1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */
10 #include <sys/capability.h>
11 #include <sys/eventfd.h>
13 #include <sys/personality.h>
14 #include <sys/prctl.h>
16 #include <sys/socket.h>
18 #include <sys/types.h>
24 #include <security/pam_appl.h>
28 #include <selinux/selinux.h>
36 #include <sys/apparmor.h>
39 #include "sd-messages.h"
42 #include "alloc-util.h"
44 #include "apparmor-util.h"
49 #include "capability-util.h"
50 #include "chown-recursive.h"
51 #include "cpu-set-util.h"
55 #include "errno-list.h"
57 #include "exit-status.h"
59 #include "format-util.h"
61 #include "glob-util.h"
68 #include "memory-util.h"
71 #include "namespace.h"
72 #include "parse-util.h"
73 #include "path-util.h"
74 #include "process-util.h"
75 #include "rlimit-util.h"
78 #include "seccomp-util.h"
80 #include "securebits-util.h"
81 #include "selinux-util.h"
82 #include "signal-util.h"
83 #include "smack-util.h"
84 #include "socket-util.h"
86 #include "stat-util.h"
87 #include "string-table.h"
88 #include "string-util.h"
90 #include "syslog-util.h"
91 #include "terminal-util.h"
92 #include "umask-util.h"
94 #include "user-util.h"
95 #include "utmp-wtmp.h"
97 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC)
98 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC)
100 /* This assumes there is a 'tty' group */
101 #define TTY_MODE 0620
103 #define SNDBUF_SIZE (8*1024*1024)
105 static int shift_fds(int fds
[], size_t n_fds
) {
106 int start
, restart_from
;
111 /* Modifies the fds array! (sorts it) */
121 for (i
= start
; i
< (int) n_fds
; i
++) {
124 /* Already at right index? */
128 nfd
= fcntl(fds
[i
], F_DUPFD
, i
+ 3);
135 /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then
136 * let's remember that and try again from here */
137 if (nfd
!= i
+3 && restart_from
< 0)
141 if (restart_from
< 0)
144 start
= restart_from
;
150 static int flags_fds(const int fds
[], size_t n_socket_fds
, size_t n_storage_fds
, bool nonblock
) {
154 n_fds
= n_socket_fds
+ n_storage_fds
;
160 /* Drops/Sets O_NONBLOCK and FD_CLOEXEC from the file flags.
161 * O_NONBLOCK only applies to socket activation though. */
163 for (i
= 0; i
< n_fds
; i
++) {
165 if (i
< n_socket_fds
) {
166 r
= fd_nonblock(fds
[i
], nonblock
);
171 /* We unconditionally drop FD_CLOEXEC from the fds,
172 * since after all we want to pass these fds to our
175 r
= fd_cloexec(fds
[i
], false);
183 static const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext
*context
) {
186 if (context
->stdio_as_fds
)
189 if (context
->tty_path
)
190 return context
->tty_path
;
192 return "/dev/console";
195 static void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext
*context
, const ExecParameters
*p
) {
200 path
= exec_context_tty_path(context
);
202 if (context
->tty_vhangup
) {
203 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
204 (void) terminal_vhangup_fd(p
->stdin_fd
);
206 (void) terminal_vhangup(path
);
209 if (context
->tty_reset
) {
210 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
211 (void) reset_terminal_fd(p
->stdin_fd
, true);
213 (void) reset_terminal(path
);
216 if (context
->tty_vt_disallocate
&& path
)
217 (void) vt_disallocate(path
);
220 static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i
) {
223 EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
,
224 EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
);
227 static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o
) {
230 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
,
231 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
232 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
);
235 static bool is_syslog_output(ExecOutput o
) {
238 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
);
241 static bool is_kmsg_output(ExecOutput o
) {
244 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
);
247 static bool exec_context_needs_term(const ExecContext
*c
) {
250 /* Return true if the execution context suggests we should set $TERM to something useful. */
252 if (is_terminal_input(c
->std_input
))
255 if (is_terminal_output(c
->std_output
))
258 if (is_terminal_output(c
->std_error
))
261 return !!c
->tty_path
;
264 static int open_null_as(int flags
, int nfd
) {
269 fd
= open("/dev/null", flags
|O_NOCTTY
);
273 return move_fd(fd
, nfd
, false);
276 static int connect_journal_socket(int fd
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
277 static const union sockaddr_union sa
= {
278 .un
.sun_family
= AF_UNIX
,
279 .un
.sun_path
= "/run/systemd/journal/stdout",
281 uid_t olduid
= UID_INVALID
;
282 gid_t oldgid
= GID_INVALID
;
285 if (gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
288 if (setegid(gid
) < 0)
292 if (uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
295 if (seteuid(uid
) < 0) {
301 r
= connect(fd
, &sa
.sa
, SOCKADDR_UN_LEN(sa
.un
)) < 0 ? -errno
: 0;
303 /* If we fail to restore the uid or gid, things will likely
304 fail later on. This should only happen if an LSM interferes. */
306 if (uid_is_valid(uid
))
307 (void) seteuid(olduid
);
310 if (gid_is_valid(gid
))
311 (void) setegid(oldgid
);
316 static int connect_logger_as(
318 const ExecContext
*context
,
319 const ExecParameters
*params
,
326 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
331 assert(output
< _EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
);
335 fd
= socket(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_STREAM
, 0);
339 r
= connect_journal_socket(fd
, uid
, gid
);
343 if (shutdown(fd
, SHUT_RD
) < 0)
346 (void) fd_inc_sndbuf(fd
, SNDBUF_SIZE
);
356 context
->syslog_identifier
?: ident
,
357 params
->flags
& EXEC_PASS_LOG_UNIT
? unit
->id
: "",
358 context
->syslog_priority
,
359 !!context
->syslog_level_prefix
,
360 is_syslog_output(output
),
361 is_kmsg_output(output
),
362 is_terminal_output(output
)) < 0)
365 return move_fd(TAKE_FD(fd
), nfd
, false);
368 static int open_terminal_as(const char *path
, int flags
, int nfd
) {
374 fd
= open_terminal(path
, flags
| O_NOCTTY
);
378 return move_fd(fd
, nfd
, false);
381 static int acquire_path(const char *path
, int flags
, mode_t mode
) {
382 union sockaddr_union sa
= {};
383 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
388 if (IN_SET(flags
& O_ACCMODE
, O_WRONLY
, O_RDWR
))
391 fd
= open(path
, flags
|O_NOCTTY
, mode
);
395 if (errno
!= ENXIO
) /* ENXIO is returned when we try to open() an AF_UNIX file system socket on Linux */
397 if (strlen(path
) >= sizeof(sa
.un
.sun_path
)) /* Too long, can't be a UNIX socket */
400 /* So, it appears the specified path could be an AF_UNIX socket. Let's see if we can connect to it. */
402 fd
= socket(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_STREAM
, 0);
406 salen
= sockaddr_un_set_path(&sa
.un
, path
);
410 if (connect(fd
, &sa
.sa
, salen
) < 0)
411 return errno
== EINVAL
? -ENXIO
: -errno
; /* Propagate initial error if we get EINVAL, i.e. we have
412 * indication that his wasn't an AF_UNIX socket after all */
414 if ((flags
& O_ACCMODE
) == O_RDONLY
)
415 r
= shutdown(fd
, SHUT_WR
);
416 else if ((flags
& O_ACCMODE
) == O_WRONLY
)
417 r
= shutdown(fd
, SHUT_RD
);
426 static int fixup_input(
427 const ExecContext
*context
,
429 bool apply_tty_stdin
) {
435 std_input
= context
->std_input
;
437 if (is_terminal_input(std_input
) && !apply_tty_stdin
)
438 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
440 if (std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
441 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
443 if (std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_DATA
&& context
->stdin_data_size
== 0)
444 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
449 static int fixup_output(ExecOutput std_output
, int socket_fd
) {
451 if (std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
452 return EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
;
457 static int setup_input(
458 const ExecContext
*context
,
459 const ExecParameters
*params
,
461 int named_iofds
[3]) {
468 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0) {
469 if (dup2(params
->stdin_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
472 /* Try to make this the controlling tty, if it is a tty, and reset it */
473 if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO
)) {
474 (void) ioctl(STDIN_FILENO
, TIOCSCTTY
, context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
);
475 (void) reset_terminal_fd(STDIN_FILENO
, true);
481 i
= fixup_input(context
, socket_fd
, params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN
);
485 case EXEC_INPUT_NULL
:
486 return open_null_as(O_RDONLY
, STDIN_FILENO
);
489 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
:
490 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
: {
493 fd
= acquire_terminal(exec_context_tty_path(context
),
494 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_TRY
:
495 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_FORCE
:
496 ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT
,
501 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
504 case EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
:
505 assert(socket_fd
>= 0);
507 return dup2(socket_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
509 case EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
:
510 assert(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] >= 0);
512 (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
], false);
513 return dup2(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
], STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
515 case EXEC_INPUT_DATA
: {
518 fd
= acquire_data_fd(context
->stdin_data
, context
->stdin_data_size
, 0);
522 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
525 case EXEC_INPUT_FILE
: {
529 assert(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
531 rw
= (context
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
&& streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
])) ||
532 (context
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
&& streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]));
534 fd
= acquire_path(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], rw
? O_RDWR
: O_RDONLY
, 0666 & ~context
->umask
);
538 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
542 assert_not_reached("Unknown input type");
546 static bool can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout(
547 const ExecContext
*context
,
553 /* Returns true, if given the specified STDERR and STDOUT output we can directly dup() the stdout fd to the
556 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
)
561 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
562 return streq_ptr(context
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
], context
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
564 if (IN_SET(e
, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
))
565 return streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
570 static int setup_output(
572 const ExecContext
*context
,
573 const ExecParameters
*params
,
580 dev_t
*journal_stream_dev
,
581 ino_t
*journal_stream_ino
) {
591 assert(journal_stream_dev
);
592 assert(journal_stream_ino
);
594 if (fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
&& params
->stdout_fd
>= 0) {
596 if (dup2(params
->stdout_fd
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
599 return STDOUT_FILENO
;
602 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
&& params
->stderr_fd
>= 0) {
603 if (dup2(params
->stderr_fd
, STDERR_FILENO
) < 0)
606 return STDERR_FILENO
;
609 i
= fixup_input(context
, socket_fd
, params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN
);
610 o
= fixup_output(context
->std_output
, socket_fd
);
612 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
) {
614 e
= fixup_output(context
->std_error
, socket_fd
);
616 /* This expects the input and output are already set up */
618 /* Don't change the stderr file descriptor if we inherit all
619 * the way and are not on a tty */
620 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
621 o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
622 i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&&
623 !is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
) &&
627 /* Duplicate from stdout if possible */
628 if (can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout(context
, o
, e
))
629 return dup2(STDOUT_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
633 } else if (o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
) {
634 /* If input got downgraded, inherit the original value */
635 if (i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&& is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
))
636 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
638 /* If the input is connected to anything that's not a /dev/null or a data fd, inherit that... */
639 if (!IN_SET(i
, EXEC_INPUT_NULL
, EXEC_INPUT_DATA
))
640 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
642 /* If we are not started from PID 1 we just inherit STDOUT from our parent process. */
646 /* We need to open /dev/null here anew, to get the right access mode. */
647 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
652 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
:
653 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
655 case EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
:
656 if (is_terminal_input(i
))
657 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
659 /* We don't reset the terminal if this is just about output */
660 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
662 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
:
663 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
:
664 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
:
665 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
:
666 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
:
667 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
:
668 r
= connect_logger_as(unit
, context
, params
, o
, ident
, fileno
, uid
, gid
);
670 log_unit_warning_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to connect %s to the journal socket, ignoring: %m", fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
? "stdout" : "stderr");
671 r
= open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
675 /* If we connected this fd to the journal via a stream, patch the device/inode into the passed
676 * parameters, but only then. This is useful so that we can set $JOURNAL_STREAM that permits
677 * services to detect whether they are connected to the journal or not.
679 * If both stdout and stderr are connected to a stream then let's make sure to store the data
680 * about STDERR as that's usually the best way to do logging. */
682 if (fstat(fileno
, &st
) >= 0 &&
683 (*journal_stream_ino
== 0 || fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
)) {
684 *journal_stream_dev
= st
.st_dev
;
685 *journal_stream_ino
= st
.st_ino
;
690 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
:
691 assert(socket_fd
>= 0);
693 return dup2(socket_fd
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
695 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
:
696 assert(named_iofds
[fileno
] >= 0);
698 (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds
[fileno
], false);
699 return dup2(named_iofds
[fileno
], fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
701 case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
:
702 case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
: {
706 assert(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
]);
708 rw
= context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_FILE
&&
709 streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
], context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
712 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
715 if (o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
718 fd
= acquire_path(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
], flags
, 0666 & ~context
->umask
);
722 return move_fd(fd
, fileno
, 0);
726 assert_not_reached("Unknown error type");
730 static int chown_terminal(int fd
, uid_t uid
) {
735 /* Before we chown/chmod the TTY, let's ensure this is actually a tty */
739 /* This might fail. What matters are the results. */
740 (void) fchown(fd
, uid
, -1);
741 (void) fchmod(fd
, TTY_MODE
);
743 if (fstat(fd
, &st
) < 0)
746 if (st
.st_uid
!= uid
|| (st
.st_mode
& 0777) != TTY_MODE
)
752 static int setup_confirm_stdio(const char *vc
, int *_saved_stdin
, int *_saved_stdout
) {
753 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, saved_stdout
= -1;
756 assert(_saved_stdin
);
757 assert(_saved_stdout
);
759 saved_stdin
= fcntl(STDIN_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
763 saved_stdout
= fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
764 if (saved_stdout
< 0)
767 fd
= acquire_terminal(vc
, ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT
, DEFAULT_CONFIRM_USEC
);
771 r
= chown_terminal(fd
, getuid());
775 r
= reset_terminal_fd(fd
, true);
779 r
= rearrange_stdio(fd
, fd
, STDERR_FILENO
);
784 *_saved_stdin
= saved_stdin
;
785 *_saved_stdout
= saved_stdout
;
787 saved_stdin
= saved_stdout
= -1;
792 static void write_confirm_error_fd(int err
, int fd
, const Unit
*u
) {
795 if (err
== -ETIMEDOUT
)
796 dprintf(fd
, "Confirmation question timed out for %s, assuming positive response.\n", u
->id
);
799 dprintf(fd
, "Couldn't ask confirmation for %s: %m, assuming positive response.\n", u
->id
);
803 static void write_confirm_error(int err
, const char *vc
, const Unit
*u
) {
804 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
808 fd
= open_terminal(vc
, O_WRONLY
|O_NOCTTY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
812 write_confirm_error_fd(err
, fd
, u
);
815 static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin
, int *saved_stdout
) {
819 assert(saved_stdout
);
823 if (*saved_stdin
>= 0)
824 if (dup2(*saved_stdin
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
827 if (*saved_stdout
>= 0)
828 if (dup2(*saved_stdout
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
831 *saved_stdin
= safe_close(*saved_stdin
);
832 *saved_stdout
= safe_close(*saved_stdout
);
838 CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE
= -1,
839 CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
= 0,
843 static int ask_for_confirmation(const char *vc
, Unit
*u
, const char *cmdline
) {
844 int saved_stdout
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, r
;
845 _cleanup_free_
char *e
= NULL
;
848 /* For any internal errors, assume a positive response. */
849 r
= setup_confirm_stdio(vc
, &saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
851 write_confirm_error(r
, vc
, u
);
852 return CONFIRM_EXECUTE
;
855 /* confirm_spawn might have been disabled while we were sleeping. */
856 if (manager_is_confirm_spawn_disabled(u
->manager
)) {
861 e
= ellipsize(cmdline
, 60, 100);
869 r
= ask_char(&c
, "yfshiDjcn", "Execute %s? [y, f, s – h for help] ", e
);
871 write_confirm_error_fd(r
, STDOUT_FILENO
, u
);
878 printf("Resuming normal execution.\n");
879 manager_disable_confirm_spawn();
883 unit_dump(u
, stdout
, " ");
884 continue; /* ask again */
886 printf("Failing execution.\n");
887 r
= CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE
;
890 printf(" c - continue, proceed without asking anymore\n"
891 " D - dump, show the state of the unit\n"
892 " f - fail, don't execute the command and pretend it failed\n"
894 " i - info, show a short summary of the unit\n"
895 " j - jobs, show jobs that are in progress\n"
896 " s - skip, don't execute the command and pretend it succeeded\n"
897 " y - yes, execute the command\n");
898 continue; /* ask again */
900 printf(" Description: %s\n"
903 u
->id
, u
->description
, cmdline
);
904 continue; /* ask again */
906 manager_dump_jobs(u
->manager
, stdout
, " ");
907 continue; /* ask again */
909 /* 'n' was removed in favor of 'f'. */
910 printf("Didn't understand 'n', did you mean 'f'?\n");
911 continue; /* ask again */
913 printf("Skipping execution.\n");
914 r
= CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
;
920 assert_not_reached("Unhandled choice");
926 restore_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
930 static int get_fixed_user(const ExecContext
*c
, const char **user
,
931 uid_t
*uid
, gid_t
*gid
,
932 const char **home
, const char **shell
) {
941 /* Note that we don't set $HOME or $SHELL if they are not particularly enlightening anyway
942 * (i.e. are "/" or "/bin/nologin"). */
945 r
= get_user_creds(&name
, uid
, gid
, home
, shell
, USER_CREDS_CLEAN
);
953 static int get_fixed_group(const ExecContext
*c
, const char **group
, gid_t
*gid
) {
963 r
= get_group_creds(&name
, gid
, 0);
971 static int get_supplementary_groups(const ExecContext
*c
, const char *user
,
972 const char *group
, gid_t gid
,
973 gid_t
**supplementary_gids
, int *ngids
) {
977 bool keep_groups
= false;
978 gid_t
*groups
= NULL
;
979 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*l_gids
= NULL
;
984 * If user is given, then lookup GID and supplementary groups list.
