1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
10 #include <sys/capability.h>
11 #include <sys/eventfd.h>
13 #include <sys/personality.h>
14 #include <sys/prctl.h>
16 #include <sys/socket.h>
18 #include <sys/types.h>
24 #include <security/pam_appl.h>
28 #include <selinux/selinux.h>
36 #include <sys/apparmor.h>
39 #include "sd-messages.h"
42 #include "alloc-util.h"
44 #include "apparmor-util.h"
49 #include "capability-util.h"
50 #include "chown-recursive.h"
51 #include "cpu-set-util.h"
55 #include "errno-list.h"
57 #include "exit-status.h"
59 #include "format-util.h"
61 #include "glob-util.h"
68 #include "memory-util.h"
71 #include "namespace.h"
72 #include "parse-util.h"
73 #include "path-util.h"
74 #include "process-util.h"
75 #include "rlimit-util.h"
78 #include "seccomp-util.h"
80 #include "securebits-util.h"
81 #include "selinux-util.h"
82 #include "signal-util.h"
83 #include "smack-util.h"
84 #include "socket-util.h"
86 #include "stat-util.h"
87 #include "string-table.h"
88 #include "string-util.h"
90 #include "syslog-util.h"
91 #include "terminal-util.h"
92 #include "umask-util.h"
94 #include "user-util.h"
95 #include "utmp-wtmp.h"
97 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC)
98 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC)
100 /* This assumes there is a 'tty' group */
101 #define TTY_MODE 0620
103 #define SNDBUF_SIZE (8*1024*1024)
105 static int shift_fds(int fds
[], size_t n_fds
) {
106 int start
, restart_from
;
111 /* Modifies the fds array! (sorts it) */
121 for (i
= start
; i
< (int) n_fds
; i
++) {
124 /* Already at right index? */
128 nfd
= fcntl(fds
[i
], F_DUPFD
, i
+ 3);
135 /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then
136 * let's remember that and try again from here */
137 if (nfd
!= i
+3 && restart_from
< 0)
141 if (restart_from
< 0)
144 start
= restart_from
;
150 static int flags_fds(const int fds
[], size_t n_socket_fds
, size_t n_storage_fds
, bool nonblock
) {
154 n_fds
= n_socket_fds
+ n_storage_fds
;
160 /* Drops/Sets O_NONBLOCK and FD_CLOEXEC from the file flags.
161 * O_NONBLOCK only applies to socket activation though. */
163 for (i
= 0; i
< n_fds
; i
++) {
165 if (i
< n_socket_fds
) {
166 r
= fd_nonblock(fds
[i
], nonblock
);
171 /* We unconditionally drop FD_CLOEXEC from the fds,
172 * since after all we want to pass these fds to our
175 r
= fd_cloexec(fds
[i
], false);
183 static const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext
*context
) {
186 if (context
->stdio_as_fds
)
189 if (context
->tty_path
)
190 return context
->tty_path
;
192 return "/dev/console";
195 static void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext
*context
, const ExecParameters
*p
) {
200 path
= exec_context_tty_path(context
);
202 if (context
->tty_vhangup
) {
203 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
204 (void) terminal_vhangup_fd(p
->stdin_fd
);
206 (void) terminal_vhangup(path
);
209 if (context
->tty_reset
) {
210 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
211 (void) reset_terminal_fd(p
->stdin_fd
, true);
213 (void) reset_terminal(path
);
216 if (context
->tty_vt_disallocate
&& path
)
217 (void) vt_disallocate(path
);
220 static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i
) {
223 EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
,
224 EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
);
227 static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o
) {
230 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
,
231 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
232 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
);
235 static bool is_syslog_output(ExecOutput o
) {
238 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
);
241 static bool is_kmsg_output(ExecOutput o
) {
244 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
);
247 static bool exec_context_needs_term(const ExecContext
*c
) {
250 /* Return true if the execution context suggests we should set $TERM to something useful. */
252 if (is_terminal_input(c
->std_input
))
255 if (is_terminal_output(c
->std_output
))
258 if (is_terminal_output(c
->std_error
))
261 return !!c
->tty_path
;
264 static int open_null_as(int flags
, int nfd
) {
269 fd
= open("/dev/null", flags
|O_NOCTTY
);
273 return move_fd(fd
, nfd
, false);
276 static int connect_journal_socket(int fd
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
277 static const union sockaddr_union sa
= {
278 .un
.sun_family
= AF_UNIX
,
279 .un
.sun_path
= "/run/systemd/journal/stdout",
281 uid_t olduid
= UID_INVALID
;
282 gid_t oldgid
= GID_INVALID
;
285 if (gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
288 if (setegid(gid
) < 0)
292 if (uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
295 if (seteuid(uid
) < 0) {
301 r
= connect(fd
, &sa
.sa
, SOCKADDR_UN_LEN(sa
.un
)) < 0 ? -errno
: 0;
303 /* If we fail to restore the uid or gid, things will likely
304 fail later on. This should only happen if an LSM interferes. */
306 if (uid_is_valid(uid
))
307 (void) seteuid(olduid
);
310 if (gid_is_valid(gid
))
311 (void) setegid(oldgid
);
316 static int connect_logger_as(
318 const ExecContext
*context
,
319 const ExecParameters
*params
,
326 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
331 assert(output
< _EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
);
335 fd
= socket(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_STREAM
, 0);
339 r
= connect_journal_socket(fd
, uid
, gid
);
343 if (shutdown(fd
, SHUT_RD
) < 0)
346 (void) fd_inc_sndbuf(fd
, SNDBUF_SIZE
);
356 context
->syslog_identifier
?: ident
,
357 params
->flags
& EXEC_PASS_LOG_UNIT
? unit
->id
: "",
358 context
->syslog_priority
,
359 !!context
->syslog_level_prefix
,
360 is_syslog_output(output
),
361 is_kmsg_output(output
),
362 is_terminal_output(output
)) < 0)
365 return move_fd(TAKE_FD(fd
), nfd
, false);
368 static int open_terminal_as(const char *path
, int flags
, int nfd
) {
374 fd
= open_terminal(path
, flags
| O_NOCTTY
);
378 return move_fd(fd
, nfd
, false);
381 static int acquire_path(const char *path
, int flags
, mode_t mode
) {
382 union sockaddr_union sa
= {};
383 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
388 if (IN_SET(flags
& O_ACCMODE
, O_WRONLY
, O_RDWR
))
391 fd
= open(path
, flags
|O_NOCTTY
, mode
);
395 if (errno
!= ENXIO
) /* ENXIO is returned when we try to open() an AF_UNIX file system socket on Linux */
397 if (strlen(path
) >= sizeof(sa
.un
.sun_path
)) /* Too long, can't be a UNIX socket */
400 /* So, it appears the specified path could be an AF_UNIX socket. Let's see if we can connect to it. */
402 fd
= socket(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_STREAM
, 0);
406 salen
= sockaddr_un_set_path(&sa
.un
, path
);
410 if (connect(fd
, &sa
.sa
, salen
) < 0)
411 return errno
== EINVAL
? -ENXIO
: -errno
; /* Propagate initial error if we get EINVAL, i.e. we have
412 * indication that his wasn't an AF_UNIX socket after all */
414 if ((flags
& O_ACCMODE
) == O_RDONLY
)
415 r
= shutdown(fd
, SHUT_WR
);
416 else if ((flags
& O_ACCMODE
) == O_WRONLY
)
417 r
= shutdown(fd
, SHUT_RD
);
426 static int fixup_input(
427 const ExecContext
*context
,
429 bool apply_tty_stdin
) {
435 std_input
= context
->std_input
;
437 if (is_terminal_input(std_input
) && !apply_tty_stdin
)
438 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
440 if (std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
441 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
443 if (std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_DATA
&& context
->stdin_data_size
== 0)
444 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
449 static int fixup_output(ExecOutput std_output
, int socket_fd
) {
451 if (std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
452 return EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
;
457 static int setup_input(
458 const ExecContext
*context
,
459 const ExecParameters
*params
,
461 int named_iofds
[3]) {
468 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0) {
469 if (dup2(params
->stdin_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
472 /* Try to make this the controlling tty, if it is a tty, and reset it */
473 if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO
)) {
474 (void) ioctl(STDIN_FILENO
, TIOCSCTTY
, context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
);
475 (void) reset_terminal_fd(STDIN_FILENO
, true);
481 i
= fixup_input(context
, socket_fd
, params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN
);
485 case EXEC_INPUT_NULL
:
486 return open_null_as(O_RDONLY
, STDIN_FILENO
);
489 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
:
490 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
: {
493 fd
= acquire_terminal(exec_context_tty_path(context
),
494 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_TRY
:
495 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_FORCE
:
496 ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT
,
501 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
504 case EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
:
505 assert(socket_fd
>= 0);
507 return dup2(socket_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
509 case EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
:
510 assert(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] >= 0);
512 (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
], false);
513 return dup2(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
], STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
515 case EXEC_INPUT_DATA
: {
518 fd
= acquire_data_fd(context
->stdin_data
, context
->stdin_data_size
, 0);
522 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
525 case EXEC_INPUT_FILE
: {
529 assert(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
531 rw
= (context
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
&& streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
])) ||
532 (context
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
&& streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]));
534 fd
= acquire_path(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], rw
? O_RDWR
: O_RDONLY
, 0666 & ~context
->umask
);
538 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
542 assert_not_reached("Unknown input type");
546 static bool can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout(
547 const ExecContext
*context
,
553 /* Returns true, if given the specified STDERR and STDOUT output we can directly dup() the stdout fd to the
556 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
)
561 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
562 return streq_ptr(context
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
], context
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
564 if (IN_SET(e
, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
))
565 return streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
570 static int setup_output(
572 const ExecContext
*context
,
573 const ExecParameters
*params
,
580 dev_t
*journal_stream_dev
,
581 ino_t
*journal_stream_ino
) {
591 assert(journal_stream_dev
);
592 assert(journal_stream_ino
);
594 if (fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
&& params
->stdout_fd
>= 0) {
596 if (dup2(params
->stdout_fd
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
599 return STDOUT_FILENO
;
602 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
&& params
->stderr_fd
>= 0) {
603 if (dup2(params
->stderr_fd
, STDERR_FILENO
) < 0)
606 return STDERR_FILENO
;
609 i
= fixup_input(context
, socket_fd
, params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN
);
610 o
= fixup_output(context
->std_output
, socket_fd
);
612 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
) {
614 e
= fixup_output(context
->std_error
, socket_fd
);
616 /* This expects the input and output are already set up */
618 /* Don't change the stderr file descriptor if we inherit all
619 * the way and are not on a tty */
620 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
621 o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
622 i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&&
623 !is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
) &&
627 /* Duplicate from stdout if possible */
628 if (can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout(context
, o
, e
))
629 return dup2(STDOUT_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
633 } else if (o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
) {
634 /* If input got downgraded, inherit the original value */
635 if (i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&& is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
))
636 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
638 /* If the input is connected to anything that's not a /dev/null or a data fd, inherit that... */
639 if (!IN_SET(i
, EXEC_INPUT_NULL
, EXEC_INPUT_DATA
))
640 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
642 /* If we are not started from PID 1 we just inherit STDOUT from our parent process. */
646 /* We need to open /dev/null here anew, to get the right access mode. */
647 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
652 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
:
653 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
655 case EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
:
656 if (is_terminal_input(i
))
657 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
659 /* We don't reset the terminal if this is just about output */
660 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
662 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
:
663 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
:
664 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
:
665 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
:
666 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
:
667 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
:
668 r
= connect_logger_as(unit
, context
, params
, o
, ident
, fileno
, uid
, gid
);
670 log_unit_warning_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to connect %s to the journal socket, ignoring: %m", fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
? "stdout" : "stderr");
671 r
= open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
675 /* If we connected this fd to the journal via a stream, patch the device/inode into the passed
676 * parameters, but only then. This is useful so that we can set $JOURNAL_STREAM that permits
677 * services to detect whether they are connected to the journal or not.
679 * If both stdout and stderr are connected to a stream then let's make sure to store the data
680 * about STDERR as that's usually the best way to do logging. */
682 if (fstat(fileno
, &st
) >= 0 &&
683 (*journal_stream_ino
== 0 || fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
)) {
684 *journal_stream_dev
= st
.st_dev
;
685 *journal_stream_ino
= st
.st_ino
;
690 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
:
691 assert(socket_fd
>= 0);
693 return dup2(socket_fd
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
695 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
:
696 assert(named_iofds
[fileno
] >= 0);
698 (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds
[fileno
], false);
699 return dup2(named_iofds
[fileno
], fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
701 case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
:
702 case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
: {
706 assert(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
]);
708 rw
= context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_FILE
&&
709 streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
], context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
712 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
715 if (o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
718 fd
= acquire_path(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
], flags
, 0666 & ~context
->umask
);
722 return move_fd(fd
, fileno
, 0);
726 assert_not_reached("Unknown error type");
730 static int chown_terminal(int fd
, uid_t uid
) {
735 /* Before we chown/chmod the TTY, let's ensure this is actually a tty */
739 /* This might fail. What matters are the results. */
740 (void) fchown(fd
, uid
, -1);
741 (void) fchmod(fd
, TTY_MODE
);
743 if (fstat(fd
, &st
) < 0)
746 if (st
.st_uid
!= uid
|| (st
.st_mode
& 0777) != TTY_MODE
)
752 static int setup_confirm_stdio(const char *vc
, int *_saved_stdin
, int *_saved_stdout
) {
753 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, saved_stdout
= -1;
756 assert(_saved_stdin
);
757 assert(_saved_stdout
);
759 saved_stdin
= fcntl(STDIN_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
763 saved_stdout
= fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
764 if (saved_stdout
< 0)
767 fd
= acquire_terminal(vc
, ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT
, DEFAULT_CONFIRM_USEC
);
771 r
= chown_terminal(fd
, getuid());
775 r
= reset_terminal_fd(fd
, true);
779 r
= rearrange_stdio(fd
, fd
, STDERR_FILENO
);
784 *_saved_stdin
= saved_stdin
;
785 *_saved_stdout
= saved_stdout
;
787 saved_stdin
= saved_stdout
= -1;
792 static void write_confirm_error_fd(int err
, int fd
, const Unit
*u
) {
795 if (err
== -ETIMEDOUT
)
796 dprintf(fd
, "Confirmation question timed out for %s, assuming positive response.\n", u
->id
);
799 dprintf(fd
, "Couldn't ask confirmation for %s: %m, assuming positive response.\n", u
->id
);
803 static void write_confirm_error(int err
, const char *vc
, const Unit
*u
) {
804 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
808 fd
= open_terminal(vc
, O_WRONLY
|O_NOCTTY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
812 write_confirm_error_fd(err
, fd
, u
);
815 static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin
, int *saved_stdout
) {
819 assert(saved_stdout
);
823 if (*saved_stdin
>= 0)
824 if (dup2(*saved_stdin
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
827 if (*saved_stdout
>= 0)
828 if (dup2(*saved_stdout
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
831 *saved_stdin
= safe_close(*saved_stdin
);
832 *saved_stdout
= safe_close(*saved_stdout
);
838 CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE
= -1,
839 CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
= 0,
843 static int ask_for_confirmation(const char *vc
, Unit
*u
, const char *cmdline
) {
844 int saved_stdout
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, r
;
845 _cleanup_free_
char *e
= NULL
;
848 /* For any internal errors, assume a positive response. */
849 r
= setup_confirm_stdio(vc
, &saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
851 write_confirm_error(r
, vc
, u
);
852 return CONFIRM_EXECUTE
;
855 /* confirm_spawn might have been disabled while we were sleeping. */
856 if (manager_is_confirm_spawn_disabled(u
->manager
)) {
861 e
= ellipsize(cmdline
, 60, 100);
869 r
= ask_char(&c
, "yfshiDjcn", "Execute %s? [y, f, s – h for help] ", e
);
871 write_confirm_error_fd(r
, STDOUT_FILENO
, u
);
878 printf("Resuming normal execution.\n");
879 manager_disable_confirm_spawn();
883 unit_dump(u
, stdout
, " ");
884 continue; /* ask again */
886 printf("Failing execution.\n");
887 r
= CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE
;
890 printf(" c - continue, proceed without asking anymore\n"
891 " D - dump, show the state of the unit\n"
892 " f - fail, don't execute the command and pretend it failed\n"
894 " i - info, show a short summary of the unit\n"
895 " j - jobs, show jobs that are in progress\n"
896 " s - skip, don't execute the command and pretend it succeeded\n"
897 " y - yes, execute the command\n");
898 continue; /* ask again */
900 printf(" Description: %s\n"
903 u
->id
, u
->description
, cmdline
);
904 continue; /* ask again */
906 manager_dump_jobs(u
->manager
, stdout
, " ");
907 continue; /* ask again */
909 /* 'n' was removed in favor of 'f'. */
910 printf("Didn't understand 'n', did you mean 'f'?\n");
911 continue; /* ask again */
913 printf("Skipping execution.\n");
914 r
= CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
;
920 assert_not_reached("Unhandled choice");
926 restore_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
930 static int get_fixed_user(const ExecContext
*c
, const char **user
,
931 uid_t
*uid
, gid_t
*gid
,
932 const char **home
, const char **shell
) {
941 /* Note that we don't set $HOME or $SHELL if they are not particularly enlightening anyway
942 * (i.e. are "/" or "/bin/nologin"). */
945 r
= get_user_creds(&name
, uid
, gid
, home
, shell
, USER_CREDS_CLEAN
);
953 static int get_fixed_group(const ExecContext
*c
, const char **group
, gid_t
*gid
) {
963 r
= get_group_creds(&name
, gid
, 0);
971 static int get_supplementary_groups(const ExecContext
*c
, const char *user
,
972 const char *group
, gid_t gid
,
973 gid_t
**supplementary_gids
, int *ngids
) {
977 bool keep_groups
= false;
978 gid_t
*groups
= NULL
;
979 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*l_gids
= NULL
;
984 * If user is given, then lookup GID and supplementary groups list.
