1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
6 #include <sys/eventfd.h>
10 #include <sys/personality.h>
11 #include <sys/prctl.h>
13 #include <sys/types.h>
19 #include <security/pam_appl.h>
23 #include <selinux/selinux.h>
31 #include <sys/apparmor.h>
34 #include "sd-messages.h"
38 #include "alloc-util.h"
40 #include "apparmor-util.h"
45 #include "capability-util.h"
46 #include "cgroup-setup.h"
47 #include "chown-recursive.h"
48 #include "cpu-set-util.h"
52 #include "errno-list.h"
54 #include "exit-status.h"
57 #include "format-util.h"
59 #include "glob-util.h"
60 #include "hexdecoct.h"
67 #include "memory-util.h"
68 #include "missing_fs.h"
70 #include "mount-util.h"
71 #include "mountpoint-util.h"
72 #include "namespace.h"
73 #include "parse-util.h"
74 #include "path-util.h"
75 #include "process-util.h"
76 #include "random-util.h"
77 #include "rlimit-util.h"
80 #include "seccomp-util.h"
82 #include "securebits-util.h"
83 #include "selinux-util.h"
84 #include "signal-util.h"
85 #include "smack-util.h"
86 #include "socket-util.h"
88 #include "stat-util.h"
89 #include "string-table.h"
90 #include "string-util.h"
92 #include "syslog-util.h"
93 #include "terminal-util.h"
94 #include "tmpfile-util.h"
95 #include "umask-util.h"
97 #include "user-util.h"
98 #include "utmp-wtmp.h"
100 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC)
101 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC)
103 #define SNDBUF_SIZE (8*1024*1024)
105 static int shift_fds(int fds
[], size_t n_fds
) {
109 /* Modifies the fds array! (sorts it) */
113 for (int start
= 0;;) {
114 int restart_from
= -1;
116 for (int i
= start
; i
< (int) n_fds
; i
++) {
119 /* Already at right index? */
123 nfd
= fcntl(fds
[i
], F_DUPFD
, i
+ 3);
130 /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then
131 * let's remember that and try again from here */
132 if (nfd
!= i
+3 && restart_from
< 0)
136 if (restart_from
< 0)
139 start
= restart_from
;
145 static int flags_fds(const int fds
[], size_t n_socket_fds
, size_t n_storage_fds
, bool nonblock
) {
149 n_fds
= n_socket_fds
+ n_storage_fds
;
155 /* Drops/Sets O_NONBLOCK and FD_CLOEXEC from the file flags.
156 * O_NONBLOCK only applies to socket activation though. */
158 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< n_fds
; i
++) {
160 if (i
< n_socket_fds
) {
161 r
= fd_nonblock(fds
[i
], nonblock
);
166 /* We unconditionally drop FD_CLOEXEC from the fds,
167 * since after all we want to pass these fds to our
170 r
= fd_cloexec(fds
[i
], false);
178 static const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext
*context
) {
181 if (context
->stdio_as_fds
)
184 if (context
->tty_path
)
185 return context
->tty_path
;
187 return "/dev/console";
190 static void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext
*context
, const ExecParameters
*p
) {
195 path
= exec_context_tty_path(context
);
197 if (context
->tty_vhangup
) {
198 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
199 (void) terminal_vhangup_fd(p
->stdin_fd
);
201 (void) terminal_vhangup(path
);
204 if (context
->tty_reset
) {
205 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
206 (void) reset_terminal_fd(p
->stdin_fd
, true);
208 (void) reset_terminal(path
);
211 if (context
->tty_vt_disallocate
&& path
)
212 (void) vt_disallocate(path
);
215 static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i
) {
218 EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
,
219 EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
);
222 static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o
) {
225 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
226 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
);
229 static bool is_kmsg_output(ExecOutput o
) {
232 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
);
235 static bool exec_context_needs_term(const ExecContext
*c
) {
238 /* Return true if the execution context suggests we should set $TERM to something useful. */
240 if (is_terminal_input(c
->std_input
))
243 if (is_terminal_output(c
->std_output
))
246 if (is_terminal_output(c
->std_error
))
249 return !!c
->tty_path
;
252 static int open_null_as(int flags
, int nfd
) {
257 fd
= open("/dev/null", flags
|O_NOCTTY
);
261 return move_fd(fd
, nfd
, false);
264 static int connect_journal_socket(
266 const char *log_namespace
,
270 union sockaddr_union sa
;
272 uid_t olduid
= UID_INVALID
;
273 gid_t oldgid
= GID_INVALID
;
278 strjoina("/run/systemd/journal.", log_namespace
, "/stdout") :
279 "/run/systemd/journal/stdout";
280 r
= sockaddr_un_set_path(&sa
.un
, j
);
285 if (gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
288 if (setegid(gid
) < 0)
292 if (uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
295 if (seteuid(uid
) < 0) {
301 r
= connect(fd
, &sa
.sa
, sa_len
) < 0 ? -errno
: 0;
303 /* If we fail to restore the uid or gid, things will likely
304 fail later on. This should only happen if an LSM interferes. */
306 if (uid_is_valid(uid
))
307 (void) seteuid(olduid
);
310 if (gid_is_valid(gid
))
311 (void) setegid(oldgid
);
316 static int connect_logger_as(
318 const ExecContext
*context
,
319 const ExecParameters
*params
,
326 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
331 assert(output
< _EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
);
335 fd
= socket(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_STREAM
, 0);
339 r
= connect_journal_socket(fd
, context
->log_namespace
, uid
, gid
);
343 if (shutdown(fd
, SHUT_RD
) < 0)
346 (void) fd_inc_sndbuf(fd
, SNDBUF_SIZE
);
356 context
->syslog_identifier
?: ident
,
357 params
->flags
& EXEC_PASS_LOG_UNIT
? unit
->id
: "",
358 context
->syslog_priority
,
359 !!context
->syslog_level_prefix
,
361 is_kmsg_output(output
),
362 is_terminal_output(output
)) < 0)
365 return move_fd(TAKE_FD(fd
), nfd
, false);
368 static int open_terminal_as(const char *path
, int flags
, int nfd
) {
374 fd
= open_terminal(path
, flags
| O_NOCTTY
);
378 return move_fd(fd
, nfd
, false);
381 static int acquire_path(const char *path
, int flags
, mode_t mode
) {
382 union sockaddr_union sa
;
384 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
389 if (IN_SET(flags
& O_ACCMODE
, O_WRONLY
, O_RDWR
))
392 fd
= open(path
, flags
|O_NOCTTY
, mode
);
396 if (errno
!= ENXIO
) /* ENXIO is returned when we try to open() an AF_UNIX file system socket on Linux */
399 /* So, it appears the specified path could be an AF_UNIX socket. Let's see if we can connect to it. */
401 r
= sockaddr_un_set_path(&sa
.un
, path
);
403 return r
== -EINVAL
? -ENXIO
: r
;
406 fd
= socket(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_STREAM
, 0);
410 if (connect(fd
, &sa
.sa
, sa_len
) < 0)
411 return errno
== EINVAL
? -ENXIO
: -errno
; /* Propagate initial error if we get EINVAL, i.e. we have
412 * indication that this wasn't an AF_UNIX socket after all */
414 if ((flags
& O_ACCMODE
) == O_RDONLY
)
415 r
= shutdown(fd
, SHUT_WR
);
416 else if ((flags
& O_ACCMODE
) == O_WRONLY
)
417 r
= shutdown(fd
, SHUT_RD
);
426 static int fixup_input(
427 const ExecContext
*context
,
429 bool apply_tty_stdin
) {
435 std_input
= context
->std_input
;
437 if (is_terminal_input(std_input
) && !apply_tty_stdin
)
438 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
440 if (std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
441 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
443 if (std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_DATA
&& context
->stdin_data_size
== 0)
444 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
449 static int fixup_output(ExecOutput std_output
, int socket_fd
) {
451 if (std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
452 return EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
;
457 static int setup_input(
458 const ExecContext
*context
,
459 const ExecParameters
*params
,
461 const int named_iofds
[static 3]) {
469 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0) {
470 if (dup2(params
->stdin_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
473 /* Try to make this the controlling tty, if it is a tty, and reset it */
474 if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO
)) {
475 (void) ioctl(STDIN_FILENO
, TIOCSCTTY
, context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
);
476 (void) reset_terminal_fd(STDIN_FILENO
, true);
482 i
= fixup_input(context
, socket_fd
, params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN
);
486 case EXEC_INPUT_NULL
:
487 return open_null_as(O_RDONLY
, STDIN_FILENO
);
490 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
:
491 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
: {
494 fd
= acquire_terminal(exec_context_tty_path(context
),
495 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_TRY
:
496 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_FORCE
:
497 ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT
,
502 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
505 case EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
:
506 assert(socket_fd
>= 0);
508 return dup2(socket_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
510 case EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
:
511 assert(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] >= 0);
513 (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
], false);
514 return dup2(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
], STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
516 case EXEC_INPUT_DATA
: {
519 fd
= acquire_data_fd(context
->stdin_data
, context
->stdin_data_size
, 0);
523 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
526 case EXEC_INPUT_FILE
: {
530 assert(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
532 rw
= (context
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
&& streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
])) ||
533 (context
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
&& streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]));
535 fd
= acquire_path(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], rw
? O_RDWR
: O_RDONLY
, 0666 & ~context
->umask
);
539 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
543 assert_not_reached("Unknown input type");
547 static bool can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout(
548 const ExecContext
*context
,
554 /* Returns true, if given the specified STDERR and STDOUT output we can directly dup() the stdout fd to the
557 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
)
562 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
563 return streq_ptr(context
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
], context
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
565 if (IN_SET(e
, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE
))
566 return streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
571 static int setup_output(
573 const ExecContext
*context
,
574 const ExecParameters
*params
,
577 const int named_iofds
[static 3],
581 dev_t
*journal_stream_dev
,
582 ino_t
*journal_stream_ino
) {
592 assert(journal_stream_dev
);
593 assert(journal_stream_ino
);
595 if (fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
&& params
->stdout_fd
>= 0) {
597 if (dup2(params
->stdout_fd
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
600 return STDOUT_FILENO
;
603 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
&& params
->stderr_fd
>= 0) {
604 if (dup2(params
->stderr_fd
, STDERR_FILENO
) < 0)
607 return STDERR_FILENO
;
610 i
= fixup_input(context
, socket_fd
, params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN
);
611 o
= fixup_output(context
->std_output
, socket_fd
);
613 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
) {
615 e
= fixup_output(context
->std_error
, socket_fd
);
617 /* This expects the input and output are already set up */
619 /* Don't change the stderr file descriptor if we inherit all
620 * the way and are not on a tty */
621 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
622 o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
623 i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&&
624 !is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
) &&
628 /* Duplicate from stdout if possible */
629 if (can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout(context
, o
, e
))
630 return dup2(STDOUT_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
634 } else if (o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
) {
635 /* If input got downgraded, inherit the original value */
636 if (i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&& is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
))
637 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
639 /* If the input is connected to anything that's not a /dev/null or a data fd, inherit that... */
640 if (!IN_SET(i
, EXEC_INPUT_NULL
, EXEC_INPUT_DATA
))
641 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
643 /* If we are not started from PID 1 we just inherit STDOUT from our parent process. */
647 /* We need to open /dev/null here anew, to get the right access mode. */
648 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
653 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
:
654 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
656 case EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
:
657 if (is_terminal_input(i
))
658 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
660 /* We don't reset the terminal if this is just about output */
661 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
663 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
:
664 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
:
665 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
:
666 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
:
667 r
= connect_logger_as(unit
, context
, params
, o
, ident
, fileno
, uid
, gid
);
669 log_unit_warning_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to connect %s to the journal socket, ignoring: %m", fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
? "stdout" : "stderr");
670 r
= open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
674 /* If we connected this fd to the journal via a stream, patch the device/inode into the passed
675 * parameters, but only then. This is useful so that we can set $JOURNAL_STREAM that permits
676 * services to detect whether they are connected to the journal or not.
678 * If both stdout and stderr are connected to a stream then let's make sure to store the data
679 * about STDERR as that's usually the best way to do logging. */
681 if (fstat(fileno
, &st
) >= 0 &&
682 (*journal_stream_ino
== 0 || fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
)) {
683 *journal_stream_dev
= st
.st_dev
;
684 *journal_stream_ino
= st
.st_ino
;
689 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
:
690 assert(socket_fd
>= 0);
692 return dup2(socket_fd
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
694 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
:
695 assert(named_iofds
[fileno
] >= 0);
697 (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds
[fileno
], false);
698 return dup2(named_iofds
[fileno
], fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
700 case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
:
701 case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
:
702 case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE
: {
706 assert(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
]);
708 rw
= context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_FILE
&&
709 streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
], context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
712 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
715 if (o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
717 else if (o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE
)
720 fd
= acquire_path(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
], flags
, 0666 & ~context
->umask
);
724 return move_fd(fd
, fileno
, 0);
728 assert_not_reached("Unknown error type");
732 static int chown_terminal(int fd
, uid_t uid
) {
737 /* Before we chown/chmod the TTY, let's ensure this is actually a tty */
738 if (isatty(fd
) < 1) {
739 if (IN_SET(errno
, EINVAL
, ENOTTY
))
740 return 0; /* not a tty */
745 /* This might fail. What matters are the results. */
746 r
= fchmod_and_chown(fd
, TTY_MODE
, uid
, -1);
753 static int setup_confirm_stdio(const char *vc
, int *_saved_stdin
, int *_saved_stdout
) {
754 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, saved_stdout
= -1;
757 assert(_saved_stdin
);
758 assert(_saved_stdout
);
760 saved_stdin
= fcntl(STDIN_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
764 saved_stdout
= fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
765 if (saved_stdout
< 0)
768 fd
= acquire_terminal(vc
, ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT
, DEFAULT_CONFIRM_USEC
);
772 r
= chown_terminal(fd
, getuid());
776 r
= reset_terminal_fd(fd
, true);
780 r
= rearrange_stdio(fd
, fd
, STDERR_FILENO
);
785 *_saved_stdin
= saved_stdin
;
786 *_saved_stdout
= saved_stdout
;
788 saved_stdin
= saved_stdout
= -1;
793 static void write_confirm_error_fd(int err
, int fd
, const Unit
*u
) {
796 if (err
== -ETIMEDOUT
)
797 dprintf(fd
, "Confirmation question timed out for %s, assuming positive response.\n", u
->id
);
800 dprintf(fd
, "Couldn't ask confirmation for %s: %m, assuming positive response.\n", u
->id
);
804 static void write_confirm_error(int err
, const char *vc
, const Unit
*u
) {
805 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
809 fd
= open_terminal(vc
, O_WRONLY
|O_NOCTTY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
813 write_confirm_error_fd(err
, fd
, u
);
816 static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin
, int *saved_stdout
) {
820 assert(saved_stdout
);
824 if (*saved_stdin
>= 0)
825 if (dup2(*saved_stdin
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
828 if (*saved_stdout
>= 0)
829 if (dup2(*saved_stdout
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
832 *saved_stdin
= safe_close(*saved_stdin
);
833 *saved_stdout
= safe_close(*saved_stdout
);
839 CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE
= -1,
840 CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
= 0,
844 static int ask_for_confirmation(const char *vc
, Unit
*u
, const char *cmdline
) {
845 int saved_stdout
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, r
;
846 _cleanup_free_
char *e
= NULL
;
849 /* For any internal errors, assume a positive response. */
850 r
= setup_confirm_stdio(vc
, &saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
852 write_confirm_error(r
, vc
, u
);
853 return CONFIRM_EXECUTE
;
856 /* confirm_spawn might have been disabled while we were sleeping. */
857 if (manager_is_confirm_spawn_disabled(u
->manager
)) {
862 e
= ellipsize(cmdline
, 60, 100);
870 r
= ask_char(&c
, "yfshiDjcn", "Execute %s? [y, f, s – h for help] ", e
);
872 write_confirm_error_fd(r
, STDOUT_FILENO
, u
);
879 printf("Resuming normal execution.\n");
880 manager_disable_confirm_spawn();
884 unit_dump(u
, stdout
, " ");
885 continue; /* ask again */
887 printf("Failing execution.\n");
888 r
= CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE
;
891 printf(" c - continue, proceed without asking anymore\n"
892 " D - dump, show the state of the unit\n"
893 " f - fail, don't execute the command and pretend it failed\n"
895 " i - info, show a short summary of the unit\n"
896 " j - jobs, show jobs that are in progress\n"
897 " s - skip, don't execute the command and pretend it succeeded\n"
898 " y - yes, execute the command\n");
899 continue; /* ask again */
901 printf(" Description: %s\n"
904 u
->id
, u
->description
, cmdline
);
905 continue; /* ask again */
907 manager_dump_jobs(u
->manager
, stdout
, " ");
908 continue; /* ask again */
910 /* 'n' was removed in favor of 'f'. */
911 printf("Didn't understand 'n', did you mean 'f'?\n");
912 continue; /* ask again */
914 printf("Skipping execution.\n");
915 r
= CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
;
921 assert_not_reached("Unhandled choice");
927 restore_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
931 static int get_fixed_user(const ExecContext
*c
, const char **user
,
932 uid_t
*uid
, gid_t
*gid
,
933 const char **home
, const char **shell
) {
942 /* Note that we don't set $HOME or $SHELL if they are not particularly enlightening anyway
943 * (i.e. are "/" or "/bin/nologin"). */
946 r
= get_user_creds(&name
, uid
, gid
, home
, shell
, USER_CREDS_CLEAN
);
954 static int get_fixed_group(const ExecContext
*c
, const char **group
, gid_t
*gid
) {
964 r
= get_group_creds(&name
, gid
, 0);
972 static int get_supplementary_groups(const ExecContext
*c
, const char *user
,
973 const char *group
, gid_t gid
,
974 gid_t
**supplementary_gids
, int *ngids
) {
978 bool keep_groups
= false;
979 gid_t
*groups
= NULL
;
980 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*l_gids
= NULL
;
985 * If user is given, then lookup GID and supplementary groups list.
986 * We avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. Also we have to initialize groups
987 * here and as early as possible so we keep the list of supplementary
988 * groups of the caller.
990 if (user
&& gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= 0) {
991 /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */
992 if (initgroups(user
, gid
) < 0)
998 if (strv_isempty(c
->supplementary_groups
))
1002 * If SupplementaryGroups= was passed then NGROUPS_MAX has to
1003 * be positive, otherwise fail.
1006 ngroups_max
= (int) sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX
);
1007 if (ngroups_max
<= 0)
1008 return errno_or_else(EOPNOTSUPP
);
1010 l_gids
= new(gid_t
, ngroups_max
);
1016 * Lookup the list of groups that the user belongs to, we
1017 * avoid NSS lookups here too for gid=0.
1020 if (getgrouplist(user
, gid
, l_gids
, &k
) < 0)
1025 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->supplementary_groups
) {
1028 if (k
>= ngroups_max
)
1032 r
= get_group_creds(&g
, l_gids
+k
, 0);
1040 * Sets ngids to zero to drop all supplementary groups, happens
1041 * when we are under root and SupplementaryGroups= is empty.
1048 /* Otherwise get the final list of supplementary groups */
1049 groups
= memdup(l_gids
, sizeof(gid_t
) * k
);
1053 *supplementary_gids
= groups
;
1061 static int enforce_groups(gid_t gid
, const gid_t
*supplementary_gids
, int ngids
) {
1064 /* Handle SupplementaryGroups= if it is not empty */
1066 r
= maybe_setgroups(ngids
, supplementary_gids
);
1071 if (gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
1072 /* Then set our gids */
1073 if (setresgid(gid
, gid
, gid
) < 0)
1080 static int set_securebits(int bits
, int mask
) {
1081 int current
, applied
;
1082 current
= prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
);
1085 /* Clear all securebits defined in mask and set bits */
1086 applied
= (current
& ~mask
) | bits
;
1087 if (current
== applied
)
1089 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, applied
) < 0)
1094 static int enforce_user(const ExecContext
*context
, uid_t uid
) {
1098 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
))
1101 /* Sets (but doesn't look up) the uid and make sure we keep the
1102 * capabilities while doing so. For setting secure bits the capability CAP_SETPCAP is
1103 * required, so we also need keep-caps in this case.
