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[thirdparty/systemd.git] / src / core / execute.c
1 /***
2 This file is part of systemd.
3
4 Copyright 2010 Lennart Poettering
5
6 systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
7 under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
8 the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
9 (at your option) any later version.
10
11 systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
12 WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
14 Lesser General Public License for more details.
15
16 You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
17 along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
18 ***/
19
20 #include <errno.h>
21 #include <fcntl.h>
22 #include <glob.h>
23 #include <grp.h>
24 #include <poll.h>
25 #include <signal.h>
26 #include <string.h>
27 #include <sys/capability.h>
28 #include <sys/mman.h>
29 #include <sys/personality.h>
30 #include <sys/prctl.h>
31 #include <sys/socket.h>
32 #include <sys/stat.h>
33 #include <sys/un.h>
34 #include <unistd.h>
35 #include <utmpx.h>
36
37 #ifdef HAVE_PAM
38 #include <security/pam_appl.h>
39 #endif
40
41 #ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
42 #include <selinux/selinux.h>
43 #endif
44
45 #ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
46 #include <seccomp.h>
47 #endif
48
49 #ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
50 #include <sys/apparmor.h>
51 #endif
52
53 #include "sd-messages.h"
54
55 #include "af-list.h"
56 #include "alloc-util.h"
57 #ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
58 #include "apparmor-util.h"
59 #endif
60 #include "async.h"
61 #include "barrier.h"
62 #include "cap-list.h"
63 #include "capability-util.h"
64 #include "def.h"
65 #include "env-util.h"
66 #include "errno-list.h"
67 #include "execute.h"
68 #include "exit-status.h"
69 #include "fd-util.h"
70 #include "fileio.h"
71 #include "formats-util.h"
72 #include "fs-util.h"
73 #include "glob-util.h"
74 #include "io-util.h"
75 #include "ioprio.h"
76 #include "log.h"
77 #include "macro.h"
78 #include "missing.h"
79 #include "mkdir.h"
80 #include "namespace.h"
81 #include "parse-util.h"
82 #include "path-util.h"
83 #include "process-util.h"
84 #include "rlimit-util.h"
85 #include "rm-rf.h"
86 #ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
87 #include "seccomp-util.h"
88 #endif
89 #include "securebits.h"
90 #include "selinux-util.h"
91 #include "signal-util.h"
92 #include "smack-util.h"
93 #include "string-table.h"
94 #include "string-util.h"
95 #include "strv.h"
96 #include "syslog-util.h"
97 #include "terminal-util.h"
98 #include "unit.h"
99 #include "user-util.h"
100 #include "util.h"
101 #include "utmp-wtmp.h"
102
103 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC)
104 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC)
105
106 /* This assumes there is a 'tty' group */
107 #define TTY_MODE 0620
108
109 #define SNDBUF_SIZE (8*1024*1024)
110
111 static int shift_fds(int fds[], unsigned n_fds) {
112 int start, restart_from;
113
114 if (n_fds <= 0)
115 return 0;
116
117 /* Modifies the fds array! (sorts it) */
118
119 assert(fds);
120
121 start = 0;
122 for (;;) {
123 int i;
124
125 restart_from = -1;
126
127 for (i = start; i < (int) n_fds; i++) {
128 int nfd;
129
130 /* Already at right index? */
131 if (fds[i] == i+3)
132 continue;
133
134 nfd = fcntl(fds[i], F_DUPFD, i + 3);
135 if (nfd < 0)
136 return -errno;
137
138 safe_close(fds[i]);
139 fds[i] = nfd;
140
141 /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then
142 * let's remember that and try again from here */
143 if (nfd != i+3 && restart_from < 0)
144 restart_from = i;
145 }
146
147 if (restart_from < 0)
148 break;
149
150 start = restart_from;
151 }
152
153 return 0;
154 }
155
156 static int flags_fds(const int fds[], unsigned n_fds, bool nonblock) {
157 unsigned i;
158 int r;
159
160 if (n_fds <= 0)
161 return 0;
162
163 assert(fds);
164
165 /* Drops/Sets O_NONBLOCK and FD_CLOEXEC from the file flags */
166
167 for (i = 0; i < n_fds; i++) {
168
169 r = fd_nonblock(fds[i], nonblock);
170 if (r < 0)
171 return r;
172
173 /* We unconditionally drop FD_CLOEXEC from the fds,
174 * since after all we want to pass these fds to our
175 * children */
176
177 r = fd_cloexec(fds[i], false);
178 if (r < 0)
179 return r;
180 }
181
182 return 0;
183 }
184
185 static const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext *context) {
186 assert(context);
187
188 if (context->stdio_as_fds)
189 return NULL;
190
191 if (context->tty_path)
192 return context->tty_path;
193
194 return "/dev/console";
195 }
196
197 static void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext *context, const ExecParameters *p) {
198 const char *path;
199
200 assert(context);
201
202 path = exec_context_tty_path(context);
203
204 if (context->tty_vhangup) {
205 if (p && p->stdin_fd >= 0)
206 (void) terminal_vhangup_fd(p->stdin_fd);
207 else if (path)
208 (void) terminal_vhangup(path);
209 }
210
211 if (context->tty_reset) {
212 if (p && p->stdin_fd >= 0)
213 (void) reset_terminal_fd(p->stdin_fd, true);
214 else if (path)
215 (void) reset_terminal(path);
216 }
217
218 if (context->tty_vt_disallocate && path)
219 (void) vt_disallocate(path);
220 }
221
222 static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o) {
223 return
224 o == EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY ||
225 o == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE ||
226 o == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE ||
227 o == EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE;
228 }
229
230 static int open_null_as(int flags, int nfd) {
231 int fd, r;
232
233 assert(nfd >= 0);
234
235 fd = open("/dev/null", flags|O_NOCTTY);
236 if (fd < 0)
237 return -errno;
238
239 if (fd != nfd) {
240 r = dup2(fd, nfd) < 0 ? -errno : nfd;
241 safe_close(fd);
242 } else
243 r = nfd;
244
245 return r;
246 }
247
248 static int connect_journal_socket(int fd, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
249 union sockaddr_union sa = {
250 .un.sun_family = AF_UNIX,
251 .un.sun_path = "/run/systemd/journal/stdout",
252 };
253 uid_t olduid = UID_INVALID;
254 gid_t oldgid = GID_INVALID;
255 int r;
256
257 if (gid != GID_INVALID) {
258 oldgid = getgid();
259
260 r = setegid(gid);
261 if (r < 0)
262 return -errno;
263 }
264
265 if (uid != UID_INVALID) {
266 olduid = getuid();
267
268 r = seteuid(uid);
269 if (r < 0) {
270 r = -errno;
271 goto restore_gid;
272 }
273 }
274
275 r = connect(fd, &sa.sa, SOCKADDR_UN_LEN(sa.un));
276 if (r < 0)
277 r = -errno;
278
279 /* If we fail to restore the uid or gid, things will likely
280 fail later on. This should only happen if an LSM interferes. */
281
282 if (uid != UID_INVALID)
283 (void) seteuid(olduid);
284
285 restore_gid:
286 if (gid != GID_INVALID)
287 (void) setegid(oldgid);
288
289 return r;
290 }
291
292 static int connect_logger_as(
293 const ExecContext *context,
294 ExecOutput output,
295 const char *ident,
296 const char *unit_id,
297 int nfd,
298 uid_t uid,
299 gid_t gid) {
300
301 int fd, r;
302
303 assert(context);
304 assert(output < _EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX);
305 assert(ident);
306 assert(nfd >= 0);
307
308 fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
309 if (fd < 0)
310 return -errno;
311
312 r = connect_journal_socket(fd, uid, gid);
313 if (r < 0)
314 return r;
315
316 if (shutdown(fd, SHUT_RD) < 0) {
317 safe_close(fd);
318 return -errno;
319 }
320
321 (void) fd_inc_sndbuf(fd, SNDBUF_SIZE);
322
323 dprintf(fd,
324 "%s\n"
325 "%s\n"
326 "%i\n"
327 "%i\n"
328 "%i\n"
329 "%i\n"
330 "%i\n",
331 context->syslog_identifier ? context->syslog_identifier : ident,
332 unit_id,
333 context->syslog_priority,
334 !!context->syslog_level_prefix,
335 output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG || output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE,
336 output == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG || output == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE,
337 is_terminal_output(output));
338
339 if (fd == nfd)
340 return nfd;
341
342 r = dup2(fd, nfd) < 0 ? -errno : nfd;
343 safe_close(fd);
344
345 return r;
346 }
347 static int open_terminal_as(const char *path, mode_t mode, int nfd) {
348 int fd, r;
349
350 assert(path);
351 assert(nfd >= 0);
352
353 fd = open_terminal(path, mode | O_NOCTTY);
354 if (fd < 0)
355 return fd;
356
357 if (fd != nfd) {
358 r = dup2(fd, nfd) < 0 ? -errno : nfd;
359 safe_close(fd);
360 } else
361 r = nfd;
362
363 return r;
364 }
365
366 static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i) {
367 return
368 i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY ||
369 i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE ||
370 i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL;
371 }
372
373 static int fixup_input(ExecInput std_input, int socket_fd, bool apply_tty_stdin) {
374
375 if (is_terminal_input(std_input) && !apply_tty_stdin)
376 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL;
377
378 if (std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET && socket_fd < 0)
379 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL;
380
381 return std_input;
382 }
383
384 static int fixup_output(ExecOutput std_output, int socket_fd) {
385
386 if (std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET && socket_fd < 0)
387 return EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT;
388
389 return std_output;
390 }
391
392 static int setup_input(
393 const ExecContext *context,
394 const ExecParameters *params,
395 int socket_fd) {
396
397 ExecInput i;
398
399 assert(context);
400 assert(params);
401
402 if (params->stdin_fd >= 0) {
403 if (dup2(params->stdin_fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0)
404 return -errno;
405
406 /* Try to make this the controlling tty, if it is a tty, and reset it */
407 (void) ioctl(STDIN_FILENO, TIOCSCTTY, context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE);
408 (void) reset_terminal_fd(STDIN_FILENO, true);
409
410 return STDIN_FILENO;
411 }
412
413 i = fixup_input(context->std_input, socket_fd, params->apply_tty_stdin);
414
415 switch (i) {
416
417 case EXEC_INPUT_NULL:
418 return open_null_as(O_RDONLY, STDIN_FILENO);
419
420 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY:
421 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE:
422 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL: {
423 int fd, r;
424
425 fd = acquire_terminal(exec_context_tty_path(context),
426 i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL,
427 i == EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE,
428 false,
429 USEC_INFINITY);
430 if (fd < 0)
431 return fd;
432
433 if (fd != STDIN_FILENO) {
434 r = dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0 ? -errno : STDIN_FILENO;
435 safe_close(fd);
436 } else
437 r = STDIN_FILENO;
438
439 return r;
440 }
441
442 case EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET:
443 return dup2(socket_fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0 ? -errno : STDIN_FILENO;
444
445 default:
446 assert_not_reached("Unknown input type");
447 }
448 }
449
450 static int setup_output(
451 Unit *unit,
452 const ExecContext *context,
453 const ExecParameters *params,
454 int fileno,
455 int socket_fd,
456 const char *ident,
457 uid_t uid,
458 gid_t gid,
459 dev_t *journal_stream_dev,
460 ino_t *journal_stream_ino) {
461
462 ExecOutput o;
463 ExecInput i;
464 int r;
465
466 assert(unit);
467 assert(context);
468 assert(params);
469 assert(ident);
470 assert(journal_stream_dev);
471 assert(journal_stream_ino);
472
473 if (fileno == STDOUT_FILENO && params->stdout_fd >= 0) {
474
475 if (dup2(params->stdout_fd, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
476 return -errno;
477
478 return STDOUT_FILENO;
479 }
480
481 if (fileno == STDERR_FILENO && params->stderr_fd >= 0) {
482 if (dup2(params->stderr_fd, STDERR_FILENO) < 0)
483 return -errno;
484
485 return STDERR_FILENO;
486 }
487
488 i = fixup_input(context->std_input, socket_fd, params->apply_tty_stdin);
489 o = fixup_output(context->std_output, socket_fd);
490
491 if (fileno == STDERR_FILENO) {
492 ExecOutput e;
