2 This file is part of systemd.
4 Copyright 2010 Lennart Poettering
6 systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
7 under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
8 the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
9 (at your option) any later version.
11 systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
12 WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
14 Lesser General Public License for more details.
16 You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
17 along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
27 #include <sys/capability.h>
28 #include <sys/eventfd.h>
30 #include <sys/personality.h>
31 #include <sys/prctl.h>
32 #include <sys/socket.h>
39 #include <security/pam_appl.h>
43 #include <selinux/selinux.h>
51 #include <sys/apparmor.h>
54 #include "sd-messages.h"
57 #include "alloc-util.h"
59 #include "apparmor-util.h"
64 #include "capability-util.h"
67 #include "errno-list.h"
69 #include "exit-status.h"
72 #include "formats-util.h"
74 #include "glob-util.h"
81 #include "namespace.h"
82 #include "parse-util.h"
83 #include "path-util.h"
84 #include "process-util.h"
85 #include "rlimit-util.h"
88 #include "seccomp-util.h"
90 #include "securebits.h"
91 #include "selinux-util.h"
92 #include "signal-util.h"
93 #include "smack-util.h"
95 #include "string-table.h"
96 #include "string-util.h"
98 #include "syslog-util.h"
99 #include "terminal-util.h"
101 #include "user-util.h"
103 #include "utmp-wtmp.h"
105 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC)
106 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC)
108 /* This assumes there is a 'tty' group */
109 #define TTY_MODE 0620
111 #define SNDBUF_SIZE (8*1024*1024)
113 static int shift_fds(int fds
[], unsigned n_fds
) {
114 int start
, restart_from
;
119 /* Modifies the fds array! (sorts it) */
129 for (i
= start
; i
< (int) n_fds
; i
++) {
132 /* Already at right index? */
136 nfd
= fcntl(fds
[i
], F_DUPFD
, i
+ 3);
143 /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then
144 * let's remember that and try again from here */
145 if (nfd
!= i
+3 && restart_from
< 0)
149 if (restart_from
< 0)
152 start
= restart_from
;
158 static int flags_fds(const int fds
[], unsigned n_fds
, bool nonblock
) {
167 /* Drops/Sets O_NONBLOCK and FD_CLOEXEC from the file flags */
169 for (i
= 0; i
< n_fds
; i
++) {
171 r
= fd_nonblock(fds
[i
], nonblock
);
175 /* We unconditionally drop FD_CLOEXEC from the fds,
176 * since after all we want to pass these fds to our
179 r
= fd_cloexec(fds
[i
], false);
187 static const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext
*context
) {
190 if (context
->stdio_as_fds
)
193 if (context
->tty_path
)
194 return context
->tty_path
;
196 return "/dev/console";
199 static void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext
*context
, const ExecParameters
*p
) {
204 path
= exec_context_tty_path(context
);
206 if (context
->tty_vhangup
) {
207 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
208 (void) terminal_vhangup_fd(p
->stdin_fd
);
210 (void) terminal_vhangup(path
);
213 if (context
->tty_reset
) {
214 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
215 (void) reset_terminal_fd(p
->stdin_fd
, true);
217 (void) reset_terminal(path
);
220 if (context
->tty_vt_disallocate
&& path
)
221 (void) vt_disallocate(path
);
224 static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i
) {
227 EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
,
228 EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
);
231 static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o
) {
234 EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
,
235 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
236 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
);
239 static bool exec_context_needs_term(const ExecContext
*c
) {
242 /* Return true if the execution context suggests we should set $TERM to something useful. */
244 if (is_terminal_input(c
->std_input
))
247 if (is_terminal_output(c
->std_output
))
250 if (is_terminal_output(c
->std_error
))
253 return !!c
->tty_path
;
256 static int open_null_as(int flags
, int nfd
) {
261 fd
= open("/dev/null", flags
|O_NOCTTY
);
266 r
= dup2(fd
, nfd
) < 0 ? -errno
: nfd
;
274 static int connect_journal_socket(int fd
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
275 union sockaddr_union sa
= {
276 .un
.sun_family
= AF_UNIX
,
277 .un
.sun_path
= "/run/systemd/journal/stdout",
279 uid_t olduid
= UID_INVALID
;
280 gid_t oldgid
= GID_INVALID
;
283 if (gid
!= GID_INVALID
) {
291 if (uid
!= UID_INVALID
) {
301 r
= connect(fd
, &sa
.sa
, SOCKADDR_UN_LEN(sa
.un
));
305 /* If we fail to restore the uid or gid, things will likely
306 fail later on. This should only happen if an LSM interferes. */
308 if (uid
!= UID_INVALID
)
309 (void) seteuid(olduid
);
312 if (gid
!= GID_INVALID
)
313 (void) setegid(oldgid
);
318 static int connect_logger_as(
320 const ExecContext
*context
,
330 assert(output
< _EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
);
334 fd
= socket(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_STREAM
, 0);
338 r
= connect_journal_socket(fd
, uid
, gid
);
342 if (shutdown(fd
, SHUT_RD
) < 0) {
347 (void) fd_inc_sndbuf(fd
, SNDBUF_SIZE
);
357 context
->syslog_identifier
? context
->syslog_identifier
: ident
,
359 context
->syslog_priority
,
360 !!context
->syslog_level_prefix
,
361 output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
|| output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
,
362 output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
|| output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
363 is_terminal_output(output
));
368 r
= dup2(fd
, nfd
) < 0 ? -errno
: nfd
;
373 static int open_terminal_as(const char *path
, mode_t mode
, int nfd
) {
379 fd
= open_terminal(path
, mode
| O_NOCTTY
);
384 r
= dup2(fd
, nfd
) < 0 ? -errno
: nfd
;
392 static int fixup_input(ExecInput std_input
, int socket_fd
, bool apply_tty_stdin
) {
394 if (is_terminal_input(std_input
) && !apply_tty_stdin
)
395 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
397 if (std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
398 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
403 static int fixup_output(ExecOutput std_output
, int socket_fd
) {
405 if (std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
406 return EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
;
411 static int setup_input(
412 const ExecContext
*context
,
413 const ExecParameters
*params
,
421 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0) {
422 if (dup2(params
->stdin_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
425 /* Try to make this the controlling tty, if it is a tty, and reset it */
426 (void) ioctl(STDIN_FILENO
, TIOCSCTTY
, context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
);
427 (void) reset_terminal_fd(STDIN_FILENO
, true);
432 i
= fixup_input(context
->std_input
, socket_fd
, params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN
);
436 case EXEC_INPUT_NULL
:
437 return open_null_as(O_RDONLY
, STDIN_FILENO
);
440 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
:
441 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
: {
444 fd
= acquire_terminal(exec_context_tty_path(context
),
445 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
,
446 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
,
452 if (fd
!= STDIN_FILENO
) {
453 r
= dup2(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
461 case EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
:
462 return dup2(socket_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
465 assert_not_reached("Unknown input type");
469 static int setup_output(
471 const ExecContext
*context
,
472 const ExecParameters
*params
,
478 dev_t
*journal_stream_dev
,
479 ino_t
*journal_stream_ino
) {
489 assert(journal_stream_dev
);
490 assert(journal_stream_ino
);
492 if (fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
&& params
->stdout_fd
>= 0) {
494 if (dup2(params
->stdout_fd
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
497 return STDOUT_FILENO
;
500 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
&& params
->stderr_fd
>= 0) {
501 if (dup2(params
->stderr_fd
, STDERR_FILENO
) < 0)
504 return STDERR_FILENO
;
507 i
= fixup_input(context
->std_input
, socket_fd
, params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN
);
508 o
= fixup_output(context
->std_output
, socket_fd
);
510 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
) {
512 e
= fixup_output(context
->std_error
, socket_fd
);
514 /* This expects the input and output are already set up */
516 /* Don't change the stderr file descriptor if we inherit all
517 * the way and are not on a tty */
518 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
519 o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
520 i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&&
521 !is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
) &&
525 /* Duplicate from stdout if possible */
526 if (e
== o
|| e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
)
