_ie
[1] + 2;
5004 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
5005 "sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake (TESTING)");
5006 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
5007 /* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
5009 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
5010 gtk_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
5015 /* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
5021 if (sm
->rx_eapol_key_secure
) {
5023 * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
5024 * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
5025 * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
5026 * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
5027 * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
5028 * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
5030 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
5031 "STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - "
5032 "set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
5037 kde_len
= wpa_ie_len
+ ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
) + ocv_oci_len(sm
);
5039 kde_len
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gtk_len
;
5040 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
5041 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
5042 kde_len
+= 2 + PMKID_LEN
; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
5043 kde_len
+= 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
5045 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
5046 kde
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
5051 os_memcpy(pos
, wpa_ie
, wpa_ie_len
);
5053 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
5054 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
5059 res
= wpa_insert_pmkid(kde
, &elen
, sm
->pmk_r1_name
);
5061 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert "
5062 "PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
5069 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
5072 hdr
[0] = keyidx
& 0x03;
5074 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
5077 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
5079 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
5080 if (pos
- opos
>= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
) {
5081 /* skip KDE header and keyid */
5082 opos
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2;
5083 os_memset(opos
, 0, 6); /* clear PN */
5085 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
5086 if (ocv_oci_add(sm
, &pos
) < 0) {
5091 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP
5092 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
)) {
5094 struct wpa_auth_config
*conf
;
5096 conf
= &sm
->wpa_auth
->conf
;
5097 if (sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
&&
5098 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
>= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]) {
5099 os_memcpy(pos
, sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
,
5100 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1]);
5101 res
= 2 + sm
->assoc_resp_ftie
[1];
5103 int use_sha384
= wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
);
5105 res
= wpa_write_ftie(conf
, use_sha384
,
5106 conf
->r0_key_holder
,
5107 conf
->r0_key_holder_len
,
5109 kde
+ kde_len
- pos
,
5113 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR
, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE "
5114 "into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
5120 /* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
5121 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
5123 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE
;
5124 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->reassociation_deadline
);
5127 /* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
5128 *pos
++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL
;
5130 *pos
++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME
;
5131 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos
, conf
->r0_key_lifetime
);
5134 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */
5136 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
5137 (secure
? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
: 0) |
5138 (wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
) ?
5139 WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
: 0) |
5140 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK
| WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
|
5141 WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE
,
5142 _rsc
, sm
->ANonce
, kde
, pos
- kde
, keyidx
, encr
);
5148 int wpa_auth_resend_group_m1(struct wpa_state_machine
*sm
,
5149 void (*cb
)(void *ctx1
, void *ctx2
),
5150 void *ctx1
, void *ctx2
)
5152 u8 rsc
[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
];
5153 struct wpa_group
*gsm
= sm
->group
;
5155 u8
*kde_buf
= NULL
, *pos
, hdr
[2];
5156 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
5158 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
5162 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
5163 os_memset(rsc
, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN
);
5165 wpa_auth_logger(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
->addr
, LOGGER_DEBUG
,
5166 "sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake (TESTING)");
5168 gtk
= gsm
->GTK
[gsm
->GN
- 1];
5169 if (sm
->wpa
== WPA_VERSION_WPA2
) {
5170 kde_len
= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2 + gsm
->GTK_len
+
5171 ieee80211w_kde_len(sm
) + ocv_oci_len(sm
);
5172 kde_buf
= os_malloc(kde_len
);
5173 if (kde_buf
== NULL
)
5176 kde
= pos
= kde_buf
;
5177 hdr
[0] = gsm
->GN
& 0x03;
5179 pos
= wpa_add_kde(pos
, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY
, hdr
, 2,
5181 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
5183 pos
= ieee80211w_kde_add(sm
, pos
);
5185 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN
) {
5186 /* skip KDE header and keyid */
5187 opos
+= 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN
+ 2;
5188 os_memset(opos
, 0, 6); /* clear PN */
5190 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
5191 if (ocv_oci_add(sm
, &pos
) < 0) {
5195 kde_len
= pos
- kde
;
5198 kde_len
= gsm
->GTK_len
;
5201 sm
->eapol_status_cb
= cb
;
5202 sm
->eapol_status_cb_ctx1
= ctx1
;
5203 sm
->eapol_status_cb_ctx2
= ctx2
;
5205 wpa_send_eapol(sm
->wpa_auth
, sm
,
5206 WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE
|
5207 (wpa_mic_len(sm
->wpa_key_mgmt
, sm
->pmk_len
) ?
5208 WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC
: 0) |
5210 (!sm
->Pair
? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL
: 0),
5211 rsc
, NULL
, kde
, kde_len
, gsm
->GN
, 1);
5218 int wpa_auth_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_authenticator
*wpa_auth
)
5222 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
5223 return eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_rekey_gtk
, wpa_auth
, NULL
);
5226 #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */