2 This file is part of systemd.
4 Copyright 2010 Lennart Poettering
6 systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
7 under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
8 the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
9 (at your option) any later version.
11 systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
12 WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
14 Lesser General Public License for more details.
16 You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
17 along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
27 #include <sys/capability.h>
29 #include <sys/personality.h>
30 #include <sys/prctl.h>
31 #include <sys/socket.h>
38 #include <security/pam_appl.h>
42 #include <selinux/selinux.h>
50 #include <sys/apparmor.h>
53 #include "sd-messages.h"
56 #include "alloc-util.h"
58 #include "apparmor-util.h"
63 #include "capability-util.h"
66 #include "errno-list.h"
68 #include "exit-status.h"
71 #include "formats-util.h"
73 #include "glob-util.h"
80 #include "namespace.h"
81 #include "parse-util.h"
82 #include "path-util.h"
83 #include "process-util.h"
84 #include "rlimit-util.h"
87 #include "seccomp-util.h"
89 #include "securebits.h"
90 #include "selinux-util.h"
91 #include "signal-util.h"
92 #include "smack-util.h"
93 #include "string-table.h"
94 #include "string-util.h"
96 #include "syslog-util.h"
97 #include "terminal-util.h"
99 #include "user-util.h"
101 #include "utmp-wtmp.h"
103 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC)
104 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC)
106 /* This assumes there is a 'tty' group */
107 #define TTY_MODE 0620
109 #define SNDBUF_SIZE (8*1024*1024)
111 static int shift_fds(int fds
[], unsigned n_fds
) {
112 int start
, restart_from
;
117 /* Modifies the fds array! (sorts it) */
127 for (i
= start
; i
< (int) n_fds
; i
++) {
130 /* Already at right index? */
134 nfd
= fcntl(fds
[i
], F_DUPFD
, i
+ 3);
141 /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then
142 * let's remember that and try again from here */
143 if (nfd
!= i
+3 && restart_from
< 0)
147 if (restart_from
< 0)
150 start
= restart_from
;
156 static int flags_fds(const int fds
[], unsigned n_fds
, bool nonblock
) {
165 /* Drops/Sets O_NONBLOCK and FD_CLOEXEC from the file flags */
167 for (i
= 0; i
< n_fds
; i
++) {
169 r
= fd_nonblock(fds
[i
], nonblock
);
173 /* We unconditionally drop FD_CLOEXEC from the fds,
174 * since after all we want to pass these fds to our
177 r
= fd_cloexec(fds
[i
], false);
185 static const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext
*context
) {
188 if (context
->stdio_as_fds
)
191 if (context
->tty_path
)
192 return context
->tty_path
;
194 return "/dev/console";
197 static void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext
*context
, const ExecParameters
*p
) {
202 path
= exec_context_tty_path(context
);
204 if (context
->tty_vhangup
) {
205 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
206 (void) terminal_vhangup_fd(p
->stdin_fd
);
208 (void) terminal_vhangup(path
);
211 if (context
->tty_reset
) {
212 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
213 (void) reset_terminal_fd(p
->stdin_fd
, true);
215 (void) reset_terminal(path
);
218 if (context
->tty_vt_disallocate
&& path
)
219 (void) vt_disallocate(path
);
222 static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o
) {
224 o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
||
225 o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
||
226 o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
||
227 o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
;
230 static int open_null_as(int flags
, int nfd
) {
235 fd
= open("/dev/null", flags
|O_NOCTTY
);
240 r
= dup2(fd
, nfd
) < 0 ? -errno
: nfd
;
248 static int connect_journal_socket(int fd
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
249 union sockaddr_union sa
= {
250 .un
.sun_family
= AF_UNIX
,
251 .un
.sun_path
= "/run/systemd/journal/stdout",
253 uid_t olduid
= UID_INVALID
;
254 gid_t oldgid
= GID_INVALID
;
257 if (gid
!= GID_INVALID
) {
265 if (uid
!= UID_INVALID
) {
275 r
= connect(fd
, &sa
.sa
, SOCKADDR_UN_LEN(sa
.un
));
279 /* If we fail to restore the uid or gid, things will likely
280 fail later on. This should only happen if an LSM interferes. */
282 if (uid
!= UID_INVALID
)
283 (void) seteuid(olduid
);
286 if (gid
!= GID_INVALID
)
287 (void) setegid(oldgid
);
292 static int connect_logger_as(
293 const ExecContext
*context
,
304 assert(output
< _EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
);
308 fd
= socket(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_STREAM
, 0);
312 r
= connect_journal_socket(fd
, uid
, gid
);
316 if (shutdown(fd
, SHUT_RD
) < 0) {
321 (void) fd_inc_sndbuf(fd
, SNDBUF_SIZE
);
331 context
->syslog_identifier
? context
->syslog_identifier
: ident
,
333 context
->syslog_priority
,
334 !!context
->syslog_level_prefix
,
335 output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
|| output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
,
336 output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
|| output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
337 is_terminal_output(output
));
342 r
= dup2(fd
, nfd
) < 0 ? -errno
: nfd
;
347 static int open_terminal_as(const char *path
, mode_t mode
, int nfd
) {
353 fd
= open_terminal(path
, mode
| O_NOCTTY
);
358 r
= dup2(fd
, nfd
) < 0 ? -errno
: nfd
;
366 static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i
) {
368 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY
||
369 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
||
370 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
;
373 static int fixup_input(ExecInput std_input
, int socket_fd
, bool apply_tty_stdin
) {
375 if (is_terminal_input(std_input
) && !apply_tty_stdin
)
376 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
378 if (std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
379 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
384 static int fixup_output(ExecOutput std_output
, int socket_fd
) {
386 if (std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
387 return EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
;
392 static int setup_input(
393 const ExecContext
*context
,
394 const ExecParameters
*params
,
402 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0) {
403 if (dup2(params
->stdin_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
406 /* Try to make this the controlling tty, if it is a tty, and reset it */
407 (void) ioctl(STDIN_FILENO
, TIOCSCTTY
, context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
);
408 (void) reset_terminal_fd(STDIN_FILENO
, true);
413 i
= fixup_input(context
->std_input
, socket_fd
, params
->apply_tty_stdin
);
417 case EXEC_INPUT_NULL
:
418 return open_null_as(O_RDONLY
, STDIN_FILENO
);
421 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
:
422 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
: {
425 fd
= acquire_terminal(exec_context_tty_path(context
),
426 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
,
427 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
,
433 if (fd
!= STDIN_FILENO
) {
434 r
= dup2(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
442 case EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
:
443 return dup2(socket_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
446 assert_not_reached("Unknown input type");
450 static int setup_output(
452 const ExecContext
*context
,
453 const ExecParameters
*params
,
459 dev_t
*journal_stream_dev
,
460 ino_t
*journal_stream_ino
) {
470 assert(journal_stream_dev
);
471 assert(journal_stream_ino
);
473 if (fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
&& params
->stdout_fd
>= 0) {
475 if (dup2(params
->stdout_fd
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
478 return STDOUT_FILENO
;
481 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
&& params
->stderr_fd
>= 0) {
482 if (dup2(params
->stderr_fd
, STDERR_FILENO
) < 0)
485 return STDERR_FILENO
;
488 i
= fixup_input(context
->std_input
, socket_fd
, params
->apply_tty_stdin
);
489 o
= fixup_output(context
->std_output
, socket_fd
);
491 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
) {
493 e
= fixup_output(context
->std_error
, socket_fd
);
495 /* This expects the input and output are already set up */
497 /* Don't change the stderr file descriptor if we inherit all
498 * the way and are not on a tty */
499 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
500 o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
501 i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&&
502 !is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
) &&
506 /* Duplicate from stdout if possible */
507 if (e
== o
|| e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
)
508 return dup2(STDOUT_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
512 } else if (o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
) {
513 /* If input got downgraded, inherit the original value */
514 if (i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&& is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
))
515 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
517 /* If the input is connected to anything that's not a /dev/null, inherit that... */
518 if (i
!= EXEC_INPUT_NULL
)
519 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
521 /* If we are not started from PID 1 we just inherit STDOUT from our parent process. */
525 /* We need to open /dev/null here anew, to get the right access mode. */
526 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
531 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
:
532 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
534 case EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
:
535 if (is_terminal_input(i
))
536 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
538 /* We don't reset the terminal if this is just about output */
539 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
541 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
:
542 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
:
543 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
:
544 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
:
545 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
:
546 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
:
547 r
= connect_logger_as(context
, o
, ident
, unit
->id
, fileno
, uid
, gid
);
549 log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to connect %s to the journal socket, ignoring: %m", fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
? "stdout" : "stderr");
550 r
= open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
554 /* If we connected this fd to the journal via a stream, patch the device/inode into the passed
555 * parameters, but only then. This is useful so that we can set $JOURNAL_STREAM that permits
556 * services to detect whether they are connected to the journal or not. */
558 if (fstat(fileno
, &st
) >= 0) {
559 *journal_stream_dev
= st
.st_dev
;
560 *journal_stream_ino
= st
.st_ino
;
565 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
:
566 assert(socket_fd
>= 0);
567 return dup2(socket_fd
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
570 assert_not_reached("Unknown error type");
574 static int chown_terminal(int fd
, uid_t uid
) {
579 /* Before we chown/chmod the TTY, let's ensure this is actually a tty */
583 /* This might fail. What matters are the results. */
584 (void) fchown(fd
, uid
, -1);
585 (void) fchmod(fd
, TTY_MODE
);
587 if (fstat(fd
, &st
) < 0)
590 if (st
.st_uid
!= uid
|| (st
.st_mode
& 0777) != TTY_MODE
)
596 static int setup_confirm_stdio(int *_saved_stdin
, int *_saved_stdout
) {
597 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, saved_stdout
= -1;
600 assert(_saved_stdin
);
601 assert(_saved_stdout
);
603 saved_stdin
= fcntl(STDIN_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
607 saved_stdout
= fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
608 if (saved_stdout
< 0)
611 fd
= acquire_terminal(
616 DEFAULT_CONFIRM_USEC
);
620 r
= chown_terminal(fd
, getuid());
624 r
= reset_terminal_fd(fd
, true);
628 if (dup2(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
631 if (dup2(fd
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
638 *_saved_stdin
= saved_stdin
;
639 *_saved_stdout
= saved_stdout
;
641 saved_stdin
= saved_stdout
= -1;
646 _printf_(1, 2) static int write_confirm_message(const char *format
, ...) {
647 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
652 fd
= open_terminal("/dev/console", O_WRONLY
|O_NOCTTY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
656 va_start(ap
, format
);
657 vdprintf(fd
, format
, ap
);
663 static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin
, int *saved_stdout
) {
667 assert(saved_stdout
);
671 if (*saved_stdin
>= 0)
672 if (dup2(*saved_stdin
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
675 if (*saved_stdout
>= 0)
676 if (dup2(*saved_stdout
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
679 *saved_stdin
= safe_close(*saved_stdin
);
680 *saved_stdout
= safe_close(*saved_stdout
);
685 static int ask_for_confirmation(char *response
, char **argv
) {
686 int saved_stdout
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, r
;
687 _cleanup_free_
char *line
= NULL
;
689 r
= setup_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
693 line
= exec_command_line(argv
);
697 r
= ask_char(response
, "yns", "Execute %s? [Yes, No, Skip] ", line
);
699 restore_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
704 static int enforce_groups(const ExecContext
*context
, const char *username
, gid_t gid
) {
705 bool keep_groups
= false;
710 /* Lookup and set GID and supplementary group list. Here too
711 * we avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. */
713 if (context
->group
|| username
) {
714 /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */
715 if (username
&& gid
!= 0) {
716 if (initgroups(username
, gid
) < 0)
722 /* Second step, set our gids */
723 if (setresgid(gid
, gid
, gid
) < 0)
727 if (context
->supplementary_groups
) {
732 /* Final step, initialize any manually set supplementary groups */
733 assert_se((ngroups_max
= (int) sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX
)) > 0);
735 if (!(gids
= new(gid_t
, ngroups_max
)))
739 k
= getgroups(ngroups_max
, gids
);
747 STRV_FOREACH(i
, context
->supplementary_groups
) {
750 if (k
>= ngroups_max
) {
756 r
= get_group_creds(&g
, gids
+k
);
765 if (setgroups(k
, gids
) < 0) {
776 static int enforce_user(const ExecContext
*context
, uid_t uid
) {
779 /* Sets (but doesn't look up) the uid and make sure we keep the
780 * capabilities while doing so. */
782 if (context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
784 /* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but
785 * drop privileges we need to make sure we keep our
786 * caps, while we drop privileges. */
788 int sb
= context
->secure_bits
| 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
;
790 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
) != sb
)
791 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, sb
) < 0)
796 /* Second step: actually set the uids */
797 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
800 /* At this point we should have all necessary capabilities but
801 are otherwise a normal user. However, the caps might got
802 corrupted due to the setresuid() so we need clean them up
803 later. This is done outside of this call. */
810 static int null_conv(
812 const struct pam_message
**msg
,
813 struct pam_response
**resp
,
816 /* We don't support conversations */
821 static int setup_pam(
827 int fds
[], unsigned n_fds
) {
829 static const struct pam_conv conv
= {
834 _cleanup_(barrier_destroy
) Barrier barrier
= BARRIER_NULL
;
835 pam_handle_t
*handle
= NULL
;
837 int pam_code
= PAM_SUCCESS
, r
;
839 bool close_session
= false;
840 pid_t pam_pid
= 0, parent_pid
;
847 /* We set up PAM in the parent process, then fork. The child
848 * will then stay around until killed via PR_GET_PDEATHSIG or
849 * systemd via the cgroup logic. It will then remove the PAM
850 * session again. The parent process will exec() the actual
851 * daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID
852 * of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */
854 r
= barrier_create(&barrier
);
858 if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG
)
861 pam_code
= pam_start(name
, user
, &conv
, &handle
);
862 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
868 pam_code
= pam_set_item(handle
, PAM_TTY
, tty
);
869 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
873 STRV_FOREACH(e
, *env
) {
874 pam_code
= pam_putenv(handle
, *e
);
875 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
879 pam_code
= pam_acct_mgmt(handle
, flags
);
880 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
883 pam_code
= pam_open_session(handle
, flags
);
884 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
887 close_session
= true;
889 e
= pam_getenvlist(handle
);
891 pam_code
= PAM_BUF_ERR
;
895 /* Block SIGTERM, so that we know that it won't get lost in
898 assert_se(sigprocmask_many(SIG_BLOCK
, &old_ss
, SIGTERM
, -1) >= 0);
900 parent_pid
= getpid();
909 int sig
, ret
= EXIT_PAM
;
911 /* The child's job is to reset the PAM session on
913 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_CHILD
);
915 /* This string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
916 * of "/sbin/init"), to look pretty in /bin/ps */
917 rename_process("(sd-pam)");
919 /* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this
920 child. We assume that otherwise only those fds are
921 open here that have been opened by PAM. */
922 close_many(fds
, n_fds
);
924 /* Drop privileges - we don't need any to pam_close_session
925 * and this will make PR_SET_PDEATHSIG work in most cases.