985 * We avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. Also we have to initialize groups
986 * here and as early as possible so we keep the list of supplementary
987 * groups of the caller.
989 if (user
&& gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= 0) {
990 /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */
991 if (initgroups(user
, gid
) < 0)
997 if (strv_isempty(c
->supplementary_groups
))
1001 * If SupplementaryGroups= was passed then NGROUPS_MAX has to
1002 * be positive, otherwise fail.
1005 ngroups_max
= (int) sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX
);
1006 if (ngroups_max
<= 0) {
1010 return -EOPNOTSUPP
; /* For all other values */
1013 l_gids
= new(gid_t
, ngroups_max
);
1019 * Lookup the list of groups that the user belongs to, we
1020 * avoid NSS lookups here too for gid=0.
1023 if (getgrouplist(user
, gid
, l_gids
, &k
) < 0)
1028 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->supplementary_groups
) {
1031 if (k
>= ngroups_max
)
1035 r
= get_group_creds(&g
, l_gids
+k
, 0);
1043 * Sets ngids to zero to drop all supplementary groups, happens
1044 * when we are under root and SupplementaryGroups= is empty.
1051 /* Otherwise get the final list of supplementary groups */
1052 groups
= memdup(l_gids
, sizeof(gid_t
) * k
);
1056 *supplementary_gids
= groups
;
1064 static int enforce_groups(gid_t gid
, const gid_t
*supplementary_gids
, int ngids
) {
1067 /* Handle SupplementaryGroups= if it is not empty */
1069 r
= maybe_setgroups(ngids
, supplementary_gids
);
1074 if (gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
1075 /* Then set our gids */
1076 if (setresgid(gid
, gid
, gid
) < 0)
1083 static int enforce_user(const ExecContext
*context
, uid_t uid
) {
1086 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
))
1089 /* Sets (but doesn't look up) the uid and make sure we keep the
1090 * capabilities while doing so. */
1092 if (context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
1094 /* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but
1095 * drop privileges we need to make sure we keep our
1096 * caps, while we drop privileges. */
1098 int sb
= context
->secure_bits
| 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
;
1100 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
) != sb
)
1101 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, sb
) < 0)
1106 /* Second step: actually set the uids */
1107 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
1110 /* At this point we should have all necessary capabilities but
1111 are otherwise a normal user. However, the caps might got
1112 corrupted due to the setresuid() so we need clean them up
1113 later. This is done outside of this call. */
1120 static int null_conv(
1122 const struct pam_message
**msg
,
1123 struct pam_response
**resp
,
1124 void *appdata_ptr
) {
1126 /* We don't support conversations */
1128 return PAM_CONV_ERR
;
1133 static int setup_pam(
1140 int fds
[], size_t n_fds
) {
1144 static const struct pam_conv conv
= {
1149 _cleanup_(barrier_destroy
) Barrier barrier
= BARRIER_NULL
;
1150 pam_handle_t
*handle
= NULL
;
1152 int pam_code
= PAM_SUCCESS
, r
;
1153 char **nv
, **e
= NULL
;
1154 bool close_session
= false;
1155 pid_t pam_pid
= 0, parent_pid
;
1162 /* We set up PAM in the parent process, then fork. The child
1163 * will then stay around until killed via PR_GET_PDEATHSIG or
1164 * systemd via the cgroup logic. It will then remove the PAM
1165 * session again. The parent process will exec() the actual
1166 * daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID
1167 * of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */
1169 r
= barrier_create(&barrier
);
1173 if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG
)
1174 flags
|= PAM_SILENT
;
1176 pam_code
= pam_start(name
, user
, &conv
, &handle
);
1177 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
1183 _cleanup_free_
char *q
= NULL
;
1185 /* Hmm, so no TTY was explicitly passed, but an fd passed to us directly might be a TTY. Let's figure
1186 * out if that's the case, and read the TTY off it. */
1188 if (getttyname_malloc(STDIN_FILENO
, &q
) >= 0)
1189 tty
= strjoina("/dev/", q
);
1193 pam_code
= pam_set_item(handle
, PAM_TTY
, tty
);
1194 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1198 STRV_FOREACH(nv
, *env
) {
1199 pam_code
= pam_putenv(handle
, *nv
);
1200 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1204 pam_code
= pam_acct_mgmt(handle
, flags
);
1205 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1208 pam_code
= pam_open_session(handle
, flags
);
1209 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1212 close_session
= true;
1214 e
= pam_getenvlist(handle
);
1216 pam_code
= PAM_BUF_ERR
;
1220 /* Block SIGTERM, so that we know that it won't get lost in
1223 assert_se(sigprocmask_many(SIG_BLOCK
, &old_ss
, SIGTERM
, -1) >= 0);
1225 parent_pid
= getpid_cached();
1227 r
= safe_fork("(sd-pam)", 0, &pam_pid
);
1231 int sig
, ret
= EXIT_PAM
;
1233 /* The child's job is to reset the PAM session on
1235 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_CHILD
);
1237 /* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this child. We assume that otherwise only those fds
1238 * are open here that have been opened by PAM. */
1239 (void) close_many(fds
, n_fds
);
1241 /* Drop privileges - we don't need any to pam_close_session
1242 * and this will make PR_SET_PDEATHSIG work in most cases.
1243 * If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam threads
1244 * to fail to exit normally */
1246 r
= maybe_setgroups(0, NULL
);
1248 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to setgroups() in sd-pam: %m");
1249 if (setresgid(gid
, gid
, gid
) < 0)
1250 log_warning_errno(errno
, "Failed to setresgid() in sd-pam: %m");
1251 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
1252 log_warning_errno(errno
, "Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m");
1254 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
1256 /* Wait until our parent died. This will only work if
1257 * the above setresuid() succeeds, otherwise the kernel
1258 * will not allow unprivileged parents kill their privileged
1259 * children this way. We rely on the control groups kill logic
1260 * to do the rest for us. */
1261 if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG
, SIGTERM
) < 0)
1264 /* Tell the parent that our setup is done. This is especially
1265 * important regarding dropping privileges. Otherwise, unit
1266 * setup might race against our setresuid(2) call.
1268 * If the parent aborted, we'll detect this below, hence ignore
1269 * return failure here. */
1270 (void) barrier_place(&barrier
);
1272 /* Check if our parent process might already have died? */
1273 if (getppid() == parent_pid
) {
1276 assert_se(sigemptyset(&ss
) >= 0);
1277 assert_se(sigaddset(&ss
, SIGTERM
) >= 0);
1280 if (sigwait(&ss
, &sig
) < 0) {
1287 assert(sig
== SIGTERM
);
1292 /* If our parent died we'll end the session */
1293 if (getppid() != parent_pid
) {
1294 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
1295 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1302 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
1306 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_PARENT
);
1308 /* If the child was forked off successfully it will do all the
1309 * cleanups, so forget about the handle here. */
1312 /* Unblock SIGTERM again in the parent */
1313 assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK
, &old_ss
, NULL
) >= 0);
1315 /* We close the log explicitly here, since the PAM modules
1316 * might have opened it, but we don't want this fd around. */
1319 /* Synchronously wait for the child to initialize. We don't care for
1320 * errors as we cannot recover. However, warn loudly if it happens. */
1321 if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier
))
1322 log_error("PAM initialization failed");
1324 return strv_free_and_replace(*env
, e
);
1327 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
1328 log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle
, pam_code
));
1329 r
= -EPERM
; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */
1331 log_error_errno(r
, "PAM failed: %m");
1335 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
1337 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
1349 static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path
) {
1350 char process_name
[11];
1354 /* This resulting string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
1355 * of "/sbin/init") to look pretty in /bin/ps */
1359 rename_process("(...)");
1365 /* The end of the process name is usually more
1366 * interesting, since the first bit might just be
1372 process_name
[0] = '(';
1373 memcpy(process_name
+1, p
, l
);
1374 process_name
[1+l
] = ')';
1375 process_name
[1+l
+1] = 0;
1377 rename_process(process_name
);
1380 static bool context_has_address_families(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1383 return c
->address_families_whitelist
||
1384 !set_isempty(c
->address_families
);
1387 static bool context_has_syscall_filters(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1390 return c
->syscall_whitelist
||
1391 !hashmap_isempty(c
->syscall_filter
);
1394 static bool context_has_no_new_privileges(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1397 if (c
->no_new_privileges
)
1400 if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) /* if we are privileged, we don't need NNP */
1403 /* We need NNP if we have any form of seccomp and are unprivileged */
1404 return context_has_address_families(c
) ||
1405 c
->memory_deny_write_execute
||
1406 c
->restrict_realtime
||
1407 exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
) ||
1408 c
->protect_kernel_tunables
||
1409 c
->protect_kernel_modules
||
1410 c
->private_devices
||
1411 context_has_syscall_filters(c
) ||
1412 !set_isempty(c
->syscall_archs
) ||
1413 c
->lock_personality
||
1414 c
->protect_hostname
;
1419 static bool skip_seccomp_unavailable(const Unit
* u
, const char* msg
) {
1421 if (is_seccomp_available())
1424 log_unit_debug(u
, "SECCOMP features not detected in the kernel, skipping %s", msg
);
1428 static int apply_syscall_filter(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
, bool needs_ambient_hack
) {
1429 uint32_t negative_action
, default_action
, action
;
1435 if (!context_has_syscall_filters(c
))
1438 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "SystemCallFilter="))
1441 negative_action
= c
->syscall_errno
== 0 ? SCMP_ACT_KILL
: SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c
->syscall_errno
);
1443 if (c
->syscall_whitelist
) {
1444 default_action
= negative_action
;
1445 action
= SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
;
1447 default_action
= SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
;
1448 action
= negative_action
;
1451 if (needs_ambient_hack
) {
1452 r
= seccomp_filter_set_add(c
->syscall_filter
, c
->syscall_whitelist
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SETUID
);
1457 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(default_action
, c
->syscall_filter
, action
, false);
1460 static int apply_syscall_archs(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1464 if (set_isempty(c
->syscall_archs
))
1467 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "SystemCallArchitectures="))
1470 return seccomp_restrict_archs(c
->syscall_archs
);
1473 static int apply_address_families(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1477 if (!context_has_address_families(c
))
1480 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictAddressFamilies="))
1483 return seccomp_restrict_address_families(c
->address_families
, c
->address_families_whitelist
);
1486 static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1490 if (!c
->memory_deny_write_execute
)
1493 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "MemoryDenyWriteExecute="))
1496 return seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute();
1499 static int apply_restrict_realtime(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1503 if (!c
->restrict_realtime
)
1506 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictRealtime="))
1509 return seccomp_restrict_realtime();
1512 static int apply_protect_sysctl(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1516 /* Turn off the legacy sysctl() system call. Many distributions turn this off while building the kernel, but
1517 * let's protect even those systems where this is left on in the kernel. */
1519 if (!c
->protect_kernel_tunables
)
1522 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectKernelTunables="))
1525 return seccomp_protect_sysctl();
1528 static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1532 /* Turn off module syscalls on ProtectKernelModules=yes */
1534 if (!c
->protect_kernel_modules
)
1537 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectKernelModules="))
1540 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE
, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
), false);
1543 static int apply_private_devices(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1547 /* If PrivateDevices= is set, also turn off iopl and all @raw-io syscalls. */
1549 if (!c
->private_devices
)
1552 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "PrivateDevices="))
1555 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO
, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
), false);
1558 static int apply_restrict_namespaces(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1562 if (!exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
))
1565 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictNamespaces="))
1568 return seccomp_restrict_namespaces(c
->restrict_namespaces
);
1571 static int apply_lock_personality(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1572 unsigned long personality
;
1578 if (!c
->lock_personality
)
1581 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "LockPersonality="))
1584 personality
