1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
6 #include <sys/eventfd.h>
10 #include <sys/personality.h>
11 #include <sys/prctl.h>
13 #include <sys/types.h>
19 #include <security/pam_appl.h>
23 #include <selinux/selinux.h>
31 #include <sys/apparmor.h>
34 #include "sd-messages.h"
38 #include "alloc-util.h"
40 #include "apparmor-util.h"
45 #include "capability-util.h"
46 #include "cgroup-setup.h"
47 #include "chown-recursive.h"
48 #include "cpu-set-util.h"
52 #include "errno-list.h"
54 #include "exit-status.h"
57 #include "format-util.h"
59 #include "glob-util.h"
60 #include "hexdecoct.h"
67 #include "memory-util.h"
68 #include "missing_fs.h"
70 #include "mount-util.h"
71 #include "mountpoint-util.h"
72 #include "namespace.h"
73 #include "parse-util.h"
74 #include "path-util.h"
75 #include "process-util.h"
76 #include "random-util.h"
77 #include "rlimit-util.h"
80 #include "seccomp-util.h"
82 #include "securebits-util.h"
83 #include "selinux-util.h"
84 #include "signal-util.h"
85 #include "smack-util.h"
86 #include "socket-util.h"
88 #include "stat-util.h"
89 #include "string-table.h"
90 #include "string-util.h"
92 #include "syslog-util.h"
93 #include "terminal-util.h"
94 #include "tmpfile-util.h"
95 #include "umask-util.h"
97 #include "user-util.h"
98 #include "utmp-wtmp.h"
100 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC (5*USEC_PER_SEC)
101 #define IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC (1*USEC_PER_SEC)
103 #define SNDBUF_SIZE (8*1024*1024)
105 static int shift_fds(int fds
[], size_t n_fds
) {
109 /* Modifies the fds array! (sorts it) */
113 for (int start
= 0;;) {
114 int restart_from
= -1;
116 for (int i
= start
; i
< (int) n_fds
; i
++) {
119 /* Already at right index? */
123 nfd
= fcntl(fds
[i
], F_DUPFD
, i
+ 3);
130 /* Hmm, the fd we wanted isn't free? Then
131 * let's remember that and try again from here */
132 if (nfd
!= i
+3 && restart_from
< 0)
136 if (restart_from
< 0)
139 start
= restart_from
;
145 static int flags_fds(const int fds
[], size_t n_socket_fds
, size_t n_storage_fds
, bool nonblock
) {
149 n_fds
= n_socket_fds
+ n_storage_fds
;
155 /* Drops/Sets O_NONBLOCK and FD_CLOEXEC from the file flags.
156 * O_NONBLOCK only applies to socket activation though. */
158 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< n_fds
; i
++) {
160 if (i
< n_socket_fds
) {
161 r
= fd_nonblock(fds
[i
], nonblock
);
166 /* We unconditionally drop FD_CLOEXEC from the fds,
167 * since after all we want to pass these fds to our
170 r
= fd_cloexec(fds
[i
], false);
178 static const char *exec_context_tty_path(const ExecContext
*context
) {
181 if (context
->stdio_as_fds
)
184 if (context
->tty_path
)
185 return context
->tty_path
;
187 return "/dev/console";
190 static void exec_context_tty_reset(const ExecContext
*context
, const ExecParameters
*p
) {
195 path
= exec_context_tty_path(context
);
197 if (context
->tty_vhangup
) {
198 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
199 (void) terminal_vhangup_fd(p
->stdin_fd
);
201 (void) terminal_vhangup(path
);
204 if (context
->tty_reset
) {
205 if (p
&& p
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
206 (void) reset_terminal_fd(p
->stdin_fd
, true);
208 (void) reset_terminal(path
);
211 if (context
->tty_vt_disallocate
&& path
)
212 (void) vt_disallocate(path
);
215 static bool is_terminal_input(ExecInput i
) {
218 EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
,
219 EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
);
222 static bool is_terminal_output(ExecOutput o
) {
225 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
226 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
);
229 static bool is_kmsg_output(ExecOutput o
) {
232 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
);
235 static bool exec_context_needs_term(const ExecContext
*c
) {
238 /* Return true if the execution context suggests we should set $TERM to something useful. */
240 if (is_terminal_input(c
->std_input
))
243 if (is_terminal_output(c
->std_output
))
246 if (is_terminal_output(c
->std_error
))
249 return !!c
->tty_path
;
252 static int open_null_as(int flags
, int nfd
) {
257 fd
= open("/dev/null", flags
|O_NOCTTY
);
261 return move_fd(fd
, nfd
, false);
264 static int connect_journal_socket(
266 const char *log_namespace
,
270 union sockaddr_union sa
;
272 uid_t olduid
= UID_INVALID
;
273 gid_t oldgid
= GID_INVALID
;
278 strjoina("/run/systemd/journal.", log_namespace
, "/stdout") :
279 "/run/systemd/journal/stdout";
280 r
= sockaddr_un_set_path(&sa
.un
, j
);
285 if (gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
288 if (setegid(gid
) < 0)
292 if (uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
295 if (seteuid(uid
) < 0) {
301 r
= connect(fd
, &sa
.sa
, sa_len
) < 0 ? -errno
: 0;
303 /* If we fail to restore the uid or gid, things will likely
304 fail later on. This should only happen if an LSM interferes. */
306 if (uid_is_valid(uid
))
307 (void) seteuid(olduid
);
310 if (gid_is_valid(gid
))
311 (void) setegid(oldgid
);
316 static int connect_logger_as(
318 const ExecContext
*context
,
319 const ExecParameters
*params
,
326 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
331 assert(output
< _EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
);
335 fd
= socket(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_STREAM
, 0);
339 r
= connect_journal_socket(fd
, context
->log_namespace
, uid
, gid
);
343 if (shutdown(fd
, SHUT_RD
) < 0)
346 (void) fd_inc_sndbuf(fd
, SNDBUF_SIZE
);
356 context
->syslog_identifier
?: ident
,
357 params
->flags
& EXEC_PASS_LOG_UNIT
? unit
->id
: "",
358 context
->syslog_priority
,
359 !!context
->syslog_level_prefix
,
361 is_kmsg_output(output
),
362 is_terminal_output(output
)) < 0)
365 return move_fd(TAKE_FD(fd
), nfd
, false);
368 static int open_terminal_as(const char *path
, int flags
, int nfd
) {
374 fd
= open_terminal(path
, flags
| O_NOCTTY
);
378 return move_fd(fd
, nfd
, false);
381 static int acquire_path(const char *path
, int flags
, mode_t mode
) {
382 union sockaddr_union sa
;
384 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
389 if (IN_SET(flags
& O_ACCMODE
, O_WRONLY
, O_RDWR
))
392 fd
= open(path
, flags
|O_NOCTTY
, mode
);
396 if (errno
!= ENXIO
) /* ENXIO is returned when we try to open() an AF_UNIX file system socket on Linux */
399 /* So, it appears the specified path could be an AF_UNIX socket. Let's see if we can connect to it. */
401 r
= sockaddr_un_set_path(&sa
.un
, path
);
403 return r
== -EINVAL
? -ENXIO
: r
;
406 fd
= socket(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_STREAM
, 0);
410 if (connect(fd
, &sa
.sa
, sa_len
) < 0)
411 return errno
== EINVAL
? -ENXIO
: -errno
; /* Propagate initial error if we get EINVAL, i.e. we have
412 * indication that this wasn't an AF_UNIX socket after all */
414 if ((flags
& O_ACCMODE
) == O_RDONLY
)
415 r
= shutdown(fd
, SHUT_WR
);
416 else if ((flags
& O_ACCMODE
) == O_WRONLY
)
417 r
= shutdown(fd
, SHUT_RD
);
426 static int fixup_input(
427 const ExecContext
*context
,
429 bool apply_tty_stdin
) {
435 std_input
= context
->std_input
;
437 if (is_terminal_input(std_input
) && !apply_tty_stdin
)
438 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
440 if (std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
441 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
443 if (std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_DATA
&& context
->stdin_data_size
== 0)
444 return EXEC_INPUT_NULL
;
449 static int fixup_output(ExecOutput std_output
, int socket_fd
) {
451 if (std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
&& socket_fd
< 0)
452 return EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
;
457 static int setup_input(
458 const ExecContext
*context
,
459 const ExecParameters
*params
,
461 const int named_iofds
[static 3]) {
469 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0) {
470 if (dup2(params
->stdin_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
473 /* Try to make this the controlling tty, if it is a tty, and reset it */
474 if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO
)) {
475 (void) ioctl(STDIN_FILENO
, TIOCSCTTY
, context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
);
476 (void) reset_terminal_fd(STDIN_FILENO
, true);
482 i
= fixup_input(context
, socket_fd
, params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN
);
486 case EXEC_INPUT_NULL
:
487 return open_null_as(O_RDONLY
, STDIN_FILENO
);
490 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
:
491 case EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
: {
494 fd
= acquire_terminal(exec_context_tty_path(context
),
495 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_TRY
:
496 i
== EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
? ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_FORCE
:
497 ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT
,
502 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
505 case EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
:
506 assert(socket_fd
>= 0);
508 return dup2(socket_fd
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
510 case EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
:
511 assert(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] >= 0);
513 (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
], false);
514 return dup2(named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
], STDIN_FILENO
) < 0 ? -errno
: STDIN_FILENO
;
516 case EXEC_INPUT_DATA
: {
519 fd
= acquire_data_fd(context
->stdin_data
, context
->stdin_data_size
, 0);
523 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
526 case EXEC_INPUT_FILE
: {
530 assert(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
532 rw
= (context
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
&& streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
])) ||
533 (context
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
&& streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]));
535 fd
= acquire_path(context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
], rw
? O_RDWR
: O_RDONLY
, 0666 & ~context
->umask
);
539 return move_fd(fd
, STDIN_FILENO
, false);
543 assert_not_reached("Unknown input type");
547 static bool can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout(
548 const ExecContext
*context
,
554 /* Returns true, if given the specified STDERR and STDOUT output we can directly dup() the stdout fd to the
557 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
)
562 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
563 return streq_ptr(context
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
], context
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
565 if (IN_SET(e
, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
, EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
))
566 return streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
], context
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
571 static int setup_output(
573 const ExecContext
*context
,
574 const ExecParameters
*params
,
577 const int named_iofds
[static 3],
581 dev_t
*journal_stream_dev
,
582 ino_t
*journal_stream_ino
) {
592 assert(journal_stream_dev
);
593 assert(journal_stream_ino
);
595 if (fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
&& params
->stdout_fd
>= 0) {
597 if (dup2(params
->stdout_fd
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
600 return STDOUT_FILENO
;
603 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
&& params
->stderr_fd
>= 0) {
604 if (dup2(params
->stderr_fd
, STDERR_FILENO
) < 0)
607 return STDERR_FILENO
;
610 i
= fixup_input(context
, socket_fd
, params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_TTY_STDIN
);
611 o
= fixup_output(context
->std_output
, socket_fd
);
613 if (fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
) {
615 e
= fixup_output(context
->std_error
, socket_fd
);
617 /* This expects the input and output are already set up */
619 /* Don't change the stderr file descriptor if we inherit all
620 * the way and are not on a tty */
621 if (e
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
622 o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
&&
623 i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&&
624 !is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
) &&
628 /* Duplicate from stdout if possible */
629 if (can_inherit_stderr_from_stdout(context
, o
, e
))
630 return dup2(STDOUT_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
634 } else if (o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
) {
635 /* If input got downgraded, inherit the original value */
636 if (i
== EXEC_INPUT_NULL
&& is_terminal_input(context
->std_input
))
637 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
639 /* If the input is connected to anything that's not a /dev/null or a data fd, inherit that... */
640 if (!IN_SET(i
, EXEC_INPUT_NULL
, EXEC_INPUT_DATA
))
641 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
643 /* If we are not started from PID 1 we just inherit STDOUT from our parent process. */
647 /* We need to open /dev/null here anew, to get the right access mode. */
648 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
653 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
:
654 return open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
656 case EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
:
657 if (is_terminal_input(i
))
658 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
660 /* We don't reset the terminal if this is just about output */
661 return open_terminal_as(exec_context_tty_path(context
), O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
663 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
:
664 case EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
:
665 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
:
666 case EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
:
667 r
= connect_logger_as(unit
, context
, params
, o
, ident
, fileno
, uid
, gid
);
669 log_unit_warning_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to connect %s to the journal socket, ignoring: %m", fileno
== STDOUT_FILENO
? "stdout" : "stderr");
670 r
= open_null_as(O_WRONLY
, fileno
);
674 /* If we connected this fd to the journal via a stream, patch the device/inode into the passed
675 * parameters, but only then. This is useful so that we can set $JOURNAL_STREAM that permits
676 * services to detect whether they are connected to the journal or not.