493 e = fixup_output(context->std_error, socket_fd);
494
495 /* This expects the input and output are already set up */
496
497 /* Don't change the stderr file descriptor if we inherit all
498 * the way and are not on a tty */
499 if (e == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT &&
500 o == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT &&
501 i == EXEC_INPUT_NULL &&
502 !is_terminal_input(context->std_input) &&
503 getppid () != 1)
504 return fileno;
505
506 /* Duplicate from stdout if possible */
507 if (e == o || e == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT)
508 return dup2(STDOUT_FILENO, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno;
509
510 o = e;
511
512 } else if (o == EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT) {
513 /* If input got downgraded, inherit the original value */
514 if (i == EXEC_INPUT_NULL && is_terminal_input(context->std_input))
515 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context), O_WRONLY, fileno);
516
517 /* If the input is connected to anything that's not a /dev/null, inherit that... */
518 if (i != EXEC_INPUT_NULL)
519 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno;
520
521 /* If we are not started from PID 1 we just inherit STDOUT from our parent process. */
522 if (getppid() != 1)
523 return fileno;
524
525 /* We need to open /dev/null here anew, to get the right access mode. */
526 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno);
527 }
528
529 switch (o) {
530
531 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL:
532 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno);
533
534 case EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY:
535 if (is_terminal_input(i))
536 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno;
537
538 /* We don't reset the terminal if this is just about output */
539 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context), O_WRONLY, fileno);
540
541 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG:
542 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE:
543 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG:
544 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE:
545 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL:
546 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE:
547 r = connect_logger_as(context, o, ident, unit->id, fileno, uid, gid);
548 if (r < 0) {
549 log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to connect %s to the journal socket, ignoring: %m", fileno == STDOUT_FILENO ? "stdout" : "stderr");
550 r = open_null_as(O_WRONLY, fileno);
551 } else {
552 struct stat st;
553
554 /* If we connected this fd to the journal via a stream, patch the device/inode into the passed
555 * parameters, but only then. This is useful so that we can set $JOURNAL_STREAM that permits
556 * services to detect whether they are connected to the journal or not. */
557
558 if (fstat(fileno, &st) >= 0) {
559 *journal_stream_dev = st.st_dev;
560 *journal_stream_ino = st.st_ino;
561 }
562 }
563 return r;
564
565 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET:
566 assert(socket_fd >= 0);
567 return dup2(socket_fd, fileno) < 0 ? -errno : fileno;
568
569 default:
570 assert_not_reached("Unknown error type");
571 }
572 }
573
574 static int chown_terminal(int fd, uid_t uid) {
575 struct stat st;
576
577 assert(fd >= 0);
578
579 /* Before we chown/chmod the TTY, let's ensure this is actually a tty */
580 if (isatty(fd) < 1)
581 return 0;
582
583 /* This might fail. What matters are the results. */
584 (void) fchown(fd, uid, -1);
585 (void) fchmod(fd, TTY_MODE);
586
587 if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
588 return -errno;
589
590 if (st.st_uid != uid || (st.st_mode & 0777) != TTY_MODE)
591 return -EPERM;
592
593 return 0;
594 }
595
596 static int setup_confirm_stdio(int *_saved_stdin, int *_saved_stdout) {
597 _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1, saved_stdin = -1, saved_stdout = -1;
598 int r;
599
600 assert(_saved_stdin);
601 assert(_saved_stdout);
602
603 saved_stdin = fcntl(STDIN_FILENO, F_DUPFD, 3);
604 if (saved_stdin < 0)
605 return -errno;
606
607 saved_stdout = fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO, F_DUPFD, 3);
608 if (saved_stdout < 0)
609 return -errno;
610
611 fd = acquire_terminal(
612 "/dev/console",
613 false,
614 false,
615 false,
616 DEFAULT_CONFIRM_USEC);
617 if (fd < 0)
618 return fd;
619
620 r = chown_terminal(fd, getuid());
621 if (r < 0)
622 return r;
623
624 r = reset_terminal_fd(fd, true);
625 if (r < 0)
626 return r;
627
628 if (dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO) < 0)
629 return -errno;
630
631 if (dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
632 return -errno;
633
634 if (fd >= 2)
635 safe_close(fd);
636 fd = -1;
637
638 *_saved_stdin = saved_stdin;
639 *_saved_stdout = saved_stdout;
640
641 saved_stdin = saved_stdout = -1;
642
643 return 0;
644 }
645
646 _printf_(1, 2) static int write_confirm_message(const char *format, ...) {
647 _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
648 va_list ap;
649
650 assert(format);
651
652 fd = open_terminal("/dev/console", O_WRONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC);
653 if (fd < 0)
654 return fd;
655
656 va_start(ap, format);
657 vdprintf(fd, format, ap);
658 va_end(ap);
659
660 return 0;
661 }
662
663 static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin, int *saved_stdout) {
664 int r = 0;
665
666 assert(saved_stdin);
667 assert(saved_stdout);
668
669 release_terminal();
670
671 if (*saved_stdin >= 0)
672 if (dup2(*saved_stdin, STDIN_FILENO) < 0)
673 r = -errno;
674
675 if (*saved_stdout >= 0)
676 if (dup2(*saved_stdout, STDOUT_FILENO) < 0)
677 r = -errno;
678
679 *saved_stdin = safe_close(*saved_stdin);
680 *saved_stdout = safe_close(*saved_stdout);
681
682 return r;
683 }
684
685 static int ask_for_confirmation(char *response, char **argv) {
686 int saved_stdout = -1, saved_stdin = -1, r;
687 _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL;
688
689 r = setup_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin, &saved_stdout);
690 if (r < 0)
691 return r;
692
693 line = exec_command_line(argv);
694 if (!line)
695 return -ENOMEM;
696
697 r = ask_char(response, "yns", "Execute %s? [Yes, No, Skip] ", line);
698
699 restore_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin, &saved_stdout);
700
701 return r;
702 }
703
704 static int enforce_groups(const ExecContext *context, const char *username, gid_t gid) {
705 bool keep_groups = false;
706 int r;
707
708 assert(context);
709
710 /* Lookup and set GID and supplementary group list. Here too
711 * we avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. */
712
713 if (context->group || username) {
714 /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */
715 if (username && gid != 0) {
716 if (initgroups(username, gid) < 0)
717 return -errno;
718
719 keep_groups = true;
720 }
721
722 /* Second step, set our gids */
723 if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) < 0)
724 return -errno;
725 }
726
727 if (context->supplementary_groups) {
728 int ngroups_max, k;
729 gid_t *gids;
730 char **i;
731
732 /* Final step, initialize any manually set supplementary groups */
733 assert_se((ngroups_max = (int) sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX)) > 0);
734
735 if (!(gids = new(gid_t, ngroups_max)))
736 return -ENOMEM;
737
738 if (keep_groups) {
739 k = getgroups(ngroups_max, gids);
740 if (k < 0) {
741 free(gids);
742 return -errno;
743 }
744 } else
745 k = 0;
746
747 STRV_FOREACH(i, context->supplementary_groups) {
748 const char *g;
749
750 if (k >= ngroups_max) {
751 free(gids);
752 return -E2BIG;
753 }
754
755 g = *i;
756 r = get_group_creds(&g, gids+k);
757 if (r < 0) {
758 free(gids);
759 return r;
760 }
761
762 k++;
763 }
764
765 if (setgroups(k, gids) < 0) {
766 free(gids);
767 return -errno;
768 }
769
770 free(gids);
771 }
772
773 return 0;
774 }
775
776 static int enforce_user(const ExecContext *context, uid_t uid) {
777 assert(context);
778
779 /* Sets (but doesn't look up) the uid and make sure we keep the
780 * capabilities while doing so. */
781
782 if (context->capability_ambient_set != 0) {
783
784 /* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but
785 * drop privileges we need to make sure we keep our
786 * caps, while we drop privileges. */
787 if (uid != 0) {
788 int sb = context->secure_bits | 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS;
789
790 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS) != sb)
791 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, sb) < 0)
792 return -errno;
793 }
794 }
795
796 /* Second step: actually set the uids */
797 if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0)
798 return -errno;
799
800 /* At this point we should have all necessary capabilities but
801 are otherwise a normal user. However, the caps might got
802 corrupted due to the setresuid() so we need clean them up
803 later. This is done outside of this call. */
804
805 return 0;
806 }
807
808 #ifdef HAVE_PAM
809
810 static int null_conv(
811 int num_msg,
812 const struct pam_message **msg,
813 struct pam_response **resp,
814 void *appdata_ptr) {
815
816 /* We don't support conversations */
817
818 return PAM_CONV_ERR;
819 }
820
821 static int setup_pam(
822 const char *name,
823 const char *user,
824 uid_t uid,
825 const char *tty,
826 char ***env,
827 int fds[], unsigned n_fds) {
828
829 static const struct pam_conv conv = {
830 .conv = null_conv,
831 .appdata_ptr = NULL
832 };
833
834 _cleanup_(barrier_destroy) Barrier barrier = BARRIER_NULL;
835 pam_handle_t *handle = NULL;
836 sigset_t old_ss;
837 int pam_code = PAM_SUCCESS, r;
838 char **e = NULL;
839 bool close_session = false;
840 pid_t pam_pid = 0, parent_pid;
841 int flags = 0;
842
843 assert(name);
844 assert(user);
845 assert(env);
846
847 /* We set up PAM in the parent process, then fork. The child
848 * will then stay around until killed via PR_GET_PDEATHSIG or
849 * systemd via the cgroup logic. It will then remove the PAM
850 * session again. The parent process will exec() the actual
851 * daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID
852 * of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */
853
854 r = barrier_create(&barrier);
855 if (r < 0)
856 goto fail;
857
858 if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG)
859 flags |= PAM_SILENT;
860
861 pam_code = pam_start(name, user, &conv, &handle);
862 if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) {
863 handle = NULL;
864 goto fail;
865 }
866
867 if (tty) {
868 pam_code = pam_set_item(handle, PAM_TTY, tty);
869 if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS)
870 goto fail;
871 }
872
873 STRV_FOREACH(e, *env) {
874 pam_code = pam_putenv(handle, *e);
875 if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS)
876 goto fail;
877 }
878
879 pam_code = pam_acct_mgmt(handle, flags);
880 if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS)
881 goto fail;
882
883 pam_code = pam_open_session(handle, flags);
884 if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS)
885 goto fail;
886
887 close_session = true;
888
889 e = pam_getenvlist(handle);
890 if (!e) {
891 pam_code = PAM_BUF_ERR;
892 goto fail;
893 }
894
895 /* Block SIGTERM, so that we know that it won't get lost in
896 * the child */
897
898 assert_se(sigprocmask_many(SIG_BLOCK, &old_ss, SIGTERM, -1) >= 0);
899
900 parent_pid = getpid();
901
902 pam_pid = fork();
903 if (pam_pid < 0) {
904 r = -errno;
905 goto fail;
906 }
907
908 if (pam_pid == 0) {
909 int sig, ret = EXIT_PAM;
910
911 /* The child's job is to reset the PAM session on
912 * termination */
913 barrier_set_role(&barrier, BARRIER_CHILD);
914
915 /* This string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
916 * of "/sbin/init"), to look pretty in /bin/ps */
917 rename_process("(sd-pam)");
918
919 /* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this
920 child. We assume that otherwise only those fds are
921 open here that have been opened by PAM. */
922 close_many(fds, n_fds);
923
924 /* Drop privileges - we don't need any to pam_close_session
925 * and this will make PR_SET_PDEATHSIG work in most cases.