= c
->personality
;
1586 /* If personality is not specified, use either PER_LINUX or PER_LINUX32 depending on what is currently set. */
1587 if (personality
== PERSONALITY_INVALID
) {
1589 r
= opinionated_personality(&personality
);
1594 return seccomp_lock_personality(personality
);
1599 static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe
[static 4]) {
1602 idle_pipe
[1] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[1]);
1603 idle_pipe
[2] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[2]);
1605 if (idle_pipe
[0] >= 0) {
1608 r
= fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC
);
1610 if (idle_pipe
[3] >= 0 && r
== 0 /* timeout */) {
1613 /* Signal systemd that we are bored and want to continue. */
1614 n
= write(idle_pipe
[3], "x", 1);
1616 /* Wait for systemd to react to the signal above. */
1617 fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC
);
1620 idle_pipe
[0] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[0]);
1624 idle_pipe
[3] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[3]);
1627 static const char *exec_directory_env_name_to_string(ExecDirectoryType t
);
1629 static int build_environment(
1631 const ExecContext
*c
,
1632 const ExecParameters
*p
,
1635 const char *username
,
1637 dev_t journal_stream_dev
,
1638 ino_t journal_stream_ino
,
1641 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
;
1642 ExecDirectoryType t
;
1651 our_env
= new0(char*, 14 + _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
1656 _cleanup_free_
char *joined
= NULL
;
1658 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid_cached()) < 0)
1660 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1662 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_FDS=%zu", n_fds
) < 0)
1664 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1666 joined
= strv_join(p
->fd_names
, ":");
1670 x
= strjoin("LISTEN_FDNAMES=", joined
);
1673 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1676 if ((p
->flags
& EXEC_SET_WATCHDOG
) && p
->watchdog_usec
> 0) {
1677 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid_cached()) < 0)
1679 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1681 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_USEC="USEC_FMT
, p
->watchdog_usec
) < 0)
1683 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1686 /* If this is D-Bus, tell the nss-systemd module, since it relies on being able to use D-Bus look up dynamic
1687 * users via PID 1, possibly dead-locking the dbus daemon. This way it will not use D-Bus to resolve names, but
1688 * check the database directly. */
1689 if (p
->flags
& EXEC_NSS_BYPASS_BUS
) {
1690 x
= strdup("SYSTEMD_NSS_BYPASS_BUS=1");
1693 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1697 x
= strappend("HOME=", home
);
1701 path_simplify(x
+ 5, true);
1702 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1706 x
= strappend("LOGNAME=", username
);
1709 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1711 x
= strappend("USER=", username
);
1714 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1718 x
= strappend("SHELL=", shell
);
1722 path_simplify(x
+ 6, true);
1723 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1726 if (!sd_id128_is_null(u
->invocation_id
)) {
1727 if (asprintf(&x
, "INVOCATION_ID=" SD_ID128_FORMAT_STR
, SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(u
->invocation_id
)) < 0)
1730 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1733 if (exec_context_needs_term(c
)) {
1734 const char *tty_path
, *term
= NULL
;
1736 tty_path
= exec_context_tty_path(c
);
1738 /* If we are forked off PID 1 and we are supposed to operate on /dev/console, then let's try to inherit
1739 * the $TERM set for PID 1. This is useful for containers so that the $TERM the container manager
1740 * passes to PID 1 ends up all the way in the console login shown. */
1742 if (path_equal(tty_path
, "/dev/console") && getppid() == 1)
1743 term
= getenv("TERM");
1745 term
= default_term_for_tty(tty_path
);
1747 x
= strappend("TERM=", term
);
1750 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1753 if (journal_stream_dev
!= 0 && journal_stream_ino
!= 0) {
1754 if (asprintf(&x
, "JOURNAL_STREAM=" DEV_FMT
":" INO_FMT
, journal_stream_dev
, journal_stream_ino
) < 0)
1757 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1760 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
1761 _cleanup_free_
char *pre
= NULL
, *joined
= NULL
;
1767 if (strv_isempty(c
->directories
[t
].paths
))
1770 n
= exec_directory_env_name_to_string(t
);
1774 pre
= strjoin(p
->prefix
[t
], "/");
1778 joined
= strv_join_prefix(c
->directories
[t
].paths
, ":", pre
);
1782 x
= strjoin(n
, "=", joined
);
1786 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1789 our_env
[n_env
++] = NULL
;
1790 assert(n_env
<= 14 + _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
1792 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(our_env
);
1797 static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext
*c
, char ***ret
) {
1798 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **pass_env
= NULL
;
1799 size_t n_env
= 0, n_bufsize
= 0;
1802 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->pass_environment
) {
1803 _cleanup_free_
char *x
= NULL
;
1809 x
= strjoin(*i
, "=", v
);
1813 if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(pass_env
, n_bufsize
, n_env
+ 2))
1816 pass_env
[n_env
++] = TAKE_PTR(x
);
1817 pass_env
[n_env
] = NULL
;
1820 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(pass_env
);
1825 static bool exec_needs_mount_namespace(
1826 const ExecContext
*context
,
1827 const ExecParameters
*params
,
1828 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
) {
1833 if (context
->root_image
)
1836 if (!strv_isempty(context
->read_write_paths
) ||
1837 !strv_isempty(context
->read_only_paths
) ||
1838 !strv_isempty(context
->inaccessible_paths
))
1841 if (context
->n_bind_mounts
> 0)
1844 if (context
->n_temporary_filesystems
> 0)
1847 if (!IN_SET(context
->mount_flags
, 0, MS_SHARED
))
1850 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
&& (runtime
->tmp_dir
|| runtime
->var_tmp_dir
))
1853 if (context
->private_devices
||
1854 context
->private_mounts
||
1855 context
->protect_system
!= PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO
||
1856 context
->protect_home
!= PROTECT_HOME_NO
||
1857 context
->protect_kernel_tunables
||
1858 context
->protect_kernel_modules
||
1859 context
->protect_control_groups
)
1862 if (context
->root_directory
) {
1863 ExecDirectoryType t
;
1865 if (context
->mount_apivfs
)
1868 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
1869 if (!params
->prefix
[t
])
1872 if (!strv_isempty(context
->directories
[t
].paths
))
1877 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
1878 (!strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
].paths
) ||
1879 !strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
].paths
) ||
1880 !strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
].paths
)))
1886 static int setup_private_users(uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
1887 _cleanup_free_
char *uid_map
= NULL
, *gid_map
= NULL
;
1888 _cleanup_close_pair_
int errno_pipe
[2] = { -1, -1 };
1889 _cleanup_close_
int unshare_ready_fd
= -1;
1890 _cleanup_(sigkill_waitp
) pid_t pid
= 0;
1895 /* Set up a user namespace and map root to root, the selected UID/GID to itself, and everything else to
1896 * nobody. In order to be able to write this mapping we need CAP_SETUID in the original user namespace, which
1897 * we however lack after opening the user namespace. To work around this we fork() a temporary child process,
1898 * which waits for the parent to create the new user namespace while staying in the original namespace. The
1899 * child then writes the UID mapping, under full privileges. The parent waits for the child to finish and
1900 * continues execution normally. */
1902 if (uid
!= 0 && uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
1903 r
= asprintf(&uid_map
,
1904 "0 0 1\n" /* Map root → root */
1905 UID_FMT
" " UID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $UID → $UID */
1910 uid_map
= strdup("0 0 1\n"); /* The case where the above is the same */
1915 if (gid
!= 0 && gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
1916 r
= asprintf(&gid_map
,
1917 "0 0 1\n" /* Map root → root */
1918 GID_FMT
" " GID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $GID → $GID */
1923 gid_map
= strdup("0 0 1\n"); /* The case where the above is the same */
1928 /* Create a communication channel so that the parent can tell the child when it finished creating the user
1930 unshare_ready_fd
= eventfd(0, EFD_CLOEXEC
);
1931 if (unshare_ready_fd
< 0)
1934 /* Create a communication channel so that the child can tell the parent a proper error code in case it
1936 if (pipe2(errno_pipe
, O_CLOEXEC
) < 0)
1939 r
= safe_fork("(sd-userns)", FORK_RESET_SIGNALS
|FORK_DEATHSIG
, &pid
);
1943 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
1947 /* Child process, running in the original user namespace. Let's update the parent's UID/GID map from
1948 * here, after the parent opened its own user namespace. */
1951 errno_pipe
[0] = safe_close(errno_pipe
[0]);
1953 /* Wait until the parent unshared the user namespace */
1954 if (read(unshare_ready_fd
, &c
, sizeof(c
)) < 0) {
1959 /* Disable the setgroups() system call in the child user namespace, for good. */
1960 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "setgroups");
1961 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
1963 if (errno
!= ENOENT
) {
1968 /* If the file is missing the kernel is too old, let's continue anyway. */
1970 if (write(fd
, "deny\n", 5) < 0) {
1975 fd
= safe_close(fd
);
1978 /* First write the GID map */
1979 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "gid_map");
1980 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
1985 if (write(fd
, gid_map
, strlen(gid_map
)) < 0) {
1989 fd
= safe_close(fd
);
1991 /* The write the UID map */
1992 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "uid_map");
1993 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
1998 if (write(fd
, uid_map
, strlen(uid_map
)) < 0) {
2003 _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS
);
2006 (void) write(errno_pipe
[1], &r
, sizeof(r
));
2007 _exit(EXIT_FAILURE
);
2010 errno_pipe
[1] = safe_close(errno_pipe
[1]);
2012 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER
) < 0)
2015 /* Let the child know that the namespace is ready now */
2016 if (write(unshare_ready_fd
, &c
, sizeof(c
)) < 0)
2019 /* Try to read an error code from the child */
2020 n
= read(errno_pipe
[0], &r
, sizeof(r
));
2023 if (n
== sizeof(r
)) { /* an error code was sent to us */
2028 if (n
!= 0) /* on success we should have read 0 bytes */
2031 r
= wait_for_terminate_and_check("(sd-userns)", pid
, 0);
2035 if (r
!= EXIT_SUCCESS
) /* If something strange happened with the child, let's consider this fatal, too */
2041 static int setup_exec_directory(
2042 const ExecContext
*context
,
2043 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2046 ExecDirectoryType type
,
2049 static const int exit_status_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
2050 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY
,
2051 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = EXIT_STATE_DIRECTORY
,
2052 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = EXIT_CACHE_DIRECTORY
,
2053 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = EXIT_LOGS_DIRECTORY
,
2054 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = EXIT_CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY
,
2061 assert(type
>= 0 && type
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
2062 assert(exit_status
);
2064 if (!params
->prefix
[type
])
2067 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_CHOWN_DIRECTORIES
) {
2068 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
))
2070 if (!gid_is_valid(gid
))
2074 STRV_FOREACH(rt
, context
->directories
[type
].paths
) {
2075 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
, *pp
= NULL
;
2077 p
= path_join(params
->prefix
[type
], *rt
);
2083 r
= mkdir_parents_label(p
, 0755);
2087 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
2088 (!IN_SET(type
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
) ||
2089 (type
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
&& context
->runtime_directory_preserve_mode
!= EXEC_PRESERVE_NO
))) {
2090 _cleanup_free_
char *private_root
= NULL
;
2092 /* So, here's one extra complication when dealing with DynamicUser=1 units. In that case we
2093 * want to avoid leaving a directory around fully accessible that is owned by a dynamic user
2094 * whose UID is later on reused. To lock this down we use the same trick used by container
2095 * managers to prohibit host users to get access to files of the same UID in containers: we
2096 * place everything inside a directory that has an access mode of 0700 and is owned root:root,
2097 * so that it acts as security boundary for unprivileged host code. We then use fs namespacing
2098 * to make this directory permeable for the service itself.
2100 * Specifically: for a service which wants a special directory "foo/" we first create a
2101 * directory "private/" with access mode 0700 owned by root:root. Then we place "foo" inside of
2102 * that directory (i.e. "private/foo/"), and make "foo" a symlink to "private/foo". This way,
2103 * privileged host users can access "foo/" as usual, but unprivileged host users can't look
2104 * into it. Inside of the namespaceof the container "private/" is replaced by a more liberally
2105 * accessible tmpfs, into which the host's "private/foo/" is mounted under the same name, thus
2106 * disabling the access boundary for the service and making sure it only gets access to the
2107 * dirs it needs but no others. Tricky? Yes, absolutely, but it works!
2109 * Note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION as that's assumed not to be
2110 * owned by the service itself.