1106 if (context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0 || context
->secure_bits
!= 0) {
1108 /* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but
1109 * drop privileges we need to make sure we keep our
1110 * caps, while we drop privileges. */
1112 /* Add KEEP_CAPS to the securebits */
1113 r
= set_securebits(1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
, 0);
1119 /* Second step: actually set the uids */
1120 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
1123 /* At this point we should have all necessary capabilities but
1124 are otherwise a normal user. However, the caps might got
1125 corrupted due to the setresuid() so we need clean them up
1126 later. This is done outside of this call. */
1133 static int null_conv(
1135 const struct pam_message
**msg
,
1136 struct pam_response
**resp
,
1137 void *appdata_ptr
) {
1139 /* We don't support conversations */
1141 return PAM_CONV_ERR
;
1146 static int setup_pam(
1153 const int fds
[], size_t n_fds
) {
1157 static const struct pam_conv conv
= {
1162 _cleanup_(barrier_destroy
) Barrier barrier
= BARRIER_NULL
;
1163 pam_handle_t
*handle
= NULL
;
1165 int pam_code
= PAM_SUCCESS
, r
;
1166 char **nv
, **e
= NULL
;
1167 bool close_session
= false;
1168 pid_t pam_pid
= 0, parent_pid
;
1175 /* We set up PAM in the parent process, then fork. The child
1176 * will then stay around until killed via PR_GET_PDEATHSIG or
1177 * systemd via the cgroup logic. It will then remove the PAM
1178 * session again. The parent process will exec() the actual
1179 * daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID
1180 * of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */
1182 r
= barrier_create(&barrier
);
1186 if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG
)
1187 flags
|= PAM_SILENT
;
1189 pam_code
= pam_start(name
, user
, &conv
, &handle
);
1190 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
1196 _cleanup_free_
char *q
= NULL
;
1198 /* Hmm, so no TTY was explicitly passed, but an fd passed to us directly might be a TTY. Let's figure
1199 * out if that's the case, and read the TTY off it. */
1201 if (getttyname_malloc(STDIN_FILENO
, &q
) >= 0)
1202 tty
= strjoina("/dev/", q
);
1206 pam_code
= pam_set_item(handle
, PAM_TTY
, tty
);
1207 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1211 STRV_FOREACH(nv
, *env
) {
1212 pam_code
= pam_putenv(handle
, *nv
);
1213 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1217 pam_code
= pam_acct_mgmt(handle
, flags
);
1218 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1221 pam_code
= pam_setcred(handle
, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED
| flags
);
1222 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1223 log_debug("pam_setcred() failed, ignoring: %s", pam_strerror(handle
, pam_code
));
1225 pam_code
= pam_open_session(handle
, flags
);
1226 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1229 close_session
= true;
1231 e
= pam_getenvlist(handle
);
1233 pam_code
= PAM_BUF_ERR
;
1237 /* Block SIGTERM, so that we know that it won't get lost in
1240 assert_se(sigprocmask_many(SIG_BLOCK
, &old_ss
, SIGTERM
, -1) >= 0);
1242 parent_pid
= getpid_cached();
1244 r
= safe_fork("(sd-pam)", 0, &pam_pid
);
1248 int sig
, ret
= EXIT_PAM
;
1250 /* The child's job is to reset the PAM session on
1252 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_CHILD
);
1254 /* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this child. We assume that otherwise only
1255 * those fds are open here that have been opened by PAM. */
1256 (void) close_many(fds
, n_fds
);
1258 /* Drop privileges - we don't need any to pam_close_session
1259 * and this will make PR_SET_PDEATHSIG work in most cases.
1260 * If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam threads
1261 * to fail to exit normally */
1263 r
= maybe_setgroups(0, NULL
);
1265 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to setgroups() in sd-pam: %m");
1266 if (setresgid(gid
, gid
, gid
) < 0)
1267 log_warning_errno(errno
, "Failed to setresgid() in sd-pam: %m");
1268 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
1269 log_warning_errno(errno
, "Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m");
1271 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
1273 /* Wait until our parent died. This will only work if
1274 * the above setresuid() succeeds, otherwise the kernel
1275 * will not allow unprivileged parents kill their privileged
1276 * children this way. We rely on the control groups kill logic
1277 * to do the rest for us. */
1278 if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG
, SIGTERM
) < 0)
1281 /* Tell the parent that our setup is done. This is especially
1282 * important regarding dropping privileges. Otherwise, unit
1283 * setup might race against our setresuid(2) call.
1285 * If the parent aborted, we'll detect this below, hence ignore
1286 * return failure here. */
1287 (void) barrier_place(&barrier
);
1289 /* Check if our parent process might already have died? */
1290 if (getppid() == parent_pid
) {
1293 assert_se(sigemptyset(&ss
) >= 0);
1294 assert_se(sigaddset(&ss
, SIGTERM
) >= 0);
1297 if (sigwait(&ss
, &sig
) < 0) {
1304 assert(sig
== SIGTERM
);
1309 pam_code
= pam_setcred(handle
, PAM_DELETE_CRED
| flags
);
1310 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1313 /* If our parent died we'll end the session */
1314 if (getppid() != parent_pid
) {
1315 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
1316 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1323 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
1327 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_PARENT
);
1329 /* If the child was forked off successfully it will do all the
1330 * cleanups, so forget about the handle here. */
1333 /* Unblock SIGTERM again in the parent */
1334 assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK
, &old_ss
, NULL
) >= 0);
1336 /* We close the log explicitly here, since the PAM modules
1337 * might have opened it, but we don't want this fd around. */
1340 /* Synchronously wait for the child to initialize. We don't care for
1341 * errors as we cannot recover. However, warn loudly if it happens. */
1342 if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier
))
1343 log_error("PAM initialization failed");
1345 return strv_free_and_replace(*env
, e
);
1348 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
1349 log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle
, pam_code
));
1350 r
= -EPERM
; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */
1352 log_error_errno(r
, "PAM failed: %m");
1356 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
1358 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
1370 static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path
) {
1371 char process_name
[11];
1375 /* This resulting string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
1376 * of "/sbin/init") to look pretty in /bin/ps */
1380 rename_process("(...)");
1386 /* The end of the process name is usually more
1387 * interesting, since the first bit might just be
1393 process_name
[0] = '(';
1394 memcpy(process_name
+1, p
, l
);
1395 process_name
[1+l
] = ')';
1396 process_name
[1+l
+1] = 0;
1398 rename_process(process_name
);
1401 static bool context_has_address_families(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1404 return c
->address_families_allow_list
||
1405 !set_isempty(c
->address_families
);
1408 static bool context_has_syscall_filters(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1411 return c
->syscall_allow_list
||
1412 !hashmap_isempty(c
->syscall_filter
);
1415 static bool context_has_syscall_logs(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1418 return c
->syscall_log_allow_list
||
1419 !hashmap_isempty(c
->syscall_log
);
1422 static bool context_has_no_new_privileges(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1425 if (c
->no_new_privileges
)
1428 if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) /* if we are privileged, we don't need NNP */
1431 /* We need NNP if we have any form of seccomp and are unprivileged */
1432 return context_has_address_families(c
) ||
1433 c
->memory_deny_write_execute
||
1434 c
->restrict_realtime
||
1435 c
->restrict_suid_sgid
||
1436 exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
) ||
1438 c
->protect_kernel_tunables
||
1439 c
->protect_kernel_modules
||
1440 c
->protect_kernel_logs
||
1441 c
->private_devices
||
1442 context_has_syscall_filters(c
) ||
1443 context_has_syscall_logs(c
) ||
1444 !set_isempty(c
->syscall_archs
) ||
1445 c
->lock_personality
||
1446 c
->protect_hostname
;
1449 static bool exec_context_has_credentials(const ExecContext
*context
) {
1453 return !hashmap_isempty(context
->set_credentials
) ||
1454 context
->load_credentials
;
1459 static bool skip_seccomp_unavailable(const Unit
* u
, const char* msg
) {
1461 if (is_seccomp_available())
1464 log_unit_debug(u
, "SECCOMP features not detected in the kernel, skipping %s", msg
);
1468 static int apply_syscall_filter(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
, bool needs_ambient_hack
) {
1469 uint32_t negative_action
, default_action
, action
;
1475 if (!context_has_syscall_filters(c
))
1478 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "SystemCallFilter="))
1481 negative_action
= c
->syscall_errno
== SECCOMP_ERROR_NUMBER_KILL
? scmp_act_kill_process() : SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c
->syscall_errno
);
1483 if (c
->syscall_allow_list
) {
1484 default_action
= negative_action
;
1485 action
= SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
;
1487 default_action
= SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
;
1488 action
= negative_action
;
1491 if (needs_ambient_hack
) {
1492 r
= seccomp_filter_set_add(c
->syscall_filter
, c
->syscall_allow_list
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SETUID
);
1497 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(default_action
, c
->syscall_filter
, action
, false);
1500 static int apply_syscall_log(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1502 uint32_t default_action
, action
;
1508 if (!context_has_syscall_logs(c
))
1512 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "SystemCallLog="))
1515 if (c
->syscall_log_allow_list
) {
1516 /* Log nothing but the ones listed */
1517 default_action
= SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
;
1518 action
= SCMP_ACT_LOG
;
1520 /* Log everything but the ones listed */
1521 default_action
= SCMP_ACT_LOG
;
1522 action
= SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
;
1525 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(default_action
, c
->syscall_log
, action
, false);
1527 /* old libseccomp */
1528 log_unit_debug(u
, "SECCOMP feature SCMP_ACT_LOG not available, skipping SystemCallLog=");
1533 static int apply_syscall_archs(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1537 if (set_isempty(c
->syscall_archs
))
1540 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "SystemCallArchitectures="))
1543 return seccomp_restrict_archs(c
->syscall_archs
);
1546 static int apply_address_families(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1550 if (!context_has_address_families(c
))
1553 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictAddressFamilies="))
1556 return seccomp_restrict_address_families(c
->address_families
, c
->address_families_allow_list
);
1559 static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1563 if (!c
->memory_deny_write_execute
)
1566 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "MemoryDenyWriteExecute="))
1569 return seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute();
1572 static int apply_restrict_realtime(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1576 if (!c
->restrict_realtime
)
1579 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictRealtime="))
1582 return seccomp_restrict_realtime();
1585 static int apply_restrict_suid_sgid(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1589 if (!c
->restrict_suid_sgid
)
1592 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictSUIDSGID="))
1595 return seccomp_restrict_suid_sgid();
1598 static int apply_protect_sysctl(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1602 /* Turn off the legacy sysctl() system call. Many distributions turn this off while building the kernel, but
1603 * let's protect even those systems where this is left on in the kernel. */
1605 if (!c
->protect_kernel_tunables
)
1608 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectKernelTunables="))
1611 return seccomp_protect_sysctl();
1614 static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1618 /* Turn off module syscalls on ProtectKernelModules=yes */
1620 if (!c
->protect_kernel_modules
)
1623 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectKernelModules="))
1626 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE
, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
), false);
1629 static int apply_protect_kernel_logs(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1633 if (!c
->protect_kernel_logs
)
1636 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectKernelLogs="))
1639 return seccomp_protect_syslog();
1642 static int apply_protect_clock(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1646 if (!c
->protect_clock
)
1649 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectClock="))
1652 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CLOCK
, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
), false);
1655 static int apply_private_devices(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1659 /* If PrivateDevices= is set, also turn off iopl and all @raw-io syscalls. */
1661 if (!c
->private_devices
)
1664 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "PrivateDevices="))
1667 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO
, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
), false);
1670 static int apply_restrict_namespaces(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1674 if (!exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
))
1677 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictNamespaces="))
1680 return seccomp_restrict_namespaces(c
->restrict_namespaces
);
1683 static int apply_lock_personality(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1684 unsigned long personality
;
1690 if (!c
->lock_personality
)
1693 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "LockPersonality="))
1696 personality
= c
->personality
;
1698 /* If personality is not specified, use either PER_LINUX or PER_LINUX32 depending on what is currently set. */
1699 if (personality
== PERSONALITY_INVALID
) {
1701 r
= opinionated_personality(&personality
);
1706 return seccomp_lock_personality(personality
);
1711 static int apply_protect_hostname(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
, int *ret_exit_status
) {
1715 if (!c
->protect_hostname
)
1718 if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_UTS
)) {
1719 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUTS
) < 0) {
1720 if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(errno
) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(errno
)) {
1721 *ret_exit_status
= EXIT_NAMESPACE
;
1722 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to set up UTS namespacing: %m");
1725 log_unit_warning(u
, "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but UTS namespace setup is prohibited (container manager?), ignoring namespace setup.");
1728 log_unit_warning(u
, "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support UTS namespaces, ignoring namespace setup.");
1733 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectHostname="))
1736 r
= seccomp_protect_hostname();
1738 *ret_exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
1739 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, r
, "Failed to apply hostname restrictions: %m");
1746 static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe
[static 4]) {
1749 idle_pipe
[1] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[1]);
1750 idle_pipe
[2] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[2]);
1752 if (idle_pipe
[0] >= 0) {
1755 r
= fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC
);
1757 if (idle_pipe
[3] >= 0 && r
== 0 /* timeout */) {
1760 /* Signal systemd that we are bored and want to continue. */
1761 n
= write(idle_pipe
[3], "x", 1);
1763 /* Wait for systemd to react to the signal above. */
1764 (void) fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC
);
1767 idle_pipe
[0] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[0]);
1771 idle_pipe
[3] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[3]);
1774 static const char *exec_directory_env_name_to_string(ExecDirectoryType t
);
1776 static int build_environment(
1778 const ExecContext
*c
,
1779 const ExecParameters
*p
,
1782 const char *username
,
1784 dev_t journal_stream_dev
,
1785 ino_t journal_stream_ino
,
1788 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
;
1797 #define N_ENV_VARS 16
1798 our_env
= new0(char*, N_ENV_VARS
+ _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
1803 _cleanup_free_
char *joined
= NULL
;
1805 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid_cached()) < 0)
1807 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1809 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_FDS=%zu", n_fds
) < 0)
1811 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1813 joined
= strv_join(p
->fd_names
, ":");
1817 x
= strjoin("LISTEN_FDNAMES=", joined
);
1820 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1823 if ((p
->flags
& EXEC_SET_WATCHDOG
) && p
->watchdog_usec
> 0) {
1824 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid_cached()) < 0)
1826 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1828 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_USEC="USEC_FMT
, p
->watchdog_usec
) < 0)
1830 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1833 /* If this is D-Bus, tell the nss-systemd module, since it relies on being able to use D-Bus look up dynamic
1834 * users via PID 1, possibly dead-locking the dbus daemon. This way it will not use D-Bus to resolve names, but
1835 * check the database directly. */
1836 if (p
->flags
& EXEC_NSS_BYPASS_BUS
) {
1837 x
= strdup("SYSTEMD_NSS_BYPASS_BUS=1");
1840 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1844 x
= strjoin("HOME=", home
);
1848 path_simplify(x
+ 5, true);
1849 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1853 x
= strjoin("LOGNAME=", username
);
1856 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1858 x
= strjoin("USER=", username
);
1861 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1865 x
= strjoin("SHELL=", shell
);
1869 path_simplify(x
+ 6, true);
1870 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1873 if (!sd_id128_is_null(u
->invocation_id
)) {
1874 if (asprintf(&x
, "INVOCATION_ID=" SD_ID128_FORMAT_STR
, SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(u
->invocation_id
)) < 0)
1877 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1880 if (exec_context_needs_term(c
)) {
1881 const char *tty_path
, *term
= NULL
;
1883 tty_path
= exec_context_tty_path(c
);
1885 /* If we are forked off PID 1 and we are supposed to operate on /dev/console, then let's try
1886 * to inherit the $TERM set for PID 1. This is useful for containers so that the $TERM the
1887 * container manager passes to PID 1 ends up all the way in the console login shown. */
1889 if (path_equal_ptr(tty_path
, "/dev/console") && getppid() == 1)
1890 term
= getenv("TERM");
1893 term
= default_term_for_tty(tty_path
);
1895 x
= strjoin("TERM=", term
);
1898 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1901 if (journal_stream_dev
!= 0 && journal_stream_ino
!= 0) {
1902 if (asprintf(&x
, "JOURNAL_STREAM=" DEV_FMT
":" INO_FMT
, journal_stream_dev
, journal_stream_ino
) < 0)
1905 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1908 if (c
->log_namespace
) {
1909 x
= strjoin("LOG_NAMESPACE=", c
->log_namespace
);
1913 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1916 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
1917 _cleanup_free_
char *pre
= NULL
, *joined
= NULL
;
1923 if (strv_isempty(c
->directories
[t
].paths
))
1926 n
= exec_directory_env_name_to_string(t
);
1930 pre
= strjoin(p
->prefix
[t
], "/");
1934 joined
= strv_join_full(c
->directories
[t
].paths
, ":", pre
, true);
1938 x
= strjoin(n
, "=", joined
);
1942 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1945 if (exec_context_has_credentials(c
) && p
->prefix
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
]) {
1946 x
= strjoin("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY=", p
->prefix
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
], "/credentials/", u
->id
);
1950 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1953 our_env
[n_env
++] = NULL
;
1954 assert(n_env
<= N_ENV_VARS
+ _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
1957 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(our_env
);
1962 static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext
*c
, char ***ret
) {
1963 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **pass_env
= NULL
;
1964 size_t n_env
= 0, n_bufsize
= 0;
1967 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->pass_environment
) {
1968 _cleanup_free_
char *x
= NULL
;
1974 x
= strjoin(*i
, "=", v
);
1978 if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(pass_env
, n_bufsize
, n_env
+ 2))
1981 pass_env
[n_env
++] = TAKE_PTR(x
);
1982 pass_env
[n_env
] = NULL
;
1985 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(pass_env
);
1990 static bool exec_needs_mount_namespace(
1991 const ExecContext
*context
,
1992 const ExecParameters
*params
,
1993 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
) {
1998 if (context
->root_image
)
2001 if (!strv_isempty(context
->read_write_paths
) ||
2002 !strv_isempty(context
->read_only_paths
) ||
2003 !strv_isempty(context
->inaccessible_paths
))
2006 if (context
->n_bind_mounts
> 0)
2009 if (context
->n_temporary_filesystems
> 0)
2012 if (context
->n_mount_images
> 0)
2015 if (!IN_SET(context
->mount_flags
, 0, MS_SHARED
))
2018 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
&& (runtime
->tmp_dir
|| runtime
->var_tmp_dir
))
2021 if (context
->private_devices
||
2022 context
->private_mounts
||
2023 context
->protect_system
!= PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO
||
2024 context
->protect_home
!= PROTECT_HOME_NO
||
2025 context
->protect_kernel_tunables
||
2026 context
->protect_kernel_modules
||
2027 context
->protect_kernel_logs
||
2028 context
->protect_control_groups
||
2029 context
->protect_proc
!= PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT
||
2030 context
->proc_subset
!= PROC_SUBSET_ALL
)
2033 if (context
->root_directory
) {
2034 if (exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(context
))
2037 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
2038 if (!params
->prefix
[t
])
2041 if (!strv_isempty(context
->directories
[t
].paths
))
2046 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
2047 (!strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
].paths
) ||
2048 !strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
].paths
) ||
2049 !strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
].paths
)))
2052 if (context
->log_namespace
)
2058 static int setup_private_users(uid_t ouid
, gid_t ogid
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
2059 _cleanup_free_
char *uid_map
= NULL
, *gid_map
= NULL
;
2060 _cleanup_close_pair_
int errno_pipe
[2] = { -1, -1 };
2061 _cleanup_close_
int unshare_ready_fd
= -1;
2062 _cleanup_(sigkill_waitp
) pid_t pid
= 0;
2067 /* Set up a user namespace and map the original UID/GID (IDs from before any user or group changes, i.e.