926 * If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam threads
927 * to fail to exit normally */
928 if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0)
929 log_error_errno(r, "Error: Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m");
930
931 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE, -1);
932
933 /* Wait until our parent died. This will only work if
934 * the above setresuid() succeeds, otherwise the kernel
935 * will not allow unprivileged parents kill their privileged
936 * children this way. We rely on the control groups kill logic
937 * to do the rest for us. */
938 if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGTERM) < 0)
939 goto child_finish;
940
941 /* Tell the parent that our setup is done. This is especially
942 * important regarding dropping privileges. Otherwise, unit
943 * setup might race against our setresuid(2) call. */
944 barrier_place(&barrier);
945
946 /* Check if our parent process might already have
947 * died? */
948 if (getppid() == parent_pid) {
949 sigset_t ss;
950
951 assert_se(sigemptyset(&ss) >= 0);
952 assert_se(sigaddset(&ss, SIGTERM) >= 0);
953
954 for (;;) {
955 if (sigwait(&ss, &sig) < 0) {
956 if (errno == EINTR)
957 continue;
958
959 goto child_finish;
960 }
961
962 assert(sig == SIGTERM);
963 break;
964 }
965 }
966
967 /* If our parent died we'll end the session */
968 if (getppid() != parent_pid) {
969 pam_code = pam_close_session(handle, flags);
970 if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS)
971 goto child_finish;
972 }
973
974 ret = 0;
975
976 child_finish:
977 pam_end(handle, pam_code | flags);
978 _exit(ret);
979 }
980
981 barrier_set_role(&barrier, BARRIER_PARENT);
982
983 /* If the child was forked off successfully it will do all the
984 * cleanups, so forget about the handle here. */
985 handle = NULL;
986
987 /* Unblock SIGTERM again in the parent */
988 assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &old_ss, NULL) >= 0);
989
990 /* We close the log explicitly here, since the PAM modules
991 * might have opened it, but we don't want this fd around. */
992 closelog();
993
994 /* Synchronously wait for the child to initialize. We don't care for
995 * errors as we cannot recover. However, warn loudly if it happens. */
996 if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier))
997 log_error("PAM initialization failed");
998
999 strv_free(*env);
1000 *env = e;
1001
1002 return 0;
1003
1004 fail:
1005 if (pam_code != PAM_SUCCESS) {
1006 log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle, pam_code));
1007 r = -EPERM; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */
1008 } else
1009 log_error_errno(r, "PAM failed: %m");
1010
1011 if (handle) {
1012 if (close_session)
1013 pam_code = pam_close_session(handle, flags);
1014
1015 pam_end(handle, pam_code | flags);
1016 }
1017
1018 strv_free(e);
1019 closelog();
1020
1021 return r;
1022 }
1023 #endif
1024
1025 static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path) {
1026 char process_name[11];
1027 const char *p;
1028 size_t l;
1029
1030 /* This resulting string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
1031 * of "/sbin/init") to look pretty in /bin/ps */
1032
1033 p = basename(path);
1034 if (isempty(p)) {
1035 rename_process("(...)");
1036 return;
1037 }
1038
1039 l = strlen(p);
1040 if (l > 8) {
1041 /* The end of the process name is usually more
1042 * interesting, since the first bit might just be
1043 * "systemd-" */
1044 p = p + l - 8;
1045 l = 8;
1046 }
1047
1048 process_name[0] = '(';
1049 memcpy(process_name+1, p, l);
1050 process_name[1+l] = ')';
1051 process_name[1+l+1] = 0;
1052
1053 rename_process(process_name);
1054 }
1055
1056 #ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
1057
1058 static int apply_seccomp(const ExecContext *c) {
1059 uint32_t negative_action, action;
1060 scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
1061 Iterator i;
1062 void *id;
1063 int r;
1064
1065 assert(c);
1066
1067 negative_action = c->syscall_errno == 0 ? SCMP_ACT_KILL : SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c->syscall_errno);
1068
1069 seccomp = seccomp_init(c->syscall_whitelist ? negative_action : SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
1070 if (!seccomp)
1071 return -ENOMEM;
1072
1073 if (c->syscall_archs) {
1074
1075 SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_archs, i) {
1076 r = seccomp_arch_add(seccomp, PTR_TO_UINT32(id) - 1);
1077 if (r == -EEXIST)
1078 continue;
1079 if (r < 0)
1080 goto finish;
1081 }
1082
1083 } else {
1084 r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp);
1085 if (r < 0)
1086 goto finish;
1087 }
1088
1089 action = c->syscall_whitelist ? SCMP_ACT_ALLOW : negative_action;
1090 SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_filter, i) {
1091 r = seccomp_rule_add(seccomp, action, PTR_TO_INT(id) - 1, 0);
1092 if (r < 0)
1093 goto finish;
1094 }
1095
1096 r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0);
1097 if (r < 0)
1098 goto finish;
1099
1100 r = seccomp_load(seccomp);
1101
1102 finish:
1103 seccomp_release(seccomp);
1104 return r;
1105 }
1106
1107 static int apply_address_families(const ExecContext *c) {
1108 scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
1109 Iterator i;
1110 int r;
1111
1112 assert(c);
1113
1114 seccomp = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
1115 if (!seccomp)
1116 return -ENOMEM;
1117
1118 r = seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp);
1119 if (r < 0)
1120 goto finish;
1121
1122 if (c->address_families_whitelist) {
1123 int af, first = 0, last = 0;
1124 void *afp;
1125
1126 /* If this is a whitelist, we first block the address
1127 * families that are out of range and then everything
1128 * that is not in the set. First, we find the lowest
1129 * and highest address family in the set. */
1130
1131 SET_FOREACH(afp, c->address_families, i) {
1132 af = PTR_TO_INT(afp);
1133
1134 if (af <= 0 || af >= af_max())
1135 continue;
1136
1137 if (first == 0 || af < first)
1138 first = af;
1139
1140 if (last == 0 || af > last)
1141 last = af;
1142 }
1143
1144 assert((first == 0) == (last == 0));
1145
1146 if (first == 0) {
1147
1148 /* No entries in the valid range, block everything */
1149 r = seccomp_rule_add(
1150 seccomp,
1151 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT),
1152 SCMP_SYS(socket),
1153 0);
1154 if (r < 0)
1155 goto finish;
1156
1157 } else {
1158
1159 /* Block everything below the first entry */
1160 r = seccomp_rule_add(
1161 seccomp,
1162 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT),
1163 SCMP_SYS(socket),
1164 1,
1165 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_LT, first));
1166 if (r < 0)
1167 goto finish;
1168
1169 /* Block everything above the last entry */
1170 r = seccomp_rule_add(
1171 seccomp,
1172 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT),
1173 SCMP_SYS(socket),
1174 1,
1175 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_GT, last));
1176 if (r < 0)
1177 goto finish;
1178
1179 /* Block everything between the first and last
1180 * entry */
1181 for (af = 1; af < af_max(); af++) {
1182
1183 if (set_contains(c->address_families, INT_TO_PTR(af)))
1184 continue;
1185
1186 r = seccomp_rule_add(
1187 seccomp,
1188 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT),
1189 SCMP_SYS(socket),
1190 1,
1191 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ, af));
1192 if (r < 0)
1193 goto finish;
1194 }
1195 }
1196
1197 } else {
1198 void *af;
1199
1200 /* If this is a blacklist, then generate one rule for
1201 * each address family that are then combined in OR
1202 * checks. */
1203
1204 SET_FOREACH(af, c->address_families, i) {
1205
1206 r = seccomp_rule_add(
1207 seccomp,
1208 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT),
1209 SCMP_SYS(socket),
1210 1,
1211 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ, PTR_TO_INT(af)));
1212 if (r < 0)
1213 goto finish;
1214 }
1215 }
1216
1217 r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0);
1218 if (r < 0)
1219 goto finish;
1220
1221 r = seccomp_load(seccomp);
1222
1223 finish:
1224 seccomp_release(seccomp);
1225 return r;
1226 }
1227
1228 static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const ExecContext *c) {
1229 scmp_filter_ctx *seccomp;
1230 int r;
1231
1232 assert(c);
1233
1234 seccomp = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
1235 if (!seccomp)
1236 return -ENOMEM;
1237
1238 r = seccomp_rule_add(
1239 seccomp,
1240 SCMP_ACT_KILL,
1241 SCMP_SYS(mmap),
1242 1,
1243 SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, PROT_EXEC|PROT_WRITE, PROT_EXEC|PROT_WRITE));
1244 if (r < 0)
1245 goto finish;
1246
1247 r = seccomp_rule_add(
1248 seccomp,
1249 SCMP_ACT_KILL,
1250 SCMP_SYS(mprotect),
1251 1,
1252 SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, PROT_EXEC, PROT_EXEC));
1253 if (r < 0)
1254 goto finish;
1255
1256 r = seccomp_attr_set(seccomp, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP, 0);
1257 if (r < 0)
1258 goto finish;
1259
1260 r = seccomp_load(seccomp);
1261
1262 finish:
1263 seccomp_release(seccomp);
1264 return r;
1265 }
1266
1267 #endif
1268
1269 static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe[4]) {
1270 assert(idle_pipe);
1271
1272
1273 idle_pipe[1] = safe_close(idle_pipe[1]);
1274 idle_pipe[2] = safe_close(idle_pipe[2]);
1275
1276 if (idle_pipe[0] >= 0) {
1277 int r;
1278
1279 r = fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe[0], POLLHUP, IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC);
1280
1281 if (idle_pipe[3] >= 0 && r == 0 /* timeout */) {
1282 ssize_t n;
1283
1284 /* Signal systemd that we are bored and want to continue. */
1285 n = write(idle_pipe[3], "x", 1);
1286 if (n > 0)
1287 /* Wait for systemd to react to the signal above. */
1288 fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe[0], POLLHUP, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC);
1289 }
1290
1291 idle_pipe[0] = safe_close(idle_pipe[0]);
1292
1293 }
1294
1295 idle_pipe[3] = safe_close(idle_pipe[3]);
1296 }
1297
1298 static int build_environment(
1299 const ExecContext *c,
1300 const ExecParameters *p,
1301 unsigned n_fds,
1302 const char *home,
1303 const char *username,
1304 const char *shell,
1305 dev_t journal_stream_dev,
1306 ino_t journal_stream_ino,
1307 char ***ret) {
1308
1309 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL;
1310 unsigned n_env = 0;
1311 char *x;
1312
1313 assert(c);