678 * If both stdout and stderr are connected to a stream then let's make sure to store the data
679 * about STDERR as that's usually the best way to do logging. */
681 if (fstat(fileno
, &st
) >= 0 &&
682 (*journal_stream_ino
== 0 || fileno
== STDERR_FILENO
)) {
683 *journal_stream_dev
= st
.st_dev
;
684 *journal_stream_ino
= st
.st_ino
;
689 case EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
:
690 assert(socket_fd
>= 0);
692 return dup2(socket_fd
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
694 case EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
:
695 assert(named_iofds
[fileno
] >= 0);
697 (void) fd_nonblock(named_iofds
[fileno
], false);
698 return dup2(named_iofds
[fileno
], fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
700 case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
:
701 case EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
: {
705 assert(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
]);
707 rw
= context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_FILE
&&
708 streq_ptr(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
], context
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
711 return dup2(STDIN_FILENO
, fileno
) < 0 ? -errno
: fileno
;
714 if (o
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
717 fd
= acquire_path(context
->stdio_file
[fileno
], flags
, 0666 & ~context
->umask
);
721 return move_fd(fd
, fileno
, 0);
725 assert_not_reached("Unknown error type");
729 static int chown_terminal(int fd
, uid_t uid
) {
734 /* Before we chown/chmod the TTY, let's ensure this is actually a tty */
735 if (isatty(fd
) < 1) {
736 if (IN_SET(errno
, EINVAL
, ENOTTY
))
737 return 0; /* not a tty */
742 /* This might fail. What matters are the results. */
743 r
= fchmod_and_chown(fd
, TTY_MODE
, uid
, -1);
750 static int setup_confirm_stdio(const char *vc
, int *_saved_stdin
, int *_saved_stdout
) {
751 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, saved_stdout
= -1;
754 assert(_saved_stdin
);
755 assert(_saved_stdout
);
757 saved_stdin
= fcntl(STDIN_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
761 saved_stdout
= fcntl(STDOUT_FILENO
, F_DUPFD
, 3);
762 if (saved_stdout
< 0)
765 fd
= acquire_terminal(vc
, ACQUIRE_TERMINAL_WAIT
, DEFAULT_CONFIRM_USEC
);
769 r
= chown_terminal(fd
, getuid());
773 r
= reset_terminal_fd(fd
, true);
777 r
= rearrange_stdio(fd
, fd
, STDERR_FILENO
);
782 *_saved_stdin
= saved_stdin
;
783 *_saved_stdout
= saved_stdout
;
785 saved_stdin
= saved_stdout
= -1;
790 static void write_confirm_error_fd(int err
, int fd
, const Unit
*u
) {
793 if (err
== -ETIMEDOUT
)
794 dprintf(fd
, "Confirmation question timed out for %s, assuming positive response.\n", u
->id
);
797 dprintf(fd
, "Couldn't ask confirmation for %s: %m, assuming positive response.\n", u
->id
);
801 static void write_confirm_error(int err
, const char *vc
, const Unit
*u
) {
802 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
806 fd
= open_terminal(vc
, O_WRONLY
|O_NOCTTY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
810 write_confirm_error_fd(err
, fd
, u
);
813 static int restore_confirm_stdio(int *saved_stdin
, int *saved_stdout
) {
817 assert(saved_stdout
);
821 if (*saved_stdin
>= 0)
822 if (dup2(*saved_stdin
, STDIN_FILENO
) < 0)
825 if (*saved_stdout
>= 0)
826 if (dup2(*saved_stdout
, STDOUT_FILENO
) < 0)
829 *saved_stdin
= safe_close(*saved_stdin
);
830 *saved_stdout
= safe_close(*saved_stdout
);
836 CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE
= -1,
837 CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
= 0,
841 static int ask_for_confirmation(const char *vc
, Unit
*u
, const char *cmdline
) {
842 int saved_stdout
= -1, saved_stdin
= -1, r
;
843 _cleanup_free_
char *e
= NULL
;
846 /* For any internal errors, assume a positive response. */
847 r
= setup_confirm_stdio(vc
, &saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
849 write_confirm_error(r
, vc
, u
);
850 return CONFIRM_EXECUTE
;
853 /* confirm_spawn might have been disabled while we were sleeping. */
854 if (manager_is_confirm_spawn_disabled(u
->manager
)) {
859 e
= ellipsize(cmdline
, 60, 100);
867 r
= ask_char(&c
, "yfshiDjcn", "Execute %s? [y, f, s – h for help] ", e
);
869 write_confirm_error_fd(r
, STDOUT_FILENO
, u
);
876 printf("Resuming normal execution.\n");
877 manager_disable_confirm_spawn();
881 unit_dump(u
, stdout
, " ");
882 continue; /* ask again */
884 printf("Failing execution.\n");
885 r
= CONFIRM_PRETEND_FAILURE
;
888 printf(" c - continue, proceed without asking anymore\n"
889 " D - dump, show the state of the unit\n"
890 " f - fail, don't execute the command and pretend it failed\n"
892 " i - info, show a short summary of the unit\n"
893 " j - jobs, show jobs that are in progress\n"
894 " s - skip, don't execute the command and pretend it succeeded\n"
895 " y - yes, execute the command\n");
896 continue; /* ask again */
898 printf(" Description: %s\n"
901 u
->id
, u
->description
, cmdline
);
902 continue; /* ask again */
904 manager_dump_jobs(u
->manager
, stdout
, " ");
905 continue; /* ask again */
907 /* 'n' was removed in favor of 'f'. */
908 printf("Didn't understand 'n', did you mean 'f'?\n");
909 continue; /* ask again */
911 printf("Skipping execution.\n");
912 r
= CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
;
918 assert_not_reached("Unhandled choice");
924 restore_confirm_stdio(&saved_stdin
, &saved_stdout
);
928 static int get_fixed_user(const ExecContext
*c
, const char **user
,
929 uid_t
*uid
, gid_t
*gid
,
930 const char **home
, const char **shell
) {
939 /* Note that we don't set $HOME or $SHELL if they are not particularly enlightening anyway
940 * (i.e. are "/" or "/bin/nologin"). */
943 r
= get_user_creds(&name
, uid
, gid
, home
, shell
, USER_CREDS_CLEAN
);
951 static int get_fixed_group(const ExecContext
*c
, const char **group
, gid_t
*gid
) {
961 r
= get_group_creds(&name
, gid
, 0);
969 static int get_supplementary_groups(const ExecContext
*c
, const char *user
,
970 const char *group
, gid_t gid
,
971 gid_t
**supplementary_gids
, int *ngids
) {
975 bool keep_groups
= false;
976 gid_t
*groups
= NULL
;
977 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*l_gids
= NULL
;
982 * If user is given, then lookup GID and supplementary groups list.
983 * We avoid NSS lookups for gid=0. Also we have to initialize groups
984 * here and as early as possible so we keep the list of supplementary
985 * groups of the caller.
987 if (user
&& gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= 0) {
988 /* First step, initialize groups from /etc/groups */
989 if (initgroups(user
, gid
) < 0)
995 if (strv_isempty(c
->supplementary_groups
))
999 * If SupplementaryGroups= was passed then NGROUPS_MAX has to
1000 * be positive, otherwise fail.
1003 ngroups_max
= (int) sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX
);
1004 if (ngroups_max
<= 0)
1005 return errno_or_else(EOPNOTSUPP
);
1007 l_gids
= new(gid_t
, ngroups_max
);
1013 * Lookup the list of groups that the user belongs to, we
1014 * avoid NSS lookups here too for gid=0.
1017 if (getgrouplist(user
, gid
, l_gids
, &k
) < 0)
1022 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->supplementary_groups
) {
1025 if (k
>= ngroups_max
)
1029 r
= get_group_creds(&g
, l_gids
+k
, 0);
1037 * Sets ngids to zero to drop all supplementary groups, happens
1038 * when we are under root and SupplementaryGroups= is empty.
1045 /* Otherwise get the final list of supplementary groups */
1046 groups
= memdup(l_gids
, sizeof(gid_t
) * k
);
1050 *supplementary_gids
= groups
;
1058 static int enforce_groups(gid_t gid
, const gid_t
*supplementary_gids
, int ngids
) {
1061 /* Handle SupplementaryGroups= if it is not empty */
1063 r
= maybe_setgroups(ngids
, supplementary_gids
);
1068 if (gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
1069 /* Then set our gids */
1070 if (setresgid(gid
, gid
, gid
) < 0)
1077 static int set_securebits(int bits
, int mask
) {
1078 int current
, applied
;
1079 current
= prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
);
1082 /* Clear all securebits defined in mask and set bits */
1083 applied
= (current
& ~mask
) | bits
;
1084 if (current
== applied
)
1086 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, applied
) < 0)
1091 static int enforce_user(const ExecContext
*context
, uid_t uid
) {
1095 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
))
1098 /* Sets (but doesn't look up) the uid and make sure we keep the
1099 * capabilities while doing so. For setting secure bits the capability CAP_SETPCAP is
1100 * required, so we also need keep-caps in this case.
1103 if (context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0 || context
->secure_bits
!= 0) {
1105 /* First step: If we need to keep capabilities but
1106 * drop privileges we need to make sure we keep our
1107 * caps, while we drop privileges. */
1109 /* Add KEEP_CAPS to the securebits */
1110 r
= set_securebits(1<<SECURE_KEEP_CAPS
, 0);
1116 /* Second step: actually set the uids */
1117 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
1120 /* At this point we should have all necessary capabilities but
1121 are otherwise a normal user. However, the caps might got
1122 corrupted due to the setresuid() so we need clean them up
1123 later. This is done outside of this call. */
1130 static int null_conv(
1132 const struct pam_message
**msg
,
1133 struct pam_response
**resp
,
1134 void *appdata_ptr
) {
1136 /* We don't support conversations */
1138 return PAM_CONV_ERR
;
1143 static int setup_pam(
1150 const int fds
[], size_t n_fds
) {
1154 static const struct pam_conv conv
= {
1159 _cleanup_(barrier_destroy
) Barrier barrier
= BARRIER_NULL
;
1160 pam_handle_t
*handle
= NULL
;
1162 int pam_code
= PAM_SUCCESS
, r
;
1163 char **nv
, **e
= NULL
;
1164 bool close_session
= false;
1165 pid_t pam_pid
= 0, parent_pid
;
1172 /* We set up PAM in the parent process, then fork. The child
1173 * will then stay around until killed via PR_GET_PDEATHSIG or
1174 * systemd via the cgroup logic. It will then remove the PAM
1175 * session again. The parent process will exec() the actual
1176 * daemon. We do things this way to ensure that the main PID
1177 * of the daemon is the one we initially fork()ed. */
1179 r
= barrier_create(&barrier
);
1183 if (log_get_max_level() < LOG_DEBUG
)
1184 flags
|= PAM_SILENT
;
1186 pam_code
= pam_start(name
, user
, &conv
, &handle
);
1187 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
1193 _cleanup_free_
char *q
= NULL
;
1195 /* Hmm, so no TTY was explicitly passed, but an fd passed to us directly might be a TTY. Let's figure
1196 * out if that's the case, and read the TTY off it. */
1198 if (getttyname_malloc(STDIN_FILENO
, &q
) >= 0)
1199 tty
= strjoina("/dev/", q
);
1203 pam_code
= pam_set_item(handle
, PAM_TTY
, tty
);
1204 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1208 STRV_FOREACH(nv
, *env
) {
1209 pam_code
= pam_putenv(handle
, *nv
);
1210 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1214 pam_code
= pam_acct_mgmt(handle
, flags
);
1215 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1218 pam_code
= pam_setcred(handle
, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED
| flags
);
1219 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1220 log_debug("pam_setcred() failed, ignoring: %s", pam_strerror(handle
, pam_code
));
1222 pam_code
= pam_open_session(handle
, flags
);
1223 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1226 close_session
= true;
1228 e
= pam_getenvlist(handle
);
1230 pam_code
= PAM_BUF_ERR
;
1234 /* Block SIGTERM, so that we know that it won't get lost in
1237 assert_se(sigprocmask_many(SIG_BLOCK
, &old_ss
, SIGTERM
, -1) >= 0);
1239 parent_pid
= getpid_cached();
1241 r
= safe_fork("(sd-pam)", 0, &pam_pid
);
1245 int sig
, ret
= EXIT_PAM
;
1247 /* The child's job is to reset the PAM session on
1249 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_CHILD
);
1251 /* Make sure we don't keep open the passed fds in this child. We assume that otherwise only
1252 * those fds are open here that have been opened by PAM. */
1253 (void) close_many(fds
, n_fds
);
1255 /* Drop privileges - we don't need any to pam_close_session
1256 * and this will make PR_SET_PDEATHSIG work in most cases.
1257 * If this fails, ignore the error - but expect sd-pam threads
1258 * to fail to exit normally */
1260 r
= maybe_setgroups(0, NULL
);
1262 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to setgroups() in sd-pam: %m");
1263 if (setresgid(gid
, gid
, gid
) < 0)
1264 log_warning_errno(errno
, "Failed to setresgid() in sd-pam: %m");
1265 if (setresuid(uid
, uid
, uid
) < 0)
1266 log_warning_errno(errno
, "Failed to setresuid() in sd-pam: %m");
1268 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
1270 /* Wait until our parent died. This will only work if
1271 * the above setresuid() succeeds, otherwise the kernel
1272 * will not allow unprivileged parents kill their privileged
1273 * children this way. We rely on the control groups kill logic
1274 * to do the rest for us. */
1275 if (prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG
, SIGTERM
) < 0)
1278 /* Tell the parent that our setup is done. This is especially
1279 * important regarding dropping privileges. Otherwise, unit
1280 * setup might race against our setresuid(2) call.