2068 * the IDs from the user or system manager(s)) to itself, the selected UID/GID to itself, and everything else to
2069 * nobody. In order to be able to write this mapping we need CAP_SETUID in the original user namespace, which
2070 * we however lack after opening the user namespace. To work around this we fork() a temporary child process,
2071 * which waits for the parent to create the new user namespace while staying in the original namespace. The
2072 * child then writes the UID mapping, under full privileges. The parent waits for the child to finish and
2073 * continues execution normally.
2074 * For unprivileged users (i.e. without capabilities), the root to root mapping is excluded. As such, it
2075 * does not need CAP_SETUID to write the single line mapping to itself. */
2077 /* Can only set up multiple mappings with CAP_SETUID. */
2078 if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SETUID
) && uid
!= ouid
&& uid_is_valid(uid
))
2079 r
= asprintf(&uid_map
,
2080 UID_FMT
" " UID_FMT
" 1\n" /* Map $OUID → $OUID */
2081 UID_FMT
" " UID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $UID → $UID */
2082 ouid
, ouid
, uid
, uid
);
2084 r
= asprintf(&uid_map
,
2085 UID_FMT
" " UID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $OUID → $OUID */
2091 /* Can only set up multiple mappings with CAP_SETGID. */
2092 if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SETGID
) && gid
!= ogid
&& gid_is_valid(gid
))
2093 r
= asprintf(&gid_map
,
2094 GID_FMT
" " GID_FMT
" 1\n" /* Map $OGID → $OGID */
2095 GID_FMT
" " GID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $GID → $GID */
2096 ogid
, ogid
, gid
, gid
);
2098 r
= asprintf(&gid_map
,
2099 GID_FMT
" " GID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $OGID -> $OGID */
2105 /* Create a communication channel so that the parent can tell the child when it finished creating the user
2107 unshare_ready_fd
= eventfd(0, EFD_CLOEXEC
);
2108 if (unshare_ready_fd
< 0)
2111 /* Create a communication channel so that the child can tell the parent a proper error code in case it
2113 if (pipe2(errno_pipe
, O_CLOEXEC
) < 0)
2116 r
= safe_fork("(sd-userns)", FORK_RESET_SIGNALS
|FORK_DEATHSIG
, &pid
);
2120 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
2124 /* Child process, running in the original user namespace. Let's update the parent's UID/GID map from
2125 * here, after the parent opened its own user namespace. */
2128 errno_pipe
[0] = safe_close(errno_pipe
[0]);
2130 /* Wait until the parent unshared the user namespace */
2131 if (read(unshare_ready_fd
, &c
, sizeof(c
)) < 0) {
2136 /* Disable the setgroups() system call in the child user namespace, for good. */
2137 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "setgroups");
2138 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
2140 if (errno
!= ENOENT
) {
2145 /* If the file is missing the kernel is too old, let's continue anyway. */
2147 if (write(fd
, "deny\n", 5) < 0) {
2152 fd
= safe_close(fd
);
2155 /* First write the GID map */
2156 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "gid_map");
2157 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
2162 if (write(fd
, gid_map
, strlen(gid_map
)) < 0) {
2166 fd
= safe_close(fd
);
2168 /* The write the UID map */
2169 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "uid_map");
2170 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
2175 if (write(fd
, uid_map
, strlen(uid_map
)) < 0) {
2180 _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS
);
2183 (void) write(errno_pipe
[1], &r
, sizeof(r
));
2184 _exit(EXIT_FAILURE
);
2187 errno_pipe
[1] = safe_close(errno_pipe
[1]);
2189 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER
) < 0)
2192 /* Let the child know that the namespace is ready now */
2193 if (write(unshare_ready_fd
, &c
, sizeof(c
)) < 0)
2196 /* Try to read an error code from the child */
2197 n
= read(errno_pipe
[0], &r
, sizeof(r
));
2200 if (n
== sizeof(r
)) { /* an error code was sent to us */
2205 if (n
!= 0) /* on success we should have read 0 bytes */
2208 r
= wait_for_terminate_and_check("(sd-userns)", pid
, 0);
2212 if (r
!= EXIT_SUCCESS
) /* If something strange happened with the child, let's consider this fatal, too */
2218 static bool exec_directory_is_private(const ExecContext
*context
, ExecDirectoryType type
) {
2219 if (!context
->dynamic_user
)
2222 if (type
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
)
2225 if (type
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
&& context
->runtime_directory_preserve_mode
== EXEC_PRESERVE_NO
)
2231 static int setup_exec_directory(
2232 const ExecContext
*context
,
2233 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2236 ExecDirectoryType type
,
2239 static const int exit_status_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
2240 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY
,
2241 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = EXIT_STATE_DIRECTORY
,
2242 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = EXIT_CACHE_DIRECTORY
,
2243 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = EXIT_LOGS_DIRECTORY
,
2244 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = EXIT_CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY
,
2251 assert(type
>= 0 && type
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
2252 assert(exit_status
);
2254 if (!params
->prefix
[type
])
2257 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_CHOWN_DIRECTORIES
) {
2258 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
))
2260 if (!gid_is_valid(gid
))
2264 STRV_FOREACH(rt
, context
->directories
[type
].paths
) {
2265 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
, *pp
= NULL
;
2267 p
= path_join(params
->prefix
[type
], *rt
);
2273 r
= mkdir_parents_label(p
, 0755);
2277 if (exec_directory_is_private(context
, type
)) {
2278 _cleanup_free_
char *private_root
= NULL
;
2280 /* So, here's one extra complication when dealing with DynamicUser=1 units. In that
2281 * case we want to avoid leaving a directory around fully accessible that is owned by
2282 * a dynamic user whose UID is later on reused. To lock this down we use the same
2283 * trick used by container managers to prohibit host users to get access to files of
2284 * the same UID in containers: we place everything inside a directory that has an
2285 * access mode of 0700 and is owned root:root, so that it acts as security boundary
2286 * for unprivileged host code. We then use fs namespacing to make this directory
2287 * permeable for the service itself.
2289 * Specifically: for a service which wants a special directory "foo/" we first create
2290 * a directory "private/" with access mode 0700 owned by root:root. Then we place
2291 * "foo" inside of that directory (i.e. "private/foo/"), and make "foo" a symlink to
2292 * "private/foo". This way, privileged host users can access "foo/" as usual, but
2293 * unprivileged host users can't look into it. Inside of the namespace of the unit
2294 * "private/" is replaced by a more liberally accessible tmpfs, into which the host's
2295 * "private/foo/" is mounted under the same name, thus disabling the access boundary
2296 * for the service and making sure it only gets access to the dirs it needs but no
2297 * others. Tricky? Yes, absolutely, but it works!
2299 * Note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION as that's assumed not
2300 * to be owned by the service itself.
2302 * Also, note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME as that's often used
2303 * for sharing files or sockets with other services. */
2305 private_root
= path_join(params
->prefix
[type
], "private");
2306 if (!private_root
) {
2311 /* First set up private root if it doesn't exist yet, with access mode 0700 and owned by root:root */
2312 r
= mkdir_safe_label(private_root
, 0700, 0, 0, MKDIR_WARN_MODE
);
2316 pp
= path_join(private_root
, *rt
);
2322 /* Create all directories between the configured directory and this private root, and mark them 0755 */
2323 r
= mkdir_parents_label(pp
, 0755);
2327 if (is_dir(p
, false) > 0 &&
2328 (laccess(pp
, F_OK
) < 0 && errno
== ENOENT
)) {
2330 /* Hmm, the private directory doesn't exist yet, but the normal one exists? If so, move
2331 * it over. Most likely the service has been upgraded from one that didn't use
2332 * DynamicUser=1, to one that does. */
2334 log_info("Found pre-existing public %s= directory %s, migrating to %s.\n"
2335 "Apparently, service previously had DynamicUser= turned off, and has now turned it on.",
2336 exec_directory_type_to_string(type
), p
, pp
);
2338 if (rename(p
, pp
) < 0) {
2343 /* Otherwise, create the actual directory for the service */
2345 r
= mkdir_label(pp
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
);
2346 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -EEXIST
)
2350 /* And link it up from the original place */
2351 r
= symlink_idempotent(pp
, p
, true);
2356 _cleanup_free_
char *target
= NULL
;
2358 if (type
!= EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
&&
2359 readlink_and_make_absolute(p
, &target
) >= 0) {
2360 _cleanup_free_
char *q
= NULL
, *q_resolved
= NULL
, *target_resolved
= NULL
;
2362 /* This already exists and is a symlink? Interesting. Maybe it's one created
2363 * by DynamicUser=1 (see above)?
2365 * We do this for all directory types except for ConfigurationDirectory=,
2366 * since they all support the private/ symlink logic at least in some
2367 * configurations, see above. */
2369 r
= chase_symlinks(target
, NULL
, 0, &target_resolved
, NULL
);
2373 q
= path_join(params
->prefix
[type
], "private", *rt
);
2379 /* /var/lib or friends may be symlinks. So, let's chase them also. */
2380 r
= chase_symlinks(q
, NULL
, CHASE_NONEXISTENT
, &q_resolved
, NULL
);
2384 if (path_equal(q_resolved
, target_resolved
)) {
2386 /* Hmm, apparently DynamicUser= was once turned on for this service,
2387 * but is no longer. Let's move the directory back up. */
2389 log_info("Found pre-existing private %s= directory %s, migrating to %s.\n"
2390 "Apparently, service previously had DynamicUser= turned on, and has now turned it off.",
2391 exec_directory_type_to_string(type
), q
, p
);
2393 if (unlink(p
) < 0) {
2398 if (rename(q
, p
) < 0) {
2405 r
= mkdir_label(p
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
);
2410 if (type
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
) {
2413 /* Don't change the owner/access mode of the configuration directory,
2414 * as in the common case it is not written to by a service, and shall
2415 * not be writable. */
2417 if (stat(p
, &st
) < 0) {
2422 /* Still complain if the access mode doesn't match */
2423 if (((st
.st_mode
^ context
->directories
[type
].mode
) & 07777) != 0)
2424 log_warning("%s \'%s\' already exists but the mode is different. "
2425 "(File system: %o %sMode: %o)",
2426 exec_directory_type_to_string(type
), *rt
,
2427 st
.st_mode
& 07777, exec_directory_type_to_string(type
), context
->directories
[type
].mode
& 07777);
2434 /* Lock down the access mode (we use chmod_and_chown() to make this idempotent. We don't
2435 * specify UID/GID here, so that path_chown_recursive() can optimize things depending on the
2436 * current UID/GID ownership.) */
2437 r
= chmod_and_chown(pp
?: p
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
, UID_INVALID
, GID_INVALID
);
2441 /* Then, change the ownership of the whole tree, if necessary. When dynamic users are used we
2442 * drop the suid/sgid bits, since we really don't want SUID/SGID files for dynamic UID/GID
2443 * assignments to exist.*/
2444 r
= path_chown_recursive(pp
?: p
, uid
, gid
, context
->dynamic_user
? 01777 : 07777);
2452 *exit_status
= exit_status_table
[type
];
2456 static int write_credential(
2462 bool ownership_ok
) {
2464 _cleanup_(unlink_and_freep
) char *tmp
= NULL
;
2465 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
2468 r
= tempfn_random_child("", "cred", &tmp
);
2472 fd
= openat(dfd
, tmp
, O_CREAT
|O_RDWR
|O_CLOEXEC
|O_EXCL
|O_NOFOLLOW
|O_NOCTTY
, 0600);
2478 r
= loop_write(fd
, data
, size
, /* do_pool = */ false);
2482 if (fchmod(fd
, 0400) < 0) /* Take away "w" bit */
2485 if (uid_is_valid(uid
) && uid
!= getuid()) {
2486 r
= fd_add_uid_acl_permission(fd
, uid
, ACL_READ
);
2488 if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r
) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r
))
2491 if (!ownership_ok
) /* Ideally we use ACLs, since we can neatly express what we want
2492 * to express: that the user gets read access and nothing
2493 * else. But if the backing fs can't support that (e.g. ramfs)
2494 * then we can use file ownership instead. But that's only safe if
2495 * we can then re-mount the whole thing read-only, so that the
2496 * user can no longer chmod() the file to gain write access. */
2499 if (fchown(fd
, uid
, (gid_t
) -1) < 0)
2504 if (renameat(dfd
, tmp
, dfd
, id
) < 0)
2511 #define CREDENTIALS_BYTES_MAX (1024LU * 1024LU) /* Refuse to pass more than 1M, after all this is unswappable memory */
2513 static int acquire_credentials(
2514 const ExecContext
*context
,
2515 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2519 bool ownership_ok
) {
2521 uint64_t left
= CREDENTIALS_BYTES_MAX
;
2522 _cleanup_close_
int dfd
= -1;
2523 ExecSetCredential
*sc
;
2530 dfd
= open(p
, O_DIRECTORY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
2534 /* First we use the literally specified credentials. Note that they might be overridden again below,
2535 * and thus act as a "default" if the same credential is specified multiple times */
2536 HASHMAP_FOREACH(sc
, context
->set_credentials
) {
2539 add
= strlen(sc
->id
) + sc
->size
;
2543 r
= write_credential(dfd
, sc
->id
, sc
->data
, sc
->size
, uid
, ownership_ok
);
2550 /* Then, load credential off disk (or acquire via AF_UNIX socket) */
2551 STRV_FOREACH_PAIR(id
, fn
, context
->load_credentials
) {
2552 ReadFullFileFlags flags
= READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE
;
2553 _cleanup_(erase_and_freep
) char *data
= NULL
;
2554 _cleanup_free_
char *j
= NULL
, *bindname
= NULL
;
2558 if (path_is_absolute(*fn
)) {
2559 /* If this is an absolute path, read the data directly from it, and support AF_UNIX sockets */
2561 flags
|= READ_FULL_FILE_CONNECT_SOCKET
;
2563 /* Pass some minimal info about the unit and the credential name we are looking to acquire
2564 * via the source socket address in case we read off an AF_UNIX socket. */
2565 if (asprintf(&bindname
, "@%" PRIx64
"/unit/%s/%s", random_u64(), unit
, *id
) < 0)
2568 } else if (params
->received_credentials
) {
2569 /* If this is a relative path, take it relative to the credentials we received
2570 * ourselves. We don't support the AF_UNIX stuff in this mode, since we are operating
2571 * on a credential store, i.e. this is guaranteed to be regular files. */
2572 j
= path_join(params
->received_credentials
, *fn
);
2582 r
= read_full_file_full(AT_FDCWD
, source
, UINT64_MAX
, SIZE_MAX
, flags
, bindname
, &data
, &size
);
2586 faccessat(dfd
, *id
, F_OK
, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW
) >= 0) /* If the source file doesn't exist, but we already acquired the key otherwise, then don't fail */
2591 add
= strlen(*id
) + size
;
2595 r
= write_credential(dfd
, *id
, data
, size
, uid
, ownership_ok
);
2602 if (fchmod(dfd
, 0500) < 0) /* Now take away the "w" bit */
2605 /* After we created all keys with the right perms, also make sure the credential store as a whole is
2608 if (uid_is_valid(uid
) && uid
!= getuid()) {
2609 r
= fd_add_uid_acl_permission(dfd
, uid
, ACL_READ
| ACL_EXECUTE
);
2611 if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r
) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r
))
2617 if (fchown(dfd
, uid
, (gid_t
) -1) < 0)
2625 static int setup_credentials_internal(
2626 const ExecContext
*context
,
2627 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2629 const char *final
, /* This is where the credential store shall eventually end up at */
2630 const char *workspace
, /* This is where we can prepare it before moving it to the final place */
2631 bool reuse_workspace
, /* Whether to reuse any existing workspace mount if it already is a mount */
2632 bool must_mount
, /* Whether to require that we mount something, it's not OK to use the plain directory fall back */
2635 int r
, workspace_mounted
; /* negative if we don't know yet whether we have/can mount something; true
2636 * if we mounted something; false if we definitely can't mount anything */
2644 if (reuse_workspace
) {
2645 r
= path_is_mount_point(workspace
, NULL
, 0);
2649 workspace_mounted
= true; /* If this is already a mount, and we are supposed to reuse it, let's keep this in mind */
2651 workspace_mounted
= -1; /* We need to figure out if we can mount something to the workspace */
2653 workspace_mounted
= -1; /* ditto */
2655 r
= path_is_mount_point(final
, NULL
, 0);
2659 /* If the final place already has something mounted, we use that. If the workspace also has
2660 * something mounted we assume it's actually the same mount (but with MS_RDONLY
2662 final_mounted
= true;
2664 if (workspace_mounted
< 0) {
2665 /* If the final place is mounted, but the workspace we isn't, then let's bind mount
2666 * the final version to the workspace, and make it writable, so that we can make
2669 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, final
, workspace
, NULL
, MS_BIND
|MS_REC
, NULL
);
2673 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, NULL
, workspace
, NULL
, MS_BIND
|MS_REMOUNT
|MS_NODEV
|MS_NOEXEC
|MS_NOSUID
, NULL
);
2677 workspace_mounted
= true;
2680 final_mounted
= false;
2682 if (workspace_mounted
< 0) {
2683 /* Nothing is mounted on the workspace yet, let's try to mount something now */
2684 for (int try = 0;; try++) {
2687 /* Try "ramfs" first, since it's not swap backed */
2688 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, "ramfs", workspace
, "ramfs", MS_NODEV
|MS_NOEXEC
|MS_NOSUID
, "mode=0700");
2690 workspace_mounted
= true;
2694 } else if (try == 1) {
2695 _cleanup_free_
char *opts
= NULL
;
2697 if (asprintf(&opts
, "mode=0700,nr_inodes=1024,size=%lu", CREDENTIALS_BYTES_MAX
) < 0)
2700 /* Fall back to "tmpfs" otherwise */
2701 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, "tmpfs", workspace
, "tmpfs", MS_NODEV
|MS_NOEXEC
|MS_NOSUID
, opts
);
2703 workspace_mounted
= true;
2708 /* If that didn't work, try to make a bind mount from the final to the workspace, so that we can make it writable there. */
2709 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, final
, workspace
, NULL
, MS_BIND
|MS_REC
, NULL
);
2711 if (!ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r
)) /* Propagate anything that isn't a permission problem */
2714 if (must_mount
) /* If we it's not OK to use the plain directory
2715 * fallback, propagate all errors too */
2718 /* If we lack privileges to bind mount stuff, then let's gracefully
2719 * proceed for compat with container envs, and just use the final dir
2722 workspace_mounted
= false;
2726 /* Make the new bind mount writable (i.e. drop MS_RDONLY) */
2727 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, NULL
, workspace
, NULL
, MS_BIND
|MS_REMOUNT
|MS_NODEV
|MS_NOEXEC
|MS_NOSUID
, NULL
);
2731 workspace_mounted
= true;
2737 assert(!must_mount
|| workspace_mounted
> 0);
2738 where
= workspace_mounted
? workspace
: final
;
2740 r
= acquire_credentials(context
, params
, unit
, where
, uid
, workspace_mounted
);
2744 if (workspace_mounted
) {
2745 /* Make workspace read-only now, so that any bind mount we make from it defaults to read-only too */
2746 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, NULL
, workspace
, NULL
, MS_BIND
|MS_REMOUNT
|MS_RDONLY
|MS_NODEV
|MS_NOEXEC
|MS_NOSUID
, NULL
);
2750 /* And mount it to the final place, read-only */
2752 r
= umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, workspace
, MNT_DETACH
|UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW
);
2754 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, workspace
, final
, NULL
, MS_MOVE
, NULL
);
2758 _cleanup_free_
char *parent
= NULL
;
2760 /* If we do not have our own mount put used the plain directory fallback, then we need to
2761 * open access to the top-level credential directory and the per-service directory now */
2763 parent
= dirname_malloc(final
);
2766 if (chmod(parent
, 0755) < 0)
2773 static int setup_credentials(
2774 const ExecContext
*context
,
2775 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2779 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
, *q
= NULL
;
2786 if (!exec_context_has_credentials(context
))
2789 if (!params
->prefix
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
])
2792 /* This where we'll place stuff when we are done; this main credentials directory is world-readable,
2793 * and the subdir we mount over with a read-only file system readable by the service's user */
2794 q
= path_join(params
->prefix
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
], "credentials");
2798 r
= mkdir_label(q
, 0755); /* top-level dir: world readable/searchable */
2799 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -EEXIST
)
2802 p
= path_join(q
, unit
);
2806 r
= mkdir_label(p
, 0700); /* per-unit dir: private to user */
2807 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -EEXIST
)
2810 r
= safe_fork("(sd-mkdcreds)", FORK_DEATHSIG
|FORK_WAIT
|FORK_NEW_MOUNTNS
, NULL
);
2812 _cleanup_free_
char *t
= NULL
, *u
= NULL
;
2814 /* If this is not a privilege or support issue then propagate the error */
2815 if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r
) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r
))
2818 /* Temporary workspace, that remains inaccessible all the time. We prepare stuff there before moving
2819 * it into place, so that users can't access half-initialized credential stores. */
2820 t
= path_join(params
->prefix
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
], "systemd/temporary-credentials");
2824 /* We can't set up a mount namespace. In that case operate on a fixed, inaccessible per-unit
2825 * directory outside of /run/credentials/ first, and then move it over to /run/credentials/
2826 * after it is fully set up */
2827 u
= path_join(t
, unit
);
2831 FOREACH_STRING(i
, t
, u
) {
2832 r
= mkdir_label(i
, 0700);
2833 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -EEXIST
)
2837 r
= setup_credentials_internal(
2841 p
, /* final mount point */
2842 u
, /* temporary workspace to overmount */
2843 true, /* reuse the workspace if it is already a mount */
2844 false, /* it's OK to fall back to a plain directory if we can't mount anything */
2847 (void) rmdir(u
); /* remove the workspace again if we can. */
2852 } else if (r
== 0) {
2854 /* We managed to set up a mount namespace, and are now in a child. That's great. In this case
2855 * we can use the same directory for all cases, after turning off propagation. Question
2856 * though is: where do we turn off propagation exactly, and where do we place the workspace
2857 * directory? We need some place that is guaranteed to be a mount point in the host, and
2858 * which is guaranteed to have a subdir we can mount over. /run/ is not suitable for this,
2859 * since we ultimately want to move the resulting file system there, i.e. we need propagation
2860 * for /run/ eventually. We could use our own /run/systemd/bind mount on itself, but that
2861 * would be visible in the host mount table all the time, which we want to avoid. Hence, what
2862 * we do here instead we use /dev/ and /dev/shm/ for our purposes. We know for sure that
2863 * /dev/ is a mount point and we now for sure that /dev/shm/ exists. Hence we can turn off
2864 * propagation on the former, and then overmount the latter.
