2 This file is part of systemd.
4 Copyright 2010 Lennart Poettering
6 systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
7 under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
8 the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
9 (at your option) any later version.
11 systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
12 WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
14 Lesser General Public License for more details.
16 You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
17 along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
27 #include <sys/capability.h>
28 #include <sys/eventfd.h>
30 #include <sys/personality.h>
31 #include <sys/prctl.h>
33 #include <sys/socket.h>
35 #include <sys/types.h>
41 #include <security/pam_appl.h>
45 #include <selinux/selinux.h>
53 #include <sys/apparmor.h>
56 #include "sd-messages.h"
59 #include "alloc-util.h"
61 #include "apparmor-util.h"
66 #include "capability-util.h"
69 #include "errno-list.h"
71 #include "exit-status.h"
74 #include "format-util.h"
76 #include "glob-util.h"
83 #include "namespace.h"
84 #include "parse-util.h"
85 #include "path-util.h"
86 #include "process-util.h"
87 #include "rlimit-util.h"
90 #include "seccomp-util.h"
92 #include "securebits.h"
93 #include "selinux-util.h"
94 #include "signal-util.h"
95 #include "smack-util.h"
97 #include "string-table.h"
98 #include "string-util.h"
100 #include "syslog-util.h"
101 #include "terminal-util.h"
103 #include "user-util.h"
105 #include "utmp-wtmp.h"
107 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC)
108 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC)
110 /* This assumes there is a 'tty' group */
111 #define TTY_MODE 0620
113 #define SNDBUF_SIZE (8*1024*1024)
115 static int shift_fds(int fds
[], unsigned n_fds
) {
116 int start
, restart_from
;
121 /* Modifies the fds array! (sorts it) */
131 for (i
= start
; i
< (int) n_fds
; i
++) {
134 /* Already at right index? */
138 nfd
= fcntl(fds
[i
], F_DUPFD
, i
+ 3);
145 /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then
146 * let's remember that and try again from here */
147 if (nfd
!= i
+3 && restart_from
< 0)
151 if (restart_from
< 0)
154 start
= restart_from
;
160 static int flags_fds(const int fds
[], unsigned n_fds
, bool nonblock
) {
169 /* Drops/Sets O_NONBLOCK and FD_CLOEXEC from the file flags */
171 for (i
= 0; i
< n_fds
; i
++) {
173 r
= fd_nonblock(fds
[i
], nonblock
);
177 /* We unconditionally drop FD_CLOEXEC from the fds,
178 * since after all we want to pass these fds to our
181 r
= fd_cloexec(fds
[i
], false);
189 static const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext
*context
) {
192 if (context
->stdio_as_fds
)
195 if (context
->tty_path
)
196 return context
->tty_path
;
198 return "/dev/console";
201 static void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext
*context
, const ExecParameters
*p
) {
206 path
= exec_context_tty_path(context
);
208 if (context
->tty_vhangup
) {
209 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
210 (void) terminal_vhangup_fd(p
->stdin_fd
);
212 (void) terminal_vhangup(path
);
215 if (context
->tty_reset
) {
216 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
217 (void) reset_terminal_fd(p
->stdin_fd
, true);
219 (void) reset_terminal(path
);
222 if (context
->tty_vt_disallocate
&& path
)
223 (void) vt_disallocate(path
);
226 static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i
) {
229 EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
,
230 EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
);
233 static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o
) {
236 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
,
237 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
238 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
);
241 static bool exec_context_needs_term(const ExecContext
*c
) {
244 /* Return true if the execution context suggests we should set $TERM to something useful. */
246 if (is_terminal_input(c
->std_input
))
249 if (is_terminal_output(c
->std_output
))
252 if (is_terminal_output(c
->std_error
))
255 return !!c
->tty_path
;
258 static int open_null_as(int flags
, int nfd
) {
263 fd
= open("/dev/null", flags
|O_NOCTTY
);
268 r
= dup2(fd
, nfd
) < 0 ? -errno
: nfd
;
276 static int connect_journal_socket(int fd
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
277 union sockaddr_union sa
= {
278 .un
.sun_family
= AF_UNIX
,
279 .un
.sun_path
= "/run/systemd/journal/stdout",
281 uid_t olduid
= UID_INVALID
;
282 gid_t oldgid
= GID_INVALID
;
285 if (gid
!= GID_INVALID
) {
293 if (uid
!= UID_INVALID
) {
303 r
= connect(fd
, &sa
.sa
, SOCKADDR_UN_LEN(sa
.un
));
307 /* If we fail to restore the uid or gid, things will likely
308 fail later on. This should only happen if an LSM interferes. */
310 if (uid
!= UID_INVALID
)
311 (void) seteuid(olduid
);
314 if (gid
!= GID_INVALID
)
315 (void) setegid(oldgid
);
320 static int connect_logger_as(
322 const ExecContext
*context
,
332 assert(output
< _EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
);
336 fd
= socket(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_STREAM
, 0);
340 r
= connect_journal_socket(fd
, uid
, gid
);
344 if (shutdown(fd
, SHUT_RD
) < 0) {
349 (void) fd_inc_sndbuf(fd
, SNDBUF_SIZE
);
359 context
->syslog_identifier
? context
->syslog_identifier
: ident
,
361 context
->syslog_priority
,
362 !!context
->syslog_level_prefix
,
363 output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
|| output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
,
364 output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
|| output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
365 is_terminal_output(output
));
370 r
= dup2(fd
, nfd
) < 0 ? -errno
: nfd
;
375 static int open_terminal_as(const char *path
, mode_t mode
, int nfd
) {
381 fd
= open_terminal(path
, mode
| O_NOCTTY
);
386 r
= dup2(fd
, nfd
) < 0 ? -errno
: nfd
;
394 static int fixup_input(ExecInput std_input
, int socket_fd
, bool apply_tty_stdin
) {
396 if (is_terminal_input(std_input
) && !apply_tty_stdin
)
397 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
399 if (std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
400 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
405 static int fixup_output(ExecOutput std_output
, int socket_fd
) {
407 if (std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
408 return EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
;
413 static int setup_input(
414 const ExecContext
*context
,
415 const ExecParameters
*params
,
417 int named_iofds
[3]) {
424 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0) {
425 if (dup2(params
->stdin_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
428 /* Try to make this the controlling tty, if it is a tty, and reset it */
429 (void) ioctl(STDIN_FILENO
, TIOCSCTTY
, context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
);
430 (void) reset_terminal_fd(STDIN_FILENO
, true);
435 i
= fixup_input(context
->std_input
, socket_fd
, params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN
);
439 case EXEC_INPUT_NULL
:
440 return open_null_as(O_RDONLY
, STDIN_FILENO
);
443 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
:
444 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
: {
447 fd
= acquire_terminal(exec_context_tty_path(context
),
448 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
,
449 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
,
455 if (fd
!= STDIN_FILENO
) {
456 r
= dup2(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
464 case EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
:
465 return dup2(socket_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
467 case EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
:
468 (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
], false);
469 return dup2(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
], STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
472 assert_not_reached("Unknown input type");
476 static int setup_output(
478 const ExecContext
*context
,
479 const ExecParameters
*params
,
486 dev_t
*journal_stream_dev
,
487 ino_t
*journal_stream_ino
) {
497 assert(journal_stream_dev
);
498 assert(journal_stream_ino
);
500 if (fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
&& params
->stdout_fd
>= 0) {
502 if (dup2(params
->stdout_fd
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
505 return STDOUT_FILENO
;
508 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
&& params
->stderr_fd
>= 0) {
509 if (dup2(params
->stderr_fd
, STDERR_FILENO
) < 0)
512 return STDERR_FILENO
;
515 i
= fixup_input(context
->std_input
, socket_fd
, params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN
);
516 o
= fixup_output(context
->std_output
, socket_fd
);
518 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
) {
520 e
= fixup_output(context
->std_error
, socket_fd
);
522 /* This expects the input and output are already set up */
524 /* Don't change the stderr file descriptor if we inherit all
525 * the way and are not on a tty */
526 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
527 o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
528 i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&&
529 !is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
) &&
533 /* Duplicate from stdout if possible */
534 if ((e
== o
&& e
!= EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
) || e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
)
535 return dup2(STDOUT_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
539 } else if (o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
) {
540 /* If input got downgraded, inherit the original value */
541 if (i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&& is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
))
542 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
544 /* If the input is connected to anything that's not a /dev/null, inherit that... */
545 if (i
!= EXEC_INPUT_NULL
)
546 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
548 /* If we are not started from PID 1 we just inherit STDOUT from our parent process. */
552 /* We need to open /dev/null here anew, to get the right access mode. */
553 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
558 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
:
559 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
561 case EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
:
562 if (is_terminal_input(i
))
563 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
565 /* We don't reset the terminal if this is just about output */
566 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
568 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
:
569 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
:
570 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
:
571 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
:
572 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
:
573 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
:
574 r
= connect_logger_as(unit
, context
, o
, ident
, fileno
, uid
, gid
);