985 * We avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. Also we have to initialize groups
986 * here and as early as possible so we keep the list of supplementary
987 * groups of the caller.
989 if (user
&& gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= 0) {
990 /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */
991 if (initgroups(user
, gid
) < 0)
997 if (strv_isempty(c
->supplementary_groups
))
1001 * If SupplementaryGroups= was passed then NGROUPS_MAX has to
1002 * be positive, otherwise fail.
1005 ngroups_max
= (int) sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX
);
1006 if (ngroups_max
<= 0) {
1010 return -EOPNOTSUPP
; /* For all other values */
1013 l_gids
= new(gid_t
, ngroups_max
);
1019 * Lookup the list of groups that the user belongs to, we
1020 * avoid NSS lookups here too for gid=0.
1023 if (getgrouplist(user
, gid
, l_gids
, &k
) < 0)
1028 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->supplementary_groups
) {
1031 if (k
>= ngroups_max
)
1035 r
= get_group_creds(&g
, l_gids
+k
, 0);
1043 * Sets ngids to zero to drop all supplementary groups, happens
1044 * when we are under root and SupplementaryGroups= is empty.
1051 /* Otherwise get the final list of supplementary groups */
1052 groups
= memdup(l_gids
, sizeof(gid_t
) * k
);
1056 *supplementary_gids
= groups
;
1064 static int enforce_groups(gid_t gid
, const gid_t
*supplementary_gids
, int ngids
) {
1067 /* Handle SupplementaryGroups= if it is not empty */
1069 r
= maybe_setgroups(ngids
, supplementary_gids
);
1074 if (gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
1075 /* Then set our gids */
1076 if (setresgid(gid
, gid
, gid
) < 0)
1083 static int enforce_user(const ExecContext
*context
, uid_t uid
) {
1086 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
))
1089 /* Sets (but doesn't look up) the uid and make sure we keep the
1090 * capabilities while doing so. */
1092 if (context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
1094 /* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but
1095 * drop privileges we need to make sure we keep our
1096 * caps, while we drop privileges. */
1098 int sb
= context
->secure_bits
| 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
;
1100 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
) != sb
)
1101 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, sb
) < 0)
1106 /* Second step: actually set the uids */
1107 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
1110 /* At this point we should have all necessary capabilities but
1111 are otherwise a normal user. However, the caps might got
1112 corrupted due to the setresuid() so we need clean them up
1113 later. This is done outside of this call. */
1120 static int null_conv(
1122 const struct pam_message
**msg
,
1123 struct pam_response
**resp
,
1124 void *appdata_ptr
) {
1126 /* We don't support conversations */
1128 return PAM_CONV_ERR
;
1133 static int setup_pam(
1140 int fds
[], size_t n_fds
) {
1144 static const struct pam_conv conv
= {
1149 _cleanup_(barrier_destroy
) Barrier barrier
= BARRIER_NULL
;
1150 pam_handle_t
*handle
= NULL
;
1152 int pam_code
= PAM_SUCCESS
, r
;
1153 char **nv
, **e
= NULL
;
1154 bool close_session
= false;
1155 pid_t pam_pid
= 0, parent_pid
;
1162 /* We set up PAM in the parent process, then fork. The child
1163 * will then stay around until killed via PR_GET_PDEATHSIG or
1164 * systemd via the cgroup logic. It will then remove the PAM
1165 * session again. The parent process will exec() the actual
1166 * daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID
1167 * of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */
1169 r
= barrier_create(&barrier
);
1173 if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG
)
1174 flags
|= PAM_SILENT
;
1176 pam_code
= pam_start(name
, user
, &conv
, &handle
);
1177 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
1183 _cleanup_free_
char *q
= NULL
;
1185 /* Hmm, so no TTY was explicitly passed, but an fd passed to us directly might be a TTY. Let's figure
1186 * out if that's the case, and read the TTY off it. */
1188 if (getttyname_malloc(STDIN_FILENO
, &q
) >= 0)
1189 tty
= strjoina("/dev/", q
);
1193 pam_code
= pam_set_item(handle
, PAM_TTY
, tty
);
1194 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1198 STRV_FOREACH(nv
, *env
) {
1199 pam_code
= pam_putenv(handle
, *nv
);
1200 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1204 pam_code
= pam_acct_mgmt(handle
, flags
);
1205 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1208 pam_code
= pam_open_session(handle
, flags
);
1209 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1212 close_session
= true;
1214 e
= pam_getenvlist(handle
);
1216 pam_code
= PAM_BUF_ERR
;
1220 /* Block SIGTERM, so that we know that it won't get lost in
1223 assert_se(sigprocmask_many(SIG_BLOCK
, &old_ss
, SIGTERM
, -1) >= 0);
1225 parent_pid
= getpid_cached();
1227 r
= safe_fork("(sd-pam)", 0, &pam_pid
);
1231 int sig
, ret
= EXIT_PAM
;
1233 /* The child's job is to reset the PAM session on
1235 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_CHILD
);
1237 /* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this child. We assume that otherwise only those fds
1238 * are open here that have been opened by PAM. */
1239 (void) close_many(fds
, n_fds
);
1241 /* Drop privileges - we don't need any to pam_close_session
1242 * and this will make PR_SET_PDEATHSIG work in most cases.
1243 * If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam threads
1244 * to fail to exit normally */
1246 r
= maybe_setgroups(0, NULL
);
1248 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to setgroups() in sd-pam: %m");
1249 if (setresgid(gid
, gid
, gid
) < 0)
1250 log_warning_errno(errno
, "Failed to setresgid() in sd-pam: %m");
1251 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
1252 log_warning_errno(errno
, "Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m");
1254 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
1256 /* Wait until our parent died. This will only work if
1257 * the above setresuid() succeeds, otherwise the kernel
1258 * will not allow unprivileged parents kill their privileged
1259 * children this way. We rely on the control groups kill logic
1260 * to do the rest for us. */
1261 if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG
, SIGTERM
) < 0)
1264 /* Tell the parent that our setup is done. This is especially
1265 * important regarding dropping privileges. Otherwise, unit
1266 * setup might race against our setresuid(2) call.
1268 * If the parent aborted, we'll detect this below, hence ignore
1269 * return failure here. */
1270 (void) barrier_place(&barrier
);
1272 /* Check if our parent process might already have died? */
1273 if (getppid() == parent_pid
) {
1276 assert_se(sigemptyset(&ss
) >= 0);
1277 assert_se(sigaddset(&ss
, SIGTERM
) >= 0);
1280 if (sigwait(&ss
, &sig
) < 0) {
1287 assert(sig
== SIGTERM
);
1292 /* If our parent died we'll end the session */
1293 if (getppid() != parent_pid
) {
1294 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
1295 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1302 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
1306 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_PARENT
);
1308 /* If the child was forked off successfully it will do all the
1309 * cleanups, so forget about the handle here. */
1312 /* Unblock SIGTERM again in the parent */
1313 assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK
, &old_ss
, NULL
) >= 0);
1315 /* We close the log explicitly here, since the PAM modules
1316 * might have opened it, but we don't want this fd around. */
1319 /* Synchronously wait for the child to initialize. We don't care for
1320 * errors as we cannot recover. However, warn loudly if it happens. */
1321 if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier
))
1322 log_error("PAM initialization failed");
1324 return strv_free_and_replace(*env
, e
);
1327 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
1328 log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle
, pam_code
));
1329 r
= -EPERM
; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */
1331 log_error_errno(r
, "PAM failed: %m");
1335 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
1337 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
1349 static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path
) {
1350 char process_name
[11];
1354 /* This resulting string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
1355 * of "/sbin/init") to look pretty in /bin/ps */
1359 rename_process("(...)");
1365 /* The end of the process name is usually more
1366 * interesting, since the first bit might just be
1372 process_name
[0] = '(';
1373 memcpy(process_name
+1, p
, l
);
1374 process_name
[1+l
] = ')';
1375 process_name
[1+l
+1] = 0;
1377 rename_process(process_name
);
1380 static bool context_has_address_families(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1383 return c
->address_families_whitelist
||
1384 !set_isempty(c
->address_families
);
1387 static bool context_has_syscall_filters(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1390 return c
->syscall_whitelist
||
1391 !hashmap_isempty(c
->syscall_filter
);
1394 static bool context_has_no_new_privileges(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1397 if (c
->no_new_privileges
)
1400 if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) /* if we are privileged, we don't need NNP */
1403 /* We need NNP if we have any form of seccomp and are unprivileged */
1404 return context_has_address_families(c
) ||
1405 c
->memory_deny_write_execute
||
1406 c
->restrict_realtime
||
1407 c
->restrict_suid_sgid
||
1408 exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
) ||
1409 c
->protect_kernel_tunables
||
1410 c
->protect_kernel_modules
||
1411 c
->private_devices
||
1412 context_has_syscall_filters(c
) ||
1413 !set_isempty(c
->syscall_archs
) ||
1414 c
->lock_personality
||
1415 c
->protect_hostname
;
1420 static bool skip_seccomp_unavailable(const Unit
* u
, const char* msg
) {
1422 if (is_seccomp_available())
1425 log_unit_debug(u
, "SECCOMP features not detected in the kernel, skipping %s", msg
);
1429 static int apply_syscall_filter(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
, bool needs_ambient_hack
) {
1430 uint32_t negative_action
, default_action
, action
;
1436 if (!context_has_syscall_filters(c
))
1439 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "SystemCallFilter="))
1442 negative_action
= c
->syscall_errno
== 0 ? SCMP_ACT_KILL
: SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c
->syscall_errno
);
1444 if (c
->syscall_whitelist
) {
1445 default_action
= negative_action
;
1446 action
= SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
;
1448 default_action
= SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
;
1449 action
= negative_action
;
1452 if (needs_ambient_hack
) {
1453 r
= seccomp_filter_set_add(c
->syscall_filter
, c
->syscall_whitelist
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SETUID
);
1458 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(default_action
, c
->syscall_filter
, action
, false);
1461 static int apply_syscall_archs(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1465 if (set_isempty(c
->syscall_archs
))
1468 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "SystemCallArchitectures="))
1471 return seccomp_restrict_archs(c
->syscall_archs
);
1474 static int apply_address_families(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1478 if (!context_has_address_families(c
))
1481 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictAddressFamilies="))
1484 return seccomp_restrict_address_families(c
->address_families
, c
->address_families_whitelist
);
1487 static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1491 if (!c
->memory_deny_write_execute
)
1494 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "MemoryDenyWriteExecute="))
1497 return seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute();
1500 static int apply_restrict_realtime(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1504 if (!c
->restrict_realtime
)
1507 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictRealtime="))
1510 return seccomp_restrict_realtime();
1513 static int apply_restrict_suid_sgid(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1517 if (!c
->restrict_suid_sgid
)
1520 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictSUIDSGID="))
1523 return seccomp_restrict_suid_sgid();
1526 static int apply_protect_sysctl(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1530 /* Turn off the legacy sysctl() system call. Many distributions turn this off while building the kernel, but
1531 * let's protect even those systems where this is left on in the kernel. */
1533 if (!c
->protect_kernel_tunables
)
1536 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectKernelTunables="))
1539 return seccomp_protect_sysctl();
1542 static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1546 /* Turn off module syscalls on ProtectKernelModules=yes */
1548 if (!c
->protect_kernel_modules
)
1551 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectKernelModules="))
1554 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE
, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
), false);
1557 static int apply_private_devices(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1561 /* If PrivateDevices= is set, also turn off iopl and all @raw-io syscalls. */
1563 if (!c
->private_devices
)
1566 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "PrivateDevices="))
1569 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO
, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
), false);
1572 static int apply_restrict_namespaces(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1576 if (!exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
))
1579 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictNamespaces="))
1582 return seccomp_restrict_namespaces(c
->restrict_namespaces
);
1585 static int apply_lock_personality(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1586 unsigned long personality