527 return dup2(STDOUT_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
531 } else if (o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
) {
532 /* If input got downgraded, inherit the original value */
533 if (i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&& is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
))
534 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
536 /* If the input is connected to anything that's not a /dev/null, inherit that... */
537 if (i
!= EXEC_INPUT_NULL
)
538 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
540 /* If we are not started from PID 1 we just inherit STDOUT from our parent process. */
544 /* We need to open /dev/null here anew, to get the right access mode. */
545 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
550 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
:
551 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
553 case EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
:
554 if (is_terminal_input(i
))
555 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
557 /* We don't reset the terminal if this is just about output */
558 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
560 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
:
561 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
:
562 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
:
563 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
:
564 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
:
565 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
:
566 r
= connect_logger_as(unit
, context
, o
, ident
, fileno
, uid
, gid
);
568 log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to connect %s to the journal socket, ignoring: %m", fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
? "stdout" : "stderr");
569 r
= open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
573 /* If we connected this fd to the journal via a stream, patch the device/inode into the passed
574 * parameters, but only then. This is useful so that we can set $JOURNAL_STREAM that permits
575 * services to detect whether they are connected to the journal or not. */
577 if (fstat(fileno
, &st
) >= 0) {
578 *journal_stream_dev
= st
.st_dev
;
579 *journal_stream_ino
= st
.st_ino
;
584 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
:
585 assert(socket_fd
>= 0);
586 return dup2(socket_fd
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
589 assert_not_reached("Unknown error type");
593 static int chown_terminal(int fd
, uid_t uid
) {
598 /* Before we chown/chmod the TTY, let's ensure this is actually a tty */
602 /* This might fail. What matters are the results. */
603 (void) fchown(fd
, uid
, -1);
604 (void) fchmod(fd
, TTY_MODE
);
606 if (fstat(fd
, &st
) < 0)
609 if (st
.st_uid
!= uid
|| (st
.st_mode
& 0777) != TTY_MODE
)
615 static int setup_confirm_stdio(int *_saved_stdin
, int *_saved_stdout
) {
616 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, saved_stdout
= -1;
619 assert(_saved_stdin
);
620 assert(_saved_stdout
);
622 saved_stdin
= fcntl(STDIN_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
626 saved_stdout
= fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
627 if (saved_stdout
< 0)
630 fd
= acquire_terminal(
635 DEFAULT_CONFIRM_USEC
);
639 r
= chown_terminal(fd
, getuid());
643 r
= reset_terminal_fd(fd
, true);
647 if (dup2(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
650 if (dup2(fd
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
657 *_saved_stdin
= saved_stdin
;
658 *_saved_stdout
= saved_stdout
;
660 saved_stdin
= saved_stdout
= -1;
665 _printf_(1, 2) static int write_confirm_message(const char *format
, ...) {
666 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
671 fd
= open_terminal("/dev/console", O_WRONLY
|O_NOCTTY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
675 va_start(ap
, format
);
676 vdprintf(fd
, format
, ap
);
682 static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin
, int *saved_stdout
) {
686 assert(saved_stdout
);
690 if (*saved_stdin
>= 0)
691 if (dup2(*saved_stdin
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
694 if (*saved_stdout
>= 0)
695 if (dup2(*saved_stdout
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
698 *saved_stdin
= safe_close(*saved_stdin
);
699 *saved_stdout
= safe_close(*saved_stdout
);
704 static int ask_for_confirmation(char *response
, char **argv
) {
705 int saved_stdout
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, r
;
706 _cleanup_free_
char *line
= NULL
;
708 r
= setup_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
712 line
= exec_command_line(argv
);
716 r
= ask_char(response
, "yns", "Execute %s? [Yes, No, Skip] ", line
);
718 restore_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
723 static int enforce_groups(const ExecContext
*context
, const char *username
, gid_t gid
) {
724 bool keep_groups
= false;
729 /* Lookup and set GID and supplementary group list. Here too
730 * we avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. */
732 if (context
->group
|| username
) {
733 /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */
734 if (username
&& gid
!= 0) {
735 if (initgroups(username
, gid
) < 0)
741 /* Second step, set our gids */
742 if (setresgid(gid
, gid
, gid
) < 0)
746 if (context
->supplementary_groups
) {
751 /* Final step, initialize any manually set supplementary groups */
752 assert_se((ngroups_max
= (int) sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX
)) > 0);
754 if (!(gids
= new(gid_t
, ngroups_max
)))
758 k
= getgroups(ngroups_max
, gids
);
766 STRV_FOREACH(i
, context
->supplementary_groups
) {
769 if (k
>= ngroups_max
) {
775 r
= get_group_creds(&g
, gids
+k
);
784 if (setgroups(k
, gids
) < 0) {
795 static int enforce_user(const ExecContext
*context
, uid_t uid
) {
798 /* Sets (but doesn't look up) the uid and make sure we keep the
799 * capabilities while doing so. */
801 if (context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
803 /* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but
804 * drop privileges we need to make sure we keep our
805 * caps, while we drop privileges. */
807 int sb
= context
->secure_bits
| 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
;
809 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
) != sb
)
810 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, sb
) < 0)
815 /* Second step: actually set the uids */
816 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
819 /* At this point we should have all necessary capabilities but
820 are otherwise a normal user. However, the caps might got
821 corrupted due to the setresuid() so we need clean them up
822 later. This is done outside of this call. */
829 static int null_conv(
831 const struct pam_message
**msg
,
832 struct pam_response
**resp
,
835 /* We don't support conversations */
840 static int setup_pam(
846 int fds
[], unsigned n_fds
) {
848 static const struct pam_conv conv
= {
853 _cleanup_(barrier_destroy
) Barrier barrier
= BARRIER_NULL
;
854 pam_handle_t
*handle
= NULL
;
856 int pam_code
= PAM_SUCCESS
, r
;
857 char **nv
, **e
= NULL
;
858 bool close_session
= false;
859 pid_t pam_pid
= 0, parent_pid
;
866 /* We set up PAM in the parent process, then fork. The child
867 * will then stay around until killed via PR_GET_PDEATHSIG or
868 * systemd via the cgroup logic. It will then remove the PAM
869 * session again. The parent process will exec() the actual
870 * daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID
871 * of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */
873 r
= barrier_create(&barrier
);
877 if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG
)
880 pam_code
= pam_start(name
, user
, &conv
, &handle
);
881 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
887 pam_code
= pam_set_item(handle
, PAM_TTY
, tty
);
888 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
892 STRV_FOREACH(nv
, *env
) {
893 pam_code
= pam_putenv(handle
, *nv
);
894 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
898 pam_code
= pam_acct_mgmt(handle
, flags
);
899 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
902 pam_code
= pam_open_session(handle
, flags
);
903 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
906 close_session
= true;
908 e
= pam_getenvlist(handle
);
910 pam_code
= PAM_BUF_ERR
;
914 /* Block SIGTERM, so that we know that it won't get lost in
917 assert_se(sigprocmask_many(SIG_BLOCK
, &old_ss
, SIGTERM
, -1) >= 0);
919 parent_pid
= getpid();
928 int sig
, ret
= EXIT_PAM
;
930 /* The child's job is to reset the PAM session on
932 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_CHILD
);
934 /* This string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
935 * of "/sbin/init"), to look pretty in /bin/ps */
936 rename_process("(sd-pam)");
938 /* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this
939 child. We assume that otherwise only those fds are
940 open here that have been opened by PAM. */
941 close_many(fds
, n_fds
);
943 /* Drop privileges - we don't need any to pam_close_session
944 * and this will make PR_SET_PDEATHSIG work in most cases.