576 log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to connect %s to the journal socket, ignoring: %m", fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
? "stdout" : "stderr");
577 r
= open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
581 /* If we connected this fd to the journal via a stream, patch the device/inode into the passed
582 * parameters, but only then. This is useful so that we can set $JOURNAL_STREAM that permits
583 * services to detect whether they are connected to the journal or not. */
585 if (fstat(fileno
, &st
) >= 0) {
586 *journal_stream_dev
= st
.st_dev
;
587 *journal_stream_ino
= st
.st_ino
;
592 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
:
593 assert(socket_fd
>= 0);
594 return dup2(socket_fd
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
596 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
:
597 (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds
[fileno
], false);
598 return dup2(named_iofds
[fileno
], fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
601 assert_not_reached("Unknown error type");
605 static int chown_terminal(int fd
, uid_t uid
) {
610 /* Before we chown/chmod the TTY, let's ensure this is actually a tty */
614 /* This might fail. What matters are the results. */
615 (void) fchown(fd
, uid
, -1);
616 (void) fchmod(fd
, TTY_MODE
);
618 if (fstat(fd
, &st
) < 0)
621 if (st
.st_uid
!= uid
|| (st
.st_mode
& 0777) != TTY_MODE
)
627 static int setup_confirm_stdio(const char *vc
, int *_saved_stdin
, int *_saved_stdout
) {
628 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, saved_stdout
= -1;
631 assert(_saved_stdin
);
632 assert(_saved_stdout
);
634 saved_stdin
= fcntl(STDIN_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
638 saved_stdout
= fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
639 if (saved_stdout
< 0)
642 fd
= acquire_terminal(vc
, false, false, false, DEFAULT_CONFIRM_USEC
);
646 r
= chown_terminal(fd
, getuid());
650 r
= reset_terminal_fd(fd
, true);
654 if (dup2(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
657 if (dup2(fd
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
664 *_saved_stdin
= saved_stdin
;
665 *_saved_stdout
= saved_stdout
;
667 saved_stdin
= saved_stdout
= -1;
672 static void write_confirm_error_fd(int err
, int fd
) {
675 if (err
== -ETIMEDOUT
)
676 dprintf(fd
, "Confirmation question timed out, assuming positive response.\n");
679 dprintf(fd
, "Couldn't ask confirmation: %m, assuming positive response.\n");
683 static void write_confirm_error(int err
, const char *vc
) {
684 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
688 fd
= open_terminal(vc
, O_WRONLY
|O_NOCTTY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
692 write_confirm_error_fd(err
, fd
);
695 static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin
, int *saved_stdout
) {
699 assert(saved_stdout
);
703 if (*saved_stdin
>= 0)
704 if (dup2(*saved_stdin
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
707 if (*saved_stdout
>= 0)
708 if (dup2(*saved_stdout
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
711 *saved_stdin
= safe_close(*saved_stdin
);
712 *saved_stdout
= safe_close(*saved_stdout
);
718 CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE
= -1,
719 CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
= 0,
723 static int ask_for_confirmation(const char *vc
, Unit
*u
, const char *cmdline
) {
724 int saved_stdout
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, r
;
725 _cleanup_free_
char *e
= NULL
;
728 /* For any internal errors, assume a positive response. */
729 r
= setup_confirm_stdio(vc
, &saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
731 write_confirm_error(r
, vc
);
732 return CONFIRM_EXECUTE
;
735 /* confirm_spawn might have been disabled while we were sleeping. */
736 if (manager_is_confirm_spawn_disabled(u
->manager
)) {
741 e
= ellipsize(cmdline
, 60, 100);
749 r
= ask_char(&c
, "yfshiDjc", "Execute %s? [y, f, s – h for help] ", e
);
751 write_confirm_error_fd(r
, STDOUT_FILENO
);
758 printf("Resuming normal execution.\n");
759 manager_disable_confirm_spawn();
763 unit_dump(u
, stdout
, " ");
764 continue; /* ask again */
766 printf("Failing execution.\n");
767 r
= CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE
;
770 printf(" c - continue, proceed without asking anymore\n"
771 " D - dump, show the state of the unit\n"
772 " f - fail, don't execute the command and pretend it failed\n"
774 " i - info, show a short summary of the unit\n"
775 " j - jobs, show jobs that are in progress\n"
776 " s - skip, don't execute the command and pretend it succeeded\n"
777 " y - yes, execute the command\n");
778 continue; /* ask again */
780 printf(" Description: %s\n"
783 u
->id
, u
->description
, cmdline
);
784 continue; /* ask again */
786 manager_dump_jobs(u
->manager
, stdout
, " ");
787 continue; /* ask again */
789 printf("Skipping execution.\n");
790 r
= CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
;
796 assert_not_reached("Unhandled choice");
802 restore_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
806 static int get_fixed_user(const ExecContext
*c
, const char **user
,
807 uid_t
*uid
, gid_t
*gid
,
808 const char **home
, const char **shell
) {
817 /* Note that we don't set $HOME or $SHELL if they are not particularly enlightening anyway
818 * (i.e. are "/" or "/bin/nologin"). */
821 r
= get_user_creds_clean(&name
, uid
, gid
, home
, shell
);
829 static int get_fixed_group(const ExecContext
*c
, const char **group
, gid_t
*gid
) {
839 r
= get_group_creds(&name
, gid
);
847 static int get_supplementary_groups(const ExecContext
*c
, const char *user
,
848 const char *group
, gid_t gid
,
849 gid_t
**supplementary_gids
, int *ngids
) {
853 bool keep_groups
= false;
854 gid_t
*groups
= NULL
;
855 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*l_gids
= NULL
;
860 * If user is given, then lookup GID and supplementary groups list.
861 * We avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. Also we have to initialize groups
862 * here and as early as possible so we keep the list of supplementary
863 * groups of the caller.
865 if (user
&& gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= 0) {
866 /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */
867 if (initgroups(user
, gid
) < 0)
873 if (!c
->supplementary_groups
)
877 * If SupplementaryGroups= was passed then NGROUPS_MAX has to
878 * be positive, otherwise fail.
881 ngroups_max
= (int) sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX
);
882 if (ngroups_max
<= 0) {
886 return -EOPNOTSUPP
; /* For all other values */
889 l_gids
= new(gid_t
, ngroups_max
);
895 * Lookup the list of groups that the user belongs to, we
896 * avoid NSS lookups here too for gid=0.
899 if (getgrouplist(user
, gid
, l_gids
, &k
) < 0)
904 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->supplementary_groups
) {
907 if (k
>= ngroups_max
)
911 r
= get_group_creds(&g
, l_gids
+k
);
919 * Sets ngids to zero to drop all supplementary groups, happens
920 * when we are under root and SupplementaryGroups= is empty.
927 /* Otherwise get the final list of supplementary groups */
928 groups
= memdup(l_gids
, sizeof(gid_t
) * k
);
932 *supplementary_gids
= groups
;
940 static int enforce_groups(const ExecContext
*context
, gid_t gid
,
941 gid_t
*supplementary_gids
, int ngids
) {
946 /* Handle SupplementaryGroups= even if it is empty */
947 if (context
->supplementary_groups
) {
948 r
= maybe_setgroups(ngids
, supplementary_gids
);
953 if (gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
954 /* Then set our gids */
955 if (setresgid(gid
, gid
, gid
) < 0)
962 static int enforce_user(const ExecContext
*context
, uid_t uid
) {
965 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
))
968 /* Sets (but doesn't look up) the uid and make sure we keep the
969 * capabilities while doing so. */
971 if (context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
973 /* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but
974 * drop privileges we need to make sure we keep our
975 * caps, while we drop privileges. */
977 int sb
= context
->secure_bits
| 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
;
979 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
) != sb
)
980 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, sb
) < 0)
985 /* Second step: actually set the uids */
986 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
989 /* At this point we should have all necessary capabilities but
990 are otherwise a normal user. However, the caps might got
991 corrupted due to the setresuid() so we need clean them up
992 later. This is done outside of this call. */
999 static int null_conv(
1001 const struct pam_message
**msg
,
1002 struct pam_response
**resp
,
1003 void *appdata_ptr
) {
1005 /* We don't support conversations */
1007 return PAM_CONV_ERR
;
1012 static int setup_pam(
1019 int fds
[], unsigned n_fds
) {
1023 static const struct pam_conv conv
= {
1028 _cleanup_(barrier_destroy
) Barrier barrier
= BARRIER_NULL
;
1029 pam_handle_t
*handle
= NULL
;
1031 int pam_code
= PAM_SUCCESS
, r
;
1032 char **nv
, **e
= NULL
;
1033 bool close_session
= false;
1034 pid_t pam_pid
= 0, parent_pid
;
1041 /* We set up PAM in the parent process, then fork. The child
1042 * will then stay around until killed via PR_GET_PDEATHSIG or
1043 * systemd via the cgroup logic. It will then remove the PAM
1044 * session again. The parent process will exec() the actual
1045 * daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID
1046 * of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */
1048 r
= barrier_create(&barrier
);
1052 if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG
)
1053 flags
|= PAM_SILENT
;
1055 pam_code
= pam_start(name
, user
, &conv
, &handle
);
1056 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
1062 pam_code
= pam_set_item(handle
, PAM_TTY
, tty
);
1063 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1067 STRV_FOREACH(nv
, *env
) {
1068 pam_code
= pam_putenv(handle
, *nv
);
1069 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1073 pam_code
= pam_acct_mgmt(handle
, flags
);
1074 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1077 pam_code
= pam_open_session(handle
, flags
);
1078 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1081 close_session
= true;
1083 e
= pam_getenvlist(handle
);
1085 pam_code
= PAM_BUF_ERR
;
1089 /* Block SIGTERM, so that we know that it won't get lost in
1092 assert_se(sigprocmask_many(SIG_BLOCK
, &old_ss
, SIGTERM
, -1) >= 0);
1094 parent_pid
= getpid();
1103 int sig
, ret
= EXIT_PAM
;
1105 /* The child's job is to reset the PAM session on
1107 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_CHILD
);
1109 /* This string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
1110 * of "/sbin/init"), to look pretty in /bin/ps */
1111 rename_process("(sd-pam)");
1113 /* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this
1114 child. We assume that otherwise only those fds are
1115 open here that have been opened by PAM. */
1116 close_many(fds
, n_fds
);
1118 /* Drop privileges - we don't need any to pam_close_session
1119 * and this will make PR_SET_PDEATHSIG work in most cases.