1282 * If the parent aborted, we'll detect this below, hence ignore
1283 * return failure here. */
1284 (void) barrier_place(&barrier
);
1286 /* Check if our parent process might already have died? */
1287 if (getppid() == parent_pid
) {
1290 assert_se(sigemptyset(&ss
) >= 0);
1291 assert_se(sigaddset(&ss
, SIGTERM
) >= 0);
1294 if (sigwait(&ss
, &sig
) < 0) {
1301 assert(sig
== SIGTERM
);
1306 pam_code
= pam_setcred(handle
, PAM_DELETE_CRED
| flags
);
1307 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1310 /* If our parent died we'll end the session */
1311 if (getppid() != parent_pid
) {
1312 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
1313 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
)
1320 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
1324 barrier_set_role(&barrier
, BARRIER_PARENT
);
1326 /* If the child was forked off successfully it will do all the
1327 * cleanups, so forget about the handle here. */
1330 /* Unblock SIGTERM again in the parent */
1331 assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK
, &old_ss
, NULL
) >= 0);
1333 /* We close the log explicitly here, since the PAM modules
1334 * might have opened it, but we don't want this fd around. */
1337 /* Synchronously wait for the child to initialize. We don't care for
1338 * errors as we cannot recover. However, warn loudly if it happens. */
1339 if (!barrier_place_and_sync(&barrier
))
1340 log_error("PAM initialization failed");
1342 return strv_free_and_replace(*env
, e
);
1345 if (pam_code
!= PAM_SUCCESS
) {
1346 log_error("PAM failed: %s", pam_strerror(handle
, pam_code
));
1347 r
= -EPERM
; /* PAM errors do not map to errno */
1349 log_error_errno(r
, "PAM failed: %m");
1353 pam_code
= pam_close_session(handle
, flags
);
1355 pam_end(handle
, pam_code
| flags
);
1367 static void rename_process_from_path(const char *path
) {
1368 char process_name
[11];
1372 /* This resulting string must fit in 10 chars (i.e. the length
1373 * of "/sbin/init") to look pretty in /bin/ps */
1377 rename_process("(...)");
1383 /* The end of the process name is usually more
1384 * interesting, since the first bit might just be
1390 process_name
[0] = '(';
1391 memcpy(process_name
+1, p
, l
);
1392 process_name
[1+l
] = ')';
1393 process_name
[1+l
+1] = 0;
1395 rename_process(process_name
);
1398 static bool context_has_address_families(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1401 return c
->address_families_allow_list
||
1402 !set_isempty(c
->address_families
);
1405 static bool context_has_syscall_filters(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1408 return c
->syscall_allow_list
||
1409 !hashmap_isempty(c
->syscall_filter
);
1412 static bool context_has_syscall_logs(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1415 return c
->syscall_log_allow_list
||
1416 !hashmap_isempty(c
->syscall_log
);
1419 static bool context_has_no_new_privileges(const ExecContext
*c
) {
1422 if (c
->no_new_privileges
)
1425 if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) /* if we are privileged, we don't need NNP */
1428 /* We need NNP if we have any form of seccomp and are unprivileged */
1429 return context_has_address_families(c
) ||
1430 c
->memory_deny_write_execute
||
1431 c
->restrict_realtime
||
1432 c
->restrict_suid_sgid
||
1433 exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
) ||
1435 c
->protect_kernel_tunables
||
1436 c
->protect_kernel_modules
||
1437 c
->protect_kernel_logs
||
1438 c
->private_devices
||
1439 context_has_syscall_filters(c
) ||
1440 context_has_syscall_logs(c
) ||
1441 !set_isempty(c
->syscall_archs
) ||
1442 c
->lock_personality
||
1443 c
->protect_hostname
;
1446 static bool exec_context_has_credentials(const ExecContext
*context
) {
1450 return !hashmap_isempty(context
->set_credentials
) ||
1451 context
->load_credentials
;
1456 static bool skip_seccomp_unavailable(const Unit
* u
, const char* msg
) {
1458 if (is_seccomp_available())
1461 log_unit_debug(u
, "SECCOMP features not detected in the kernel, skipping %s", msg
);
1465 static int apply_syscall_filter(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
, bool needs_ambient_hack
) {
1466 uint32_t negative_action
, default_action
, action
;
1472 if (!context_has_syscall_filters(c
))
1475 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "SystemCallFilter="))
1478 negative_action
= c
->syscall_errno
== SECCOMP_ERROR_NUMBER_KILL
? scmp_act_kill_process() : SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(c
->syscall_errno
);
1480 if (c
->syscall_allow_list
) {
1481 default_action
= negative_action
;
1482 action
= SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
;
1484 default_action
= SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
;
1485 action
= negative_action
;
1488 if (needs_ambient_hack
) {
1489 r
= seccomp_filter_set_add(c
->syscall_filter
, c
->syscall_allow_list
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_SETUID
);
1494 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(default_action
, c
->syscall_filter
, action
, false);
1497 static int apply_syscall_log(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1499 uint32_t default_action
, action
;
1505 if (!context_has_syscall_logs(c
))
1509 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "SystemCallLog="))
1512 if (c
->syscall_log_allow_list
) {
1513 /* Log nothing but the ones listed */
1514 default_action
= SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
;
1515 action
= SCMP_ACT_LOG
;
1517 /* Log everything but the ones listed */
1518 default_action
= SCMP_ACT_LOG
;
1519 action
= SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
;
1522 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(default_action
, c
->syscall_log
, action
, false);
1524 /* old libseccomp */
1525 log_unit_debug(u
, "SECCOMP feature SCMP_ACT_LOG not available, skipping SystemCallLog=");
1530 static int apply_syscall_archs(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1534 if (set_isempty(c
->syscall_archs
))
1537 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "SystemCallArchitectures="))
1540 return seccomp_restrict_archs(c
->syscall_archs
);
1543 static int apply_address_families(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1547 if (!context_has_address_families(c
))
1550 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictAddressFamilies="))
1553 return seccomp_restrict_address_families(c
->address_families
, c
->address_families_allow_list
);
1556 static int apply_memory_deny_write_execute(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1560 if (!c
->memory_deny_write_execute
)
1563 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "MemoryDenyWriteExecute="))
1566 return seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute();
1569 static int apply_restrict_realtime(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1573 if (!c
->restrict_realtime
)
1576 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictRealtime="))
1579 return seccomp_restrict_realtime();
1582 static int apply_restrict_suid_sgid(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1586 if (!c
->restrict_suid_sgid
)
1589 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictSUIDSGID="))
1592 return seccomp_restrict_suid_sgid();
1595 static int apply_protect_sysctl(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1599 /* Turn off the legacy sysctl() system call. Many distributions turn this off while building the kernel, but
1600 * let's protect even those systems where this is left on in the kernel. */
1602 if (!c
->protect_kernel_tunables
)
1605 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectKernelTunables="))
1608 return seccomp_protect_sysctl();
1611 static int apply_protect_kernel_modules(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1615 /* Turn off module syscalls on ProtectKernelModules=yes */
1617 if (!c
->protect_kernel_modules
)
1620 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectKernelModules="))
1623 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MODULE
, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
), false);
1626 static int apply_protect_kernel_logs(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1630 if (!c
->protect_kernel_logs
)
1633 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectKernelLogs="))
1636 return seccomp_protect_syslog();
1639 static int apply_protect_clock(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1643 if (!c
->protect_clock
)
1646 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectClock="))
1649 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CLOCK
, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
), false);
1652 static int apply_private_devices(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1656 /* If PrivateDevices= is set, also turn off iopl and all @raw-io syscalls. */
1658 if (!c
->private_devices
)
1661 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "PrivateDevices="))
1664 return seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
, syscall_filter_sets
+ SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO
, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM
), false);
1667 static int apply_restrict_namespaces(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1671 if (!exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
))
1674 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "RestrictNamespaces="))
1677 return seccomp_restrict_namespaces(c
->restrict_namespaces
);
1680 static int apply_lock_personality(const Unit
* u
, const ExecContext
*c
) {
1681 unsigned long personality
;
1687 if (!c
->lock_personality
)
1690 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "LockPersonality="))
1693 personality
= c
->personality
;
1695 /* If personality is not specified, use either PER_LINUX or PER_LINUX32 depending on what is currently set. */
1696 if (personality
== PERSONALITY_INVALID
) {
1698 r
= opinionated_personality(&personality
);
1703 return seccomp_lock_personality(personality
);
1708 static int apply_protect_hostname(const Unit
*u
, const ExecContext
*c
, int *ret_exit_status
) {
1712 if (!c
->protect_hostname
)
1715 if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_UTS
)) {
1716 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUTS
) < 0) {
1717 if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(errno
) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(errno
)) {
1718 *ret_exit_status
= EXIT_NAMESPACE
;
1719 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to set up UTS namespacing: %m");
1722 log_unit_warning(u
, "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but UTS namespace setup is prohibited (container manager?), ignoring namespace setup.");
1725 log_unit_warning(u
, "ProtectHostname=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support UTS namespaces, ignoring namespace setup.");
1730 if (skip_seccomp_unavailable(u
, "ProtectHostname="))
1733 r
= seccomp_protect_hostname();
1735 *ret_exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
1736 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, r
, "Failed to apply hostname restrictions: %m");
1743 static void do_idle_pipe_dance(int idle_pipe
[static 4]) {
1746 idle_pipe
[1] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[1]);
1747 idle_pipe
[2] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[2]);
1749 if (idle_pipe
[0] >= 0) {
1752 r
= fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT_USEC
);
1754 if (idle_pipe
[3] >= 0 && r
== 0 /* timeout */) {
1757 /* Signal systemd that we are bored and want to continue. */
1758 n
= write(idle_pipe
[3], "x", 1);
1760 /* Wait for systemd to react to the signal above. */
1761 (void) fd_wait_for_event(idle_pipe
[0], POLLHUP
, IDLE_TIMEOUT2_USEC
);
1764 idle_pipe
[0] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[0]);
1768 idle_pipe
[3] = safe_close(idle_pipe
[3]);
1771 static const char *exec_directory_env_name_to_string(ExecDirectoryType t
);
1773 static int build_environment(
1775 const ExecContext
*c
,
1776 const ExecParameters
*p
,
1779 const char *username
,
1781 dev_t journal_stream_dev
,
1782 ino_t journal_stream_ino
,
1785 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
;
1794 #define N_ENV_VARS 16
1795 our_env
= new0(char*, N_ENV_VARS
+ _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
1800 _cleanup_free_
char *joined
= NULL
;
1802 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid_cached()) < 0)
1804 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1806 if (asprintf(&x
, "LISTEN_FDS=%zu", n_fds
) < 0)
1808 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1810 joined
= strv_join(p
->fd_names
, ":");
1814 x
= strjoin("LISTEN_FDNAMES=", joined
);
1817 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1820 if ((p
->flags
& EXEC_SET_WATCHDOG
) && p
->watchdog_usec
> 0) {
1821 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_PID="PID_FMT
, getpid_cached()) < 0)
1823 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1825 if (asprintf(&x
, "WATCHDOG_USEC="USEC_FMT
, p
->watchdog_usec
) < 0)
1827 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1830 /* If this is D-Bus, tell the nss-systemd module, since it relies on being able to use D-Bus look up dynamic
1831 * users via PID 1, possibly dead-locking the dbus daemon. This way it will not use D-Bus to resolve names, but
1832 * check the database directly. */
1833 if (p
->flags
& EXEC_NSS_BYPASS_BUS
) {
1834 x
= strdup("SYSTEMD_NSS_BYPASS_BUS=1");
1837 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1841 x
= strjoin("HOME=", home
);
1845 path_simplify(x
+ 5, true);
1846 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1850 x
= strjoin("LOGNAME=", username
);
1853 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1855 x
= strjoin("USER=", username
);
1858 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1862 x
= strjoin("SHELL=", shell
);
1866 path_simplify(x
+ 6, true);
1867 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1870 if (!sd_id128_is_null(u
->invocation_id
)) {
1871 if (asprintf(&x
, "INVOCATION_ID=" SD_ID128_FORMAT_STR
, SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(u
->invocation_id
)) < 0)
1874 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1877 if (exec_context_needs_term(c
)) {
1878 const char *tty_path
, *term
= NULL
;
1880 tty_path
= exec_context_tty_path(c
);
1882 /* If we are forked off PID 1 and we are supposed to operate on /dev/console, then let's try
1883 * to inherit the $TERM set for PID 1. This is useful for containers so that the $TERM the
1884 * container manager passes to PID 1 ends up all the way in the console login shown. */
1886 if (path_equal_ptr(tty_path
, "/dev/console") && getppid() == 1)
1887 term
= getenv("TERM");
1890 term
= default_term_for_tty(tty_path
);
1892 x
= strjoin("TERM=", term
);
1895 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1898 if (journal_stream_dev
!= 0 && journal_stream_ino
!= 0) {
1899 if (asprintf(&x
, "JOURNAL_STREAM=" DEV_FMT
":" INO_FMT
, journal_stream_dev
, journal_stream_ino
) < 0)
1902 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1905 if (c
->log_namespace
) {
1906 x
= strjoin("LOG_NAMESPACE=", c
->log_namespace
);
1910 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1913 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
1914 _cleanup_free_
char *pre
= NULL
, *joined
= NULL
;
1920 if (strv_isempty(c
->directories
[t
].paths
))
1923 n
= exec_directory_env_name_to_string(t
);
1927 pre
= strjoin(p
->prefix
[t
], "/");
1931 joined
= strv_join_full(c
->directories
[t
].paths
, ":", pre
, true);
1935 x
= strjoin(n
, "=", joined
);
1939 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1942 if (exec_context_has_credentials(c
) && p
->prefix
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
]) {
1943 x
= strjoin("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY=", p
->prefix
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
], "/credentials/", u
->id
);
1947 our_env
[n_env
++] = x
;
1950 our_env
[n_env
++] = NULL
;
1951 assert(n_env
<= N_ENV_VARS
+ _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
1954 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(our_env
);
1959 static int build_pass_environment(const ExecContext
*c
, char ***ret
) {
1960 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **pass_env
= NULL
;
1961 size_t n_env
= 0, n_bufsize
= 0;
1964 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->pass_environment
) {
1965 _cleanup_free_
char *x
= NULL
;
1971 x
= strjoin(*i
, "=", v
);
1975 if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(pass_env
, n_bufsize
, n_env
+ 2))
1978 pass_env
[n_env
++] = TAKE_PTR(x
);
1979 pass_env
[n_env
] = NULL
;
1982 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(pass_env
);
1987 static bool exec_needs_mount_namespace(
1988 const ExecContext
*context
,
1989 const ExecParameters
*params
,
1990 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
) {
1995 if (context
->root_image
)
1998 if (!strv_isempty(context
->read_write_paths
) ||
1999 !strv_isempty(context
->read_only_paths
) ||
2000 !strv_isempty(context
->inaccessible_paths
))
2003 if (context
->n_bind_mounts
> 0)
2006 if (context
->n_temporary_filesystems
> 0)
2009 if (context
->n_mount_images
> 0)
2012 if (!IN_SET(context
->mount_flags
, 0, MS_SHARED
))
2015 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
&& (runtime
->tmp_dir
|| runtime
->var_tmp_dir
))
2018 if (context
->private_devices
||
2019 context
->private_mounts
||
2020 context
->protect_system
!= PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO
||
2021 context
->protect_home
!= PROTECT_HOME_NO
||
2022 context
->protect_kernel_tunables
||
2023 context
->protect_kernel_modules
||
2024 context
->protect_kernel_logs
||
2025 context
->protect_control_groups
||
2026 context
->protect_proc
!= PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT
||
2027 context
->proc_subset
!= PROC_SUBSET_ALL
)
2030 if (context
->root_directory
) {
2031 if (exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(context
))
2034 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
2035 if (!params
->prefix
[t
])
2038 if (!strv_isempty(context
->directories
[t
].paths
))
2043 if (context
->dynamic_user
&&
2044 (!strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
].paths
) ||
2045 !strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
].paths
) ||
2046 !strv_isempty(context
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
].paths
)))
2049 if (context
->log_namespace
)
2055 static int setup_private_users(uid_t ouid
, gid_t ogid
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
2056 _cleanup_free_
char *uid_map
= NULL
, *gid_map
= NULL
;
2057 _cleanup_close_pair_
int errno_pipe
[2] = { -1, -1 };
2058 _cleanup_close_
int unshare_ready_fd
= -1;
2059 _cleanup_(sigkill_waitp
) pid_t pid
= 0;
2064 /* Set up a user namespace and map the original UID/GID (IDs from before any user or group changes, i.e.
2065 * the IDs from the user or system manager(s)) to itself, the selected UID/GID to itself, and everything else to
2066 * nobody. In order to be able to write this mapping we need CAP_SETUID in the original user namespace, which
2067 * we however lack after opening the user namespace. To work around this we fork() a temporary child process,
2068 * which waits for the parent to create the new user namespace while staying in the original namespace. The
2069 * child then writes the UID mapping, under full privileges. The parent waits for the child to finish and
2070 * continues execution normally.