2866 * Yes it's nasty playing games with /dev/ and /dev/shm/ like this, since it does not exist
2867 * for this purpose, but there are few other candidates that work equally well for us, and
2868 * given that the we do this in a privately namespaced short-lived single-threaded process
2869 * that no one else sees this should be OK to do.*/
2871 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, NULL
, "/dev", NULL
, MS_SLAVE
|MS_REC
, NULL
); /* Turn off propagation from our namespace to host */
2875 r
= setup_credentials_internal(
2879 p
, /* final mount point */
2880 "/dev/shm", /* temporary workspace to overmount */
2881 false, /* do not reuse /dev/shm if it is already a mount, under no circumstances */
2882 true, /* insist that something is mounted, do not allow fallback to plain directory */
2887 _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS
);
2890 _exit(EXIT_FAILURE
);
2897 static int setup_smack(
2898 const ExecContext
*context
,
2899 int executable_fd
) {
2903 assert(executable_fd
>= 0);
2905 if (context
->smack_process_label
) {
2906 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context
->smack_process_label
);
2910 #ifdef SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
2912 _cleanup_free_
char *exec_label
= NULL
;
2914 r
= mac_smack_read_fd(executable_fd
, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC
, &exec_label
);
2915 if (r
< 0 && !IN_SET(r
, -ENODATA
, -EOPNOTSUPP
))
2918 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label
? : SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
);
2928 static int compile_bind_mounts(
2929 const ExecContext
*context
,
2930 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2931 BindMount
**ret_bind_mounts
,
2932 size_t *ret_n_bind_mounts
,
2933 char ***ret_empty_directories
) {
2935 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **empty_directories
= NULL
;
2936 BindMount
*bind_mounts
;
2942 assert(ret_bind_mounts
);
2943 assert(ret_n_bind_mounts
);
2944 assert(ret_empty_directories
);
2946 n
= context
->n_bind_mounts
;
2947 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
2948 if (!params
->prefix
[t
])
2951 n
+= strv_length(context
->directories
[t
].paths
);
2955 *ret_bind_mounts
= NULL
;
2956 *ret_n_bind_mounts
= 0;
2957 *ret_empty_directories
= NULL
;
2961 bind_mounts
= new(BindMount
, n
);
2965 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< context
->n_bind_mounts
; i
++) {
2966 BindMount
*item
= context
->bind_mounts
+ i
;
2969 s
= strdup(item
->source
);
2975 d
= strdup(item
->destination
);
2982 bind_mounts
[h
++] = (BindMount
) {
2985 .read_only
= item
->read_only
,
2986 .recursive
= item
->recursive
,
2987 .ignore_enoent
= item
->ignore_enoent
,
2991 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
2994 if (!params
->prefix
[t
])
2997 if (strv_isempty(context
->directories
[t
].paths
))
3000 if (exec_directory_is_private(context
, t
) &&
3001 !exec_context_with_rootfs(context
)) {
3004 /* So this is for a dynamic user, and we need to make sure the process can access its own
3005 * directory. For that we overmount the usually inaccessible "private" subdirectory with a
3006 * tmpfs that makes it accessible and is empty except for the submounts we do this for. */
3008 private_root
= path_join(params
->prefix
[t
], "private");
3009 if (!private_root
) {
3014 r
= strv_consume(&empty_directories
, private_root
);
3019 STRV_FOREACH(suffix
, context
->directories
[t
].paths
) {
3022 if (exec_directory_is_private(context
, t
))
3023 s
= path_join(params
->prefix
[t
], "private", *suffix
);
3025 s
= path_join(params
->prefix
[t
], *suffix
);
3031 if (exec_directory_is_private(context
, t
) &&
3032 exec_context_with_rootfs(context
))
3033 /* When RootDirectory= or RootImage= are set, then the symbolic link to the private
3034 * directory is not created on the root directory. So, let's bind-mount the directory
3035 * on the 'non-private' place. */
3036 d
= path_join(params
->prefix
[t
], *suffix
);
3045 bind_mounts
[h
++] = (BindMount
) {
3049 .nosuid
= context
->dynamic_user
, /* don't allow suid/sgid when DynamicUser= is on */
3051 .ignore_enoent
= false,
3058 *ret_bind_mounts
= bind_mounts
;
3059 *ret_n_bind_mounts
= n
;
3060 *ret_empty_directories
= TAKE_PTR(empty_directories
);
3065 bind_mount_free_many(bind_mounts
, h
);
3069 static bool insist_on_sandboxing(
3070 const ExecContext
*context
,
3071 const char *root_dir
,
3072 const char *root_image
,
3073 const BindMount
*bind_mounts
,
3074 size_t n_bind_mounts
) {
3077 assert(n_bind_mounts
== 0 || bind_mounts
);
3079 /* Checks whether we need to insist on fs namespacing. i.e. whether we have settings configured that
3080 * would alter the view on the file system beyond making things read-only or invisible, i.e. would
3081 * rearrange stuff in a way we cannot ignore gracefully. */
3083 if (context
->n_temporary_filesystems
> 0)
3086 if (root_dir
|| root_image
)
3089 if (context
->n_mount_images
> 0)
3092 if (context
->dynamic_user
)
3095 /* If there are any bind mounts set that don't map back onto themselves, fs namespacing becomes
3097 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< n_bind_mounts
; i
++)
3098 if (!path_equal(bind_mounts
[i
].source
, bind_mounts
[i
].destination
))
3101 if (context
->log_namespace
)
3107 static int apply_mount_namespace(
3109 ExecCommandFlags command_flags
,
3110 const ExecContext
*context
,
3111 const ExecParameters
*params
,
3112 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
3113 char **error_path
) {
3115 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **empty_directories
= NULL
;
3116 const char *tmp_dir
= NULL
, *var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
3117 const char *root_dir
= NULL
, *root_image
= NULL
;
3118 _cleanup_free_
char *creds_path
= NULL
;
3119 NamespaceInfo ns_info
;
3120 bool needs_sandboxing
;
3121 BindMount
*bind_mounts
= NULL
;
3122 size_t n_bind_mounts
= 0;
3127 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
) {
3128 root_image
= context
->root_image
;
3131 root_dir
= context
->root_directory
;
3134 r
= compile_bind_mounts(context
, params
, &bind_mounts
, &n_bind_mounts
, &empty_directories
);
3138 needs_sandboxing
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command_flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
);
3139 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3140 /* The runtime struct only contains the parent of the private /tmp,
3141 * which is non-accessible to world users. Inside of it there's a /tmp
3142 * that is sticky, and that's the one we want to use here.
3143 * This does not apply when we are using /run/systemd/empty as fallback. */
3145 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
) {
3146 if (streq_ptr(runtime
->tmp_dir
, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY
))
3147 tmp_dir
= runtime
->tmp_dir
;
3148 else if (runtime
->tmp_dir
)
3149 tmp_dir
= strjoina(runtime
->tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
3151 if (streq_ptr(runtime
->var_tmp_dir
, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY
))
3152 var_tmp_dir
= runtime
->var_tmp_dir
;
3153 else if (runtime
->var_tmp_dir
)
3154 var_tmp_dir
= strjoina(runtime
->var_tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
3157 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {
3158 .ignore_protect_paths
= false,
3159 .private_dev
= context
->private_devices
,
3160 .protect_control_groups
= context
->protect_control_groups
,
3161 .protect_kernel_tunables
= context
->protect_kernel_tunables
,
3162 .protect_kernel_modules
= context
->protect_kernel_modules
,
3163 .protect_kernel_logs
= context
->protect_kernel_logs
,
3164 .protect_hostname
= context
->protect_hostname
,
3165 .mount_apivfs
= exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(context
),
3166 .private_mounts
= context
->private_mounts
,
3167 .protect_home
= context
->protect_home
,
3168 .protect_system
= context
->protect_system
,
3169 .protect_proc
= context
->protect_proc
,
3170 .proc_subset
= context
->proc_subset
,
3172 } else if (!context
->dynamic_user
&& root_dir
)
3174 * If DynamicUser=no and RootDirectory= is set then lets pass a relaxed
3175 * sandbox info, otherwise enforce it, don't ignore protected paths and
3176 * fail if we are enable to apply the sandbox inside the mount namespace.
3178 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {
3179 .ignore_protect_paths
= true,
3182 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {};
3184 if (context
->mount_flags
== MS_SHARED
)
3185 log_unit_debug(u
, "shared mount propagation hidden by other fs namespacing unit settings: ignoring");
3187 if (exec_context_has_credentials(context
) && params
->prefix
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
]) {
3188 creds_path
= path_join(params
->prefix
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
], "credentials", u
->id
);
3195 r
= setup_namespace(root_dir
, root_image
, context
->root_image_options
,
3196 &ns_info
, context
->read_write_paths
,
3197 needs_sandboxing
? context
->read_only_paths
: NULL
,
3198 needs_sandboxing
? context
->inaccessible_paths
: NULL
,
3202 context
->temporary_filesystems
,
3203 context
->n_temporary_filesystems
,
3204 context
->mount_images
,
3205 context
->n_mount_images
,
3209 context
->log_namespace
,
3210 context
->mount_flags
,
3211 context
->root_hash
, context
->root_hash_size
, context
->root_hash_path
,
3212 context
->root_hash_sig
, context
->root_hash_sig_size
, context
->root_hash_sig_path
,
3213 context
->root_verity
,
3214 DISSECT_IMAGE_DISCARD_ON_LOOP
|DISSECT_IMAGE_RELAX_VAR_CHECK
|DISSECT_IMAGE_FSCK
,
3217 /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is probably due to a missing capability. setup_namespace() reports
3218 * that with a special, recognizable error ENOANO. In this case, silently proceed, but only if exclusively
3219 * sandboxing options were used, i.e. nothing such as RootDirectory= or BindMount= that would result in a
3220 * completely different execution environment. */
3222 if (insist_on_sandboxing(
3224 root_dir
, root_image
,
3227 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to set up namespace, and refusing to continue since the selected namespacing options alter mount environment non-trivially.\n"
3228 "Bind mounts: %zu, temporary filesystems: %zu, root directory: %s, root image: %s, dynamic user: %s",
3229 n_bind_mounts
, context
->n_temporary_filesystems
, yes_no(root_dir
), yes_no(root_image
), yes_no(context
->dynamic_user
));
3233 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution and ignoring.");
3239 bind_mount_free_many(bind_mounts
, n_bind_mounts
);
3243 static int apply_working_directory(
3244 const ExecContext
*context
,
3245 const ExecParameters
*params
,
3252 assert(exit_status
);
3254 if (context
->working_directory_home
) {
3257 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
3264 wd
= empty_to_root(context
->working_directory
);
3266 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
)
3269 d
= prefix_roota(context
->root_directory
, wd
);
3271 if (chdir(d
) < 0 && !context
->working_directory_missing_ok
) {
3272 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
3279 static int apply_root_directory(
3280 const ExecContext
*context
,
3281 const ExecParameters
*params
,
3282 const bool needs_mount_ns
,
3286 assert(exit_status
);
3288 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
)
3289 if (!needs_mount_ns
&& context
->root_directory
)
3290 if (chroot(context
->root_directory
) < 0) {
3291 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHROOT
;
3298 static int setup_keyring(
3300 const ExecContext
*context
,
3301 const ExecParameters
*p
,
3302 uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
3304 key_serial_t keyring
;
3313 /* Let's set up a new per-service "session" kernel keyring for each system service. This has the benefit that
3314 * each service runs with its own keyring shared among all processes of the service, but with no hook-up beyond
3315 * that scope, and in particular no link to the per-UID keyring. If we don't do this the keyring will be
3316 * automatically created on-demand and then linked to the per-UID keyring, by the kernel. The kernel's built-in
3317 * on-demand behaviour is very appropriate for login users, but probably not so much for system services, where
3318 * UIDs are not necessarily specific to a service but reused (at least in the case of UID 0). */
3320 if (context
->keyring_mode
== EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT
)
3323 /* Acquiring a reference to the user keyring is nasty. We briefly change identity in order to get things set up
3324 * properly by the kernel. If we don't do that then we can't create it atomically, and that sucks for parallel
3325 * execution. This mimics what pam_keyinit does, too. Setting up session keyring, to be owned by the right user
3326 * & group is just as nasty as acquiring a reference to the user keyring. */
3328 saved_uid
= getuid();
3329 saved_gid
= getgid();
3331 if (gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= saved_gid
) {
3332 if (setregid(gid
, -1) < 0)
3333 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change GID for user keyring: %m");
3336 if (uid_is_valid(uid
) && uid
!= saved_uid
) {
3337 if (setreuid(uid
, -1) < 0) {
3338 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change UID for user keyring: %m");
3343 keyring
= keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING
, 0, 0, 0, 0);
3344 if (keyring
== -1) {
3345 if (errno
== ENOSYS
)
3346 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Kernel keyring not supported, ignoring.");
3347 else if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(errno
))
3348 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Kernel keyring access prohibited, ignoring.");
3349 else if (errno
== EDQUOT
)
3350 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Out of kernel keyrings to allocate, ignoring.");
3352 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Setting up kernel keyring failed: %m");
3357 /* When requested link the user keyring into the session keyring. */
3358 if (context
->keyring_mode
== EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED
) {
3360 if (keyctl(KEYCTL_LINK
,
3361 KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING
,
3362 KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING
, 0, 0) < 0) {
3363 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to link user keyring into session keyring: %m");
3368 /* Restore uid/gid back */
3369 if (uid_is_valid(uid
) && uid
!= saved_uid
) {
3370 if (setreuid(saved_uid
, -1) < 0) {
3371 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change UID back for user keyring: %m");
3376 if (gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= saved_gid
) {
3377 if (setregid(saved_gid
, -1) < 0)
3378 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change GID back for user keyring: %m");
3381 /* Populate they keyring with the invocation ID by default, as original saved_uid. */
3382 if (!sd_id128_is_null(u
->invocation_id
)) {
3385 key
= add_key("user", "invocation_id", &u
->invocation_id
, sizeof(u
->invocation_id
), KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING
);
3387 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to add invocation ID to keyring, ignoring: %m");
3389 if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM
, key
,
3390 KEY_POS_VIEW
|KEY_POS_READ
|KEY_POS_SEARCH
|
3391 KEY_USR_VIEW
|KEY_USR_READ
|KEY_USR_SEARCH
, 0, 0) < 0)
3392 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to restrict invocation ID permission: %m");
3397 /* Revert back uid & gid for the last time, and exit */
3398 /* no extra logging, as only the first already reported error matters */
3399 if (getuid() != saved_uid
)
3400 (void) setreuid(saved_uid
, -1);
3402 if (getgid() != saved_gid
)
3403 (void) setregid(saved_gid
, -1);
3408 static void append_socket_pair(int *array
, size_t *n
, const int pair
[static 2]) {
3414 array
[(*n
)++] = pair
[0];
3416 array
[(*n
)++] = pair
[1];
3419 static int close_remaining_fds(
3420 const ExecParameters
*params
,
3421 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
3422 const DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
3425 const int *fds
, size_t n_fds
) {
3427 size_t n_dont_close
= 0;
3428 int dont_close
[n_fds
+ 12];
3432 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
3433 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdin_fd
;
3434 if (params
->stdout_fd
>= 0)
3435 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdout_fd
;
3436 if (params
->stderr_fd
>= 0)
3437 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stderr_fd
;
3440 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = socket_fd
;
3442 memcpy(dont_close
+ n_dont_close
, fds
, sizeof(int) * n_fds
);
3443 n_dont_close
+= n_fds
;
3447 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, runtime
->netns_storage_socket
);
3451 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, dcreds
->user
->storage_socket
);
3453 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, dcreds
->group
->storage_socket
);
3456 if (user_lookup_fd
>= 0)
3457 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = user_lookup_fd
;
3459 return close_all_fds(dont_close
, n_dont_close
);
3462 static int send_user_lookup(
3470 /* Send the resolved UID/GID to PID 1 after we learnt it. We send a single datagram, containing the UID/GID
3471 * data as well as the unit name. Note that we suppress sending this if no user/group to resolve was
3474 if (user_lookup_fd
< 0)
3477 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
) && !gid_is_valid(gid
))
3480 if (writev(user_lookup_fd
,
3482 IOVEC_INIT(&uid
, sizeof(uid
)),
3483 IOVEC_INIT(&gid
, sizeof(gid
)),
3484 IOVEC_INIT_STRING(unit
->id
) }, 3) < 0)
3490 static int acquire_home(const ExecContext
*c
, uid_t uid
, const char** home
, char **buf
) {
3497 /* If WorkingDirectory=~ is set, try to acquire a usable home directory. */
3502 if (!c
->working_directory_home
)
3505 r
= get_home_dir(buf
);
3513 static int compile_suggested_paths(const ExecContext
*c
, const ExecParameters
*p
, char ***ret
) {
3514 _cleanup_strv_free_
char ** list
= NULL
;
3521 assert(c
->dynamic_user
);
3523 /* Compile a list of paths that it might make sense to read the owning UID from to use as initial candidate for
3524 * dynamic UID allocation, in order to save us from doing costly recursive chown()s of the special
3527 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
3530 if (t
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
)
3536 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->directories
[t
].paths
) {
3539 if (exec_directory_is_private(c
, t
))
3540 e
= path_join(p
->prefix
[t
], "private", *i
);
3542 e
= path_join(p
->prefix
[t
], *i
);
3546 r
= strv_consume(&list
, e
);
3552 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(list
);
3557 static char *exec_command_line(char **argv
);
3559 static int exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(const ExecParameters
*params
, char **ret
) {
3560 bool using_subcgroup
;
3566 if (!params
->cgroup_path
)
3569 /* If we are called for a unit where cgroup delegation is on, and the payload created its own populated
3570 * subcgroup (which we expect it to do, after all it asked for delegation), then we cannot place the control
3571 * processes started after the main unit's process in the unit's main cgroup because it is now an inner one,
3572 * and inner cgroups may not contain processes. Hence, if delegation is on, and this is a control process,
3573 * let's use ".control" as subcgroup instead. Note that we do so only for ExecStartPost=, ExecReload=,
3574 * ExecStop=, ExecStopPost=, i.e. for the commands where the main process is already forked. For ExecStartPre=
3575 * this is not necessary, the cgroup is still empty. We distinguish these cases with the EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP
3576 * flag, which is only passed for the former statements, not for the latter. */
3578 using_subcgroup
= FLAGS_SET(params
->flags
, EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP
|EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE
|EXEC_IS_CONTROL
);
3579 if (using_subcgroup
)
3580 p
= path_join(params
->cgroup_path
, ".control");
3582 p
= strdup(params
->cgroup_path
);
3587 return using_subcgroup
;
3590 static int exec_context_cpu_affinity_from_numa(const ExecContext