2111 * Also, note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME as that's often used for sharing
2112 * files or sockets with other services. */
2114 private_root
= path_join(params
->prefix
[type
], "private");
2115 if (!private_root
) {
2120 /* First set up private root if it doesn't exist yet, with access mode 0700 and owned by root:root */
2121 r
= mkdir_safe_label(private_root
, 0700, 0, 0, MKDIR_WARN_MODE
);
2125 pp
= path_join(private_root
, *rt
);
2131 /* Create all directories between the configured directory and this private root, and mark them 0755 */
2132 r
= mkdir_parents_label(pp
, 0755);
2136 if (is_dir(p
, false) > 0 &&
2137 (laccess(pp
, F_OK
) < 0 && errno
== ENOENT
)) {
2139 /* Hmm, the private directory doesn't exist yet, but the normal one exists? If so, move
2140 * it over. Most likely the service has been upgraded from one that didn't use
2141 * DynamicUser=1, to one that does. */
2143 if (rename(p
, pp
) < 0) {
2148 /* Otherwise, create the actual directory for the service */
2150 r
= mkdir_label(pp
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
);
2151 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -EEXIST
)
2155 /* And link it up from the original place */
2156 r
= symlink_idempotent(pp
, p
, true);
2161 r
= mkdir_label(p
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
);
2166 if (type
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
) {
2169 /* Don't change the owner/access mode of the configuration directory,
2170 * as in the common case it is not written to by a service, and shall
2171 * not be writable. */
2173 if (stat(p
, &st
) < 0) {
2178 /* Still complain if the access mode doesn't match */
2179 if (((st
.st_mode
^ context
->directories
[type
].mode
) & 07777) != 0)
2180 log_warning("%s \'%s\' already exists but the mode is different. "
2181 "(File system: %o %sMode: %o)",
2182 exec_directory_type_to_string(type
), *rt
,
2183 st
.st_mode
& 07777, exec_directory_type_to_string(type
), context
->directories
[type
].mode
& 07777);
2190 /* Lock down the access mode (we use chmod_and_chown() to make this idempotent. We don't
2191 * specifiy UID/GID here, so that path_chown_recursive() can optimize things depending on the
2192 * current UID/GID ownership.) */
2193 r
= chmod_and_chown(pp
?: p
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
, UID_INVALID
, GID_INVALID
);
2197 /* Then, change the ownership of the whole tree, if necessary */
2198 r
= path_chown_recursive(pp
?: p
, uid
, gid
);
2206 *exit_status
= exit_status_table
[type
];
2211 static int setup_smack(
2212 const ExecContext
*context
,
2213 const ExecCommand
*command
) {
2220 if (context
->smack_process_label
) {
2221 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context
->smack_process_label
);
2225 #ifdef SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
2227 _cleanup_free_
char *exec_label
= NULL
;
2229 r
= mac_smack_read(command
->path
, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC
, &exec_label
);
2230 if (r
< 0 && !IN_SET(r
, -ENODATA
, -EOPNOTSUPP
))
2233 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label
? : SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
);
2243 static int compile_bind_mounts(
2244 const ExecContext
*context
,
2245 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2246 BindMount
**ret_bind_mounts
,
2247 size_t *ret_n_bind_mounts
,
2248 char ***ret_empty_directories
) {
2250 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **empty_directories
= NULL
;
2251 BindMount
*bind_mounts
;
2253 ExecDirectoryType t
;
2258 assert(ret_bind_mounts
);
2259 assert(ret_n_bind_mounts
);
2260 assert(ret_empty_directories
);
2262 n
= context
->n_bind_mounts
;
2263 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
2264 if (!params
->prefix
[t
])
2267 n
+= strv_length(context
->directories
[t
].paths
);
2271 *ret_bind_mounts
= NULL
;
2272 *ret_n_bind_mounts
= 0;
2273 *ret_empty_directories
= NULL
;
2277 bind_mounts
= new(BindMount
, n
);
2281 for (i
= 0; i
< context
->n_bind_mounts
; i
++) {
2282 BindMount
*item
= context
->bind_mounts
+ i
;
2285 s
= strdup(item
->source
);
2291 d
= strdup(item
->destination
);
2298 bind_mounts
[h
++] = (BindMount
) {
2301 .read_only
= item
->read_only
,
2302 .recursive
= item
->recursive
,
2303 .ignore_enoent
= item
->ignore_enoent
,
2307 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
2310 if (!params
->prefix
[t
])
2313 if (strv_isempty(context
->directories
[t
].paths
))
2316 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
2317 !IN_SET(t
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
) &&
2318 !(context
->root_directory
|| context
->root_image
)) {
2321 /* So this is for a dynamic user, and we need to make sure the process can access its own
2322 * directory. For that we overmount the usually inaccessible "private" subdirectory with a
2323 * tmpfs that makes it accessible and is empty except for the submounts we do this for. */
2325 private_root
= strjoin(params
->prefix
[t
], "/private");
2326 if (!private_root
) {
2331 r
= strv_consume(&empty_directories
, private_root
);
2336 STRV_FOREACH(suffix
, context
->directories
[t
].paths
) {
2339 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
2340 !IN_SET(t
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
))
2341 s
= strjoin(params
->prefix
[t
], "/private/", *suffix
);
2343 s
= strjoin(params
->prefix
[t
], "/", *suffix
);
2349 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
2350 !IN_SET(t
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
) &&
2351 (context
->root_directory
|| context
->root_image
))
2352 /* When RootDirectory= or RootImage= are set, then the symbolic link to the private
2353 * directory is not created on the root directory. So, let's bind-mount the directory
2354 * on the 'non-private' place. */
2355 d
= strjoin(params
->prefix
[t
], "/", *suffix
);
2364 bind_mounts
[h
++] = (BindMount
) {
2369 .ignore_enoent
= false,
2376 *ret_bind_mounts
= bind_mounts
;
2377 *ret_n_bind_mounts
= n
;
2378 *ret_empty_directories
= TAKE_PTR(empty_directories
);
2383 bind_mount_free_many(bind_mounts
, h
);
2387 static int apply_mount_namespace(
2389 const ExecCommand
*command
,
2390 const ExecContext
*context
,
2391 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2392 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
) {
2394 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **empty_directories
= NULL
;
2395 char *tmp
= NULL
, *var
= NULL
;
2396 const char *root_dir
= NULL
, *root_image
= NULL
;
2397 NamespaceInfo ns_info
;
2398 bool needs_sandboxing
;
2399 BindMount
*bind_mounts
= NULL
;
2400 size_t n_bind_mounts
= 0;
2405 /* The runtime struct only contains the parent of the private /tmp,
2406 * which is non-accessible to world users. Inside of it there's a /tmp
2407 * that is sticky, and that's the one we want to use here. */
2409 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
) {
2410 if (runtime
->tmp_dir
)
2411 tmp
= strjoina(runtime
->tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
2412 if (runtime
->var_tmp_dir
)
2413 var
= strjoina(runtime
->var_tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
2416 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
) {
2417 root_image
= context
->root_image
;
2420 root_dir
= context
->root_directory
;
2423 r
= compile_bind_mounts(context
, params
, &bind_mounts
, &n_bind_mounts
, &empty_directories
);
2427 needs_sandboxing
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
);
2428 if (needs_sandboxing
)
2429 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {
2430 .ignore_protect_paths
= false,
2431 .private_dev
= context
->private_devices
,
2432 .protect_control_groups
= context
->protect_control_groups
,
2433 .protect_kernel_tunables
= context
->protect_kernel_tunables
,
2434 .protect_kernel_modules
= context
->protect_kernel_modules
,
2435 .protect_hostname
= context
->protect_hostname
,
2436 .mount_apivfs
= context
->mount_apivfs
,
2437 .private_mounts
= context
->private_mounts
,
2439 else if (!context
->dynamic_user
&& root_dir
)
2441 * If DynamicUser=no and RootDirectory= is set then lets pass a relaxed
2442 * sandbox info, otherwise enforce it, don't ignore protected paths and
2443 * fail if we are enable to apply the sandbox inside the mount namespace.
2445 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {
2446 .ignore_protect_paths
= true,
2449 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {};
2451 if (context
->mount_flags
== MS_SHARED
)
2452 log_unit_debug(u
, "shared mount propagation hidden by other fs namespacing unit settings: ignoring");
2454 r
= setup_namespace(root_dir
, root_image
,
2455 &ns_info
, context
->read_write_paths
,
2456 needs_sandboxing
? context
->read_only_paths
: NULL
,
2457 needs_sandboxing
? context
->inaccessible_paths
: NULL
,
2461 context
->temporary_filesystems
,
2462 context
->n_temporary_filesystems
,
2465 needs_sandboxing
? context
->protect_home
: PROTECT_HOME_NO
,
2466 needs_sandboxing
? context
->protect_system
: PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO
,
2467 context
->mount_flags
,
2468 DISSECT_IMAGE_DISCARD_ON_LOOP
);
2470 bind_mount_free_many(bind_mounts
, n_bind_mounts
);
2472 /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is probably due to a missing capability. setup_namespace() reports
2473 * that with a special, recognizable error ENOANO. In this case, silently proceeed, but only if exclusively
2474 * sandboxing options were used, i.e. nothing such as RootDirectory= or BindMount= that would result in a
2475 * completely different execution environment. */
2477 if (n_bind_mounts
== 0 &&
2478 context
->n_temporary_filesystems
== 0 &&
2479 !root_dir
&& !root_image
&&
2480 !context
->dynamic_user
) {
2481 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution and ignoring.");
2485 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to set up namespace, and refusing to continue since the selected namespacing options alter mount environment non-trivially.\n"
2486 "Bind mounts: %zu, temporary filesystems: %zu, root directory: %s, root image: %s, dynamic user: %s",
2487 n_bind_mounts
, context
->n_temporary_filesystems
, yes_no(root_dir
), yes_no(root_image
), yes_no(context
->dynamic_user
));
2495 static int apply_working_directory(
2496 const ExecContext
*context
,
2497 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2499 const bool needs_mount_ns
,
2505 assert(exit_status
);
2507 if (context
->working_directory_home
) {
2510 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
2516 } else if (context
->working_directory
)
2517 wd
= context
->working_directory
;
2521 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
) {
2522 if (!needs_mount_ns
&& context
->root_directory
)
2523 if (chroot(context
->root_directory
) < 0) {
2524 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHROOT
;
2530 d
= prefix_roota(context
->root_directory
, wd
);
2532 if (chdir(d
) < 0 && !context
->working_directory_missing_ok
) {
2533 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
2540 static int setup_keyring(
2542 const ExecContext
*context
,
2543 const ExecParameters
*p
,
2544 uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
2546 key_serial_t keyring
;
2555 /* Let's set up a new per-service "session" kernel keyring for each system service. This has the benefit that
2556 * each service runs with its own keyring shared among all processes of the service, but with no hook-up beyond
2557 * that scope, and in particular no link to the per-UID keyring. If we don't do this the keyring will be
2558 * automatically created on-demand and then linked to the per-UID keyring, by the kernel. The kernel's built-in
2559 * on-demand behaviour is very appropriate for login users, but probably not so much for system services, where
2560 * UIDs are not necessarily specific to a service but reused (at least in the case of UID 0). */
2562 if (context
->keyring_mode
== EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT
)
2565 /* Acquiring a reference to the user keyring is nasty. We briefly change identity in order to get things set up
2566 * properly by the kernel. If we don't do that then we can't create it atomically, and that sucks for parallel
2567 * execution. This mimics what pam_keyinit does, too. Setting up session keyring, to be owned by the right user
2568 * & group is just as nasty as acquiring a reference to the user keyring. */
2570 saved_uid
= getuid();
2571 saved_gid
= getgid();
2573 if (gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= saved_gid
) {
2574 if (setregid(gid
, -1) < 0)
2575 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change GID for user keyring: %m");
2578 if (uid_is_valid(uid
) && uid
!= saved_uid
) {
2579 if (setreuid(uid
, -1) < 0) {
2580 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change UID for user keyring: %m");
2585 keyring
= keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING
, 0, 0, 0, 0);
2586 if (keyring
== -1) {
2587 if (errno
== ENOSYS
)
2588 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Kernel keyring not supported, ignoring.");
2589 else if (IN_SET(errno
, EACCES
, EPERM
))
2590 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Kernel keyring access prohibited, ignoring.");
2591 else if (errno
== EDQUOT
)
2592 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Out of kernel keyrings to allocate, ignoring.");
2594 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Setting up kernel keyring failed: %m");
2599 /* When requested link the user keyring into the session keyring. */
2600 if (context
->keyring_mode
== EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED
) {
2602 if (keyctl(KEYCTL_LINK
,
2603 KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING
,
2604 KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING
, 0, 0) < 0) {
2605 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to link user keyring into session keyring: %m");
2610 /* Restore uid/gid back */
2611 if (uid_is_valid(uid
) && uid
!= saved_uid
) {
2612 if (setreuid(saved_uid
, -1) < 0) {
2613 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change UID back for user keyring: %m");
2618 if (gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= saved_gid
) {
2619 if (setregid(saved_gid
, -1) < 0)
2620 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change GID back for user keyring: %m");
2623 /* Populate they keyring with the invocation ID by default, as original saved_uid. */
2624 if (!sd_id128_is_null(u
->invocation_id
)) {
2627 key
= add_key("user", "invocation_id", &u
->invocation_id
, sizeof(u
->invocation_id
), KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING
);
2629 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to add invocation ID to keyring, ignoring: %m");
2631 if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM
, key
,
2632 KEY_POS_VIEW
|KEY_POS_READ
|KEY_POS_SEARCH
|
2633 KEY_USR_VIEW
|KEY_USR_READ
|KEY_USR_SEARCH
, 0, 0) < 0)
2634 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to restrict invocation ID permission: %m");
2639 /* Revert back uid & gid for the the last time, and exit */
2640 /* no extra logging, as only the first already reported error matters */
2641 if (getuid() != saved_uid
)
2642 (void) setreuid(saved_uid
, -1);
2644 if (getgid() != saved_gid
)
2645 (void) setregid(saved_gid
, -1);
2650 static void append_socket_pair(int *array
, size_t *n
, const int pair
[static 2]) {
2658 array
[(*n
)++] = pair
[0];
2660 array
[(*n
)++] = pair
[1];
2663 static int close_remaining_fds(
2664 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2665 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
2666 const DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
2670 int *fds
, size_t n_fds
) {
2672 size_t n_dont_close
= 0;
2673 int dont_close
[n_fds
+ 12];
2677 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
2678 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdin_fd
;
2679 if (params
->stdout_fd
>= 0)
2680 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdout_fd
;
2681 if (params
->stderr_fd
>= 0)
2682 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stderr_fd
;
2685 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = socket_fd
;
2687 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = exec_fd
;
2689 memcpy(dont_close
+ n_dont_close
, fds
, sizeof(int) * n_fds
);
2690 n_dont_close
+= n_fds
;
2694 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, runtime
->netns_storage_socket
);
2698 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, dcreds
->user
->storage_socket
);
2700 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, dcreds
->group
->storage_socket
);
2703 if (user_lookup_fd
>= 0)
2704 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = user_lookup_fd
;
2706 return close_all_fds(dont_close
, n_dont_close
);
2709 static int send_user_lookup(
2717 /* Send the resolved UID/GID to PID 1 after we learnt it. We send a single datagram, containing the UID/GID
2718 * data as well as the unit name. Note that we suppress sending this if no user/group to resolve was
2721 if (user_lookup_fd
< 0)
2724 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
) && !gid_is_valid(gid
))
2727 if (writev(user_lookup_fd
,
2729 IOVEC_INIT(&uid
, sizeof(uid
)),
2730 IOVEC_INIT(&gid
, sizeof(gid
)),
2731 IOVEC_INIT_STRING(unit
->id
) }, 3) < 0)
2737 static int acquire_home(const ExecContext
*c
, uid_t uid
, const char** home
, char **buf
) {
2744 /* If WorkingDirectory=~ is set, try to acquire a usable home directory. */
2749 if (!c
->working_directory_home
)
2752 r
= get_home_dir(buf
);
2760 static int compile_suggested_paths(const ExecContext
*c
, const ExecParameters
*p
, char ***ret
) {
2761 _cleanup_strv_free_
char ** list
= NULL
;
2762 ExecDirectoryType t
;
2769 assert(c
->dynamic_user
);
2771 /* Compile a list of paths that it might make sense to read the owning UID from to use as initial candidate for
2772 * dynamic UID allocation, in order to save us from doing costly recursive chown()s of the special
2775 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
2778 if (t
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
)
2784 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->directories
[t
].paths
) {
2787 if (t
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
)
2788 e
= strjoin(p
->prefix
[t
], "/", *i
);
2790 e
= strjoin(p
->prefix
[t
], "/private/", *i
);
2794 r
= strv_consume(&list
, e
);
2800 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(list
);
2805 static char *exec_command_line(char **argv
);
2807 static int exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(const ExecParameters
*params
, char **ret
) {
2808 bool using_subcgroup
;
2814 if (!params
->cgroup_path
)