;
1592 if (!c
->lock_personality
)
1595 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "LockPersonality="))
1598 personality
= c
->personality
;
1600 /* If personality is not specified, use either PER_LINUX or PER_LINUX32 depending on what is currently set. */
1601 if (personality
== PERSONALITY_INVALID
) {
1603 r
= opinionated_personality(&personality
);
1608 return seccomp_lock_personality(personality
);
1613 static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe
[static 4]) {
1616 idle_pipe
[1] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[1]);
1617 idle_pipe
[2] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[2]);
1619 if (idle_pipe
[0] >= 0) {
1622 r
= fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC
);
1624 if (idle_pipe
[3] >= 0 && r
== 0 /* timeout */) {
1627 /* Signal systemd that we are bored and want to continue. */
1628 n
= write(idle_pipe
[3], "x", 1);
1630 /* Wait for systemd to react to the signal above. */
1631 fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC
);
1634 idle_pipe
[0] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[0]);
1638 idle_pipe
[3] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[3]);
1641 static const char *exec_directory_env_name_to_string(ExecDirectoryType t
);
1643 static int build_environment(
1645 const ExecContext
*c
,
1646 const ExecParameters
*p
,
1649 const char *username
,
1651 dev_t journal_stream_dev
,
1652 ino_t journal_stream_ino
,
1655 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
;
1656 ExecDirectoryType t
;
1665 our_env
= new0(char*, 14 + _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
1670 _cleanup_free_
char *joined
= NULL
;
1672 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid_cached()) < 0)
1674 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1676 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_FDS=%zu", n_fds
) < 0)
1678 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1680 joined
= strv_join(p
->fd_names
, ":");
1684 x
= strjoin("LISTEN_FDNAMES=", joined
);
1687 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1690 if ((p
->flags
& EXEC_SET_WATCHDOG
) && p
->watchdog_usec
> 0) {
1691 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid_cached()) < 0)
1693 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1695 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_USEC="USEC_FMT
, p
->watchdog_usec
) < 0)
1697 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1700 /* If this is D-Bus, tell the nss-systemd module, since it relies on being able to use D-Bus look up dynamic
1701 * users via PID 1, possibly dead-locking the dbus daemon. This way it will not use D-Bus to resolve names, but
1702 * check the database directly. */
1703 if (p
->flags
& EXEC_NSS_BYPASS_BUS
) {
1704 x
= strdup("SYSTEMD_NSS_BYPASS_BUS=1");
1707 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1711 x
= strappend("HOME=", home
);
1715 path_simplify(x
+ 5, true);
1716 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1720 x
= strappend("LOGNAME=", username
);
1723 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1725 x
= strappend("USER=", username
);
1728 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1732 x
= strappend("SHELL=", shell
);
1736 path_simplify(x
+ 6, true);
1737 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1740 if (!sd_id128_is_null(u
->invocation_id
)) {
1741 if (asprintf(&x
, "INVOCATION_ID=" SD_ID128_FORMAT_STR
, SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(u
->invocation_id
)) < 0)
1744 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1747 if (exec_context_needs_term(c
)) {
1748 const char *tty_path
, *term
= NULL
;
1750 tty_path
= exec_context_tty_path(c
);
1752 /* If we are forked off PID 1 and we are supposed to operate on /dev/console, then let's try to inherit
1753 * the $TERM set for PID 1. This is useful for containers so that the $TERM the container manager
1754 * passes to PID 1 ends up all the way in the console login shown. */
1756 if (path_equal(tty_path
, "/dev/console") && getppid() == 1)
1757 term
= getenv("TERM");
1759 term
= default_term_for_tty(tty_path
);
1761 x
= strappend("TERM=", term
);
1764 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1767 if (journal_stream_dev
!= 0 && journal_stream_ino
!= 0) {
1768 if (asprintf(&x
, "JOURNAL_STREAM=" DEV_FMT
":" INO_FMT
, journal_stream_dev
, journal_stream_ino
) < 0)
1771 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1774 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
1775 _cleanup_free_
char *pre
= NULL
, *joined
= NULL
;
1781 if (strv_isempty(c
->directories
[t
].paths
))
1784 n
= exec_directory_env_name_to_string(t
);
1788 pre
= strjoin(p
->prefix
[t
], "/");
1792 joined
= strv_join_prefix(c
->directories
[t
].paths
, ":", pre
);
1796 x
= strjoin(n
, "=", joined
);
1800 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1803 our_env
[n_env
++] = NULL
;
1804 assert(n_env
<= 14 + _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
1806 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(our_env
);
1811 static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext
*c
, char ***ret
) {
1812 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **pass_env
= NULL
;
1813 size_t n_env
= 0, n_bufsize
= 0;
1816 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->pass_environment
) {
1817 _cleanup_free_
char *x
= NULL
;
1823 x
= strjoin(*i
, "=", v
);
1827 if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(pass_env
, n_bufsize
, n_env
+ 2))
1830 pass_env
[n_env
++] = TAKE_PTR(x
);
1831 pass_env
[n_env
] = NULL
;
1834 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(pass_env
);
1839 static bool exec_needs_mount_namespace(
1840 const ExecContext
*context
,
1841 const ExecParameters
*params
,
1842 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
) {
1847 if (context
->root_image
)
1850 if (!strv_isempty(context
->read_write_paths
) ||
1851 !strv_isempty(context
->read_only_paths
) ||
1852 !strv_isempty(context
->inaccessible_paths
))
1855 if (context
->n_bind_mounts
> 0)
1858 if (context
->n_temporary_filesystems
> 0)
1861 if (!IN_SET(context
->mount_flags
, 0, MS_SHARED
))
1864 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
&& (runtime
->tmp_dir
|| runtime
->var_tmp_dir
))
1867 if (context
->private_devices
||
1868 context
->private_mounts
||
1869 context
->protect_system
!= PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO
||
1870 context
->protect_home
!= PROTECT_HOME_NO
||
1871 context
->protect_kernel_tunables
||
1872 context
->protect_kernel_modules
||
1873 context
->protect_control_groups
)
1876 if (context
->root_directory
) {
1877 ExecDirectoryType t
;
1879 if (context
->mount_apivfs
)
1882 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
1883 if (!params
->prefix
[t
])
1886 if (!strv_isempty(context
->directories
[t
].paths
))
1891 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
1892 (!strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
].paths
) ||
1893 !strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
].paths
) ||
1894 !strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
].paths
)))
1900 static int setup_private_users(uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
1901 _cleanup_free_
char *uid_map
= NULL
, *gid_map
= NULL
;
1902 _cleanup_close_pair_
int errno_pipe
[2] = { -1, -1 };
1903 _cleanup_close_
int unshare_ready_fd
= -1;
1904 _cleanup_(sigkill_waitp
) pid_t pid
= 0;
1909 /* Set up a user namespace and map root to root, the selected UID/GID to itself, and everything else to
1910 * nobody. In order to be able to write this mapping we need CAP_SETUID in the original user namespace, which
1911 * we however lack after opening the user namespace. To work around this we fork() a temporary child process,
1912 * which waits for the parent to create the new user namespace while staying in the original namespace. The
1913 * child then writes the UID mapping, under full privileges. The parent waits for the child to finish and
1914 * continues execution normally. */
1916 if (uid
!= 0 && uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
1917 r
= asprintf(&uid_map
,
1918 "0 0 1\n" /* Map root → root */
1919 UID_FMT
" " UID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $UID → $UID */
1924 uid_map
= strdup("0 0 1\n"); /* The case where the above is the same */
1929 if (gid
!= 0 && gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
1930 r
= asprintf(&gid_map
,
1931 "0 0 1\n" /* Map root → root */
1932 GID_FMT
" " GID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $GID → $GID */
1937 gid_map
= strdup("0 0 1\n"); /* The case where the above is the same */
1942 /* Create a communication channel so that the parent can tell the child when it finished creating the user
1944 unshare_ready_fd
= eventfd(0, EFD_CLOEXEC
);
1945 if (unshare_ready_fd
< 0)
1948 /* Create a communication channel so that the child can tell the parent a proper error code in case it
1950 if (pipe2(errno_pipe
, O_CLOEXEC
) < 0)
1953 r
= safe_fork("(sd-userns)", FORK_RESET_SIGNALS
|FORK_DEATHSIG
, &pid
);
1957 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
1961 /* Child process, running in the original user namespace. Let's update the parent's UID/GID map from
1962 * here, after the parent opened its own user namespace. */
1965 errno_pipe
[0] = safe_close(errno_pipe
[0]);
1967 /* Wait until the parent unshared the user namespace */
1968 if (read(unshare_ready_fd
, &c
, sizeof(c
)) < 0) {
1973 /* Disable the setgroups() system call in the child user namespace, for good. */
1974 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "setgroups");
1975 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
1977 if (errno
!= ENOENT
) {
1982 /* If the file is missing the kernel is too old, let's continue anyway. */
1984 if (write(fd
, "deny\n", 5) < 0) {
1989 fd
= safe_close(fd
);
1992 /* First write the GID map */
1993 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "gid_map");
1994 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
1999 if (write(fd
, gid_map
, strlen(gid_map
)) < 0) {
2003 fd
= safe_close(fd
);
2005 /* The write the UID map */
2006 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "uid_map");
2007 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
2012 if (write(fd
, uid_map
, strlen(uid_map
)) < 0) {
2017 _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS
);
2020 (void) write(errno_pipe
[1], &r
, sizeof(r
));
2021 _exit(EXIT_FAILURE
);
2024 errno_pipe
[1] = safe_close(errno_pipe
[1]);
2026 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER
) < 0)
2029 /* Let the child know that the namespace is ready now */
2030 if (write(unshare_ready_fd
, &c
, sizeof(c
)) < 0)
2033 /* Try to read an error code from the child */
2034 n
= read(errno_pipe
[0], &r
, sizeof(r
));
2037 if (n
== sizeof(r
)) { /* an error code was sent to us */
2042 if (n
!= 0) /* on success we should have read 0 bytes */
2045 r
= wait_for_terminate_and_check("(sd-userns)", pid
, 0);
2049 if (r
!= EXIT_SUCCESS
) /* If something strange happened with the child, let's consider this fatal, too */
2055 static int setup_exec_directory(
2056 const ExecContext
*context
,
2057 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2060 ExecDirectoryType type
,
2063 static const int exit_status_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
2064 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY
,
2065 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = EXIT_STATE_DIRECTORY
,
2066 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = EXIT_CACHE_DIRECTORY
,
2067 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = EXIT_LOGS_DIRECTORY
,
2068 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = EXIT_CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY
,
2075 assert(type
>= 0 && type
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
2076 assert(exit_status
);
2078 if (!params
->prefix
[type
])
2081 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_CHOWN_DIRECTORIES
) {
2082 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
))
2084 if (!gid_is_valid(gid
))
2088 STRV_FOREACH(rt
, context
->directories
[type
].paths
) {
2089 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
, *pp
= NULL
;
2091 p
= path_join(params
->prefix
[type
], *rt
);
2097 r
= mkdir_parents_label(p
, 0755);
2101 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
2102 (!IN_SET(type
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
) ||
2103 (type
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
&& context
->runtime_directory_preserve_mode
!= EXEC_PRESERVE_NO
))) {
2104 _cleanup_free_
char *private_root
= NULL
;
2106 /* So, here's one extra complication when dealing with DynamicUser=1 units. In that case we
2107 * want to avoid leaving a directory around fully accessible that is owned by a dynamic user
2108 * whose UID is later on reused. To lock this down we use the same trick used by container
2109 * managers to prohibit host users to get access to files of the same UID in containers: we
2110 * place everything inside a directory that has an access mode of 0700 and is owned root:root,
2111 * so that it acts as security boundary for unprivileged host code. We then use fs namespacing
2112 * to make this directory permeable for the service itself.
2114 * Specifically: for a service which wants a special directory "foo/" we first create a
2115 * directory "private/" with access mode 0700 owned by root:root. Then we place "foo" inside of
2116 * that directory (i.e. "private/foo/"), and make "foo" a symlink to "private/foo". This way,
2117 * privileged host users can access "foo/" as usual, but unprivileged host users can't look
2118 * into it. Inside of the namespaceof the container "private/" is replaced by a more liberally
2119 * accessible tmpfs, into which the host's "private/foo/" is mounted under the same name, thus
2120 * disabling the access boundary for the service and making sure it only gets access to the
2121 * dirs it needs but no others. Tricky? Yes, absolutely, but it works!
2123 * Note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION as that's assumed not to be
2124 * owned by the service itself.