1120 * If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam threads
1121 * to fail to exit normally */
1123 r
= maybe_setgroups(0, NULL
);
1125 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to setgroups() in sd-pam: %m");
1126 if (setresgid(gid
, gid
, gid
) < 0)
1127 log_warning_errno(errno
, "Failed to setresgid() in sd-pam: %m");
1128 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
1129 log_warning_errno(errno
, "Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m");
1131 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
1133 /* Wait until our parent died. This will only work if
1134 * the above setresuid() succeeds, otherwise the kernel
1135 * will not allow unprivileged parents kill their privileged
1136 * children this way. We rely on the control groups kill logic
1137 * to do the rest for us. */
1138 if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG
, SIGTERM
) < 0)
1141 /* Tell the parent that our setup is done. This is especially
1142 * important regarding dropping privileges. Otherwise, unit
1143 * setup might race against our setresuid(2) call. */
1144 barrier_place(&barrier
);
1146 /* Check if our parent process might already have
1148 if (getppid() == parent_pid
) {
1151 assert_se(sigemptyset(&ss
) >= 0);
1152 assert_se(sigaddset(&ss
, SIGTERM
) >= 0);
1155 if (sigwait(&ss
, &sig
) < 0) {
1162 assert(sig
== SIGTERM
);
1167 /* If our parent died we'll end the session */
1168 if (getppid() != parent_pid
) {
1169 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
1170 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1177 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
1181 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_PARENT
);
1183 /* If the child was forked off successfully it will do all the
1184 * cleanups, so forget about the handle here. */
1187 /* Unblock SIGTERM again in the parent */
1188 assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK
, &old_ss
, NULL
) >= 0);
1190 /* We close the log explicitly here, since the PAM modules
1191 * might have opened it, but we don't want this fd around. */
1194 /* Synchronously wait for the child to initialize. We don't care for
1195 * errors as we cannot recover. However, warn loudly if it happens. */
1196 if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier
))
1197 log_error("PAM initialization failed");
1205 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
1206 log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle
, pam_code
));
1207 r
= -EPERM
; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */
1209 log_error_errno(r
, "PAM failed: %m");
1213 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
1215 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
1227 static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path
) {
1228 char process_name
[11];
1232 /* This resulting string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
1233 * of "/sbin/init") to look pretty in /bin/ps */
1237 rename_process("(...)");
1243 /* The end of the process name is usually more
1244 * interesting, since the first bit might just be
1250 process_name
[0] = '(';
1251 memcpy(process_name
+1, p
, l
);
1252 process_name
[1+l
] = ')';
1253 process_name
[1+l
+1] = 0;
1255 rename_process(process_name
);
1260 static bool skip_seccomp_unavailable(const Unit
* u
, const char* msg
) {
1262 if (is_seccomp_available())
1266 log_unit_debug(u
, "SECCOMP features not detected in the kernel, skipping %s", msg
);
1271 static int apply_seccomp(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1272 uint32_t negative_action
, action
;
1273 scmp_filter_ctx seccomp
;
1280 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "syscall filtering"))
1283 negative_action
= c
->syscall_errno
== 0 ? SCMP_ACT_KILL
: SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c
->syscall_errno
);
1285 seccomp
= seccomp_init(c
->syscall_whitelist
? negative_action
: SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
);
1289 if (c
->syscall_archs
) {
1291 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_archs
, i
) {
1292 r
= seccomp_arch_add(seccomp
, PTR_TO_UINT32(id
) - 1);
1300 r
= seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp
);
1305 action
= c
->syscall_whitelist
? SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
: negative_action
;
1306 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_filter
, i
) {
1307 r
= seccomp_rule_add(seccomp
, action
, PTR_TO_INT(id
) - 1, 0);
1312 r
= seccomp_attr_set(seccomp
, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP
, 0);
1316 r
= seccomp_load(seccomp
);
1319 seccomp_release(seccomp
);
1323 static int apply_address_families(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1324 scmp_filter_ctx seccomp
;
1330 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictAddressFamilies="))
1333 r
= seccomp_init_conservative(&seccomp
, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
);
1337 if (c
->address_families_whitelist
) {
1338 int af
, first
= 0, last
= 0;
1341 /* If this is a whitelist, we first block the address
1342 * families that are out of range and then everything
1343 * that is not in the set. First, we find the lowest
1344 * and highest address family in the set. */
1346 SET_FOREACH(afp
, c
->address_families
, i
) {
1347 af
= PTR_TO_INT(afp
);
1349 if (af
<= 0 || af
>= af_max())
1352 if (first
== 0 || af
< first
)
1355 if (last
== 0 || af
> last
)
1359 assert((first
== 0) == (last
== 0));
1363 /* No entries in the valid range, block everything */
1364 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1366 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT
),
1374 /* Block everything below the first entry */
1375 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1377 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT
),
1380 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_LT
, first
));
1384 /* Block everything above the last entry */
1385 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1387 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT
),
1390 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_GT
, last
));
1394 /* Block everything between the first and last
1396 for (af
= 1; af
< af_max(); af
++) {
1398 if (set_contains(c
->address_families
, INT_TO_PTR(af
)))
1401 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1403 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT
),
1406 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ
, af
));
1415 /* If this is a blacklist, then generate one rule for
1416 * each address family that are then combined in OR
1419 SET_FOREACH(af
, c
->address_families
, i
) {
1421 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1423 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT
),
1426 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ
, PTR_TO_INT(af
)));
1432 r
= seccomp_load(seccomp
);
1435 seccomp_release(seccomp
);
1439 static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1440 scmp_filter_ctx seccomp
;
1445 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "MemoryDenyWriteExecute="))
1448 r
= seccomp_init_conservative(&seccomp
, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
);
1452 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1454 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
),
1457 SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ
, PROT_EXEC
|PROT_WRITE
, PROT_EXEC
|PROT_WRITE
));
1461 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1463 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
),
1466 SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ
, PROT_EXEC
, PROT_EXEC
));
1470 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1472 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
),
1475 SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ
, SHM_EXEC
, SHM_EXEC
));
1479 r
= seccomp_load(seccomp
);
1482 seccomp_release(seccomp
);
1486 static int apply_restrict_realtime(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1487 static const int permitted_policies
[] = {
1493 scmp_filter_ctx seccomp
;
1495 int r
, p
, max_policy
= 0;
1499 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictRealtime="))
1502 r
= seccomp_init_conservative(&seccomp
, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
);
1506 /* Determine the highest policy constant we want to allow */
1507 for (i
= 0; i
< ELEMENTSOF(permitted_policies
); i
++)
1508 if (permitted_policies
[i
] > max_policy
)
1509 max_policy
= permitted_policies
[i
];
1511 /* Go through all policies with lower values than that, and block them -- unless they appear in the
1513 for (p
= 0; p
< max_policy
; p
++) {
1516 /* Check if this is in the whitelist. */
1517 for (i
= 0; i
< ELEMENTSOF(permitted_policies
); i
++)
1518 if (permitted_policies
[i
] == p
) {
1526 /* Deny this policy */
1527 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1529 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
),
1530 SCMP_SYS(sched_setscheduler
),
1532 SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_EQ
, p
));
1537 /* Blacklist all other policies, i.e. the ones with higher values. Note that all comparisons are unsigned here,
1538 * hence no need no check for < 0 values. */
1539 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1541 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
),
1542 SCMP_SYS(sched_setscheduler
),
1544 SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_GT
, max_policy
));
1548 r
= seccomp_load(seccomp
);
1551 seccomp_release(seccomp
);
1555 static int apply_protect_sysctl(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1556 scmp_filter_ctx seccomp
;
1561 /* Turn off the legacy sysctl() system call. Many distributions turn this off while building the kernel, but
1562 * let's protect even those systems where this is left on in the kernel. */
1564 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectKernelTunables="))
1567 r
= seccomp_init_conservative(&seccomp
, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
);
1571 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1573 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
),
1579 r
= seccomp_load(seccomp
);
1582 seccomp_release(seccomp
);
1586 static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1589 /* Turn off module syscalls on ProtectKernelModules=yes */
1591 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectKernelModules="))
1594 return seccomp_load_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE
, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
));
1597 static int apply_private_devices(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1600 /* If PrivateDevices= is set, also turn off iopl and all @raw-io syscalls. */
1602 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "PrivateDevices="))
1605 return seccomp_load_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO
, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
));
1608 static int apply_restrict_namespaces(Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1611 if (!exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
))
1614 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictNamespaces="))
1617 return seccomp_restrict_namespaces(c
->restrict_namespaces
);
1622 static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe
[4]) {
1625 idle_pipe
[1] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[1]);
1626 idle_pipe
[2] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[2]);
1628 if (idle_pipe
[0] >= 0) {
1631 r
= fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC
);
1633 if (idle_pipe
[3] >= 0 && r
== 0 /* timeout */) {
1636 /* Signal systemd that we are bored and want to continue. */
1637 n
= write(idle_pipe
[3], "x", 1);