1314 assert(ret);
1315
1316 our_env = new0(char*, 12);
1317 if (!our_env)
1318 return -ENOMEM;
1319
1320 if (n_fds > 0) {
1321 _cleanup_free_ char *joined = NULL;
1322
1323 if (asprintf(&x, "LISTEN_PID="PID_FMT, getpid()) < 0)
1324 return -ENOMEM;
1325 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1326
1327 if (asprintf(&x, "LISTEN_FDS=%u", n_fds) < 0)
1328 return -ENOMEM;
1329 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1330
1331 joined = strv_join(p->fd_names, ":");
1332 if (!joined)
1333 return -ENOMEM;
1334
1335 x = strjoin("LISTEN_FDNAMES=", joined, NULL);
1336 if (!x)
1337 return -ENOMEM;
1338 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1339 }
1340
1341 if (p->watchdog_usec > 0) {
1342 if (asprintf(&x, "WATCHDOG_PID="PID_FMT, getpid()) < 0)
1343 return -ENOMEM;
1344 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1345
1346 if (asprintf(&x, "WATCHDOG_USEC="USEC_FMT, p->watchdog_usec) < 0)
1347 return -ENOMEM;
1348 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1349 }
1350
1351 if (home) {
1352 x = strappend("HOME=", home);
1353 if (!x)
1354 return -ENOMEM;
1355 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1356 }
1357
1358 if (username) {
1359 x = strappend("LOGNAME=", username);
1360 if (!x)
1361 return -ENOMEM;
1362 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1363
1364 x = strappend("USER=", username);
1365 if (!x)
1366 return -ENOMEM;
1367 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1368 }
1369
1370 if (shell) {
1371 x = strappend("SHELL=", shell);
1372 if (!x)
1373 return -ENOMEM;
1374 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1375 }
1376
1377 if (is_terminal_input(c->std_input) ||
1378 c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY ||
1379 c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY ||
1380 c->tty_path) {
1381
1382 x = strdup(default_term_for_tty(exec_context_tty_path(c)));
1383 if (!x)
1384 return -ENOMEM;
1385 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1386 }
1387
1388 if (journal_stream_dev != 0 && journal_stream_ino != 0) {
1389 if (asprintf(&x, "JOURNAL_STREAM=" DEV_FMT ":" INO_FMT, journal_stream_dev, journal_stream_ino) < 0)
1390 return -ENOMEM;
1391
1392 our_env[n_env++] = x;
1393 }
1394
1395 our_env[n_env++] = NULL;
1396 assert(n_env <= 12);
1397
1398 *ret = our_env;
1399 our_env = NULL;
1400
1401 return 0;
1402 }
1403
1404 static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext *c, char ***ret) {
1405 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **pass_env = NULL;
1406 size_t n_env = 0, n_bufsize = 0;
1407 char **i;
1408
1409 STRV_FOREACH(i, c->pass_environment) {
1410 _cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL;
1411 char *v;
1412
1413 v = getenv(*i);
1414 if (!v)
1415 continue;
1416 x = strjoin(*i, "=", v, NULL);
1417 if (!x)
1418 return -ENOMEM;
1419 if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(pass_env, n_bufsize, n_env + 2))
1420 return -ENOMEM;
1421 pass_env[n_env++] = x;
1422 pass_env[n_env] = NULL;
1423 x = NULL;
1424 }
1425
1426 *ret = pass_env;
1427 pass_env = NULL;
1428
1429 return 0;
1430 }
1431
1432 static bool exec_needs_mount_namespace(
1433 const ExecContext *context,
1434 const ExecParameters *params,
1435 ExecRuntime *runtime) {
1436
1437 assert(context);
1438 assert(params);
1439
1440 if (!strv_isempty(context->read_write_dirs) ||
1441 !strv_isempty(context->read_only_dirs) ||
1442 !strv_isempty(context->inaccessible_dirs))
1443 return true;
1444
1445 if (context->mount_flags != 0)
1446 return true;
1447
1448 if (context->private_tmp && runtime && (runtime->tmp_dir || runtime->var_tmp_dir))
1449 return true;
1450
1451 if (context->private_devices ||
1452 context->protect_system != PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO ||
1453 context->protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO)
1454 return true;
1455
1456 return false;
1457 }
1458
1459 static int close_remaining_fds(
1460 const ExecParameters *params,
1461 ExecRuntime *runtime,
1462 int socket_fd,
1463 int *fds, unsigned n_fds) {
1464
1465 unsigned n_dont_close = 0;
1466 int dont_close[n_fds + 7];
1467
1468 assert(params);
1469
1470 if (params->stdin_fd >= 0)
1471 dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stdin_fd;
1472 if (params->stdout_fd >= 0)
1473 dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stdout_fd;
1474 if (params->stderr_fd >= 0)
1475 dont_close[n_dont_close++] = params->stderr_fd;
1476
1477 if (socket_fd >= 0)
1478 dont_close[n_dont_close++] = socket_fd;
1479 if (n_fds > 0) {
1480 memcpy(dont_close + n_dont_close, fds, sizeof(int) * n_fds);
1481 n_dont_close += n_fds;
1482 }
1483
1484 if (runtime) {
1485 if (runtime->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0)
1486 dont_close[n_dont_close++] = runtime->netns_storage_socket[0];
1487 if (runtime->netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0)
1488 dont_close[n_dont_close++] = runtime->netns_storage_socket[1];
1489 }
1490
1491 return close_all_fds(dont_close, n_dont_close);
1492 }
1493
1494 static int exec_child(
1495 Unit *unit,
1496 ExecCommand *command,
1497 const ExecContext *context,
1498 const ExecParameters *params,
1499 ExecRuntime *runtime,
1500 char **argv,
1501 int socket_fd,
1502 int *fds, unsigned n_fds,
1503 char **files_env,
1504 int *exit_status) {
1505
1506 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **our_env = NULL, **pass_env = NULL, **accum_env = NULL, **final_argv = NULL;
1507 _cleanup_free_ char *mac_selinux_context_net = NULL;
1508 const char *username = NULL, *home = NULL, *shell = NULL, *wd;
1509 dev_t journal_stream_dev = 0;
1510 ino_t journal_stream_ino = 0;
1511 bool needs_mount_namespace;
1512 uid_t uid = UID_INVALID;
1513 gid_t gid = GID_INVALID;
1514 int i, r;
1515
1516 assert(unit);
1517 assert(command);
1518 assert(context);
1519 assert(params);
1520 assert(exit_status);
1521
1522 rename_process_from_path(command->path);
1523
1524 /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the
1525 * only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main daemon. All
1526 * others we leave untouched because we set them to
1527 * SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, both of which
1528 * will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */
1529 (void) default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER,
1530 SIGNALS_IGNORE, -1);
1531
1532 if (context->ignore_sigpipe)
1533 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE, -1);
1534
1535 r = reset_signal_mask();
1536 if (r < 0) {
1537 *exit_status = EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK;
1538 return r;
1539 }
1540
1541 if (params->idle_pipe)
1542 do_idle_pipe_dance(params->idle_pipe);
1543
1544 /* Close sockets very early to make sure we don't
1545 * block init reexecution because it cannot bind its
1546 * sockets */
1547
1548 log_forget_fds();
1549
1550 r = close_remaining_fds(params, runtime, socket_fd, fds, n_fds);
1551 if (r < 0) {
1552 *exit_status = EXIT_FDS;
1553 return r;
1554 }
1555
1556 if (!context->same_pgrp)
1557 if (setsid() < 0) {
1558 *exit_status = EXIT_SETSID;
1559 return -errno;
1560 }
1561
1562 exec_context_tty_reset(context, params);
1563
1564 if (params->confirm_spawn) {
1565 char response;
1566
1567 r = ask_for_confirmation(&response, argv);
1568 if (r == -ETIMEDOUT)
1569 write_confirm_message("Confirmation question timed out, assuming positive response.\n");
1570 else if (r < 0)
1571 write_confirm_message("Couldn't ask confirmation question, assuming positive response: %s\n", strerror(-r));
1572 else if (response == 's') {
1573 write_confirm_message("Skipping execution.\n");
1574 *exit_status = EXIT_CONFIRM;
1575 return -ECANCELED;
1576 } else if (response == 'n') {
1577 write_confirm_message("Failing execution.\n");
1578 *exit_status = 0;
1579 return 0;
1580 }
1581 }
1582
1583 if (context->user) {
1584 username = context->user;
1585 r = get_user_creds(&username, &uid, &gid, &home, &shell);
1586 if (r < 0) {
1587 *exit_status = EXIT_USER;
1588 return r;
1589 }
1590 }
1591
1592 if (context->group) {
1593 const char *g = context->group;
1594
1595 r = get_group_creds(&g, &gid);
1596 if (r < 0) {
1597 *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP;
1598 return r;
1599 }
1600 }
1601
1602
1603 /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we
1604 * must sure to drop O_NONBLOCK */
1605 if (socket_fd >= 0)
1606 (void) fd_nonblock(socket_fd, false);
1607
1608 r = setup_input(context, params, socket_fd);
1609 if (r < 0) {
1610 *exit_status = EXIT_STDIN;
1611 return r;
1612 }
1613
1614 r = setup_output(unit, context, params, STDOUT_FILENO, socket_fd, basename(command->path), uid, gid, &journal_stream_dev, &journal_stream_ino);
1615 if (r < 0) {
1616 *exit_status = EXIT_STDOUT;
1617 return r;
1618 }
1619
1620 r = setup_output(unit, context, params, STDERR_FILENO, socket_fd, basename(command->path), uid, gid, &journal_stream_dev, &journal_stream_ino);
1621 if (r < 0) {
1622 *exit_status = EXIT_STDERR;
1623 return r;
1624 }
1625
1626 if (params->cgroup_path) {
1627 r = cg_attach_everywhere(params->cgroup_supported, params->cgroup_path, 0, NULL, NULL);
1628 if (r < 0) {
1629 *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP;
1630 return r;
1631 }
1632 }
1633
1634 if (context->oom_score_adjust_set) {
1635 char t[DECIMAL_STR_MAX(context->oom_score_adjust)];
1636
1637 /* When we can't make this change due to EPERM, then
1638 * let's silently skip over it. User namespaces
1639 * prohibit write access to this file, and we
1640 * shouldn't trip up over that. */
1641
1642 sprintf(t, "%i", context->oom_score_adjust);
1643 r = write_string_file("/proc/self/oom_score_adj", t, 0);
1644 if (r == -EPERM || r == -EACCES) {
1645 log_open();
1646 log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "Failed to adjust OOM setting, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
1647 log_close();
1648 } else if (r < 0) {
1649 *exit_status = EXIT_OOM_ADJUST;
1650 return -errno;
1651 }
1652 }
1653
1654 if (context->nice_set)
1655 if (setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, context->nice) < 0) {
1656 *exit_status = EXIT_NICE;
1657 return -errno;
1658 }
1659
1660 if (context->cpu_sched_set) {
1661 struct sched_param param = {
1662 .sched_priority = context->cpu_sched_priority,
1663 };
1664
1665 r = sched_setscheduler(0,
1666 context->cpu_sched_policy |
1667 (context->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork ?