2071 * For unprivileged users (i.e. without capabilities), the root to root mapping is excluded. As such, it
2072 * does not need CAP_SETUID to write the single line mapping to itself. */
2074 /* Can only set up multiple mappings with CAP_SETUID. */
2075 if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SETUID
) && uid
!= ouid
&& uid_is_valid(uid
))
2076 r
= asprintf(&uid_map
,
2077 UID_FMT
" " UID_FMT
" 1\n" /* Map $OUID → $OUID */
2078 UID_FMT
" " UID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $UID → $UID */
2079 ouid
, ouid
, uid
, uid
);
2081 r
= asprintf(&uid_map
,
2082 UID_FMT
" " UID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $OUID → $OUID */
2088 /* Can only set up multiple mappings with CAP_SETGID. */
2089 if (have_effective_cap(CAP_SETGID
) && gid
!= ogid
&& gid_is_valid(gid
))
2090 r
= asprintf(&gid_map
,
2091 GID_FMT
" " GID_FMT
" 1\n" /* Map $OGID → $OGID */
2092 GID_FMT
" " GID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $GID → $GID */
2093 ogid
, ogid
, gid
, gid
);
2095 r
= asprintf(&gid_map
,
2096 GID_FMT
" " GID_FMT
" 1\n", /* Map $OGID -> $OGID */
2102 /* Create a communication channel so that the parent can tell the child when it finished creating the user
2104 unshare_ready_fd
= eventfd(0, EFD_CLOEXEC
);
2105 if (unshare_ready_fd
< 0)
2108 /* Create a communication channel so that the child can tell the parent a proper error code in case it
2110 if (pipe2(errno_pipe
, O_CLOEXEC
) < 0)
2113 r
= safe_fork("(sd-userns)", FORK_RESET_SIGNALS
|FORK_DEATHSIG
, &pid
);
2117 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
2121 /* Child process, running in the original user namespace. Let's update the parent's UID/GID map from
2122 * here, after the parent opened its own user namespace. */
2125 errno_pipe
[0] = safe_close(errno_pipe
[0]);
2127 /* Wait until the parent unshared the user namespace */
2128 if (read(unshare_ready_fd
, &c
, sizeof(c
)) < 0) {
2133 /* Disable the setgroups() system call in the child user namespace, for good. */
2134 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "setgroups");
2135 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
2137 if (errno
!= ENOENT
) {
2142 /* If the file is missing the kernel is too old, let's continue anyway. */
2144 if (write(fd
, "deny\n", 5) < 0) {
2149 fd
= safe_close(fd
);
2152 /* First write the GID map */
2153 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "gid_map");
2154 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
2159 if (write(fd
, gid_map
, strlen(gid_map
)) < 0) {
2163 fd
= safe_close(fd
);
2165 /* The write the UID map */
2166 a
= procfs_file_alloca(ppid
, "uid_map");
2167 fd
= open(a
, O_WRONLY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
2172 if (write(fd
, uid_map
, strlen(uid_map
)) < 0) {
2177 _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS
);
2180 (void) write(errno_pipe
[1], &r
, sizeof(r
));
2181 _exit(EXIT_FAILURE
);
2184 errno_pipe
[1] = safe_close(errno_pipe
[1]);
2186 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER
) < 0)
2189 /* Let the child know that the namespace is ready now */
2190 if (write(unshare_ready_fd
, &c
, sizeof(c
)) < 0)
2193 /* Try to read an error code from the child */
2194 n
= read(errno_pipe
[0], &r
, sizeof(r
));
2197 if (n
== sizeof(r
)) { /* an error code was sent to us */
2202 if (n
!= 0) /* on success we should have read 0 bytes */
2205 r
= wait_for_terminate_and_check("(sd-userns)", pid
, 0);
2209 if (r
!= EXIT_SUCCESS
) /* If something strange happened with the child, let's consider this fatal, too */
2215 static bool exec_directory_is_private(const ExecContext
*context
, ExecDirectoryType type
) {
2216 if (!context
->dynamic_user
)
2219 if (type
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
)
2222 if (type
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
&& context
->runtime_directory_preserve_mode
== EXEC_PRESERVE_NO
)
2228 static int setup_exec_directory(
2229 const ExecContext
*context
,
2230 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2233 ExecDirectoryType type
,
2236 static const int exit_status_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
2237 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = EXIT_RUNTIME_DIRECTORY
,
2238 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = EXIT_STATE_DIRECTORY
,
2239 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = EXIT_CACHE_DIRECTORY
,
2240 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = EXIT_LOGS_DIRECTORY
,
2241 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = EXIT_CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY
,
2248 assert(type
>= 0 && type
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
);
2249 assert(exit_status
);
2251 if (!params
->prefix
[type
])
2254 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_CHOWN_DIRECTORIES
) {
2255 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
))
2257 if (!gid_is_valid(gid
))
2261 STRV_FOREACH(rt
, context
->directories
[type
].paths
) {
2262 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
, *pp
= NULL
;
2264 p
= path_join(params
->prefix
[type
], *rt
);
2270 r
= mkdir_parents_label(p
, 0755);
2274 if (exec_directory_is_private(context
, type
)) {
2275 _cleanup_free_
char *private_root
= NULL
;
2277 /* So, here's one extra complication when dealing with DynamicUser=1 units. In that
2278 * case we want to avoid leaving a directory around fully accessible that is owned by
2279 * a dynamic user whose UID is later on reused. To lock this down we use the same
2280 * trick used by container managers to prohibit host users to get access to files of
2281 * the same UID in containers: we place everything inside a directory that has an
2282 * access mode of 0700 and is owned root:root, so that it acts as security boundary
2283 * for unprivileged host code. We then use fs namespacing to make this directory
2284 * permeable for the service itself.
2286 * Specifically: for a service which wants a special directory "foo/" we first create
2287 * a directory "private/" with access mode 0700 owned by root:root. Then we place
2288 * "foo" inside of that directory (i.e. "private/foo/"), and make "foo" a symlink to
2289 * "private/foo". This way, privileged host users can access "foo/" as usual, but
2290 * unprivileged host users can't look into it. Inside of the namespace of the unit
2291 * "private/" is replaced by a more liberally accessible tmpfs, into which the host's
2292 * "private/foo/" is mounted under the same name, thus disabling the access boundary
2293 * for the service and making sure it only gets access to the dirs it needs but no
2294 * others. Tricky? Yes, absolutely, but it works!
2296 * Note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION as that's assumed not
2297 * to be owned by the service itself.
2299 * Also, note that we don't do this for EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME as that's often used
2300 * for sharing files or sockets with other services. */
2302 private_root
= path_join(params
->prefix
[type
], "private");
2303 if (!private_root
) {
2308 /* First set up private root if it doesn't exist yet, with access mode 0700 and owned by root:root */
2309 r
= mkdir_safe_label(private_root
, 0700, 0, 0, MKDIR_WARN_MODE
);
2313 pp
= path_join(private_root
, *rt
);
2319 /* Create all directories between the configured directory and this private root, and mark them 0755 */
2320 r
= mkdir_parents_label(pp
, 0755);
2324 if (is_dir(p
, false) > 0 &&
2325 (laccess(pp
, F_OK
) < 0 && errno
== ENOENT
)) {
2327 /* Hmm, the private directory doesn't exist yet, but the normal one exists? If so, move
2328 * it over. Most likely the service has been upgraded from one that didn't use
2329 * DynamicUser=1, to one that does. */
2331 log_info("Found pre-existing public %s= directory %s, migrating to %s.\n"
2332 "Apparently, service previously had DynamicUser= turned off, and has now turned it on.",
2333 exec_directory_type_to_string(type
), p
, pp
);
2335 if (rename(p
, pp
) < 0) {
2340 /* Otherwise, create the actual directory for the service */
2342 r
= mkdir_label(pp
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
);
2343 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -EEXIST
)
2347 /* And link it up from the original place */
2348 r
= symlink_idempotent(pp
, p
, true);
2353 _cleanup_free_
char *target
= NULL
;
2355 if (type
!= EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
&&
2356 readlink_and_make_absolute(p
, &target
) >= 0) {
2357 _cleanup_free_
char *q
= NULL
, *q_resolved
= NULL
, *target_resolved
= NULL
;
2359 /* This already exists and is a symlink? Interesting. Maybe it's one created
2360 * by DynamicUser=1 (see above)?
2362 * We do this for all directory types except for ConfigurationDirectory=,
2363 * since they all support the private/ symlink logic at least in some
2364 * configurations, see above. */
2366 r
= chase_symlinks(target
, NULL
, 0, &target_resolved
, NULL
);
2370 q
= path_join(params
->prefix
[type
], "private", *rt
);
2376 /* /var/lib or friends may be symlinks. So, let's chase them also. */
2377 r
= chase_symlinks(q
, NULL
, CHASE_NONEXISTENT
, &q_resolved
, NULL
);
2381 if (path_equal(q_resolved
, target_resolved
)) {
2383 /* Hmm, apparently DynamicUser= was once turned on for this service,
2384 * but is no longer. Let's move the directory back up. */
2386 log_info("Found pre-existing private %s= directory %s, migrating to %s.\n"
2387 "Apparently, service previously had DynamicUser= turned on, and has now turned it off.",
2388 exec_directory_type_to_string(type
), q
, p
);
2390 if (unlink(p
) < 0) {
2395 if (rename(q
, p
) < 0) {
2402 r
= mkdir_label(p
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
);
2407 if (type
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
) {
2410 /* Don't change the owner/access mode of the configuration directory,
2411 * as in the common case it is not written to by a service, and shall
2412 * not be writable. */
2414 if (stat(p
, &st
) < 0) {
2419 /* Still complain if the access mode doesn't match */
2420 if (((st
.st_mode
^ context
->directories
[type
].mode
) & 07777) != 0)
2421 log_warning("%s \'%s\' already exists but the mode is different. "
2422 "(File system: %o %sMode: %o)",
2423 exec_directory_type_to_string(type
), *rt
,
2424 st
.st_mode
& 07777, exec_directory_type_to_string(type
), context
->directories
[type
].mode
& 07777);
2431 /* Lock down the access mode (we use chmod_and_chown() to make this idempotent. We don't
2432 * specify UID/GID here, so that path_chown_recursive() can optimize things depending on the
2433 * current UID/GID ownership.) */
2434 r
= chmod_and_chown(pp
?: p
, context
->directories
[type
].mode
, UID_INVALID
, GID_INVALID
);
2438 /* Then, change the ownership of the whole tree, if necessary. When dynamic users are used we
2439 * drop the suid/sgid bits, since we really don't want SUID/SGID files for dynamic UID/GID
2440 * assignments to exist.*/
2441 r
= path_chown_recursive(pp
?: p
, uid
, gid
, context
->dynamic_user
? 01777 : 07777);
2449 *exit_status
= exit_status_table
[type
];
2453 static int write_credential(
2459 bool ownership_ok
) {
2461 _cleanup_(unlink_and_freep
) char *tmp
= NULL
;
2462 _cleanup_close_
int fd
= -1;
2465 r
= tempfn_random_child("", "cred", &tmp
);
2469 fd
= openat(dfd
, tmp
, O_CREAT
|O_RDWR
|O_CLOEXEC
|O_EXCL
|O_NOFOLLOW
|O_NOCTTY
, 0600);
2475 r
= loop_write(fd
, data
, size
, /* do_pool = */ false);
2479 if (fchmod(fd
, 0400) < 0) /* Take away "w" bit */
2482 if (uid_is_valid(uid
) && uid
!= getuid()) {
2483 r
= fd_add_uid_acl_permission(fd
, uid
, ACL_READ
);
2485 if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r
) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r
))
2488 if (!ownership_ok
) /* Ideally we use ACLs, since we can neatly express what we want
2489 * to express: that the user gets read access and nothing
2490 * else. But if the backing fs can't support that (e.g. ramfs)
2491 * then we can use file ownership instead. But that's only safe if
2492 * we can then re-mount the whole thing read-only, so that the
2493 * user can no longer chmod() the file to gain write access. */
2496 if (fchown(fd
, uid
, (gid_t
) -1) < 0)
2501 if (renameat(dfd
, tmp
, dfd
, id
) < 0)
2508 #define CREDENTIALS_BYTES_MAX (1024LU * 1024LU) /* Refuse to pass more than 1M, after all this is unswappable memory */
2510 static int acquire_credentials(
2511 const ExecContext
*context
,
2512 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2516 bool ownership_ok
) {
2518 uint64_t left
= CREDENTIALS_BYTES_MAX
;
2519 _cleanup_close_
int dfd
= -1;
2520 ExecSetCredential
*sc
;
2527 dfd
= open(p
, O_DIRECTORY
|O_CLOEXEC
);
2531 /* First we use the literally specified credentials. Note that they might be overridden again below,
2532 * and thus act as a "default" if the same credential is specified multiple times */
2533 HASHMAP_FOREACH(sc
, context
->set_credentials
) {
2536 add
= strlen(sc
->id
) + sc
->size
;
2540 r
= write_credential(dfd
, sc
->id
, sc
->data
, sc
->size
, uid
, ownership_ok
);
2547 /* Then, load credential off disk (or acquire via AF_UNIX socket) */
2548 STRV_FOREACH_PAIR(id
, fn
, context
->load_credentials
) {
2549 ReadFullFileFlags flags
= READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE
;
2550 _cleanup_(erase_and_freep
) char *data
= NULL
;
2551 _cleanup_free_
char *j
= NULL
, *bindname
= NULL
;
2555 if (path_is_absolute(*fn
)) {
2556 /* If this is an absolute path, read the data directly from it, and support AF_UNIX sockets */
2558 flags
|= READ_FULL_FILE_CONNECT_SOCKET
;
2560 /* Pass some minimal info about the unit and the credential name we are looking to acquire
2561 * via the source socket address in case we read off an AF_UNIX socket. */
2562 if (asprintf(&bindname
, "@%" PRIx64
"/unit/%s/%s", random_u64(), unit
, *id
) < 0)
2565 } else if (params
->received_credentials
) {
2566 /* If this is a relative path, take it relative to the credentials we received
2567 * ourselves. We don't support the AF_UNIX stuff in this mode, since we are operating
2568 * on a credential store, i.e. this is guaranteed to be regular files. */
2569 j
= path_join(params
->received_credentials
, *fn
);
2579 r
= read_full_file_full(AT_FDCWD
, source
, UINT64_MAX
, SIZE_MAX
, flags
, bindname
, &data
, &size
);
2583 faccessat(dfd
, *id
, F_OK
, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW
) >= 0) /* If the source file doesn't exist, but we already acquired the key otherwise, then don't fail */
2588 add
= strlen(*id
) + size
;
2592 r
= write_credential(dfd
, *id
, data
, size
, uid
, ownership_ok
);
2599 if (fchmod(dfd
, 0500) < 0) /* Now take away the "w" bit */
2602 /* After we created all keys with the right perms, also make sure the credential store as a whole is
2605 if (uid_is_valid(uid
) && uid
!= getuid()) {
2606 r
= fd_add_uid_acl_permission(dfd
, uid
, ACL_READ
| ACL_EXECUTE
);
2608 if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r
) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r
))
2614 if (fchown(dfd
, uid
, (gid_t
) -1) < 0)
2622 static int setup_credentials_internal(
2623 const ExecContext
*context
,
2624 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2626 const char *final
, /* This is where the credential store shall eventually end up at */
2627 const char *workspace
, /* This is where we can prepare it before moving it to the final place */
2628 bool reuse_workspace
, /* Whether to reuse any existing workspace mount if it already is a mount */
2629 bool must_mount
, /* Whether to require that we mount something, it's not OK to use the plain directory fall back */