1639 /* Wait for systemd to react to the signal above. */
1640 fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC
);
1643 idle_pipe
[0] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[0]);
1647 idle_pipe
[3] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[3]);
1650 static int build_environment(
1652 const ExecContext
*c
,
1653 const ExecParameters
*p
,
1656 const char *username
,
1658 dev_t journal_stream_dev
,
1659 ino_t journal_stream_ino
,
1662 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
;
1670 our_env
= new0(char*, 14);
1675 _cleanup_free_
char *joined
= NULL
;
1677 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid()) < 0)
1679 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1681 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_FDS=%u", n_fds
) < 0)
1683 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1685 joined
= strv_join(p
->fd_names
, ":");
1689 x
= strjoin("LISTEN_FDNAMES=", joined
);
1692 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1695 if ((p
->flags
& EXEC_SET_WATCHDOG
) && p
->watchdog_usec
> 0) {
1696 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid()) < 0)
1698 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1700 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_USEC="USEC_FMT
, p
->watchdog_usec
) < 0)
1702 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1705 /* If this is D-Bus, tell the nss-systemd module, since it relies on being able to use D-Bus look up dynamic
1706 * users via PID 1, possibly dead-locking the dbus daemon. This way it will not use D-Bus to resolve names, but
1707 * check the database directly. */
1708 if (unit_has_name(u
, SPECIAL_DBUS_SERVICE
)) {
1709 x
= strdup("SYSTEMD_NSS_BYPASS_BUS=1");
1712 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1716 x
= strappend("HOME=", home
);
1719 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1723 x
= strappend("LOGNAME=", username
);
1726 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1728 x
= strappend("USER=", username
);
1731 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1735 x
= strappend("SHELL=", shell
);
1738 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1741 if (!sd_id128_is_null(u
->invocation_id
)) {
1742 if (asprintf(&x
, "INVOCATION_ID=" SD_ID128_FORMAT_STR
, SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(u
->invocation_id
)) < 0)
1745 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1748 if (exec_context_needs_term(c
)) {
1749 const char *tty_path
, *term
= NULL
;
1751 tty_path
= exec_context_tty_path(c
);
1753 /* If we are forked off PID 1 and we are supposed to operate on /dev/console, then let's try to inherit
1754 * the $TERM set for PID 1. This is useful for containers so that the $TERM the container manager
1755 * passes to PID 1 ends up all the way in the console login shown. */
1757 if (path_equal(tty_path
, "/dev/console") && getppid() == 1)
1758 term
= getenv("TERM");
1760 term
= default_term_for_tty(tty_path
);
1762 x
= strappend("TERM=", term
);
1765 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1768 if (journal_stream_dev
!= 0 && journal_stream_ino
!= 0) {
1769 if (asprintf(&x
, "JOURNAL_STREAM=" DEV_FMT
":" INO_FMT
, journal_stream_dev
, journal_stream_ino
) < 0)
1772 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1775 our_env
[n_env
++] = NULL
;
1776 assert(n_env
<= 12);
1784 static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext
*c
, char ***ret
) {
1785 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **pass_env
= NULL
;
1786 size_t n_env
= 0, n_bufsize
= 0;
1789 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->pass_environment
) {
1790 _cleanup_free_
char *x
= NULL
;
1796 x
= strjoin(*i
, "=", v
);
1799 if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(pass_env
, n_bufsize
, n_env
+ 2))
1801 pass_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1802 pass_env
[n_env
] = NULL
;
1812 static bool exec_needs_mount_namespace(
1813 const ExecContext
*context
,
1814 const ExecParameters
*params
,
1815 ExecRuntime
*runtime
) {
1820 if (!strv_isempty(context
->read_write_paths
) ||
1821 !strv_isempty(context
->read_only_paths
) ||
1822 !strv_isempty(context
->inaccessible_paths
))
1825 if (context
->mount_flags
!= 0)
1828 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
&& (runtime
->tmp_dir
|| runtime
->var_tmp_dir
))
1831 if (context
->private_devices
||
1832 context
->protect_system
!= PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO
||
1833 context
->protect_home
!= PROTECT_HOME_NO
||
1834 context
->protect_kernel_tunables
||
1835 context
->protect_kernel_modules
||
1836 context
->protect_control_groups
)
1842 static int setup_private_users(uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
1843 _cleanup_free_
char *uid_map
= NULL
, *gid_map
= NULL
;
1844 _cleanup_close_pair_
int errno_pipe
[2] = { -1, -1 };
1845 _cleanup_close_
int unshare_ready_fd
= -1;
1846 _cleanup_(sigkill_waitp
) pid_t pid
= 0;
1852 /* Set up a user namespace and map root to root, the selected UID/GID to itself, and everything else to
1853 * nobody. In order to be able to write this mapping we need CAP_SETUID in the original user namespace, which
1854 * we however lack after opening the user namespace. To work around this we fork() a temporary child process,
1855 * which waits for the parent to create the new user namespace while staying in the original namespace. The
1856 * child then writes the UID mapping, under full privileges. The parent waits for the child to finish and
1857 * continues execution normally. */
1859 if (uid
!= 0 && uid_is_valid(uid
))
1861 "0 0 1\n" /* Map root → root */
1862 UID_FMT
" " UID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $UID → $UID */
1865 uid_map
= strdup("0 0 1\n"); /* The case where the above is the same */
1869 if (gid
!= 0 && gid_is_valid(gid
))
1871 "0 0 1\n" /* Map root → root */
1872 GID_FMT
" " GID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $GID → $GID */
1875 gid_map
= strdup("0 0 1\n"); /* The case where the above is the same */
1879 /* Create a communication channel so that the parent can tell the child when it finished creating the user
1881 unshare_ready_fd
= eventfd(0, EFD_CLOEXEC
);
1882 if (unshare_ready_fd
< 0)
1885 /* Create a communication channel so that the child can tell the parent a proper error code in case it
1887 if (pipe2(errno_pipe
, O_CLOEXEC
) < 0)
1895 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
1899 /* Child process, running in the original user namespace. Let's update the parent's UID/GID map from
1900 * here, after the parent opened its own user namespace. */
1903 errno_pipe
[0] = safe_close(errno_pipe
[0]);
1905 /* Wait until the parent unshared the user namespace */
1906 if (read(unshare_ready_fd
, &c
, sizeof(c
)) < 0) {
1911 /* Disable the setgroups() system call in the child user namespace, for good. */
1912 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "setgroups");
1913 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
1915 if (errno
!= ENOENT
) {
1920 /* If the file is missing the kernel is too old, let's continue anyway. */
1922 if (write(fd
, "deny\n", 5) < 0) {
1927 fd
= safe_close(fd
);
1930 /* First write the GID map */
1931 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "gid_map");
1932 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
1937 if (write(fd
, gid_map
, strlen(gid_map
)) < 0) {
1941 fd
= safe_close(fd
);
1943 /* The write the UID map */
1944 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "uid_map");
1945 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
1950 if (write(fd
, uid_map
, strlen(uid_map
)) < 0) {
1955 _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS
);
1958 (void) write(errno_pipe
[1], &r
, sizeof(r
));
1959 _exit(EXIT_FAILURE
);
1962 errno_pipe
[1] = safe_close(errno_pipe
[1]);
1964 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER
) < 0)
1967 /* Let the child know that the namespace is ready now */
1968 if (write(unshare_ready_fd
, &c
, sizeof(c
)) < 0)
1971 /* Try to read an error code from the child */
1972 n
= read(errno_pipe
[0], &r
, sizeof(r
));
1975 if (n
== sizeof(r
)) { /* an error code was sent to us */
1980 if (n
!= 0) /* on success we should have read 0 bytes */
1983 r
= wait_for_terminate(pid
, &si
);
1988 /* If something strange happened with the child, let's consider this fatal, too */
1989 if (si
.si_code
!= CLD_EXITED
|| si
.si_status
!= 0)
1995 static int setup_runtime_directory(
1996 const ExecContext
*context
,
1997 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2007 STRV_FOREACH(rt
, context
->runtime_directory
) {
2008 _cleanup_free_
char *p
;
2010 p
= strjoin(params
->runtime_prefix
, "/", *rt
);
2014 r
= mkdir_p_label(p
, context
->runtime_directory_mode
);
2018 r
= chmod_and_chown(p
, context
->runtime_directory_mode
, uid
, gid
);
2026 static int setup_smack(
2027 const ExecContext
*context
,
2028 const ExecCommand
*command
) {
2036 if (!mac_smack_use())
2039 if (context
->smack_process_label
) {
2040 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context
->smack_process_label
);
2044 #ifdef SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
2046 _cleanup_free_
char *exec_label
= NULL
;
2048 r
= mac_smack_read(command
->path
, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC
, &exec_label
);
2049 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -ENODATA
&& r
!= -EOPNOTSUPP
)
2052 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label
? : SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
);
2062 static int compile_read_write_paths(
2063 const ExecContext
*context
,
2064 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2067 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **l
= NULL
;
2070 /* Compile the list of writable paths. This is the combination of the explicitly configured paths, plus all
2071 * runtime directories. */
2073 if (strv_isempty(context
->read_write_paths
) &&
2074 strv_isempty(context
->runtime_directory
)) {
2075 *ret
= NULL
; /* NOP if neither is set */
2079 l
= strv_copy(context
->read_write_paths
);
2083 STRV_FOREACH(rt
, context
->runtime_directory
) {
2086 s
= strjoin(params
->runtime_prefix
, "/", *rt
);
2090 if (strv_consume(&l
, s
) < 0)
2100 static int apply_mount_namespace(Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*context
,
2101 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2102 ExecRuntime
*runtime
) {
2104 _cleanup_free_
char **rw
= NULL
;
2105 char *tmp
= NULL
, *var
= NULL
;
2106 const char *root_dir
= NULL
;
2107 NameSpaceInfo ns_info
= {
2108 .ignore_protect_paths
= false,
2109 .private_dev
= context
->private_devices
,
2110 .protect_control_groups
= context
->protect_control_groups
,
2111 .protect_kernel_tunables
= context
->protect_kernel_tunables
,
2112 .protect_kernel_modules
= context
->protect_kernel_modules
,
2117 /* The runtime struct only contains the parent of the private /tmp,
2118 * which is non-accessible to world users. Inside of it there's a /tmp
2119 * that is sticky, and that's the one we want to use here. */
2121 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
) {
2122 if (runtime
->tmp_dir
)
2123 tmp
= strjoina(runtime
->tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
2124 if (runtime
->var_tmp_dir
)
2125 var
= strjoina(runtime
->var_tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
2128 r
= compile_read_write_paths(context
, params
, &rw
);
2132 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
)
2133 root_dir
= context
->root_directory
;
2136 * If DynamicUser=no and RootDirectory= is set then lets pass a relaxed
2137 * sandbox info, otherwise enforce it, don't ignore protected paths and
2138 * fail if we are enable to apply the sandbox inside the mount namespace.