2125 * Also, note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME as that's often used for sharing
2126 * files or sockets with other services. */
2128 private_root
= path_join(params
->prefix
[type
], "private");
2129 if (!private_root
) {
2134 /* First set up private root if it doesn't exist yet, with access mode 0700 and owned by root:root */
2135 r
= mkdir_safe_label(private_root
, 0700, 0, 0, MKDIR_WARN_MODE
);
2139 pp
= path_join(private_root
, *rt
);
2145 /* Create all directories between the configured directory and this private root, and mark them 0755 */
2146 r
= mkdir_parents_label(pp
, 0755);
2150 if (is_dir(p
, false) > 0 &&
2151 (laccess(pp
, F_OK
) < 0 && errno
== ENOENT
)) {
2153 /* Hmm, the private directory doesn't exist yet, but the normal one exists? If so, move
2154 * it over. Most likely the service has been upgraded from one that didn't use
2155 * DynamicUser=1, to one that does. */
2157 if (rename(p
, pp
) < 0) {
2162 /* Otherwise, create the actual directory for the service */
2164 r
= mkdir_label(pp
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
);
2165 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -EEXIST
)
2169 /* And link it up from the original place */
2170 r
= symlink_idempotent(pp
, p
, true);
2175 r
= mkdir_label(p
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
);
2180 if (type
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
) {
2183 /* Don't change the owner/access mode of the configuration directory,
2184 * as in the common case it is not written to by a service, and shall
2185 * not be writable. */
2187 if (stat(p
, &st
) < 0) {
2192 /* Still complain if the access mode doesn't match */
2193 if (((st
.st_mode
^ context
->directories
[type
].mode
) & 07777) != 0)
2194 log_warning("%s \'%s\' already exists but the mode is different. "
2195 "(File system: %o %sMode: %o)",
2196 exec_directory_type_to_string(type
), *rt
,
2197 st
.st_mode
& 07777, exec_directory_type_to_string(type
), context
->directories
[type
].mode
& 07777);
2204 /* Lock down the access mode (we use chmod_and_chown() to make this idempotent. We don't
2205 * specify UID/GID here, so that path_chown_recursive() can optimize things depending on the
2206 * current UID/GID ownership.) */
2207 r
= chmod_and_chown(pp
?: p
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
, UID_INVALID
, GID_INVALID
);
2211 /* Then, change the ownership of the whole tree, if necessary. When dynamic users are used we
2212 * drop the suid/sgid bits, since we really don't want SUID/SGID files for dynamic UID/GID
2213 * assignments to exist.*/
2214 r
= path_chown_recursive(pp
?: p
, uid
, gid
, context
->dynamic_user
? 01777 : 07777);
2222 *exit_status
= exit_status_table
[type
];
2227 static int setup_smack(
2228 const ExecContext
*context
,
2229 const ExecCommand
*command
) {
2236 if (context
->smack_process_label
) {
2237 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context
->smack_process_label
);
2241 #ifdef SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
2243 _cleanup_free_
char *exec_label
= NULL
;
2245 r
= mac_smack_read(command
->path
, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC
, &exec_label
);
2246 if (r
< 0 && !IN_SET(r
, -ENODATA
, -EOPNOTSUPP
))
2249 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label
? : SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
);
2259 static int compile_bind_mounts(
2260 const ExecContext
*context
,
2261 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2262 BindMount
**ret_bind_mounts
,
2263 size_t *ret_n_bind_mounts
,
2264 char ***ret_empty_directories
) {
2266 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **empty_directories
= NULL
;
2267 BindMount
*bind_mounts
;
2269 ExecDirectoryType t
;
2274 assert(ret_bind_mounts
);
2275 assert(ret_n_bind_mounts
);
2276 assert(ret_empty_directories
);
2278 n
= context
->n_bind_mounts
;
2279 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
2280 if (!params
->prefix
[t
])
2283 n
+= strv_length(context
->directories
[t
].paths
);
2287 *ret_bind_mounts
= NULL
;
2288 *ret_n_bind_mounts
= 0;
2289 *ret_empty_directories
= NULL
;
2293 bind_mounts
= new(BindMount
, n
);
2297 for (i
= 0; i
< context
->n_bind_mounts
; i
++) {
2298 BindMount
*item
= context
->bind_mounts
+ i
;
2301 s
= strdup(item
->source
);
2307 d
= strdup(item
->destination
);
2314 bind_mounts
[h
++] = (BindMount
) {
2317 .read_only
= item
->read_only
,
2318 .recursive
= item
->recursive
,
2319 .ignore_enoent
= item
->ignore_enoent
,
2323 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
2326 if (!params
->prefix
[t
])
2329 if (strv_isempty(context
->directories
[t
].paths
))
2332 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
2333 !IN_SET(t
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
) &&
2334 !(context
->root_directory
|| context
->root_image
)) {
2337 /* So this is for a dynamic user, and we need to make sure the process can access its own
2338 * directory. For that we overmount the usually inaccessible "private" subdirectory with a
2339 * tmpfs that makes it accessible and is empty except for the submounts we do this for. */
2341 private_root
= strjoin(params
->prefix
[t
], "/private");
2342 if (!private_root
) {
2347 r
= strv_consume(&empty_directories
, private_root
);
2352 STRV_FOREACH(suffix
, context
->directories
[t
].paths
) {
2355 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
2356 !IN_SET(t
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
))
2357 s
= strjoin(params
->prefix
[t
], "/private/", *suffix
);
2359 s
= strjoin(params
->prefix
[t
], "/", *suffix
);
2365 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
2366 !IN_SET(t
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
) &&
2367 (context
->root_directory
|| context
->root_image
))
2368 /* When RootDirectory= or RootImage= are set, then the symbolic link to the private
2369 * directory is not created on the root directory. So, let's bind-mount the directory
2370 * on the 'non-private' place. */
2371 d
= strjoin(params
->prefix
[t
], "/", *suffix
);
2380 bind_mounts
[h
++] = (BindMount
) {
2384 .nosuid
= context
->dynamic_user
, /* don't allow suid/sgid when DynamicUser= is on */
2386 .ignore_enoent
= false,
2393 *ret_bind_mounts
= bind_mounts
;
2394 *ret_n_bind_mounts
= n
;
2395 *ret_empty_directories
= TAKE_PTR(empty_directories
);
2400 bind_mount_free_many(bind_mounts
, h
);
2404 static int apply_mount_namespace(
2406 const ExecCommand
*command
,
2407 const ExecContext
*context
,
2408 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2409 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
) {
2411 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **empty_directories
= NULL
;
2412 char *tmp
= NULL
, *var
= NULL
;
2413 const char *root_dir
= NULL
, *root_image
= NULL
;
2414 NamespaceInfo ns_info
;
2415 bool needs_sandboxing
;
2416 BindMount
*bind_mounts
= NULL
;
2417 size_t n_bind_mounts
= 0;
2422 /* The runtime struct only contains the parent of the private /tmp,
2423 * which is non-accessible to world users. Inside of it there's a /tmp
2424 * that is sticky, and that's the one we want to use here. */
2426 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
) {
2427 if (runtime
->tmp_dir
)
2428 tmp
= strjoina(runtime
->tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
2429 if (runtime
->var_tmp_dir
)
2430 var
= strjoina(runtime
->var_tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
2433 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
) {
2434 root_image
= context
->root_image
;
2437 root_dir
= context
->root_directory
;
2440 r
= compile_bind_mounts(context
, params
, &bind_mounts
, &n_bind_mounts
, &empty_directories
);
2444 needs_sandboxing
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
);
2445 if (needs_sandboxing
)
2446 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {
2447 .ignore_protect_paths
= false,
2448 .private_dev
= context
->private_devices
,
2449 .protect_control_groups
= context
->protect_control_groups
,
2450 .protect_kernel_tunables
= context
->protect_kernel_tunables
,
2451 .protect_kernel_modules
= context
->protect_kernel_modules
,
2452 .protect_hostname
= context
->protect_hostname
,
2453 .mount_apivfs
= context
->mount_apivfs
,
2454 .private_mounts
= context
->private_mounts
,
2456 else if (!context
->dynamic_user
&& root_dir
)
2458 * If DynamicUser=no and RootDirectory= is set then lets pass a relaxed
2459 * sandbox info, otherwise enforce it, don't ignore protected paths and
2460 * fail if we are enable to apply the sandbox inside the mount namespace.
2462 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {
2463 .ignore_protect_paths
= true,
2466 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {};
2468 if (context
->mount_flags
== MS_SHARED
)
2469 log_unit_debug(u
, "shared mount propagation hidden by other fs namespacing unit settings: ignoring");
2471 r
= setup_namespace(root_dir
, root_image
,
2472 &ns_info
, context
->read_write_paths
,
2473 needs_sandboxing
? context
->read_only_paths
: NULL
,
2474 needs_sandboxing
? context
->inaccessible_paths
: NULL
,
2478 context
->temporary_filesystems
,
2479 context
->n_temporary_filesystems
,
2482 needs_sandboxing
? context
->protect_home
: PROTECT_HOME_NO
,
2483 needs_sandboxing
? context
->protect_system
: PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO
,
2484 context
->mount_flags
,
2485 DISSECT_IMAGE_DISCARD_ON_LOOP
);
2487 bind_mount_free_many(bind_mounts
, n_bind_mounts
);
2489 /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is probably due to a missing capability. setup_namespace() reports
2490 * that with a special, recognizable error ENOANO. In this case, silently proceed, but only if exclusively
2491 * sandboxing options were used, i.e. nothing such as RootDirectory= or BindMount= that would result in a
2492 * completely different execution environment. */
2494 if (n_bind_mounts
== 0 &&
2495 context
->n_temporary_filesystems
== 0 &&
2496 !root_dir
&& !root_image
&&
2497 !context
->dynamic_user
) {
2498 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution and ignoring.");
2502 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to set up namespace, and refusing to continue since the selected namespacing options alter mount environment non-trivially.\n"
2503 "Bind mounts: %zu, temporary filesystems: %zu, root directory: %s, root image: %s, dynamic user: %s",
2504 n_bind_mounts
, context
->n_temporary_filesystems
, yes_no(root_dir
), yes_no(root_image
), yes_no(context
->dynamic_user
));
2512 static int apply_working_directory(
2513 const ExecContext
*context
,
2514 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2516 const bool needs_mount_ns
,
2522 assert(exit_status
);
2524 if (context
->working_directory_home
) {
2527 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
2533 } else if (context
->working_directory
)
2534 wd
= context
->working_directory
;
2538 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
) {
2539 if (!needs_mount_ns
&& context
->root_directory
)
2540 if (chroot(context
->root_directory
) < 0) {
2541 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHROOT
;
2547 d
= prefix_roota(context
->root_directory
, wd
);
2549 if (chdir(d
) < 0 && !context
->working_directory_missing_ok
) {
2550 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
2557 static int setup_keyring(
2559 const ExecContext
*context
,
2560 const ExecParameters
*p
,
2561 uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
2563 key_serial_t keyring
;
2572 /* Let's set up a new per-service "session" kernel keyring for each system service. This has the benefit that
2573 * each service runs with its own keyring shared among all processes of the service, but with no hook-up beyond
2574 * that scope, and in particular no link to the per-UID keyring. If we don't do this the keyring will be
2575 * automatically created on-demand and then linked to the per-UID keyring, by the kernel. The kernel's built-in
2576 * on-demand behaviour is very appropriate for login users, but probably not so much for system services, where
2577 * UIDs are not necessarily specific to a service but reused (at least in the case of UID 0). */
2579 if (context
->keyring_mode
== EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT
)
2582 /* Acquiring a reference to the user keyring is nasty. We briefly change identity in order to get things set up
2583 * properly by the kernel. If we don't do that then we can't create it atomically, and that sucks for parallel
2584 * execution. This mimics what pam_keyinit does, too. Setting up session keyring, to be owned by the right user
2585 * & group is just as nasty as acquiring a reference to the user keyring. */
2587 saved_uid
= getuid();
2588 saved_gid
= getgid();
2590 if (gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= saved_gid
) {
2591 if (setregid(gid
, -1) < 0)
2592 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change GID for user keyring: %m");
2595 if (uid_is_valid(uid
) && uid
!= saved_uid
) {
2596 if (setreuid(uid
, -1) < 0) {
2597 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change UID for user keyring: %m");
2602 keyring
= keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING
, 0, 0, 0, 0);
2603 if (keyring
== -1) {
2604 if (errno
== ENOSYS
)
2605 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Kernel keyring not supported, ignoring.");
2606 else if (IN_SET(errno
, EACCES
, EPERM
))
2607 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Kernel keyring access prohibited, ignoring.");
2608 else if (errno
== EDQUOT
)
2609 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Out of kernel keyrings to allocate, ignoring.");
2611 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Setting up kernel keyring failed: %m");
2616 /* When requested link the user keyring into the session keyring. */
2617 if (context
->keyring_mode
== EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED
) {
2619 if (keyctl(KEYCTL_LINK
,
2620 KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING
,
2621 KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING
, 0, 0) < 0) {
2622 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to link user keyring into session keyring: %m");
2627 /* Restore uid/gid back */
2628 if (uid_is_valid(uid
) && uid
!= saved_uid
) {
2629 if (setreuid(saved_uid
, -1) < 0) {
2630 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change UID back for user keyring: %m");
2635 if (gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= saved_gid
) {
2636 if (setregid(saved_gid
, -1) < 0)
2637 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change GID back for user keyring: %m");
2640 /* Populate they keyring with the invocation ID by default, as original saved_uid. */
2641 if (!sd_id128_is_null(u
->invocation_id
)) {
2644 key
= add_key("user", "invocation_id", &u
->invocation_id
, sizeof(u
->invocation_id
), KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING
);
2646 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to add invocation ID to keyring, ignoring: %m");
2648 if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM
, key
,
2649 KEY_POS_VIEW
|KEY_POS_READ
|KEY_POS_SEARCH
|
2650 KEY_USR_VIEW
|KEY_USR_READ
|KEY_USR_SEARCH
, 0, 0) < 0)
2651 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to restrict invocation ID permission: %m");
2656 /* Revert back uid & gid for the the last time, and exit */
2657 /* no extra logging, as only the first already reported error matters */
2658 if (getuid() != saved_uid
)
2659 (void) setreuid(saved_uid
, -1);
2661 if (getgid() != saved_gid
)
2662 (void) setregid(saved_gid
, -1);
2667 static void append_socket_pair(int *array
, size_t *n
, const int pair
[static 2]) {
2675 array
[(*n
)++] = pair
[0];
2677 array
[(*n
)++] = pair
[1];
2680 static int close_remaining_fds(
2681 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2682 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
2683 const DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
2687 int *fds
, size_t n_fds
) {
2689 size_t n_dont_close
= 0;
2690 int dont_close
[n_fds
+ 12];
2694 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
2695 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdin_fd
;
2696 if (params
->stdout_fd
>= 0)
2697 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdout_fd
;
2698 if (params
->stderr_fd
>= 0)
2699 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stderr_fd
;
2702 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = socket_fd
;
2704 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = exec_fd
;
2706 memcpy(dont_close
+ n_dont_close
, fds
, sizeof(int) * n_fds
);
2707 n_dont_close
+= n_fds
;
2711 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, runtime
->netns_storage_socket
);
2715 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, dcreds
->user
->storage_socket
);
2717 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, dcreds
->group
->storage_socket
);
2720 if (user_lookup_fd
>= 0)
2721 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = user_lookup_fd
;
2723 return close_all_fds(dont_close
, n_dont_close
);
2726 static int send_user_lookup(
2734 /* Send the resolved UID/GID to PID 1 after we learnt it. We send a single datagram, containing the UID/GID
2735 * data as well as the unit name. Note that we suppress sending this if no user/group to resolve was
2738 if (user_lookup_fd
< 0)
2741 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
) && !gid_is_valid(gid
))
2744 if (writev(user_lookup_fd
,
2746 IOVEC_INIT(&uid
, sizeof(uid
)),
2747 IOVEC_INIT(&gid
, sizeof(gid
)),
2748 IOVEC_INIT_STRING(unit
->id
) }, 3) < 0)
2754 static int acquire_home(const ExecContext
*c
, uid_t uid
, const char** home
, char **buf
) {
2761 /* If WorkingDirectory=~ is set, try to acquire a usable home directory. */
2766 if (!c
->working_directory_home
)
2769 r
= get_home_dir(buf
);
2777 static int compile_suggested_paths(const ExecContext
*c
, const ExecParameters
*p
, char ***ret
) {
2778 _cleanup_strv_free_
char ** list
= NULL
;
2779 ExecDirectoryType t
;
2786 assert(c
->dynamic_user
);
2788 /* Compile a list of paths that it might make sense to read the owning UID from to use as initial candidate for
2789 * dynamic UID allocation, in order to save us from doing costly recursive chown()s of the special
2792 for (t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
2795 if (t
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
)
2801 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->directories
[t
].paths
) {
2804 if (t
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
)
2805 e
= strjoin(p
->prefix
[t
], "/", *i
);
2807 e
= strjoin(p
->prefix
[t
], "/private/", *i
);
2811 r
= strv_consume(&list
, e
);
2817 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(list
);
2822 static char *exec_command_line(char **argv
);
2824 static int exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(const ExecParameters
*params
, char **ret
) {
2825 bool using_subcgroup
;
2831 if (!params
->cgroup_path
)