2632 int r
, workspace_mounted
; /* negative if we don't know yet whether we have/can mount something; true
2633 * if we mounted something; false if we definitely can't mount anything */
2641 if (reuse_workspace
) {
2642 r
= path_is_mount_point(workspace
, NULL
, 0);
2646 workspace_mounted
= true; /* If this is already a mount, and we are supposed to reuse it, let's keep this in mind */
2648 workspace_mounted
= -1; /* We need to figure out if we can mount something to the workspace */
2650 workspace_mounted
= -1; /* ditto */
2652 r
= path_is_mount_point(final
, NULL
, 0);
2656 /* If the final place already has something mounted, we use that. If the workspace also has
2657 * something mounted we assume it's actually the same mount (but with MS_RDONLY
2659 final_mounted
= true;
2661 if (workspace_mounted
< 0) {
2662 /* If the final place is mounted, but the workspace we isn't, then let's bind mount
2663 * the final version to the workspace, and make it writable, so that we can make
2666 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, final
, workspace
, NULL
, MS_BIND
|MS_REC
, NULL
);
2670 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, NULL
, workspace
, NULL
, MS_BIND
|MS_REMOUNT
|MS_NODEV
|MS_NOEXEC
|MS_NOSUID
, NULL
);
2674 workspace_mounted
= true;
2677 final_mounted
= false;
2679 if (workspace_mounted
< 0) {
2680 /* Nothing is mounted on the workspace yet, let's try to mount something now */
2681 for (int try = 0;; try++) {
2684 /* Try "ramfs" first, since it's not swap backed */
2685 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, "ramfs", workspace
, "ramfs", MS_NODEV
|MS_NOEXEC
|MS_NOSUID
, "mode=0700");
2687 workspace_mounted
= true;
2691 } else if (try == 1) {
2692 _cleanup_free_
char *opts
= NULL
;
2694 if (asprintf(&opts
, "mode=0700,nr_inodes=1024,size=%lu", CREDENTIALS_BYTES_MAX
) < 0)
2697 /* Fall back to "tmpfs" otherwise */
2698 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, "tmpfs", workspace
, "tmpfs", MS_NODEV
|MS_NOEXEC
|MS_NOSUID
, opts
);
2700 workspace_mounted
= true;
2705 /* If that didn't work, try to make a bind mount from the final to the workspace, so that we can make it writable there. */
2706 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, final
, workspace
, NULL
, MS_BIND
|MS_REC
, NULL
);
2708 if (!ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r
)) /* Propagate anything that isn't a permission problem */
2711 if (must_mount
) /* If we it's not OK to use the plain directory
2712 * fallback, propagate all errors too */
2715 /* If we lack privileges to bind mount stuff, then let's gracefully
2716 * proceed for compat with container envs, and just use the final dir
2719 workspace_mounted
= false;
2723 /* Make the new bind mount writable (i.e. drop MS_RDONLY) */
2724 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, NULL
, workspace
, NULL
, MS_BIND
|MS_REMOUNT
|MS_NODEV
|MS_NOEXEC
|MS_NOSUID
, NULL
);
2728 workspace_mounted
= true;
2734 assert(!must_mount
|| workspace_mounted
> 0);
2735 where
= workspace_mounted
? workspace
: final
;
2737 r
= acquire_credentials(context
, params
, unit
, where
, uid
, workspace_mounted
);
2741 if (workspace_mounted
) {
2742 /* Make workspace read-only now, so that any bind mount we make from it defaults to read-only too */
2743 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, NULL
, workspace
, NULL
, MS_BIND
|MS_REMOUNT
|MS_RDONLY
|MS_NODEV
|MS_NOEXEC
|MS_NOSUID
, NULL
);
2747 /* And mount it to the final place, read-only */
2749 r
= umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, workspace
, MNT_DETACH
|UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW
);
2751 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, workspace
, final
, NULL
, MS_MOVE
, NULL
);
2755 _cleanup_free_
char *parent
= NULL
;
2757 /* If we do not have our own mount put used the plain directory fallback, then we need to
2758 * open access to the top-level credential directory and the per-service directory now */
2760 parent
= dirname_malloc(final
);
2763 if (chmod(parent
, 0755) < 0)
2770 static int setup_credentials(
2771 const ExecContext
*context
,
2772 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2776 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
, *q
= NULL
;
2783 if (!exec_context_has_credentials(context
))
2786 if (!params
->prefix
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
])
2789 /* This where we'll place stuff when we are done; this main credentials directory is world-readable,
2790 * and the subdir we mount over with a read-only file system readable by the service's user */
2791 q
= path_join(params
->prefix
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
], "credentials");
2795 r
= mkdir_label(q
, 0755); /* top-level dir: world readable/searchable */
2796 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -EEXIST
)
2799 p
= path_join(q
, unit
);
2803 r
= mkdir_label(p
, 0700); /* per-unit dir: private to user */
2804 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -EEXIST
)
2807 r
= safe_fork("(sd-mkdcreds)", FORK_DEATHSIG
|FORK_WAIT
|FORK_NEW_MOUNTNS
, NULL
);
2809 _cleanup_free_
char *t
= NULL
, *u
= NULL
;
2811 /* If this is not a privilege or support issue then propagate the error */
2812 if (!ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r
) && !ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r
))
2815 /* Temporary workspace, that remains inaccessible all the time. We prepare stuff there before moving
2816 * it into place, so that users can't access half-initialized credential stores. */
2817 t
= path_join(params
->prefix
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
], "systemd/temporary-credentials");
2821 /* We can't set up a mount namespace. In that case operate on a fixed, inaccessible per-unit
2822 * directory outside of /run/credentials/ first, and then move it over to /run/credentials/
2823 * after it is fully set up */
2824 u
= path_join(t
, unit
);
2828 FOREACH_STRING(i
, t
, u
) {
2829 r
= mkdir_label(i
, 0700);
2830 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -EEXIST
)
2834 r
= setup_credentials_internal(
2838 p
, /* final mount point */
2839 u
, /* temporary workspace to overmount */
2840 true, /* reuse the workspace if it is already a mount */
2841 false, /* it's OK to fall back to a plain directory if we can't mount anything */
2844 (void) rmdir(u
); /* remove the workspace again if we can. */
2849 } else if (r
== 0) {
2851 /* We managed to set up a mount namespace, and are now in a child. That's great. In this case
2852 * we can use the same directory for all cases, after turning off propagation. Question
2853 * though is: where do we turn off propagation exactly, and where do we place the workspace
2854 * directory? We need some place that is guaranteed to be a mount point in the host, and
2855 * which is guaranteed to have a subdir we can mount over. /run/ is not suitable for this,
2856 * since we ultimately want to move the resulting file system there, i.e. we need propagation
2857 * for /run/ eventually. We could use our own /run/systemd/bind mount on itself, but that
2858 * would be visible in the host mount table all the time, which we want to avoid. Hence, what
2859 * we do here instead we use /dev/ and /dev/shm/ for our purposes. We know for sure that
2860 * /dev/ is a mount point and we now for sure that /dev/shm/ exists. Hence we can turn off
2861 * propagation on the former, and then overmount the latter.
2863 * Yes it's nasty playing games with /dev/ and /dev/shm/ like this, since it does not exist
2864 * for this purpose, but there are few other candidates that work equally well for us, and
2865 * given that the we do this in a privately namespaced short-lived single-threaded process
2866 * that no one else sees this should be OK to do.*/
2868 r
= mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG
, NULL
, "/dev", NULL
, MS_SLAVE
|MS_REC
, NULL
); /* Turn off propagation from our namespace to host */
2872 r
= setup_credentials_internal(
2876 p
, /* final mount point */
2877 "/dev/shm", /* temporary workspace to overmount */
2878 false, /* do not reuse /dev/shm if it is already a mount, under no circumstances */
2879 true, /* insist that something is mounted, do not allow fallback to plain directory */
2884 _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS
);
2887 _exit(EXIT_FAILURE
);
2894 static int setup_smack(
2895 const ExecContext
*context
,
2896 int executable_fd
) {
2900 assert(executable_fd
>= 0);
2902 if (context
->smack_process_label
) {
2903 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, context
->smack_process_label
);
2907 #ifdef SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
2909 _cleanup_free_
char *exec_label
= NULL
;
2911 r
= mac_smack_read_fd(executable_fd
, SMACK_ATTR_EXEC
, &exec_label
);
2912 if (r
< 0 && !IN_SET(r
, -ENODATA
, -EOPNOTSUPP
))
2915 r
= mac_smack_apply_pid(0, exec_label
? : SMACK_DEFAULT_PROCESS_LABEL
);
2925 static int compile_bind_mounts(
2926 const ExecContext
*context
,
2927 const ExecParameters
*params
,
2928 BindMount
**ret_bind_mounts
,
2929 size_t *ret_n_bind_mounts
,
2930 char ***ret_empty_directories
) {
2932 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **empty_directories
= NULL
;
2933 BindMount
*bind_mounts
;
2939 assert(ret_bind_mounts
);
2940 assert(ret_n_bind_mounts
);
2941 assert(ret_empty_directories
);
2943 n
= context
->n_bind_mounts
;
2944 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
2945 if (!params
->prefix
[t
])
2948 n
+= strv_length(context
->directories
[t
].paths
);
2952 *ret_bind_mounts
= NULL
;
2953 *ret_n_bind_mounts
= 0;
2954 *ret_empty_directories
= NULL
;
2958 bind_mounts
= new(BindMount
, n
);
2962 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< context
->n_bind_mounts
; i
++) {
2963 BindMount
*item
= context
->bind_mounts
+ i
;
2966 s
= strdup(item
->source
);
2972 d
= strdup(item
->destination
);
2979 bind_mounts
[h
++] = (BindMount
) {
2982 .read_only
= item
->read_only
,
2983 .recursive
= item
->recursive
,
2984 .ignore_enoent
= item
->ignore_enoent
,
2988 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
2991 if (!params
->prefix
[t
])
2994 if (strv_isempty(context
->directories
[t
].paths
))
2997 if (exec_directory_is_private(context
, t
) &&
2998 !exec_context_with_rootfs(context
)) {
3001 /* So this is for a dynamic user, and we need to make sure the process can access its own
3002 * directory. For that we overmount the usually inaccessible "private" subdirectory with a
3003 * tmpfs that makes it accessible and is empty except for the submounts we do this for. */
3005 private_root
= path_join(params
->prefix
[t
], "private");
3006 if (!private_root
) {
3011 r
= strv_consume(&empty_directories
, private_root
);
3016 STRV_FOREACH(suffix
, context
->directories
[t
].paths
) {
3019 if (exec_directory_is_private(context
, t
))
3020 s
= path_join(params
->prefix
[t
], "private", *suffix
);
3022 s
= path_join(params
->prefix
[t
], *suffix
);
3028 if (exec_directory_is_private(context
, t
) &&
3029 exec_context_with_rootfs(context
))
3030 /* When RootDirectory= or RootImage= are set, then the symbolic link to the private
3031 * directory is not created on the root directory. So, let's bind-mount the directory
3032 * on the 'non-private' place. */
3033 d
= path_join(params
->prefix
[t
], *suffix
);
3042 bind_mounts
[h
++] = (BindMount
) {
3046 .nosuid
= context
->dynamic_user
, /* don't allow suid/sgid when DynamicUser= is on */
3048 .ignore_enoent
= false,
3055 *ret_bind_mounts
= bind_mounts
;
3056 *ret_n_bind_mounts
= n
;
3057 *ret_empty_directories
= TAKE_PTR(empty_directories
);
3062 bind_mount_free_many(bind_mounts
, h
);
3066 static bool insist_on_sandboxing(
3067 const ExecContext
*context
,
3068 const char *root_dir
,
3069 const char *root_image
,
3070 const BindMount
*bind_mounts
,
3071 size_t n_bind_mounts
) {
3074 assert(n_bind_mounts
== 0 || bind_mounts
);
3076 /* Checks whether we need to insist on fs namespacing. i.e. whether we have settings configured that
3077 * would alter the view on the file system beyond making things read-only or invisible, i.e. would
3078 * rearrange stuff in a way we cannot ignore gracefully. */
3080 if (context
->n_temporary_filesystems
> 0)
3083 if (root_dir
|| root_image
)
3086 if (context
->n_mount_images
> 0)
3089 if (context
->dynamic_user
)
3092 /* If there are any bind mounts set that don't map back onto themselves, fs namespacing becomes
3094 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< n_bind_mounts
; i
++)
3095 if (!path_equal(bind_mounts
[i
].source
, bind_mounts
[i
].destination
))
3098 if (context
->log_namespace
)
3104 static int apply_mount_namespace(
3106 ExecCommandFlags command_flags
,
3107 const ExecContext
*context
,
3108 const ExecParameters
*params
,
3109 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
3110 char **error_path
) {
3112 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **empty_directories
= NULL
;
3113 const char *tmp_dir
= NULL
, *var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
3114 const char *root_dir
= NULL
, *root_image
= NULL
;
3115 _cleanup_free_
char *creds_path
= NULL
;
3116 NamespaceInfo ns_info
;
3117 bool needs_sandboxing
;
3118 BindMount
*bind_mounts
= NULL
;
3119 size_t n_bind_mounts
= 0;
3124 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
) {
3125 root_image
= context
->root_image
;
3128 root_dir
= context
->root_directory
;
3131 r
= compile_bind_mounts(context
, params
, &bind_mounts
, &n_bind_mounts
, &empty_directories
);
3135 needs_sandboxing
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command_flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
);
3136 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
3137 /* The runtime struct only contains the parent of the private /tmp,
3138 * which is non-accessible to world users. Inside of it there's a /tmp
3139 * that is sticky, and that's the one we want to use here.
3140 * This does not apply when we are using /run/systemd/empty as fallback. */
3142 if (context
->private_tmp
&& runtime
) {
3143 if (streq_ptr(runtime
->tmp_dir
, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY
))
3144 tmp_dir
= runtime
->tmp_dir
;
3145 else if (runtime
->tmp_dir
)
3146 tmp_dir
= strjoina(runtime
->tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
3148 if (streq_ptr(runtime
->var_tmp_dir
, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY
))
3149 var_tmp_dir
= runtime
->var_tmp_dir
;
3150 else if (runtime
->var_tmp_dir
)
3151 var_tmp_dir
= strjoina(runtime
->var_tmp_dir
, "/tmp");
3154 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {
3155 .ignore_protect_paths
= false,
3156 .private_dev
= context
->private_devices
,
3157 .protect_control_groups
= context
->protect_control_groups
,
3158 .protect_kernel_tunables
= context
->protect_kernel_tunables
,
3159 .protect_kernel_modules
= context
->protect_kernel_modules
,
3160 .protect_kernel_logs
= context
->protect_kernel_logs
,
3161 .protect_hostname
= context
->protect_hostname
,
3162 .mount_apivfs
= exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(context
),
3163 .private_mounts
= context
->private_mounts
,
3164 .protect_home
= context
->protect_home
,
3165 .protect_system
= context
->protect_system
,
3166 .protect_proc
= context
->protect_proc
,
3167 .proc_subset
= context
->proc_subset
,
3169 } else if (!context
->dynamic_user
&& root_dir
)
3171 * If DynamicUser=no and RootDirectory= is set then lets pass a relaxed
3172 * sandbox info, otherwise enforce it, don't ignore protected paths and
3173 * fail if we are enable to apply the sandbox inside the mount namespace.