*c
, CPUSet
*ret
) {
3591 _cleanup_(cpu_set_reset
) CPUSet s
= {};
3597 if (!c
->numa_policy
.nodes
.set
) {
3598 log_debug("Can't derive CPU affinity mask from NUMA mask because NUMA mask is not set, ignoring");
3602 r
= numa_to_cpu_set(&c
->numa_policy
, &s
);
3608 return cpu_set_add_all(ret
, &s
);
3611 bool exec_context_get_cpu_affinity_from_numa(const ExecContext
*c
) {
3614 return c
->cpu_affinity_from_numa
;
3617 static int add_shifted_fd(int *fds
, size_t fds_size
, size_t *n_fds
, int fd
, int *ret_fd
) {
3622 assert(*n_fds
< fds_size
);
3630 if (fd
< 3 + (int) *n_fds
) {
3631 /* Let's move the fd up, so that it's outside of the fd range we will use to store
3632 * the fds we pass to the process (or which are closed only during execve). */
3634 r
= fcntl(fd
, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC
, 3 + (int) *n_fds
);
3638 CLOSE_AND_REPLACE(fd
, r
);
3641 *ret_fd
= fds
[*n_fds
] = fd
;
3646 static int exec_child(
3648 const ExecCommand
*command
,
3649 const ExecContext
*context
,
3650 const ExecParameters
*params
,
3651 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
3652 DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
3654 const int named_iofds
[static 3],
3656 size_t n_socket_fds
,
3657 size_t n_storage_fds
,
3662 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
, **pass_env
= NULL
, **accum_env
= NULL
, **replaced_argv
= NULL
;
3663 int r
, ngids
= 0, exec_fd
;
3664 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*supplementary_gids
= NULL
;
3665 const char *username
= NULL
, *groupname
= NULL
;
3666 _cleanup_free_
char *home_buffer
= NULL
;
3667 const char *home
= NULL
, *shell
= NULL
;
3668 char **final_argv
= NULL
;
3669 dev_t journal_stream_dev
= 0;
3670 ino_t journal_stream_ino
= 0;
3671 bool userns_set_up
= false;
3672 bool needs_sandboxing
, /* Do we need to set up full sandboxing? (i.e. all namespacing, all MAC stuff, caps, yadda yadda */
3673 needs_setuid
, /* Do we need to do the actual setresuid()/setresgid() calls? */
3674 needs_mount_namespace
, /* Do we need to set up a mount namespace for this kernel? */
3675 needs_ambient_hack
; /* Do we need to apply the ambient capabilities hack? */
3677 _cleanup_free_
char *mac_selinux_context_net
= NULL
;
3678 bool use_selinux
= false;
3681 bool use_smack
= false;
3684 bool use_apparmor
= false;
3686 uid_t saved_uid
= getuid();
3687 gid_t saved_gid
= getgid();
3688 uid_t uid
= UID_INVALID
;
3689 gid_t gid
= GID_INVALID
;
3690 size_t n_fds
= n_socket_fds
+ n_storage_fds
, /* fds to pass to the child */
3691 n_keep_fds
; /* total number of fds not to close */
3693 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*gids_after_pam
= NULL
;
3694 int ngids_after_pam
= 0;
3700 assert(exit_status
);
3702 rename_process_from_path(command
->path
);
3704 /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the
3705 * only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main daemon. All
3706 * others we leave untouched because we set them to
3707 * SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, both of which
3708 * will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */
3709 (void) default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER
,
3710 SIGNALS_IGNORE
, -1);
3712 if (context
->ignore_sigpipe
)
3713 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
3715 r
= reset_signal_mask();
3717 *exit_status
= EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK
;
3718 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set process signal mask: %m");
3721 if (params
->idle_pipe
)
3722 do_idle_pipe_dance(params
->idle_pipe
);
3724 /* Close fds we don't need very early to make sure we don't block init reexecution because it cannot bind its
3725 * sockets. Among the fds we close are the logging fds, and we want to keep them closed, so that we don't have
3726 * any fds open we don't really want open during the transition. In order to make logging work, we switch the
3727 * log subsystem into open_when_needed mode, so that it reopens the logs on every single log call. */
3730 log_set_open_when_needed(true);
3732 /* In case anything used libc syslog(), close this here, too */
3735 int keep_fds
[n_fds
+ 2];
3736 memcpy_safe(keep_fds
, fds
, n_fds
* sizeof(int));
3739 r
= add_shifted_fd(keep_fds
, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds
), &n_keep_fds
, params
->exec_fd
, &exec_fd
);
3741 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
3742 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m");
3745 r
= close_remaining_fds(params
, runtime
, dcreds
, user_lookup_fd
, socket_fd
, keep_fds
, n_keep_fds
);
3747 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
3748 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to close unwanted file descriptors: %m");
3751 if (!context
->same_pgrp
&&
3753 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSID
;
3754 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to create new process session: %m");
3757 exec_context_tty_reset(context
, params
);
3759 if (unit_shall_confirm_spawn(unit
)) {
3760 const char *vc
= params
->confirm_spawn
;
3761 _cleanup_free_
char *cmdline
= NULL
;
3763 cmdline
= exec_command_line(command
->argv
);
3765 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3769 r
= ask_for_confirmation(vc
, unit
, cmdline
);
3770 if (r
!= CONFIRM_EXECUTE
) {
3771 if (r
== CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
) {
3772 *exit_status
= EXIT_SUCCESS
;
3775 *exit_status
= EXIT_CONFIRM
;
3776 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ECANCELED
),
3777 "Execution cancelled by the user");
3781 /* We are about to invoke NSS and PAM modules. Let's tell them what we are doing here, maybe they care. This is
3782 * used by nss-resolve to disable itself when we are about to start systemd-resolved, to avoid deadlocks. Note
3783 * that these env vars do not survive the execve(), which means they really only apply to the PAM and NSS
3784 * invocations themselves. Also note that while we'll only invoke NSS modules involved in user management they
3785 * might internally call into other NSS modules that are involved in hostname resolution, we never know. */
3786 if (setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_UNIT", unit
->id
, true) != 0 ||
3787 setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_SCOPE", MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(unit
->manager
) ? "system" : "user", true) != 0) {
3788 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3789 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to update environment: %m");
3792 if (context
->dynamic_user
&& dcreds
) {
3793 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **suggested_paths
= NULL
;
3795 /* On top of that, make sure we bypass our own NSS module nss-systemd comprehensively for any NSS
3796 * checks, if DynamicUser=1 is used, as we shouldn't create a feedback loop with ourselves here.*/
3797 if (putenv((char*) "SYSTEMD_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS=1") != 0) {
3798 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3799 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to update environment: %m");
3802 r
= compile_suggested_paths(context
, params
, &suggested_paths
);
3804 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3808 r
= dynamic_creds_realize(dcreds
, suggested_paths
, &uid
, &gid
);
3810 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3812 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP
),
3813 "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: User or group with specified name already exists.");
3814 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: %m");
3817 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
3818 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3819 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH
), "UID validation failed for \""UID_FMT
"\"", uid
);
3822 if (!gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
3823 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3824 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH
), "GID validation failed for \""GID_FMT
"\"", gid
);
3828 username
= dcreds
->user
->name
;
3831 r
= get_fixed_user(context
, &username
, &uid
, &gid
, &home
, &shell
);
3833 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3834 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine user credentials: %m");
3837 r
= get_fixed_group(context
, &groupname
, &gid
);
3839 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
3840 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine group credentials: %m");
3844 /* Initialize user supplementary groups and get SupplementaryGroups= ones */
3845 r
= get_supplementary_groups(context
, username
, groupname
, gid
,
3846 &supplementary_gids
, &ngids
);
3848 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
3849 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine supplementary groups: %m");
3852 r
= send_user_lookup(unit
, user_lookup_fd
, uid
, gid
);
3854 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3855 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to send user credentials to PID1: %m");
3858 user_lookup_fd
= safe_close(user_lookup_fd
);
3860 r
= acquire_home(context
, uid
, &home
, &home_buffer
);
3862 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
3863 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine $HOME for user: %m");
3866 /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we
3867 * must sure to drop O_NONBLOCK */
3869 (void) fd_nonblock(socket_fd
, false);
3871 /* Journald will try to look-up our cgroup in order to populate _SYSTEMD_CGROUP and _SYSTEMD_UNIT fields.
3872 * Hence we need to migrate to the target cgroup from init.scope before connecting to journald */
3873 if (params
->cgroup_path
) {
3874 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
;
3876 r
= exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params
, &p
);
3878 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
3879 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to acquire cgroup path: %m");
3882 r
= cg_attach_everywhere(params
->cgroup_supported
, p
, 0, NULL
, NULL
);
3884 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
3885 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to attach to cgroup %s: %m", p
);
3889 if (context
->network_namespace_path
&& runtime
&& runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
3890 r
= open_netns_path(runtime
->netns_storage_socket
, context
->network_namespace_path
);
3892 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
3893 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to open network namespace path %s: %m", context
->network_namespace_path
);
3897 r
= setup_input(context
, params
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
);
3899 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
3900 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard input: %m");
3903 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDOUT_FILENO
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
, &journal_stream_dev
, &journal_stream_ino
);
3905 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDOUT
;
3906 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard output: %m");
3909 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDERR_FILENO
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
, &journal_stream_dev
, &journal_stream_ino
);
3911 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDERR
;
3912 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard error output: %m");
3915 if (context
->oom_score_adjust_set
) {
3916 /* When we can't make this change due to EPERM, then let's silently skip over it. User namespaces
3917 * prohibit write access to this file, and we shouldn't trip up over that. */
3918 r
= set_oom_score_adjust(context
->oom_score_adjust
);
3919 if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r
))
3920 log_unit_debug_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust OOM setting, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
3922 *exit_status
= EXIT_OOM_ADJUST
;
3923 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust OOM setting: %m");
3927 if (context
->coredump_filter_set
) {
3928 r
= set_coredump_filter(context
->coredump_filter
);
3929 if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r
))
3930 log_unit_debug_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust coredump_filter, ignoring: %m");
3932 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust coredump_filter: %m");
3935 if (context
->nice_set
) {
3936 r
= setpriority_closest(context
->nice
);
3938 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up process scheduling priority (nice level): %m");
3941 if (context
->cpu_sched_set
) {
3942 struct sched_param param
= {
3943 .sched_priority
= context
->cpu_sched_priority
,
3946 r
= sched_setscheduler(0,
3947 context
->cpu_sched_policy
|
3948 (context
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
?
3949 SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK
: 0),
3952 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSCHEDULER
;
3953 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up CPU scheduling: %m");
3957 if (context
->cpu_affinity_from_numa
|| context
->cpu_set
.set
) {
3958 _cleanup_(cpu_set_reset
) CPUSet converted_cpu_set
= {};
3959 const CPUSet
*cpu_set
;
3961 if (context
->cpu_affinity_from_numa
) {
3962 r
= exec_context_cpu_affinity_from_numa(context
, &converted_cpu_set
);
3964 *exit_status
= EXIT_CPUAFFINITY
;
3965 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to derive CPU affinity mask from NUMA mask: %m");
3968 cpu_set
= &converted_cpu_set
;
3970 cpu_set
= &context
->cpu_set
;
3972 if (sched_setaffinity(0, cpu_set
->allocated
, cpu_set
->set
) < 0) {
3973 *exit_status
= EXIT_CPUAFFINITY
;
3974 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up CPU affinity: %m");
3978 if (mpol_is_valid(numa_policy_get_type(&context
->numa_policy
))) {
3979 r
= apply_numa_policy(&context
->numa_policy
);
3980 if (r
== -EOPNOTSUPP
)
3981 log_unit_debug_errno(unit
, r
, "NUMA support not available, ignoring.");
3983 *exit_status
= EXIT_NUMA_POLICY
;
3984 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set NUMA memory policy: %m");
3988 if (context
->ioprio_set
)
3989 if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS
, 0, context
->ioprio
) < 0) {
3990 *exit_status
= EXIT_IOPRIO
;
3991 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up IO scheduling priority: %m");
3994 if (context
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
3995 if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK
, context
->timer_slack_nsec
) < 0) {
3996 *exit_status
= EXIT_TIMERSLACK
;
3997 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up timer slack: %m");
4000 if (context
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
) {
4001 r
= safe_personality(context
->personality
);
4003 *exit_status
= EXIT_PERSONALITY
;
4004 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up execution domain (personality): %m");
4008 if (context
->utmp_id
)
4009 utmp_put_init_process(context
->utmp_id
, getpid_cached(), getsid(0),
4011 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_INIT
? INIT_PROCESS
:
4012 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
? LOGIN_PROCESS
:
4016 if (uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
4017 r
= chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO
, uid
);
4019 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
4020 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change ownership of terminal: %m");
4024 /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup to the user of the new process. On cgroup v1
4025 * this is only about systemd's own hierarchy, i.e. not the controller hierarchies, simply because that's not
4026 * safe. On cgroup v2 there's only one hierarchy anyway, and delegation is safe there, hence in that case only
4027 * touch a single hierarchy too. */
4028 if (params
->cgroup_path
&& context
->user
&& (params
->flags
& EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE
)) {
4029 r
= cg_set_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, params
->cgroup_path
, uid
, gid
);
4031 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
4032 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust control group access: %m");
4036 for (ExecDirectoryType dt
= 0; dt
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; dt
++) {
4037 r
= setup_exec_directory(context
, params
, uid
, gid
, dt
, exit_status
);
4039 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up special execution directory in %s: %m", params
->prefix
[dt
]);
4042 if (FLAGS_SET(params
->flags
, EXEC_WRITE_CREDENTIALS
)) {
4043 r
= setup_credentials(context
, params
, unit
->id
, uid
);
4045 *exit_status
= EXIT_CREDENTIALS
;
4046 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up credentials: %m");
4050 r
= build_environment(
4062 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
4066 r
= build_pass_environment(context
, &pass_env
);
4068 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
4072 accum_env
= strv_env_merge(5,
4073 params
->environment
,
4076 context
->environment
,
4079 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
4082 accum_env
= strv_env_clean(accum_env
);
4084 (void) umask(context
->umask
);
4086 r
= setup_keyring(unit
, context
, params
, uid
, gid
);
4088 *exit_status
= EXIT_KEYRING
;
4089 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up kernel keyring: %m");
4092 /* We need sandboxing if the caller asked us to apply it and the command isn't explicitly excepted from it */
4093 needs_sandboxing
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
);
4095 /* We need the ambient capability hack, if the caller asked us to apply it and the command is marked for it, and the kernel doesn't actually support ambient caps */
4096 needs_ambient_hack
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && (command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_AMBIENT_MAGIC
) && !ambient_capabilities_supported();
4098 /* We need setresuid() if the caller asked us to apply sandboxing and the command isn't explicitly excepted from either whole sandboxing or just setresuid() itself, and the ambient hack is not desired */
4099 if (needs_ambient_hack
)
4100 needs_setuid
= false;
4102 needs_setuid
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command
->flags
& (EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
|EXEC_COMMAND_NO_SETUID
));
4104 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
4105 /* MAC enablement checks need to be done before a new mount ns is created, as they rely on /sys being
4106 * present. The actual MAC context application will happen later, as late as possible, to avoid
4107 * impacting our own code paths. */
4110 use_selinux
= mac_selinux_use();
4113 use_smack
= mac_smack_use();
4116 use_apparmor
= mac_apparmor_use();
4120 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
4123 /* Let's set the resource limits before we call into PAM, so that pam_limits wins over what
4124 * is set here. (See below.) */
4126 r
= setrlimit_closest_all((const struct rlimit
* const *) context
->rlimit
, &which_failed
);
4128 *exit_status
= EXIT_LIMITS
;
4129 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust resource limit RLIMIT_%s: %m", rlimit_to_string(which_failed
));
4133 if (needs_setuid
&& context
->pam_name
&& username
) {
4134 /* Let's call into PAM after we set up our own idea of resource limits to that pam_limits
4135 * wins here. (See above.) */
4137 /* All fds passed in the fds array will be closed in the pam child process. */
4138 r
= setup_pam(context
->pam_name
, username
, uid
, gid
, context
->tty_path
, &accum_env
, fds
, n_fds
);
4140 *exit_status
= EXIT_PAM
;
4141 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up PAM session: %m");
4144 ngids_after_pam
= getgroups_alloc(&gids_after_pam
);
4145 if (ngids_after_pam
< 0) {
4146 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
4147 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, ngids_after_pam
, "Failed to obtain groups after setting up PAM: %m");
4151 if (needs_sandboxing
&& context
->private_users
&& !have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
4152 /* If we're unprivileged, set up the user namespace first to enable use of the other namespaces.