2140 if (!context
->dynamic_user
&& root_dir
)
2141 ns_info
.ignore_protect_paths
= true;
2143 r
= setup_namespace(root_dir
, &ns_info
, rw
,
2144 context
->read_only_paths
,
2145 context
->inaccessible_paths
,
2148 context
->protect_home
,
2149 context
->protect_system
,
2150 context
->mount_flags
);
2152 /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is probably due to a
2153 * missing capability. In this case, silently proceeed. */
2154 if (IN_SET(r
, -EPERM
, -EACCES
)) {
2156 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, r
, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
2164 static int apply_working_directory(const ExecContext
*context
,
2165 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2167 const bool needs_mount_ns
) {
2173 if (context
->working_directory_home
)
2175 else if (context
->working_directory
)
2176 wd
= context
->working_directory
;
2180 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
) {
2181 if (!needs_mount_ns
&& context
->root_directory
)
2182 if (chroot(context
->root_directory
) < 0)
2187 d
= strjoina(strempty(context
->root_directory
), "/", strempty(wd
));
2189 if (chdir(d
) < 0 && !context
->working_directory_missing_ok
)
2195 static void append_socket_pair(int *array
, unsigned *n
, int pair
[2]) {
2203 array
[(*n
)++] = pair
[0];
2205 array
[(*n
)++] = pair
[1];
2208 static int close_remaining_fds(
2209 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2210 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
2211 DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
2214 int *fds
, unsigned n_fds
) {
2216 unsigned n_dont_close
= 0;
2217 int dont_close
[n_fds
+ 12];
2221 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
2222 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdin_fd
;
2223 if (params
->stdout_fd
>= 0)
2224 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdout_fd
;
2225 if (params
->stderr_fd
>= 0)
2226 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stderr_fd
;
2229 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = socket_fd
;
2231 memcpy(dont_close
+ n_dont_close
, fds
, sizeof(int) * n_fds
);
2232 n_dont_close
+= n_fds
;
2236 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, runtime
->netns_storage_socket
);
2240 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, dcreds
->user
->storage_socket
);
2242 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, dcreds
->group
->storage_socket
);
2245 if (user_lookup_fd
>= 0)
2246 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = user_lookup_fd
;
2248 return close_all_fds(dont_close
, n_dont_close
);
2251 static bool context_has_address_families(const ExecContext
*c
) {
2254 return c
->address_families_whitelist
||
2255 !set_isempty(c
->address_families
);
2258 static bool context_has_syscall_filters(const ExecContext
*c
) {
2261 return c
->syscall_whitelist
||
2262 !set_isempty(c
->syscall_filter
) ||
2263 !set_isempty(c
->syscall_archs
);
2266 static bool context_has_no_new_privileges(const ExecContext
*c
) {
2269 if (c
->no_new_privileges
)
2272 if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) /* if we are privileged, we don't need NNP */
2275 return context_has_address_families(c
) || /* we need NNP if we have any form of seccomp and are unprivileged */
2276 c
->memory_deny_write_execute
||
2277 c
->restrict_realtime
||
2278 exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
) ||
2279 c
->protect_kernel_tunables
||
2280 c
->protect_kernel_modules
||
2281 c
->private_devices
||
2282 context_has_syscall_filters(c
);
2285 static int send_user_lookup(
2293 /* Send the resolved UID/GID to PID 1 after we learnt it. We send a single datagram, containing the UID/GID
2294 * data as well as the unit name. Note that we suppress sending this if no user/group to resolve was
2297 if (user_lookup_fd
< 0)
2300 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
) && !gid_is_valid(gid
))
2303 if (writev(user_lookup_fd
,
2305 { .iov_base
= &uid
, .iov_len
= sizeof(uid
) },
2306 { .iov_base
= &gid
, .iov_len
= sizeof(gid
) },
2307 { .iov_base
= unit
->id
, .iov_len
= strlen(unit
->id
) }}, 3) < 0)
2313 static int exec_child(
2315 ExecCommand
*command
,
2316 const ExecContext
*context
,
2317 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2318 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
2319 DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
2323 int *fds
, unsigned n_fds
,
2328 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
, **pass_env
= NULL
, **accum_env
= NULL
, **final_argv
= NULL
;
2329 _cleanup_free_
char *mac_selinux_context_net
= NULL
;
2330 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*supplementary_gids
= NULL
;
2331 const char *username
= NULL
, *groupname
= NULL
;
2332 const char *home
= NULL
, *shell
= NULL
;
2333 dev_t journal_stream_dev
= 0;
2334 ino_t journal_stream_ino
= 0;
2335 bool needs_mount_namespace
;
2336 uid_t uid
= UID_INVALID
;
2337 gid_t gid
= GID_INVALID
;
2338 int i
, r
, ngids
= 0;
2344 assert(exit_status
);
2346 rename_process_from_path(command
->path
);
2348 /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the
2349 * only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main daemon. All
2350 * others we leave untouched because we set them to
2351 * SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, both of which
2352 * will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */
2353 (void) default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER
,
2354 SIGNALS_IGNORE
, -1);
2356 if (context
->ignore_sigpipe
)
2357 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
2359 r
= reset_signal_mask();
2361 *exit_status
= EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK
;
2365 if (params
->idle_pipe
)
2366 do_idle_pipe_dance(params
->idle_pipe
);
2368 /* Close sockets very early to make sure we don't
2369 * block init reexecution because it cannot bind its
2374 r
= close_remaining_fds(params
, runtime
, dcreds
, user_lookup_fd
, socket_fd
, fds
, n_fds
);
2376 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
2380 if (!context
->same_pgrp
)
2382 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSID
;
2386 exec_context_tty_reset(context
, params
);
2388 if (!manager_is_confirm_spawn_disabled(unit
->manager
)) {
2389 const char *vc
= params
->confirm_spawn
;
2390 _cleanup_free_
char *cmdline
= NULL
;
2392 cmdline
= exec_command_line(argv
);
2394 *exit_status
= EXIT_CONFIRM
;
2398 r
= ask_for_confirmation(vc
, unit
, cmdline
);
2399 if (r
!= CONFIRM_EXECUTE
) {
2400 if (r
== CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
) {
2401 *exit_status
= EXIT_SUCCESS
;
2404 *exit_status
= EXIT_CONFIRM
;
2409 if (context
->dynamic_user
&& dcreds
) {
2411 /* Make sure we bypass our own NSS module for any NSS checks */
2412 if (putenv((char*) "SYSTEMD_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS=1") != 0) {
2413 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
2417 r
= dynamic_creds_realize(dcreds
, &uid
, &gid
);
2419 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
2423 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
) || !gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
2424 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
2429 username
= dcreds
->user
->name
;
2432 r
= get_fixed_user(context
, &username
, &uid
, &gid
, &home
, &shell
);
2434 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
2438 r
= get_fixed_group(context
, &groupname
, &gid
);
2440 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
2445 /* Initialize user supplementary groups and get SupplementaryGroups= ones */
2446 r
= get_supplementary_groups(context
, username
, groupname
, gid
,
2447 &supplementary_gids
, &ngids
);
2449 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
2453 r
= send_user_lookup(unit
, user_lookup_fd
, uid
, gid
);
2455 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
2459 user_lookup_fd
= safe_close(user_lookup_fd
);
2461 /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we
2462 * must sure to drop O_NONBLOCK */
2464 (void) fd_nonblock(socket_fd
, false);
2466 r
= setup_input(context
, params
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
);
2468 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
2472 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDOUT_FILENO
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
, &journal_stream_dev
, &journal_stream_ino
);
2474 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDOUT
;
2478 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDERR_FILENO
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
, &journal_stream_dev
, &journal_stream_ino
);
2480 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDERR
;
2484 if (params
->cgroup_path
) {
2485 r
= cg_attach_everywhere(params
->cgroup_supported
, params
->cgroup_path
, 0, NULL
, NULL
);
2487 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
2492 if (context
->oom_score_adjust_set
) {
2493 char t
[DECIMAL_STR_MAX(context
->oom_score_adjust
)];
2495 /* When we can't make this change due to EPERM, then
2496 * let's silently skip over it. User namespaces
2497 * prohibit write access to this file, and we
2498 * shouldn't trip up over that. */
2500 sprintf(t
, "%i", context
->oom_score_adjust
);
2501 r
= write_string_file("/proc/self/oom_score_adj", t
, 0);
2502 if (r
== -EPERM
|| r
== -EACCES
) {
2504 log_unit_debug_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust OOM setting, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
2507 *exit_status
= EXIT_OOM_ADJUST
;
2512 if (context
->nice_set
)
2513 if (setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS
, 0, context
->nice
) < 0) {
2514 *exit_status
= EXIT_NICE
;
2518 if (context
->cpu_sched_set
) {
2519 struct sched_param param
= {
2520 .sched_priority
= context
->cpu_sched_priority
,
2523 r
= sched_setscheduler(0,
2524 context
->cpu_sched_policy
|
2525 (context
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
?