945 * If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam threads
946 * to fail to exit normally */
947 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
948 log_error_errno(r
, "Error: Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m");
950 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
952 /* Wait until our parent died. This will only work if
953 * the above setresuid() succeeds, otherwise the kernel
954 * will not allow unprivileged parents kill their privileged
955 * children this way. We rely on the control groups kill logic
956 * to do the rest for us. */
957 if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG
, SIGTERM
) < 0)
960 /* Tell the parent that our setup is done. This is especially
961 * important regarding dropping privileges. Otherwise, unit
962 * setup might race against our setresuid(2) call. */
963 barrier_place(&barrier
);
965 /* Check if our parent process might already have
967 if (getppid() == parent_pid
) {
970 assert_se(sigemptyset(&ss
) >= 0);
971 assert_se(sigaddset(&ss
, SIGTERM
) >= 0);
974 if (sigwait(&ss
, &sig
) < 0) {
981 assert(sig
== SIGTERM
);
986 /* If our parent died we'll end the session */
987 if (getppid() != parent_pid
) {
988 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
989 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
996 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
1000 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_PARENT
);
1002 /* If the child was forked off successfully it will do all the
1003 * cleanups, so forget about the handle here. */
1006 /* Unblock SIGTERM again in the parent */
1007 assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK
, &old_ss
, NULL
) >= 0);
1009 /* We close the log explicitly here, since the PAM modules
1010 * might have opened it, but we don't want this fd around. */
1013 /* Synchronously wait for the child to initialize. We don't care for
1014 * errors as we cannot recover. However, warn loudly if it happens. */
1015 if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier
))
1016 log_error("PAM initialization failed");
1024 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
1025 log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle
, pam_code
));
1026 r
= -EPERM
; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */
1028 log_error_errno(r
, "PAM failed: %m");
1032 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
1034 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
1044 static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path
) {
1045 char process_name
[11];
1049 /* This resulting string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
1050 * of "/sbin/init") to look pretty in /bin/ps */
1054 rename_process("(...)");
1060 /* The end of the process name is usually more
1061 * interesting, since the first bit might just be
1067 process_name
[0] = '(';
1068 memcpy(process_name
+1, p
, l
);
1069 process_name
[1+l
] = ')';
1070 process_name
[1+l
+1] = 0;
1072 rename_process(process_name
);
1077 static int apply_seccomp(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1078 uint32_t negative_action
, action
;
1079 scmp_filter_ctx
*seccomp
;
1086 negative_action
= c
->syscall_errno
== 0 ? SCMP_ACT_KILL
: SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c
->syscall_errno
);
1088 seccomp
= seccomp_init(c
->syscall_whitelist
? negative_action
: SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
);
1092 if (c
->syscall_archs
) {
1094 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_archs
, i
) {
1095 r
= seccomp_arch_add(seccomp
, PTR_TO_UINT32(id
) - 1);
1103 r
= seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp
);
1108 action
= c
->syscall_whitelist
? SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
: negative_action
;
1109 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_filter
, i
) {
1110 r
= seccomp_rule_add(seccomp
, action
, PTR_TO_INT(id
) - 1, 0);
1115 r
= seccomp_attr_set(seccomp
, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP
, 0);
1119 r
= seccomp_load(seccomp
);
1122 seccomp_release(seccomp
);
1126 static int apply_address_families(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1127 scmp_filter_ctx
*seccomp
;
1133 seccomp
= seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
);
1137 r
= seccomp_add_secondary_archs(seccomp
);
1141 if (c
->address_families_whitelist
) {
1142 int af
, first
= 0, last
= 0;
1145 /* If this is a whitelist, we first block the address
1146 * families that are out of range and then everything
1147 * that is not in the set. First, we find the lowest
1148 * and highest address family in the set. */
1150 SET_FOREACH(afp
, c
->address_families
, i
) {
1151 af
= PTR_TO_INT(afp
);
1153 if (af
<= 0 || af
>= af_max())
1156 if (first
== 0 || af
< first
)
1159 if (last
== 0 || af
> last
)
1163 assert((first
== 0) == (last
== 0));
1167 /* No entries in the valid range, block everything */
1168 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1170 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT
),
1178 /* Block everything below the first entry */
1179 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1181 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT
),
1184 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_LT
, first
));
1188 /* Block everything above the last entry */
1189 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1191 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT
),
1194 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_GT
, last
));
1198 /* Block everything between the first and last
1200 for (af
= 1; af
< af_max(); af
++) {
1202 if (set_contains(c
->address_families
, INT_TO_PTR(af
)))
1205 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1207 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT
),
1210 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ
, af
));
1219 /* If this is a blacklist, then generate one rule for
1220 * each address family that are then combined in OR
1223 SET_FOREACH(af
, c
->address_families
, i
) {
1225 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1227 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPROTONOSUPPORT
),
1230 SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_EQ
, PTR_TO_INT(af
)));
1236 r
= seccomp_attr_set(seccomp
, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP
, 0);
1240 r
= seccomp_load(seccomp
);
1243 seccomp_release(seccomp
);
1247 static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1248 scmp_filter_ctx
*seccomp
;
1253 seccomp
= seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
);
1257 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1259 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
),
1262 SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ
, PROT_EXEC
|PROT_WRITE
, PROT_EXEC
|PROT_WRITE
));
1266 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1268 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
),
1271 SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ
, PROT_EXEC
, PROT_EXEC
));
1275 r
= seccomp_attr_set(seccomp
, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP
, 0);
1279 r
= seccomp_load(seccomp
);
1282 seccomp_release(seccomp
);
1286 static int apply_restrict_realtime(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1287 static const int permitted_policies
[] = {
1293 scmp_filter_ctx
*seccomp
;
1295 int r
, p
, max_policy
= 0;
1299 seccomp
= seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
);
1303 /* Determine the highest policy constant we want to allow */
1304 for (i
= 0; i
< ELEMENTSOF(permitted_policies
); i
++)
1305 if (permitted_policies
[i
] > max_policy
)
1306 max_policy
= permitted_policies
[i
];
1308 /* Go through all policies with lower values than that, and block them -- unless they appear in the
1310 for (p
= 0; p
< max_policy
; p
++) {
1313 /* Check if this is in the whitelist. */
1314 for (i
= 0; i
< ELEMENTSOF(permitted_policies
); i
++)
1315 if (permitted_policies
[i
] == p
) {
1323 /* Deny this policy */
1324 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1326 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
),
1327 SCMP_SYS(sched_setscheduler
),
1329 SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_EQ
, p
));
1334 /* Blacklist all other policies, i.e. the ones with higher values. Note that all comparisons are unsigned here,
1335 * hence no need no check for < 0 values. */
1336 r
= seccomp_rule_add(
1338 SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
),
1339 SCMP_SYS(sched_setscheduler
),
1341 SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_GT
, max_policy
));
1345 r
= seccomp_attr_set(seccomp
, SCMP_FLTATR_CTL_NNP
, 0);
1349 r
= seccomp_load(seccomp
);
1352 seccomp_release(seccomp
);
1358 static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe
[4]) {
1362 idle_pipe
[1] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[1]);
1363 idle_pipe
[2] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[2]);
1365 if (idle_pipe
[0] >= 0) {
1368 r
= fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC
);
1370 if (idle_pipe
[3] >= 0 && r
== 0 /* timeout */) {
1373 /* Signal systemd that we are bored and want to continue. */
1374 n
= write(idle_pipe
[3], "x", 1);
1376 /* Wait for systemd to react to the signal above. */
1377 fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC
);
1380 idle_pipe
[0] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[0]);
1384 idle_pipe
[3] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[3]);
1387 static int build_environment(
1389 const ExecContext
*c
,
1390 const ExecParameters
*p
,
1393 const char *username
,
1395 dev_t journal_stream_dev
,
1396 ino_t journal_stream_ino
,
1399 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
;
1406 our_env
= new0(char*, 13);
1411 _cleanup_free_
char *joined
= NULL
;
1413 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid()) < 0)
1415 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1417 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_FDS=%u", n_fds
) < 0)
1419 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1421 joined
= strv_join(p
->fd_names
, ":");
1425 x
= strjoin("LISTEN_FDNAMES=", joined
, NULL
);
1428 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1431 if ((p
->flags
& EXEC_SET_WATCHDOG
) && p
->watchdog_usec
> 0) {
1432 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid()) < 0)
1434 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1436 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_USEC="USEC_FMT
, p
->watchdog_usec
) < 0)
1438 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1441 /* If this is D-Bus, tell the nss-systemd module, since it relies on being able to use D-Bus look up dynamic
1442 * users via PID 1, possibly dead-locking the dbus daemon. This way it will not use D-Bus to resolve names, but
1443 * check the database directly. */
1444 if (unit_has_name(u
, SPECIAL_DBUS_SERVICE
)) {
1445 x
= strdup("SYSTEMD_NSS_BYPASS_BUS=1");
1448 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1452 x
= strappend("HOME=", home
);
1455 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1459 x
= strappend("LOGNAME=", username
);
1462 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1464 x
= strappend("USER=", username
);
1467 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1471 x
= strappend("SHELL=", shell
);
1474 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1477 if (exec_context_needs_term(c
)) {
1478 const char *tty_path
, *term
= NULL
;
1480 tty_path
= exec_context_tty_path(c
);
1482 /* If we are forked off PID 1 and we are supposed to operate on /dev/console, then let's try to inherit
1483 * the $TERM set for PID 1. This is useful for containers so that the $TERM the container manager
1484 * passes to PID 1 ends up all the way in the console login shown. */
1486 if (path_equal(tty_path
, "/dev/console") && getppid() == 1)
1487 term
= getenv("TERM");
1489 term
= default_term_for_tty(tty_path
);
1491 x
= strappend("TERM=", term
);
1494 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1497 if (journal_stream_dev
!= 0 && journal_stream_ino
!= 0) {
1498 if (asprintf(&x
, "JOURNAL_STREAM=" DEV_FMT
":" INO_FMT
, journal_stream_dev
, journal_stream_ino
) < 0)
1501 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1504 our_env
[n_env
++] = NULL
;
1505 assert(n_env
<= 12);
1513 static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext
*c
, char ***ret
) {
1514 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **pass_env
= NULL
;
1515 size_t n_env
= 0, n_bufsize
= 0;