1668 SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK : 0),
1669 &param);
1670 if (r < 0) {
1671 *exit_status = EXIT_SETSCHEDULER;
1672 return -errno;
1673 }
1674 }
1675
1676 if (context->cpuset)
1677 if (sched_setaffinity(0, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(context->cpuset_ncpus), context->cpuset) < 0) {
1678 *exit_status = EXIT_CPUAFFINITY;
1679 return -errno;
1680 }
1681
1682 if (context->ioprio_set)
1683 if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, context->ioprio) < 0) {
1684 *exit_status = EXIT_IOPRIO;
1685 return -errno;
1686 }
1687
1688 if (context->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY)
1689 if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, context->timer_slack_nsec) < 0) {
1690 *exit_status = EXIT_TIMERSLACK;
1691 return -errno;
1692 }
1693
1694 if (context->personality != PERSONALITY_INVALID)
1695 if (personality(context->personality) < 0) {
1696 *exit_status = EXIT_PERSONALITY;
1697 return -errno;
1698 }
1699
1700 if (context->utmp_id)
1701 utmp_put_init_process(context->utmp_id, getpid(), getsid(0), context->tty_path,
1702 context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_INIT ? INIT_PROCESS :
1703 context->utmp_mode == EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN ? LOGIN_PROCESS :
1704 USER_PROCESS,
1705 username ? "root" : context->user);
1706
1707 if (context->user && is_terminal_input(context->std_input)) {
1708 r = chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO, uid);
1709 if (r < 0) {
1710 *exit_status = EXIT_STDIN;
1711 return r;
1712 }
1713 }
1714
1715 /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup
1716 * (but only in systemd's own controller hierarchy!) to the
1717 * user of the new process. */
1718 if (params->cgroup_path && context->user && params->cgroup_delegate) {
1719 r = cg_set_task_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, 0644, uid, gid);
1720 if (r < 0) {
1721 *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP;
1722 return r;
1723 }
1724
1725
1726 r = cg_set_group_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, 0755, uid, gid);
1727 if (r < 0) {
1728 *exit_status = EXIT_CGROUP;
1729 return r;
1730 }
1731 }
1732
1733 if (!strv_isempty(context->runtime_directory) && params->runtime_prefix) {
1734 char **rt;
1735
1736 STRV_FOREACH(rt, context->runtime_directory) {
1737 _cleanup_free_ char *p;
1738
1739 p = strjoin(params->runtime_prefix, "/", *rt, NULL);
1740 if (!p) {
1741 *exit_status = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY;
1742 return -ENOMEM;
1743 }
1744
1745 r = mkdir_p_label(p, context->runtime_directory_mode);
1746 if (r < 0) {
1747 *exit_status = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY;
1748 return r;
1749 }
1750
1751 r = chmod_and_chown(p, context->runtime_directory_mode, uid, gid);
1752 if (r < 0) {
1753 *exit_status = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY;
1754 return r;
1755 }
1756 }
1757 }
1758
1759 r = build_environment(
1760 context,
1761 params,
1762 n_fds,
1763 home,
1764 username,
1765 shell,
1766 journal_stream_dev,
1767 journal_stream_ino,
1768 &our_env);
1769 if (r < 0) {
1770 *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
1771 return r;
1772 }
1773
1774 r = build_pass_environment(context, &pass_env);
1775 if (r < 0) {
1776 *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
1777 return r;
1778 }
1779
1780 accum_env = strv_env_merge(5,
1781 params->environment,
1782 our_env,
1783 pass_env,
1784 context->environment,
1785 files_env,
1786 NULL);
1787 if (!accum_env) {
1788 *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
1789 return -ENOMEM;
1790 }
1791
1792 umask(context->umask);
1793
1794 if (params->apply_permissions && !command->privileged) {
1795 r = enforce_groups(context, username, gid);
1796 if (r < 0) {
1797 *exit_status = EXIT_GROUP;
1798 return r;
1799 }
1800 #ifdef HAVE_SMACK
1801 if (context->smack_process_label) {
1802 r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context->smack_process_label);
1803 if (r < 0) {
1804 *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL;
1805 return r;
1806 }
1807 }
1808 #ifdef SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
1809 else {
1810 _cleanup_free_ char *exec_label = NULL;
1811
1812 r = mac_smack_read(command->path, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC, &exec_label);
1813 if (r < 0 && r != -ENODATA && r != -EOPNOTSUPP) {
1814 *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL;
1815 return r;
1816 }
1817
1818 r = mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label ? : SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL);
1819 if (r < 0) {
1820 *exit_status = EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL;
1821 return r;
1822 }
1823 }
1824 #endif
1825 #endif
1826 #ifdef HAVE_PAM
1827 if (context->pam_name && username) {
1828 r = setup_pam(context->pam_name, username, uid, context->tty_path, &accum_env, fds, n_fds);
1829 if (r < 0) {
1830 *exit_status = EXIT_PAM;
1831 return r;
1832 }
1833 }
1834 #endif
1835 }
1836
1837 if (context->private_network && runtime && runtime->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) {
1838 r = setup_netns(runtime->netns_storage_socket);
1839 if (r < 0) {
1840 *exit_status = EXIT_NETWORK;
1841 return r;
1842 }
1843 }
1844
1845 needs_mount_namespace = exec_needs_mount_namespace(context, params, runtime);
1846
1847 if (needs_mount_namespace) {
1848 char *tmp = NULL, *var = NULL;
1849
1850 /* The runtime struct only contains the parent
1851 * of the private /tmp, which is
1852 * non-accessible to world users. Inside of it
1853 * there's a /tmp that is sticky, and that's
1854 * the one we want to use here. */
1855
1856 if (context->private_tmp && runtime) {
1857 if (runtime->tmp_dir)
1858 tmp = strjoina(runtime->tmp_dir, "/tmp");
1859 if (runtime->var_tmp_dir)
1860 var = strjoina(runtime->var_tmp_dir, "/tmp");
1861 }
1862
1863 r = setup_namespace(
1864 params->apply_chroot ? context->root_directory : NULL,
1865 context->read_write_dirs,
1866 context->read_only_dirs,
1867 context->inaccessible_dirs,
1868 tmp,
1869 var,
1870 context->private_devices,
1871 context->protect_home,
1872 context->protect_system,
1873 context->mount_flags);
1874
1875 /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is
1876 * probably due to a missing capability. In this case,
1877 * silently proceeed. */
1878 if (r == -EPERM || r == -EACCES) {
1879 log_open();
1880 log_unit_debug_errno(unit, r, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
1881 log_close();
1882 } else if (r < 0) {
1883 *exit_status = EXIT_NAMESPACE;
1884 return r;
1885 }
1886 }
1887
1888 if (context->working_directory_home)
1889 wd = home;
1890 else if (context->working_directory)
1891 wd = context->working_directory;
1892 else
1893 wd = "/";
1894
1895 if (params->apply_chroot) {
1896 if (!needs_mount_namespace && context->root_directory)
1897 if (chroot(context->root_directory) < 0) {
1898 *exit_status = EXIT_CHROOT;
1899 return -errno;
1900 }
1901
1902 if (chdir(wd) < 0 &&
1903 !context->working_directory_missing_ok) {
1904 *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR;
1905 return -errno;
1906 }
1907 } else {
1908 const char *d;
1909
1910 d = strjoina(strempty(context->root_directory), "/", strempty(wd));
1911 if (chdir(d) < 0 &&
1912 !context->working_directory_missing_ok) {
1913 *exit_status = EXIT_CHDIR;
1914 return -errno;
1915 }
1916 }
1917
1918 #ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
1919 if (params->apply_permissions && mac_selinux_use() && params->selinux_context_net && socket_fd >= 0 && !command->privileged) {
1920 r = mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd, command->path, context->selinux_context, &mac_selinux_context_net);
1921 if (r < 0) {
1922 *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT;
1923 return r;
1924 }
1925 }
1926 #endif
1927
1928 /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that
1929 * nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that
1930 * we are more aggressive this time since socket_fd
1931 * and the netns fds we don't need anymore. The custom
1932 * endpoint fd was needed to upload the policy and can
1933 * now be closed as well. */
1934 r = close_all_fds(fds, n_fds);
1935 if (r >= 0)
1936 r = shift_fds(fds, n_fds);
1937 if (r >= 0)
1938 r = flags_fds(fds, n_fds, context->non_blocking);
1939 if (r < 0) {
1940 *exit_status = EXIT_FDS;
1941 return r;
1942 }
1943
1944 if (params->apply_permissions && !command->privileged) {
1945
1946 bool use_address_families = context->address_families_whitelist ||
1947 !set_isempty(context->address_families);
1948 bool use_syscall_filter = context->syscall_whitelist ||
1949 !set_isempty(context->syscall_filter) ||
1950 !set_isempty(context->syscall_archs);
1951 int secure_bits = context->secure_bits;
1952
1953 for (i = 0; i < _RLIMIT_MAX; i++) {
1954 if (!context->rlimit[i])
1955 continue;
1956
1957 if (setrlimit_closest(i, context->rlimit[i]) < 0) {
1958 *exit_status = EXIT_LIMITS;
1959 return -errno;
1960 }
1961 }
1962
1963 if (!cap_test_all(context->capability_bounding_set)) {
1964 r = capability_bounding_set_drop(context->capability_bounding_set, false);
1965 if (r < 0) {
1966 *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
1967 return r;
1968 }
1969 }
1970
1971 /* This is done before enforce_user, but ambient set
1972 * does not survive over setresuid() if keep_caps is not set. */
1973 if (context->capability_ambient_set != 0) {
1974 r = capability_ambient_set_apply(context->capability_ambient_set, true);
1975 if (r < 0) {
1976 *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
1977 return r;
1978 }
1979 }
1980
1981 if (context->user) {
1982 r = enforce_user(context, uid);
1983 if (r < 0) {
1984 *exit_status = EXIT_USER;
1985 return r;
1986 }
1987 if (context->capability_ambient_set != 0) {
1988
1989 /* Fix the ambient capabilities after user change. */
1990 r = capability_ambient_set_apply(context->capability_ambient_set, false);
1991 if (r < 0) {
1992 *exit_status = EXIT_CAPABILITIES;
1993 return r;
1994 }
1995
1996 /* If we were asked to change user and ambient capabilities
1997 * were requested, we had to add keep-caps to the securebits
1998 * so that we would maintain the inherited capability set
1999 * through the setresuid(). Make sure that the bit is added
2000 * also to the context secure_bits so that we don't try to
2001 * drop the bit away next. */
2002
2003 secure_bits |= 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS;
2004 }
2005 }
2006
2007 /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while
2008 * PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress
2009 * potential EPERMs we'll try not to call
2010 * PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. */
2011 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS) != secure_bits)
2012 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, secure_bits) < 0) {