2834 /* If we are called for a unit where cgroup delegation is on, and the payload created its own populated
2835 * subcgroup (which we expect it to do, after all it asked for delegation), then we cannot place the control
2836 * processes started after the main unit's process in the unit's main cgroup because it is now an inner one,
2837 * and inner cgroups may not contain processes. Hence, if delegation is on, and this is a control process,
2838 * let's use ".control" as subcgroup instead. Note that we do so only for ExecStartPost=, ExecReload=,
2839 * ExecStop=, ExecStopPost=, i.e. for the commands where the main process is already forked. For ExecStartPre=
2840 * this is not necessary, the cgroup is still empty. We distinguish these cases with the EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP
2841 * flag, which is only passed for the former statements, not for the latter. */
2843 using_subcgroup
= FLAGS_SET(params
->flags
, EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP
|EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE
|EXEC_IS_CONTROL
);
2844 if (using_subcgroup
)
2845 p
= strjoin(params
->cgroup_path
, "/.control");
2847 p
= strdup(params
->cgroup_path
);
2852 return using_subcgroup
;
2855 static int exec_child(
2857 const ExecCommand
*command
,
2858 const ExecContext
*context
,
2859 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2860 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
2861 DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
2865 size_t n_socket_fds
,
2866 size_t n_storage_fds
,
2871 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
, **pass_env
= NULL
, **accum_env
= NULL
, **replaced_argv
= NULL
;
2872 int *fds_with_exec_fd
, n_fds_with_exec_fd
, r
, ngids
= 0, exec_fd
= -1;
2873 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*supplementary_gids
= NULL
;
2874 const char *username
= NULL
, *groupname
= NULL
;
2875 _cleanup_free_
char *home_buffer
= NULL
;
2876 const char *home
= NULL
, *shell
= NULL
;
2877 char **final_argv
= NULL
;
2878 dev_t journal_stream_dev
= 0;
2879 ino_t journal_stream_ino
= 0;
2880 bool needs_sandboxing
, /* Do we need to set up full sandboxing? (i.e. all namespacing, all MAC stuff, caps, yadda yadda */
2881 needs_setuid
, /* Do we need to do the actual setresuid()/setresgid() calls? */
2882 needs_mount_namespace
, /* Do we need to set up a mount namespace for this kernel? */
2883 needs_ambient_hack
; /* Do we need to apply the ambient capabilities hack? */
2885 _cleanup_free_
char *mac_selinux_context_net
= NULL
;
2886 bool use_selinux
= false;
2889 bool use_smack
= false;
2892 bool use_apparmor
= false;
2894 uid_t uid
= UID_INVALID
;
2895 gid_t gid
= GID_INVALID
;
2897 ExecDirectoryType dt
;
2904 assert(exit_status
);
2906 rename_process_from_path(command
->path
);
2908 /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the
2909 * only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main daemon. All
2910 * others we leave untouched because we set them to
2911 * SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, both of which
2912 * will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */
2913 (void) default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER
,
2914 SIGNALS_IGNORE
, -1);
2916 if (context
->ignore_sigpipe
)
2917 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
2919 r
= reset_signal_mask();
2921 *exit_status
= EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK
;
2922 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set process signal mask: %m");
2925 if (params
->idle_pipe
)
2926 do_idle_pipe_dance(params
->idle_pipe
);
2928 /* Close fds we don't need very early to make sure we don't block init reexecution because it cannot bind its
2929 * sockets. Among the fds we close are the logging fds, and we want to keep them closed, so that we don't have
2930 * any fds open we don't really want open during the transition. In order to make logging work, we switch the
2931 * log subsystem into open_when_needed mode, so that it reopens the logs on every single log call. */
2934 log_set_open_when_needed(true);
2936 /* In case anything used libc syslog(), close this here, too */
2939 n_fds
= n_socket_fds
+ n_storage_fds
;
2940 r
= close_remaining_fds(params
, runtime
, dcreds
, user_lookup_fd
, socket_fd
, params
->exec_fd
, fds
, n_fds
);
2942 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
2943 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to close unwanted file descriptors: %m");
2946 if (!context
->same_pgrp
)
2948 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSID
;
2949 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to create new process session: %m");
2952 exec_context_tty_reset(context
, params
);
2954 if (unit_shall_confirm_spawn(unit
)) {
2955 const char *vc
= params
->confirm_spawn
;
2956 _cleanup_free_
char *cmdline
= NULL
;
2958 cmdline
= exec_command_line(command
->argv
);
2960 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
2964 r
= ask_for_confirmation(vc
, unit
, cmdline
);
2965 if (r
!= CONFIRM_EXECUTE
) {
2966 if (r
== CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
) {
2967 *exit_status
= EXIT_SUCCESS
;
2970 *exit_status
= EXIT_CONFIRM
;
2971 log_unit_error(unit
, "Execution cancelled by the user");
2976 /* We are about to invoke NSS and PAM modules. Let's tell them what we are doing here, maybe they care. This is
2977 * used by nss-resolve to disable itself when we are about to start systemd-resolved, to avoid deadlocks. Note
2978 * that these env vars do not survive the execve(), which means they really only apply to the PAM and NSS
2979 * invocations themselves. Also note that while we'll only invoke NSS modules involved in user management they
2980 * might internally call into other NSS modules that are involved in hostname resolution, we never know. */
2981 if (setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_UNIT", unit
->id
, true) != 0 ||
2982 setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_SCOPE", MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(unit
->manager
) ? "system" : "user", true) != 0) {
2983 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
2984 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to update environment: %m");
2987 if (context
->dynamic_user
&& dcreds
) {
2988 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **suggested_paths
= NULL
;
2990 /* On top of that, make sure we bypass our own NSS module nss-systemd comprehensively for any NSS
2991 * checks, if DynamicUser=1 is used, as we shouldn't create a feedback loop with ourselves here.*/
2992 if (putenv((char*) "SYSTEMD_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS=1") != 0) {
2993 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
2994 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to update environment: %m");
2997 r
= compile_suggested_paths(context
, params
, &suggested_paths
);
2999 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3003 r
= dynamic_creds_realize(dcreds
, suggested_paths
, &uid
, &gid
);
3005 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3007 log_unit_error(unit
, "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: User or group with specified name already exists.");
3010 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: %m");
3013 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
3014 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3015 log_unit_error(unit
, "UID validation failed for \""UID_FMT
"\"", uid
);
3019 if (!gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
3020 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3021 log_unit_error(unit
, "GID validation failed for \""GID_FMT
"\"", gid
);
3026 username
= dcreds
->user
->name
;
3029 r
= get_fixed_user(context
, &username
, &uid
, &gid
, &home
, &shell
);
3031 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3032 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine user credentials: %m");
3035 r
= get_fixed_group(context
, &groupname
, &gid
);
3037 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
3038 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine group credentials: %m");
3042 /* Initialize user supplementary groups and get SupplementaryGroups= ones */
3043 r
= get_supplementary_groups(context
, username
, groupname
, gid
,
3044 &supplementary_gids
, &ngids
);
3046 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
3047 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine supplementary groups: %m");
3050 r
= send_user_lookup(unit
, user_lookup_fd
, uid
, gid
);
3052 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3053 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to send user credentials to PID1: %m");
3056 user_lookup_fd
= safe_close(user_lookup_fd
);
3058 r
= acquire_home(context
, uid
, &home
, &home_buffer
);
3060 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
3061 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine $HOME for user: %m");
3064 /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we
3065 * must sure to drop O_NONBLOCK */
3067 (void) fd_nonblock(socket_fd
, false);
3069 /* Journald will try to look-up our cgroup in order to populate _SYSTEMD_CGROUP and _SYSTEMD_UNIT fields.
3070 * Hence we need to migrate to the target cgroup from init.scope before connecting to journald */
3071 if (params
->cgroup_path
) {
3072 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
;
3074 r
= exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params
, &p
);
3076 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
3077 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to acquire cgroup path: %m");
3080 r
= cg_attach_everywhere(params
->cgroup_supported
, p
, 0, NULL
, NULL
);
3082 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
3083 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to attach to cgroup %s: %m", p
);
3087 if (context
->network_namespace_path
&& runtime
&& runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
3088 r
= open_netns_path(runtime
->netns_storage_socket
, context
->network_namespace_path
);
3090 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
3091 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to open network namespace path %s: %m", context
->network_namespace_path
);
3095 r
= setup_input(context
, params
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
);
3097 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
3098 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard input: %m");
3101 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDOUT_FILENO
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
, &journal_stream_dev
, &journal_stream_ino
);
3103 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDOUT
;
3104 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard output: %m");
3107 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDERR_FILENO
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
, &journal_stream_dev
, &journal_stream_ino
);
3109 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDERR
;
3110 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard error output: %m");
3113 if (context
->oom_score_adjust_set
) {
3114 /* When we can't make this change due to EPERM, then let's silently skip over it. User namespaces
3115 * prohibit write access to this file, and we shouldn't trip up over that. */
3116 r
= set_oom_score_adjust(context
->oom_score_adjust
);
3117 if (IN_SET(r
, -EPERM
, -EACCES
))
3118 log_unit_debug_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust OOM setting, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
3120 *exit_status
= EXIT_OOM_ADJUST
;
3121 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust OOM setting: %m");
3125 if (context
->nice_set
)
3126 if (setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS
, 0, context
->nice
) < 0) {
3127 *exit_status
= EXIT_NICE
;
3128 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up process scheduling priority (nice level): %m");
3131 if (context
->cpu_sched_set
) {
3132 struct sched_param param
= {
3133 .sched_priority
= context
->cpu_sched_priority
,
3136 r
= sched_setscheduler(0,
3137 context
->cpu_sched_policy
|
3138 (context
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
?
3139 SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK
: 0),
3142 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSCHEDULER
;
3143 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up CPU scheduling: %m");
3147 if (context
->cpuset
)
3148 if (sched_setaffinity(0, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(context
->cpuset_ncpus
), context
->cpuset
) < 0) {
3149 *exit_status
= EXIT_CPUAFFINITY
;
3150 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up CPU affinity: %m");
3153 if (context
->ioprio_set
)
3154 if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS
, 0, context
->ioprio
) < 0) {
3155 *exit_status
= EXIT_IOPRIO
;
3156 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up IO scheduling priority: %m");
3159 if (context
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
3160 if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK
, context
->timer_slack_nsec
) < 0) {
3161 *exit_status
= EXIT_TIMERSLACK
;
3162 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up timer slack: %m");
3165 if (context
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
) {
3166 r
= safe_personality(context
->personality
);
3168 *exit_status
= EXIT_PERSONALITY
;
3169 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up execution domain (personality): %m");
3173 if (context
->utmp_id
)
3174 utmp_put_init_process(context
->utmp_id
, getpid_cached(), getsid(0),
3176 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_INIT
? INIT_PROCESS
:
3177 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
? LOGIN_PROCESS
:
3181 if (uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
3182 r
= chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO
, uid
);
3184 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
3185 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change ownership of terminal: %m");
3189 /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup to the user of the new process. On cgroup v1
3190 * this is only about systemd's own hierarchy, i.e. not the controller hierarchies, simply because that's not
3191 * safe. On cgroup v2 there's only one hierarchy anyway, and delegation is safe there, hence in that case only
3192 * touch a single hierarchy too. */
3193 if (params
->cgroup_path
&& context
->user
&& (params
->flags
& EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE
)) {
3194 r
= cg_set_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, params
->cgroup_path
, uid
, gid
);
3196 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
3197 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust control group access: %m");
3201 for (dt
= 0; dt
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; dt
++) {
3202 r
= setup_exec_directory(context
, params
, uid
, gid
, dt
, exit_status
);
3204 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up special execution directory in %s: %m", params
->prefix
[dt
]);
3207 r
= build_environment(
3219 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3223 r
= build_pass_environment(context
, &pass_env
);
3225 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3229 accum_env
= strv_env_merge(5,
3230 params
->environment
,
3233 context
->environment
,
3237 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3240 accum_env
= strv_env_clean(accum_env
);
3242 (void) umask(context
->umask
);
3244 r
= setup_keyring(unit
, context
, params
, uid
, gid
);
3246 *exit_status
= EXIT_KEYRING
;
3247 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up kernel keyring: %m");
3250 /* We need sandboxing if the caller asked us to apply it and the command isn't explicitly excepted from it */
3251 needs_sandboxing
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
);
3253 /* We need the ambient capability hack, if the caller asked us to apply it and the command is marked for it, and the kernel doesn't actually support ambient caps */
3254 needs_ambient_hack
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && (command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_AMBIENT_MAGIC
) && !ambient_capabilities_supported();
3256 /* We need setresuid() if the caller asked us to apply sandboxing and the command isn't explicitly excepted from either whole sandboxing or just setresuid() itself, and the ambient hack is not desired */
3257 if (needs_ambient_hack
)
3258 needs_setuid
= false;
3260 needs_setuid
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command
->flags
& (EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
|EXEC_COMMAND_NO_SETUID
));
3262 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3263 /* MAC enablement checks need to be done before a new mount ns is created, as they rely on /sys being
3264 * present. The actual MAC context application will happen later, as late as possible, to avoid
3265 * impacting our own code paths. */
3268 use_selinux
= mac_selinux_use();
3271 use_smack
= mac_smack_use();
3274 use_apparmor
= mac_apparmor_use();
3278 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3281 /* Let's set the resource limits before we call into PAM, so that pam_limits wins over what
3282 * is set here. (See below.) */
3284 r
= setrlimit_closest_all((const struct rlimit
* const *) context
->rlimit
, &which_failed
);
3286 *exit_status
= EXIT_LIMITS
;
3287 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust resource limit RLIMIT_%s: %m", rlimit_to_string(which_failed
));
3293 /* Let's call into PAM after we set up our own idea of resource limits to that pam_limits
3294 * wins here. (See above.) */
3296 if (context
->pam_name
&& username
) {
3297 r
= setup_pam(context
->pam_name
, username
, uid
, gid
, context
->tty_path
, &accum_env
, fds
, n_fds
);
3299 *exit_status
= EXIT_PAM
;
3300 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up PAM session: %m");
3305 if ((context
->private_network
|| context
->network_namespace_path
) && runtime
&& runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
3307 if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_NET
)) {
3308 r
= setup_netns(runtime
->netns_storage_socket
);
3310 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
3311 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up network namespacing: %m");
3313 } else if (context
->network_namespace_path
) {
3314 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
3315 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP
), "NetworkNamespacePath= is not supported, refusing.");
3317 log_unit_warning(unit
, "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support network namespaces, ignoring.");
3320 needs_mount_namespace
= exec_needs_mount_namespace(context
, params
, runtime
);
3321 if (needs_mount_namespace
) {
3322 r
= apply_mount_namespace(unit
, command
, context
, params
, runtime
);
3324 *exit_status
= EXIT_NAMESPACE
;