1518 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->pass_environment
) {
1519 _cleanup_free_
char *x
= NULL
;
1525 x
= strjoin(*i
, "=", v
, NULL
);
1528 if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(pass_env
, n_bufsize
, n_env
+ 2))
1530 pass_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1531 pass_env
[n_env
] = NULL
;
1541 static bool exec_needs_mount_namespace(
1542 const ExecContext
*context
,
1543 const ExecParameters
*params
,
1544 ExecRuntime
*runtime
) {
1549 if (!strv_isempty(context
->read_write_paths
) ||
1550 !strv_isempty(context
->read_only_paths
) ||
1551 !strv_isempty(context
->inaccessible_paths
))
1554 if (context
->mount_flags
!= 0)
1557 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
&& (runtime
->tmp_dir
|| runtime
->var_tmp_dir
))
1560 if (context
->private_devices
||
1561 context
->protect_system
!= PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO
||
1562 context
->protect_home
!= PROTECT_HOME_NO
)
1568 static int setup_private_users(uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
1569 _cleanup_free_
char *uid_map
= NULL
, *gid_map
= NULL
;
1570 _cleanup_close_pair_
int errno_pipe
[2] = { -1, -1 };
1571 _cleanup_close_
int unshare_ready_fd
= -1;
1572 _cleanup_(sigkill_waitp
) pid_t pid
= 0;
1578 /* Set up a user namespace and map root to root, the selected UID/GID to itself, and everything else to
1579 * nobody. In order to be able to write this mapping we need CAP_SETUID in the original user namespace, which
1580 * we however lack after opening the user namespace. To work around this we fork() a temporary child process,
1581 * which waits for the parent to create the new user namespace while staying in the original namespace. The
1582 * child then writes the UID mapping, under full privileges. The parent waits for the child to finish and
1583 * continues execution normally. */
1585 if (uid
!= 0 && uid_is_valid(uid
))
1587 "0 0 1\n" /* Map root → root */
1588 UID_FMT
" " UID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $UID → $UID */
1589 uid
, uid
); /* The case where the above is the same */
1591 uid_map
= strdup("0 0 1\n");
1595 if (gid
!= 0 && gid_is_valid(gid
))
1597 "0 0 1\n" /* Map root → root */
1598 GID_FMT
" " GID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $GID → $GID */
1601 gid_map
= strdup("0 0 1\n"); /* The case where the above is the same */
1605 /* Create a communication channel so that the parent can tell the child when it finished creating the user
1607 unshare_ready_fd
= eventfd(0, EFD_CLOEXEC
);
1608 if (unshare_ready_fd
< 0)
1611 /* Create a communication channel so that the child can tell the parent a proper error code in case it
1613 if (pipe2(errno_pipe
, O_CLOEXEC
) < 0)
1621 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
1625 /* Child process, running in the original user namespace. Let's update the parent's UID/GID map from
1626 * here, after the parent opened its own user namespace. */
1629 errno_pipe
[0] = safe_close(errno_pipe
[0]);
1631 /* Wait until the parent unshared the user namespace */
1632 if (read(unshare_ready_fd
, &c
, sizeof(c
)) < 0) {
1637 /* Disable the setgroups() system call in the child user namespace, for good. */
1638 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "setgroups");
1639 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
1641 if (errno
!= ENOENT
) {
1646 /* If the file is missing the kernel is too old, let's continue anyway. */
1648 if (write(fd
, "deny\n", 5) < 0) {
1653 fd
= safe_close(fd
);
1656 /* First write the GID map */
1657 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "gid_map");
1658 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
1663 if (write(fd
, gid_map
, strlen(gid_map
)) < 0) {
1667 fd
= safe_close(fd
);
1669 /* The write the UID map */
1670 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "uid_map");
1671 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
1676 if (write(fd
, uid_map
, strlen(uid_map
)) < 0) {
1681 _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS
);
1684 (void) write(errno_pipe
[1], &r
, sizeof(r
));
1685 _exit(EXIT_FAILURE
);
1688 errno_pipe
[1] = safe_close(errno_pipe
[1]);
1690 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER
) < 0)
1693 /* Let the child know that the namespace is ready now */
1694 if (write(unshare_ready_fd
, &c
, sizeof(c
)) < 0)
1697 /* Try to read an error code from the child */
1698 n
= read(errno_pipe
[0], &r
, sizeof(r
));
1701 if (n
== sizeof(r
)) { /* an error code was sent to us */
1706 if (n
!= 0) /* on success we should have read 0 bytes */
1709 r
= wait_for_terminate(pid
, &si
);
1714 /* If something strange happened with the child, let's consider this fatal, too */
1715 if (si
.si_code
!= CLD_EXITED
|| si
.si_status
!= 0)
1721 static void append_socket_pair(int *array
, unsigned *n
, int pair
[2]) {
1729 array
[(*n
)++] = pair
[0];
1731 array
[(*n
)++] = pair
[1];
1734 static int close_remaining_fds(
1735 const ExecParameters
*params
,
1736 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
1737 DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
1740 int *fds
, unsigned n_fds
) {
1742 unsigned n_dont_close
= 0;
1743 int dont_close
[n_fds
+ 12];
1747 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
1748 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdin_fd
;
1749 if (params
->stdout_fd
>= 0)
1750 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdout_fd
;
1751 if (params
->stderr_fd
>= 0)
1752 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stderr_fd
;
1755 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = socket_fd
;
1757 memcpy(dont_close
+ n_dont_close
, fds
, sizeof(int) * n_fds
);
1758 n_dont_close
+= n_fds
;
1762 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, runtime
->netns_storage_socket
);
1766 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, dcreds
->user
->storage_socket
);
1768 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, dcreds
->group
->storage_socket
);
1771 if (user_lookup_fd
>= 0)
1772 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = user_lookup_fd
;
1774 return close_all_fds(dont_close
, n_dont_close
);
1777 static int send_user_lookup(
1785 /* Send the resolved UID/GID to PID 1 after we learnt it. We send a single datagram, containing the UID/GID
1786 * data as well as the unit name. Note that we suppress sending this if no user/group to resolve was
1789 if (user_lookup_fd
< 0)
1792 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
) && !gid_is_valid(gid
))
1795 if (writev(user_lookup_fd
,
1797 { .iov_base
= &uid
, .iov_len
= sizeof(uid
) },
1798 { .iov_base
= &gid
, .iov_len
= sizeof(gid
) },
1799 { .iov_base
= unit
->id
, .iov_len
= strlen(unit
->id
) }}, 3) < 0)
1805 static int exec_child(
1807 ExecCommand
*command
,
1808 const ExecContext
*context
,
1809 const ExecParameters
*params
,
1810 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
1811 DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
1814 int *fds
, unsigned n_fds
,
1819 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
, **pass_env
= NULL
, **accum_env
= NULL
, **final_argv
= NULL
;
1820 _cleanup_free_
char *mac_selinux_context_net
= NULL
;
1821 const char *username
= NULL
, *home
= NULL
, *shell
= NULL
, *wd
;
1822 dev_t journal_stream_dev
= 0;
1823 ino_t journal_stream_ino
= 0;
1824 bool needs_mount_namespace
;
1825 uid_t uid
= UID_INVALID
;
1826 gid_t gid
= GID_INVALID
;
1833 assert(exit_status
);
1835 rename_process_from_path(command
->path
);
1837 /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the
1838 * only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main daemon. All
1839 * others we leave untouched because we set them to
1840 * SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, both of which
1841 * will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */
1842 (void) default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER
,
1843 SIGNALS_IGNORE
, -1);
1845 if (context
->ignore_sigpipe
)
1846 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
1848 r
= reset_signal_mask();
1850 *exit_status
= EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK
;
1854 if (params
->idle_pipe
)
1855 do_idle_pipe_dance(params
->idle_pipe
);
1857 /* Close sockets very early to make sure we don't
1858 * block init reexecution because it cannot bind its
1863 r
= close_remaining_fds(params
, runtime
, dcreds
, user_lookup_fd
, socket_fd
, fds
, n_fds
);
1865 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
1869 if (!context
->same_pgrp
)
1871 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSID
;
1875 exec_context_tty_reset(context
, params
);
1877 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_CONFIRM_SPAWN
) {
1880 r
= ask_for_confirmation(&response
, argv
);
1881 if (r
== -ETIMEDOUT
)
1882 write_confirm_message("Confirmation question timed out, assuming positive response.\n");
1884 write_confirm_message("Couldn't ask confirmation question, assuming positive response: %s\n", strerror(-r
));
1885 else if (response
== 's') {
1886 write_confirm_message("Skipping execution.\n");
1887 *exit_status
= EXIT_CONFIRM
;
1889 } else if (response
== 'n') {
1890 write_confirm_message("Failing execution.\n");
1896 if (context
->dynamic_user
&& dcreds
) {
1898 /* Make sure we bypass our own NSS module for any NSS checks */
1899 if (putenv((char*) "SYSTEMD_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS=1") != 0) {
1900 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
1904 r
= dynamic_creds_realize(dcreds
, &uid
, &gid
);
1906 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
1910 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
) || !gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
1911 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
1916 username
= dcreds
->user
->name
;
1919 if (context
->user
) {
1920 username
= context
->user
;
1921 r
= get_user_creds(&username
, &uid
, &gid
, &home
, &shell
);
1923 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
1927 /* Don't set $HOME or $SHELL if they are are not particularly enlightening anyway. */
1928 if (isempty(home
) || path_equal(home
, "/"))
1931 if (isempty(shell
) || PATH_IN_SET(shell
,
1935 "/usr/sbin/nologin"))
1939 if (context
->group
) {
1940 const char *g
= context
->group
;
1942 r
= get_group_creds(&g
, &gid
);
1944 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
1950 r
= send_user_lookup(unit
, user_lookup_fd
, uid
, gid
);
1952 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
1956 user_lookup_fd
= safe_close(user_lookup_fd
);
1958 /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we
1959 * must sure to drop O_NONBLOCK */
1961 (void) fd_nonblock(socket_fd
, false);
1963 r
= setup_input(context
, params
, socket_fd
);
1965 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
1969 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDOUT_FILENO
, socket_fd
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
, &journal_stream_dev
, &journal_stream_ino
);
1971 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDOUT
;
1975 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDERR_FILENO
, socket_fd
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
, &journal_stream_dev
, &journal_stream_ino
);
1977 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDERR
;
1981 if (params
->cgroup_path
) {
1982 r
= cg_attach_everywhere(params
->cgroup_supported
, params
->cgroup_path
, 0, NULL
, NULL
);
1984 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
1989 if (context
->oom_score_adjust_set
) {
1990 char t
[DECIMAL_STR_MAX(context
->oom_score_adjust
)];
1992 /* When we can't make this change due to EPERM, then
1993 * let's silently skip over it. User namespaces
1994 * prohibit write access to this file, and we
1995 * shouldn't trip up over that. */
1997 sprintf(t
, "%i", context
->oom_score_adjust
);
1998 r
= write_string_file("/proc/self/oom_score_adj", t
, 0);
1999 if (r
== -EPERM
|| r
== -EACCES
) {
2001 log_unit_debug_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust OOM setting, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
2004 *exit_status
= EXIT_OOM_ADJUST
;
2009 if (context
->nice_set
)
2010 if (setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS
, 0, context
->nice
) < 0) {
2011 *exit_status
= EXIT_NICE
;
2015 if (context
->cpu_sched_set
) {
2016 struct sched_param param
= {
2017 .sched_priority
= context
->cpu_sched_priority
,
2020 r
= sched_setscheduler(0,
2021 context
->cpu_sched_policy
|
2022 (context
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
?