2013 *exit_status = EXIT_SECUREBITS;
2014 return -errno;
2015 }
2016
2017 if (context->no_new_privileges ||
2018 (!have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && (use_address_families || use_syscall_filter)))
2019 if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
2020 *exit_status = EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES;
2021 return -errno;
2022 }
2023
2024 #ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
2025 if (use_address_families) {
2026 r = apply_address_families(context);
2027 if (r < 0) {
2028 *exit_status = EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES;
2029 return r;
2030 }
2031 }
2032
2033 if (context->memory_deny_write_execute) {
2034 r = apply_memory_deny_write_execute(context);
2035 if (r < 0) {
2036 *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
2037 return r;
2038 }
2039 }
2040 if (use_syscall_filter) {
2041 r = apply_seccomp(context);
2042 if (r < 0) {
2043 *exit_status = EXIT_SECCOMP;
2044 return r;
2045 }
2046 }
2047 #endif
2048
2049 #ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
2050 if (mac_selinux_use()) {
2051 char *exec_context = mac_selinux_context_net ?: context->selinux_context;
2052
2053 if (exec_context) {
2054 r = setexeccon(exec_context);
2055 if (r < 0) {
2056 *exit_status = EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT;
2057 return r;
2058 }
2059 }
2060 }
2061 #endif
2062
2063 #ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
2064 if (context->apparmor_profile && mac_apparmor_use()) {
2065 r = aa_change_onexec(context->apparmor_profile);
2066 if (r < 0 && !context->apparmor_profile_ignore) {
2067 *exit_status = EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE;
2068 return -errno;
2069 }
2070 }
2071 #endif
2072 }
2073
2074 final_argv = replace_env_argv(argv, accum_env);
2075 if (!final_argv) {
2076 *exit_status = EXIT_MEMORY;
2077 return -ENOMEM;
2078 }
2079
2080 accum_env = strv_env_clean(accum_env);
2081
2082 if (_unlikely_(log_get_max_level() >= LOG_DEBUG)) {
2083 _cleanup_free_ char *line;
2084
2085 line = exec_command_line(final_argv);
2086 if (line) {
2087 log_open();
2088 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG,
2089 LOG_UNIT_ID(unit),
2090 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path,
2091 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "Executing: %s", line),
2092 NULL);
2093 log_close();
2094 }
2095 }
2096
2097 execve(command->path, final_argv, accum_env);
2098 *exit_status = EXIT_EXEC;
2099 return -errno;
2100 }
2101
2102 int exec_spawn(Unit *unit,
2103 ExecCommand *command,
2104 const ExecContext *context,
2105 const ExecParameters *params,
2106 ExecRuntime *runtime,
2107 pid_t *ret) {
2108
2109 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **files_env = NULL;
2110 int *fds = NULL; unsigned n_fds = 0;
2111 _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL;
2112 int socket_fd, r;
2113 char **argv;
2114 pid_t pid;
2115
2116 assert(unit);
2117 assert(command);
2118 assert(context);
2119 assert(ret);
2120 assert(params);
2121 assert(params->fds || params->n_fds <= 0);
2122
2123 if (context->std_input == EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET ||
2124 context->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET ||
2125 context->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET) {
2126
2127 if (params->n_fds != 1) {
2128 log_unit_error(unit, "Got more than one socket.");
2129 return -EINVAL;
2130 }
2131
2132 socket_fd = params->fds[0];
2133 } else {
2134 socket_fd = -1;
2135 fds = params->fds;
2136 n_fds = params->n_fds;
2137 }
2138
2139 r = exec_context_load_environment(unit, context, &files_env);
2140 if (r < 0)
2141 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, r, "Failed to load environment files: %m");
2142
2143 argv = params->argv ?: command->argv;
2144 line = exec_command_line(argv);
2145 if (!line)
2146 return log_oom();
2147
2148 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG,
2149 LOG_UNIT_ID(unit),
2150 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "About to execute: %s", line),
2151 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path,
2152 NULL);
2153 pid = fork();
2154 if (pid < 0)
2155 return log_unit_error_errno(unit, errno, "Failed to fork: %m");
2156
2157 if (pid == 0) {
2158 int exit_status;
2159
2160 r = exec_child(unit,
2161 command,
2162 context,
2163 params,
2164 runtime,
2165 argv,
2166 socket_fd,
2167 fds, n_fds,
2168 files_env,
2169 &exit_status);
2170 if (r < 0) {
2171 log_open();
2172 log_struct_errno(LOG_ERR, r,
2173 LOG_MESSAGE_ID(SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED),
2174 LOG_UNIT_ID(unit),
2175 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit, "Failed at step %s spawning %s: %m",
2176 exit_status_to_string(exit_status, EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD),
2177 command->path),
2178 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command->path,
2179 NULL);
2180 }
2181
2182 _exit(exit_status);
2183 }
2184
2185 log_unit_debug(unit, "Forked %s as "PID_FMT, command->path, pid);
2186
2187 /* We add the new process to the cgroup both in the child (so
2188 * that we can be sure that no user code is ever executed
2189 * outside of the cgroup) and in the parent (so that we can be
2190 * sure that when we kill the cgroup the process will be
2191 * killed too). */
2192 if (params->cgroup_path)
2193 (void) cg_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER, params->cgroup_path, pid);
2194
2195 exec_status_start(&command->exec_status, pid);
2196
2197 *ret = pid;
2198 return 0;
2199 }
2200
2201 void exec_context_init(ExecContext *c) {
2202 assert(c);
2203
2204 c->umask = 0022;
2205 c->ioprio = IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE, 0);
2206 c->cpu_sched_policy = SCHED_OTHER;
2207 c->syslog_priority = LOG_DAEMON|LOG_INFO;
2208 c->syslog_level_prefix = true;
2209 c->ignore_sigpipe = true;
2210 c->timer_slack_nsec = NSEC_INFINITY;
2211 c->personality = PERSONALITY_INVALID;
2212 c->runtime_directory_mode = 0755;
2213 c->capability_bounding_set = CAP_ALL;
2214 }
2215
2216 void exec_context_done(ExecContext *c) {
2217 unsigned l;
2218
2219 assert(c);
2220
2221 c->environment = strv_free(c->environment);
2222 c->environment_files = strv_free(c->environment_files);
2223 c->pass_environment = strv_free(c->pass_environment);
2224
2225 for (l = 0; l < ELEMENTSOF(c->rlimit); l++)
2226 c->rlimit[l] = mfree(c->rlimit[l]);
2227
2228 c->working_directory = mfree(c->working_directory);
2229 c->root_directory = mfree(c->root_directory);
2230 c->tty_path = mfree(c->tty_path);
2231 c->syslog_identifier = mfree(c->syslog_identifier);
2232 c->user = mfree(c->user);
2233 c->group = mfree(c->group);
2234
2235 c->supplementary_groups = strv_free(c->supplementary_groups);
2236
2237 c->pam_name = mfree(c->pam_name);
2238
2239 c->read_only_dirs = strv_free(c->read_only_dirs);
2240 c->read_write_dirs = strv_free(c->read_write_dirs);
2241 c->inaccessible_dirs = strv_free(c->inaccessible_dirs);
2242
2243 if (c->cpuset)
2244 CPU_FREE(c->cpuset);
2245
2246 c->utmp_id = mfree(c->utmp_id);
2247 c->selinux_context = mfree(c->selinux_context);
2248 c->apparmor_profile = mfree(c->apparmor_profile);
2249
2250 c->syscall_filter = set_free(c->syscall_filter);
2251 c->syscall_archs = set_free(c->syscall_archs);
2252 c->address_families = set_free(c->address_families);
2253
2254 c->runtime_directory = strv_free(c->runtime_directory);
2255 }
2256
2257 int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(ExecContext *c, const char *runtime_prefix) {
2258 char **i;
2259
2260 assert(c);
2261
2262 if (!runtime_prefix)
2263 return 0;
2264
2265 STRV_FOREACH(i, c->runtime_directory) {
2266 _cleanup_free_ char *p;
2267
2268 p = strjoin(runtime_prefix, "/", *i, NULL);
2269 if (!p)
2270 return -ENOMEM;
2271
2272 /* We execute this synchronously, since we need to be
2273 * sure this is gone when we start the service
2274 * next. */
2275 (void) rm_rf(p, REMOVE_ROOT);
2276 }
2277
2278 return 0;
2279 }
2280
2281 void exec_command_done(ExecCommand *c) {
2282 assert(c);
2283
2284 c->path = mfree(c->path);
2285
2286 c->argv = strv_free(c->argv);
2287 }
2288
2289 void exec_command_done_array(ExecCommand *c, unsigned n) {
2290 unsigned i;
2291
2292 for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
2293 exec_command_done(c+i);
2294 }
2295
2296 ExecCommand* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand *c) {
2297 ExecCommand *i;
2298
2299 while ((i = c)) {
2300 LIST_REMOVE(command, c, i);
2301 exec_command_done(i);
2302 free(i);
2303 }
2304
2305 return NULL;
2306 }
2307
2308 void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand **c, unsigned n) {
2309 unsigned i;
2310
2311 for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
2312 c[i] = exec_command_free_list(c[i]);
2313 }
2314
2315 typedef struct InvalidEnvInfo {
2316 Unit *unit;
2317 const char *path;
2318 } InvalidEnvInfo;
2319
2320 static void invalid_env(const char *p, void *userdata) {
2321 InvalidEnvInfo *info = userdata;
2322
2323 log_unit_error(info->unit, "Ignoring invalid environment assignment '%s': %s", p, info->path);
2324 }
2325
2326 int exec_context_load_environment(Unit *unit, const ExecContext *c, char ***l) {
2327 char **i, **r = NULL;
2328
2329 assert(c);
2330 assert(l);
2331
2332 STRV_FOREACH(i, c->environment_files) {
2333 char *fn;
2334 int k;
2335 bool ignore = false;
2336 char **p;
2337 _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t pglob = {};
2338 int count, n;
2339
2340 fn = *i;
2341
2342 if (fn[0] == '-') {
2343 ignore = true;
2344 fn++;
2345 }
2346
2347 if (!path_is_absolute(fn)) {
2348 if (ignore)
2349 continue;
2350
2351 strv_free(r);
2352 return -EINVAL;
2353 }
2354
2355 /* Filename supports globbing, take all matching files */
2356 errno = 0;
2357 if (glob(fn, 0, NULL, &pglob) != 0) {
2358 if (ignore)
2359 continue;
2360
2361 strv_free(r);
2362 return errno > 0 ? -errno : -EINVAL;
2363 }
2364 count = pglob.gl_pathc;
2365 if (count == 0) {
2366 if (ignore)
2367 continue;
2368
2369 strv_free(r);
2370 return -EINVAL;
2371 }
2372 for (n = 0; n < count; n++) {
2373 k = load_env_file(NULL, pglob.gl_pathv[n], NULL, &p);
2374 if (k < 0) {
2375 if (ignore)
2376 continue;
2377
2378 strv_free(r);
2379 return k;
2380 }
2381 /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */
2382 if (p) {
2383 InvalidEnvInfo info = {
2384 .unit = unit,
2385 .path = pglob.gl_pathv[n]
2386 };
2387
2388 p = strv_env_clean_with_callback(p, invalid_env, &info);
2389 }
2390
2391 if (r == NULL)
2392 r = p;
2393 else {
2394 char **m;
2395
2396 m = strv_env_merge(2, r, p);
2397 strv_free(r);
2398 strv_free(p);
2399 if (!m)
2400 return -ENOMEM;
2401
2402 r = m;
2403 }
2404 }
2405 }
2406
2407 *l = r;
2408
2409 return 0;
2410 }
2411
2412 static bool tty_may_match_dev_console(const char *tty) {
2413 _cleanup_free_ char *active = NULL;