3325 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up mount namespacing: %m");
3329 if (context
->protect_hostname
) {
3330 if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_UTS
)) {
3331 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUTS
) < 0) {
3332 *exit_status
= EXIT_NAMESPACE
;
3333 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up UTS namespacing: %m");
3336 log_unit_warning(unit
, "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support UTS namespaces, ignoring namespace setup.");
3338 r
= seccomp_protect_hostname();
3340 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3341 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply hostname restrictions: %m");
3346 /* Drop groups as early as possbile */
3348 r
= enforce_groups(gid
, supplementary_gids
, ngids
);
3350 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
3351 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Changing group credentials failed: %m");
3355 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3357 if (use_selinux
&& params
->selinux_context_net
&& socket_fd
>= 0) {
3358 r
= mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd
, command
->path
, context
->selinux_context
, &mac_selinux_context_net
);
3360 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
3361 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine SELinux context: %m");
3366 if (context
->private_users
) {
3367 r
= setup_private_users(uid
, gid
);
3369 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3370 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up user namespacing: %m");
3375 /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that we are
3376 * more aggressive this time since socket_fd and the netns fds we don't need anymore. We do keep the exec_fd
3377 * however if we have it as we want to keep it open until the final execve(). */
3379 if (params
->exec_fd
>= 0) {
3380 exec_fd
= params
->exec_fd
;
3382 if (exec_fd
< 3 + (int) n_fds
) {
3385 /* Let's move the exec fd far up, so that it's outside of the fd range we want to pass to the
3386 * process we are about to execute. */
3388 moved_fd
= fcntl(exec_fd
, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC
, 3 + (int) n_fds
);
3390 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
3391 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Couldn't move exec fd up: %m");
3394 safe_close(exec_fd
);
3397 /* This fd should be FD_CLOEXEC already, but let's make sure. */
3398 r
= fd_cloexec(exec_fd
, true);
3400 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
3401 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to make exec fd FD_CLOEXEC: %m");
3405 fds_with_exec_fd
= newa(int, n_fds
+ 1);
3406 memcpy_safe(fds_with_exec_fd
, fds
, n_fds
* sizeof(int));
3407 fds_with_exec_fd
[n_fds
] = exec_fd
;
3408 n_fds_with_exec_fd
= n_fds
+ 1;
3410 fds_with_exec_fd
= fds
;
3411 n_fds_with_exec_fd
= n_fds
;
3414 r
= close_all_fds(fds_with_exec_fd
, n_fds_with_exec_fd
);
3416 r
= shift_fds(fds
, n_fds
);
3418 r
= flags_fds(fds
, n_socket_fds
, n_storage_fds
, context
->non_blocking
);
3420 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
3421 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust passed file descriptors: %m");
3424 /* At this point, the fds we want to pass to the program are all ready and set up, with O_CLOEXEC turned off
3425 * and at the right fd numbers. The are no other fds open, with one exception: the exec_fd if it is defined,
3426 * and it has O_CLOEXEC set, after all we want it to be closed by the execve(), so that our parent knows we
3429 secure_bits
= context
->secure_bits
;
3431 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3434 /* Set the RTPRIO resource limit to 0, but only if nothing else was explicitly
3435 * requested. (Note this is placed after the general resource limit initialization, see
3436 * above, in order to take precedence.) */
3437 if (context
->restrict_realtime
&& !context
->rlimit
[RLIMIT_RTPRIO
]) {
3438 if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_RTPRIO
, &RLIMIT_MAKE_CONST(0)) < 0) {
3439 *exit_status
= EXIT_LIMITS
;
3440 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to adjust RLIMIT_RTPRIO resource limit: %m");
3445 /* LSM Smack needs the capability CAP_MAC_ADMIN to change the current execution security context of the
3446 * process. This is the latest place before dropping capabilities. Other MAC context are set later. */
3448 r
= setup_smack(context
, command
);
3450 *exit_status
= EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL
;
3451 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set SMACK process label: %m");
3456 bset
= context
->capability_bounding_set
;
3457 /* If the ambient caps hack is enabled (which means the kernel can't do them, and the user asked for
3458 * our magic fallback), then let's add some extra caps, so that the service can drop privs of its own,
3459 * instead of us doing that */
3460 if (needs_ambient_hack
)
3461 bset
|= (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETPCAP
) |
3462 (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETUID
) |
3463 (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETGID
);
3465 if (!cap_test_all(bset
)) {
3466 r
= capability_bounding_set_drop(bset
, false);
3468 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
3469 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to drop capabilities: %m");
3473 /* This is done before enforce_user, but ambient set
3474 * does not survive over setresuid() if keep_caps is not set. */
3475 if (!needs_ambient_hack
&&
3476 context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
3477 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, true);
3479 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
3480 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (before UID change): %m");
3486 if (uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
3487 r
= enforce_user(context
, uid
);
3489 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3490 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change UID to " UID_FMT
": %m", uid
);
3493 if (!needs_ambient_hack
&&
3494 context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
3496 /* Fix the ambient capabilities after user change. */
3497 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, false);
3499 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
3500 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (after UID change): %m");
3503 /* If we were asked to change user and ambient capabilities
3504 * were requested, we had to add keep-caps to the securebits
3505 * so that we would maintain the inherited capability set
3506 * through the setresuid(). Make sure that the bit is added
3507 * also to the context secure_bits so that we don't try to
3508 * drop the bit away next. */
3510 secure_bits
|= 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
;
3515 /* Apply working directory here, because the working directory might be on NFS and only the user running
3516 * this service might have the correct privilege to change to the working directory */
3517 r
= apply_working_directory(context
, params
, home
, needs_mount_namespace
, exit_status
);
3519 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Changing to the requested working directory failed: %m");
3521 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3522 /* Apply other MAC contexts late, but before seccomp syscall filtering, as those should really be last to
3523 * influence our own codepaths as little as possible. Moreover, applying MAC contexts usually requires
3524 * syscalls that are subject to seccomp filtering, hence should probably be applied before the syscalls
3525 * are restricted. */
3529 char *exec_context
= mac_selinux_context_net
?: context
->selinux_context
;
3532 r
= setexeccon(exec_context
);
3534 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
3535 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change SELinux context to %s: %m", exec_context
);
3542 if (use_apparmor
&& context
->apparmor_profile
) {
3543 r
= aa_change_onexec(context
->apparmor_profile
);
3544 if (r
< 0 && !context
->apparmor_profile_ignore
) {
3545 *exit_status
= EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE
;
3546 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to prepare AppArmor profile change to %s: %m", context
->apparmor_profile
);
3551 /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress potential EPERMs
3552 * we'll try not to call PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. */
3553 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
) != secure_bits
)
3554 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, secure_bits
) < 0) {
3555 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECUREBITS
;
3556 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set process secure bits: %m");
3559 if (context_has_no_new_privileges(context
))
3560 if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
3561 *exit_status
= EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES
;
3562 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to disable new privileges: %m");
3566 r
= apply_address_families(unit
, context
);
3568 *exit_status
= EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES
;
3569 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to restrict address families: %m");
3572 r
= apply_memory_deny_write_execute(unit
, context
);
3574 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3575 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to disable writing to executable memory: %m");
3578 r
= apply_restrict_realtime(unit
, context
);
3580 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3581 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply realtime restrictions: %m");
3584 r
= apply_restrict_suid_sgid(unit
, context
);
3586 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3587 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply SUID/SGID restrictions: %m");
3590 r
= apply_restrict_namespaces(unit
, context
);
3592 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3593 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply namespace restrictions: %m");
3596 r
= apply_protect_sysctl(unit
, context
);
3598 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3599 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply sysctl restrictions: %m");
3602 r
= apply_protect_kernel_modules(unit
, context
);
3604 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3605 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply module loading restrictions: %m");
3608 r
= apply_private_devices(unit
, context
);
3610 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3611 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up private devices: %m");
3614 r
= apply_syscall_archs(unit
, context
);
3616 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3617 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply syscall architecture restrictions: %m");
3620 r
= apply_lock_personality(unit
, context
);
3622 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3623 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to lock personalities: %m");
3626 /* This really should remain the last step before the execve(), to make sure our own code is unaffected
3627 * by the filter as little as possible. */
3628 r
= apply_syscall_filter(unit
, context
, needs_ambient_hack
);
3630 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
3631 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply system call filters: %m");
3636 if (!strv_isempty(context
->unset_environment
)) {
3639 ee
= strv_env_delete(accum_env
, 1, context
->unset_environment
);
3641 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3645 strv_free_and_replace(accum_env
, ee
);
3648 if (!FLAGS_SET(command
->flags
, EXEC_COMMAND_NO_ENV_EXPAND
)) {
3649 replaced_argv
= replace_env_argv(command
->argv
, accum_env
);
3650 if (!replaced_argv
) {
3651 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3654 final_argv
= replaced_argv
;
3656 final_argv
= command
->argv
;
3658 if (DEBUG_LOGGING
) {
3659 _cleanup_free_
char *line
;
3661 line
= exec_command_line(final_argv
);
3663 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
3664 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
,
3665 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Executing: %s", line
),
3667 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
));
3673 /* We have finished with all our initializations. Let's now let the manager know that. From this point
3674 * on, if the manager sees POLLHUP on the exec_fd, then execve() was successful. */
3676 if (write(exec_fd
, &hot
, sizeof(hot
)) < 0) {
3677 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
3678 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to enable exec_fd: %m");
3682 execve(command
->path
, final_argv
, accum_env
);
3688 /* The execve() failed. This means the exec_fd is still open. Which means we need to tell the manager
3689 * that POLLHUP on it no longer means execve() succeeded. */
3691 if (write(exec_fd
, &hot
, sizeof(hot
)) < 0) {
3692 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
3693 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to disable exec_fd: %m");
3697 if (r
== -ENOENT
&& (command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_IGNORE_FAILURE
)) {
3698 log_struct_errno(LOG_INFO
, r
,
3699 "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR
,
3701 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
),
3702 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Executable %s missing, skipping: %m",
3704 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
);
3708 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
3709 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to execute command: %m");
3712 static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit
*unit
, const ExecContext
*c
, char ***l
);
3713 static int exec_context_named_iofds(const ExecContext
*c
, const ExecParameters
*p
, int named_iofds
[3]);
3715 int exec_spawn(Unit
*unit
,
3716 ExecCommand
*command
,
3717 const ExecContext
*context
,
3718 const ExecParameters
*params
,
3719 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
3720 DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
3723 int socket_fd
, r
, named_iofds
[3] = { -1, -1, -1 }, *fds
= NULL
;
3724 _cleanup_free_
char *subcgroup_path
= NULL
;
3725 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **files_env
= NULL
;
3726 size_t n_storage_fds
= 0, n_socket_fds
= 0;
3727 _cleanup_free_
char *line
= NULL
;
3735 assert(params
->fds
|| (params
->n_socket_fds
+ params
->n_storage_fds
<= 0));
3737 if (context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
||
3738 context
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
||
3739 context
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
) {
3741 if (params
->n_socket_fds
> 1) {
3742 log_unit_error(unit
, "Got more than one socket.");
3746 if (params
->n_socket_fds
== 0) {
3747 log_unit_error(unit
, "Got no socket.");
3751 socket_fd
= params
->fds
[0];
3755 n_socket_fds
= params
->n_socket_fds
;
3756 n_storage_fds
= params
->n_storage_fds
;
3759 r
= exec_context_named_iofds(context
, params
, named_iofds
);
3761 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to load a named file descriptor: %m");
3763 r
= exec_context_load_environment(unit
, context
, &files_env
);
3765 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to load environment files: %m");
3767 line
= exec_command_line(command
->argv
);
3771 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
3772 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "About to execute: %s", line
),
3773 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
,
3775 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
));
3777 if (params
->cgroup_path
) {
3778 r
= exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params
, &subcgroup_path
);
3780 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to acquire subcgroup path: %m");
3781 if (r
> 0) { /* We are using a child cgroup */
3782 r
= cg_create(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, subcgroup_path
);
3784 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to create control group '%s': %m", subcgroup_path
);
3790 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to fork: %m");
3793 int exit_status
= EXIT_SUCCESS
;
3795 r
= exec_child(unit
,
3807 unit
->manager
->user_lookup_fds
[1],
3811 log_struct_errno(LOG_ERR
, r
,
3812 "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR
,
3814 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
),
3815 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Failed at step %s spawning %s: %m",
3816 exit_status_to_string(exit_status
, EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD
),
3818 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
);
3823 log_unit_debug(unit
, "Forked %s as "PID_FMT
, command
->path
, pid
);
3825 /* We add the new process to the cgroup both in the child (so that we can be sure that no user code is ever
3826 * executed outside of the cgroup) and in the parent (so that we can be sure that when we kill the cgroup the
3827 * process will be killed too). */
3829 (void) cg_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, subcgroup_path
, pid
);
3831 exec_status_start(&command
->exec_status
, pid
);
3837 void exec_context_init(ExecContext
*c
) {
3838 ExecDirectoryType i
;
3843 c
->ioprio
= IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE
, 0);
3844 c
->cpu_sched_policy
= SCHED_OTHER
;
3845 c
->syslog_priority
= LOG_DAEMON
|LOG_INFO
;
3846 c
->syslog_level_prefix
= true;
3847 c
->ignore_sigpipe
= true;
3848 c
->timer_slack_nsec
= NSEC_INFINITY
;
3849 c
->personality
= PERSONALITY_INVALID
;
3850 for (i
= 0; i
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; i
++)
3851 c
->directories
[i
].mode
= 0755;
3852 c
->capability_bounding_set
= CAP_ALL
;
3853 assert_cc(NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL
!= NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL
);
3854 c
->restrict_namespaces
= NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL
;
3855 c
->log_level_max
= -1;
3858 void exec_context_done(ExecContext
*c
) {
3859 ExecDirectoryType i
;
3864 c
->environment
= strv_free(c
->environment
);
3865 c
->environment_files
= strv_free(c
->environment_files
);
3866 c
->pass_environment
= strv_free(c
->pass_environment
);
3867 c
->unset_environment
= strv_free(c
->unset_environment
);
3869 rlimit_free_all(c
->rlimit
);
3871 for (l
= 0; l
< 3; l
++) {
3872 c
->stdio_fdname
[l
] = mfree(c
->stdio_fdname
[l
]);
3873 c
->stdio_file
[l
] = mfree(c
->stdio_file
[l
]);
3876 c
->working_directory
= mfree(c
->working_directory
);
3877 c
->root_directory
= mfree(c
->root_directory
);
3878 c
->root_image
= mfree(c
->root_image
);
3879 c
->tty_path
= mfree(c
->tty_path
);
3880 c
->syslog_identifier
= mfree(c
->syslog_identifier
);
3881 c
->user
= mfree(c
->user
);
3882 c
->group
= mfree(c
->group
);
3884 c