4153 * Users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can set up user namespaces last because they will be able to
4154 * set up the all of the other namespaces (i.e. network, mount, UTS) without a user namespace. */
4156 userns_set_up
= true;
4157 r
= setup_private_users(saved_uid
, saved_gid
, uid
, gid
);
4159 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
4160 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up user namespacing for unprivileged user: %m");
4164 if ((context
->private_network
|| context
->network_namespace_path
) && runtime
&& runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
4166 if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_NET
)) {
4167 r
= setup_netns(runtime
->netns_storage_socket
);
4169 log_unit_warning_errno(unit
, r
,
4170 "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but network namespace setup failed, ignoring: %m");
4172 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
4173 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up network namespacing: %m");
4175 } else if (context
->network_namespace_path
) {
4176 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
4177 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP
),
4178 "NetworkNamespacePath= is not supported, refusing.");
4180 log_unit_warning(unit
, "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support network namespaces, ignoring.");
4183 needs_mount_namespace
= exec_needs_mount_namespace(context
, params
, runtime
);
4184 if (needs_mount_namespace
) {
4185 _cleanup_free_
char *error_path
= NULL
;
4187 r
= apply_mount_namespace(unit
, command
->flags
, context
, params
, runtime
, &error_path
);
4189 *exit_status
= EXIT_NAMESPACE
;
4190 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up mount namespacing%s%s: %m",
4191 error_path
? ": " : "", strempty(error_path
));
4195 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
4196 r
= apply_protect_hostname(unit
, context
, exit_status
);
4201 /* Drop groups as early as possible.
4202 * This needs to be done after PrivateDevices=y setup as device nodes should be owned by the host's root.
4203 * For non-root in a userns, devices will be owned by the user/group before the group change, and nobody. */
4205 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*gids_to_enforce
= NULL
;
4206 int ngids_to_enforce
= 0;
4208 ngids_to_enforce
= merge_gid_lists(supplementary_gids
,
4213 if (ngids_to_enforce
< 0) {
4214 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
4215 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
,
4217 "Failed to merge group lists. Group membership might be incorrect: %m");
4220 r
= enforce_groups(gid
, gids_to_enforce
, ngids_to_enforce
);
4222 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
4223 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Changing group credentials failed: %m");
4227 /* If the user namespace was not set up above, try to do it now.
4228 * It's preferred to set up the user namespace later (after all other namespaces) so as not to be
4229 * restricted by rules pertaining to combining user namspaces with other namespaces (e.g. in the
4230 * case of mount namespaces being less privileged when the mount point list is copied from a
4231 * different user namespace). */
4233 if (needs_sandboxing
&& context
->private_users
&& !userns_set_up
) {
4234 r
= setup_private_users(saved_uid
, saved_gid
, uid
, gid
);
4236 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
4237 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up user namespacing: %m");
4241 /* Now that the mount namespace has been set up and privileges adjusted, let's look for the thing we
4244 _cleanup_free_
char *executable
= NULL
;
4245 _cleanup_close_
int executable_fd
= -1;
4246 r
= find_executable_full(command
->path
, false, &executable
, &executable_fd
);
4248 if (r
!= -ENOMEM
&& (command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_IGNORE_FAILURE
)) {
4249 log_struct_errno(LOG_INFO
, r
,
4250 "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR
,
4252 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
),
4253 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Executable %s missing, skipping: %m",
4255 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
);
4259 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
4260 return log_struct_errno(LOG_INFO
, r
,
4261 "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR
,
4263 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
),
4264 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Failed to locate executable %s: %m",
4266 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
);
4269 r
= add_shifted_fd(keep_fds
, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds
), &n_keep_fds
, executable_fd
, &executable_fd
);
4271 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
4272 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m");
4276 if (needs_sandboxing
&& use_selinux
&& params
->selinux_context_net
&& socket_fd
>= 0) {
4277 r
= mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd
, executable
, context
->selinux_context
, &mac_selinux_context_net
);
4279 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
4280 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine SELinux context: %m");
4285 /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that we are
4286 * more aggressive this time since socket_fd and the netns fds we don't need anymore. We do keep the exec_fd
4287 * however if we have it as we want to keep it open until the final execve(). */
4289 r
= close_all_fds(keep_fds
, n_keep_fds
);
4291 r
= shift_fds(fds
, n_fds
);
4293 r
= flags_fds(fds
, n_socket_fds
, n_storage_fds
, context
->non_blocking
);
4295 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
4296 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust passed file descriptors: %m");
4299 /* At this point, the fds we want to pass to the program are all ready and set up, with O_CLOEXEC turned off
4300 * and at the right fd numbers. The are no other fds open, with one exception: the exec_fd if it is defined,
4301 * and it has O_CLOEXEC set, after all we want it to be closed by the execve(), so that our parent knows we
4304 secure_bits
= context
->secure_bits
;
4306 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
4309 /* Set the RTPRIO resource limit to 0, but only if nothing else was explicitly
4310 * requested. (Note this is placed after the general resource limit initialization, see
4311 * above, in order to take precedence.) */
4312 if (context
->restrict_realtime
&& !context
->rlimit
[RLIMIT_RTPRIO
]) {
4313 if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_RTPRIO
, &RLIMIT_MAKE_CONST(0)) < 0) {
4314 *exit_status
= EXIT_LIMITS
;
4315 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to adjust RLIMIT_RTPRIO resource limit: %m");
4320 /* LSM Smack needs the capability CAP_MAC_ADMIN to change the current execution security context of the
4321 * process. This is the latest place before dropping capabilities. Other MAC context are set later. */
4323 r
= setup_smack(context
, executable_fd
);
4325 *exit_status
= EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL
;
4326 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set SMACK process label: %m");
4331 bset
= context
->capability_bounding_set
;
4332 /* If the ambient caps hack is enabled (which means the kernel can't do them, and the user asked for
4333 * our magic fallback), then let's add some extra caps, so that the service can drop privs of its own,
4334 * instead of us doing that */
4335 if (needs_ambient_hack
)
4336 bset
|= (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETPCAP
) |
4337 (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETUID
) |
4338 (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETGID
);
4340 if (!cap_test_all(bset
)) {
4341 r
= capability_bounding_set_drop(bset
, false);
4343 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
4344 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to drop capabilities: %m");
4348 /* Ambient capabilities are cleared during setresuid() (in enforce_user()) even with
4350 * To be able to raise the ambient capabilities after setresuid() they have to be
4351 * added to the inherited set and keep caps has to be set (done in enforce_user()).
4352 * After setresuid() the ambient capabilities can be raised as they are present in
4353 * the permitted and inhertiable set. However it is possible that someone wants to
4354 * set ambient capabilities without changing the user, so we also set the ambient
4355 * capabilities here.
4356 * The requested ambient capabilities are raised in the inheritable set if the
4357 * second argument is true. */
4358 if (!needs_ambient_hack
) {
4359 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, true);
4361 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
4362 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (before UID change): %m");
4367 /* chroot to root directory first, before we lose the ability to chroot */
4368 r
= apply_root_directory(context
, params
, needs_mount_namespace
, exit_status
);
4370 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Chrooting to the requested root directory failed: %m");
4373 if (uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
4374 r
= enforce_user(context
, uid
);
4376 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
4377 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change UID to " UID_FMT
": %m", uid
);
4380 if (!needs_ambient_hack
&&
4381 context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
4383 /* Raise the ambient capabilities after user change. */
4384 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, false);
4386 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
4387 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (after UID change): %m");
4393 /* Apply working directory here, because the working directory might be on NFS and only the user running
4394 * this service might have the correct privilege to change to the working directory */
4395 r
= apply_working_directory(context
, params
, home
, exit_status
);
4397 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Changing to the requested working directory failed: %m");
4399 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
4400 /* Apply other MAC contexts late, but before seccomp syscall filtering, as those should really be last to
4401 * influence our own codepaths as little as possible. Moreover, applying MAC contexts usually requires
4402 * syscalls that are subject to seccomp filtering, hence should probably be applied before the syscalls
4403 * are restricted. */
4407 char *exec_context
= mac_selinux_context_net
?: context
->selinux_context
;
4410 r
= setexeccon(exec_context
);
4412 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
4413 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change SELinux context to %s: %m", exec_context
);
4420 if (use_apparmor
&& context
->apparmor_profile
) {
4421 r
= aa_change_onexec(context
->apparmor_profile
);
4422 if (r
< 0 && !context
->apparmor_profile_ignore
) {
4423 *exit_status
= EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE
;
4424 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to prepare AppArmor profile change to %s: %m", context
->apparmor_profile
);
4429 /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress potential EPERMs
4430 * we'll try not to call PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. Setting securebits requires
4432 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
) != secure_bits
) {
4433 /* CAP_SETPCAP is required to set securebits. This capability is raised into the
4434 * effective set here.
4435 * The effective set is overwritten during execve with the following values:
4436 * - ambient set (for non-root processes)
4437 * - (inheritable | bounding) set for root processes)
4439 * Hence there is no security impact to raise it in the effective set before execve
4441 r
= capability_gain_cap_setpcap(NULL
);
4443 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
4444 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to gain CAP_SETPCAP for setting secure bits");
4446 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, secure_bits
) < 0) {
4447 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECUREBITS
;
4448 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set process secure bits: %m");
4452 if (context_has_no_new_privileges(context
))
4453 if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
4454 *exit_status
= EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES
;
4455 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to disable new privileges: %m");
4459 r
= apply_address_families(unit
, context
);
4461 *exit_status
= EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES
;
4462 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to restrict address families: %m");
4465 r
= apply_memory_deny_write_execute(unit
, context
);
4467 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4468 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to disable writing to executable memory: %m");
4471 r
= apply_restrict_realtime(unit
, context
);
4473 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4474 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply realtime restrictions: %m");
4477 r
= apply_restrict_suid_sgid(unit
, context
);
4479 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4480 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply SUID/SGID restrictions: %m");
4483 r
= apply_restrict_namespaces(unit
, context
);
4485 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4486 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply namespace restrictions: %m");
4489 r
= apply_protect_sysctl(unit
, context
);
4491 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4492 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply sysctl restrictions: %m");
4495 r
= apply_protect_kernel_modules(unit
, context
);
4497 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4498 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply module loading restrictions: %m");
4501 r
= apply_protect_kernel_logs(unit
, context
);
4503 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4504 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply kernel log restrictions: %m");
4507 r
= apply_protect_clock(unit
, context
);
4509 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4510 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply clock restrictions: %m");
4513 r
= apply_private_devices(unit
, context
);
4515 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4516 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up private devices: %m");
4519 r
= apply_syscall_archs(unit
, context
);
4521 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4522 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply syscall architecture restrictions: %m");
4525 r
= apply_lock_personality(unit
, context
);
4527 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4528 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to lock personalities: %m");
4531 r
= apply_syscall_log(unit
, context
);
4533 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4534 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply system call log filters: %m");
4537 /* This really should remain the last step before the execve(), to make sure our own code is unaffected
4538 * by the filter as little as possible. */
4539 r
= apply_syscall_filter(unit
, context
, needs_ambient_hack
);
4541 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4542 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply system call filters: %m");
4547 if (!strv_isempty(context
->unset_environment
)) {
4550 ee
= strv_env_delete(accum_env
, 1, context
->unset_environment
);
4552 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
4556 strv_free_and_replace(accum_env
, ee
);
4559 if (!FLAGS_SET(command
->flags
, EXEC_COMMAND_NO_ENV_EXPAND
)) {
4560 replaced_argv
= replace_env_argv(command
->argv
, accum_env
);
4561 if (!replaced_argv
) {
4562 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
4565 final_argv
= replaced_argv
;
4567 final_argv
= command
->argv
;
4569 if (DEBUG_LOGGING
) {
4570 _cleanup_free_
char *line
;
4572 line
= exec_command_line(final_argv
);
4574 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
4575 "EXECUTABLE=%s", executable
,
4576 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Executing: %s", line
),
4578 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
));
4584 /* We have finished with all our initializations. Let's now let the manager know that. From this point
4585 * on, if the manager sees POLLHUP on the exec_fd, then execve() was successful. */
4587 if (write(exec_fd
, &hot
, sizeof(hot
)) < 0) {
4588 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
4589 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to enable exec_fd: %m");
4593 r
= fexecve_or_execve(executable_fd
, executable
, final_argv
, accum_env
);
4598 /* The execve() failed. This means the exec_fd is still open. Which means we need to tell the manager
4599 * that POLLHUP on it no longer means execve() succeeded. */
4601 if (write(exec_fd
, &hot
, sizeof(hot
)) < 0) {
4602 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
4603 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to disable exec_fd: %m");
4607 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
4608 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to execute %s: %m", executable
);
4611 static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit
*unit
, const ExecContext
*c
, char ***l
);
4612 static int exec_context_named_iofds(const ExecContext
*c
, const ExecParameters
*p
, int named_iofds
[static 3]);
4614 int exec_spawn(Unit
*unit
,
4615 ExecCommand
*command
,
4616 const ExecContext
*context
,
4617 const ExecParameters
*params
,
4618 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
4619 DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
4622 int socket_fd
, r
, named_iofds
[3] = { -1, -1, -1 }, *fds
= NULL
;
4623 _cleanup_free_
char *subcgroup_path
= NULL
;
4624 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **files_env
= NULL
;
4625 size_t n_storage_fds
= 0, n_socket_fds
= 0;
4626 _cleanup_free_
char *line
= NULL
;
4634 assert(params
->fds
|| (params
->n_socket_fds
+ params
->n_storage_fds
<= 0));
4636 if (context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
||
4637 context
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
||
4638 context
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
) {
4640 if (params
->n_socket_fds
> 1)
4641 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL
), "Got more than one socket.");
4643 if (params
->n_socket_fds
== 0)
4644 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL
), "Got no socket.");
4646 socket_fd
= params
->fds
[0];
4650 n_socket_fds
= params
->n_socket_fds
;
4651 n_storage_fds
= params
->n_storage_fds
;
4654 r
= exec_context_named_iofds(context
, params
, named_iofds
);
4656 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to load a named file descriptor: %m");
4658 r
= exec_context_load_environment(unit
, context
, &files_env
);
4660 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to load environment files: %m");
4662 line
= exec_command_line(command
->argv
);
4666 /* Fork with up-to-date SELinux label database, so the child inherits the up-to-date db
4667 and, until the next SELinux policy changes, we save further reloads in future children. */
4668 mac_selinux_maybe_reload();
4670 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
4671 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "About to execute %s", line
),
4672 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
, /* We won't know the real executable path until we create
4673 the mount namespace in the child, but we want to log
4674 from the parent, so we need to use the (possibly
4675 inaccurate) path here. */
4677 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
));
4679 if (params
->cgroup_path
) {
4680 r
= exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params
, &subcgroup_path
);
4682 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to acquire subcgroup path: %m");
4683 if (r
> 0) { /* We are using a child cgroup */
4684 r
= cg_create(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, subcgroup_path
);
4686 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to create control group '%s': %m", subcgroup_path
);
4692 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to fork: %m");
4695 int exit_status
= EXIT_SUCCESS
;
4697 r
= exec_child(unit
,
4709 unit
->manager
->user_lookup_fds
[1],
4713 const char *status
=
4714 exit_status_to_string(exit_status
,
4715 EXIT_STATUS_LIBC
| EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD
);
4717 log_struct_errno(LOG_ERR
, r
,
4718 "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR
,
4720 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
),
4721 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Failed at step %s spawning %s: %m",
4722 status
, command
->path
),
4723 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
);
4729 log_unit_debug(unit
, "Forked %s as "PID_FMT
, command
->path
, pid
);
4731 /* We add the new process to the cgroup both in the child (so that we can be sure that no user code is ever
4732 * executed outside of the cgroup) and in the parent (so that we can be sure that when we kill the cgroup the
4733 * process will be killed too). */
4735 (void) cg_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, subcgroup_path
, pid
);
4737 exec_status_start(&command
->exec_status
, pid
);
4743 void exec_context_init(ExecContext
*c
) {
4747 c
->ioprio
= IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE
, 0);
4748 c
->cpu_sched_policy
= SCHED_OTHER
;
4749 c
->syslog_priority
= LOG_DAEMON
|LOG_INFO
;
4750 c
->syslog_level_prefix
= true;
4751 c
->ignore_sigpipe
= true;
4752 c
->timer_slack_nsec
= NSEC_INFINITY
;
4753 c
->personality
= PERSONALITY_INVALID
;
4754 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++)
4755 c
->directories
[t
].mode
= 0755;
4756 c
->timeout_clean_usec
= USEC_INFINITY
;
4757 c
->capability_bounding_set
= CAP_ALL
;
4758 assert_cc(NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL
!= NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL
);
4759 c
->restrict_namespaces
= NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL
;
4760 c
->log_level_max
= -1;
4762 c
->syscall_errno
= SECCOMP_ERROR_NUMBER_KILL
;
4764 numa_policy_reset(&c
->numa_policy
);
4767 void exec_context_done(ExecContext
*c
) {
4770 c
->environment
= strv_free(c
->environment
);
4771 c
->environment_files
= strv_free(c
->environment_files
);
4772 c
->pass_environment
= strv_free(c
->pass_environment
);
4773 c
->unset_environment
= strv_free(c
->unset_environment
);
4775 rlimit_free_all(c
->rlimit
);