2414 char *console;
2415
2416 if (!tty)
2417 return true;
2418
2419 if (startswith(tty, "/dev/"))
2420 tty += 5;
2421
2422 /* trivial identity? */
2423 if (streq(tty, "console"))
2424 return true;
2425
2426 console = resolve_dev_console(&active);
2427 /* if we could not resolve, assume it may */
2428 if (!console)
2429 return true;
2430
2431 /* "tty0" means the active VC, so it may be the same sometimes */
2432 return streq(console, tty) || (streq(console, "tty0") && tty_is_vc(tty));
2433 }
2434
2435 bool exec_context_may_touch_console(ExecContext *ec) {
2436
2437 return (ec->tty_reset ||
2438 ec->tty_vhangup ||
2439 ec->tty_vt_disallocate ||
2440 is_terminal_input(ec->std_input) ||
2441 is_terminal_output(ec->std_output) ||
2442 is_terminal_output(ec->std_error)) &&
2443 tty_may_match_dev_console(exec_context_tty_path(ec));
2444 }
2445
2446 static void strv_fprintf(FILE *f, char **l) {
2447 char **g;
2448
2449 assert(f);
2450
2451 STRV_FOREACH(g, l)
2452 fprintf(f, " %s", *g);
2453 }
2454
2455 void exec_context_dump(ExecContext *c, FILE* f, const char *prefix) {
2456 char **e, **d;
2457 unsigned i;
2458
2459 assert(c);
2460 assert(f);
2461
2462 prefix = strempty(prefix);
2463
2464 fprintf(f,
2465 "%sUMask: %04o\n"
2466 "%sWorkingDirectory: %s\n"
2467 "%sRootDirectory: %s\n"
2468 "%sNonBlocking: %s\n"
2469 "%sPrivateTmp: %s\n"
2470 "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n"
2471 "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n"
2472 "%sProtectHome: %s\n"
2473 "%sProtectSystem: %s\n"
2474 "%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n"
2475 "%sMemoryDenyWriteExecute: %s\n",
2476 prefix, c->umask,
2477 prefix, c->working_directory ? c->working_directory : "/",
2478 prefix, c->root_directory ? c->root_directory : "/",
2479 prefix, yes_no(c->non_blocking),
2480 prefix, yes_no(c->private_tmp),
2481 prefix, yes_no(c->private_network),
2482 prefix, yes_no(c->private_devices),
2483 prefix, protect_home_to_string(c->protect_home),
2484 prefix, protect_system_to_string(c->protect_system),
2485 prefix, yes_no(c->ignore_sigpipe),
2486 prefix, yes_no(c->memory_deny_write_execute));
2487
2488 STRV_FOREACH(e, c->environment)
2489 fprintf(f, "%sEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, *e);
2490
2491 STRV_FOREACH(e, c->environment_files)
2492 fprintf(f, "%sEnvironmentFile: %s\n", prefix, *e);
2493
2494 STRV_FOREACH(e, c->pass_environment)
2495 fprintf(f, "%sPassEnvironment: %s\n", prefix, *e);
2496
2497 fprintf(f, "%sRuntimeDirectoryMode: %04o\n", prefix, c->runtime_directory_mode);
2498
2499 STRV_FOREACH(d, c->runtime_directory)
2500 fprintf(f, "%sRuntimeDirectory: %s\n", prefix, *d);
2501
2502 if (c->nice_set)
2503 fprintf(f,
2504 "%sNice: %i\n",
2505 prefix, c->nice);
2506
2507 if (c->oom_score_adjust_set)
2508 fprintf(f,
2509 "%sOOMScoreAdjust: %i\n",
2510 prefix, c->oom_score_adjust);
2511
2512 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++)
2513 if (c->rlimit[i]) {
2514 fprintf(f, "%s%s: " RLIM_FMT "\n",
2515 prefix, rlimit_to_string(i), c->rlimit[i]->rlim_max);
2516 fprintf(f, "%s%sSoft: " RLIM_FMT "\n",
2517 prefix, rlimit_to_string(i), c->rlimit[i]->rlim_cur);
2518 }
2519
2520 if (c->ioprio_set) {
2521 _cleanup_free_ char *class_str = NULL;
2522
2523 ioprio_class_to_string_alloc(IOPRIO_PRIO_CLASS(c->ioprio), &class_str);
2524 fprintf(f,
2525 "%sIOSchedulingClass: %s\n"
2526 "%sIOPriority: %i\n",
2527 prefix, strna(class_str),
2528 prefix, (int) IOPRIO_PRIO_DATA(c->ioprio));
2529 }
2530
2531 if (c->cpu_sched_set) {
2532 _cleanup_free_ char *policy_str = NULL;
2533
2534 sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c->cpu_sched_policy, &policy_str);
2535 fprintf(f,
2536 "%sCPUSchedulingPolicy: %s\n"
2537 "%sCPUSchedulingPriority: %i\n"
2538 "%sCPUSchedulingResetOnFork: %s\n",
2539 prefix, strna(policy_str),
2540 prefix, c->cpu_sched_priority,
2541 prefix, yes_no(c->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork));
2542 }
2543
2544 if (c->cpuset) {
2545 fprintf(f, "%sCPUAffinity:", prefix);
2546 for (i = 0; i < c->cpuset_ncpus; i++)
2547 if (CPU_ISSET_S(i, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(c->cpuset_ncpus), c->cpuset))
2548 fprintf(f, " %u", i);
2549 fputs("\n", f);
2550 }
2551
2552 if (c->timer_slack_nsec != NSEC_INFINITY)
2553 fprintf(f, "%sTimerSlackNSec: "NSEC_FMT "\n", prefix, c->timer_slack_nsec);
2554
2555 fprintf(f,
2556 "%sStandardInput: %s\n"
2557 "%sStandardOutput: %s\n"
2558 "%sStandardError: %s\n",
2559 prefix, exec_input_to_string(c->std_input),
2560 prefix, exec_output_to_string(c->std_output),
2561 prefix, exec_output_to_string(c->std_error));
2562
2563 if (c->tty_path)
2564 fprintf(f,
2565 "%sTTYPath: %s\n"
2566 "%sTTYReset: %s\n"
2567 "%sTTYVHangup: %s\n"
2568 "%sTTYVTDisallocate: %s\n",
2569 prefix, c->tty_path,
2570 prefix, yes_no(c->tty_reset),
2571 prefix, yes_no(c->tty_vhangup),
2572 prefix, yes_no(c->tty_vt_disallocate));
2573
2574 if (c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG ||
2575 c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG ||
2576 c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL ||
2577 c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE ||
2578 c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE ||
2579 c->std_output == EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE ||
2580 c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG ||
2581 c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG ||
2582 c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL ||
2583 c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE ||
2584 c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE ||
2585 c->std_error == EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE) {
2586
2587 _cleanup_free_ char *fac_str = NULL, *lvl_str = NULL;
2588
2589 log_facility_unshifted_to_string_alloc(c->syslog_priority >> 3, &fac_str);
2590 log_level_to_string_alloc(LOG_PRI(c->syslog_priority), &lvl_str);
2591
2592 fprintf(f,
2593 "%sSyslogFacility: %s\n"
2594 "%sSyslogLevel: %s\n",
2595 prefix, strna(fac_str),
2596 prefix, strna(lvl_str));
2597 }
2598
2599 if (c->secure_bits)
2600 fprintf(f, "%sSecure Bits:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
2601 prefix,
2602 (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS) ? " keep-caps" : "",
2603 (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED) ? " keep-caps-locked" : "",
2604 (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) ? " no-setuid-fixup" : "",
2605 (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED) ? " no-setuid-fixup-locked" : "",
2606 (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_NOROOT) ? " noroot" : "",
2607 (c->secure_bits & 1<<SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED) ? "noroot-locked" : "");
2608
2609 if (c->capability_bounding_set != CAP_ALL) {
2610 unsigned long l;
2611 fprintf(f, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet:", prefix);
2612
2613 for (l = 0; l <= cap_last_cap(); l++)
2614 if (c->capability_bounding_set & (UINT64_C(1) << l))
2615 fprintf(f, " %s", strna(capability_to_name(l)));
2616
2617 fputs("\n", f);
2618 }
2619
2620 if (c->capability_ambient_set != 0) {
2621 unsigned long l;
2622 fprintf(f, "%sAmbientCapabilities:", prefix);
2623
2624 for (l = 0; l <= cap_last_cap(); l++)
2625 if (c->capability_ambient_set & (UINT64_C(1) << l))
2626 fprintf(f, " %s", strna(capability_to_name(l)));
2627
2628 fputs("\n", f);
2629 }
2630
2631 if (c->user)
2632 fprintf(f, "%sUser: %s\n", prefix, c->user);
2633 if (c->group)
2634 fprintf(f, "%sGroup: %s\n", prefix, c->group);
2635
2636 if (strv_length(c->supplementary_groups) > 0) {
2637 fprintf(f, "%sSupplementaryGroups:", prefix);
2638 strv_fprintf(f, c->supplementary_groups);
2639 fputs("\n", f);
2640 }
2641
2642 if (c->pam_name)
2643 fprintf(f, "%sPAMName: %s\n", prefix, c->pam_name);
2644
2645 if (strv_length(c->read_write_dirs) > 0) {
2646 fprintf(f, "%sReadWriteDirs:", prefix);
2647 strv_fprintf(f, c->read_write_dirs);
2648 fputs("\n", f);
2649 }
2650
2651 if (strv_length(c->read_only_dirs) > 0) {
2652 fprintf(f, "%sReadOnlyDirs:", prefix);
2653 strv_fprintf(f, c->read_only_dirs);
2654 fputs("\n", f);
2655 }
2656
2657 if (strv_length(c->inaccessible_dirs) > 0) {
2658 fprintf(f, "%sInaccessibleDirs:", prefix);
2659 strv_fprintf(f, c->inaccessible_dirs);
2660 fputs("\n", f);
2661 }
2662
2663 if (c->utmp_id)
2664 fprintf(f,
2665 "%sUtmpIdentifier: %s\n",
2666 prefix, c->utmp_id);
2667
2668 if (c->selinux_context)
2669 fprintf(f,
2670 "%sSELinuxContext: %s%s\n",
2671 prefix, c->selinux_context_ignore ? "-" : "", c->selinux_context);
2672
2673 if (c->personality != PERSONALITY_INVALID)
2674 fprintf(f,
2675 "%sPersonality: %s\n",
2676 prefix, strna(personality_to_string(c->personality)));
2677
2678 if (c->syscall_filter) {
2679 #ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
2680 Iterator j;
2681 void *id;
2682 bool first = true;
2683 #endif
2684
2685 fprintf(f,
2686 "%sSystemCallFilter: ",
2687 prefix);
2688
2689 if (!c->syscall_whitelist)
2690 fputc('~', f);
2691
2692 #ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
2693 SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_filter, j) {
2694 _cleanup_free_ char *name = NULL;
2695
2696 if (first)
2697 first = false;
2698 else
2699 fputc(' ', f);
2700
2701 name = seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE, PTR_TO_INT(id) - 1);
2702 fputs(strna(name), f);
2703 }
2704 #endif
2705
2706 fputc('\n', f);
2707 }
2708
2709 if (c->syscall_archs) {
2710 #ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
2711 Iterator j;
2712 void *id;
2713 #endif
2714
2715 fprintf(f,
2716 "%sSystemCallArchitectures:",
2717 prefix);
2718
2719 #ifdef HAVE_SECCOMP
2720 SET_FOREACH(id, c->syscall_archs, j)
2721 fprintf(f, " %s", strna(seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id) - 1)));
2722 #endif
2723 fputc('\n', f);
2724 }
2725
2726 if (c->syscall_errno > 0)
2727 fprintf(f,
2728 "%sSystemCallErrorNumber: %s\n",
2729 prefix, strna(errno_to_name(c->syscall_errno)));
2730
2731 if (c->apparmor_profile)
2732 fprintf(f,
2733 "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n",
2734 prefix, c->apparmor_profile_ignore ? "-" : "", c->apparmor_profile);
2735 }
2736
2737 bool exec_context_maintains_privileges(ExecContext *c) {
2738 assert(c);
2739
2740 /* Returns true if the process forked off would run run under
2741 * an unchanged UID or as root. */
2742
2743 if (!c->user)
2744 return true;
2745
2746 if (streq(c->user, "root") || streq(c->user, "0"))
2747 return true;
2748
2749 return false;
2750 }
2751
2752 void exec_status_start(ExecStatus *s, pid_t pid) {
2753 assert(s);
2754
2755 zero(*s);
2756 s->pid = pid;
2757 dual_timestamp_get(&s->start_timestamp);
2758 }
2759
2760 void exec_status_exit(ExecStatus *s, ExecContext *context, pid_t pid, int code, int status) {
2761 assert(s);
2762
2763 if (s->pid && s->pid != pid)