3175 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {
3176 .ignore_protect_paths
= true,
3179 ns_info
= (NamespaceInfo
) {};
3181 if (context
->mount_flags
== MS_SHARED
)
3182 log_unit_debug(u
, "shared mount propagation hidden by other fs namespacing unit settings: ignoring");
3184 if (exec_context_has_credentials(context
) && params
->prefix
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
]) {
3185 creds_path
= path_join(params
->prefix
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
], "credentials", u
->id
);
3192 r
= setup_namespace(root_dir
, root_image
, context
->root_image_options
,
3193 &ns_info
, context
->read_write_paths
,
3194 needs_sandboxing
? context
->read_only_paths
: NULL
,
3195 needs_sandboxing
? context
->inaccessible_paths
: NULL
,
3199 context
->temporary_filesystems
,
3200 context
->n_temporary_filesystems
,
3201 context
->mount_images
,
3202 context
->n_mount_images
,
3206 context
->log_namespace
,
3207 context
->mount_flags
,
3208 context
->root_hash
, context
->root_hash_size
, context
->root_hash_path
,
3209 context
->root_hash_sig
, context
->root_hash_sig_size
, context
->root_hash_sig_path
,
3210 context
->root_verity
,
3211 DISSECT_IMAGE_DISCARD_ON_LOOP
|DISSECT_IMAGE_RELAX_VAR_CHECK
|DISSECT_IMAGE_FSCK
,
3214 /* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is probably due to a missing capability. setup_namespace() reports
3215 * that with a special, recognizable error ENOANO. In this case, silently proceed, but only if exclusively
3216 * sandboxing options were used, i.e. nothing such as RootDirectory= or BindMount= that would result in a
3217 * completely different execution environment. */
3219 if (insist_on_sandboxing(
3221 root_dir
, root_image
,
3224 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to set up namespace, and refusing to continue since the selected namespacing options alter mount environment non-trivially.\n"
3225 "Bind mounts: %zu, temporary filesystems: %zu, root directory: %s, root image: %s, dynamic user: %s",
3226 n_bind_mounts
, context
->n_temporary_filesystems
, yes_no(root_dir
), yes_no(root_image
), yes_no(context
->dynamic_user
));
3230 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to set up namespace, assuming containerized execution and ignoring.");
3236 bind_mount_free_many(bind_mounts
, n_bind_mounts
);
3240 static int apply_working_directory(
3241 const ExecContext
*context
,
3242 const ExecParameters
*params
,
3249 assert(exit_status
);
3251 if (context
->working_directory_home
) {
3254 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
3261 wd
= empty_to_root(context
->working_directory
);
3263 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
)
3266 d
= prefix_roota(context
->root_directory
, wd
);
3268 if (chdir(d
) < 0 && !context
->working_directory_missing_ok
) {
3269 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
3276 static int apply_root_directory(
3277 const ExecContext
*context
,
3278 const ExecParameters
*params
,
3279 const bool needs_mount_ns
,
3283 assert(exit_status
);
3285 if (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_CHROOT
)
3286 if (!needs_mount_ns
&& context
->root_directory
)
3287 if (chroot(context
->root_directory
) < 0) {
3288 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHROOT
;
3295 static int setup_keyring(
3297 const ExecContext
*context
,
3298 const ExecParameters
*p
,
3299 uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
) {
3301 key_serial_t keyring
;
3310 /* Let's set up a new per-service "session" kernel keyring for each system service. This has the benefit that
3311 * each service runs with its own keyring shared among all processes of the service, but with no hook-up beyond
3312 * that scope, and in particular no link to the per-UID keyring. If we don't do this the keyring will be
3313 * automatically created on-demand and then linked to the per-UID keyring, by the kernel. The kernel's built-in
3314 * on-demand behaviour is very appropriate for login users, but probably not so much for system services, where
3315 * UIDs are not necessarily specific to a service but reused (at least in the case of UID 0). */
3317 if (context
->keyring_mode
== EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT
)
3320 /* Acquiring a reference to the user keyring is nasty. We briefly change identity in order to get things set up
3321 * properly by the kernel. If we don't do that then we can't create it atomically, and that sucks for parallel
3322 * execution. This mimics what pam_keyinit does, too. Setting up session keyring, to be owned by the right user
3323 * & group is just as nasty as acquiring a reference to the user keyring. */
3325 saved_uid
= getuid();
3326 saved_gid
= getgid();
3328 if (gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= saved_gid
) {
3329 if (setregid(gid
, -1) < 0)
3330 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change GID for user keyring: %m");
3333 if (uid_is_valid(uid
) && uid
!= saved_uid
) {
3334 if (setreuid(uid
, -1) < 0) {
3335 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change UID for user keyring: %m");
3340 keyring
= keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING
, 0, 0, 0, 0);
3341 if (keyring
== -1) {
3342 if (errno
== ENOSYS
)
3343 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Kernel keyring not supported, ignoring.");
3344 else if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(errno
))
3345 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Kernel keyring access prohibited, ignoring.");
3346 else if (errno
== EDQUOT
)
3347 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Out of kernel keyrings to allocate, ignoring.");
3349 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Setting up kernel keyring failed: %m");
3354 /* When requested link the user keyring into the session keyring. */
3355 if (context
->keyring_mode
== EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED
) {
3357 if (keyctl(KEYCTL_LINK
,
3358 KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING
,
3359 KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING
, 0, 0) < 0) {
3360 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to link user keyring into session keyring: %m");
3365 /* Restore uid/gid back */
3366 if (uid_is_valid(uid
) && uid
!= saved_uid
) {
3367 if (setreuid(saved_uid
, -1) < 0) {
3368 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change UID back for user keyring: %m");
3373 if (gid_is_valid(gid
) && gid
!= saved_gid
) {
3374 if (setregid(saved_gid
, -1) < 0)
3375 return log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to change GID back for user keyring: %m");
3378 /* Populate they keyring with the invocation ID by default, as original saved_uid. */
3379 if (!sd_id128_is_null(u
->invocation_id
)) {
3382 key
= add_key("user", "invocation_id", &u
->invocation_id
, sizeof(u
->invocation_id
), KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING
);
3384 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to add invocation ID to keyring, ignoring: %m");
3386 if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM
, key
,
3387 KEY_POS_VIEW
|KEY_POS_READ
|KEY_POS_SEARCH
|
3388 KEY_USR_VIEW
|KEY_USR_READ
|KEY_USR_SEARCH
, 0, 0) < 0)
3389 r
= log_unit_error_errno(u
, errno
, "Failed to restrict invocation ID permission: %m");
3394 /* Revert back uid & gid for the last time, and exit */
3395 /* no extra logging, as only the first already reported error matters */
3396 if (getuid() != saved_uid
)
3397 (void) setreuid(saved_uid
, -1);
3399 if (getgid() != saved_gid
)
3400 (void) setregid(saved_gid
, -1);
3405 static void append_socket_pair(int *array
, size_t *n
, const int pair
[static 2]) {
3411 array
[(*n
)++] = pair
[0];
3413 array
[(*n
)++] = pair
[1];
3416 static int close_remaining_fds(
3417 const ExecParameters
*params
,
3418 const ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
3419 const DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
3422 const int *fds
, size_t n_fds
) {
3424 size_t n_dont_close
= 0;
3425 int dont_close
[n_fds
+ 12];
3429 if (params
->stdin_fd
>= 0)
3430 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdin_fd
;
3431 if (params
->stdout_fd
>= 0)
3432 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stdout_fd
;
3433 if (params
->stderr_fd
>= 0)
3434 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = params
->stderr_fd
;
3437 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = socket_fd
;
3439 memcpy(dont_close
+ n_dont_close
, fds
, sizeof(int) * n_fds
);
3440 n_dont_close
+= n_fds
;
3444 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, runtime
->netns_storage_socket
);
3448 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, dcreds
->user
->storage_socket
);
3450 append_socket_pair(dont_close
, &n_dont_close
, dcreds
->group
->storage_socket
);
3453 if (user_lookup_fd
>= 0)
3454 dont_close
[n_dont_close
++] = user_lookup_fd
;
3456 return close_all_fds(dont_close
, n_dont_close
);
3459 static int send_user_lookup(
3467 /* Send the resolved UID/GID to PID 1 after we learnt it. We send a single datagram, containing the UID/GID
3468 * data as well as the unit name. Note that we suppress sending this if no user/group to resolve was
3471 if (user_lookup_fd
< 0)
3474 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
) && !gid_is_valid(gid
))
3477 if (writev(user_lookup_fd
,
3479 IOVEC_INIT(&uid
, sizeof(uid
)),
3480 IOVEC_INIT(&gid
, sizeof(gid
)),
3481 IOVEC_INIT_STRING(unit
->id
) }, 3) < 0)
3487 static int acquire_home(const ExecContext
*c
, uid_t uid
, const char** home
, char **buf
) {
3494 /* If WorkingDirectory=~ is set, try to acquire a usable home directory. */
3499 if (!c
->working_directory_home
)
3502 r
= get_home_dir(buf
);
3510 static int compile_suggested_paths(const ExecContext
*c
, const ExecParameters
*p
, char ***ret
) {
3511 _cleanup_strv_free_
char ** list
= NULL
;
3518 assert(c
->dynamic_user
);
3520 /* Compile a list of paths that it might make sense to read the owning UID from to use as initial candidate for
3521 * dynamic UID allocation, in order to save us from doing costly recursive chown()s of the special
3524 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
3527 if (t
== EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
)
3533 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->directories
[t
].paths
) {
3536 if (exec_directory_is_private(c
, t
))
3537 e
= path_join(p
->prefix
[t
], "private", *i
);
3539 e
= path_join(p
->prefix
[t
], *i
);
3543 r
= strv_consume(&list
, e
);
3549 *ret
= TAKE_PTR(list
);
3554 static char *exec_command_line(char **argv
);
3556 static int exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(const ExecParameters
*params
, char **ret
) {
3557 bool using_subcgroup
;
3563 if (!params
->cgroup_path
)
3566 /* If we are called for a unit where cgroup delegation is on, and the payload created its own populated
3567 * subcgroup (which we expect it to do, after all it asked for delegation), then we cannot place the control
3568 * processes started after the main unit's process in the unit's main cgroup because it is now an inner one,
3569 * and inner cgroups may not contain processes. Hence, if delegation is on, and this is a control process,
3570 * let's use ".control" as subcgroup instead. Note that we do so only for ExecStartPost=, ExecReload=,
3571 * ExecStop=, ExecStopPost=, i.e. for the commands where the main process is already forked. For ExecStartPre=
3572 * this is not necessary, the cgroup is still empty. We distinguish these cases with the EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP
3573 * flag, which is only passed for the former statements, not for the latter. */
3575 using_subcgroup
= FLAGS_SET(params
->flags
, EXEC_CONTROL_CGROUP
|EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE
|EXEC_IS_CONTROL
);
3576 if (using_subcgroup
)
3577 p
= path_join(params
->cgroup_path
, ".control");
3579 p
= strdup(params
->cgroup_path
);
3584 return using_subcgroup
;
3587 static int exec_context_cpu_affinity_from_numa(const ExecContext
*c
, CPUSet
*ret
) {
3588 _cleanup_(cpu_set_reset
) CPUSet s
= {};
3594 if (!c
->numa_policy
.nodes
.set
) {
3595 log_debug("Can't derive CPU affinity mask from NUMA mask because NUMA mask is not set, ignoring");
3599 r
= numa_to_cpu_set(&c
->numa_policy
, &s
);
3605 return cpu_set_add_all(ret
, &s
);
3608 bool exec_context_get_cpu_affinity_from_numa(const ExecContext
*c
) {
3611 return c
->cpu_affinity_from_numa
;
3614 static int add_shifted_fd(int *fds
, size_t fds_size
, size_t *n_fds
, int fd
, int *ret_fd
) {
3619 assert(*n_fds
< fds_size
);
3627 if (fd
< 3 + (int) *n_fds
) {
3628 /* Let's move the fd up, so that it's outside of the fd range we will use to store
3629 * the fds we pass to the process (or which are closed only during execve). */
3631 r
= fcntl(fd
, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC
, 3 + (int) *n_fds
);
3635 CLOSE_AND_REPLACE(fd
, r
);
3638 *ret_fd
= fds
[*n_fds
] = fd
;
3643 static int exec_child(
3645 const ExecCommand
*command
,
3646 const ExecContext
*context
,
3647 const ExecParameters
*params
,
3648 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
3649 DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
3651 const int named_iofds
[static 3],
3653 size_t n_socket_fds
,
3654 size_t n_storage_fds
,
3659 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **our_env
= NULL
, **pass_env
= NULL
, **accum_env
= NULL
, **replaced_argv
= NULL
;
3660 int r
, ngids
= 0, exec_fd
;
3661 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*supplementary_gids
= NULL
;
3662 const char *username
= NULL
, *groupname
= NULL
;
3663 _cleanup_free_
char *home_buffer
= NULL
;
3664 const char *home
= NULL
, *shell
= NULL
;
3665 char **final_argv
= NULL
;
3666 dev_t journal_stream_dev
= 0;
3667 ino_t journal_stream_ino
= 0;
3668 bool userns_set_up
= false;
3669 bool needs_sandboxing
, /* Do we need to set up full sandboxing? (i.e. all namespacing, all MAC stuff, caps, yadda yadda */
3670 needs_setuid
, /* Do we need to do the actual setresuid()/setresgid() calls? */
3671 needs_mount_namespace
, /* Do we need to set up a mount namespace for this kernel? */
3672 needs_ambient_hack
; /* Do we need to apply the ambient capabilities hack? */
3674 _cleanup_free_
char *mac_selinux_context_net
= NULL
;
3675 bool use_selinux
= false;
3678 bool use_smack
= false;
3681 bool use_apparmor
= false;
3683 uid_t saved_uid
= getuid();
3684 gid_t saved_gid
= getgid();
3685 uid_t uid
= UID_INVALID
;
3686 gid_t gid
= GID_INVALID
;
3687 size_t n_fds
= n_socket_fds
+ n_storage_fds
, /* fds to pass to the child */
3688 n_keep_fds
; /* total number of fds not to close */
3690 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*gids_after_pam
= NULL
;
3691 int ngids_after_pam
= 0;
3697 assert(exit_status
);
3699 rename_process_from_path(command
->path
);
3701 /* We reset exactly these signals, since they are the
3702 * only ones we set to SIG_IGN in the main daemon. All
3703 * others we leave untouched because we set them to
3704 * SIG_DFL or a valid handler initially, both of which
3705 * will be demoted to SIG_DFL. */
3706 (void) default_signals(SIGNALS_CRASH_HANDLER
,
3707 SIGNALS_IGNORE
, -1);
3709 if (context
->ignore_sigpipe
)
3710 (void) ignore_signals(SIGPIPE
, -1);
3712 r
= reset_signal_mask();
3714 *exit_status
= EXIT_SIGNAL_MASK
;
3715 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set process signal mask: %m");
3718 if (params
->idle_pipe
)
3719 do_idle_pipe_dance(params
->idle_pipe
);
3721 /* Close fds we don't need very early to make sure we don't block init reexecution because it cannot bind its
3722 * sockets. Among the fds we close are the logging fds, and we want to keep them closed, so that we don't have
3723 * any fds open we don't really want open during the transition. In order to make logging work, we switch the
3724 * log subsystem into open_when_needed mode, so that it reopens the logs on every single log call. */
3727 log_set_open_when_needed(true);
3729 /* In case anything used libc syslog(), close this here, too */
3732 int keep_fds
[n_fds
+ 2];
3733 memcpy_safe(keep_fds
, fds
, n_fds
* sizeof(int));
3736 r
= add_shifted_fd(keep_fds
, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds
), &n_keep_fds
, params
->exec_fd
, &exec_fd
);
3738 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
3739 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m");
3742 r
= close_remaining_fds(params
, runtime
, dcreds
, user_lookup_fd
, socket_fd
, keep_fds
, n_keep_fds
);
3744 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
3745 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to close unwanted file descriptors: %m");
3748 if (!context
->same_pgrp
&&
3750 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSID
;
3751 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to create new process session: %m");
3754 exec_context_tty_reset(context
, params
);
3756 if (unit_shall_confirm_spawn(unit
)) {
3757 const char *vc
= params
->confirm_spawn
;
3758 _cleanup_free_
char *cmdline
= NULL
;
3760 cmdline
= exec_command_line(command
->argv
);
3762 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3766 r
= ask_for_confirmation(vc
, unit
, cmdline
);
3767 if (r
!= CONFIRM_EXECUTE
) {
3768 if (r
== CONFIRM_PRETEND_SUCCESS
) {
3769 *exit_status
= EXIT_SUCCESS
;
3772 *exit_status
= EXIT_CONFIRM
;
3773 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ECANCELED
),
3774 "Execution cancelled by the user");
3778 /* We are about to invoke NSS and PAM modules. Let's tell them what we are doing here, maybe they care. This is
3779 * used by nss-resolve to disable itself when we are about to start systemd-resolved, to avoid deadlocks. Note
3780 * that these env vars do not survive the execve(), which means they really only apply to the PAM and NSS
3781 * invocations themselves. Also note that while we'll only invoke NSS modules involved in user management they
3782 * might internally call into other NSS modules that are involved in hostname resolution, we never know. */
3783 if (setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_UNIT", unit
->id
, true) != 0 ||
3784 setenv("SYSTEMD_ACTIVATION_SCOPE", MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(unit
->manager
) ? "system" : "user", true) != 0) {
3785 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3786 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to update environment: %m");
3789 if (context
->dynamic_user
&& dcreds
) {
3790 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **suggested_paths
= NULL
;
3792 /* On top of that, make sure we bypass our own NSS module nss-systemd comprehensively for any NSS
3793 * checks, if DynamicUser=1 is used, as we shouldn't create a feedback loop with ourselves here.*/
3794 if (putenv((char*) "SYSTEMD_NSS_DYNAMIC_BYPASS=1") != 0) {
3795 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3796 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to update environment: %m");
3799 r
= compile_suggested_paths(context
, params
, &suggested_paths
);
3801 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
3805 r
= dynamic_creds_realize(dcreds
, suggested_paths
, &uid
, &gid
);
3807 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3809 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP
),
3810 "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: User or group with specified name already exists.");
3811 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to update dynamic user credentials: %m");
3814 if (!uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
3815 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3816 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH
), "UID validation failed for \""UID_FMT
"\"", uid
);
3819 if (!gid_is_valid(gid
)) {
3820 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3821 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESRCH
), "GID validation failed for \""GID_FMT
"\"", gid
);
3825 username
= dcreds
->user
->name
;
3828 r
= get_fixed_user(context
, &username
, &uid
, &gid
, &home
, &shell
);
3830 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3831 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine user credentials: %m");
3834 r
= get_fixed_group(context
, &groupname
, &gid
);
3836 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
3837 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine group credentials: %m");
3841 /* Initialize user supplementary groups and get SupplementaryGroups= ones */
3842 r
= get_supplementary_groups(context
, username
, groupname
, gid
,
3843 &supplementary_gids
, &ngids
);
3845 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
3846 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine supplementary groups: %m");
3849 r
= send_user_lookup(unit
, user_lookup_fd
, uid
, gid
);
3851 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
3852 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to send user credentials to PID1: %m");
3855 user_lookup_fd
= safe_close(user_lookup_fd
);
3857 r
= acquire_home(context
, uid
, &home
, &home_buffer
);
3859 *exit_status
= EXIT_CHDIR
;
3860 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine $HOME for user: %m");
3863 /* If a socket is connected to STDIN/STDOUT/STDERR, we
3864 * must sure to drop O_NONBLOCK */
3866 (void) fd_nonblock(socket_fd
, false);
3868 /* Journald will try to look-up our cgroup in order to populate _SYSTEMD_CGROUP and _SYSTEMD_UNIT fields.