->supplementary_groups
= strv_free(c
->supplementary_groups
);
3886 c
->pam_name
= mfree(c
->pam_name
);
3888 c
->read_only_paths
= strv_free(c
->read_only_paths
);
3889 c
->read_write_paths
= strv_free(c
->read_write_paths
);
3890 c
->inaccessible_paths
= strv_free(c
->inaccessible_paths
);
3892 bind_mount_free_many(c
->bind_mounts
, c
->n_bind_mounts
);
3893 c
->bind_mounts
= NULL
;
3894 c
->n_bind_mounts
= 0;
3895 temporary_filesystem_free_many(c
->temporary_filesystems
, c
->n_temporary_filesystems
);
3896 c
->temporary_filesystems
= NULL
;
3897 c
->n_temporary_filesystems
= 0;
3899 c
->cpuset
= cpu_set_mfree(c
->cpuset
);
3901 c
->utmp_id
= mfree(c
->utmp_id
);
3902 c
->selinux_context
= mfree(c
->selinux_context
);
3903 c
->apparmor_profile
= mfree(c
->apparmor_profile
);
3904 c
->smack_process_label
= mfree(c
->smack_process_label
);
3906 c
->syscall_filter
= hashmap_free(c
->syscall_filter
);
3907 c
->syscall_archs
= set_free(c
->syscall_archs
);
3908 c
->address_families
= set_free(c
->address_families
);
3910 for (i
= 0; i
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; i
++)
3911 c
->directories
[i
].paths
= strv_free(c
->directories
[i
].paths
);
3913 c
->log_level_max
= -1;
3915 exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(c
);
3917 c
->log_rate_limit_interval_usec
= 0;
3918 c
->log_rate_limit_burst
= 0;
3920 c
->stdin_data
= mfree(c
->stdin_data
);
3921 c
->stdin_data_size
= 0;
3923 c
->network_namespace_path
= mfree(c
->network_namespace_path
);
3926 int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(const ExecContext
*c
, const char *runtime_prefix
) {
3931 if (!runtime_prefix
)
3934 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
].paths
) {
3935 _cleanup_free_
char *p
;
3937 p
= path_join(runtime_prefix
, *i
);
3941 /* We execute this synchronously, since we need to be sure this is gone when we start the
3943 (void) rm_rf(p
, REMOVE_ROOT
);
3949 static void exec_command_done(ExecCommand
*c
) {
3952 c
->path
= mfree(c
->path
);
3953 c
->argv
= strv_free(c
->argv
);
3956 void exec_command_done_array(ExecCommand
*c
, size_t n
) {
3959 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
3960 exec_command_done(c
+i
);
3963 ExecCommand
* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand
*c
) {
3967 LIST_REMOVE(command
, c
, i
);
3968 exec_command_done(i
);
3975 void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand
**c
, size_t n
) {
3978 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
3979 c
[i
] = exec_command_free_list(c
[i
]);
3982 void exec_command_reset_status_array(ExecCommand
*c
, size_t n
) {
3985 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
3986 exec_status_reset(&c
[i
].exec_status
);
3989 void exec_command_reset_status_list_array(ExecCommand
**c
, size_t n
) {
3992 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++) {
3995 LIST_FOREACH(command
, z
, c
[i
])
3996 exec_status_reset(&z
->exec_status
);
4000 typedef struct InvalidEnvInfo
{
4005 static void invalid_env(const char *p
, void *userdata
) {
4006 InvalidEnvInfo
*info
= userdata
;
4008 log_unit_error(info
->unit
, "Ignoring invalid environment assignment '%s': %s", p
, info
->path
);
4011 const char* exec_context_fdname(const ExecContext
*c
, int fd_index
) {
4017 if (c
->std_input
!= EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4020 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
] ?: "stdin";
4023 if (c
->std_output
!= EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4026 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
] ?: "stdout";
4029 if (c
->std_error
!= EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4032 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
] ?: "stderr";
4039 static int exec_context_named_iofds(const ExecContext
*c
, const ExecParameters
*p
, int named_iofds
[static 3]) {
4041 const char* stdio_fdname
[3];
4047 targets
= (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
) +
4048 (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
) +
4049 (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
);
4051 for (i
= 0; i
< 3; i
++)
4052 stdio_fdname
[i
] = exec_context_fdname(c
, i
);
4054 n_fds
= p
->n_storage_fds
+ p
->n_socket_fds
;
4056 for (i
= 0; i
< n_fds
&& targets
> 0; i
++)
4057 if (named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] < 0 &&
4058 c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
4059 stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
] &&
4060 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
])) {
4062 named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
4065 } else if (named_iofds
[STDOUT_FILENO
] < 0 &&
4066 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
4067 stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
] &&
4068 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
])) {
4070 named_iofds
[STDOUT_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
4073 } else if (named_iofds
[STDERR_FILENO
] < 0 &&
4074 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
4075 stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
] &&
4076 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
])) {
4078 named_iofds
[STDERR_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
4082 return targets
== 0 ? 0 : -ENOENT
;
4085 static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit
*unit
, const ExecContext
*c
, char ***l
) {
4086 char **i
, **r
= NULL
;
4091 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->environment_files
) {
4095 bool ignore
= false;
4097 _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t pglob
= {};
4106 if (!path_is_absolute(fn
)) {
4114 /* Filename supports globbing, take all matching files */
4115 k
= safe_glob(fn
, 0, &pglob
);
4124 /* When we don't match anything, -ENOENT should be returned */
4125 assert(pglob
.gl_pathc
> 0);
4127 for (n
= 0; n
< pglob
.gl_pathc
; n
++) {
4128 k
= load_env_file(NULL
, pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
], &p
);
4136 /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */
4138 InvalidEnvInfo info
= {
4140 .path
= pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
]
4143 p
= strv_env_clean_with_callback(p
, invalid_env
, &info
);
4151 m
= strv_env_merge(2, r
, p
);
4167 static bool tty_may_match_dev_console(const char *tty
) {
4168 _cleanup_free_
char *resolved
= NULL
;
4173 tty
= skip_dev_prefix(tty
);
4175 /* trivial identity? */
4176 if (streq(tty
, "console"))
4179 if (resolve_dev_console(&resolved
) < 0)
4180 return true; /* if we could not resolve, assume it may */
4182 /* "tty0" means the active VC, so it may be the same sometimes */
4183 return path_equal(resolved
, tty
) || (streq(resolved
, "tty0") && tty_is_vc(tty
));
4186 static bool exec_context_may_touch_tty(const ExecContext
*ec
) {
4189 return ec
->tty_reset
||
4191 ec
->tty_vt_disallocate
||
4192 is_terminal_input(ec
->std_input
) ||
4193 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_output
) ||
4194 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_error
);
4197 bool exec_context_may_touch_console(const ExecContext
*ec
) {
4199 return exec_context_may_touch_tty(ec
) &&
4200 tty_may_match_dev_console(exec_context_tty_path(ec
));
4203 static void strv_fprintf(FILE *f
, char **l
) {
4209 fprintf(f
, " %s", *g
);
4212 void exec_context_dump(const ExecContext
*c
, FILE* f
, const char *prefix
) {
4213 ExecDirectoryType dt
;
4221 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
4225 "%sWorkingDirectory: %s\n"
4226 "%sRootDirectory: %s\n"
4227 "%sNonBlocking: %s\n"
4228 "%sPrivateTmp: %s\n"
4229 "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n"
4230 "%sProtectKernelTunables: %s\n"
4231 "%sProtectKernelModules: %s\n"
4232 "%sProtectControlGroups: %s\n"
4233 "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n"
4234 "%sPrivateUsers: %s\n"
4235 "%sProtectHome: %s\n"
4236 "%sProtectSystem: %s\n"
4237 "%sMountAPIVFS: %s\n"
4238 "%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n"
4239 "%sMemoryDenyWriteExecute: %s\n"
4240 "%sRestrictRealtime: %s\n"
4241 "%sRestrictSUIDSGID: %s\n"
4242 "%sKeyringMode: %s\n"
4243 "%sProtectHostname: %s\n",
4245 prefix
, c
->working_directory
? c
->working_directory
: "/",
4246 prefix
, c
->root_directory
? c
->root_directory
: "/",
4247 prefix
, yes_no(c
->non_blocking
),
4248 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_tmp
),
4249 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_devices
),
4250 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_kernel_tunables
),
4251 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_kernel_modules
),
4252 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_control_groups
),
4253 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_network
),
4254 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_users
),
4255 prefix
, protect_home_to_string(c
->protect_home
),
4256 prefix
, protect_system_to_string(c
->protect_system
),
4257 prefix
, yes_no(c
->mount_apivfs
),
4258 prefix
, yes_no(c
->ignore_sigpipe
),
4259 prefix
, yes_no(c
->memory_deny_write_execute
),
4260 prefix
, yes_no(c
->restrict_realtime
),
4261 prefix
, yes_no(c
->restrict_suid_sgid
),
4262 prefix
, exec_keyring_mode_to_string(c
->keyring_mode
),
4263 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_hostname
));
4266 fprintf(f
, "%sRootImage: %s\n", prefix
, c
->root_image
);
4268 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment
)
4269 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
4271 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment_files
)
4272 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironmentFile: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
4274 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->pass_environment
)
4275 fprintf(f
, "%sPassEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
4277 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->unset_environment
)
4278 fprintf(f
, "%sUnsetEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
4280 fprintf(f
, "%sRuntimeDirectoryPreserve: %s\n", prefix
, exec_preserve_mode_to_string(c
->runtime_directory_preserve_mode
));
4282 for (dt
= 0; dt
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; dt
++) {
4283 fprintf(f
, "%s%sMode: %04o\n", prefix
, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt
), c
->directories
[dt
].mode
);
4285 STRV_FOREACH(d
, c
->directories
[dt
].paths
)
4286 fprintf(f
, "%s%s: %s\n", prefix
, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt
), *d
);
4294 if (c
->oom_score_adjust_set
)
4296 "%sOOMScoreAdjust: %i\n",
4297 prefix
, c
->oom_score_adjust
);
4299 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++)
4301 fprintf(f
, "%sLimit%s: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
4302 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_max
);
4303 fprintf(f
, "%sLimit%sSoft: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
4304 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_cur
);
4307 if (c
->ioprio_set
) {
4308 _cleanup_free_
char *class_str
= NULL
;
4310 r
= ioprio_class_to_string_alloc(IOPRIO_PRIO_CLASS(c
->ioprio
), &class_str
);
4312 fprintf(f
, "%sIOSchedulingClass: %s\n", prefix
, class_str
);
4314 fprintf(f
, "%sIOPriority: %lu\n", prefix
, IOPRIO_PRIO_DATA(c
->ioprio
));
4317 if (c
->cpu_sched_set
) {
4318 _cleanup_free_
char *policy_str
= NULL
;
4320 r
= sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c
->cpu_sched_policy
, &policy_str
);
4322 fprintf(f
, "%sCPUSchedulingPolicy: %s\n", prefix
, policy_str
);
4325 "%sCPUSchedulingPriority: %i\n"
4326 "%sCPUSchedulingResetOnFork: %s\n",
4327 prefix
, c
->cpu_sched_priority
,
4328 prefix
, yes_no(c
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
));
4332 fprintf(f
, "%sCPUAffinity:", prefix
);
4333 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->cpuset_ncpus
; i
++)
4334 if (CPU_ISSET_S(i
, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(c
->cpuset_ncpus
), c
->cpuset
))
4335 fprintf(f
, " %u", i
);
4339 if (c
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
4340 fprintf(f
, "%sTimerSlackNSec: "NSEC_FMT
"\n", prefix
, c
->timer_slack_nsec
);
4343 "%sStandardInput: %s\n"
4344 "%sStandardOutput: %s\n"
4345 "%sStandardError: %s\n",
4346 prefix
, exec_input_to_string(c
->std_input
),
4347 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_output
),
4348 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_error
));
4350 if (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4351 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardInputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
4352 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4353 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
4354 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4355 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
4357 if (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_FILE
)
4358 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardInputFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
4359 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
)
4360 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
4361 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
4362 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
4363 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
)
4364 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
4365 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
4366 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
4372 "%sTTYVHangup: %s\n"
4373 "%sTTYVTDisallocate: %s\n",
4374 prefix
, c
->tty_path
,
4375 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_reset
),
4376 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vhangup
),
4377 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vt_disallocate
));
4379 if (IN_SET(c
->std_output
,
4382 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
,
4383 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
,
4384 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
4385 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
) ||
4386 IN_SET(c
->std_error
,
4389 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
,
4390 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
,
4391 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
4392 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
)) {
4394 _cleanup_free_
char *fac_str
= NULL
, *lvl_str
= NULL
;
4396 r
= log_facility_unshifted_to_string_alloc(c
->syslog_priority
>> 3, &fac_str
);
4398 fprintf(f
, "%sSyslogFacility: %s\n", prefix
, fac_str
);
4400 r
= log_level_to_string_alloc(LOG_PRI(c
->syslog_priority
), &lvl_str
);
4402 fprintf(f
, "%sSyslogLevel: %s\n", prefix
, lvl_str
);
4405 if (c
->log_level_max
>= 0) {
4406 _cleanup_free_
char *t
= NULL
;
4408 (void) log_level_to_string_alloc(c
->log_level_max
, &t
);
4410 fprintf(f
, "%sLogLevelMax: %s\n", prefix
, strna(t
));
4413 if (c
->log_rate_limit_interval_usec
> 0) {
4414 char buf_timespan
[FORMAT_TIMESPAN_MAX
];
4417 "%sLogRateLimitIntervalSec: %s\n",
4418 prefix
, format_timespan(buf_timespan
, sizeof(buf_timespan
), c
->log_rate_limit_interval_usec
, USEC_PER_SEC
));
4421 if (c
->log_rate_limit_burst
> 0)
4422 fprintf(f
, "%sLogRateLimitBurst: %u\n", prefix
, c
->log_rate_limit_burst
);
4424 if (c
->n_log_extra_fields
> 0) {
4427 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->n_log_extra_fields
; j
++) {
4428 fprintf(f
, "%sLogExtraFields: ", prefix
);
4429 fwrite(c
->log_extra_fields
[j
].iov_base
,
4430 1, c
->log_extra_fields
[j
].iov_len
,
4436 if (c
->secure_bits
) {
4437 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
4439 r
= secure_bits_to_string_alloc(c
->secure_bits
, &str
);
4441 fprintf(f
, "%sSecure Bits: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
4444 if (c
->capability_bounding_set
!= CAP_ALL
) {
4445 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
4447 r
= capability_set_to_string_alloc(c
->capability_bounding_set
, &str
);
4449 fprintf(f
, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
4452 if (c
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
4453 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
4455 r
= capability_set_to_string_alloc(c
->capability_ambient_set
, &str
);
4457 fprintf(f
, "%sAmbientCapabilities: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
4461 fprintf(f
, "%sUser: %s\n", prefix
, c
->user
);
4463 fprintf(f
, "%sGroup: %s\n", prefix
, c
->group
);
4465 fprintf(f
, "%sDynamicUser: %s\n", prefix
, yes_no(c
->dynamic_user
));
4467 if (!strv_isempty(c
->supplementary_groups
)) {
4468 fprintf(f
, "%sSupplementaryGroups:", prefix
);
4469 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->supplementary_groups
);
4474 fprintf(f
, "%sPAMName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->pam_name
);
4476 if (!strv_isempty(c
->read_write_paths
)) {
4477 fprintf(f
, "%sReadWritePaths:", prefix
);
4478 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_write_paths
);
4482 if (!strv_isempty(c
->read_only_paths
)) {
4483 fprintf(f
, "%sReadOnlyPaths:", prefix
);
4484 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_only_paths
);
4488 if (!strv_isempty(c
->inaccessible_paths
)) {
4489 fprintf(f
, "%sInaccessiblePaths:", prefix
);
4490 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->inaccessible_paths
);
4494 if (c
->n_bind_mounts
> 0)
4495 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->n_bind_mounts
; i
++)
4496 fprintf(f
, "%s%s: %s%s:%s:%s\n", prefix
,
4497 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].read_only
? "BindReadOnlyPaths" : "BindPaths",
4498 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].ignore_enoent
? "-": "",
4499 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].source
,
4500 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].destination
,
4501 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].recursive
? "rbind" : "norbind");
4503 if (c
->n_temporary_filesystems
> 0)
4504 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->n_temporary_filesystems
; i
++) {
4505 TemporaryFileSystem
*t
= c
->temporary_filesystems
+ i
;
4507 fprintf(f
, "%sTemporaryFileSystem: %s%s%s\n", prefix
,
4509 isempty(t
->options
) ? "" : ":",
4510 strempty(t
->options
));
4515 "%sUtmpIdentifier: %s\n",
4516 prefix
, c
->utmp_id
);
4518 if (c
->selinux_context
)
4520 "%sSELinuxContext: %s%s\n",
4521 prefix
, c
->selinux_context_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->selinux_context
);
4523 if (c
->apparmor_profile
)
4525 "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n",
4526 prefix
, c
->apparmor_profile_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->apparmor_profile
);
4528 if (c
->smack_process_label
)
4530 "%sSmackProcessLabel: %s%s\n",
4531 prefix
, c
->smack_process_label_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->smack_process_label
);
4533 if (c
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
)
4535 "%sPersonality: %s\n",
4536 prefix
, strna(personality_to_string(c
->personality
)));
4539 "%sLockPersonality: %s\n",
4540 prefix
, yes_no(c