2023 SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK
: 0),
2026 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSCHEDULER
;
2031 if (context
->cpuset
)
2032 if (sched_setaffinity(0, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(context
->cpuset_ncpus
), context
->cpuset
) < 0) {
2033 *exit_status
= EXIT_CPUAFFINITY
;
2037 if (context
->ioprio_set
)
2038 if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS
, 0, context
->ioprio
) < 0) {
2039 *exit_status
= EXIT_IOPRIO
;
2043 if (context
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
2044 if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK
, context
->timer_slack_nsec
) < 0) {
2045 *exit_status
= EXIT_TIMERSLACK
;
2049 if (context
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
)
2050 if (personality(context
->personality
) < 0) {
2051 *exit_status
= EXIT_PERSONALITY
;
2055 if (context
->utmp_id
)
2056 utmp_put_init_process(context
->utmp_id
, getpid(), getsid(0), context
->tty_path
,
2057 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_INIT
? INIT_PROCESS
:
2058 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
? LOGIN_PROCESS
:
2060 username
? "root" : context
->user
);
2062 if (context
->user
&& is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
)) {
2063 r
= chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO
, uid
);
2065 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
2070 /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup
2071 * (but only in systemd's own controller hierarchy!) to the
2072 * user of the new process. */
2073 if (params
->cgroup_path
&& context
->user
&& params
->cgroup_delegate
) {
2074 r
= cg_set_task_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, params
->cgroup_path
, 0644, uid
, gid
);
2076 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
2081 r
= cg_set_group_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, params
->cgroup_path
, 0755, uid
, gid
);
2083 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
2088 if (!strv_isempty(context
->runtime_directory
) && params
->runtime_prefix
) {
2091 STRV_FOREACH(rt
, context
->runtime_directory
) {
2092 _cleanup_free_
char *p
;
2094 p
= strjoin(params
->runtime_prefix
, "/", *rt
, NULL
);
2096 *exit_status
= EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY
;
2100 r
= mkdir_p_label(p
, context
->runtime_directory_mode
);
2102 *exit_status
= EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY
;
2106 r
= chmod_and_chown(p
, context
->runtime_directory_mode
, uid
, gid
);
2108 *exit_status
= EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY
;
2114 r
= build_environment(
2126 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
2130 r
= build_pass_environment(context
, &pass_env
);
2132 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
2136 accum_env
= strv_env_merge(5,
2137 params
->environment
,
2140 context
->environment
,
2144 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
2147 accum_env
= strv_env_clean(accum_env
);
2149 umask(context
->umask
);
2151 if ((params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_PERMISSIONS
) && !command
->privileged
) {
2152 r
= enforce_groups(context
, username
, gid
);
2154 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
2158 if (context
->smack_process_label
) {
2159 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context
->smack_process_label
);
2161 *exit_status
= EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL
;
2165 #ifdef SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
2167 _cleanup_free_
char *exec_label
= NULL
;
2169 r
= mac_smack_read(command
->path
, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC
, &exec_label
);
2170 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -ENODATA
&& r
!= -EOPNOTSUPP
) {
2171 *exit_status
= EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL
;
2175 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label
? : SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
);
2177 *exit_status
= EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL
;
2184 if (context
->pam_name
&& username
) {
2185 r
= setup_pam(context
->pam_name
, username
, uid
, context
->tty_path
, &accum_env
, fds
, n_fds
);
2187 *exit_status
= EXIT_PAM
;
2194 if (context
->private_network
&& runtime
&& runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
2195 r
= setup_netns(runtime
->netns_storage_socket
);
2197 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
2202 needs_mount_namespace
= exec_needs_mount_namespace(context
, params
, runtime
);
2204 if (needs_mount_namespace
) {
2205 char *tmp
= NULL
, *var
= NULL
;
2207 /* The runtime struct only contains the parent
2208 * of the private /tmp, which is
2209 * non-accessible to world users. Inside of it
2210 * there's a /tmp that is sticky, and that's
2211 * the one we want to use here. */
2213 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
) {
2214 if (runtime
->tmp_dir
)
2215 tmp
= strjoina(runtime
->tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
2216 if (runtime
->var_tmp_dir
)
2217 var
= strjoina(runtime
->var_tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
2220 r
= setup_namespace(
2221 (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
) ? context
->root_directory
: NULL
,
2222 context
->read_write_paths
,
2223 context
->read_only_paths
,
2224 context
->inaccessible_paths
,
2227 context
->private_devices
,
2228 context
->protect_home
,
2229 context
->protect_system
,
2230 context
->mount_flags
);
2232 /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is
2233 * probably due to a missing capability. In this case,
2234 * silently proceeed. */
2235 if (r
== -EPERM
|| r
== -EACCES
) {
2237 log_unit_debug_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
2240 *exit_status
= EXIT_NAMESPACE
;
2245 if (context
->working_directory_home
)
2247 else if (context
->working_directory
)
2248 wd
= context
->working_directory
;
2252 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
) {
2253 if (!needs_mount_namespace
&& context
->root_directory
)
2254 if (chroot(context
->root_directory
) < 0) {
2255 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHROOT
;
2259 if (chdir(wd
) < 0 &&
2260 !context
->working_directory_missing_ok
) {
2261 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
2267 d
= strjoina(strempty(context
->root_directory
), "/", strempty(wd
));
2269 !context
->working_directory_missing_ok
) {
2270 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
2276 if ((params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_PERMISSIONS
) &&
2277 mac_selinux_use() &&
2278 params
->selinux_context_net
&&
2280 !command
->privileged
) {
2282 r
= mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd
, command
->path
, context
->selinux_context
, &mac_selinux_context_net
);
2284 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
2290 if ((params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_PERMISSIONS
) && context
->private_users
) {
2291 r
= setup_private_users(uid
, gid
);
2293 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
2298 /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that
2299 * nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that
2300 * we are more aggressive this time since socket_fd
2301 * and the netns fds we don't need anymore. The custom
2302 * endpoint fd was needed to upload the policy and can
2303 * now be closed as well. */
2304 r
= close_all_fds(fds
, n_fds
);
2306 r
= shift_fds(fds
, n_fds
);
2308 r
= flags_fds(fds
, n_fds
, context
->non_blocking
);
2310 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
2314 if ((params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_PERMISSIONS
) && !command
->privileged
) {
2316 bool use_address_families
= context
->address_families_whitelist
||
2317 !set_isempty(context
->address_families
);
2318 bool use_syscall_filter
= context
->syscall_whitelist
||
2319 !set_isempty(context
->syscall_filter
) ||
2320 !set_isempty(context
->syscall_archs
);
2321 int secure_bits
= context
->secure_bits
;
2323 for (i
= 0; i
< _RLIMIT_MAX
; i
++) {
2325 if (!context
->rlimit
[i
])
2328 r
= setrlimit_closest(i
, context
->rlimit
[i
]);
2330 *exit_status
= EXIT_LIMITS
;
2335 /* Set the RTPRIO resource limit to 0, but only if nothing else was explicitly requested. */
2336 if (context
->restrict_realtime
&& !context
->rlimit
[RLIMIT_RTPRIO
]) {
2337 if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_RTPRIO
, &RLIMIT_MAKE_CONST(0)) < 0) {
2338 *exit_status
= EXIT_LIMITS
;
2343 if (!cap_test_all(context
->capability_bounding_set
)) {
2344 r
= capability_bounding_set_drop(context
->capability_bounding_set
, false);
2346 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
2351 /* This is done before enforce_user, but ambient set
2352 * does not survive over setresuid() if keep_caps is not set. */
2353 if (context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
2354 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, true);
2356 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
2361 if (context
->user
) {
2362 r
= enforce_user(context
, uid
);
2364 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
2367 if (context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