926 * If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam threads
927 * to fail to exit normally */
928 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
929 log_error_errno(r
, "Error: Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m");
931 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
933 /* Wait until our parent died. This will only work if
934 * the above setresuid() succeeds, otherwise the kernel
935 * will not allow unprivileged parents kill their privileged
936 * children this way. We rely on the control groups kill logic
937 * to do the rest for us. */
938 if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG
, SIGTERM
) < 0)
941 /* Tell the parent that our setup is done. This is especially
942 * important regarding dropping privileges. Otherwise, unit
943 * setup might race against our setresuid(2) call. */
944 barrier_place(&barrier
);
946 /* Check if our parent process might already have
948 if (getppid() == parent_pid
) {
951 assert_se(sigemptyset(&ss
) >= 0);
952 assert_se(sigaddset(&ss
, SIGTERM
) >= 0);
955 if (sigwait(&ss
, &sig
) < 0) {
962 assert(sig
== SIGTERM
);
967 /* If our parent died we'll end the session */
968 if (getppid() != parent_pid
) {
969 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
970 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
977 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
981 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_PARENT
);
983 /* If the child was forked off successfully it will do all the
984 * cleanups, so forget about the handle here. */
987 /* Unblock SIGTERM again in the parent */
988 assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK
, &old_ss
, NULL
) >= 0);
990 /* We close the log explicitly here, since the PAM modules
991 * might have opened it, but we don't want this fd around. */
994 /* Synchronously wait for the child to initialize. We don't care for
995 * errors as we cannot recover. However, warn loudly if it happens. */
996 if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier
))
997 log_error("PAM initialization failed");
1005 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
1006 log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle
, pam_code
));
1007 r
= -EPERM
; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */
1009 log_error_errno(r
, "PAM failed: %m");
1013 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
1015 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
1025 static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path
) {
1026 char process_name
[11];
1030 /* This resulting string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
1031 * of "/sbin/init") to look pretty in /bin/ps */
1035 rename_process("(...)");
1041 /* The end of the process name is usually more
1042 * interesting, since the first bit might just be
1048 process_name
[0] = '(';
1049 memcpy(process_name
+1, p
, l
);
1050 process_name
[1+l
] = ')';
1051 process_name
[1+l
+1] = 0;
1053 rename_process(process_name
);
1058 static int apply_seccomp(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1059 uint32_t negative_action
, action
;
1060 scmp_filter_ctx
*seccomp
;
1067 negative_action
= c
->syscall_errno
== 0 ? SCMP_ACT_KILL
: SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c
->syscall_errno
);
1069 seccomp
= seccomp_init(c
->syscall_whitelist
? negative_action
: SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
);
1073 if (c
->syscall_archs
) {
1075 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_archs
, i
) {
1076 r
= seccomp_arch_add(seccomp
, PTR_TO_UINT32(id
) - 1);
1084 r
= seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp
);
1089 action
= c
->syscall_whitelist
? SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
: negative_action
;
1090 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_filter
, i
) {
1091 r
= seccomp_rule_add(seccomp
, action
, PTR_TO_INT(id
) - 1, 0);
1096 r
= seccomp_attr_set(seccomp
, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP
, 0);
1100 r
= seccomp_load(seccomp
);
1103 seccomp_release(seccomp
);
1107 static int apply_address_families(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1108 scmp_filter_ctx
*seccomp
;
1114 seccomp
= seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
);
1118 r
= seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp
);
1122 if (c
->address_families_whitelist
) {
1123 int af
, first
= 0, last
= 0;
1126 /* If this is a whitelist, we first block the address
1127 * families that are out of range and then everything
1128 * that is not in the set. First, we find the lowest
1129 * and highest address family in the set. */
1131 SET_FOREACH(afp
, c
->address_families
, i
) {
1132 af
= PTR_TO_INT(afp
);
1134 if (af
<= 0 || af
>= af_max())
1137 if (first
== 0 || af
< first
)
1140 if (last
== 0 || af
> last
)
1144 assert((first
== 0) == (last
== 0));
1148 /* No entries in the valid range, block everything */
1149 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1151 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT
),
1159 /* Block everything below the first entry */
1160 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1162 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT
),
1165 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_LT
, first
));
1169 /* Block everything above the last entry */
1170 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1172 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT
),
1175 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_GT
, last
));
1179 /* Block everything between the first and last
1181 for (af
= 1; af
< af_max(); af
++) {
1183 if (set_contains(c
->address_families
, INT_TO_PTR(af
)))
1186 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1188 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT
),
1191 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ
, af
));
1200 /* If this is a blacklist, then generate one rule for
1201 * each address family that are then combined in OR
1204 SET_FOREACH(af
, c
->address_families
, i
) {
1206 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1208 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT
),
1211 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ
, PTR_TO_INT(af
)));
1217 r
= seccomp_attr_set(seccomp
, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP
, 0);
1221 r
= seccomp_load(seccomp
);
1224 seccomp_release(seccomp
);
1228 static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1229 scmp_filter_ctx
*seccomp
;
1234 seccomp
= seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
);
1238 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1243 SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ
, PROT_EXEC
|PROT_WRITE
, PROT_EXEC
|PROT_WRITE
));
1247 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1252 SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ
, PROT_EXEC
, PROT_EXEC
));
1256 r
= seccomp_attr_set(seccomp
, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP
, 0);
1260 r
= seccomp_load(seccomp
);
1263 seccomp_release(seccomp
);
1269 static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe
[4]) {
1273 idle_pipe
[1] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[1]);
1274 idle_pipe
[2] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[2]);
1276 if (idle_pipe
[0] >= 0) {
1279 r
= fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC
);
1281 if (idle_pipe
[3] >= 0 && r
== 0 /* timeout */) {
1284 /* Signal systemd that we are bored and want to continue. */
1285 n
= write(idle_pipe
[3], "x", 1);
1287 /* Wait for systemd to react to the signal above. */
1288 fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC
);
1291 idle_pipe
[0] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[0]);
1295 idle_pipe
[3] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[3]);
1298 static int build_environment(
1299 const ExecContext
*c
,
1300 const ExecParameters
*p
,
1303 const char *username
,
1305 dev_t journal_stream_dev
,
1306 ino_t journal_stream_ino
,
1309 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
;
1316 our_env
= new0(char*, 12);
1321 _cleanup_free_
char *joined
= NULL
;
1323 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid()) < 0)
1325 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1327 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_FDS=%u", n_fds
) < 0)
1329 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1331 joined