->lock_personality
));
4542 if (c
->syscall_filter
) {
4550 "%sSystemCallFilter: ",
4553 if (!c
->syscall_whitelist
)
4557 HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(val
, id
, c
->syscall_filter
, j
) {
4558 _cleanup_free_
char *name
= NULL
;
4559 const char *errno_name
= NULL
;
4560 int num
= PTR_TO_INT(val
);
4567 name
= seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE
, PTR_TO_INT(id
) - 1);
4568 fputs(strna(name
), f
);
4571 errno_name
= errno_to_name(num
);
4573 fprintf(f
, ":%s", errno_name
);
4575 fprintf(f
, ":%d", num
);
4583 if (c
->syscall_archs
) {
4590 "%sSystemCallArchitectures:",
4594 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_archs
, j
)
4595 fprintf(f
, " %s", strna(seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id
) - 1)));
4600 if (exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
)) {
4601 _cleanup_free_
char *s
= NULL
;
4603 r
= namespace_flags_to_string(c
->restrict_namespaces
, &s
);
4605 fprintf(f
, "%sRestrictNamespaces: %s\n",
4609 if (c
->network_namespace_path
)
4611 "%sNetworkNamespacePath: %s\n",
4612 prefix
, c
->network_namespace_path
);
4614 if (c
->syscall_errno
> 0) {
4615 const char *errno_name
;
4617 fprintf(f
, "%sSystemCallErrorNumber: ", prefix
);
4619 errno_name
= errno_to_name(c
->syscall_errno
);
4621 fprintf(f
, "%s\n", errno_name
);
4623 fprintf(f
, "%d\n", c
->syscall_errno
);
4627 bool exec_context_maintains_privileges(const ExecContext
*c
) {
4630 /* Returns true if the process forked off would run under
4631 * an unchanged UID or as root. */
4636 if (streq(c
->user
, "root") || streq(c
->user
, "0"))
4642 int exec_context_get_effective_ioprio(const ExecContext
*c
) {
4650 p
= ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS
, 0);
4652 return IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE
, 4);
4657 void exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(ExecContext
*c
) {
4662 for (l
= 0; l
< c
->n_log_extra_fields
; l
++)
4663 free(c
->log_extra_fields
[l
].iov_base
);
4664 c
->log_extra_fields
= mfree(c
->log_extra_fields
);
4665 c
->n_log_extra_fields
= 0;
4668 void exec_context_revert_tty(ExecContext
*c
) {
4673 /* First, reset the TTY (possibly kicking everybody else from the TTY) */
4674 exec_context_tty_reset(c
, NULL
);
4676 /* And then undo what chown_terminal() did earlier. Note that we only do this if we have a path
4677 * configured. If the TTY was passed to us as file descriptor we assume the TTY is opened and managed
4678 * by whoever passed it to us and thus knows better when and how to chmod()/chown() it back. */
4680 if (exec_context_may_touch_tty(c
)) {
4683 path
= exec_context_tty_path(c
);
4685 r
= chmod_and_chown(path
, TTY_MODE
, 0, TTY_GID
);
4686 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -ENOENT
)
4687 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to reset TTY ownership/access mode of %s, ignoring: %m", path
);
4692 void exec_status_start(ExecStatus
*s
, pid_t pid
) {
4699 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->start_timestamp
);
4702 void exec_status_exit(ExecStatus
*s
, const ExecContext
*context
, pid_t pid
, int code
, int status
) {
4705 if (s
->pid
!= pid
) {
4711 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->exit_timestamp
);
4716 if (context
&& context
->utmp_id
)
4717 (void) utmp_put_dead_process(context
->utmp_id
, pid
, code
, status
);
4720 void exec_status_reset(ExecStatus
*s
) {
4723 *s
= (ExecStatus
) {};
4726 void exec_status_dump(const ExecStatus
*s
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
4727 char buf
[FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_MAX
];
4735 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
4738 "%sPID: "PID_FMT
"\n",
4741 if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s
->start_timestamp
))
4743 "%sStart Timestamp: %s\n",
4744 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->start_timestamp
.realtime
));
4746 if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s
->exit_timestamp
))
4748 "%sExit Timestamp: %s\n"
4750 "%sExit Status: %i\n",
4751 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->exit_timestamp
.realtime
),
4752 prefix
, sigchld_code_to_string(s
->code
),
4756 static char *exec_command_line(char **argv
) {
4764 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
)
4772 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
) {
4779 if (strpbrk(*a
, WHITESPACE
)) {
4790 /* FIXME: this doesn't really handle arguments that have
4791 * spaces and ticks in them */
4796 static void exec_command_dump(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
4797 _cleanup_free_
char *cmd
= NULL
;
4798 const char *prefix2
;
4803 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
4804 prefix2
= strjoina(prefix
, "\t");
4806 cmd
= exec_command_line(c
->argv
);
4808 "%sCommand Line: %s\n",
4809 prefix
, cmd
? cmd
: strerror(ENOMEM
));
4811 exec_status_dump(&c
->exec_status
, f
, prefix2
);
4814 void exec_command_dump_list(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
4817 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
4819 LIST_FOREACH(command
, c
, c
)
4820 exec_command_dump(c
, f
, prefix
);
4823 void exec_command_append_list(ExecCommand
**l
, ExecCommand
*e
) {
4830 /* It's kind of important, that we keep the order here */
4831 LIST_FIND_TAIL(command
, *l
, end
);
4832 LIST_INSERT_AFTER(command
, *l
, end
, e
);
4837 int exec_command_set(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
4845 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
4857 free_and_replace(c
->path
, p
);
4859 return strv_free_and_replace(c
->argv
, l
);
4862 int exec_command_append(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
4863 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **l
= NULL
;
4871 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
4877 r
= strv_extend_strv(&c
->argv
, l
, false);
4884 static void *remove_tmpdir_thread(void *p
) {
4885 _cleanup_free_
char *path
= p
;
4887 (void) rm_rf(path
, REMOVE_ROOT
|REMOVE_PHYSICAL
);
4891 static ExecRuntime
* exec_runtime_free(ExecRuntime
*rt
, bool destroy
) {
4898 (void) hashmap_remove(rt
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, rt
->id
);
4900 /* When destroy is true, then rm_rf tmp_dir and var_tmp_dir. */
4901 if (destroy
&& rt
->tmp_dir
) {
4902 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->tmp_dir
);
4904 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->tmp_dir
);
4906 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->tmp_dir
);
4913 if (destroy
&& rt
->var_tmp_dir
) {
4914 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4916 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4918 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4919 free(rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4922 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
4925 rt
->id
= mfree(rt
->id
);
4926 rt
->tmp_dir
= mfree(rt
->tmp_dir
);
4927 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= mfree(rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
4928 safe_close_pair(rt
->netns_storage_socket
);
4932 static void exec_runtime_freep(ExecRuntime
**rt
) {
4933 (void) exec_runtime_free(*rt
, false);
4936 static int exec_runtime_allocate(ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
4941 n
= new(ExecRuntime
, 1);
4945 *n
= (ExecRuntime
) {
4946 .netns_storage_socket
= { -1, -1 },
4953 static int exec_runtime_add(
4956 const char *tmp_dir
,
4957 const char *var_tmp_dir
,
4958 const int netns_storage_socket
[2],
4959 ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
4961 _cleanup_(exec_runtime_freep
) ExecRuntime
*rt
= NULL
;
4967 r
= hashmap_ensure_allocated(&m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, &string_hash_ops
);
4971 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(&rt
);
4975 rt
->id
= strdup(id
);
4980 rt
->tmp_dir
= strdup(tmp_dir
);
4984 /* When tmp_dir is set, then we require var_tmp_dir is also set. */
4985 assert(var_tmp_dir
);
4986 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= strdup(var_tmp_dir
);
4987 if (!rt
->var_tmp_dir
)
4991 if (netns_storage_socket
) {
4992 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] = netns_storage_socket
[0];
4993 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] = netns_storage_socket
[1];
4996 r
= hashmap_put(m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, rt
->id
, rt
);
5005 /* do not remove created ExecRuntime object when the operation succeeds. */
5010 static int exec_runtime_make(Manager
*m
, const ExecContext
*c
, const char *id
, ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
5011 _cleanup_free_
char *tmp_dir
= NULL
, *var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
5012 _cleanup_close_pair_
int netns_storage_socket
[2] = { -1, -1 };
5019 /* It is not necessary to create ExecRuntime object. */
5020 if (!c
->private_network
&& !c
->private_tmp
&& !c
->network_namespace_path
)
5023 if (c
->private_tmp
) {
5024 r
= setup_tmp_dirs(id
, &tmp_dir
, &var_tmp_dir
);
5029 if (c
->private_network
|| c
->network_namespace_path
) {
5030 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_DGRAM
|SOCK_CLOEXEC
, 0, netns_storage_socket
) < 0)
5034 r
= exec_runtime_add(m
, id
, tmp_dir
, var_tmp_dir
, netns_storage_socket
, ret
);
5039 netns_storage_socket
[0] = netns_storage_socket
[1] = -1;
5043 int exec_runtime_acquire(Manager
*m
, const ExecContext
*c
, const char *id
, bool create
, ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
5051 rt
= hashmap_get(m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, id
);
5053 /* We already have a ExecRuntime object, let's increase the ref count and reuse it */
5059 /* If not found, then create a new object. */
5060 r
= exec_runtime_make(m
, c
, id
, &rt
);
5062 /* When r == 0, it is not necessary to create ExecRuntime object. */
5066 /* increment reference counter. */
5072 ExecRuntime
*exec_runtime_unref(ExecRuntime
*rt
, bool destroy
) {
5076 assert(rt
->n_ref
> 0);
5082 return exec_runtime_free(rt
, destroy
);
5085 int exec_runtime_serialize(const Manager
*m
, FILE *f
, FDSet
*fds
) {
5093 HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt
, m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, i
) {
5094 fprintf(f
, "exec-runtime=%s", rt
->id
);
5097 fprintf(f
, " tmp-dir=%s", rt
->tmp_dir
);
5099 if (rt
->var_tmp_dir
)
5100 fprintf(f
, " var-tmp-dir=%s", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
5102 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
5105 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
5109 fprintf(f
, " netns-socket-0=%i", copy
);
5112 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] >= 0) {
5115 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
5119 fprintf(f
, " netns-socket-1=%i", copy
);
5128 int exec_runtime_deserialize_compat(Unit
*u
, const char *key
, const char *value
, FDSet
*fds
) {
5129 _cleanup_(exec_runtime_freep
) ExecRuntime
*rt_create
= NULL
;
5133 /* This is for the migration from old (v237 or earlier) deserialization text.
5134 * Due to the bug #7790, this may not work with the units that use JoinsNamespaceOf=.
5135 * Even if the ExecRuntime object originally created by the other unit, we cannot judge
5136 * so or not from the serialized text, then we always creates a new object owned by this. */
5142 /* Manager manages ExecRuntime objects by the unit id.
5143 * So, we omit the serialized text when the unit does not have id (yet?)... */
5144 if (isempty(u
->id
)) {
5145 log_unit_debug(u
, "Invocation ID not found. Dropping runtime parameter.");
5149 r
= hashmap_ensure_allocated(&u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, &string_hash_ops
);
5151 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, r
, "Failed to allocate storage for runtime parameter: %m");
5155 rt
= hashmap_get(u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, u
->id
);
5157 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(&rt_create
);
5161 rt_create
->id
= strdup(u
->id
);
5168 if (streq(key
, "tmp-dir")) {
5171 copy
= strdup(value
);
5175 free_and_replace(rt
->tmp_dir
, copy
);
5177 } else if (streq(key
, "var-tmp-dir")) {
5180 copy
= strdup(value
);
5184 free_and_replace(rt
->var_tmp_dir
, copy
);
5186 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-0")) {
5189 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
)) {
5190 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
5194 safe_close(rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
5195 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
5197 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-1")) {
5200 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
)) {
5201 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
5205 safe_close(rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
5206 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
5210 /* If the object is newly created, then put it to the hashmap which manages ExecRuntime objects. */
5212 r
= hashmap_put(u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, rt_create
->id
, rt_create
);
5214 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, r
, "Failed to put runtime parameter to manager's storage: %m");
5218 rt_create
->manager
= u
->manager
;
5227 void exec_runtime_deserialize_one(Manager
*m
, const char *value
, FDSet
*fds
) {
5228 char *id
= NULL
, *tmp_dir
= NULL
, *var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
5229 int r
, fd0
= -1, fd1
= -1;
5230 const char *p
, *v
= value
;
5237 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5238 id
= strndupa(v
, n
);
5243 v
= startswith(p
, "tmp-dir=");
5245 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5246 tmp_dir
= strndupa(v
, n
);
5252 v
= startswith(p
, "var-tmp-dir=");
5254 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5255 var_tmp_dir
= strndupa(v
, n
);
5261 v
= startswith(p
, "netns-socket-0=");
5265 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5266 buf
= strndupa(v
, n
);
5267 if (safe_atoi(buf
, &fd0
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd0
)) {
5268 log_debug("Unable to process exec-runtime netns fd specification.");
5271 fd0
= fdset_remove(fds
, fd0
);
5277 v
= startswith(p
, "netns-socket-1=");
5281 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
5282 buf
= strndupa(v
, n
);
5283 if (safe_atoi(buf
, &fd1
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd1
)) {
5284 log_debug("Unable to process exec-runtime netns fd specification.");
5287 fd1
= fdset_remove(fds
, fd1
);
5292 r
= exec_runtime_add(m
, id
, tmp_dir
, var_tmp_dir
, (int[]) { fd0
, fd1
}, NULL
);
5294 log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to add exec-runtime: %m");
5297 void exec_runtime_vacuum(Manager
*m
) {
5303 /* Free unreferenced ExecRuntime objects. This is used after manager deserialization process. */
5305 HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt
, m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, i
) {
5309 (void) exec_runtime_free(rt
, false);
5313 void exec_params_clear(ExecParameters
*p
) {
5317 strv_free(p
->environment
);
5320 static const char* const exec_input_table
[_EXEC_INPUT_MAX
] = {
5321 [EXEC_INPUT_NULL
] = "null",
5322 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
5323 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
] = "tty-force",
5324 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
] = "tty-fail",
5325 [EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket",
5326 [EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
] = "fd",
5327 [EXEC_INPUT_DATA
] = "data",
5328 [EXEC_INPUT_FILE
] = "file",
5331 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_input
, ExecInput
);
5333 static const char* const exec_output_table
[_EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
] = {
5334 [EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
] = "inherit",
5335 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
] = "null",
5336 [EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
5337 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
] = "syslog",
5338 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
] = "syslog+console",
5339 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
] = "kmsg",
5340 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
] = "kmsg+console",
5341 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
] = "journal",
5342 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
] = "journal+console",
5343 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket",
5344 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
] = "fd",
5345 [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
] = "file",
5346 [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
] = "append",
5349 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_output
, ExecOutput
);
5351 static const char* const exec_utmp_mode_table
[_EXEC_UTMP_MODE_MAX
] = {
5352 [EXEC_UTMP_INIT
] = "init",
5353 [EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
] = "login",
5354 [EXEC_UTMP_USER
] = "user",
5357 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_utmp_mode
, ExecUtmpMode
);
5359 static const char* const exec_preserve_mode_table
[_EXEC_PRESERVE_MODE_MAX
] = {
5360 [EXEC_PRESERVE_NO
] = "no",
5361 [EXEC_PRESERVE_YES
] = "yes",
5362 [EXEC_PRESERVE_RESTART
] = "restart",
5365 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(exec_preserve_mode
, ExecPreserveMode
, EXEC_PRESERVE_YES
);
5367 static const char* const exec_directory_type_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
5368 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = "RuntimeDirectory",
5369 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = "StateDirectory",
5370 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = "CacheDirectory",
5371 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = "LogsDirectory",
5372 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = "ConfigurationDirectory",
5375 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_directory_type
, ExecDirectoryType
);
5377 static const char* const exec_directory_env_name_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
5378 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = "RUNTIME_DIRECTORY",
5379 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = "STATE_DIRECTORY",
5380 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = "CACHE_DIRECTORY",
5381 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = "LOGS_DIRECTORY",
5382 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = "CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY",
5385 DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(exec_directory_env_name
, ExecDirectoryType
);
5387 static const char* const exec_keyring_mode_table
[_EXEC_KEYRING_MODE_MAX
] = {
5388 [EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT
] = "inherit",
5389 [EXEC_KEYRING_PRIVATE
] = "private",
5390 [EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED
] = "shared",
5393 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_keyring_mode
, ExecKeyringMode
);