3869 * Hence we need to migrate to the target cgroup from init.scope before connecting to journald */
3870 if (params
->cgroup_path
) {
3871 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
;
3873 r
= exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params
, &p
);
3875 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
3876 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to acquire cgroup path: %m");
3879 r
= cg_attach_everywhere(params
->cgroup_supported
, p
, 0, NULL
, NULL
);
3881 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
3882 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to attach to cgroup %s: %m", p
);
3886 if (context
->network_namespace_path
&& runtime
&& runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
3887 r
= open_netns_path(runtime
->netns_storage_socket
, context
->network_namespace_path
);
3889 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
3890 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to open network namespace path %s: %m", context
->network_namespace_path
);
3894 r
= setup_input(context
, params
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
);
3896 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
3897 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard input: %m");
3900 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDOUT_FILENO
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
, &journal_stream_dev
, &journal_stream_ino
);
3902 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDOUT
;
3903 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard output: %m");
3906 r
= setup_output(unit
, context
, params
, STDERR_FILENO
, socket_fd
, named_iofds
, basename(command
->path
), uid
, gid
, &journal_stream_dev
, &journal_stream_ino
);
3908 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDERR
;
3909 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up standard error output: %m");
3912 if (context
->oom_score_adjust_set
) {
3913 /* When we can't make this change due to EPERM, then let's silently skip over it. User namespaces
3914 * prohibit write access to this file, and we shouldn't trip up over that. */
3915 r
= set_oom_score_adjust(context
->oom_score_adjust
);
3916 if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r
))
3917 log_unit_debug_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust OOM setting, assuming containerized execution, ignoring: %m");
3919 *exit_status
= EXIT_OOM_ADJUST
;
3920 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust OOM setting: %m");
3924 if (context
->coredump_filter_set
) {
3925 r
= set_coredump_filter(context
->coredump_filter
);
3926 if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r
))
3927 log_unit_debug_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust coredump_filter, ignoring: %m");
3929 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust coredump_filter: %m");
3932 if (context
->nice_set
) {
3933 r
= setpriority_closest(context
->nice
);
3935 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up process scheduling priority (nice level): %m");
3938 if (context
->cpu_sched_set
) {
3939 struct sched_param param
= {
3940 .sched_priority
= context
->cpu_sched_priority
,
3943 r
= sched_setscheduler(0,
3944 context
->cpu_sched_policy
|
3945 (context
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
?
3946 SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK
: 0),
3949 *exit_status
= EXIT_SETSCHEDULER
;
3950 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up CPU scheduling: %m");
3954 if (context
->cpu_affinity_from_numa
|| context
->cpu_set
.set
) {
3955 _cleanup_(cpu_set_reset
) CPUSet converted_cpu_set
= {};
3956 const CPUSet
*cpu_set
;
3958 if (context
->cpu_affinity_from_numa
) {
3959 r
= exec_context_cpu_affinity_from_numa(context
, &converted_cpu_set
);
3961 *exit_status
= EXIT_CPUAFFINITY
;
3962 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to derive CPU affinity mask from NUMA mask: %m");
3965 cpu_set
= &converted_cpu_set
;
3967 cpu_set
= &context
->cpu_set
;
3969 if (sched_setaffinity(0, cpu_set
->allocated
, cpu_set
->set
) < 0) {
3970 *exit_status
= EXIT_CPUAFFINITY
;
3971 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up CPU affinity: %m");
3975 if (mpol_is_valid(numa_policy_get_type(&context
->numa_policy
))) {
3976 r
= apply_numa_policy(&context
->numa_policy
);
3977 if (r
== -EOPNOTSUPP
)
3978 log_unit_debug_errno(unit
, r
, "NUMA support not available, ignoring.");
3980 *exit_status
= EXIT_NUMA_POLICY
;
3981 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set NUMA memory policy: %m");
3985 if (context
->ioprio_set
)
3986 if (ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS
, 0, context
->ioprio
) < 0) {
3987 *exit_status
= EXIT_IOPRIO
;
3988 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up IO scheduling priority: %m");
3991 if (context
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
3992 if (prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK
, context
->timer_slack_nsec
) < 0) {
3993 *exit_status
= EXIT_TIMERSLACK
;
3994 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set up timer slack: %m");
3997 if (context
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
) {
3998 r
= safe_personality(context
->personality
);
4000 *exit_status
= EXIT_PERSONALITY
;
4001 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up execution domain (personality): %m");
4005 if (context
->utmp_id
)
4006 utmp_put_init_process(context
->utmp_id
, getpid_cached(), getsid(0),
4008 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_INIT
? INIT_PROCESS
:
4009 context
->utmp_mode
== EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
? LOGIN_PROCESS
:
4013 if (uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
4014 r
= chown_terminal(STDIN_FILENO
, uid
);
4016 *exit_status
= EXIT_STDIN
;
4017 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change ownership of terminal: %m");
4021 /* If delegation is enabled we'll pass ownership of the cgroup to the user of the new process. On cgroup v1
4022 * this is only about systemd's own hierarchy, i.e. not the controller hierarchies, simply because that's not
4023 * safe. On cgroup v2 there's only one hierarchy anyway, and delegation is safe there, hence in that case only
4024 * touch a single hierarchy too. */
4025 if (params
->cgroup_path
&& context
->user
&& (params
->flags
& EXEC_CGROUP_DELEGATE
)) {
4026 r
= cg_set_access(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, params
->cgroup_path
, uid
, gid
);
4028 *exit_status
= EXIT_CGROUP
;
4029 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust control group access: %m");
4033 for (ExecDirectoryType dt
= 0; dt
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; dt
++) {
4034 r
= setup_exec_directory(context
, params
, uid
, gid
, dt
, exit_status
);
4036 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up special execution directory in %s: %m", params
->prefix
[dt
]);
4039 if (FLAGS_SET(params
->flags
, EXEC_WRITE_CREDENTIALS
)) {
4040 r
= setup_credentials(context
, params
, unit
->id
, uid
);
4042 *exit_status
= EXIT_CREDENTIALS
;
4043 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up credentials: %m");
4047 r
= build_environment(
4059 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
4063 r
= build_pass_environment(context
, &pass_env
);
4065 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
4069 accum_env
= strv_env_merge(5,
4070 params
->environment
,
4073 context
->environment
,
4076 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
4079 accum_env
= strv_env_clean(accum_env
);
4081 (void) umask(context
->umask
);
4083 r
= setup_keyring(unit
, context
, params
, uid
, gid
);
4085 *exit_status
= EXIT_KEYRING
;
4086 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up kernel keyring: %m");
4089 /* We need sandboxing if the caller asked us to apply it and the command isn't explicitly excepted from it */
4090 needs_sandboxing
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
);
4092 /* We need the ambient capability hack, if the caller asked us to apply it and the command is marked for it, and the kernel doesn't actually support ambient caps */
4093 needs_ambient_hack
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && (command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_AMBIENT_MAGIC
) && !ambient_capabilities_supported();
4095 /* We need setresuid() if the caller asked us to apply sandboxing and the command isn't explicitly excepted from either whole sandboxing or just setresuid() itself, and the ambient hack is not desired */
4096 if (needs_ambient_hack
)
4097 needs_setuid
= false;
4099 needs_setuid
= (params
->flags
& EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING
) && !(command
->flags
& (EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED
|EXEC_COMMAND_NO_SETUID
));
4101 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
4102 /* MAC enablement checks need to be done before a new mount ns is created, as they rely on /sys being
4103 * present. The actual MAC context application will happen later, as late as possible, to avoid
4104 * impacting our own code paths. */
4107 use_selinux
= mac_selinux_use();
4110 use_smack
= mac_smack_use();
4113 use_apparmor
= mac_apparmor_use();
4117 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
4120 /* Let's set the resource limits before we call into PAM, so that pam_limits wins over what
4121 * is set here. (See below.) */
4123 r
= setrlimit_closest_all((const struct rlimit
* const *) context
->rlimit
, &which_failed
);
4125 *exit_status
= EXIT_LIMITS
;
4126 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust resource limit RLIMIT_%s: %m", rlimit_to_string(which_failed
));
4130 if (needs_setuid
&& context
->pam_name
&& username
) {
4131 /* Let's call into PAM after we set up our own idea of resource limits to that pam_limits
4132 * wins here. (See above.) */
4134 /* All fds passed in the fds array will be closed in the pam child process. */
4135 r
= setup_pam(context
->pam_name
, username
, uid
, gid
, context
->tty_path
, &accum_env
, fds
, n_fds
);
4137 *exit_status
= EXIT_PAM
;
4138 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up PAM session: %m");
4141 ngids_after_pam
= getgroups_alloc(&gids_after_pam
);
4142 if (ngids_after_pam
< 0) {
4143 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
4144 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, ngids_after_pam
, "Failed to obtain groups after setting up PAM: %m");
4148 if (needs_sandboxing
&& context
->private_users
&& !have_effective_cap(CAP_SYS_ADMIN
)) {
4149 /* If we're unprivileged, set up the user namespace first to enable use of the other namespaces.
4150 * Users with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can set up user namespaces last because they will be able to
4151 * set up the all of the other namespaces (i.e. network, mount, UTS) without a user namespace. */
4153 userns_set_up
= true;
4154 r
= setup_private_users(saved_uid
, saved_gid
, uid
, gid
);
4156 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
4157 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up user namespacing for unprivileged user: %m");
4161 if ((context
->private_network
|| context
->network_namespace_path
) && runtime
&& runtime
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
4163 if (ns_type_supported(NAMESPACE_NET
)) {
4164 r
= setup_netns(runtime
->netns_storage_socket
);
4166 log_unit_warning_errno(unit
, r
,
4167 "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but network namespace setup failed, ignoring: %m");
4169 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
4170 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up network namespacing: %m");
4172 } else if (context
->network_namespace_path
) {
4173 *exit_status
= EXIT_NETWORK
;
4174 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP
),
4175 "NetworkNamespacePath= is not supported, refusing.");
4177 log_unit_warning(unit
, "PrivateNetwork=yes is configured, but the kernel does not support network namespaces, ignoring.");
4180 needs_mount_namespace
= exec_needs_mount_namespace(context
, params
, runtime
);
4181 if (needs_mount_namespace
) {
4182 _cleanup_free_
char *error_path
= NULL
;
4184 r
= apply_mount_namespace(unit
, command
->flags
, context
, params
, runtime
, &error_path
);
4186 *exit_status
= EXIT_NAMESPACE
;
4187 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up mount namespacing%s%s: %m",
4188 error_path
? ": " : "", strempty(error_path
));
4192 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
4193 r
= apply_protect_hostname(unit
, context
, exit_status
);
4198 /* Drop groups as early as possible.
4199 * This needs to be done after PrivateDevices=y setup as device nodes should be owned by the host's root.
4200 * For non-root in a userns, devices will be owned by the user/group before the group change, and nobody. */
4202 _cleanup_free_ gid_t
*gids_to_enforce
= NULL
;
4203 int ngids_to_enforce
= 0;
4205 ngids_to_enforce
= merge_gid_lists(supplementary_gids
,
4210 if (ngids_to_enforce
< 0) {
4211 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
4212 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
,
4214 "Failed to merge group lists. Group membership might be incorrect: %m");
4217 r
= enforce_groups(gid
, gids_to_enforce
, ngids_to_enforce
);
4219 *exit_status
= EXIT_GROUP
;
4220 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Changing group credentials failed: %m");
4224 /* If the user namespace was not set up above, try to do it now.