4777 for (size_t l
= 0; l
< 3; l
++) {
4778 c
->stdio_fdname
[l
] = mfree(c
->stdio_fdname
[l
]);
4779 c
->stdio_file
[l
] = mfree(c
->stdio_file
[l
]);
4782 c
->working_directory
= mfree(c
->working_directory
);
4783 c
->root_directory
= mfree(c
->root_directory
);
4784 c
->root_image
= mfree(c
->root_image
);
4785 c
->root_image_options
= mount_options_free_all(c
->root_image_options
);
4786 c
->root_hash
= mfree(c
->root_hash
);
4787 c
->root_hash_size
= 0;
4788 c
->root_hash_path
= mfree(c
->root_hash_path
);
4789 c
->root_hash_sig
= mfree(c
->root_hash_sig
);
4790 c
->root_hash_sig_size
= 0;
4791 c
->root_hash_sig_path
= mfree(c
->root_hash_sig_path
);
4792 c
->root_verity
= mfree(c
->root_verity
);
4793 c
->tty_path
= mfree(c
->tty_path
);
4794 c
->syslog_identifier
= mfree(c
->syslog_identifier
);
4795 c
->user
= mfree(c
->user
);
4796 c
->group
= mfree(c
->group
);
4798 c
->supplementary_groups
= strv_free(c
->supplementary_groups
);
4800 c
->pam_name
= mfree(c
->pam_name
);
4802 c
->read_only_paths
= strv_free(c
->read_only_paths
);
4803 c
->read_write_paths
= strv_free(c
->read_write_paths
);
4804 c
->inaccessible_paths
= strv_free(c
->inaccessible_paths
);
4806 bind_mount_free_many(c
->bind_mounts
, c
->n_bind_mounts
);
4807 c
->bind_mounts
= NULL
;
4808 c
->n_bind_mounts
= 0;
4809 temporary_filesystem_free_many(c
->temporary_filesystems
, c
->n_temporary_filesystems
);
4810 c
->temporary_filesystems
= NULL
;
4811 c
->n_temporary_filesystems
= 0;
4812 c
->mount_images
= mount_image_free_many(c
->mount_images
, &c
->n_mount_images
);
4814 cpu_set_reset(&c
->cpu_set
);
4815 numa_policy_reset(&c
->numa_policy
);
4817 c
->utmp_id
= mfree(c
->utmp_id
);
4818 c
->selinux_context
= mfree(c
->selinux_context
);
4819 c
->apparmor_profile
= mfree(c
->apparmor_profile
);
4820 c
->smack_process_label
= mfree(c
->smack_process_label
);
4822 c
->syscall_filter
= hashmap_free(c
->syscall_filter
);
4823 c
->syscall_archs
= set_free(c
->syscall_archs
);
4824 c
->address_families
= set_free(c
->address_families
);
4826 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++)
4827 c
->directories
[t
].paths
= strv_free(c
->directories
[t
].paths
);
4829 c
->log_level_max
= -1;
4831 exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(c
);
4833 c
->log_ratelimit_interval_usec
= 0;
4834 c
->log_ratelimit_burst
= 0;
4836 c
->stdin_data
= mfree(c
->stdin_data
);
4837 c
->stdin_data_size
= 0;
4839 c
->network_namespace_path
= mfree(c
->network_namespace_path
);
4841 c
->log_namespace
= mfree(c
->log_namespace
);
4843 c
->load_credentials
= strv_free(c
->load_credentials
);
4844 c
->set_credentials
= hashmap_free(c
->set_credentials
);
4847 int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(const ExecContext
*c
, const char *runtime_prefix
) {
4852 if (!runtime_prefix
)
4855 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
].paths
) {
4856 _cleanup_free_
char *p
;
4858 if (exec_directory_is_private(c
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
))
4859 p
= path_join(runtime_prefix
, "private", *i
);
4861 p
= path_join(runtime_prefix
, *i
);
4865 /* We execute this synchronously, since we need to be sure this is gone when we start the
4867 (void) rm_rf(p
, REMOVE_ROOT
);
4873 int exec_context_destroy_credentials(const ExecContext
*c
, const char *runtime_prefix
, const char *unit
) {
4874 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
;
4878 if (!runtime_prefix
|| !unit
)
4881 p
= path_join(runtime_prefix
, "credentials", unit
);
4885 /* This is either a tmpfs/ramfs of its own, or a plain directory. Either way, let's first try to
4886 * unmount it, and afterwards remove the mount point */
4887 (void) umount2(p
, MNT_DETACH
|UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW
);
4888 (void) rm_rf(p
, REMOVE_ROOT
|REMOVE_CHMOD
);
4893 static void exec_command_done(ExecCommand
*c
) {
4896 c
->path
= mfree(c
->path
);
4897 c
->argv
= strv_free(c
->argv
);
4900 void exec_command_done_array(ExecCommand
*c
, size_t n
) {
4903 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
4904 exec_command_done(c
+i
);
4907 ExecCommand
* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand
*c
) {
4911 LIST_REMOVE(command
, c
, i
);
4912 exec_command_done(i
);
4919 void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand
**c
, size_t n
) {
4920 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
4921 c
[i
] = exec_command_free_list(c
[i
]);
4924 void exec_command_reset_status_array(ExecCommand
*c
, size_t n
) {
4925 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
4926 exec_status_reset(&c
[i
].exec_status
);
4929 void exec_command_reset_status_list_array(ExecCommand
**c
, size_t n
) {
4930 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++) {
4933 LIST_FOREACH(command
, z
, c
[i
])
4934 exec_status_reset(&z
->exec_status
);
4938 typedef struct InvalidEnvInfo
{
4943 static void invalid_env(const char *p
, void *userdata
) {
4944 InvalidEnvInfo
*info
= userdata
;
4946 log_unit_error(info
->unit
, "Ignoring invalid environment assignment '%s': %s", p
, info
->path
);
4949 const char* exec_context_fdname(const ExecContext
*c
, int fd_index
) {
4955 if (c
->std_input
!= EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4958 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
] ?: "stdin";
4961 if (c
->std_output
!= EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4964 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
] ?: "stdout";
4967 if (c
->std_error
!= EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4970 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
] ?: "stderr";
4977 static int exec_context_named_iofds(
4978 const ExecContext
*c
,
4979 const ExecParameters
*p
,
4980 int named_iofds
[static 3]) {
4983 const char* stdio_fdname
[3];
4988 assert(named_iofds
);
4990 targets
= (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
) +
4991 (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
) +
4992 (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
);
4994 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< 3; i
++)
4995 stdio_fdname
[i
] = exec_context_fdname(c
, i
);
4997 n_fds
= p
->n_storage_fds
+ p
->n_socket_fds
;
4999 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< n_fds
&& targets
> 0; i
++)
5000 if (named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] < 0 &&
5001 c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
5002 stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
] &&
5003 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
])) {
5005 named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
5008 } else if (named_iofds
[STDOUT_FILENO
] < 0 &&
5009 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
5010 stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
] &&
5011 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
])) {
5013 named_iofds
[STDOUT_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
5016 } else if (named_iofds
[STDERR_FILENO
] < 0 &&
5017 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
5018 stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
] &&
5019 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
])) {
5021 named_iofds
[STDERR_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
5025 return targets
== 0 ? 0 : -ENOENT
;
5028 static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit
*unit
, const ExecContext
*c
, char ***l
) {
5029 char **i
, **r
= NULL
;
5034 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->environment_files
) {
5037 bool ignore
= false;
5039 _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t pglob
= {};
5048 if (!path_is_absolute(fn
)) {
5056 /* Filename supports globbing, take all matching files */
5057 k
= safe_glob(fn
, 0, &pglob
);
5066 /* When we don't match anything, -ENOENT should be returned */
5067 assert(pglob
.gl_pathc
> 0);
5069 for (unsigned n
= 0; n
< pglob
.gl_pathc
; n
++) {
5070 k
= load_env_file(NULL
, pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
], &p
);
5078 /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */
5080 InvalidEnvInfo info
= {
5082 .path
= pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
]
5085 p
= strv_env_clean_with_callback(p
, invalid_env
, &info
);
5093 m
= strv_env_merge(2, r
, p
);
5109 static bool tty_may_match_dev_console(const char *tty
) {
5110 _cleanup_free_
char *resolved
= NULL
;
5115 tty
= skip_dev_prefix(tty
);
5117 /* trivial identity? */
5118 if (streq(tty
, "console"))
5121 if (resolve_dev_console(&resolved
) < 0)
5122 return true; /* if we could not resolve, assume it may */
5124 /* "tty0" means the active VC, so it may be the same sometimes */
5125 return path_equal(resolved
, tty
) || (streq(resolved
, "tty0") && tty_is_vc(tty
));
5128 static bool exec_context_may_touch_tty(const ExecContext
*ec
) {
5131 return ec
->tty_reset
||
5133 ec
->tty_vt_disallocate
||
5134 is_terminal_input(ec
->std_input
) ||
5135 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_output
) ||
5136 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_error
);
5139 bool exec_context_may_touch_console(const ExecContext
*ec
) {
5141 return exec_context_may_touch_tty(ec
) &&
5142 tty_may_match_dev_console(exec_context_tty_path(ec
));
5145 static void strv_fprintf(FILE *f
, char **l
) {
5151 fprintf(f
, " %s", *g
);
5154 void exec_context_dump(const ExecContext
*c
, FILE* f
, const char *prefix
) {
5155 char **e
, **d
, buf_clean
[FORMAT_TIMESPAN_MAX
];
5161 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
5165 "%sWorkingDirectory: %s\n"
5166 "%sRootDirectory: %s\n"
5167 "%sNonBlocking: %s\n"
5168 "%sPrivateTmp: %s\n"
5169 "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n"
5170 "%sProtectKernelTunables: %s\n"
5171 "%sProtectKernelModules: %s\n"
5172 "%sProtectKernelLogs: %s\n"
5173 "%sProtectClock: %s\n"
5174 "%sProtectControlGroups: %s\n"
5175 "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n"
5176 "%sPrivateUsers: %s\n"
5177 "%sProtectHome: %s\n"
5178 "%sProtectSystem: %s\n"
5179 "%sMountAPIVFS: %s\n"
5180 "%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n"
5181 "%sMemoryDenyWriteExecute: %s\n"
5182 "%sRestrictRealtime: %s\n"
5183 "%sRestrictSUIDSGID: %s\n"
5184 "%sKeyringMode: %s\n"
5185 "%sProtectHostname: %s\n"
5186 "%sProtectProc: %s\n"
5187 "%sProcSubset: %s\n",
5189 prefix
, empty_to_root(c
->working_directory
),
5190 prefix
, empty_to_root(c
->root_directory
),
5191 prefix
, yes_no(c
->non_blocking
),
5192 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_tmp
),
5193 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_devices
),
5194 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_kernel_tunables
),
5195 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_kernel_modules
),
5196 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_kernel_logs
),
5197 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_clock
),
5198 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_control_groups
),
5199 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_network
),
5200 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_users
),
5201 prefix
, protect_home_to_string(c
->protect_home
),
5202 prefix
, protect_system_to_string(c
->protect_system
),
5203 prefix
, yes_no(exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(c
)),
5204 prefix
, yes_no(c
->ignore_sigpipe
),
5205 prefix
, yes_no(c
->memory_deny_write_execute
),
5206 prefix
, yes_no(c
->restrict_realtime
),
5207 prefix
, yes_no(c
->restrict_suid_sgid
),
5208 prefix
, exec_keyring_mode_to_string(c
->keyring_mode
),
5209 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_hostname
),
5210 prefix
, protect_proc_to_string(c
->protect_proc
),
5211 prefix
, proc_subset_to_string(c
->proc_subset
));
5214 fprintf(f
, "%sRootImage: %s\n", prefix
, c
->root_image
);
5216 if (c
->root_image_options
) {
5219 fprintf(f
, "%sRootImageOptions:", prefix
);
5220 LIST_FOREACH(mount_options
, o
, c
->root_image_options
)
5221 if (!isempty(o
->options
))
5222 fprintf(f
, " %s:%s",
5223 partition_designator_to_string(o
->partition_designator
),
5229 _cleanup_free_
char *encoded
= NULL
;
5230 encoded
= hexmem(c
->root_hash
, c
->root_hash_size
);
5232 fprintf(f
, "%sRootHash: %s\n", prefix
, encoded
);
5235 if (c
->root_hash_path
)
5236 fprintf(f
, "%sRootHash: %s\n", prefix
, c
->root_hash_path
);
5238 if (c
->root_hash_sig
) {
5239 _cleanup_free_
char *encoded
= NULL
;
5241 len
= base64mem(c
->root_hash_sig
, c
->root_hash_sig_size
, &encoded
);
5243 fprintf(f
, "%sRootHashSignature: base64:%s\n", prefix
, encoded
);
5246 if (c
->root_hash_sig_path
)
5247 fprintf(f
, "%sRootHashSignature: %s\n", prefix
, c
->root_hash_sig_path
);
5250 fprintf(f
, "%sRootVerity: %s\n", prefix
, c
->root_verity
);
5252 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment
)
5253 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
5255 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment_files
)
5256 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironmentFile: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
5258 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->pass_environment
)
5259 fprintf(f
, "%sPassEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
5261 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->unset_environment
)
5262 fprintf(f
, "%sUnsetEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
5264 fprintf(f
, "%sRuntimeDirectoryPreserve: %s\n", prefix
, exec_preserve_mode_to_string(c
->runtime_directory_preserve_mode
));
5266 for (ExecDirectoryType dt
= 0; dt
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; dt
++) {
5267 fprintf(f
, "%s%sMode: %04o\n", prefix
, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt
), c
->directories
[dt
].mode
);
5269 STRV_FOREACH(d
, c
->directories
[dt
].paths
)
5270 fprintf(f
, "%s%s: %s\n", prefix
, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt
), *d
);
5274 "%sTimeoutCleanSec: %s\n",
5275 prefix
, format_timespan(buf_clean
, sizeof(buf_clean
), c
->timeout_clean_usec
, USEC_PER_SEC
));
5282 if (c
->oom_score_adjust_set
)
5284 "%sOOMScoreAdjust: %i\n",
5285 prefix
, c
->oom_score_adjust
);
5287 if (c
->coredump_filter_set
)
5289 "%sCoredumpFilter: 0x%"PRIx64
"\n",
5290 prefix
, c
->coredump_filter
);
5292 for (unsigned i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++)
5294 fprintf(f
, "%sLimit%s: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
5295 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_max
);
5296 fprintf(f
, "%sLimit%sSoft: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
5297 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_cur
);
5300 if (c
->ioprio_set
) {
5301 _cleanup_free_
char *class_str
= NULL
;
5303 r
= ioprio_class_to_string_alloc(IOPRIO_PRIO_CLASS(c
->ioprio
), &class_str
);
5305 fprintf(f
, "%sIOSchedulingClass: %s\n", prefix
, class_str
);
5307 fprintf(f
, "%sIOPriority: %lu\n", prefix
, IOPRIO_PRIO_DATA(c
->ioprio
));
5310 if (c
->cpu_sched_set
) {
5311 _cleanup_free_
char *policy_str
= NULL
;
5313 r
= sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c
->cpu_sched_policy
, &policy_str
);
5315 fprintf(f
, "%sCPUSchedulingPolicy: %s\n", prefix
, policy_str
);
5318 "%sCPUSchedulingPriority: %i\n"
5319 "%sCPUSchedulingResetOnFork: %s\n",
5320 prefix
, c
->cpu_sched_priority
,
5321 prefix
, yes_no(c
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
));
5324 if (c
->cpu_set
.set
) {
5325 _cleanup_free_
char *affinity
= NULL
;
5327 affinity
= cpu_set_to_range_string(&c
->cpu_set
);
5328 fprintf(f
, "%sCPUAffinity: %s\n", prefix
, affinity
);
5331 if (mpol_is_valid(numa_policy_get_type(&c
->numa_policy
))) {
5332 _cleanup_free_
char *nodes
= NULL
;
5334 nodes
= cpu_set_to_range_string(&c
->numa_policy
.nodes
);
5335 fprintf(f
, "%sNUMAPolicy: %s\n", prefix
, mpol_to_string(numa_policy_get_type(&c
->numa_policy
)));
5336 fprintf(f
, "%sNUMAMask: %s\n", prefix
, strnull(nodes
));
5339 if (c
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
5340 fprintf(f
, "%sTimerSlackNSec: "NSEC_FMT
"\n", prefix
, c
->timer_slack_nsec
);
5343 "%sStandardInput: %s\n"
5344 "%sStandardOutput: %s\n"
5345 "%sStandardError: %s\n",
5346 prefix
, exec_input_to_string(c
->std_input
),
5347 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_output
),
5348 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_error
));
5350 if (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
)
5351 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardInputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
5352 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
5353 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
5354 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
5355 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
5357 if (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_FILE
)
5358 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardInputFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
5359 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
)
5360 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
5361 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
5362 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
5363 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE
)
5364 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFileToTruncate: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
5365 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
)
5366 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
5367 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
5368 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
5369 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE
)
5370 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFileToTruncate: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
5376 "%sTTYVHangup: %s\n"
5377 "%sTTYVTDisallocate: %s\n",
5378 prefix
, c
->tty_path
,
5379 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_reset
),
5380 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vhangup
),
5381 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vt_disallocate
));
5383 if (IN_SET(c
->std_output
,
5385 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
,
5386 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
5387 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
) ||
5388 IN_SET(c
->std_error
,
5390 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
,
5391 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
5392 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
)) {
5394 _cleanup_free_
char *fac_str
= NULL
, *lvl_str
= NULL
;
5396 r
= log_facility_unshifted_to_string_alloc(c
->syslog_priority
>> 3, &fac_str
);
5398 fprintf(f
, "%sSyslogFacility: %s\n", prefix
, fac_str
);
5400 r
= log_level_to_string_alloc(LOG_PRI(c
->syslog_priority
), &lvl_str
);
5402 fprintf(f
, "%sSyslogLevel: %s\n", prefix
, lvl_str
);
5405 if (c
->log_level_max
>= 0) {
5406 _cleanup_free_
char *t
= NULL
;
5408 (void) log_level_to_string_alloc(c
->log_level_max
, &t
);
5410 fprintf(f
, "%sLogLevelMax: %s\n", prefix
, strna(t
));
5413 if (c
->log_ratelimit_interval_usec
> 0) {
5414 char buf_timespan
[FORMAT_TIMESPAN_MAX
];
5417 "%sLogRateLimitIntervalSec: %s\n",
5418 prefix
, format_timespan(buf_timespan
, sizeof(buf_timespan
), c
->log_ratelimit_interval_usec
, USEC_PER_SEC
));
5421 if (c
->log_ratelimit_burst
> 0)
5422 fprintf(f
, "%sLogRateLimitBurst: %u\n", prefix
, c
->log_ratelimit_burst
);
5424 for (size_t j
= 0; j
< c
->n_log_extra_fields
; j
++) {
5425 fprintf(f
, "%sLogExtraFields: ", prefix
);
5426 fwrite(c
->log_extra_fields
[j
].iov_base
,
5427 1, c
->log_extra_fields
[j
].iov_len
,
5432 if (c
->log_namespace
)
5433 fprintf(f
, "%sLogNamespace: %s\n", prefix
, c
->log_namespace
);
5435 if (c
->secure_bits
) {
5436 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
5438 r
= secure_bits_to_string_alloc(c
->secure_bits
, &str
);
5440 fprintf(f
, "%sSecure Bits: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
5443 if (c
->capability_bounding_set
!= CAP_ALL
) {
5444 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
5446 r
= capability_set_to_string_alloc(c
->capability_bounding_set
, &str
);
5448 fprintf(f
, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
5451 if (c
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
5452 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
5454 r
= capability_set_to_string_alloc(c
->capability_ambient_set
, &str
);
5456 fprintf(f
, "%sAmbientCapabilities: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
5460 fprintf(f
, "%sUser: %s\n", prefix
, c
->user
);
5462 fprintf(f
, "%sGroup: %s\n", prefix
, c
->group
);
5464 fprintf(f
, "%sDynamicUser: %s\n", prefix
, yes_no(c
->dynamic_user
));
5466 if (!strv_isempty(c
->supplementary_groups
)) {
5467 fprintf(f
, "%sSupplementaryGroups:", prefix
);
5468 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->supplementary_groups
);
5473 fprintf(f
, "%sPAMName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->pam_name
);
5475 if (!strv_isempty(c
->read_write_paths
)) {
5476 fprintf(f
, "%sReadWritePaths:", prefix
);
5477 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_write_paths
);
5481 if (!strv_isempty(c
->read_only_paths
)) {
5482 fprintf(f
, "%sReadOnlyPaths:", prefix
);
5483 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_only_paths
);
5487 if (!strv_isempty(c
->inaccessible_paths
)) {
5488 fprintf(f
, "%sInaccessiblePaths:", prefix
);
5489 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->inaccessible_paths
);
5493 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< c
->n_bind_mounts
; i
++)
5494 fprintf(f
, "%s%s: %s%s:%s:%s\n", prefix
,
5495 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].read_only
? "BindReadOnlyPaths" : "BindPaths",
5496 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].ignore_enoent
? "-": "",
5497 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].source
,
5498 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].destination
,
5499 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].recursive
? "rbind" : "norbind");
5501 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< c
->n_temporary_filesystems
; i
++) {
5502 const TemporaryFileSystem
*t
= c
->temporary_filesystems
+ i
;
5504 fprintf(f
, "%sTemporaryFileSystem: %s%s%s\n", prefix
,
5506 isempty(t
->options
) ? "" : ":",
5507 strempty(t
->options
));
5512 "%sUtmpIdentifier: %s\n",
5513 prefix
, c
->utmp_id
);
5515 if (c
->selinux_context
)
5517 "%sSELinuxContext: %s%s\n",
5518 prefix
, c
->selinux_context_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->selinux_context
);
5520 if (c
->apparmor_profile
)
5522 "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n",
5523 prefix
, c
->apparmor_profile_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->apparmor_profile
);
5525 if (c
->smack_process_label
)
5527 "%sSmackProcessLabel: %s%s\n",
5528 prefix
, c
->smack_process_label_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->smack_process_label
);