2526 SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK
: 0),
2529 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSCHEDULER
;
2534 if (context
->cpuset
)
2535 if (sched_setaffinity(0, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(context
->cpuset_ncpus
), context
->cpuset
) < 0) {
2536 *exit_status
= EXIT_CPUAFFINITY
;
2540 if (context
->ioprio_set
)
2541 if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS
, 0, context
->ioprio
) < 0) {
2542 *exit_status
= EXIT_IOPRIO
;
2546 if (context
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
2547 if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK
, context
->timer_slack_nsec
) < 0) {
2548 *exit_status
= EXIT_TIMERSLACK
;
2552 if (context
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
)
2553 if (personality(context
->personality
) < 0) {
2554 *exit_status
= EXIT_PERSONALITY
;
2558 if (context
->utmp_id
)
2559 utmp_put_init_process(context
->utmp_id
, getpid(), getsid(0), context
->tty_path
,
2560 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_INIT
? INIT_PROCESS
:
2561 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
? LOGIN_PROCESS
:
2563 username
? "root" : context
->user
);
2565 if (context
->user
) {
2566 r
= chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO
, uid
);
2568 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
2573 /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup
2574 * (but only in systemd's own controller hierarchy!) to the
2575 * user of the new process. */
2576 if (params
->cgroup_path
&& context
->user
&& params
->cgroup_delegate
) {
2577 r
= cg_set_task_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, params
->cgroup_path
, 0644, uid
, gid
);
2579 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
2584 r
= cg_set_group_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, params
->cgroup_path
, 0755, uid
, gid
);
2586 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
2591 if (!strv_isempty(context
->runtime_directory
) && params
->runtime_prefix
) {
2592 r
= setup_runtime_directory(context
, params
, uid
, gid
);
2594 *exit_status
= EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY
;
2599 r
= build_environment(
2611 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
2615 r
= build_pass_environment(context
, &pass_env
);
2617 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
2621 accum_env
= strv_env_merge(5,
2622 params
->environment
,
2625 context
->environment
,
2629 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
2632 accum_env
= strv_env_clean(accum_env
);
2634 (void) umask(context
->umask
);
2636 if ((params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_PERMISSIONS
) && !command
->privileged
) {
2637 if (context
->pam_name
&& username
) {
2638 r
= setup_pam(context
->pam_name
, username
, uid
, gid
, context
->tty_path
, &accum_env
, fds
, n_fds
);
2640 *exit_status
= EXIT_PAM
;
2646 if (context
->private_network
&& runtime
&& runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
2647 r
= setup_netns(runtime
->netns_storage_socket
);
2649 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
2654 needs_mount_namespace
= exec_needs_mount_namespace(context
, params
, runtime
);
2655 if (needs_mount_namespace
) {
2656 r
= apply_mount_namespace(unit
, context
, params
, runtime
);
2658 *exit_status
= EXIT_NAMESPACE
;
2663 /* Apply just after mount namespace setup */
2664 r
= apply_working_directory(context
, params
, home
, needs_mount_namespace
);
2666 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHROOT
;
2670 /* Drop groups as early as possbile */
2671 if ((params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_PERMISSIONS
) && !command
->privileged
) {
2672 r
= enforce_groups(context
, gid
, supplementary_gids
, ngids
);
2674 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
2680 if ((params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_PERMISSIONS
) &&
2681 mac_selinux_use() &&
2682 params
->selinux_context_net
&&
2684 !command
->privileged
) {
2686 r
= mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd
, command
->path
, context
->selinux_context
, &mac_selinux_context_net
);
2688 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
2694 if ((params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_PERMISSIONS
) && context
->private_users
) {
2695 r
= setup_private_users(uid
, gid
);
2697 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
2702 /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that
2703 * nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that
2704 * we are more aggressive this time since socket_fd
2705 * and the netns fds we don't need anymore. The custom
2706 * endpoint fd was needed to upload the policy and can
2707 * now be closed as well. */
2708 r
= close_all_fds(fds
, n_fds
);
2710 r
= shift_fds(fds
, n_fds
);
2712 r
= flags_fds(fds
, n_fds
, context
->non_blocking
);
2714 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
2718 if ((params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_PERMISSIONS
) && !command
->privileged
) {
2720 int secure_bits
= context
->secure_bits
;
2722 for (i
= 0; i
< _RLIMIT_MAX
; i
++) {
2724 if (!context
->rlimit
[i
])
2727 r
= setrlimit_closest(i
, context
->rlimit
[i
]);
2729 *exit_status
= EXIT_LIMITS
;
2734 /* Set the RTPRIO resource limit to 0, but only if nothing else was explicitly requested. */
2735 if (context
->restrict_realtime
&& !context
->rlimit
[RLIMIT_RTPRIO
]) {
2736 if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_RTPRIO
, &RLIMIT_MAKE_CONST(0)) < 0) {
2737 *exit_status
= EXIT_LIMITS
;
2742 if (!cap_test_all(context
->capability_bounding_set
)) {
2743 r
= capability_bounding_set_drop(context
->capability_bounding_set
, false);
2745 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
2750 /* This is done before enforce_user, but ambient set
2751 * does not survive over setresuid() if keep_caps is not set. */
2752 if (context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
2753 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, true);
2755 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
2760 if (context
->user
) {
2761 r
= enforce_user(context
, uid
);
2763 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
2766 if (context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
2768 /* Fix the ambient capabilities after user change. */
2769 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, false);
2771 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
2775 /* If we were asked to change user and ambient capabilities
2776 * were requested, we had to add keep-caps to the securebits
2777 * so that we would maintain the inherited capability set
2778 * through the setresuid(). Make sure that the bit is added
2779 * also to the context secure_bits so that we don't try to
2780 * drop the bit away next. */
2782 secure_bits
|= 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
;
2786 /* Apply the MAC contexts late, but before seccomp syscall filtering, as those should really be last to
2787 * influence our own codepaths as little as possible. Moreover, applying MAC contexts usually requires
2788 * syscalls that are subject to seccomp filtering, hence should probably be applied before the syscalls
2789 * are restricted. */
2792 if (mac_selinux_use()) {
2793 char *exec_context
= mac_selinux_context_net
?: context
->selinux_context
;
2796 r
= setexeccon(exec_context
);
2798 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
2805 r
= setup_smack(context
, command
);
2807 *exit_status
= EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL
;
2811 #ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
2812 if (context
->apparmor_profile
&& mac_apparmor_use()) {
2813 r
= aa_change_onexec(context
->apparmor_profile
);
2814 if (r
< 0 && !context
->apparmor_profile_ignore
) {
2815 *exit_status
= EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE
;
2821 /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while
2822 * PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress
2823 * potential EPERMs we'll try not to call
2824 * PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. */
2825 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
) != secure_bits
)
2826 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, secure_bits
) < 0) {
2827 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECUREBITS
;
2831 if (context_has_no_new_privileges(context
))
2832 if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
2833 *exit_status
= EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES
;
2838 if (context_has_address_families(context
)) {
2839 r
= apply_address_families(unit
, context
);
2841 *exit_status
= EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES
;
2846 if (context
->memory_deny_write_execute
) {
2847 r
= apply_memory_deny_write_execute(unit
, context
);
2849 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
2854 if (context
->restrict_realtime
) {
2855 r
= apply_restrict_realtime(unit
, context
);
2857 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
2862 r
= apply_restrict_namespaces(unit
, context
);
2864 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
2868 if (context
->protect_kernel_tunables
) {
2869 r
= apply_protect_sysctl(unit
, context
);
2871 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
2876 if (context
->protect_kernel_modules
) {
2877 r
= apply_protect_kernel_modules(unit
, context
);
2879 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
2884 if (context
->private_devices
) {
2885 r
= apply_private_devices(unit
, context
);
2887 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
2892 /* This really should remain the last step before the execve(), to make sure our own code is unaffected
2893 * by the filter as little as possible. */
2894 if (context_has_syscall_filters(context
)) {
2895 r
= apply_seccomp(unit
, context
);
2897 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
2904 final_argv
= replace_env_argv(argv
, accum_env
);
2906 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
2910 if (_unlikely_(log_get_max_level() >= LOG_DEBUG
)) {
2911 _cleanup_free_
char *line
;
2913 line
= exec_command_line(final_argv
);
2916 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
2918 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
,
2919 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Executing: %s", line
),
2925 execve(command
->path
, final_argv
, accum_env
);
2926 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
2930 int exec_spawn(Unit
*unit
,
2931 ExecCommand
*command
,
2932 const ExecContext
*context
,
2933 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2934 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
2935 DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
2938 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **files_env
= NULL
;
2939 int *fds
= NULL
; unsigned n_fds
= 0;
2940 _cleanup_free_
char *line
= NULL
;
2942 int named_iofds
[3] = { -1, -1, -1 };
2951 assert(params
->fds
|| params
->n_fds
<= 0);
2953 if (context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
||
2954 context
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
||
2955 context
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
) {
2957 if (params
->n_fds
!= 1) {
2958 log_unit_error(unit
, "Got more than one socket.");
2962 socket_fd
= params
->fds
[0];
2966 n_fds
= params
->n_fds
;
2969 r
= exec_context_named_iofds(unit
, context
, params
, named_iofds
);
2971 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to load a named file descriptor: %m");
2973 r
= exec_context_load_environment(unit
, context
, &files_env
);
2975 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to load environment files: %m");
2977 argv
= params
->argv
?: command
->argv
;
2978 line
= exec_command_line(argv
);
2982 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
2984 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "About to execute: %s", line
),
2985 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
,
2989 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to fork: %m");
2994 r
= exec_child(unit
,
3005 unit
->manager
->user_lookup_fds
[1],
3009 log_struct_errno(LOG_ERR
, r
,
3010 LOG_MESSAGE_ID(SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED
),
3012 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Failed at step %s spawning %s: %m",
3013 exit_status_to_string(exit_status
, EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD
),
3015 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
,
3022 log_unit_debug(unit
, "Forked %s as "PID_FMT
, command
->path
, pid
);
3024 /* We add the new process to the cgroup both in the child (so
3025 * that we can be sure that no user code is ever executed