2817 /* If we are called for a unit where cgroup delegation is on, and the payload created its own populated
2818 * subcgroup (which we expect it to do, after all it asked for delegation), then we cannot place the control
2819 * processes started after the main unit's process in the unit's main cgroup because it is now an inner one,
2820 * and inner cgroups may not contain processes. Hence, if delegation is on, and this is a control process,
2821 * let's use ".control" as subcgroup instead. Note that we do so only for ExecStartPost=, ExecReload=,
2822 * ExecStop=, ExecStopPost=, i.e. for the commands where the main process is already forked. For ExecStartPre=
2823 * this is not necessary, the cgroup is still empty. We distinguish these cases with the EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP
2824 * flag, which is only passed for the former statements, not for the latter. */
2826 using_subcgroup
= FLAGS_SET(params
->flags
, EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP
|EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE
|EXEC_IS_CONTROL
);
2827 if (using_subcgroup
)
2828 p
= strjoin(params
->cgroup_path
, "/.control");
2830 p
= strdup(params
->cgroup_path
);
2835 return using_subcgroup
;
2838 static int exec_child(
2840 const ExecCommand
*command
,
2841 const ExecContext
*context
,
2842 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2843 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
2844 DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
2848 size_t n_socket_fds
,
2849 size_t n_storage_fds
,
2854 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
, **pass_env
= NULL
, **accum_env
= NULL
, **replaced_argv
= NULL
;
2855 int *fds_with_exec_fd
, n_fds_with_exec_fd
, r
, ngids
= 0, exec_fd
= -1;
2856 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*supplementary_gids
= NULL
;
2857 const char *username
= NULL
, *groupname
= NULL
;
2858 _cleanup_free_
char *home_buffer
= NULL
;
2859 const char *home
= NULL
, *shell
= NULL
;
2860 char **final_argv
= NULL
;
2861 dev_t journal_stream_dev
= 0;
2862 ino_t journal_stream_ino
= 0;
2863 bool needs_sandboxing
, /* Do we need to set up full sandboxing? (i.e. all namespacing, all MAC stuff, caps, yadda yadda */
2864 needs_setuid
, /* Do we need to do the actual setresuid()/setresgid() calls? */
2865 needs_mount_namespace
, /* Do we need to set up a mount namespace for this kernel? */
2866 needs_ambient_hack
; /* Do we need to apply the ambient capabilities hack? */
2868 _cleanup_free_
char *mac_selinux_context_net
= NULL
;
2869 bool use_selinux
= false;
2872 bool use_smack
= false;
2875 bool use_apparmor
= false;
2877 uid_t uid
= UID_INVALID
;
2878 gid_t gid
= GID_INVALID
;
2880 ExecDirectoryType dt
;
2887 assert(exit_status
);
2889 rename_process_from_path(command
->path
);
2891 /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the
2892 * only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main daemon. All
2893 * others we leave untouched because we set them to
2894 * SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, both of which
2895 * will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */
2896 (void) default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER
,
2897 SIGNALS_IGNORE
, -1);
2899 if (context
->ignore_sigpipe
)
2900 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
2902 r
= reset_signal_mask();
2904 *exit_status
= EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK
;
2905 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set process signal mask: %m");
2908 if (params
->idle_pipe
)
2909 do_idle_pipe_dance(params
->idle_pipe
);
2911 /* Close fds we don't need very early to make sure we don't block init reexecution because it cannot bind its
2912 * sockets. Among the fds we close are the logging fds, and we want to keep them closed, so that we don't have
2913 * any fds open we don't really want open during the transition. In order to make logging work, we switch the
2914 * log subsystem into open_when_needed mode, so that it reopens the logs on every single log call. */
2917 log_set_open_when_needed(true);
2919 /* In case anything used libc syslog(), close this here, too */
2922 n_fds
= n_socket_fds
+ n_storage_fds
;
2923 r
= close_remaining_fds(params
, runtime
, dcreds
, user_lookup_fd
, socket_fd
, params
->exec_fd
, fds
, n_fds
);
2925 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
2926 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to close unwanted file descriptors: %m");
2929 if (!context
->same_pgrp
)
2931 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSID
;
2932 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to create new process session: %m");
2935 exec_context_tty_reset(context
, params
);
2937 if (unit_shall_confirm_spawn(unit
)) {
2938 const char *vc
= params
->confirm_spawn
;
2939 _cleanup_free_
char *cmdline
= NULL
;
2941 cmdline
= exec_command_line(command
->argv
);
2943 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
2947 r
= ask_for_confirmation(vc
, unit
, cmdline
);
2948 if (r
!= CONFIRM_EXECUTE
) {
2949 if (r
== CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
) {
2950 *exit_status
= EXIT_SUCCESS
;
2953 *exit_status
= EXIT_CONFIRM
;
2954 log_unit_error(unit
, "Execution cancelled by the user");
2959 /* We are about to invoke NSS and PAM modules. Let's tell them what we are doing here, maybe they care. This is
2960 * used by nss-resolve to disable itself when we are about to start systemd-resolved, to avoid deadlocks. Note
2961 * that these env vars do not survive the execve(), which means they really only apply to the PAM and NSS
2962 * invocations themselves. Also note that while we'll only invoke NSS modules involved in user management they
2963 * might internally call into other NSS modules that are involved in hostname resolution, we never know. */
2964 if (setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_UNIT", unit
->id
, true) != 0 ||
2965 setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_SCOPE", MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(unit
->manager
) ? "system" : "user", true) != 0) {
2966 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
2967 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to update environment: %m");
2970 if (context
->dynamic_user
&& dcreds
) {
2971 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **suggested_paths
= NULL
;
2973 /* On top of that, make sure we bypass our own NSS module nss-systemd comprehensively for any NSS
2974 * checks, if DynamicUser=1 is used, as we shouldn't create a feedback loop with ourselves here.*/
2975 if (putenv((char*) "SYSTEMD_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS=1") != 0) {
2976 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
2977 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to update environment: %m");
2980 r
= compile_suggested_paths(context
, params
, &suggested_paths
);
2982 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
2986 r
= dynamic_creds_realize(dcreds
, suggested_paths
, &uid
, &gid
);
2988 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
2990 log_unit_error(unit
, "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: User or group with specified name already exists.");
2993 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: %m");
2996 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
2997 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
2998 log_unit_error(unit
, "UID validation failed for \""UID_FMT
"\"", uid
);
3002 if (!gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
3003 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3004 log_unit_error(unit
, "GID validation failed for \""GID_FMT
"\"", gid
);
3009 username
= dcreds
->user
->name
;
3012 r
= get_fixed_user(context
, &username
, &uid
, &gid
, &home
, &shell
);
3014 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3015 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine user credentials: %m");
3018 r
= get_fixed_group(context
, &groupname
, &gid
);
3020 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
3021 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine group credentials: %m");
3025 /* Initialize user supplementary groups and get SupplementaryGroups= ones */
3026 r
= get_supplementary_groups(context
, username
, groupname
, gid
,
3027 &supplementary_gids
, &ngids
);
3029 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
3030 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine supplementary groups: %m");
3033 r
= send_user_lookup(unit
, user_lookup_fd
, uid
, gid
);
3035 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3036 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to send user credentials to PID1: %m");
3039 user_lookup_fd
= safe_close(user_lookup_fd
);
3041 r
= acquire_home(context
, uid
, &home
, &home_buffer
);
3043 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
3044 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine $HOME for user: %m");
3047 /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we
3048 * must sure to drop O_NONBLOCK */
3050 (void) fd_nonblock(socket_fd
, false);
3052 /* Journald will try to look-up our cgroup in order to populate _SYSTEMD_CGROUP and _SYSTEMD_UNIT fields.
3053 * Hence we need to migrate to the target cgroup from init.scope before connecting to journald */
3054 if (params
->cgroup_path
) {
3055 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
;
3057 r
= exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params
, &p
);
3059 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
3060 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to acquire cgroup path: %m");
3063 r
= cg_attach_everywhere(params
->cgroup_supported
, p
, 0, NULL
, NULL
);
3065 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
3066 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to attach to cgroup %s: %m", p
);
3070 if (context
->network_namespace_path
&& runtime
&& runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
3071 r
= open_netns_path(runtime
->netns_storage_socket
, context
->network_namespace_path
);
3073 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
3074 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to open network namespace path %s: %m", context
->network_namespace_path
);
3078 r
= setup_input(context
, params
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
);
3080 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
3081 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard input: %m");
3084 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDOUT_FILENO
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
, &journal_stream_dev
, &journal_stream_ino
);
3086 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDOUT
;
3087 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard output: %m");
3090 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDERR_FILENO
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
, &journal_stream_dev
, &journal_stream_ino
);
3092 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDERR
;
3093 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard error output: %m");
3096 if (context
->oom_score_adjust_set
) {
3097 /* When we can't make this change due to EPERM, then let's silently skip over it. User namespaces
3098 * prohibit write access to this file, and we shouldn't trip up over that. */
3099 r
= set_oom_score_adjust(context
->oom_score_adjust
);
3100 if (IN_SET(r
, -EPERM
, -EACCES
))
3101 log_unit_debug_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust OOM setting, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
3103 *exit_status
= EXIT_OOM_ADJUST
;
3104 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust OOM setting: %m");
3108 if (context
->nice_set
)
3109 if (setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS
, 0, context
->nice
) < 0) {
3110 *exit_status
= EXIT_NICE
;
3111 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up process scheduling priority (nice level): %m");
3114 if (context
->cpu_sched_set
) {
3115 struct sched_param param
= {
3116 .sched_priority
= context
->cpu_sched_priority
,
3119 r
= sched_setscheduler(0,
3120 context
->cpu_sched_policy
|
3121 (context
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
?
3122 SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK
: 0),
3125 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSCHEDULER
;
3126 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up CPU scheduling: %m");
3130 if (context
->cpuset
)
3131 if (sched_setaffinity(0, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(context
->cpuset_ncpus
), context
->cpuset
) < 0) {
3132 *exit_status
= EXIT_CPUAFFINITY
;
3133 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up CPU affinity: %m");
3136 if (context
->ioprio_set
)
3137 if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS
, 0, context
->ioprio
) < 0) {
3138 *exit_status
= EXIT_IOPRIO
;
3139 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up IO scheduling priority: %m");
3142 if (context
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
3143 if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK
, context
->timer_slack_nsec
) < 0) {
3144 *exit_status
= EXIT_TIMERSLACK
;
3145 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up timer slack: %m");
3148 if (context
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
) {
3149 r
= safe_personality(context
->personality
);
3151 *exit_status
= EXIT_PERSONALITY
;
3152 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up execution domain (personality): %m");
3156 if (context
->utmp_id
)
3157 utmp_put_init_process(context
->utmp_id
, getpid_cached(), getsid(0),
3159 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_INIT
? INIT_PROCESS
:
3160 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
? LOGIN_PROCESS
:
3164 if (uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
3165 r
= chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO
, uid
);
3167 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
3168 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change ownership of terminal: %m");
3172 /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup to the user of the new process. On cgroup v1
3173 * this is only about systemd's own hierarchy, i.e. not the controller hierarchies, simply because that's not
3174 * safe. On cgroup v2 there's only one hierarchy anyway, and delegation is safe there, hence in that case only
3175 * touch a single hierarchy too. */
3176 if (params
->cgroup_path
&& context
->user
&& (params
->flags
& EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE
)) {
3177 r
= cg_set_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, params
->cgroup_path
, uid
, gid
);
3179 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
3180 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust control group access: %m");
3184 for (dt
= 0; dt
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; dt
++) {
3185 r
= setup_exec_directory(context
, params
, uid
, gid
, dt
, exit_status
);
3187 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up special execution directory in %s: %m", params
->prefix
[dt
]);
3190 r
= build_environment(
3202 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3206 r
= build_pass_environment(context
, &pass_env
);
3208 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3212 accum_env
= strv_env_merge(5,
3213 params
->environment
,
3216 context
->environment
,
3220 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3223 accum_env
= strv_env_clean(accum_env
);
3225 (void) umask(context
->umask
);
3227 r
= setup_keyring(unit
, context
, params
, uid
, gid
);
3229 *exit_status
= EXIT_KEYRING
;
3230 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up kernel keyring: %m");
3233 /* We need sandboxing if the caller asked us to apply it and the command isn't explicitly excepted from it */
3234 needs_sandboxing
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
);
3236 /* We need the ambient capability hack, if the caller asked us to apply it and the command is marked for it, and the kernel doesn't actually support ambient caps */
3237 needs_ambient_hack
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && (command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_AMBIENT_MAGIC
) && !ambient_capabilities_supported();
3239 /* We need setresuid() if the caller asked us to apply sandboxing and the command isn't explicitly excepted from either whole sandboxing or just setresuid() itself, and the ambient hack is not desired */
3240 if (needs_ambient_hack
)
3241 needs_setuid
= false;
3243 needs_setuid
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command
->flags
& (EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
|EXEC_COMMAND_NO_SETUID
));
3245 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3246 /* MAC enablement checks need to be done before a new mount ns is created, as they rely on /sys being
3247 * present. The actual MAC context application will happen later, as late as possible, to avoid
3248 * impacting our own code paths. */
3251 use_selinux
= mac_selinux_use();
3254 use_smack
= mac_smack_use();
3257 use_apparmor
= mac_apparmor_use();
3261 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3264 /* Let's set the resource limits before we call into PAM, so that pam_limits wins over what
3265 * is set here. (See below.) */
3267 r
= setrlimit_closest_all((const struct rlimit
* const *) context
->rlimit
, &which_failed
);
3269 *exit_status
= EXIT_LIMITS
;
3270 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust resource limit RLIMIT_%s: %m", rlimit_to_string(which_failed
));
3276 /* Let's call into PAM after we set up our own idea of resource limits to that pam_limits
3277 * wins here. (See above.) */
3279 if (context
->pam_name
&& username
) {
3280 r
= setup_pam(context
->pam_name
, username
, uid
, gid
, context
->tty_path
, &accum_env
, fds
, n_fds
);
3282 *exit_status
= EXIT_PAM
;
3283 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up PAM session: %m");
3288 if ((context
->private_network
|| context
->network_namespace_path
) && runtime
&& runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
3290 if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_NET
)) {
3291 r
= setup_netns(runtime
->netns_storage_socket
);
3293 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
3294 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up network namespacing: %m");
3296 } else if (context
->network_namespace_path
) {
3297 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
3298 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP
), "NetworkNamespacePath= is not supported, refusing.");
3300 log_unit_warning(unit
, "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support network namespaces, ignoring.");