2764 zero(*s);
2765
2766 s->pid = pid;
2767 dual_timestamp_get(&s->exit_timestamp);
2768
2769 s->code = code;
2770 s->status = status;
2771
2772 if (context) {
2773 if (context->utmp_id)
2774 utmp_put_dead_process(context->utmp_id, pid, code, status);
2775
2776 exec_context_tty_reset(context, NULL);
2777 }
2778 }
2779
2780 void exec_status_dump(ExecStatus *s, FILE *f, const char *prefix) {
2781 char buf[FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_MAX];
2782
2783 assert(s);
2784 assert(f);
2785
2786 if (s->pid <= 0)
2787 return;
2788
2789 prefix = strempty(prefix);
2790
2791 fprintf(f,
2792 "%sPID: "PID_FMT"\n",
2793 prefix, s->pid);
2794
2795 if (s->start_timestamp.realtime > 0)
2796 fprintf(f,
2797 "%sStart Timestamp: %s\n",
2798 prefix, format_timestamp(buf, sizeof(buf), s->start_timestamp.realtime));
2799
2800 if (s->exit_timestamp.realtime > 0)
2801 fprintf(f,
2802 "%sExit Timestamp: %s\n"
2803 "%sExit Code: %s\n"
2804 "%sExit Status: %i\n",
2805 prefix, format_timestamp(buf, sizeof(buf), s->exit_timestamp.realtime),
2806 prefix, sigchld_code_to_string(s->code),
2807 prefix, s->status);
2808 }
2809
2810 char *exec_command_line(char **argv) {
2811 size_t k;
2812 char *n, *p, **a;
2813 bool first = true;
2814
2815 assert(argv);
2816
2817 k = 1;
2818 STRV_FOREACH(a, argv)
2819 k += strlen(*a)+3;
2820
2821 if (!(n = new(char, k)))
2822 return NULL;
2823
2824 p = n;
2825 STRV_FOREACH(a, argv) {
2826
2827 if (!first)
2828 *(p++) = ' ';
2829 else
2830 first = false;
2831
2832 if (strpbrk(*a, WHITESPACE)) {
2833 *(p++) = '\'';
2834 p = stpcpy(p, *a);
2835 *(p++) = '\'';
2836 } else
2837 p = stpcpy(p, *a);
2838
2839 }
2840
2841 *p = 0;
2842
2843 /* FIXME: this doesn't really handle arguments that have
2844 * spaces and ticks in them */
2845
2846 return n;
2847 }
2848
2849 void exec_command_dump(ExecCommand *c, FILE *f, const char *prefix) {
2850 _cleanup_free_ char *cmd = NULL;
2851 const char *prefix2;
2852
2853 assert(c);
2854 assert(f);
2855
2856 prefix = strempty(prefix);
2857 prefix2 = strjoina(prefix, "\t");
2858
2859 cmd = exec_command_line(c->argv);
2860 fprintf(f,
2861 "%sCommand Line: %s\n",
2862 prefix, cmd ? cmd : strerror(ENOMEM));
2863
2864 exec_status_dump(&c->exec_status, f, prefix2);
2865 }
2866
2867 void exec_command_dump_list(ExecCommand *c, FILE *f, const char *prefix) {
2868 assert(f);
2869
2870 prefix = strempty(prefix);
2871
2872 LIST_FOREACH(command, c, c)
2873 exec_command_dump(c, f, prefix);
2874 }
2875
2876 void exec_command_append_list(ExecCommand **l, ExecCommand *e) {
2877 ExecCommand *end;
2878
2879 assert(l);
2880 assert(e);
2881
2882 if (*l) {
2883 /* It's kind of important, that we keep the order here */
2884 LIST_FIND_TAIL(command, *l, end);
2885 LIST_INSERT_AFTER(command, *l, end, e);
2886 } else
2887 *l = e;
2888 }
2889
2890 int exec_command_set(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) {
2891 va_list ap;
2892 char **l, *p;
2893
2894 assert(c);
2895 assert(path);
2896
2897 va_start(ap, path);
2898 l = strv_new_ap(path, ap);
2899 va_end(ap);
2900
2901 if (!l)
2902 return -ENOMEM;
2903
2904 p = strdup(path);
2905 if (!p) {
2906 strv_free(l);
2907 return -ENOMEM;
2908 }
2909
2910 free(c->path);
2911 c->path = p;
2912
2913 strv_free(c->argv);
2914 c->argv = l;
2915
2916 return 0;
2917 }
2918
2919 int exec_command_append(ExecCommand *c, const char *path, ...) {
2920 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL;
2921 va_list ap;
2922 int r;
2923
2924 assert(c);
2925 assert(path);
2926
2927 va_start(ap, path);
2928 l = strv_new_ap(path, ap);
2929 va_end(ap);
2930
2931 if (!l)
2932 return -ENOMEM;
2933
2934 r = strv_extend_strv(&c->argv, l, false);
2935 if (r < 0)
2936 return r;
2937
2938 return 0;
2939 }
2940
2941
2942 static int exec_runtime_allocate(ExecRuntime **rt) {
2943
2944 if (*rt)
2945 return 0;
2946
2947 *rt = new0(ExecRuntime, 1);
2948 if (!*rt)
2949 return -ENOMEM;
2950
2951 (*rt)->n_ref = 1;
2952 (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[0] = (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[1] = -1;
2953
2954 return 0;
2955 }
2956
2957 int exec_runtime_make(ExecRuntime **rt, ExecContext *c, const char *id) {
2958 int r;
2959
2960 assert(rt);
2961 assert(c);
2962 assert(id);
2963
2964 if (*rt)
2965 return 1;
2966
2967 if (!c->private_network && !c->private_tmp)
2968 return 0;
2969
2970 r = exec_runtime_allocate(rt);
2971 if (r < 0)
2972 return r;
2973
2974 if (c->private_network && (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[0] < 0) {
2975 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, (*rt)->netns_storage_socket) < 0)
2976 return -errno;
2977 }
2978
2979 if (c->private_tmp && !(*rt)->tmp_dir) {
2980 r = setup_tmp_dirs(id, &(*rt)->tmp_dir, &(*rt)->var_tmp_dir);
2981 if (r < 0)
2982 return r;
2983 }
2984
2985 return 1;
2986 }
2987
2988 ExecRuntime *exec_runtime_ref(ExecRuntime *r) {
2989 assert(r);
2990 assert(r->n_ref > 0);
2991
2992 r->n_ref++;
2993 return r;
2994 }
2995
2996 ExecRuntime *exec_runtime_unref(ExecRuntime *r) {
2997
2998 if (!r)
2999 return NULL;
3000
3001 assert(r->n_ref > 0);
3002
3003 r->n_ref--;
3004 if (r->n_ref > 0)
3005 return NULL;
3006
3007 free(r->tmp_dir);
3008 free(r->var_tmp_dir);
3009 safe_close_pair(r->netns_storage_socket);
3010 free(r);
3011
3012 return NULL;
3013 }
3014
3015 int exec_runtime_serialize(Unit *u, ExecRuntime *rt, FILE *f, FDSet *fds) {
3016 assert(u);
3017 assert(f);
3018 assert(fds);
3019
3020 if (!rt)
3021 return 0;
3022
3023 if (rt->tmp_dir)
3024 unit_serialize_item(u, f, "tmp-dir", rt->tmp_dir);
3025
3026 if (rt->var_tmp_dir)
3027 unit_serialize_item(u, f, "var-tmp-dir", rt->var_tmp_dir);
3028
3029 if (rt->netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0) {
3030 int copy;
3031
3032 copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->netns_storage_socket[0]);
3033 if (copy < 0)
3034 return copy;
3035
3036 unit_serialize_item_format(u, f, "netns-socket-0", "%i", copy);
3037 }
3038
3039 if (rt->netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0) {
3040 int copy;
3041
3042 copy = fdset_put_dup(fds, rt->netns_storage_socket[1]);
3043 if (copy < 0)
3044 return copy;
3045
3046 unit_serialize_item_format(u, f, "netns-socket-1", "%i", copy);
3047 }
3048
3049 return 0;
3050 }
3051
3052 int exec_runtime_deserialize_item(Unit *u, ExecRuntime **rt, const char *key, const char *value, FDSet *fds) {
3053 int r;
3054
3055 assert(rt);
3056 assert(key);
3057 assert(value);
3058
3059 if (streq(key, "tmp-dir")) {
3060 char *copy;
3061
3062 r = exec_runtime_allocate(rt);
3063 if (r < 0)
3064 return log_oom();
3065
3066 copy = strdup(value);
3067 if (!copy)
3068 return log_oom();
3069
3070 free((*rt)->tmp_dir);
3071 (*rt)->tmp_dir = copy;
3072
3073 } else if (streq(key, "var-tmp-dir")) {
3074 char *copy;
3075
3076 r = exec_runtime_allocate(rt);
3077 if (r < 0)
3078 return log_oom();
3079
3080 copy = strdup(value);
3081 if (!copy)
3082 return log_oom();
3083
3084 free((*rt)->var_tmp_dir);
3085 (*rt)->var_tmp_dir = copy;
3086
3087 } else if (streq(key, "netns-socket-0")) {
3088 int fd;
3089
3090 r = exec_runtime_allocate(rt);
3091 if (r < 0)
3092 return log_oom();
3093
3094 if (safe_atoi(value, &fd) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd))
3095 log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value);
3096 else {
3097 safe_close((*rt)->netns_storage_socket[0]);
3098 (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[0] = fdset_remove(fds, fd);
3099 }
3100 } else if (streq(key, "netns-socket-1")) {
3101 int fd;
3102
3103 r = exec_runtime_allocate(rt);
3104 if (r < 0)
3105 return log_oom();
3106
3107 if (safe_atoi(value, &fd) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds, fd))
3108 log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value);
3109 else {
3110 safe_close((*rt)->netns_storage_socket[1]);
3111 (*rt)->netns_storage_socket[1] = fdset_remove(fds, fd);
3112 }
3113 } else
3114 return 0;
3115
3116 return 1;
3117 }
3118
3119 static void *remove_tmpdir_thread(void *p) {
3120 _cleanup_free_ char *path = p;
3121
3122 (void) rm_rf(path, REMOVE_ROOT|REMOVE_PHYSICAL);
3123 return NULL;
3124 }
3125
3126 void exec_runtime_destroy(ExecRuntime *rt) {
3127 int r;
3128
3129 if (!rt)
3130 return;
3131
3132 /* If there are multiple users of this, let's leave the stuff around */
3133 if (rt->n_ref > 1)
3134 return;
3135
3136 if (rt->tmp_dir) {
3137 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt->tmp_dir);
3138
3139 r = asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread, rt->tmp_dir);
3140 if (r < 0) {
3141 log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt->tmp_dir);
3142 free(rt->tmp_dir);
3143 }
3144
3145 rt->tmp_dir = NULL;
3146 }
3147
3148 if (rt->var_tmp_dir) {
3149 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt->var_tmp_dir);
3150
3151 r = asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread, rt->var_tmp_dir);
3152 if (r < 0) {
3153 log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt->var_tmp_dir);
3154 free(rt->var_tmp_dir);
3155 }
3156
3157 rt->var_tmp_dir = NULL;
3158 }
3159
3160 safe_close_pair(rt->netns_storage_socket);
3161 }
3162
3163 static const char* const exec_input_table[_EXEC_INPUT_MAX] = {
3164 [EXEC_INPUT_NULL] = "null",
3165 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY] = "tty",
3166 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE] = "tty-force",
3167 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL] = "tty-fail",
3168 [EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET] = "socket"
3169 };
3170
3171 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_input, ExecInput);
3172
3173 static const char* const exec_output_table[_EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX] = {
3174 [EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT] = "inherit",
3175 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL] = "null",
3176 [EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY] = "tty",
3177 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG] = "syslog",
3178 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE] = "syslog+console",
3179 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG] = "kmsg",
3180 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE] = "kmsg+console",
3181 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL] = "journal",
3182 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE] = "journal+console",
3183 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET] = "socket"
3184 };
3185
3186 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_output, ExecOutput);
3187
3188 static const char* const exec_utmp_mode_table[_EXEC_UTMP_MODE_MAX] = {
3189 [EXEC_UTMP_INIT] = "init",
3190 [EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN] = "login",
3191 [EXEC_UTMP_USER] = "user",
3192 };
3193
3194 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_utmp_mode, ExecUtmpMode);