3026 * outside of the cgroup) and in the parent (so that we can be
3027 * sure that when we kill the cgroup the process will be
3029 if (params
->cgroup_path
)
3030 (void) cg_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, params
->cgroup_path
, pid
);
3032 exec_status_start(&command
->exec_status
, pid
);
3038 void exec_context_init(ExecContext
*c
) {
3042 c
->ioprio
= IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE
, 0);
3043 c
->cpu_sched_policy
= SCHED_OTHER
;
3044 c
->syslog_priority
= LOG_DAEMON
|LOG_INFO
;
3045 c
->syslog_level_prefix
= true;
3046 c
->ignore_sigpipe
= true;
3047 c
->timer_slack_nsec
= NSEC_INFINITY
;
3048 c
->personality
= PERSONALITY_INVALID
;
3049 c
->runtime_directory_mode
= 0755;
3050 c
->capability_bounding_set
= CAP_ALL
;
3051 c
->restrict_namespaces
= NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL
;
3054 void exec_context_done(ExecContext
*c
) {
3059 c
->environment
= strv_free(c
->environment
);
3060 c
->environment_files
= strv_free(c
->environment_files
);
3061 c
->pass_environment
= strv_free(c
->pass_environment
);
3063 for (l
= 0; l
< ELEMENTSOF(c
->rlimit
); l
++)
3064 c
->rlimit
[l
] = mfree(c
->rlimit
[l
]);
3066 for (l
= 0; l
< 3; l
++)
3067 c
->stdio_fdname
[l
] = mfree(c
->stdio_fdname
[l
]);
3069 c
->working_directory
= mfree(c
->working_directory
);
3070 c
->root_directory
= mfree(c
->root_directory
);
3071 c
->tty_path
= mfree(c
->tty_path
);
3072 c
->syslog_identifier
= mfree(c
->syslog_identifier
);
3073 c
->user
= mfree(c
->user
);
3074 c
->group
= mfree(c
->group
);
3076 c
->supplementary_groups
= strv_free(c
->supplementary_groups
);
3078 c
->pam_name
= mfree(c
->pam_name
);
3080 c
->read_only_paths
= strv_free(c
->read_only_paths
);
3081 c
->read_write_paths
= strv_free(c
->read_write_paths
);
3082 c
->inaccessible_paths
= strv_free(c
->inaccessible_paths
);
3085 CPU_FREE(c
->cpuset
);
3087 c
->utmp_id
= mfree(c
->utmp_id
);
3088 c
->selinux_context
= mfree(c
->selinux_context
);
3089 c
->apparmor_profile
= mfree(c
->apparmor_profile
);
3091 c
->syscall_filter
= set_free(c
->syscall_filter
);
3092 c
->syscall_archs
= set_free(c
->syscall_archs
);
3093 c
->address_families
= set_free(c
->address_families
);
3095 c
->runtime_directory
= strv_free(c
->runtime_directory
);
3098 int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(ExecContext
*c
, const char *runtime_prefix
) {
3103 if (!runtime_prefix
)
3106 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->runtime_directory
) {
3107 _cleanup_free_
char *p
;
3109 p
= strjoin(runtime_prefix
, "/", *i
);
3113 /* We execute this synchronously, since we need to be
3114 * sure this is gone when we start the service
3116 (void) rm_rf(p
, REMOVE_ROOT
);
3122 void exec_command_done(ExecCommand
*c
) {
3125 c
->path
= mfree(c
->path
);
3127 c
->argv
= strv_free(c
->argv
);
3130 void exec_command_done_array(ExecCommand
*c
, unsigned n
) {
3133 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
3134 exec_command_done(c
+i
);
3137 ExecCommand
* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand
*c
) {
3141 LIST_REMOVE(command
, c
, i
);
3142 exec_command_done(i
);
3149 void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand
**c
, unsigned n
) {
3152 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
3153 c
[i
] = exec_command_free_list(c
[i
]);
3156 typedef struct InvalidEnvInfo
{
3161 static void invalid_env(const char *p
, void *userdata
) {
3162 InvalidEnvInfo
*info
= userdata
;
3164 log_unit_error(info
->unit
, "Ignoring invalid environment assignment '%s': %s", p
, info
->path
);
3167 const char* exec_context_fdname(const ExecContext
*c
, int fd_index
) {
3172 if (c
->std_input
!= EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
)
3174 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
] ?: "stdin";
3176 if (c
->std_output
!= EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
3178 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
] ?: "stdout";
3180 if (c
->std_error
!= EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
3182 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
] ?: "stderr";
3188 int exec_context_named_iofds(Unit
*unit
, const ExecContext
*c
, const ExecParameters
*p
, int named_iofds
[3]) {
3189 unsigned i
, targets
;
3190 const char *stdio_fdname
[3];
3195 targets
= (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
) +
3196 (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
) +
3197 (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
);
3199 for (i
= 0; i
< 3; i
++)
3200 stdio_fdname
[i
] = exec_context_fdname(c
, i
);
3202 for (i
= 0; i
< p
->n_fds
&& targets
> 0; i
++)
3203 if (named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] < 0 && c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
&& stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
] && streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
])) {
3204 named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
3206 } else if (named_iofds
[STDOUT_FILENO
] < 0 && c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
&& stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
] && streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
])) {
3207 named_iofds
[STDOUT_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
3209 } else if (named_iofds
[STDERR_FILENO
] < 0 && c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
&& stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
] && streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
])) {
3210 named_iofds
[STDERR_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
3214 return (targets
== 0 ? 0 : -ENOENT
);
3217 int exec_context_load_environment(Unit
*unit
, const ExecContext
*c
, char ***l
) {
3218 char **i
, **r
= NULL
;
3223 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->environment_files
) {
3226 bool ignore
= false;
3228 _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t pglob
= {};
3238 if (!path_is_absolute(fn
)) {
3246 /* Filename supports globbing, take all matching files */
3248 if (glob(fn
, 0, NULL
, &pglob
) != 0) {
3253 return errno
> 0 ? -errno
: -EINVAL
;
3255 count
= pglob
.gl_pathc
;
3263 for (n
= 0; n
< count
; n
++) {
3264 k
= load_env_file(NULL
, pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
], NULL
, &p
);
3272 /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */
3274 InvalidEnvInfo info
= {
3276 .path
= pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
]
3279 p
= strv_env_clean_with_callback(p
, invalid_env
, &info
);
3287 m
= strv_env_merge(2, r
, p
);
3303 static bool tty_may_match_dev_console(const char *tty
) {
3304 _cleanup_free_
char *active
= NULL
;
3310 if (startswith(tty
, "/dev/"))
3313 /* trivial identity? */
3314 if (streq(tty
, "console"))
3317 console
= resolve_dev_console(&active
);
3318 /* if we could not resolve, assume it may */
3322 /* "tty0" means the active VC, so it may be the same sometimes */
3323 return streq(console
, tty
) || (streq(console
, "tty0") && tty_is_vc(tty
));
3326 bool exec_context_may_touch_console(ExecContext
*ec
) {
3328 return (ec
->tty_reset
||
3330 ec
->tty_vt_disallocate
||
3331 is_terminal_input(ec
->std_input
) ||
3332 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_output
) ||
3333 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_error
)) &&
3334 tty_may_match_dev_console(exec_context_tty_path(ec
));
3337 static void strv_fprintf(FILE *f
, char **l
) {
3343 fprintf(f
, " %s", *g
);
3346 void exec_context_dump(ExecContext
*c
, FILE* f
, const char *prefix
) {
3354 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
3358 "%sWorkingDirectory: %s\n"
3359 "%sRootDirectory: %s\n"
3360 "%sNonBlocking: %s\n"
3361 "%sPrivateTmp: %s\n"
3362 "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n"
3363 "%sProtectKernelTunables: %s\n"
3364 "%sProtectKernelModules: %s\n"
3365 "%sProtectControlGroups: %s\n"
3366 "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n"
3367 "%sPrivateUsers: %s\n"
3368 "%sProtectHome: %s\n"
3369 "%sProtectSystem: %s\n"
3370 "%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n"
3371 "%sMemoryDenyWriteExecute: %s\n"
3372 "%sRestrictRealtime: %s\n",
3374 prefix
, c
->working_directory
? c
->working_directory
: "/",
3375 prefix
, c
->root_directory
? c
->root_directory
: "/",
3376 prefix
, yes_no(c
->non_blocking
),
3377 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_tmp
),
3378 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_devices
),
3379 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_kernel_tunables
),
3380 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_kernel_modules
),
3381 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_control_groups
),
3382 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_network
),
3383 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_users
),
3384 prefix
, protect_home_to_string(c
->protect_home
),
3385 prefix
, protect_system_to_string(c
->protect_system
),
3386 prefix
, yes_no(c
->ignore_sigpipe
),
3387 prefix
, yes_no(c
->memory_deny_write_execute
),
3388 prefix
, yes_no(c
->restrict_realtime
));
3390 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment
)
3391 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
3393 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment_files
)
3394 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironmentFile: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
3396 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->pass_environment
)
3397 fprintf(f
, "%sPassEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
3399 fprintf(f
, "%sRuntimeDirectoryMode: %04o\n", prefix
, c
->runtime_directory_mode
);
3401 STRV_FOREACH(d
, c
->runtime_directory
)
3402 fprintf(f
, "%sRuntimeDirectory: %s\n", prefix
, *d
);
3409 if (c
->oom_score_adjust_set
)
3411 "%sOOMScoreAdjust: %i\n",
3412 prefix
, c
->oom_score_adjust
);
3414 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++)
3416 fprintf(f
, "%s%s: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
3417 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_max
);
3418 fprintf(f
, "%s%sSoft: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
3419 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_cur
);
3422 if (c
->ioprio_set
) {
3423 _cleanup_free_
char *class_str
= NULL
;
3425 ioprio_class_to_string_alloc(IOPRIO_PRIO_CLASS(c
->ioprio
), &class_str
);
3427 "%sIOSchedulingClass: %s\n"
3428 "%sIOPriority: %i\n",
3429 prefix
, strna(class_str
),
3430 prefix
, (int) IOPRIO_PRIO_DATA(c
->ioprio
));
3433 if (c
->cpu_sched_set
) {
3434 _cleanup_free_
char *policy_str
= NULL
;
3436 sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c
->cpu_sched_policy
, &policy_str
);
3438 "%sCPUSchedulingPolicy: %s\n"
3439 "%sCPUSchedulingPriority: %i\n"
3440 "%sCPUSchedulingResetOnFork: %s\n",
3441 prefix
, strna(policy_str
),
3442 prefix
, c
->cpu_sched_priority
,
3443 prefix
, yes_no(c
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
));
3447 fprintf(f
, "%sCPUAffinity:", prefix
);
3448 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->cpuset_ncpus
; i
++)
3449 if (CPU_ISSET_S(i
, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(c
->cpuset_ncpus
), c
->cpuset
))
3450 fprintf(f
, " %u", i
);
3454 if (c
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
3455 fprintf(f
, "%sTimerSlackNSec: "NSEC_FMT
"\n", prefix
, c
->timer_slack_nsec
);
3458 "%sStandardInput: %s\n"
3459 "%sStandardOutput: %s\n"
3460 "%sStandardError: %s\n",
3461 prefix
, exec_input_to_string(c
->std_input
),
3462 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_output
),
3463 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_error
));
3469 "%sTTYVHangup: %s\n"
3470 "%sTTYVTDisallocate: %s\n",
3471 prefix
, c
->tty_path
,
3472 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_reset
),
3473 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vhangup
),
3474 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vt_disallocate
));
3476 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
||
3477 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
||
3478 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
||
3479 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
||
3480 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
||
3481 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
||
3482 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
||
3483 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
||
3484 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
||
3485 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
||
3486 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
||
3487 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
) {
3489 _cleanup_free_
char *fac_str
= NULL
, *lvl_str
= NULL
;