3303 needs_mount_namespace
= exec_needs_mount_namespace(context
, params
, runtime
);
3304 if (needs_mount_namespace
) {
3305 r
= apply_mount_namespace(unit
, command
, context
, params
, runtime
);
3307 *exit_status
= EXIT_NAMESPACE
;
3308 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up mount namespacing: %m");
3312 if (context
->protect_hostname
) {
3313 if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_UTS
)) {
3314 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUTS
) < 0) {
3315 *exit_status
= EXIT_NAMESPACE
;
3316 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up UTS namespacing: %m");
3319 log_unit_warning(unit
, "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support UTS namespaces, ignoring namespace setup.");
3321 r
= seccomp_protect_hostname();
3323 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3324 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply hostname restrictions: %m");
3329 /* Drop groups as early as possbile */
3331 r
= enforce_groups(gid
, supplementary_gids
, ngids
);
3333 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
3334 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Changing group credentials failed: %m");
3338 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3340 if (use_selinux
&& params
->selinux_context_net
&& socket_fd
>= 0) {
3341 r
= mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd
, command
->path
, context
->selinux_context
, &mac_selinux_context_net
);
3343 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
3344 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine SELinux context: %m");
3349 if (context
->private_users
) {
3350 r
= setup_private_users(uid
, gid
);
3352 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3353 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up user namespacing: %m");
3358 /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that we are
3359 * more aggressive this time since socket_fd and the netns fds we don't need anymore. We do keep the exec_fd
3360 * however if we have it as we want to keep it open until the final execve(). */
3362 if (params
->exec_fd
>= 0) {
3363 exec_fd
= params
->exec_fd
;
3365 if (exec_fd
< 3 + (int) n_fds
) {
3368 /* Let's move the exec fd far up, so that it's outside of the fd range we want to pass to the
3369 * process we are about to execute. */
3371 moved_fd
= fcntl(exec_fd
, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC
, 3 + (int) n_fds
);
3373 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
3374 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Couldn't move exec fd up: %m");
3377 safe_close(exec_fd
);
3380 /* This fd should be FD_CLOEXEC already, but let's make sure. */
3381 r
= fd_cloexec(exec_fd
, true);
3383 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
3384 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to make exec fd FD_CLOEXEC: %m");
3388 fds_with_exec_fd
= newa(int, n_fds
+ 1);
3389 memcpy_safe(fds_with_exec_fd
, fds
, n_fds
* sizeof(int));
3390 fds_with_exec_fd
[n_fds
] = exec_fd
;
3391 n_fds_with_exec_fd
= n_fds
+ 1;
3393 fds_with_exec_fd
= fds
;
3394 n_fds_with_exec_fd
= n_fds
;
3397 r
= close_all_fds(fds_with_exec_fd
, n_fds_with_exec_fd
);
3399 r
= shift_fds(fds
, n_fds
);
3401 r
= flags_fds(fds
, n_socket_fds
, n_storage_fds
, context
->non_blocking
);
3403 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
3404 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust passed file descriptors: %m");
3407 /* At this point, the fds we want to pass to the program are all ready and set up, with O_CLOEXEC turned off
3408 * and at the right fd numbers. The are no other fds open, with one exception: the exec_fd if it is defined,
3409 * and it has O_CLOEXEC set, after all we want it to be closed by the execve(), so that our parent knows we
3412 secure_bits
= context
->secure_bits
;
3414 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3417 /* Set the RTPRIO resource limit to 0, but only if nothing else was explicitly
3418 * requested. (Note this is placed after the general resource limit initialization, see
3419 * above, in order to take precedence.) */
3420 if (context
->restrict_realtime
&& !context
->rlimit
[RLIMIT_RTPRIO
]) {
3421 if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_RTPRIO
, &RLIMIT_MAKE_CONST(0)) < 0) {
3422 *exit_status
= EXIT_LIMITS
;
3423 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to adjust RLIMIT_RTPRIO resource limit: %m");
3428 /* LSM Smack needs the capability CAP_MAC_ADMIN to change the current execution security context of the
3429 * process. This is the latest place before dropping capabilities. Other MAC context are set later. */
3431 r
= setup_smack(context
, command
);
3433 *exit_status
= EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL
;
3434 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set SMACK process label: %m");
3439 bset
= context
->capability_bounding_set
;
3440 /* If the ambient caps hack is enabled (which means the kernel can't do them, and the user asked for
3441 * our magic fallback), then let's add some extra caps, so that the service can drop privs of its own,
3442 * instead of us doing that */
3443 if (needs_ambient_hack
)
3444 bset
|= (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETPCAP
) |
3445 (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETUID
) |
3446 (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETGID
);
3448 if (!cap_test_all(bset
)) {
3449 r
= capability_bounding_set_drop(bset
, false);
3451 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
3452 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to drop capabilities: %m");
3456 /* This is done before enforce_user, but ambient set
3457 * does not survive over setresuid() if keep_caps is not set. */
3458 if (!needs_ambient_hack
&&
3459 context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
3460 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, true);
3462 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
3463 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (before UID change): %m");
3469 if (uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
3470 r
= enforce_user(context
, uid
);
3472 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3473 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change UID to " UID_FMT
": %m", uid
);
3476 if (!needs_ambient_hack
&&
3477 context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
3479 /* Fix the ambient capabilities after user change. */
3480 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, false);
3482 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
3483 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (after UID change): %m");
3486 /* If we were asked to change user and ambient capabilities
3487 * were requested, we had to add keep-caps to the securebits
3488 * so that we would maintain the inherited capability set
3489 * through the setresuid(). Make sure that the bit is added
3490 * also to the context secure_bits so that we don't try to
3491 * drop the bit away next. */
3493 secure_bits
|= 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
;
3498 /* Apply working directory here, because the working directory might be on NFS and only the user running
3499 * this service might have the correct privilege to change to the working directory */
3500 r
= apply_working_directory(context
, params
, home
, needs_mount_namespace
, exit_status
);
3502 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Changing to the requested working directory failed: %m");
3504 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3505 /* Apply other MAC contexts late, but before seccomp syscall filtering, as those should really be last to
3506 * influence our own codepaths as little as possible. Moreover, applying MAC contexts usually requires
3507 * syscalls that are subject to seccomp filtering, hence should probably be applied before the syscalls
3508 * are restricted. */
3512 char *exec_context
= mac_selinux_context_net
?: context
->selinux_context
;
3515 r
= setexeccon(exec_context
);
3517 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
3518 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change SELinux context to %s: %m", exec_context
);
3525 if (use_apparmor
&& context
->apparmor_profile
) {
3526 r
= aa_change_onexec(context
->apparmor_profile
);
3527 if (r
< 0 && !context
->apparmor_profile_ignore
) {
3528 *exit_status
= EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE
;
3529 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to prepare AppArmor profile change to %s: %m", context
->apparmor_profile
);
3534 /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress potential EPERMs
3535 * we'll try not to call PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. */
3536 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
) != secure_bits
)
3537 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, secure_bits
) < 0) {
3538 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECUREBITS
;
3539 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set process secure bits: %m");
3542 if (context_has_no_new_privileges(context
))
3543 if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
3544 *exit_status
= EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES
;
3545 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to disable new privileges: %m");
3549 r
= apply_address_families(unit
, context
);
3551 *exit_status
= EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES
;
3552 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to restrict address families: %m");
3555 r
= apply_memory_deny_write_execute(unit
, context
);
3557 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3558 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to disable writing to executable memory: %m");
3561 r
= apply_restrict_realtime(unit
, context
);
3563 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3564 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply realtime restrictions: %m");
3567 r
= apply_restrict_namespaces(unit
, context
);
3569 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3570 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply namespace restrictions: %m");
3573 r
= apply_protect_sysctl(unit
, context
);
3575 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3576 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply sysctl restrictions: %m");
3579 r
= apply_protect_kernel_modules(unit
, context
);
3581 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3582 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply module loading restrictions: %m");
3585 r
= apply_private_devices(unit
, context
);
3587 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3588 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up private devices: %m");
3591 r
= apply_syscall_archs(unit
, context
);
3593 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3594 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply syscall architecture restrictions: %m");
3597 r
= apply_lock_personality(unit
, context
);
3599 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3600 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to lock personalities: %m");
3603 /* This really should remain the last step before the execve(), to make sure our own code is unaffected
3604 * by the filter as little as possible. */
3605 r
= apply_syscall_filter(unit
, context
, needs_ambient_hack
);
3607 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3608 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply system call filters: %m");
3613 if (!strv_isempty(context
->unset_environment
)) {
3616 ee
= strv_env_delete(accum_env
, 1, context
->unset_environment
);
3618 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3622 strv_free_and_replace(accum_env
, ee
);
3625 if (!FLAGS_SET(command
->flags
, EXEC_COMMAND_NO_ENV_EXPAND
)) {
3626 replaced_argv
= replace_env_argv(command
->argv
, accum_env
);
3627 if (!replaced_argv
) {
3628 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3631 final_argv
= replaced_argv
;
3633 final_argv
= command
->argv
;
3635 if (DEBUG_LOGGING
) {
3636 _cleanup_free_
char *line
;
3638 line
= exec_command_line(final_argv
);
3640 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
3641 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
,
3642 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Executing: %s", line
),
3644 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
));
3650 /* We have finished with all our initializations. Let's now let the manager know that. From this point
3651 * on, if the manager sees POLLHUP on the exec_fd, then execve() was successful. */
3653 if (write(exec_fd
, &hot
, sizeof(hot
)) < 0) {
3654 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
3655 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to enable exec_fd: %m");
3659 execve(command
->path
, final_argv
, accum_env
);
3665 /* The execve() failed. This means the exec_fd is still open. Which means we need to tell the manager
3666 * that POLLHUP on it no longer means execve() succeeded. */
3668 if (write(exec_fd
, &hot
, sizeof(hot
)) < 0) {
3669 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
3670 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to disable exec_fd: %m");
3674 if (r
== -ENOENT
&& (command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_IGNORE_FAILURE
)) {
3675 log_struct_errno(LOG_INFO
, r
,
3676 "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR
,
3678 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
),
3679 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Executable %s missing, skipping: %m",
3681 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
);
3685 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
3686 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to execute command: %m");
3689 static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit
*unit
, const ExecContext
*c
, char ***l
);
3690 static int exec_context_named_iofds(const ExecContext
*c
, const ExecParameters
*p
, int named_iofds
[3]);
3692 int exec_spawn(Unit
*unit
,
3693 ExecCommand
*command
,
3694 const ExecContext
*context
,
3695 const ExecParameters
*params
,
3696 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
3697 DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
3700 int socket_fd
, r
, named_iofds
[3] = { -1, -1, -1 }, *fds
= NULL
;
3701 _cleanup_free_
char *subcgroup_path
= NULL
;
3702 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **files_env
= NULL
;
3703 size_t n_storage_fds
= 0, n_socket_fds
= 0;
3704 _cleanup_free_
char *line
= NULL
;
3712 assert(params
->fds
|| (params
->n_socket_fds
+ params
->n_storage_fds
<= 0));
3714 if (context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
||
3715 context
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
||
3716 context
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
) {
3718 if (params
->n_socket_fds
> 1) {
3719 log_unit_error(unit
, "Got more than one socket.");
3723 if (params
->n_socket_fds
== 0) {
3724 log_unit_error(unit
, "Got no socket.");
3728 socket_fd
= params
->fds
[0];
3732 n_socket_fds
= params
->n_socket_fds
;
3733 n_storage_fds
= params
->n_storage_fds
;
3736 r
= exec_context_named_iofds(context
, params
, named_iofds
);
3738 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to load a named file descriptor: %m");
3740 r
= exec_context_load_environment(unit
, context
, &files_env
);
3742 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to load environment files: %m");
3744 line
= exec_command_line(command
->argv
);
3748 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
3749 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "About to execute: %s", line
),
3750 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
,
3752 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
));
3754 if (params
->cgroup_path
) {
3755 r
= exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params
, &subcgroup_path
);
3757 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to acquire subcgroup path: %m");
3758 if (r
> 0) { /* We are using a child cgroup */
3759 r
= cg_create(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, subcgroup_path
);
3761 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to create control group '%s': %m", subcgroup_path
);
3767 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to fork: %m");
3770 int exit_status
= EXIT_SUCCESS
;
3772 r
= exec_child(unit
,
3784 unit
->manager
->user_lookup_fds
[1],
3788 log_struct_errno(LOG_ERR
, r
,
3789 "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR
,
3791 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
),
3792 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Failed at step %s spawning %s: %m",
3793 exit_status_to_string(exit_status
, EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD
),
3795 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
);
3800 log_unit_debug(unit
, "Forked %s as "PID_FMT
, command
->path
, pid
);
3802 /* We add the new process to the cgroup both in the child (so that we can be sure that no user code is ever
3803 * executed outside of the cgroup) and in the parent (so that we can be sure that when we kill the cgroup the
3804 * process will be killed too). */
3806 (void) cg_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, subcgroup_path
, pid
);
3808 exec_status_start(&command
->exec_status
, pid
);
3814 void exec_context_init(ExecContext
*c
) {
3815 ExecDirectoryType i
;
3820 c
->ioprio
= IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE
, 0);
3821 c
->cpu_sched_policy
= SCHED_OTHER
;
3822 c
->syslog_priority
= LOG_DAEMON
|LOG_INFO
;
3823 c
->syslog_level_prefix
= true;
3824 c
->ignore_sigpipe
= true;
3825 c
->timer_slack_nsec
= NSEC_INFINITY
;
3826 c
->personality
= PERSONALITY_INVALID
;
3827 for (i
= 0; i
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; i
++)
3828 c
->directories
[i
].mode
= 0755;
3829 c
->capability_bounding_set
= CAP_ALL
;
3830 assert_cc(NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL
!= NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL
);
3831 c
->restrict_namespaces
= NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL
;
3832 c
->log_level_max
= -1;
3835 void exec_context_done(ExecContext
*c
) {
3836 ExecDirectoryType i
;
3841 c
->environment
= strv_free(c
->environment
);
3842 c
->environment_files
= strv_free(c
->environment_files
);
3843 c
->pass_environment
= strv_free(c
->pass_environment
);
3844 c
->unset_environment
= strv_free(c
->unset_environment
);
3846 rlimit_free_all(c
->rlimit
);
3848 for (l
= 0; l
< 3; l
++) {
3849 c
->stdio_fdname
[l
] = mfree(c
->stdio_fdname
[l
]);
3850 c
->stdio_file