= strv_join(p
->fd_names
, ":");
1335 x
= strjoin("LISTEN_FDNAMES=", joined
, NULL
);
1338 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1341 if (p
->watchdog_usec
> 0) {
1342 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid()) < 0)
1344 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1346 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_USEC="USEC_FMT
, p
->watchdog_usec
) < 0)
1348 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1352 x
= strappend("HOME=", home
);
1355 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1359 x
= strappend("LOGNAME=", username
);
1362 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1364 x
= strappend("USER=", username
);
1367 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1371 x
= strappend("SHELL=", shell
);
1374 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1377 if (is_terminal_input(c
->std_input
) ||
1378 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
||
1379 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
||
1382 x
= strdup(default_term_for_tty(exec_context_tty_path(c
)));
1385 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1388 if (journal_stream_dev
!= 0 && journal_stream_ino
!= 0) {
1389 if (asprintf(&x
, "JOURNAL_STREAM=" DEV_FMT
":" INO_FMT
, journal_stream_dev
, journal_stream_ino
) < 0)
1392 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1395 our_env
[n_env
++] = NULL
;
1396 assert(n_env
<= 12);
1404 static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext
*c
, char ***ret
) {
1405 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **pass_env
= NULL
;
1406 size_t n_env
= 0, n_bufsize
= 0;
1409 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->pass_environment
) {
1410 _cleanup_free_
char *x
= NULL
;
1416 x
= strjoin(*i
, "=", v
, NULL
);
1419 if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(pass_env
, n_bufsize
, n_env
+ 2))
1421 pass_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1422 pass_env
[n_env
] = NULL
;
1432 static bool exec_needs_mount_namespace(
1433 const ExecContext
*context
,
1434 const ExecParameters
*params
,
1435 ExecRuntime
*runtime
) {
1440 if (!strv_isempty(context
->read_write_dirs
) ||
1441 !strv_isempty(context
->read_only_dirs
) ||
1442 !strv_isempty(context
->inaccessible_dirs
))
1445 if (context
->mount_flags
!= 0)
1448 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
&& (runtime
->tmp_dir
|| runtime
->var_tmp_dir
))
1451 if (context
->private_devices
||
1452 context
->protect_system
!= PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO
||
1453 context
->protect_home
!= PROTECT_HOME_NO
)
1459 static int close_remaining_fds(
1460 const ExecParameters
*params
,
1461 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
1463 int *fds
, unsigned n_fds
) {
1465 unsigned n_dont_close
= 0;
1466 int dont_close
[n_fds
+ 7];
1470 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
1471 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdin_fd
;
1472 if (params
->stdout_fd
>= 0)
1473 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdout_fd
;
1474 if (params
->stderr_fd
>= 0)
1475 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stderr_fd
;
1478 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = socket_fd
;
1480 memcpy(dont_close
+ n_dont_close
, fds
, sizeof(int) * n_fds
);
1481 n_dont_close
+= n_fds
;
1485 if (runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0)
1486 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[0];
1487 if (runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[1] >= 0)
1488 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[1];
1491 return close_all_fds(dont_close
, n_dont_close
);
1494 static int exec_child(
1496 ExecCommand
*command
,
1497 const ExecContext
*context
,
1498 const ExecParameters
*params
,
1499 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
1502 int *fds
, unsigned n_fds
,
1506 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
, **pass_env
= NULL
, **accum_env
= NULL
, **final_argv
= NULL
;
1507 _cleanup_free_
char *mac_selinux_context_net
= NULL
;
1508 const char *username
= NULL
, *home
= NULL
, *shell
= NULL
, *wd
;
1509 dev_t journal_stream_dev
= 0;
1510 ino_t journal_stream_ino
= 0;
1511 bool needs_mount_namespace
;
1512 uid_t uid
= UID_INVALID
;
1513 gid_t gid
= GID_INVALID
;
1520 assert(exit_status
);
1522 rename_process_from_path(command
->path
);
1524 /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the
1525 * only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main daemon. All
1526 * others we leave untouched because we set them to
1527 * SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, both of which
1528 * will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */
1529 (void) default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER
,
1530 SIGNALS_IGNORE
, -1);
1532 if (context
->ignore_sigpipe
)
1533 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
1535 r
= reset_signal_mask();
1537 *exit_status
= EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK
;
1541 if (params
->idle_pipe
)
1542 do_idle_pipe_dance(params
->idle_pipe
);
1544 /* Close sockets very early to make sure we don't
1545 * block init reexecution because it cannot bind its
1550 r
= close_remaining_fds(params
, runtime
, socket_fd
, fds
, n_fds
);
1552 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
1556 if (!context
->same_pgrp
)
1558 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSID
;
1562 exec_context_tty_reset(context
, params
);
1564 if (params
->confirm_spawn
) {
1567 r
= ask_for_confirmation(&response
, argv
);
1568 if (r
== -ETIMEDOUT
)
1569 write_confirm_message("Confirmation question timed out, assuming positive response.\n");
1571 write_confirm_message("Couldn't ask confirmation question, assuming positive response: %s\n", strerror(-r
));
1572 else if (response
== 's') {
1573 write_confirm_message("Skipping execution.\n");
1574 *exit_status
= EXIT_CONFIRM
;
1576 } else if (response
== 'n') {
1577 write_confirm_message("Failing execution.\n");
1583 if (context
->user
) {
1584 username
= context
->user
;
1585 r
= get_user_creds(&username
, &uid
, &gid
, &home
, &shell
);
1587 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
1592 if (context
->group
) {
1593 const char *g
= context
->group
;
1595 r
= get_group_creds(&g
, &gid
);
1597 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
1603 /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we
1604 * must sure to drop O_NONBLOCK */
1606 (void) fd_nonblock(socket_fd
, false);
1608 r
= setup_input(context
, params
, socket_fd
);
1610 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
1614 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDOUT_FILENO
, socket_fd
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
, &journal_stream_dev
, &journal_stream_ino
);
1616 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDOUT
;
1620 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDERR_FILENO
, socket_fd
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
, &journal_stream_dev
, &journal_stream_ino
);
1622 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDERR
;
1626 if (params
->cgroup_path
) {
1627 r
= cg_attach_everywhere(params
->cgroup_supported
, params
->cgroup_path
, 0, NULL
, NULL
);
1629 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
1634 if (context
->oom_score_adjust_set
) {
1635 char t
[DECIMAL_STR_MAX(context
->oom_score_adjust
)];
1637 /* When we can't make this change due to EPERM, then
1638 * let's silently skip over it. User namespaces
1639 * prohibit write access to this file, and we
1640 * shouldn't trip up over that. */
1642 sprintf(t
, "%i", context
->oom_score_adjust
);
1643 r
= write_string_file("/proc/self/oom_score_adj", t
, 0);
1644 if (r
== -EPERM
|| r
== -EACCES
) {
1646 log_unit_debug_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust OOM setting, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
1649 *exit_status
= EXIT_OOM_ADJUST
;
1654 if (context
->nice_set
)
1655 if (setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS
, 0, context
->nice
) < 0) {
1656 *exit_status
= EXIT_NICE
;
1660 if (context
->cpu_sched_set
) {
1661 struct sched_param param
= {
1662 .sched_priority
= context
->cpu_sched_priority
,
1665 r
= sched_setscheduler(0,
1666 context
->cpu_sched_policy
|
1667 (context
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
?