3491 log_facility_unshifted_to_string_alloc(c
->syslog_priority
>> 3, &fac_str
);
3492 log_level_to_string_alloc(LOG_PRI(c
->syslog_priority
), &lvl_str
);
3495 "%sSyslogFacility: %s\n"
3496 "%sSyslogLevel: %s\n",
3497 prefix
, strna(fac_str
),
3498 prefix
, strna(lvl_str
));
3502 fprintf(f
, "%sSecure Bits:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
3504 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
) ? " keep-caps" : "",
3505 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED
) ? " keep-caps-locked" : "",
3506 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP
) ? " no-setuid-fixup" : "",
3507 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED
) ? " no-setuid-fixup-locked" : "",
3508 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_NOROOT
) ? " noroot" : "",
3509 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED
) ? "noroot-locked" : "");
3511 if (c
->capability_bounding_set
!= CAP_ALL
) {
3513 fprintf(f
, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet:", prefix
);
3515 for (l
= 0; l
<= cap_last_cap(); l
++)
3516 if (c
->capability_bounding_set
& (UINT64_C(1) << l
))
3517 fprintf(f
, " %s", strna(capability_to_name(l
)));
3522 if (c
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
3524 fprintf(f
, "%sAmbientCapabilities:", prefix
);
3526 for (l
= 0; l
<= cap_last_cap(); l
++)
3527 if (c
->capability_ambient_set
& (UINT64_C(1) << l
))
3528 fprintf(f
, " %s", strna(capability_to_name(l
)));
3534 fprintf(f
, "%sUser: %s\n", prefix
, c
->user
);
3536 fprintf(f
, "%sGroup: %s\n", prefix
, c
->group
);
3538 fprintf(f
, "%sDynamicUser: %s\n", prefix
, yes_no(c
->dynamic_user
));
3540 if (strv_length(c
->supplementary_groups
) > 0) {
3541 fprintf(f
, "%sSupplementaryGroups:", prefix
);
3542 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->supplementary_groups
);
3547 fprintf(f
, "%sPAMName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->pam_name
);
3549 if (strv_length(c
->read_write_paths
) > 0) {
3550 fprintf(f
, "%sReadWritePaths:", prefix
);
3551 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_write_paths
);
3555 if (strv_length(c
->read_only_paths
) > 0) {
3556 fprintf(f
, "%sReadOnlyPaths:", prefix
);
3557 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_only_paths
);
3561 if (strv_length(c
->inaccessible_paths
) > 0) {
3562 fprintf(f
, "%sInaccessiblePaths:", prefix
);
3563 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->inaccessible_paths
);
3569 "%sUtmpIdentifier: %s\n",
3570 prefix
, c
->utmp_id
);
3572 if (c
->selinux_context
)
3574 "%sSELinuxContext: %s%s\n",
3575 prefix
, c
->selinux_context_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->selinux_context
);
3577 if (c
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
)
3579 "%sPersonality: %s\n",
3580 prefix
, strna(personality_to_string(c
->personality
)));
3582 if (c
->syscall_filter
) {
3590 "%sSystemCallFilter: ",
3593 if (!c
->syscall_whitelist
)
3597 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_filter
, j
) {
3598 _cleanup_free_
char *name
= NULL
;
3605 name
= seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE
, PTR_TO_INT(id
) - 1);
3606 fputs(strna(name
), f
);
3613 if (c
->syscall_archs
) {
3620 "%sSystemCallArchitectures:",
3624 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_archs
, j
)
3625 fprintf(f
, " %s", strna(seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id
) - 1)));
3630 if (exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
)) {
3631 _cleanup_free_
char *s
= NULL
;
3633 r
= namespace_flag_to_string_many(c
->restrict_namespaces
, &s
);
3635 fprintf(f
, "%sRestrictNamespaces: %s\n",
3639 if (c
->syscall_errno
> 0)
3641 "%sSystemCallErrorNumber: %s\n",
3642 prefix
, strna(errno_to_name(c
->syscall_errno
)));
3644 if (c
->apparmor_profile
)
3646 "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n",
3647 prefix
, c
->apparmor_profile_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->apparmor_profile
);
3650 bool exec_context_maintains_privileges(ExecContext
*c
) {
3653 /* Returns true if the process forked off would run under
3654 * an unchanged UID or as root. */
3659 if (streq(c
->user
, "root") || streq(c
->user
, "0"))
3665 void exec_status_start(ExecStatus
*s
, pid_t pid
) {
3670 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->start_timestamp
);
3673 void exec_status_exit(ExecStatus
*s
, ExecContext
*context
, pid_t pid
, int code
, int status
) {
3676 if (s
->pid
&& s
->pid
!= pid
)
3680 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->exit_timestamp
);
3686 if (context
->utmp_id
)
3687 utmp_put_dead_process(context
->utmp_id
, pid
, code
, status
);
3689 exec_context_tty_reset(context
, NULL
);
3693 void exec_status_dump(ExecStatus
*s
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
3694 char buf
[FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_MAX
];
3702 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
3705 "%sPID: "PID_FMT
"\n",
3708 if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s
->start_timestamp
))
3710 "%sStart Timestamp: %s\n",
3711 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->start_timestamp
.realtime
));
3713 if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s
->exit_timestamp
))
3715 "%sExit Timestamp: %s\n"
3717 "%sExit Status: %i\n",
3718 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->exit_timestamp
.realtime
),
3719 prefix
, sigchld_code_to_string(s
->code
),
3723 char *exec_command_line(char **argv
) {
3731 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
)
3739 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
) {
3746 if (strpbrk(*a
, WHITESPACE
)) {
3757 /* FIXME: this doesn't really handle arguments that have
3758 * spaces and ticks in them */
3763 void exec_command_dump(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
3764 _cleanup_free_
char *cmd
= NULL
;
3765 const char *prefix2
;
3770 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
3771 prefix2
= strjoina(prefix
, "\t");
3773 cmd
= exec_command_line(c
->argv
);
3775 "%sCommand Line: %s\n",
3776 prefix
, cmd
? cmd
: strerror(ENOMEM
));
3778 exec_status_dump(&c
->exec_status
, f
, prefix2
);
3781 void exec_command_dump_list(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
3784 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
3786 LIST_FOREACH(command
, c
, c
)
3787 exec_command_dump(c
, f
, prefix
);
3790 void exec_command_append_list(ExecCommand
**l
, ExecCommand
*e
) {
3797 /* It's kind of important, that we keep the order here */
3798 LIST_FIND_TAIL(command
, *l
, end
);
3799 LIST_INSERT_AFTER(command
, *l
, end
, e
);
3804 int exec_command_set(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
3812 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
3833 int exec_command_append(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
3834 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **l
= NULL
;
3842 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
3848 r
= strv_extend_strv(&c
->argv
, l
, false);
3856 static int exec_runtime_allocate(ExecRuntime
**rt
) {
3861 *rt
= new0(ExecRuntime
, 1);
3866 (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[0] = (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[1] = -1;
3871 int exec_runtime_make(ExecRuntime
**rt
, ExecContext
*c
, const char *id
) {
3881 if (!c
->private_network
&& !c
->private_tmp
)
3884 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(rt
);
3888 if (c
->private_network
&& (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[0] < 0) {
3889 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_DGRAM
|SOCK_CLOEXEC
, 0, (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
) < 0)
3893 if (c
->private_tmp
&& !(*rt
)->tmp_dir
) {
3894 r
= setup_tmp_dirs(id
, &(*rt
)->tmp_dir
, &(*rt
)->var_tmp_dir
);
3902 ExecRuntime
*exec_runtime_ref(ExecRuntime
*r
) {
3904 assert(r
->n_ref
> 0);
3910 ExecRuntime
*exec_runtime_unref(ExecRuntime
*r
) {
3915 assert(r
->n_ref
> 0);
3922 free(r
->var_tmp_dir
);
3923 safe_close_pair(r
->netns_storage_socket
);
3927 int exec_runtime_serialize(Unit
*u
, ExecRuntime
*rt
, FILE *f
, FDSet
*fds
) {
3936 unit_serialize_item(u
, f
, "tmp-dir", rt
->tmp_dir
);
3938 if (rt
->var_tmp_dir
)
3939 unit_serialize_item(u
, f
, "var-tmp-dir", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
3941 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
3944 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
3948 unit_serialize_item_format(u
, f
, "netns-socket-0", "%i", copy
);
3951 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] >= 0) {
3954 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
3958 unit_serialize_item_format(u
, f
, "netns-socket-1", "%i", copy
);
3964 int exec_runtime_deserialize_item(Unit
*u
, ExecRuntime
**rt
, const char *key
, const char *value
, FDSet
*fds
) {
3971 if (streq(key
, "tmp-dir")) {
3974 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(rt
);
3978 copy
= strdup(value
);
3982 free((*rt
)->tmp_dir
);
3983 (*rt
)->tmp_dir
= copy
;
3985 } else if (streq(key
, "var-tmp-dir")) {
3988 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(rt
);
3992 copy
= strdup(value
);
3996 free((*rt
)->var_tmp_dir
);
3997 (*rt
)->var_tmp_dir
= copy
;
3999 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-0")) {
4002 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(rt
);
4006 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
))
4007 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
4009 safe_close((*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
4010 (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[0] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
4012 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-1")) {
4015 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(rt
);
4019 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
))
4020 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
4022 safe_close((*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
4023 (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[1] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
4031 static void *remove_tmpdir_thread(void *p
) {
4032 _cleanup_free_
char *path
= p
;
4034 (void) rm_rf(path
, REMOVE_ROOT
|REMOVE_PHYSICAL
);
4038 void exec_runtime_destroy(ExecRuntime
*rt
) {
4044 /* If there are multiple users of this, let's leave the stuff around */
4049 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->tmp_dir
);
4051 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->tmp_dir
);
4053 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->tmp_dir
);
4060 if (rt
->var_tmp_dir
) {
4061 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4063 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4065 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4066 free(rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4069 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
4072 safe_close_pair(rt
->netns_storage_socket
);
4075 static const char* const exec_input_table
[_EXEC_INPUT_MAX
] = {
4076 [EXEC_INPUT_NULL
] = "null",
4077 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
4078 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
] = "tty-force",
4079 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
] = "tty-fail",
4080 [EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket",
4081 [EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
] = "fd",
4084 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_input
, ExecInput
);
4086 static const char* const exec_output_table
[_EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
] = {
4087 [EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
] = "inherit",
4088 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
] = "null",
4089 [EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
4090 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
] = "syslog",
4091 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
] = "syslog+console",
4092 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
] = "kmsg",
4093 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
] = "kmsg+console",
4094 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
] = "journal",
4095 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
] = "journal+console",
4096 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket",
4097 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
] = "fd",
4100 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_output
, ExecOutput
);
4102 static const char* const exec_utmp_mode_table
[_EXEC_UTMP_MODE_MAX
] = {
4103 [EXEC_UTMP_INIT
] = "init",
4104 [EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
] = "login",
4105 [EXEC_UTMP_USER
] = "user",
4108 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_utmp_mode
, ExecUtmpMode
);