[l
] = mfree(c
->stdio_file
[l
]);
3853 c
->working_directory
= mfree(c
->working_directory
);
3854 c
->root_directory
= mfree(c
->root_directory
);
3855 c
->root_image
= mfree(c
->root_image
);
3856 c
->tty_path
= mfree(c
->tty_path
);
3857 c
->syslog_identifier
= mfree(c
->syslog_identifier
);
3858 c
->user
= mfree(c
->user
);
3859 c
->group
= mfree(c
->group
);
3861 c
->supplementary_groups
= strv_free(c
->supplementary_groups
);
3863 c
->pam_name
= mfree(c
->pam_name
);
3865 c
->read_only_paths
= strv_free(c
->read_only_paths
);
3866 c
->read_write_paths
= strv_free(c
->read_write_paths
);
3867 c
->inaccessible_paths
= strv_free(c
->inaccessible_paths
);
3869 bind_mount_free_many(c
->bind_mounts
, c
->n_bind_mounts
);
3870 c
->bind_mounts
= NULL
;
3871 c
->n_bind_mounts
= 0;
3872 temporary_filesystem_free_many(c
->temporary_filesystems
, c
->n_temporary_filesystems
);
3873 c
->temporary_filesystems
= NULL
;
3874 c
->n_temporary_filesystems
= 0;
3876 c
->cpuset
= cpu_set_mfree(c
->cpuset
);
3878 c
->utmp_id
= mfree(c
->utmp_id
);
3879 c
->selinux_context
= mfree(c
->selinux_context
);
3880 c
->apparmor_profile
= mfree(c
->apparmor_profile
);
3881 c
->smack_process_label
= mfree(c
->smack_process_label
);
3883 c
->syscall_filter
= hashmap_free(c
->syscall_filter
);
3884 c
->syscall_archs
= set_free(c
->syscall_archs
);
3885 c
->address_families
= set_free(c
->address_families
);
3887 for (i
= 0; i
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; i
++)
3888 c
->directories
[i
].paths
= strv_free(c
->directories
[i
].paths
);
3890 c
->log_level_max
= -1;
3892 exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(c
);
3894 c
->log_rate_limit_interval_usec
= 0;
3895 c
->log_rate_limit_burst
= 0;
3897 c
->stdin_data
= mfree(c
->stdin_data
);
3898 c
->stdin_data_size
= 0;
3900 c
->network_namespace_path
= mfree(c
->network_namespace_path
);
3903 int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(const ExecContext
*c
, const char *runtime_prefix
) {
3908 if (!runtime_prefix
)
3911 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
].paths
) {
3912 _cleanup_free_
char *p
;
3914 p
= path_join(runtime_prefix
, *i
);
3918 /* We execute this synchronously, since we need to be sure this is gone when we start the
3920 (void) rm_rf(p
, REMOVE_ROOT
);
3926 static void exec_command_done(ExecCommand
*c
) {
3929 c
->path
= mfree(c
->path
);
3930 c
->argv
= strv_free(c
->argv
);
3933 void exec_command_done_array(ExecCommand
*c
, size_t n
) {
3936 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
3937 exec_command_done(c
+i
);
3940 ExecCommand
* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand
*c
) {
3944 LIST_REMOVE(command
, c
, i
);
3945 exec_command_done(i
);
3952 void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand
**c
, size_t n
) {
3955 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
3956 c
[i
] = exec_command_free_list(c
[i
]);
3959 void exec_command_reset_status_array(ExecCommand
*c
, size_t n
) {
3962 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
3963 exec_status_reset(&c
[i
].exec_status
);
3966 void exec_command_reset_status_list_array(ExecCommand
**c
, size_t n
) {
3969 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++) {
3972 LIST_FOREACH(command
, z
, c
[i
])
3973 exec_status_reset(&z
->exec_status
);
3977 typedef struct InvalidEnvInfo
{
3982 static void invalid_env(const char *p
, void *userdata
) {
3983 InvalidEnvInfo
*info
= userdata
;
3985 log_unit_error(info
->unit
, "Ignoring invalid environment assignment '%s': %s", p
, info
->path
);
3988 const char* exec_context_fdname(const ExecContext
*c
, int fd_index
) {
3994 if (c
->std_input
!= EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
)
3997 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
] ?: "stdin";
4000 if (c
->std_output
!= EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4003 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
] ?: "stdout";
4006 if (c
->std_error
!= EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4009 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
] ?: "stderr";
4016 static int exec_context_named_iofds(const ExecContext
*c
, const ExecParameters
*p
, int named_iofds
[static 3]) {
4018 const char* stdio_fdname
[3];
4024 targets
= (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
) +
4025 (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
) +
4026 (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
);
4028 for (i
= 0; i
< 3; i
++)
4029 stdio_fdname
[i
] = exec_context_fdname(c
, i
);
4031 n_fds
= p
->n_storage_fds
+ p
->n_socket_fds
;
4033 for (i
= 0; i
< n_fds
&& targets
> 0; i
++)
4034 if (named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] < 0 &&
4035 c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
4036 stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
] &&
4037 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
])) {
4039 named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
4042 } else if (named_iofds
[STDOUT_FILENO
] < 0 &&
4043 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
4044 stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
] &&
4045 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
])) {
4047 named_iofds
[STDOUT_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
4050 } else if (named_iofds
[STDERR_FILENO
] < 0 &&
4051 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
4052 stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
] &&
4053 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
])) {
4055 named_iofds
[STDERR_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
4059 return targets
== 0 ? 0 : -ENOENT
;
4062 static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit
*unit
, const ExecContext
*c
, char ***l
) {
4063 char **i
, **r
= NULL
;
4068 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->environment_files
) {
4072 bool ignore
= false;
4074 _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t pglob
= {};
4083 if (!path_is_absolute(fn
)) {
4091 /* Filename supports globbing, take all matching files */
4092 k
= safe_glob(fn
, 0, &pglob
);
4101 /* When we don't match anything, -ENOENT should be returned */
4102 assert(pglob
.gl_pathc
> 0);
4104 for (n
= 0; n
< pglob
.gl_pathc
; n
++) {
4105 k
= load_env_file(NULL
, pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
], &p
);
4113 /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */
4115 InvalidEnvInfo info
= {
4117 .path
= pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
]
4120 p
= strv_env_clean_with_callback(p
, invalid_env
, &info
);
4128 m
= strv_env_merge(2, r
, p
);
4144 static bool tty_may_match_dev_console(const char *tty
) {
4145 _cleanup_free_
char *resolved
= NULL
;
4150 tty
= skip_dev_prefix(tty
);
4152 /* trivial identity? */
4153 if (streq(tty
, "console"))
4156 if (resolve_dev_console(&resolved
) < 0)
4157 return true; /* if we could not resolve, assume it may */
4159 /* "tty0" means the active VC, so it may be the same sometimes */
4160 return streq(resolved
, tty
) || (streq(resolved
, "tty0") && tty_is_vc(tty
));
4163 bool exec_context_may_touch_console(const ExecContext
*ec
) {
4165 return (ec
->tty_reset
||
4167 ec
->tty_vt_disallocate
||
4168 is_terminal_input(ec
->std_input
) ||
4169 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_output
) ||
4170 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_error
)) &&
4171 tty_may_match_dev_console(exec_context_tty_path(ec
));
4174 static void strv_fprintf(FILE *f
, char **l
) {
4180 fprintf(f
, " %s", *g
);
4183 void exec_context_dump(const ExecContext
*c
, FILE* f
, const char *prefix
) {
4184 ExecDirectoryType dt
;
4192 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
4196 "%sWorkingDirectory: %s\n"
4197 "%sRootDirectory: %s\n"
4198 "%sNonBlocking: %s\n"
4199 "%sPrivateTmp: %s\n"
4200 "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n"
4201 "%sProtectKernelTunables: %s\n"
4202 "%sProtectKernelModules: %s\n"
4203 "%sProtectControlGroups: %s\n"
4204 "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n"
4205 "%sPrivateUsers: %s\n"
4206 "%sProtectHome: %s\n"
4207 "%sProtectSystem: %s\n"
4208 "%sMountAPIVFS: %s\n"
4209 "%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n"
4210 "%sMemoryDenyWriteExecute: %s\n"
4211 "%sRestrictRealtime: %s\n"
4212 "%sKeyringMode: %s\n"
4213 "%sProtectHostname: %s\n",
4215 prefix
, c
->working_directory
? c
->working_directory
: "/",
4216 prefix
, c
->root_directory
? c
->root_directory
: "/",
4217 prefix
, yes_no(c
->non_blocking
),
4218 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_tmp
),
4219 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_devices
),
4220 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_kernel_tunables
),
4221 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_kernel_modules
),
4222 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_control_groups
),
4223 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_network
),
4224 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_users
),
4225 prefix
, protect_home_to_string(c
->protect_home
),
4226 prefix
, protect_system_to_string(c
->protect_system
),
4227 prefix
, yes_no(c
->mount_apivfs
),
4228 prefix
, yes_no(c
->ignore_sigpipe
),
4229 prefix
, yes_no(c
->memory_deny_write_execute
),
4230 prefix
, yes_no(c
->restrict_realtime
),
4231 prefix
, exec_keyring_mode_to_string(c
->keyring_mode
),
4232 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_hostname
));
4235 fprintf(f
, "%sRootImage: %s\n", prefix
, c
->root_image
);
4237 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment
)
4238 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
4240 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment_files
)
4241 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironmentFile: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
4243 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->pass_environment
)
4244 fprintf(f
, "%sPassEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
4246 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->unset_environment
)
4247 fprintf(f
, "%sUnsetEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
4249 fprintf(f
, "%sRuntimeDirectoryPreserve: %s\n", prefix
, exec_preserve_mode_to_string(c
->runtime_directory_preserve_mode
));
4251 for (dt
= 0; dt
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; dt
++) {
4252 fprintf(f
, "%s%sMode: %04o\n", prefix
, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt
), c
->directories
[dt
].mode
);
4254 STRV_FOREACH(d
, c
->directories
[dt
].paths
)
4255 fprintf(f
, "%s%s: %s\n", prefix
, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt
), *d
);
4263 if (c
->oom_score_adjust_set
)
4265 "%sOOMScoreAdjust: %i\n",
4266 prefix
, c
->oom_score_adjust
);
4268 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++)
4270 fprintf(f
, "%sLimit%s: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
4271 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_max
);
4272 fprintf(f
, "%sLimit%sSoft: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
4273 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_cur
);
4276 if (c
->ioprio_set
) {
4277 _cleanup_free_
char *class_str
= NULL
;
4279 r
= ioprio_class_to_string_alloc(IOPRIO_PRIO_CLASS(c
->ioprio
), &class_str
);
4281 fprintf(f
, "%sIOSchedulingClass: %s\n", prefix
, class_str
);
4283 fprintf(f
, "%sIOPriority: %lu\n", prefix
, IOPRIO_PRIO_DATA(c
->ioprio
));
4286 if (c
->cpu_sched_set
) {
4287 _cleanup_free_
char *policy_str
= NULL
;
4289 r
= sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c
->cpu_sched_policy
, &policy_str
);
4291 fprintf(f
, "%sCPUSchedulingPolicy: %s\n", prefix
, policy_str
);
4294 "%sCPUSchedulingPriority: %i\n"
4295 "%sCPUSchedulingResetOnFork: %s\n",
4296 prefix
, c
->cpu_sched_priority
,
4297 prefix
, yes_no(c
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
));
4301 fprintf(f
, "%sCPUAffinity:", prefix
);
4302 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->cpuset_ncpus
; i
++)
4303 if (CPU_ISSET_S(i
, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(c
->cpuset_ncpus
), c
->cpuset
))
4304 fprintf(f
, " %u", i
);
4308 if (c
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
4309 fprintf(f
, "%sTimerSlackNSec: "NSEC_FMT
"\n", prefix
, c
->timer_slack_nsec
);
4312 "%sStandardInput: %s\n"
4313 "%sStandardOutput: %s\n"
4314 "%sStandardError: %s\n",
4315 prefix
, exec_input_to_string(c
->std_input
),
4316 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_output
),
4317 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_error
));
4319 if (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4320 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardInputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
4321 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4322 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
4323 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4324 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
4326 if (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_FILE
)
4327 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardInputFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
4328 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
)
4329 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
4330 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
4331 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
4332 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
)
4333 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
4334 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
4335 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
4341 "%sTTYVHangup: %s\n"
4342 "%sTTYVTDisallocate: %s\n",
4343 prefix
, c
->tty_path
,
4344 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_reset
),
4345 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vhangup
),
4346 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vt_disallocate
));
4348 if (IN_SET(c
->std_output
,
4351 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
,
4352 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
,
4353 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
4354 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
) ||
4355 IN_SET(c
->std_error
,
4358 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
,
4359 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
,
4360 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
4361 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
)) {
4363 _cleanup_free_
char *fac_str
= NULL
, *lvl_str
= NULL
;
4365 r
= log_facility_unshifted_to_string_alloc(c
->syslog_priority
>> 3, &fac_str
);
4367 fprintf(f
, "%sSyslogFacility: %s\n", prefix
, fac_str
);
4369 r
= log_level_to_string_alloc(LOG_PRI(c
->syslog_priority
), &lvl_str
);
4371 fprintf(f
, "%sSyslogLevel: %s\n", prefix
, lvl_str
);
4374 if (c
->log_level_max
>= 0) {
4375 _cleanup_free_
char *t
= NULL
;
4377 (void) log_level_to_string_alloc(c
->log_level_max
, &t
);
4379 fprintf(f
, "%sLogLevelMax: %s\n", prefix
, strna(t
));
4382 if (c
->log_rate_limit_interval_usec
> 0) {
4383 char buf_timespan
[FORMAT_TIMESPAN_MAX
];
4386 "%sLogRateLimitIntervalSec: %s\n",
4387 prefix
, format_timespan(buf_timespan
, sizeof(buf_timespan
), c
->log_rate_limit_interval_usec
, USEC_PER_SEC
));
4390 if (c
->log_rate_limit_burst
> 0)
4391 fprintf(f
, "%sLogRateLimitBurst: %u\n", prefix
, c
->log_rate_limit_burst
);
4393 if (c
->n_log_extra_fields
> 0) {
4396 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->n_log_extra_fields
; j
++) {
4397 fprintf(f
, "%sLogExtraFields: ", prefix
);
4398 fwrite(c
->log_extra_fields
[j
].iov_base
,
4399 1, c
->log_extra_fields
[j
].iov_len
,
4405 if (c
->secure_bits
) {
4406 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
4408 r
= secure_bits_to_string_alloc(c
->secure_bits
, &str
);
4410 fprintf(f
, "%sSecure Bits: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
4413 if (c
->capability_bounding_set
!= CAP_ALL
) {
4414 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
4416 r
= capability_set_to_string_alloc(c
->capability_bounding_set
, &str
);
4418 fprintf(f
, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
4421 if (c
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
4422 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
4424 r
= capability_set_to_string_alloc(c
->capability_ambient_set
, &str
);
4426 fprintf(f
, "%sAmbientCapabilities: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
4430 fprintf(f
, "%sUser: %s\n", prefix
, c
->user
);
4432 fprintf(f
, "%sGroup: %s\n", prefix
, c
->group
);
4434 fprintf(f
, "%sDynamicUser: %s\n", prefix
, yes_no(c
->dynamic_user
));
4436 if (!strv_isempty(c
->supplementary_groups
)) {
4437 fprintf(f
, "%sSupplementaryGroups:", prefix
);
4438 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->supplementary_groups
);
4443 fprintf(f
, "%sPAMName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->pam_name
);
4445 if (!strv_isempty(c
->read_write_paths
)) {
4446 fprintf(f
, "%sReadWritePaths:", prefix
);
4447 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_write_paths
);
4451 if (!strv_isempty(c
->read_only_paths
)) {
4452 fprintf(f
, "%sReadOnlyPaths:", prefix
);
4453 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_only_paths
);
4457 if (!strv_isempty(c
->inaccessible_paths
)) {
4458 fprintf(f
, "%sInaccessiblePaths:", prefix
);
4459 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->inaccessible_paths
);
4463 if (c
->n_bind_mounts
> 0)
4464 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->n_bind_mounts
; i
++)
4465 fprintf(f
, "%s%s: %s%s:%s:%s\n", prefix
,
4466 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].read_only
? "BindReadOnlyPaths" : "BindPaths",
4467 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].ignore_enoent
? "-": "",
4468 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].source
,
4469 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].destination
,
4470 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].recursive
? "rbind" : "norbind");
4472 if (c
->n_temporary_filesystems
> 0)
4473 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->n_temporary_filesystems
; i
++) {
4474 TemporaryFileSystem
*t
= c
->temporary_filesystems
+ i
;
4476 fprintf(f
, "%sTemporaryFileSystem: %s%s%s\n", prefix
,
4478 isempty(t
->options
) ? "" : ":",
4479 strempty(t
->options
));
4484 "%sUtmpIdentifier: %s\n",
4485 prefix
, c
->utmp_id
);
4487 if (c
->selinux_context
)
4489 "%sSELinuxContext: %s%s\n",
4490 prefix
, c
->selinux_context_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->selinux_context
);
4492 if (c
->apparmor_profile
)
4494 "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n",
4495 prefix
, c