2369 /* Fix the ambient capabilities after user change. */
2370 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, false);
2372 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
2376 /* If we were asked to change user and ambient capabilities
2377 * were requested, we had to add keep-caps to the securebits
2378 * so that we would maintain the inherited capability set
2379 * through the setresuid(). Make sure that the bit is added
2380 * also to the context secure_bits so that we don't try to
2381 * drop the bit away next. */
2383 secure_bits
|= 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
;
2387 /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while
2388 * PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress
2389 * potential EPERMs we'll try not to call
2390 * PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. */
2391 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
) != secure_bits
)
2392 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, secure_bits
) < 0) {
2393 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECUREBITS
;
2397 if (context
->no_new_privileges
||
2398 (!have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
) && (use_address_families
|| context
->memory_deny_write_execute
|| context
->restrict_realtime
|| use_syscall_filter
)))
2399 if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
2400 *exit_status
= EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES
;
2405 if (use_address_families
) {
2406 r
= apply_address_families(context
);
2408 *exit_status
= EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES
;
2413 if (context
->memory_deny_write_execute
) {
2414 r
= apply_memory_deny_write_execute(context
);
2416 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
2421 if (context
->restrict_realtime
) {
2422 r
= apply_restrict_realtime(context
);
2424 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
2429 if (use_syscall_filter
) {
2430 r
= apply_seccomp(context
);
2432 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
2439 if (mac_selinux_use()) {
2440 char *exec_context
= mac_selinux_context_net
?: context
->selinux_context
;
2443 r
= setexeccon(exec_context
);
2445 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
2452 #ifdef HAVE_APPARMOR
2453 if (context
->apparmor_profile
&& mac_apparmor_use()) {
2454 r
= aa_change_onexec(context
->apparmor_profile
);
2455 if (r
< 0 && !context
->apparmor_profile_ignore
) {
2456 *exit_status
= EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE
;
2463 final_argv
= replace_env_argv(argv
, accum_env
);
2465 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
2469 if (_unlikely_(log_get_max_level() >= LOG_DEBUG
)) {
2470 _cleanup_free_
char *line
;
2472 line
= exec_command_line(final_argv
);
2475 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
2477 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
,
2478 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Executing: %s", line
),
2484 execve(command
->path
, final_argv
, accum_env
);
2485 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
2489 int exec_spawn(Unit
*unit
,
2490 ExecCommand
*command
,
2491 const ExecContext
*context
,
2492 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2493 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
2494 DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
2497 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **files_env
= NULL
;
2498 int *fds
= NULL
; unsigned n_fds
= 0;
2499 _cleanup_free_
char *line
= NULL
;
2509 assert(params
->fds
|| params
->n_fds
<= 0);
2511 if (context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
||
2512 context
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
||
2513 context
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
) {
2515 if (params
->n_fds
!= 1) {
2516 log_unit_error(unit
, "Got more than one socket.");
2520 socket_fd
= params
->fds
[0];
2524 n_fds
= params
->n_fds
;
2527 r
= exec_context_load_environment(unit
, context
, &files_env
);
2529 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to load environment files: %m");
2531 argv
= params
->argv
?: command
->argv
;
2532 line
= exec_command_line(argv
);
2536 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
2538 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "About to execute: %s", line
),
2539 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
,
2543 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to fork: %m");
2548 r
= exec_child(unit
,
2558 unit
->manager
->user_lookup_fds
[1],
2562 log_struct_errno(LOG_ERR
, r
,
2563 LOG_MESSAGE_ID(SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED
),
2565 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Failed at step %s spawning %s: %m",
2566 exit_status_to_string(exit_status
, EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD
),
2568 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
,
2575 log_unit_debug(unit
, "Forked %s as "PID_FMT
, command
->path
, pid
);
2577 /* We add the new process to the cgroup both in the child (so
2578 * that we can be sure that no user code is ever executed
2579 * outside of the cgroup) and in the parent (so that we can be
2580 * sure that when we kill the cgroup the process will be
2582 if (params
->cgroup_path
)
2583 (void) cg_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, params
->cgroup_path
, pid
);
2585 exec_status_start(&command
->exec_status
, pid
);
2591 void exec_context_init(ExecContext
*c
) {
2595 c
->ioprio
= IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE
, 0);
2596 c
->cpu_sched_policy
= SCHED_OTHER
;
2597 c
->syslog_priority
= LOG_DAEMON
|LOG_INFO
;
2598 c
->syslog_level_prefix
= true;
2599 c
->ignore_sigpipe
= true;
2600 c
->timer_slack_nsec
= NSEC_INFINITY
;
2601 c
->personality
= PERSONALITY_INVALID
;
2602 c
->runtime_directory_mode
= 0755;
2603 c
->capability_bounding_set
= CAP_ALL
;
2606 void exec_context_done(ExecContext
*c
) {
2611 c
->environment
= strv_free(c
->environment
);
2612 c
->environment_files
= strv_free(c
->environment_files
);
2613 c
->pass_environment
= strv_free(c
->pass_environment
);
2615 for (l
= 0; l
< ELEMENTSOF(c
->rlimit
); l
++)
2616 c
->rlimit
[l
] = mfree(c
->rlimit
[l
]);
2618 c
->working_directory
= mfree(c
->working_directory
);
2619 c
->root_directory
= mfree(c
->root_directory
);
2620 c
->tty_path
= mfree(c
->tty_path
);
2621 c
->syslog_identifier
= mfree(c
->syslog_identifier
);
2622 c
->user
= mfree(c
->user
);
2623 c
->group
= mfree(c
->group
);
2625 c
->supplementary_groups
= strv_free(c
->supplementary_groups
);
2627 c
->pam_name
= mfree(c
->pam_name
);
2629 c
->read_only_paths
= strv_free(c
->read_only_paths
);
2630 c
->read_write_paths
= strv_free(c
->read_write_paths
);
2631 c
->inaccessible_paths
= strv_free(c
->inaccessible_paths
);
2634 CPU_FREE(c
->cpuset
);
2636 c
->utmp_id
= mfree(c
->utmp_id
);
2637 c
->selinux_context
= mfree(c
->selinux_context
);
2638 c
->apparmor_profile
= mfree(c
->apparmor_profile
);
2640 c
->syscall_filter
= set_free(c
->syscall_filter
);
2641 c
->syscall_archs
= set_free(c
->syscall_archs
);
2642 c
->address_families
= set_free(c
->address_families
);
2644 c
->runtime_directory
= strv_free(c
->runtime_directory
);
2647 int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(ExecContext
*c
, const char *runtime_prefix
) {
2652 if (!runtime_prefix
)
2655 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->runtime_directory
) {
2656 _cleanup_free_
char *p
;
2658 p
= strjoin(runtime_prefix
, "/", *i
, NULL
);
2662 /* We execute this synchronously, since we need to be
2663 * sure this is gone when we start the service
2665 (void) rm_rf(p
, REMOVE_ROOT
);
2671 void exec_command_done(ExecCommand
*c
) {
2674 c
->path
= mfree(c
->path
);
2676 c
->argv
= strv_free(c
->argv
);
2679 void exec_command_done_array(ExecCommand
*c
, unsigned n
) {
2682 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
2683 exec_command_done(c
+i
);
2686 ExecCommand
* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand
*c
) {
2690 LIST_REMOVE(command
, c
, i
);
2691 exec_command_done(i
);
2698 void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand
**c
, unsigned n
) {
2701 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
2702 c
[i
] = exec_command_free_list(c
[i
]);
2705 typedef struct InvalidEnvInfo
{
2710 static void invalid_env(const char *p
, void *userdata
) {
2711 InvalidEnvInfo
*info
= userdata
;
2713 log_unit_error(info
->unit
, "Ignoring invalid environment assignment '%s': %s", p
, info
->path
);
2716 int exec_context_load_environment(Unit
*unit
, const ExecContext
*c
, char ***l
) {
2717 char **i
, **r
= NULL
;
2722 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->environment_files
) {
2725 bool ignore
= false;
2727 _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t pglob
= {};
2737 if (!path_is_absolute(fn
)) {
2745 /* Filename supports globbing, take all matching files */
2747 if (glob(fn
, 0, NULL
, &pglob
) != 0) {
2752 return errno
> 0 ? -errno
: -EINVAL
;
2754 count
= pglob
.gl_pathc
;
2762 for (n
= 0; n
< count
; n
++) {
2763 k
= load_env_file(NULL
, pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
], NULL
, &p
);
2771 /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */
2773 InvalidEnvInfo info