1668 SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK
: 0),
1671 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSCHEDULER
;
1676 if (context
->cpuset
)
1677 if (sched_setaffinity(0, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(context
->cpuset_ncpus
), context
->cpuset
) < 0) {
1678 *exit_status
= EXIT_CPUAFFINITY
;
1682 if (context
->ioprio_set
)
1683 if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS
, 0, context
->ioprio
) < 0) {
1684 *exit_status
= EXIT_IOPRIO
;
1688 if (context
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
1689 if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK
, context
->timer_slack_nsec
) < 0) {
1690 *exit_status
= EXIT_TIMERSLACK
;
1694 if (context
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
)
1695 if (personality(context
->personality
) < 0) {
1696 *exit_status
= EXIT_PERSONALITY
;
1700 if (context
->utmp_id
)
1701 utmp_put_init_process(context
->utmp_id
, getpid(), getsid(0), context
->tty_path
,
1702 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_INIT
? INIT_PROCESS
:
1703 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
? LOGIN_PROCESS
:
1705 username
? "root" : context
->user
);
1707 if (context
->user
&& is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
)) {
1708 r
= chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO
, uid
);
1710 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
1715 /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup
1716 * (but only in systemd's own controller hierarchy!) to the
1717 * user of the new process. */
1718 if (params
->cgroup_path
&& context
->user
&& params
->cgroup_delegate
) {
1719 r
= cg_set_task_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, params
->cgroup_path
, 0644, uid
, gid
);
1721 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
1726 r
= cg_set_group_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, params
->cgroup_path
, 0755, uid
, gid
);
1728 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
1733 if (!strv_isempty(context
->runtime_directory
) && params
->runtime_prefix
) {
1736 STRV_FOREACH(rt
, context
->runtime_directory
) {
1737 _cleanup_free_
char *p
;
1739 p
= strjoin(params
->runtime_prefix
, "/", *rt
, NULL
);
1741 *exit_status
= EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY
;
1745 r
= mkdir_p_label(p
, context
->runtime_directory_mode
);
1747 *exit_status
= EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY
;
1751 r
= chmod_and_chown(p
, context
->runtime_directory_mode
, uid
, gid
);
1753 *exit_status
= EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY
;
1759 r
= build_environment(
1770 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
1774 r
= build_pass_environment(context
, &pass_env
);
1776 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
1780 accum_env
= strv_env_merge(5,
1781 params
->environment
,
1784 context
->environment
,
1788 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
1792 umask(context
->umask
);
1794 if (params
->apply_permissions
&& !command
->privileged
) {
1795 r
= enforce_groups(context
, username
, gid
);
1797 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
1801 if (context
->smack_process_label
) {
1802 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context
->smack_process_label
);
1804 *exit_status
= EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL
;
1808 #ifdef SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
1810 _cleanup_free_
char *exec_label
= NULL
;
1812 r
= mac_smack_read(command
->path
, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC
, &exec_label
);
1813 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -ENODATA
&& r
!= -EOPNOTSUPP
) {
1814 *exit_status
= EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL
;
1818 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label
? : SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
);
1820 *exit_status
= EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL
;
1827 if (context
->pam_name
&& username
) {
1828 r
= setup_pam(context
->pam_name
, username
, uid
, context
->tty_path
, &accum_env
, fds
, n_fds
);
1830 *exit_status
= EXIT_PAM
;
1837 if (context
->private_network
&& runtime
&& runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
1838 r
= setup_netns(runtime
->netns_storage_socket
);
1840 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
1845 needs_mount_namespace
= exec_needs_mount_namespace(context
, params
, runtime
);
1847 if (needs_mount_namespace
) {
1848 char *tmp
= NULL
, *var
= NULL
;
1850 /* The runtime struct only contains the parent
1851 * of the private /tmp, which is
1852 * non-accessible to world users. Inside of it
1853 * there's a /tmp that is sticky, and that's
1854 * the one we want to use here. */
1856 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
) {
1857 if (runtime
->tmp_dir
)
1858 tmp
= strjoina(runtime
->tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
1859 if (runtime
->var_tmp_dir
)
1860 var
= strjoina(runtime
->var_tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
1863 r
= setup_namespace(
1864 params
->apply_chroot
? context
->root_directory
: NULL
,
1865 context
->read_write_dirs
,
1866 context
->read_only_dirs
,
1867 context
->inaccessible_dirs
,
1870 context
->private_devices
,
1871 context
->protect_home
,
1872 context
->protect_system
,
1873 context
->mount_flags
);
1875 /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is
1876 * probably due to a missing capability. In this case,
1877 * silently proceeed. */
1878 if (r
== -EPERM
|| r
== -EACCES
) {
1880 log_unit_debug_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
1883 *exit_status
= EXIT_NAMESPACE
;
1888 if (context
->working_directory_home
)
1890 else if (context
->working_directory
)
1891 wd
= context
->working_directory
;
1895 if (params
->apply_chroot
) {
1896 if (!needs_mount_namespace
&& context
->root_directory
)
1897 if (chroot(context
->root_directory
) < 0) {
1898 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHROOT
;
1902 if (chdir(wd
) < 0 &&
1903 !context
->working_directory_missing_ok
) {
1904 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
1910 d
= strjoina(strempty(context
->root_directory
), "/", strempty(wd
));
1912 !context
->working_directory_missing_ok
) {
1913 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
1919 if (params
->apply_permissions
&& mac_selinux_use() && params
->selinux_context_net
&& socket_fd
>= 0 && !command
->privileged
) {
1920 r
= mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd
, command
->path
, context
->selinux_context
, &mac_selinux_context_net
);
1922 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
1928 /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that
1929 * nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that
1930 * we are more aggressive this time since socket_fd
1931 * and the netns fds we don't need anymore. The custom
1932 * endpoint fd was needed to upload the policy and can
1933 * now be closed as well. */
1934 r
= close_all_fds(fds
, n_fds
);
1936 r
= shift_fds(fds
, n_fds
);
1938 r
= flags_fds(fds
, n_fds
, context
->non_blocking
);
1940 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
1944 if (params
->apply_permissions
&& !command
->privileged
) {
1946 bool use_address_families
= context
->address_families_whitelist
||
1947 !set_isempty(context
->address_families
);
1948 bool use_syscall_filter
= context
->syscall_whitelist
||
1949 !set_isempty(context
->syscall_filter
) ||
1950 !set_isempty(context
->syscall_archs
);
1951 int secure_bits
= context
->secure_bits
;
1953 for (i
= 0; i
< _RLIMIT_MAX
; i
++) {
1954 if (!context
->rlimit
[i
])
1957 if (setrlimit_closest(i
, context
->rlimit
[i
]) < 0) {
1958 *exit_status
= EXIT_LIMITS
;
1963 if (!cap_test_all(context
->capability_bounding_set
)) {
1964 r
= capability_bounding_set_drop(context
->capability_bounding_set
, false);
1966 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
1971 /* This is done before enforce_user, but ambient set
1972 * does not survive over setresuid() if keep_caps is not set. */
1973 if (context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
1974 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, true);
1976 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
1981 if (context
->user
) {
1982 r
= enforce_user(context
, uid
);
1984 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
1987 if (context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
1989 /* Fix the ambient capabilities after user change. */
1990 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, false);
1992 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
1996 /* If we were asked to change user and ambient capabilities
1997 * were requested, we had to add keep-caps to the securebits
1998 * so that we would maintain the inherited capability set
1999 * through the setresuid(). Make sure that the bit is added