->apparmor_profile_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->apparmor_profile
);
4497 if (c
->smack_process_label
)
4499 "%sSmackProcessLabel: %s%s\n",
4500 prefix
, c
->smack_process_label_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->smack_process_label
);
4502 if (c
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
)
4504 "%sPersonality: %s\n",
4505 prefix
, strna(personality_to_string(c
->personality
)));
4508 "%sLockPersonality: %s\n",
4509 prefix
, yes_no(c
->lock_personality
));
4511 if (c
->syscall_filter
) {
4519 "%sSystemCallFilter: ",
4522 if (!c
->syscall_whitelist
)
4526 HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(val
, id
, c
->syscall_filter
, j
) {
4527 _cleanup_free_
char *name
= NULL
;
4528 const char *errno_name
= NULL
;
4529 int num
= PTR_TO_INT(val
);
4536 name
= seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE
, PTR_TO_INT(id
) - 1);
4537 fputs(strna(name
), f
);
4540 errno_name
= errno_to_name(num
);
4542 fprintf(f
, ":%s", errno_name
);
4544 fprintf(f
, ":%d", num
);
4552 if (c
->syscall_archs
) {
4559 "%sSystemCallArchitectures:",
4563 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_archs
, j
)
4564 fprintf(f
, " %s", strna(seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id
) - 1)));
4569 if (exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
)) {
4570 _cleanup_free_
char *s
= NULL
;
4572 r
= namespace_flags_to_string(c
->restrict_namespaces
, &s
);
4574 fprintf(f
, "%sRestrictNamespaces: %s\n",
4578 if (c
->network_namespace_path
)
4580 "%sNetworkNamespacePath: %s\n",
4581 prefix
, c
->network_namespace_path
);
4583 if (c
->syscall_errno
> 0) {
4584 const char *errno_name
;
4586 fprintf(f
, "%sSystemCallErrorNumber: ", prefix
);
4588 errno_name
= errno_to_name(c
->syscall_errno
);
4590 fprintf(f
, "%s\n", errno_name
);
4592 fprintf(f
, "%d\n", c
->syscall_errno
);
4596 bool exec_context_maintains_privileges(const ExecContext
*c
) {
4599 /* Returns true if the process forked off would run under
4600 * an unchanged UID or as root. */
4605 if (streq(c
->user
, "root") || streq(c
->user
, "0"))
4611 int exec_context_get_effective_ioprio(const ExecContext
*c
) {
4619 p
= ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS
, 0);
4621 return IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE
, 4);
4626 void exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(ExecContext
*c
) {
4631 for (l
= 0; l
< c
->n_log_extra_fields
; l
++)
4632 free(c
->log_extra_fields
[l
].iov_base
);
4633 c
->log_extra_fields
= mfree(c
->log_extra_fields
);
4634 c
->n_log_extra_fields
= 0;
4637 void exec_status_start(ExecStatus
*s
, pid_t pid
) {
4644 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->start_timestamp
);
4647 void exec_status_exit(ExecStatus
*s
, const ExecContext
*context
, pid_t pid
, int code
, int status
) {
4650 if (s
->pid
!= pid
) {
4656 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->exit_timestamp
);
4662 if (context
->utmp_id
)
4663 (void) utmp_put_dead_process(context
->utmp_id
, pid
, code
, status
);
4665 exec_context_tty_reset(context
, NULL
);
4669 void exec_status_reset(ExecStatus
*s
) {
4672 *s
= (ExecStatus
) {};
4675 void exec_status_dump(const ExecStatus
*s
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
4676 char buf
[FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_MAX
];
4684 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
4687 "%sPID: "PID_FMT
"\n",
4690 if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s
->start_timestamp
))
4692 "%sStart Timestamp: %s\n",
4693 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->start_timestamp
.realtime
));
4695 if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s
->exit_timestamp
))
4697 "%sExit Timestamp: %s\n"
4699 "%sExit Status: %i\n",
4700 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->exit_timestamp
.realtime
),
4701 prefix
, sigchld_code_to_string(s
->code
),
4705 static char *exec_command_line(char **argv
) {
4713 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
)
4721 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
) {
4728 if (strpbrk(*a
, WHITESPACE
)) {
4739 /* FIXME: this doesn't really handle arguments that have
4740 * spaces and ticks in them */
4745 static void exec_command_dump(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
4746 _cleanup_free_
char *cmd
= NULL
;
4747 const char *prefix2
;
4752 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
4753 prefix2
= strjoina(prefix
, "\t");
4755 cmd
= exec_command_line(c
->argv
);
4757 "%sCommand Line: %s\n",
4758 prefix
, cmd
? cmd
: strerror(ENOMEM
));
4760 exec_status_dump(&c
->exec_status
, f
, prefix2
);
4763 void exec_command_dump_list(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
4766 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
4768 LIST_FOREACH(command
, c
, c
)
4769 exec_command_dump(c
, f
, prefix
);
4772 void exec_command_append_list(ExecCommand
**l
, ExecCommand
*e
) {
4779 /* It's kind of important, that we keep the order here */
4780 LIST_FIND_TAIL(command
, *l
, end
);
4781 LIST_INSERT_AFTER(command
, *l
, end
, e
);
4786 int exec_command_set(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
4794 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
4806 free_and_replace(c
->path
, p
);
4808 return strv_free_and_replace(c
->argv
, l
);
4811 int exec_command_append(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
4812 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **l
= NULL
;
4820 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
4826 r
= strv_extend_strv(&c
->argv
, l
, false);
4833 static void *remove_tmpdir_thread(void *p
) {
4834 _cleanup_free_
char *path
= p
;
4836 (void) rm_rf(path
, REMOVE_ROOT
|REMOVE_PHYSICAL
);
4840 static ExecRuntime
* exec_runtime_free(ExecRuntime
*rt
, bool destroy
) {
4847 (void) hashmap_remove(rt
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, rt
->id
);
4849 /* When destroy is true, then rm_rf tmp_dir and var_tmp_dir. */
4850 if (destroy
&& rt
->tmp_dir
) {
4851 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->tmp_dir
);
4853 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->tmp_dir
);
4855 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->tmp_dir
);
4862 if (destroy
&& rt
->var_tmp_dir
) {
4863 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4865 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4867 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4868 free(rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4871 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
4874 rt
->id
= mfree(rt
->id
);
4875 rt
->tmp_dir
= mfree(rt
->tmp_dir
);
4876 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= mfree(rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4877 safe_close_pair(rt
->netns_storage_socket
);
4881 static void exec_runtime_freep(ExecRuntime
**rt
) {
4882 (void) exec_runtime_free(*rt
, false);
4885 static int exec_runtime_allocate(ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
4890 n
= new(ExecRuntime
, 1);
4894 *n
= (ExecRuntime
) {
4895 .netns_storage_socket
= { -1, -1 },
4902 static int exec_runtime_add(
4905 const char *tmp_dir
,
4906 const char *var_tmp_dir
,
4907 const int netns_storage_socket
[2],
4908 ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
4910 _cleanup_(exec_runtime_freep
) ExecRuntime
*rt
= NULL
;
4916 r
= hashmap_ensure_allocated(&m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, &string_hash_ops
);
4920 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(&rt
);
4924 rt
->id
= strdup(id
);
4929 rt
->tmp_dir
= strdup(tmp_dir
);
4933 /* When tmp_dir is set, then we require var_tmp_dir is also set. */
4934 assert(var_tmp_dir
);
4935 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= strdup(var_tmp_dir
);
4936 if (!rt
->var_tmp_dir
)
4940 if (netns_storage_socket
) {
4941 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] = netns_storage_socket
[0];
4942 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] = netns_storage_socket
[1];
4945 r
= hashmap_put(m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, rt
->id
, rt
);
4954 /* do not remove created ExecRuntime object when the operation succeeds. */
4959 static int exec_runtime_make(Manager
*m
, const ExecContext
*c
, const char *id
, ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
4960 _cleanup_free_
char *tmp_dir
= NULL
, *var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
4961 _cleanup_close_pair_
int netns_storage_socket
[2] = { -1, -1 };
4968 /* It is not necessary to create ExecRuntime object. */
4969 if (!c
->private_network
&& !c
->private_tmp
&& !c
->network_namespace_path
)
4972 if (c
->private_tmp
) {
4973 r
= setup_tmp_dirs(id
, &tmp_dir
, &var_tmp_dir
);
4978 if (c
->private_network
|| c
->network_namespace_path
) {
4979 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_DGRAM
|SOCK_CLOEXEC
, 0, netns_storage_socket
) < 0)
4983 r
= exec_runtime_add(m
, id
, tmp_dir
, var_tmp_dir
, netns_storage_socket
, ret
);
4988 netns_storage_socket
[0] = netns_storage_socket
[1] = -1;
4992 int exec_runtime_acquire(Manager
*m
, const ExecContext
*c
, const char *id
, bool create
, ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
5000 rt
= hashmap_get(m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, id
);
5002 /* We already have a ExecRuntime object, let's increase the ref count and reuse it */
5008 /* If not found, then create a new object. */
5009 r
= exec_runtime_make(m
, c
, id
, &rt
);
5011 /* When r == 0, it is not necessary to create ExecRuntime object. */
5015 /* increment reference counter. */
5021 ExecRuntime
*exec_runtime_unref(ExecRuntime
*rt
, bool destroy
) {
5025 assert(rt
->n_ref
> 0);
5031 return exec_runtime_free(rt
, destroy
);
5034 int exec_runtime_serialize(const Manager
*m
, FILE *f
, FDSet
*fds
) {
5042 HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt
, m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, i
) {
5043 fprintf(f
, "exec-runtime=%s", rt
->id
);
5046 fprintf(f
, " tmp-dir=%s", rt
->tmp_dir
);
5048 if (rt
->var_tmp_dir
)
5049 fprintf(f
, " var-tmp-dir=%s", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
5051 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
5054 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
5058 fprintf(f
, " netns-socket-0=%i", copy
);
5061 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] >= 0) {
5064 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
5068 fprintf(f
, " netns-socket-1=%i", copy
);
5077 int exec_runtime_deserialize_compat(Unit
*u
, const char *key
, const char *value
, FDSet
*fds
) {
5078 _cleanup_(exec_runtime_freep
) ExecRuntime
*rt_create
= NULL
;
5082 /* This is for the migration from old (v237 or earlier) deserialization text.
5083 * Due to the bug #7790, this may not work with the units that use JoinsNamespaceOf=.
5084 * Even if the ExecRuntime object originally created by the other unit, we cannot judge
5085 * so or not from the serialized text, then we always creates a new object owned by this. */
5091 /* Manager manages ExecRuntime objects by the unit id.
5092 * So, we omit the serialized text when the unit does not have id (yet?)... */
5093 if (isempty(u
->id
)) {
5094 log_unit_debug(u
, "Invocation ID not found. Dropping runtime parameter.");
5098 r
= hashmap_ensure_allocated(&u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, &string_hash_ops
);
5100 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, r
, "Failed to allocate storage for runtime parameter: %m");
5104 rt
= hashmap_get(u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, u
->id
);
5106 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(&rt_create
);
5110 rt_create
->id
= strdup(u
->id
);
5117 if (streq(key
, "tmp-dir")) {
5120 copy
= strdup(value
);
5124 free_and_replace(rt
->tmp_dir
, copy
);
5126 } else if (streq(key
, "var-tmp-dir")) {
5129 copy
= strdup(value
);
5133 free_and_replace(rt
->var_tmp_dir
, copy
);
5135 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-0")) {
5138 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
)) {
5139 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
5143 safe_close(rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
5144 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
5146 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-1")) {
5149 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
)) {
5150 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
5154 safe_close(rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
5155 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
5159 /* If the object is newly created, then put it to the hashmap which manages ExecRuntime objects. */
5161 r
= hashmap_put(u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, rt_create
->id
, rt_create
);
5163 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, r
, "Failed to put runtime parameter to manager's storage: %m");
5167 rt_create
->manager
= u
->manager
;
5176 void exec_runtime_deserialize_one(Manager
*m
, const char *value
, FDSet
*fds
) {
5177 char *id
= NULL
, *tmp_dir
= NULL
, *var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
5178 int r
, fd0
= -1, fd1
= -1;
5179 const char *p
, *v
= value
;
5186 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5187 id
= strndupa(v
, n
);
5192 v
= startswith(p
, "tmp-dir=");
5194 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5195 tmp_dir
= strndupa(v
, n
);
5201 v
= startswith(p
, "var-tmp-dir=");
5203 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5204 var_tmp_dir
= strndupa(v
, n
);
5210 v
= startswith(p
, "netns-socket-0=");
5214 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5215 buf
= strndupa(v
, n
);
5216 if (safe_atoi(buf
, &fd0
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd0
)) {
5217 log_debug("Unable to process exec-runtime netns fd specification.");
5220 fd0
= fdset_remove(fds
, fd0
);
5226 v
= startswith(p
, "netns-socket-1=");
5230 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5231 buf
= strndupa(v
, n
);
5232 if (safe_atoi(buf
, &fd1
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd1
)) {
5233 log_debug("Unable to process exec-runtime netns fd specification.");
5236 fd1
= fdset_remove(fds
, fd1
);
5241 r
= exec_runtime_add(m
, id
, tmp_dir
, var_tmp_dir
, (int[]) { fd0
, fd1
}, NULL
);
5243 log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to add exec-runtime: %m");
5246 void exec_runtime_vacuum(Manager
*m
) {
5252 /* Free unreferenced ExecRuntime objects. This is used after manager deserialization process. */
5254 HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt
, m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, i
) {
5258 (void) exec_runtime_free(rt
, false);
5262 void exec_params_clear(ExecParameters
*p
) {
5266 strv_free(p
->environment
);
5269 static const char* const exec_input_table
[_EXEC_INPUT_MAX
] = {
5270 [EXEC_INPUT_NULL
] = "null",
5271 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
5272 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
] = "tty-force",
5273 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
] = "tty-fail",
5274 [EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket",
5275 [EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
] = "fd",
5276 [EXEC_INPUT_DATA
] = "data",
5277 [EXEC_INPUT_FILE
] = "file",
5280 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_input
, ExecInput
);
5282 static const char* const exec_output_table
[_EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
] = {
5283 [EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
] = "inherit",
5284 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
] = "null",
5285 [EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
5286 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
] = "syslog",
5287 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
] = "syslog+console",
5288 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
] = "kmsg",
5289 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
] = "kmsg+console",
5290 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
] = "journal",
5291 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
] = "journal+console",
5292 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket",
5293 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
] = "fd",
5294 [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
] = "file",
5295 [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
] = "append",
5298 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_output
, ExecOutput
);
5300 static const char* const exec_utmp_mode_table
[_EXEC_UTMP_MODE_MAX
] = {
5301 [EXEC_UTMP_INIT
] = "init",
5302 [EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
] = "login",
5303 [EXEC_UTMP_USER
] = "user",
5306 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_utmp_mode
, ExecUtmpMode
);
5308 static const char* const exec_preserve_mode_table
[_EXEC_PRESERVE_MODE_MAX
] = {
5309 [EXEC_PRESERVE_NO
] = "no",
5310 [EXEC_PRESERVE_YES
] = "yes",
5311 [EXEC_PRESERVE_RESTART
] = "restart",
5314 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(exec_preserve_mode
, ExecPreserveMode
, EXEC_PRESERVE_YES
);
5316 static const char* const exec_directory_type_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
5317 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = "RuntimeDirectory",
5318 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = "StateDirectory",
5319 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = "CacheDirectory",
5320 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = "LogsDirectory",
5321 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = "ConfigurationDirectory",
5324 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_directory_type
, ExecDirectoryType
);
5326 static const char* const exec_directory_env_name_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
5327 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = "RUNTIME_DIRECTORY",
5328 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = "STATE_DIRECTORY",
5329 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = "CACHE_DIRECTORY",
5330 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = "LOGS_DIRECTORY",
5331 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = "CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY",
5334 DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(exec_directory_env_name
, ExecDirectoryType
);
5336 static const char* const exec_keyring_mode_table
[_EXEC_KEYRING_MODE_MAX
] = {
5337 [EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT
] = "inherit",
5338 [EXEC_KEYRING_PRIVATE
] = "private",
5339 [EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED
] = "shared",
5342 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_keyring_mode
, ExecKeyringMode
);