= {
2775 .path
= pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
]
2778 p
= strv_env_clean_with_callback(p
, invalid_env
, &info
);
2786 m
= strv_env_merge(2, r
, p
);
2802 static bool tty_may_match_dev_console(const char *tty
) {
2803 _cleanup_free_
char *active
= NULL
;
2809 if (startswith(tty
, "/dev/"))
2812 /* trivial identity? */
2813 if (streq(tty
, "console"))
2816 console
= resolve_dev_console(&active
);
2817 /* if we could not resolve, assume it may */
2821 /* "tty0" means the active VC, so it may be the same sometimes */
2822 return streq(console
, tty
) || (streq(console
, "tty0") && tty_is_vc(tty
));
2825 bool exec_context_may_touch_console(ExecContext
*ec
) {
2827 return (ec
->tty_reset
||
2829 ec
->tty_vt_disallocate
||
2830 is_terminal_input(ec
->std_input
) ||
2831 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_output
) ||
2832 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_error
)) &&
2833 tty_may_match_dev_console(exec_context_tty_path(ec
));
2836 static void strv_fprintf(FILE *f
, char **l
) {
2842 fprintf(f
, " %s", *g
);
2845 void exec_context_dump(ExecContext
*c
, FILE* f
, const char *prefix
) {
2852 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
2856 "%sWorkingDirectory: %s\n"
2857 "%sRootDirectory: %s\n"
2858 "%sNonBlocking: %s\n"
2859 "%sPrivateTmp: %s\n"
2860 "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n"
2861 "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n"
2862 "%sPrivateUsers: %s\n"
2863 "%sProtectHome: %s\n"
2864 "%sProtectSystem: %s\n"
2865 "%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n"
2866 "%sMemoryDenyWriteExecute: %s\n"
2867 "%sRestrictRealtime: %s\n",
2869 prefix
, c
->working_directory
? c
->working_directory
: "/",
2870 prefix
, c
->root_directory
? c
->root_directory
: "/",
2871 prefix
, yes_no(c
->non_blocking
),
2872 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_tmp
),
2873 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_devices
),
2874 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_network
),
2875 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_users
),
2876 prefix
, protect_home_to_string(c
->protect_home
),
2877 prefix
, protect_system_to_string(c
->protect_system
),
2878 prefix
, yes_no(c
->ignore_sigpipe
),
2879 prefix
, yes_no(c
->memory_deny_write_execute
),
2880 prefix
, yes_no(c
->restrict_realtime
));
2882 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment
)
2883 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
2885 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment_files
)
2886 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironmentFile: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
2888 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->pass_environment
)
2889 fprintf(f
, "%sPassEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
2891 fprintf(f
, "%sRuntimeDirectoryMode: %04o\n", prefix
, c
->runtime_directory_mode
);
2893 STRV_FOREACH(d
, c
->runtime_directory
)
2894 fprintf(f
, "%sRuntimeDirectory: %s\n", prefix
, *d
);
2901 if (c
->oom_score_adjust_set
)
2903 "%sOOMScoreAdjust: %i\n",
2904 prefix
, c
->oom_score_adjust
);
2906 for (i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++)
2908 fprintf(f
, "%s%s: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
2909 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_max
);
2910 fprintf(f
, "%s%sSoft: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
2911 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_cur
);
2914 if (c
->ioprio_set
) {
2915 _cleanup_free_
char *class_str
= NULL
;
2917 ioprio_class_to_string_alloc(IOPRIO_PRIO_CLASS(c
->ioprio
), &class_str
);
2919 "%sIOSchedulingClass: %s\n"
2920 "%sIOPriority: %i\n",
2921 prefix
, strna(class_str
),
2922 prefix
, (int) IOPRIO_PRIO_DATA(c
->ioprio
));
2925 if (c
->cpu_sched_set
) {
2926 _cleanup_free_
char *policy_str
= NULL
;
2928 sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c
->cpu_sched_policy
, &policy_str
);
2930 "%sCPUSchedulingPolicy: %s\n"
2931 "%sCPUSchedulingPriority: %i\n"
2932 "%sCPUSchedulingResetOnFork: %s\n",
2933 prefix
, strna(policy_str
),
2934 prefix
, c
->cpu_sched_priority
,
2935 prefix
, yes_no(c
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
));
2939 fprintf(f
, "%sCPUAffinity:", prefix
);
2940 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->cpuset_ncpus
; i
++)
2941 if (CPU_ISSET_S(i
, CPU_ALLOC_SIZE(c
->cpuset_ncpus
), c
->cpuset
))
2942 fprintf(f
, " %u", i
);
2946 if (c
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
2947 fprintf(f
, "%sTimerSlackNSec: "NSEC_FMT
"\n", prefix
, c
->timer_slack_nsec
);
2950 "%sStandardInput: %s\n"
2951 "%sStandardOutput: %s\n"
2952 "%sStandardError: %s\n",
2953 prefix
, exec_input_to_string(c
->std_input
),
2954 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_output
),
2955 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_error
));
2961 "%sTTYVHangup: %s\n"
2962 "%sTTYVTDisallocate: %s\n",
2963 prefix
, c
->tty_path
,
2964 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_reset
),
2965 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vhangup
),
2966 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vt_disallocate
));
2968 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
||
2969 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
||
2970 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
||
2971 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
||
2972 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
||
2973 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
||
2974 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
||
2975 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
||
2976 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
||
2977 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
||
2978 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
||
2979 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
) {
2981 _cleanup_free_
char *fac_str
= NULL
, *lvl_str
= NULL
;
2983 log_facility_unshifted_to_string_alloc(c
->syslog_priority
>> 3, &fac_str
);
2984 log_level_to_string_alloc(LOG_PRI(c
->syslog_priority
), &lvl_str
);
2987 "%sSyslogFacility: %s\n"
2988 "%sSyslogLevel: %s\n",
2989 prefix
, strna(fac_str
),
2990 prefix
, strna(lvl_str
));
2994 fprintf(f
, "%sSecure Bits:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
2996 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
) ? " keep-caps" : "",
2997 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED
) ? " keep-caps-locked" : "",
2998 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP
) ? " no-setuid-fixup" : "",
2999 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED
) ? " no-setuid-fixup-locked" : "",
3000 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_NOROOT
) ? " noroot" : "",
3001 (c
->secure_bits
& 1<<SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED
) ? "noroot-locked" : "");
3003 if (c
->capability_bounding_set
!= CAP_ALL
) {
3005 fprintf(f
, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet:", prefix
);
3007 for (l
= 0; l
<= cap_last_cap(); l
++)
3008 if (c
->capability_bounding_set
& (UINT64_C(1) << l
))
3009 fprintf(f
, " %s", strna(capability_to_name(l
)));
3014 if (c
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
3016 fprintf(f
, "%sAmbientCapabilities:", prefix
);
3018 for (l
= 0; l
<= cap_last_cap(); l
++)
3019 if (c
->capability_ambient_set
& (UINT64_C(1) << l
))
3020 fprintf(f
, " %s", strna(capability_to_name(l
)));
3026 fprintf(f
, "%sUser: %s\n", prefix
, c
->user
);
3028 fprintf(f
, "%sGroup: %s\n", prefix
, c
->group
);
3030 fprintf(f
, "%sDynamicUser: %s\n", prefix
, yes_no(c
->dynamic_user
));
3032 if (strv_length(c
->supplementary_groups
) > 0) {
3033 fprintf(f
, "%sSupplementaryGroups:", prefix
);
3034 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->supplementary_groups
);
3039 fprintf(f
, "%sPAMName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->pam_name
);
3041 if (strv_length(c
->read_write_paths
) > 0) {
3042 fprintf(f
, "%sReadWritePaths:", prefix
);
3043 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_write_paths
);
3047 if (strv_length(c
->read_only_paths
) > 0) {
3048 fprintf(f
, "%sReadOnlyPaths:", prefix
);
3049 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_only_paths
);
3053 if (strv_length(c
->inaccessible_paths
) > 0) {
3054 fprintf(f
, "%sInaccessiblePaths:", prefix
);
3055 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->inaccessible_paths
);
3061 "%sUtmpIdentifier: %s\n",
3062 prefix
, c
->utmp_id
);
3064 if (c
->selinux_context
)
3066 "%sSELinuxContext: %s%s\n",
3067 prefix
, c
->selinux_context_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->selinux_context
);
3069 if (c
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
)
3071 "%sPersonality: %s\n",
3072 prefix
, strna(personality_to_string(c
->personality
)));
3074 if (c
->syscall_filter
) {
3082 "%sSystemCallFilter: ",
3085 if (!c
->syscall_whitelist
)
3089 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_filter
, j
) {
3090 _cleanup_free_
char *name
= NULL
;
3097 name
= seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE
, PTR_TO_INT(id
) - 1);
3098 fputs(strna(name
), f
);
3105 if (c