2000 * also to the context secure_bits so that we don't try to
2001 * drop the bit away next. */
2003 secure_bits
|= 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
;
2007 /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while
2008 * PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress
2009 * potential EPERMs we'll try not to call
2010 * PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. */
2011 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
) != secure_bits
)
2012 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, secure_bits
) < 0) {
2013 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECUREBITS
;
2017 if (context
->no_new_privileges
||
2018 (!have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
) && (use_address_families
|| use_syscall_filter
)))
2019 if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
2020 *exit_status
= EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES
;
2025 if (use_address_families
) {
2026 r
= apply_address_families(context
);
2028 *exit_status
= EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES
;
2033 if (context
->memory_deny_write_execute
) {
2034 r
= apply_memory_deny_write_execute(context
);
2036 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
2040 if (use_syscall_filter
) {
2041 r
= apply_seccomp(context
);
2043 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
2050 if (mac_selinux_use()) {
2051 char *exec_context
= mac_selinux_context_net
?: context
->selinux_context
;
2054 r
= setexeccon(exec_context
);
2056 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
2063 #ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
2064 if (context
->apparmor_profile
&& mac_apparmor_use()) {
2065 r
= aa_change_onexec(context
->apparmor_profile
);
2066 if (r
< 0 && !context
->apparmor_profile_ignore
) {
2067 *exit_status
= EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE
;
2074 final_argv
= replace_env_argv(argv
, accum_env
);
2076 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
2080 accum_env
= strv_env_clean(accum_env
);
2082 if (_unlikely_(log_get_max_level() >= LOG_DEBUG
)) {
2083 _cleanup_free_
char *line
;
2085 line
= exec_command_line(final_argv
);
2088 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
2090 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
,
2091 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Executing: %s", line
),
2097 execve(command
->path
, final_argv
, accum_env
);
2098 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
2102 int exec_spawn(Unit
*unit
,
2103 ExecCommand
*command
,
2104 const ExecContext
*context
,
2105 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2106 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
2109 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **files_env
= NULL
;
2110 int *fds
= NULL
; unsigned n_fds
= 0;
2111 _cleanup_free_
char *line
= NULL
;
2121 assert(params
->fds
|| params
->n_fds
<= 0);
2123 if (context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
||
2124 context
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
||
2125 context
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
) {
2127 if (params
->n_fds
!= 1) {
2128 log_unit_error(unit
, "Got more than one socket.");
2132 socket_fd
= params
->fds
[0];
2136 n_fds
= params
->n_fds
;
2139 r
= exec_context_load_environment(unit
, context
, &files_env
);
2141 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to load environment files: %m");
2143 argv
= params
->argv
?: command
->argv
;
2144 line
= exec_command_line(argv
);
2148 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
2150 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "About to execute: %s", line
),
2151 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
,
2155 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to fork: %m");
2160 r
= exec_child(unit
,
2172 log_struct_errno(LOG_ERR
, r
,
2173 LOG_MESSAGE_ID(SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED
),
2175 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Failed at step %s spawning %s: %m",
2176 exit_status_to_string(exit_status
, EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD
),
2178 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
,
2185 log_unit_debug(unit
, "Forked %s as "PID_FMT
, command
->path
, pid
);
2187 /* We add the new process to the cgroup both in the child (so
2188 * that we can be sure that no user code is ever executed
2189 * outside of the cgroup) and in the parent (so that we can be
2190 * sure that when we kill the cgroup the process will be
2192 if (params
->cgroup_path
)
2193 (void) cg_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, params
->cgroup_path
, pid
);
2195 exec_status_start(&command
->exec_status
, pid
);
2201 void exec_context_init(ExecContext
*c
) {
2205 c
->ioprio
= IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE
, 0);
2206 c
->cpu_sched_policy
= SCHED_OTHER
;
2207 c
->syslog_priority
= LOG_DAEMON
|LOG_INFO
;
2208 c
->syslog_level_prefix
= true;
2209 c
->ignore_sigpipe
= true;
2210 c
->timer_slack_nsec
= NSEC_INFINITY
;
2211 c
->personality
= PERSONALITY_INVALID
;
2212 c
->runtime_directory_mode
= 0755;
2213 c
->capability_bounding_set
= CAP_ALL
;
2216 void exec_context_done(ExecContext
*c
) {
2221 c
->environment
= strv_free(c
->environment
);
2222 c
->environment_files
= strv_free(c
->environment_files
);
2223 c
->pass_environment
= strv_free(c
->pass_environment
);
2225 for (l
= 0; l
< ELEMENTSOF(c
->rlimit
); l
++)
2226 c
->rlimit
[l
] = mfree(c
->rlimit
[l
]);
2228 c
->working_directory
= mfree(c
->working_directory
);
2229 c
->root_directory
= mfree(c
->root_directory
);
2230 c
->tty_path
= mfree(c
->tty_path
);
2231 c
->syslog_identifier
= mfree(c
->syslog_identifier
);
2232 c
->user
= mfree(c
->user
);
2233 c
->group
= mfree(c
->group
);
2235 c
->supplementary_groups
= strv_free(c
->supplementary_groups
);
2237 c
->pam_name
= mfree(c
->pam_name
);
2239 c
->read_only_dirs
= strv_free(c
->read_only_dirs
);
2240 c
->read_write_dirs
= strv_free(c
->read_write_dirs
);
2241 c
->inaccessible_dirs
= strv_free(c
->inaccessible_dirs
);
2244 CPU_FREE(c
->cpuset
);
2246 c
->utmp_id
= mfree(c
->utmp_id
);
2247 c
->selinux_context
= mfree(c
->selinux_context
);
2248 c
->apparmor_profile
= mfree(c
->apparmor_profile
);
2250 c
->syscall_filter
= set_free(c
->syscall_filter
);
2251 c
->syscall_archs
= set_free(c
->syscall_archs
);
2252 c
->address_families
= set_free(c
->address_families
);
2254 c
->runtime_directory
= strv_free(c
->runtime_directory
);
2257 int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(ExecContext
*c
, const char *runtime_prefix
) {
2262 if (!runtime_prefix
)
2265 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->runtime_directory
) {
2266 _cleanup_free_
char *p
;
2268 p
= strjoin(runtime_prefix
, "/", *i
, NULL
);
2272 /* We execute this synchronously, since we need to be
2273 * sure this is gone when we start the service
2275 (void) rm_rf(p
, REMOVE_ROOT
);
2281 void exec_command_done(ExecCommand
*c
) {
2284 c
->path
= mfree(c
->path
);
2286 c
->argv
= strv_free(c
->argv
);
2289 void exec_command_done_array(ExecCommand
*c
, unsigned n
) {
2292 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
2293 exec_command_done(c
+i
);
2296 ExecCommand
* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand
*c
) {
2300 LIST_REMOVE(command
, c
, i
);
2301 exec_command_done(i
);
2308 void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand
**c
, unsigned n
) {
2311 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
2312 c
[i
] = exec_command_free_list(c
[i
]);
2315 typedef struct InvalidEnvInfo
{
2320 static void invalid_env(const char *p
, void *userdata
) {
2321 InvalidEnvInfo
*info
= userdata
;
2323 log_unit_error(info
->unit
, "Ignoring invalid environment assignment '%s': %s", p
, info
->path
);
2326 int exec_context_load_environment(Unit
*unit
, const ExecContext
*c
, char ***l
) {
2327 char **i
, **r
= NULL
;
2332 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->environment_files
) {
2335 bool ignore
= false;
2337 _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t pglob
= {};
2347 if (!path_is_absolute(fn
)) {
2355 /* Filename supports globbing, take all matching files */
2357 if (glob(fn
, 0, NULL
, &pglob
) != 0) {
2362 return errno
> 0 ? -errno
: -EINVAL
;
2364 count
= pglob
.gl_pathc
;
2372 for (n
= 0; n
< count
; n
++) {
2373 k
= load_env_file(NULL
, pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
], NULL
, &p
);
2381 /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */
2383 InvalidEnvInfo info
= {
2385 .path
= pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
]
2388 p
= strv_env_clean_with_callback(p
, invalid_env
, &info
);
2396 m
= strv_env_merge(2, r
, p
);
2412 static bool tty_may_match_dev_console(const char *tty
) {
2413 _cleanup_free_
char *active
= NULL
;
2419 if (startswith(tty
, "/dev/"))
2422 /* trivial identity? */