5530 if (c
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
)
5532 "%sPersonality: %s\n",
5533 prefix
, strna(personality_to_string(c
->personality
)));
5536 "%sLockPersonality: %s\n",
5537 prefix
, yes_no(c
->lock_personality
));
5539 if (c
->syscall_filter
) {
5546 "%sSystemCallFilter: ",
5549 if (!c
->syscall_allow_list
)
5553 HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(val
, id
, c
->syscall_filter
) {
5554 _cleanup_free_
char *name
= NULL
;
5555 const char *errno_name
= NULL
;
5556 int num
= PTR_TO_INT(val
);
5563 name
= seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE
, PTR_TO_INT(id
) - 1);
5564 fputs(strna(name
), f
);
5567 errno_name
= seccomp_errno_or_action_to_string(num
);
5569 fprintf(f
, ":%s", errno_name
);
5571 fprintf(f
, ":%d", num
);
5579 if (c
->syscall_archs
) {
5585 "%sSystemCallArchitectures:",
5589 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_archs
)
5590 fprintf(f
, " %s", strna(seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id
) - 1)));
5595 if (exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
)) {
5596 _cleanup_free_
char *s
= NULL
;
5598 r
= namespace_flags_to_string(c
->restrict_namespaces
, &s
);
5600 fprintf(f
, "%sRestrictNamespaces: %s\n",
5604 if (c
->network_namespace_path
)
5606 "%sNetworkNamespacePath: %s\n",
5607 prefix
, c
->network_namespace_path
);
5609 if (c
->syscall_errno
> 0) {
5611 const char *errno_name
;
5614 fprintf(f
, "%sSystemCallErrorNumber: ", prefix
);
5617 errno_name
= seccomp_errno_or_action_to_string(c
->syscall_errno
);
5619 fputs(errno_name
, f
);
5621 fprintf(f
, "%d", c
->syscall_errno
);
5626 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< c
->n_mount_images
; i
++) {
5629 fprintf(f
, "%sMountImages: %s%s:%s%s", prefix
,
5630 c
->mount_images
[i
].ignore_enoent
? "-": "",
5631 c
->mount_images
[i
].source
,
5632 c
->mount_images
[i
].destination
,
5633 LIST_IS_EMPTY(c
->mount_images
[i
].mount_options
) ? "": ":");
5634 LIST_FOREACH(mount_options
, o
, c
->mount_images
[i
].mount_options
)
5636 partition_designator_to_string(o
->partition_designator
),
5642 bool exec_context_maintains_privileges(const ExecContext
*c
) {
5645 /* Returns true if the process forked off would run under
5646 * an unchanged UID or as root. */
5651 if (streq(c
->user
, "root") || streq(c
->user
, "0"))
5657 int exec_context_get_effective_ioprio(const ExecContext
*c
) {
5665 p
= ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS
, 0);
5667 return IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE
, 4);
5672 bool exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(const ExecContext
*c
) {
5675 /* Explicit setting wins */
5676 if (c
->mount_apivfs_set
)
5677 return c
->mount_apivfs
;
5679 /* Default to "yes" if root directory or image are specified */
5680 if (exec_context_with_rootfs(c
))
5686 void exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(ExecContext
*c
) {
5689 for (size_t l
= 0; l
< c
->n_log_extra_fields
; l
++)
5690 free(c
->log_extra_fields
[l
].iov_base
);
5691 c
->log_extra_fields
= mfree(c
->log_extra_fields
);
5692 c
->n_log_extra_fields
= 0;
5695 void exec_context_revert_tty(ExecContext
*c
) {
5700 /* First, reset the TTY (possibly kicking everybody else from the TTY) */
5701 exec_context_tty_reset(c
, NULL
);
5703 /* And then undo what chown_terminal() did earlier. Note that we only do this if we have a path
5704 * configured. If the TTY was passed to us as file descriptor we assume the TTY is opened and managed
5705 * by whoever passed it to us and thus knows better when and how to chmod()/chown() it back. */
5707 if (exec_context_may_touch_tty(c
)) {
5710 path
= exec_context_tty_path(c
);
5712 r
= chmod_and_chown(path
, TTY_MODE
, 0, TTY_GID
);
5713 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -ENOENT
)
5714 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to reset TTY ownership/access mode of %s, ignoring: %m", path
);
5719 int exec_context_get_clean_directories(
5725 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **l
= NULL
;
5732 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
5735 if (!FLAGS_SET(mask
, 1U << t
))
5741 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->directories
[t
].paths
) {
5744 j
= path_join(prefix
[t
], *i
);
5748 r
= strv_consume(&l
, j
);
5752 /* Also remove private directories unconditionally. */
5753 if (t
!= EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
) {
5754 j
= path_join(prefix
[t
], "private", *i
);
5758 r
= strv_consume(&l
, j
);
5769 int exec_context_get_clean_mask(ExecContext
*c
, ExecCleanMask
*ret
) {
5770 ExecCleanMask mask
= 0;
5775 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++)
5776 if (!strv_isempty(c
->directories
[t
].paths
))
5783 void exec_status_start(ExecStatus
*s
, pid_t pid
) {
5790 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->start_timestamp
);
5793 void exec_status_exit(ExecStatus
*s
, const ExecContext
*context
, pid_t pid
, int code
, int status
) {
5801 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->exit_timestamp
);
5806 if (context
&& context
->utmp_id
)
5807 (void) utmp_put_dead_process(context
->utmp_id
, pid
, code
, status
);
5810 void exec_status_reset(ExecStatus
*s
) {
5813 *s
= (ExecStatus
) {};
5816 void exec_status_dump(const ExecStatus
*s
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
5817 char buf
[FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_MAX
];
5825 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
5828 "%sPID: "PID_FMT
"\n",
5831 if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s
->start_timestamp
))
5833 "%sStart Timestamp: %s\n",
5834 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->start_timestamp
.realtime
));
5836 if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s
->exit_timestamp
))
5838 "%sExit Timestamp: %s\n"
5840 "%sExit Status: %i\n",
5841 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->exit_timestamp
.realtime
),
5842 prefix
, sigchld_code_to_string(s
->code
),
5846 static char *exec_command_line(char **argv
) {
5854 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
)
5862 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
) {
5869 if (strpbrk(*a
, WHITESPACE
)) {
5880 /* FIXME: this doesn't really handle arguments that have
5881 * spaces and ticks in them */
5886 static void exec_command_dump(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
5887 _cleanup_free_
char *cmd
= NULL
;
5888 const char *prefix2
;
5893 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
5894 prefix2
= strjoina(prefix
, "\t");
5896 cmd
= exec_command_line(c
->argv
);
5898 "%sCommand Line: %s\n",
5899 prefix
, cmd
? cmd
: strerror_safe(ENOMEM
));
5901 exec_status_dump(&c
->exec_status
, f
, prefix2
);
5904 void exec_command_dump_list(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
5907 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
5909 LIST_FOREACH(command
, c
, c
)
5910 exec_command_dump(c
, f
, prefix
);
5913 void exec_command_append_list(ExecCommand
**l
, ExecCommand
*e
) {
5920 /* It's kind of important, that we keep the order here */
5921 LIST_FIND_TAIL(command
, *l
, end
);
5922 LIST_INSERT_AFTER(command
, *l
, end
, e
);
5927 int exec_command_set(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
5935 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
5947 free_and_replace(c
->path
, p
);
5949 return strv_free_and_replace(c
->argv
, l
);
5952 int exec_command_append(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
5953 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **l
= NULL
;
5961 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
5967 r
= strv_extend_strv(&c
->argv
, l
, false);
5974 static void *remove_tmpdir_thread(void *p
) {
5975 _cleanup_free_
char *path
= p
;
5977 (void) rm_rf(path
, REMOVE_ROOT
|REMOVE_PHYSICAL
);
5981 static ExecRuntime
* exec_runtime_free(ExecRuntime
*rt
, bool destroy
) {
5988 (void) hashmap_remove(rt
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, rt
->id
);
5990 /* When destroy is true, then rm_rf tmp_dir and var_tmp_dir. */
5992 if (destroy
&& rt
->tmp_dir
&& !streq(rt
->tmp_dir
, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY
)) {
5993 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->tmp_dir
);
5995 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->tmp_dir
);
5997 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->tmp_dir
);
6002 if (destroy
&& rt
->var_tmp_dir
&& !streq(rt
->var_tmp_dir
, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY
)) {
6003 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
6005 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
6007 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
6009 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
6012 rt
->id
= mfree(rt
->id
);
6013 rt
->tmp_dir
= mfree(rt
->tmp_dir
);
6014 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= mfree(rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
6015 safe_close_pair(rt
->netns_storage_socket
);
6019 static void exec_runtime_freep(ExecRuntime
**rt
) {
6020 (void) exec_runtime_free(*rt
, false);
6023 static int exec_runtime_allocate(ExecRuntime
**ret
, const char *id
) {
6024 _cleanup_free_
char *id_copy
= NULL
;
6029 id_copy
= strdup(id
);
6033 n
= new(ExecRuntime
, 1);
6037 *n
= (ExecRuntime
) {
6038 .id
= TAKE_PTR(id_copy
),
6039 .netns_storage_socket
= { -1, -1 },
6046 static int exec_runtime_add(
6051 int netns_storage_socket
[2],
6052 ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
6054 _cleanup_(exec_runtime_freep
) ExecRuntime
*rt
= NULL
;
6060 /* tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir, netns_storage_socket fds are donated on success */
6062 r
= hashmap_ensure_allocated(&m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, &string_hash_ops
);
6066 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(&rt
, id
);
6070 r
= hashmap_put(m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, rt
->id
, rt
);
6074 assert(!!rt
->tmp_dir
== !!rt
->var_tmp_dir
); /* We require both to be set together */
6075 rt
->tmp_dir
= TAKE_PTR(*tmp_dir
);
6076 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= TAKE_PTR(*var_tmp_dir
);
6078 if (netns_storage_socket
) {
6079 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] = TAKE_FD(netns_storage_socket
[0]);
6080 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] = TAKE_FD(netns_storage_socket
[1]);
6087 /* do not remove created ExecRuntime object when the operation succeeds. */
6092 static int exec_runtime_make(
6094 const ExecContext
*c
,
6096 ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
6098 _cleanup_(namespace_cleanup_tmpdirp
) char *tmp_dir
= NULL
, *var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
6099 _cleanup_close_pair_
int netns_storage_socket
[2] = { -1, -1 };
6106 /* It is not necessary to create ExecRuntime object. */
6107 if (!c
->private_network
&& !c
->private_tmp
&& !c
->network_namespace_path
) {
6112 if (c
->private_tmp
&&
6113 !(prefixed_path_strv_contains(c
->inaccessible_paths
, "/tmp") &&
6114 (prefixed_path_strv_contains(c
->inaccessible_paths
, "/var/tmp") ||
6115 prefixed_path_strv_contains(c
->inaccessible_paths
, "/var")))) {
6116 r
= setup_tmp_dirs(id
, &tmp_dir
, &var_tmp_dir
);
6121 if (c
->private_network
|| c
->network_namespace_path
) {
6122 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_DGRAM
|SOCK_CLOEXEC
, 0, netns_storage_socket
) < 0)
6126 r
= exec_runtime_add(m
, id
, &tmp_dir
, &var_tmp_dir
, netns_storage_socket
, ret
);
6133 int exec_runtime_acquire(Manager
*m
, const ExecContext
*c
, const char *id
, bool create
, ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
6141 rt
= hashmap_get(m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, id
);
6143 /* We already have a ExecRuntime object, let's increase the ref count and reuse it */
6151 /* If not found, then create a new object. */
6152 r
= exec_runtime_make(m
, c
, id
, &rt
);
6156 /* When r == 0, it is not necessary to create ExecRuntime object. */
6162 /* increment reference counter. */
6168 ExecRuntime
*exec_runtime_unref(ExecRuntime
*rt
, bool destroy
) {
6172 assert(rt
->n_ref
> 0);
6178 return exec_runtime_free(rt
, destroy
);
6181 int exec_runtime_serialize(const Manager
*m
, FILE *f
, FDSet
*fds
) {
6188 HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt
, m
->exec_runtime_by_id
) {
6189 fprintf(f
, "exec-runtime=%s", rt
->id
);
6192 fprintf(f
, " tmp-dir=%s", rt
->tmp_dir
);
6194 if (rt
->var_tmp_dir
)
6195 fprintf(f
, " var-tmp-dir=%s", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
6197 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
6200 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
6204 fprintf(f
, " netns-socket-0=%i", copy
);
6207 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] >= 0) {
6210 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
6214 fprintf(f
, " netns-socket-1=%i", copy
);
6223 int exec_runtime_deserialize_compat(Unit
*u
, const char *key
, const char *value
, FDSet
*fds
) {
6224 _cleanup_(exec_runtime_freep
) ExecRuntime
*rt_create
= NULL
;
6228 /* This is for the migration from old (v237 or earlier) deserialization text.
6229 * Due to the bug #7790, this may not work with the units that use JoinsNamespaceOf=.
6230 * Even if the ExecRuntime object originally created by the other unit, we cannot judge
6231 * so or not from the serialized text, then we always creates a new object owned by this. */
6237 /* Manager manages ExecRuntime objects by the unit id.
6238 * So, we omit the serialized text when the unit does not have id (yet?)... */
6239 if (isempty(u
->id
)) {
6240 log_unit_debug(u
, "Invocation ID not found. Dropping runtime parameter.");
6244 r
= hashmap_ensure_allocated(&u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, &string_hash_ops
);
6246 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, r
, "Failed to allocate storage for runtime parameter: %m");
6250 rt
= hashmap_get(u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, u
->id
);
6252 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(&rt_create
, u
->id
);
6259 if (streq(key
, "tmp-dir")) {
6262 copy
= strdup(value
);
6266 free_and_replace(rt
->tmp_dir
, copy
);
6268 } else if (streq(key
, "var-tmp-dir")) {
6271 copy
= strdup(value
);
6275 free_and_replace(rt
->var_tmp_dir
, copy
);
6277 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-0")) {
6280 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
)) {
6281 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
6285 safe_close(rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
6286 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
6288 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-1")) {
6291 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
)) {
6292 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
6296 safe_close(rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
6297 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
6301 /* If the object is newly created, then put it to the hashmap which manages ExecRuntime objects. */
6303 r
= hashmap_put(u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, rt_create
->id
, rt_create
);
6305 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, r
, "Failed to put runtime parameter to manager's storage: %m");
6309 rt_create
->manager
= u
->manager
;
6312 TAKE_PTR(rt_create
);
6318 int exec_runtime_deserialize_one(Manager
*m
, const char *value
, FDSet
*fds
) {
6319 _cleanup_free_
char *tmp_dir
= NULL
, *var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
6321 int r
, fdpair
[] = {-1, -1};
6322 const char *p
, *v
= value
;
6329 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
6330 id
= strndupa(v
, n
);
6335 v
= startswith(p
, "tmp-dir=");
6337 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
6338 tmp_dir
= strndup(v
, n
);
6346 v
= startswith(p
, "var-tmp-dir=");
6348 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
6349 var_tmp_dir
= strndup(v
, n
);
6357 v
= startswith(p
, "netns-socket-0=");
6361 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
6362 buf
= strndupa(v
, n
);
6364 r
= safe_atoi(buf
, &fdpair
[0]);
6366 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Unable to parse exec-runtime specification netns-socket-0=%s: %m", buf
);
6367 if (!fdset_contains(fds
, fdpair
[0]))
6368 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADF
),
6369 "exec-runtime specification netns-socket-0= refers to unknown fd %d: %m", fdpair
[0]);
6370 fdpair
[0] = fdset_remove(fds
, fdpair
[0]);
6376 v
= startswith(p
, "netns-socket-1=");
6380 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
6381 buf
= strndupa(v
, n
);
6382 r
= safe_atoi(buf
, &fdpair
[1]);
6384 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Unable to parse exec-runtime specification netns-socket-1=%s: %m", buf
);
6385 if (!fdset_contains(fds
, fdpair
[1]))
6386 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADF
),
6387 "exec-runtime specification netns-socket-1= refers to unknown fd %d: %m", fdpair
[1]);
6388 fdpair
[1] = fdset_remove(fds
, fdpair
[1]);
6392 r
= exec_runtime_add(m
, id
, &tmp_dir
, &var_tmp_dir
, fdpair
, NULL
);
6394 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to add exec-runtime: %m");
6398 void exec_runtime_vacuum(Manager
*m
) {
6403 /* Free unreferenced ExecRuntime objects. This is used after manager deserialization process. */
6405 HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt
, m
->exec_runtime_by_id
) {
6409 (void) exec_runtime_free(rt
, false);
6413 void exec_params_clear(ExecParameters
*p
) {
6417 p
->environment
= strv_free(p
->environment
);
6418 p
->fd_names
= strv_free(p
->fd_names
);
6419 p
->fds
= mfree(p
->fds
);
6420 p
->exec_fd
= safe_close(p
->exec_fd
);
6423 ExecSetCredential
*exec_set_credential_free(ExecSetCredential
*sc
) {
6432 DEFINE_HASH_OPS_WITH_VALUE_DESTRUCTOR(exec_set_credential_hash_ops
, char, string_hash_func
, string_compare_func
, ExecSetCredential
, exec_set_credential_free
);
6434 static const char* const exec_input_table
[_EXEC_INPUT_MAX
] = {
6435 [EXEC_INPUT_NULL
] = "null",
6436 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
6437 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
] = "tty-force",
6438 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
] = "tty-fail",
6439 [EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket",
6440 [EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
] = "fd",
6441 [EXEC_INPUT_DATA
] = "data",
6442 [EXEC_INPUT_FILE
] = "file",
6445 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_input
, ExecInput
);
6447 static const char* const exec_output_table
[_EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
] = {
6448 [EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
] = "inherit",
6449 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
] = "null",
6450 [EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
6451 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
] = "kmsg",
6452 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
] = "kmsg+console",
6453 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
] = "journal",
6454 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
] = "journal+console",
6455 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket",
6456 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
] = "fd",
6457 [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
] = "file",
6458 [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
] = "append",
6459 [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_TRUNCATE
] = "truncate",
6462 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_output
, ExecOutput
);
6464 static const char* const exec_utmp_mode_table
[_EXEC_UTMP_MODE_MAX
] = {
6465 [EXEC_UTMP_INIT
] = "init",
6466 [EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
] = "login",
6467 [EXEC_UTMP_USER
] = "user",
6470 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_utmp_mode
, ExecUtmpMode
);
6472 static const char* const exec_preserve_mode_table
[_EXEC_PRESERVE_MODE_MAX
] = {
6473 [EXEC_PRESERVE_NO
] = "no",
6474 [EXEC_PRESERVE_YES
] = "yes",
6475 [EXEC_PRESERVE_RESTART
] = "restart",
6478 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(exec_preserve_mode
, ExecPreserveMode
, EXEC_PRESERVE_YES
);
6480 /* This table maps ExecDirectoryType to the setting it is configured with in the unit */
6481 static const char* const exec_directory_type_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
6482 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = "RuntimeDirectory",
6483 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = "StateDirectory",
6484 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = "CacheDirectory",
6485 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = "LogsDirectory",
6486 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = "ConfigurationDirectory",
6489 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_directory_type
, ExecDirectoryType
);
6491 /* And this table maps ExecDirectoryType too, but to a generic term identifying the type of resource. This
6492 * one is supposed to be generic enough to be used for unit types that don't use ExecContext and per-unit
6493 * directories, specifically .timer units with their timestamp touch file. */
6494 static const char* const exec_resource_type_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
6495 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = "runtime",
6496 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = "state",
6497 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = "cache",
6498 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = "logs",
6499 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = "configuration",
6502 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_resource_type
, ExecDirectoryType
);
6504 /* And this table also maps ExecDirectoryType, to the environment variable we pass the selected directory to
6505 * the service payload in. */
6506 static const char* const exec_directory_env_name_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
6507 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = "RUNTIME_DIRECTORY",
6508 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = "STATE_DIRECTORY",
6509 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = "CACHE_DIRECTORY",
6510 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = "LOGS_DIRECTORY",
6511 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = "CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY",
6514 DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(exec_directory_env_name
, ExecDirectoryType
);
6516 static const char* const exec_keyring_mode_table
[_EXEC_KEYRING_MODE_MAX
] = {
6517 [EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT
] = "inherit",
6518 [EXEC_KEYRING_PRIVATE
] = "private",
6519 [EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED
] = "shared",
6522 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_keyring_mode
, ExecKeyringMode
);