->syscall_archs
) {
3112 "%sSystemCallArchitectures:",
3116 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_archs
, j
)
3117 fprintf(f
, " %s", strna(seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id
) - 1)));
3122 if (c
->syscall_errno
> 0)
3124 "%sSystemCallErrorNumber: %s\n",
3125 prefix
, strna(errno_to_name(c
->syscall_errno
)));
3127 if (c
->apparmor_profile
)
3129 "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n",
3130 prefix
, c
->apparmor_profile_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->apparmor_profile
);
3133 bool exec_context_maintains_privileges(ExecContext
*c
) {
3136 /* Returns true if the process forked off would run under
3137 * an unchanged UID or as root. */
3142 if (streq(c
->user
, "root") || streq(c
->user
, "0"))
3148 void exec_status_start(ExecStatus
*s
, pid_t pid
) {
3153 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->start_timestamp
);
3156 void exec_status_exit(ExecStatus
*s
, ExecContext
*context
, pid_t pid
, int code
, int status
) {
3159 if (s
->pid
&& s
->pid
!= pid
)
3163 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->exit_timestamp
);
3169 if (context
->utmp_id
)
3170 utmp_put_dead_process(context
->utmp_id
, pid
, code
, status
);
3172 exec_context_tty_reset(context
, NULL
);
3176 void exec_status_dump(ExecStatus
*s
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
3177 char buf
[FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_MAX
];
3185 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
3188 "%sPID: "PID_FMT
"\n",
3191 if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s
->start_timestamp
))
3193 "%sStart Timestamp: %s\n",
3194 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->start_timestamp
.realtime
));
3196 if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s
->exit_timestamp
))
3198 "%sExit Timestamp: %s\n"
3200 "%sExit Status: %i\n",
3201 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->exit_timestamp
.realtime
),
3202 prefix
, sigchld_code_to_string(s
->code
),
3206 char *exec_command_line(char **argv
) {
3214 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
)
3217 if (!(n
= new(char, k
)))
3221 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
) {
3228 if (strpbrk(*a
, WHITESPACE
)) {
3239 /* FIXME: this doesn't really handle arguments that have
3240 * spaces and ticks in them */
3245 void exec_command_dump(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
3246 _cleanup_free_
char *cmd
= NULL
;
3247 const char *prefix2
;
3252 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
3253 prefix2
= strjoina(prefix
, "\t");
3255 cmd
= exec_command_line(c
->argv
);
3257 "%sCommand Line: %s\n",
3258 prefix
, cmd
? cmd
: strerror(ENOMEM
));
3260 exec_status_dump(&c
->exec_status
, f
, prefix2
);
3263 void exec_command_dump_list(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
3266 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
3268 LIST_FOREACH(command
, c
, c
)
3269 exec_command_dump(c
, f
, prefix
);
3272 void exec_command_append_list(ExecCommand
**l
, ExecCommand
*e
) {
3279 /* It's kind of important, that we keep the order here */
3280 LIST_FIND_TAIL(command
, *l
, end
);
3281 LIST_INSERT_AFTER(command
, *l
, end
, e
);
3286 int exec_command_set(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
3294 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
3315 int exec_command_append(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
3316 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **l
= NULL
;
3324 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
3330 r
= strv_extend_strv(&c
->argv
, l
, false);
3338 static int exec_runtime_allocate(ExecRuntime
**rt
) {
3343 *rt
= new0(ExecRuntime
, 1);
3348 (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[0] = (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[1] = -1;
3353 int exec_runtime_make(ExecRuntime
**rt
, ExecContext
*c
, const char *id
) {
3363 if (!c
->private_network
&& !c
->private_tmp
)
3366 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(rt
);
3370 if (c
->private_network
&& (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[0] < 0) {
3371 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_DGRAM
|SOCK_CLOEXEC
, 0, (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
) < 0)
3375 if (c
->private_tmp
&& !(*rt
)->tmp_dir
) {
3376 r
= setup_tmp_dirs(id
, &(*rt
)->tmp_dir
, &(*rt
)->var_tmp_dir
);
3384 ExecRuntime
*exec_runtime_ref(ExecRuntime
*r
) {
3386 assert(r
->n_ref
> 0);
3392 ExecRuntime
*exec_runtime_unref(ExecRuntime
*r
) {
3397 assert(r
->n_ref
> 0);
3404 free(r
->var_tmp_dir
);
3405 safe_close_pair(r
->netns_storage_socket
);
3411 int exec_runtime_serialize(Unit
*u
, ExecRuntime
*rt
, FILE *f
, FDSet
*fds
) {
3420 unit_serialize_item(u
, f
, "tmp-dir", rt
->tmp_dir
);
3422 if (rt
->var_tmp_dir
)
3423 unit_serialize_item(u
, f
, "var-tmp-dir", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
3425 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
3428 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
3432 unit_serialize_item_format(u
, f
, "netns-socket-0", "%i", copy
);
3435 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] >= 0) {
3438 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
3442 unit_serialize_item_format(u
, f
, "netns-socket-1", "%i", copy
);
3448 int exec_runtime_deserialize_item(Unit
*u
, ExecRuntime
**rt
, const char *key
, const char *value
, FDSet
*fds
) {
3455 if (streq(key
, "tmp-dir")) {
3458 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(rt
);
3462 copy
= strdup(value
);
3466 free((*rt
)->tmp_dir
);
3467 (*rt
)->tmp_dir
= copy
;
3469 } else if (streq(key
, "var-tmp-dir")) {
3472 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(rt
);
3476 copy
= strdup(value
);
3480 free((*rt
)->var_tmp_dir
);
3481 (*rt
)->var_tmp_dir
= copy
;
3483 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-0")) {
3486 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(rt
);
3490 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
))
3491 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
3493 safe_close((*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
3494 (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[0] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
3496 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-1")) {
3499 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(rt
);
3503 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
))
3504 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
3506 safe_close((*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
3507 (*rt
)->netns_storage_socket
[1] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
3515 static void *remove_tmpdir_thread(void *p
) {
3516 _cleanup_free_
char *path
= p
;
3518 (void) rm_rf(path
, REMOVE_ROOT
|REMOVE_PHYSICAL
);
3522 void exec_runtime_destroy(ExecRuntime
*rt
) {
3528 /* If there are multiple users of this, let's leave the stuff around */
3533 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->tmp_dir
);
3535 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->tmp_dir
);
3537 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->tmp_dir
);
3544 if (rt
->var_tmp_dir
) {
3545 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
3547 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
3549 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
3550 free(rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
3553 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
3556 safe_close_pair(rt
->netns_storage_socket
);
3559 static const char* const exec_input_table
[_EXEC_INPUT_MAX
] = {
3560 [EXEC_INPUT_NULL
] = "null",
3561 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
3562 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
] = "tty-force",
3563 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
] = "tty-fail",
3564 [EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket"
3567 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_input
, ExecInput
);
3569 static const char* const exec_output_table
[_EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
] = {
3570 [EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
] = "inherit",
3571 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
] = "null",
3572 [EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
3573 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG
] = "syslog",
3574 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SYSLOG_AND_CONSOLE
] = "syslog+console",
3575 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
] = "kmsg",
3576 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
] = "kmsg+console",
3577 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
] = "journal",
3578 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
] = "journal+console",
3579 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket"
3582 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_output
, ExecOutput
);
3584 static const char* const exec_utmp_mode_table
[_EXEC_UTMP_MODE_MAX
] = {
3585 [EXEC_UTMP_INIT
] = "init",
3586 [EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
] = "login",
3587 [EXEC_UTMP_USER
] = "user",
3590 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_utmp_mode
, ExecUtmpMode
);