2423 if (streq(tty
, "console"))
2426 console
= resolve_dev_console(&active
);
2427 /* if we could not resolve, assume it may */
2431 /* "tty0" means the active VC, so it may be the same sometimes */
2432 return streq(console
, tty
) || (streq(console
, "tty0") && tty_is_vc(tty
));
2435 bool exec_context_may_touch_console(ExecContext
*ec
) {
2437 return (ec
->tty_reset
||
2439 ec
->tty_vt_disallocate
||
2440 is_terminal_input(ec
->std_input
) ||
2441 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_output
) ||
2442 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_error
)) &&
2443 tty_may_match_dev_console(exec_context_tty_path(ec
));
2446 static void strv_fprintf(FILE *f
, char **l
) {
2452 fprintf(f
, " %s", *g
);
2455 void exec_context_dump(ExecContext
*c
, FILE* f
, const char *prefix
) {
2462 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
2466 "%sWorkingDirectory: %s\n"
2467 "%sRootDirectory: %s\n"
2468 "%sNonBlocking: %s\n"
2469 "%sPrivateTmp: %s\n"
2470 "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n"
2471 "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n"
2472 "%sProtectHome: %s\n"
2473 "%sProtectSystem: %s\n"
2474 "%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n"
2475 "%sMemoryDenyWriteExecute: %s\n",
2477 prefix
, c
->working_directory
? c
->working_directory
: "/",
2478 prefix
, c
->root_directory
? c
->root_directory
: "/",
2479 prefix
, yes_no(c
->non_blocking
),
2480 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_tmp
),
2481 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_network
),
2482 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_devices
),
2483 prefix
, protect_home_to_string(c
->protect_home
),
2484 prefix
, protect_system_to_string(c
->protect_system
),
2485 prefix
, yes_no(c
->ignore_sigpipe
),
2486 prefix
, yes_no(c
->memory_deny_write_execute
));
2488 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment
)
2489 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
2491 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment_files
)
2492 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironmentFile: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
2494 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->pass_environment
)
2495 fprintf(f
, "%sPassEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
2497 fprintf(f
, "%sRuntimeDirectoryMode: %04o\n", prefix
, c
->runtime_directory_mode
);
2499 STRV_FOREACH(d
, c
->runtime_directory
)
2500 fprintf(f
, "%sRuntimeDirectory: %s\n", prefix
, *d
);
2507 if (c
->oom_score_adjust_set
)
2509 "%sOOMScoreAdjust: %i\n",
2510 prefix
, c
->oom_score_adjust
);
2512 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++)
2514 fprintf(f
, "%s%s: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
2515 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_max
);
2516 fprintf(f
, "%s%sSoft: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
2517 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_cur
);
2520 if (c
->ioprio_set
) {
2521 _cleanup_free_
char *class_str
= NULL
;
2523 ioprio_class_to_string_alloc(IOPRIO_PRIO_CLASS(c
->ioprio
), &class_str
);
2525 "%sIOSchedulingClass: %s\n"
2526 "%sIOPriority: %i\n",
2527 prefix
, strna(class_str
),
2528 prefix
, (int) IOPRIO_PRIO_DATA(c
->ioprio
));
2531 if (c
->cpu_sched_set
) {
2532 _cleanup_free_
char *policy_str
= NULL
;
2534 sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c
->cpu_sched_policy
, &policy_str
);
2536 "%sCPUSchedulingPolicy: %s\n"
2537 "%sCPUSchedulingPriority: %i\n"
2538 "%sCPUSchedulingResetOnFork: %s\n",
2539 prefix
, strna(policy_str
),
2540 prefix
, c
->cpu_sched_priority
,
2541 prefix
, yes_no(c
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
));
2545 fprintf(f
, "%sCPUAffinity:", prefix
);
2546 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->cpuset_ncpus
; i
++)
2547 if (CPU_ISSET_S(i
, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(c
->cpuset_ncpus
), c
->cpuset
))
2548 fprintf(f
, " %u", i
);
2552 if (c
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
2553 fprintf(f
, "%sTimerSlackNSec: "NSEC_FMT
"\n", prefix
, c
->timer_slack_nsec
);
2556 "%sStandardInput: %s\n"
2557 "%sStandardOutput: %s\n"
2558 "%sStandardError: %s\n",
2559 prefix
, exec_input_to_string(c
->std_input
),
2560 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_output
),
2561 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_error
));
2567 "%sTTYVHangup: %s\n"
2568 "%sTTYVTDisallocate: %s\n",
2569 prefix
, c
->tty_path
,
2570 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_reset
),
2571 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vhangup
),
2572 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vt_disallocate
));
2574 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
||
2575 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
||
2576 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
||
2577 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
||
2578 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
||
2579 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
||
2580 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
||
2581 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
||
2582 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
||
2583 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
||
2584 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
||
2585 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
) {
2587 _cleanup_free_
char *fac_str
= NULL
, *lvl_str
= NULL
;
2589 log_facility_unshifted_to_string_alloc(c
->syslog_priority
>> 3, &fac_str
);
2590 log_level_to_string_alloc(LOG_PRI(c
->syslog_priority
), &lvl_str
);
2593 "%sSyslogFacility: %s\n"
2594 "%sSyslogLevel: %s\n",
2595 prefix
, strna(fac_str
),
2596 prefix
, strna(lvl_str
));
2600 fprintf(f
, "%sSecure Bits:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
2602 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
) ? " keep-caps" : "",
2603 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED
) ? " keep-caps-locked" : "",
2604 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP
) ? " no-setuid-fixup" : "",
2605 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED
) ? " no-setuid-fixup-locked" : "",
2606 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_NOROOT
) ? " noroot" : "",
2607 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED
) ? "noroot-locked" : "");
2609 if (c
->capability_bounding_set
!= CAP_ALL
) {
2611 fprintf(f
, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet:", prefix
);
2613 for (l
= 0; l
<= cap_last_cap(); l
++)
2614 if (c
->capability_bounding_set
& (UINT64_C(1) << l
))
2615 fprintf(f
, " %s", strna(capability_to_name(l
)));
2620 if (c
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
2622 fprintf(f
, "%sAmbientCapabilities:", prefix
);
2624 for (l
= 0; l
<= cap_last_cap(); l
++)
2625 if (c
->capability_ambient_set
& (UINT64_C(1) << l
))
2626 fprintf(f
, " %s", strna(capability_to_name(l
)));
2632 fprintf(f
, "%sUser: %s\n", prefix
, c
->user
);
2634 fprintf(f
, "%sGroup: %s\n", prefix
, c
->group
);
2636 if (strv_length(c
->supplementary_groups
) > 0) {
2637 fprintf(f
, "%sSupplementaryGroups:", prefix
);
2638 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->supplementary_groups
);
2643 fprintf(f
, "%sPAMName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->pam_name
);
2645 if (strv_length(c
->read_write_dirs
) > 0) {
2646 fprintf(f
, "%sReadWriteDirs:", prefix
);
2647 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_write_dirs
);
2651 if (strv_length(c
->read_only_dirs
) > 0) {
2652 fprintf(f
, "%sReadOnlyDirs:", prefix
);
2653 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_only_dirs
);
2657 if (strv_length(c
->inaccessible_dirs
) > 0) {
2658 fprintf(f
, "%sInaccessibleDirs:", prefix
);
2659 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->inaccessible_dirs
);
2665 "%sUtmpIdentifier: %s\n",
2666 prefix
, c
->utmp_id
);
2668 if (c
->selinux_context
)
2670 "%sSELinuxContext: %s%s\n",
2671 prefix
, c
->selinux_context_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->selinux_context
);
2673 if (c
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
)
2675 "%sPersonality: %s\n",
2676 prefix
, strna(personality_to_string(c
->personality
)));
2678 if (c
->syscall_filter
) {
2686 "%sSystemCallFilter: ",
2689 if (!c
->syscall_whitelist
)
2693 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_filter
, j
) {
2694 _cleanup_free_
char *name
= NULL
;
2701 name
= seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE
, PTR_TO_INT(id
) - 1);
2702 fputs(strna(name
), f
);
2709 if (c
->syscall_archs
) {
2716 "%sSystemCallArchitectures:",
2720 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_archs
, j
)
2721 fprintf(f
, " %s", strna(seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id
) - 1)));
2726 if (c
->syscall_errno
> 0)
2728 "%sSystemCallErrorNumber: %s\n",
2729 prefix
, strna(errno_to_name(c
->syscall_errno
)));
2731 if (c
->apparmor_profile
)
2733 "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n",
2734 prefix
, c
->apparmor_profile_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->apparmor_profile
);
2737 bool exec_context_maintains_privileges(ExecContext
*c
) {
2740 /* Returns true if the process forked off would run run under
2741 * an unchanged UID or as root. */
2746 if (streq(c
->user
, "root") || streq(c
->user
, "0"))
2752 void exec_status_start(ExecStatus
*s
, pid_t pid
) {
2757 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->start_timestamp
);
2760 void exec_status_exit(ExecStatus
*s
, ExecContext
*context
, pid_t pid
, int code
, int status
) {
2763 if (s
->pid
&& s
->pid
!= pid
)
2767 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->exit_timestamp
);
2773 if (context
->utmp_id
)
2774 utmp_put_dead_process(context
->utmp_id
, pid
, code
, status
);
2776 exec_context_tty_reset(context
, NULL
);
2780 void exec_status_dump(ExecStatus
*s
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
2781 char buf
[FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_MAX
];
2789 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
2792 "%sPID: "PID_FMT
"\n",
2795 if (s
->start_timestamp
.realtime
> 0)
2797 "%sStart Timestamp: %s\n",
2798 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->start_timestamp
.realtime
));
2800 if (s
->exit_timestamp
.realtime
> 0)
2802 "%sExit Timestamp: %s\n"
2804 "%sExit Status: %i\n",
2805 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->exit_timestamp
.realtime
),
2806 prefix
, sigchld_code_to_string(s
->code
),
2810 char *exec_command_line(char **argv
) {
2818 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
)
2821 if (!(n
= new(char, k
)))
2825 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
) {
2832 if (strpbrk(*a
, WHITESPACE
)) {
2843 /* FIXME: this doesn't really handle arguments that have
2844 * spaces and ticks in them */
2849 void exec_command_dump(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
2850 _cleanup_free_
char *cmd
= NULL
;
2851 const char *prefix2
;
2856 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
2857 prefix2
= strjoina(prefix
, "\t");
2859 cmd
= exec_command_line(c
->argv
);
2861 "%sCommand Line: %s\n",
2862 prefix
, cmd
? cmd
: strerror(ENOMEM
));
2864 exec_status_dump(&c
->exec_status
, f
, prefix2
);
2867 void exec_command_dump_list(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
2870 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
2872 LIST_FOREACH(command
, c
, c
)
2873 exec_command_dump(c
, f
, prefix
);
2876 void exec_command_append_list(ExecCommand
**l
, ExecCommand
*e
) {
2883 /* It's kind of important, that we keep the order here */
2884 LIST_FIND_TAIL(command
, *l
, end
);
2885 LIST_INSERT_AFTER(command
, *l
, end
, e
);
2890 int exec_command_set(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
2898 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
2919 int exec_command_append(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
2920 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **l
= NULL
;
2928 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
2934 r
= strv_extend_strv(&c
->argv
, l
, false);
2942 static int exec_runtime_allocate(ExecRuntime
**rt
) {
2947 *rt
= new0(ExecRuntime
, 1);
2952 (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[0] = (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[1] = -1;
2957 int exec_runtime_make(ExecRuntime
**rt
, ExecContext
*c
, const char *id
) {
2967 if (!c
->private_network
&& !c
->private_tmp
)
2970 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(rt
);
2974 if (c
->private_network
&& (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[0] < 0) {
2975 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_DGRAM
, 0, (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
) < 0)
2979 if (c
->private_tmp
&& !(*rt
)->tmp_dir
) {
2980 r
= setup_tmp_dirs(id
, &(*rt
)->tmp_dir
, &(*rt
)->var_tmp_dir
);
2988 ExecRuntime
*exec_runtime_ref(ExecRuntime
*r
) {
2990 assert(r
->n_ref
> 0);
2996 ExecRuntime
*exec_runtime_unref(ExecRuntime
*r
) {
3001 assert(r
->n_ref
> 0);
3008 free(r
->var_tmp_dir
);
3009 safe_close_pair(r
->netns_storage_socket
);
3015 int exec_runtime_serialize(Unit
*u
, ExecRuntime
*rt
, FILE *f
, FDSet
*fds
) {
3024 unit_serialize_item(u
, f
, "tmp-dir", rt
->tmp_dir
);
3026 if (rt
->var_tmp_dir
)
3027 unit_serialize_item(u
, f
, "var-tmp-dir", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
3029 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
3032 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
3036 unit_serialize_item_format(u
, f
, "netns-socket-0", "%i", copy
);
3039 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] >= 0) {
3042 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
3046 unit_serialize_item_format(u
, f
, "netns-socket-1", "%i", copy
);
3052 int exec_runtime_deserialize_item(Unit
*u
, ExecRuntime
**rt
, const char *key
, const char *value
, FDSet
*fds
) {
3059 if (streq(key
, "tmp-dir")) {
3062 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(rt
);
3066 copy
= strdup(value
);
3070 free((*rt
)->tmp_dir
);
3071 (*rt
)->tmp_dir
= copy
;
3073 } else if (streq(key
, "var-tmp-dir")) {
3076 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(rt
);
3080 copy
= strdup(value
);
3084 free((*rt
)->var_tmp_dir
);
3085 (*rt
)->var_tmp_dir
= copy
;
3087 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-0")) {
3090 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(rt
);
3094 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
))
3095 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
3097 safe_close((*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
3098 (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[0] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
3100 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-1")) {
3103 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(rt
);
3107 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
))
3108 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
3110 safe_close((*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
3111 (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[1] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
3119 static void *remove_tmpdir_thread(void *p
) {
3120 _cleanup_free_
char *path
= p
;
3122 (void) rm_rf(path
, REMOVE_ROOT
|REMOVE_PHYSICAL
);
3126 void exec_runtime_destroy(ExecRuntime
*rt
) {
3132 /* If there are multiple users of this, let's leave the stuff around */
3137 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->tmp_dir
);
3139 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->tmp_dir
);
3141 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->tmp_dir
);
3148 if (rt
->var_tmp_dir
) {
3149 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
3151 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
3153 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
3154 free(rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
3157 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
3160 safe_close_pair(rt
->netns_storage_socket
);
3163 static const char* const exec_input_table
[_EXEC_INPUT_MAX
] = {
3164 [EXEC_INPUT_NULL
] = "null",
3165 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
3166 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
] = "tty-force",
3167 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
] = "tty-fail",
3168 [EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket"
3171 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_input
, ExecInput
);
3173 static const char* const exec_output_table
[_EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
] = {
3174 [EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
] = "inherit",
3175 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
] = "null",
3176 [EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
3177 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
] = "syslog",
3178 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
] = "syslog+console",
3179 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
] = "kmsg",
3180 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
] = "kmsg+console",
3181 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
] = "journal",
3182 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
] = "journal+console",
3183 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket"
3186 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_output
, ExecOutput
);
3188 static const char* const exec_utmp_mode_table
[_EXEC_UTMP_MODE_MAX
] = {
3189 [EXEC_UTMP_INIT
] = "init",
3190 [EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
] = "login",
3191 [EXEC_UTMP_USER
] = "user",
3194 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_utmp_mode
, ExecUtmpMode
);