4225 * It's preferred to set up the user namespace later (after all other namespaces) so as not to be
4226 * restricted by rules pertaining to combining user namspaces with other namespaces (e.g. in the
4227 * case of mount namespaces being less privileged when the mount point list is copied from a
4228 * different user namespace). */
4230 if (needs_sandboxing
&& context
->private_users
&& !userns_set_up
) {
4231 r
= setup_private_users(saved_uid
, saved_gid
, uid
, gid
);
4233 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
4234 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up user namespacing: %m");
4238 /* Now that the mount namespace has been set up and privileges adjusted, let's look for the thing we
4241 _cleanup_free_
char *executable
= NULL
;
4242 _cleanup_close_
int executable_fd
= -1;
4243 r
= find_executable_full(command
->path
, false, &executable
, &executable_fd
);
4245 if (r
!= -ENOMEM
&& (command
->flags
& EXEC_COMMAND_IGNORE_FAILURE
)) {
4246 log_struct_errno(LOG_INFO
, r
,
4247 "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR
,
4249 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
),
4250 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Executable %s missing, skipping: %m",
4252 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
);
4256 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
4257 return log_struct_errno(LOG_INFO
, r
,
4258 "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR
,
4260 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
),
4261 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Failed to locate executable %s: %m",
4263 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
);
4266 r
= add_shifted_fd(keep_fds
, ELEMENTSOF(keep_fds
), &n_keep_fds
, executable_fd
, &executable_fd
);
4268 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
4269 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to shift fd and set FD_CLOEXEC: %m");
4273 if (needs_sandboxing
&& use_selinux
&& params
->selinux_context_net
&& socket_fd
>= 0) {
4274 r
= mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(socket_fd
, executable
, context
->selinux_context
, &mac_selinux_context_net
);
4276 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
4277 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to determine SELinux context: %m");
4282 /* We repeat the fd closing here, to make sure that nothing is leaked from the PAM modules. Note that we are
4283 * more aggressive this time since socket_fd and the netns fds we don't need anymore. We do keep the exec_fd
4284 * however if we have it as we want to keep it open until the final execve(). */
4286 r
= close_all_fds(keep_fds
, n_keep_fds
);
4288 r
= shift_fds(fds
, n_fds
);
4290 r
= flags_fds(fds
, n_socket_fds
, n_storage_fds
, context
->non_blocking
);
4292 *exit_status
= EXIT_FDS
;
4293 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to adjust passed file descriptors: %m");
4296 /* At this point, the fds we want to pass to the program are all ready and set up, with O_CLOEXEC turned off
4297 * and at the right fd numbers. The are no other fds open, with one exception: the exec_fd if it is defined,
4298 * and it has O_CLOEXEC set, after all we want it to be closed by the execve(), so that our parent knows we
4301 secure_bits
= context
->secure_bits
;
4303 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
4306 /* Set the RTPRIO resource limit to 0, but only if nothing else was explicitly
4307 * requested. (Note this is placed after the general resource limit initialization, see
4308 * above, in order to take precedence.) */
4309 if (context
->restrict_realtime
&& !context
->rlimit
[RLIMIT_RTPRIO
]) {
4310 if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_RTPRIO
, &RLIMIT_MAKE_CONST(0)) < 0) {
4311 *exit_status
= EXIT_LIMITS
;
4312 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to adjust RLIMIT_RTPRIO resource limit: %m");
4317 /* LSM Smack needs the capability CAP_MAC_ADMIN to change the current execution security context of the
4318 * process. This is the latest place before dropping capabilities. Other MAC context are set later. */
4320 r
= setup_smack(context
, executable_fd
);
4322 *exit_status
= EXIT_SMACK_PROCESS_LABEL
;
4323 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set SMACK process label: %m");
4328 bset
= context
->capability_bounding_set
;
4329 /* If the ambient caps hack is enabled (which means the kernel can't do them, and the user asked for
4330 * our magic fallback), then let's add some extra caps, so that the service can drop privs of its own,
4331 * instead of us doing that */
4332 if (needs_ambient_hack
)
4333 bset
|= (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETPCAP
) |
4334 (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETUID
) |
4335 (UINT64_C(1) << CAP_SETGID
);
4337 if (!cap_test_all(bset
)) {
4338 r
= capability_bounding_set_drop(bset
, false);
4340 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
4341 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to drop capabilities: %m");
4345 /* Ambient capabilities are cleared during setresuid() (in enforce_user()) even with
4347 * To be able to raise the ambient capabilities after setresuid() they have to be
4348 * added to the inherited set and keep caps has to be set (done in enforce_user()).
4349 * After setresuid() the ambient capabilities can be raised as they are present in
4350 * the permitted and inhertiable set. However it is possible that someone wants to
4351 * set ambient capabilities without changing the user, so we also set the ambient
4352 * capabilities here.
4353 * The requested ambient capabilities are raised in the inheritable set if the
4354 * second argument is true. */
4355 if (!needs_ambient_hack
) {
4356 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, true);
4358 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
4359 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (before UID change): %m");
4364 /* chroot to root directory first, before we lose the ability to chroot */
4365 r
= apply_root_directory(context
, params
, needs_mount_namespace
, exit_status
);
4367 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Chrooting to the requested root directory failed: %m");
4370 if (uid_is_valid(uid
)) {
4371 r
= enforce_user(context
, uid
);
4373 *exit_status
= EXIT_USER
;
4374 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change UID to " UID_FMT
": %m", uid
);
4377 if (!needs_ambient_hack
&&
4378 context
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
4380 /* Raise the ambient capabilities after user change. */
4381 r
= capability_ambient_set_apply(context
->capability_ambient_set
, false);
4383 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
4384 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply ambient capabilities (after UID change): %m");
4390 /* Apply working directory here, because the working directory might be on NFS and only the user running
4391 * this service might have the correct privilege to change to the working directory */
4392 r
= apply_working_directory(context
, params
, home
, exit_status
);
4394 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Changing to the requested working directory failed: %m");
4396 if (needs_sandboxing
) {
4397 /* Apply other MAC contexts late, but before seccomp syscall filtering, as those should really be last to
4398 * influence our own codepaths as little as possible. Moreover, applying MAC contexts usually requires
4399 * syscalls that are subject to seccomp filtering, hence should probably be applied before the syscalls
4400 * are restricted. */
4404 char *exec_context
= mac_selinux_context_net
?: context
->selinux_context
;
4407 r
= setexeccon(exec_context
);
4409 *exit_status
= EXIT_SELINUX_CONTEXT
;
4410 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to change SELinux context to %s: %m", exec_context
);
4417 if (use_apparmor
&& context
->apparmor_profile
) {
4418 r
= aa_change_onexec(context
->apparmor_profile
);
4419 if (r
< 0 && !context
->apparmor_profile_ignore
) {
4420 *exit_status
= EXIT_APPARMOR_PROFILE
;
4421 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to prepare AppArmor profile change to %s: %m", context
->apparmor_profile
);
4426 /* PR_GET_SECUREBITS is not privileged, while PR_SET_SECUREBITS is. So to suppress potential EPERMs
4427 * we'll try not to call PR_SET_SECUREBITS unless necessary. Setting securebits requires
4429 if (prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS
) != secure_bits
) {
4430 /* CAP_SETPCAP is required to set securebits. This capability is raised into the
4431 * effective set here.
4432 * The effective set is overwritten during execve with the following values:
4433 * - ambient set (for non-root processes)
4434 * - (inheritable | bounding) set for root processes)
4436 * Hence there is no security impact to raise it in the effective set before execve
4438 r
= capability_gain_cap_setpcap(NULL
);
4440 *exit_status
= EXIT_CAPABILITIES
;
4441 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to gain CAP_SETPCAP for setting secure bits");
4443 if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS
, secure_bits
) < 0) {
4444 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECUREBITS
;
4445 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to set process secure bits: %m");
4449 if (context_has_no_new_privileges(context
))
4450 if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
4451 *exit_status
= EXIT_NO_NEW_PRIVILEGES
;
4452 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to disable new privileges: %m");
4456 r
= apply_address_families(unit
, context
);
4458 *exit_status
= EXIT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES
;
4459 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to restrict address families: %m");
4462 r
= apply_memory_deny_write_execute(unit
, context
);
4464 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4465 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to disable writing to executable memory: %m");
4468 r
= apply_restrict_realtime(unit
, context
);
4470 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4471 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply realtime restrictions: %m");
4474 r
= apply_restrict_suid_sgid(unit
, context
);
4476 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4477 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply SUID/SGID restrictions: %m");
4480 r
= apply_restrict_namespaces(unit
, context
);
4482 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4483 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply namespace restrictions: %m");
4486 r
= apply_protect_sysctl(unit
, context
);
4488 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4489 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply sysctl restrictions: %m");
4492 r
= apply_protect_kernel_modules(unit
, context
);
4494 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4495 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply module loading restrictions: %m");
4498 r
= apply_protect_kernel_logs(unit
, context
);
4500 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4501 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply kernel log restrictions: %m");
4504 r
= apply_protect_clock(unit
, context
);
4506 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4507 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply clock restrictions: %m");
4510 r
= apply_private_devices(unit
, context
);
4512 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4513 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to set up private devices: %m");
4516 r
= apply_syscall_archs(unit
, context
);
4518 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4519 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply syscall architecture restrictions: %m");
4522 r
= apply_lock_personality(unit
, context
);
4524 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4525 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to lock personalities: %m");
4528 r
= apply_syscall_log(unit
, context
);
4530 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4531 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply system call log filters: %m");
4534 /* This really should remain the last step before the execve(), to make sure our own code is unaffected
4535 * by the filter as little as possible. */
4536 r
= apply_syscall_filter(unit
, context
, needs_ambient_hack
);
4538 *exit_status
= EXIT_SECCOMP
;
4539 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to apply system call filters: %m");
4544 if (!strv_isempty(context
->unset_environment
)) {
4547 ee
= strv_env_delete(accum_env
, 1, context
->unset_environment
);
4549 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
4553 strv_free_and_replace(accum_env
, ee
);
4556 if (!FLAGS_SET(command
->flags
, EXEC_COMMAND_NO_ENV_EXPAND
)) {
4557 replaced_argv
= replace_env_argv(command
->argv
, accum_env
);
4558 if (!replaced_argv
) {
4559 *exit_status
= EXIT_MEMORY
;
4562 final_argv
= replaced_argv
;
4564 final_argv
= command
->argv
;
4566 if (DEBUG_LOGGING
) {
4567 _cleanup_free_
char *line
;
4569 line
= exec_command_line(final_argv
);
4571 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
4572 "EXECUTABLE=%s", executable
,
4573 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Executing: %s", line
),
4575 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
));
4581 /* We have finished with all our initializations. Let's now let the manager know that. From this point
4582 * on, if the manager sees POLLHUP on the exec_fd, then execve() was successful. */
4584 if (write(exec_fd
, &hot
, sizeof(hot
)) < 0) {
4585 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
4586 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to enable exec_fd: %m");
4590 r
= fexecve_or_execve(executable_fd
, executable
, final_argv
, accum_env
);
4595 /* The execve() failed. This means the exec_fd is still open. Which means we need to tell the manager
4596 * that POLLHUP on it no longer means execve() succeeded. */
4598 if (write(exec_fd
, &hot
, sizeof(hot
)) < 0) {
4599 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
4600 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to disable exec_fd: %m");
4604 *exit_status
= EXIT_EXEC
;
4605 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to execute %s: %m", executable
);
4608 static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit
*unit
, const ExecContext
*c
, char ***l
);
4609 static int exec_context_named_iofds(const ExecContext
*c
, const ExecParameters
*p
, int named_iofds
[static 3]);
4611 int exec_spawn(Unit
*unit
,
4612 ExecCommand
*command
,
4613 const ExecContext
*context
,
4614 const ExecParameters
*params
,
4615 ExecRuntime
*runtime
,
4616 DynamicCreds
*dcreds
,
4619 int socket_fd
, r
, named_iofds
[3] = { -1, -1, -1 }, *fds
= NULL
;
4620 _cleanup_free_
char *subcgroup_path
= NULL
;
4621 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **files_env
= NULL
;
4622 size_t n_storage_fds
= 0, n_socket_fds
= 0;
4623 _cleanup_free_
char *line
= NULL
;
4631 assert(params
->fds
|| (params
->n_socket_fds
+ params
->n_storage_fds
<= 0));
4633 if (context
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
||
4634 context
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
||
4635 context
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
) {
4637 if (params
->n_socket_fds
> 1)
4638 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL
), "Got more than one socket.");
4640 if (params
->n_socket_fds
== 0)
4641 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL
), "Got no socket.");
4643 socket_fd
= params
->fds
[0];
4647 n_socket_fds
= params
->n_socket_fds
;
4648 n_storage_fds
= params
->n_storage_fds
;
4651 r
= exec_context_named_iofds(context
, params
, named_iofds
);
4653 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to load a named file descriptor: %m");
4655 r
= exec_context_load_environment(unit
, context
, &files_env
);
4657 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to load environment files: %m");
4659 line
= exec_command_line(command
->argv
);
4663 /* Fork with up-to-date SELinux label database, so the child inherits the up-to-date db
4664 and, until the next SELinux policy changes, we save further reloads in future children. */
4665 mac_selinux_maybe_reload();
4667 log_struct(LOG_DEBUG
,
4668 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "About to execute %s", line
),
4669 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
, /* We won't know the real executable path until we create
4670 the mount namespace in the child, but we want to log
4671 from the parent, so we need to use the (possibly
4672 inaccurate) path here. */
4674 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
));
4676 if (params
->cgroup_path
) {
4677 r
= exec_parameters_get_cgroup_path(params
, &subcgroup_path
);
4679 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to acquire subcgroup path: %m");
4680 if (r
> 0) { /* We are using a child cgroup */
4681 r
= cg_create(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, subcgroup_path
);
4683 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, r
, "Failed to create control group '%s': %m", subcgroup_path
);
4689 return log_unit_error_errno(unit
, errno
, "Failed to fork: %m");
4692 int exit_status
= EXIT_SUCCESS
;
4694 r
= exec_child(unit
,
4706 unit
->manager
->user_lookup_fds
[1],
4710 const char *status
=
4711 exit_status_to_string(exit_status
,
4712 EXIT_STATUS_LIBC
| EXIT_STATUS_SYSTEMD
);
4714 log_struct_errno(LOG_ERR
, r
,
4715 "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_SPAWN_FAILED_STR
,
4717 LOG_UNIT_INVOCATION_ID(unit
),
4718 LOG_UNIT_MESSAGE(unit
, "Failed at step %s spawning %s: %m",
4719 status
, command
->path
),
4720 "EXECUTABLE=%s", command
->path
);
4726 log_unit_debug(unit
, "Forked %s as "PID_FMT
, command
->path
, pid
);
4728 /* We add the new process to the cgroup both in the child (so that we can be sure that no user code is ever
4729 * executed outside of the cgroup) and in the parent (so that we can be sure that when we kill the cgroup the
4730 * process will be killed too). */
4732 (void) cg_attach(SYSTEMD_CGROUP_CONTROLLER
, subcgroup_path
, pid
);
4734 exec_status_start(&command
->exec_status
, pid
);
4740 void exec_context_init(ExecContext
*c
) {
4744 c
->ioprio
= IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE
, 0);
4745 c
->cpu_sched_policy
= SCHED_OTHER
;
4746 c
->syslog_priority
= LOG_DAEMON
|LOG_INFO
;
4747 c
->syslog_level_prefix
= true;
4748 c
->ignore_sigpipe
= true;
4749 c
->timer_slack_nsec
= NSEC_INFINITY
;
4750 c
->personality
= PERSONALITY_INVALID
;
4751 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++)
4752 c
->directories
[t
].mode
= 0755;
4753 c
->timeout_clean_usec
= USEC_INFINITY
;
4754 c
->capability_bounding_set
= CAP_ALL
;
4755 assert_cc(NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL
!= NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL
);
4756 c
->restrict_namespaces
= NAMESPACE_FLAGS_INITIAL
;
4757 c
->log_level_max
= -1;
4759 c
->syscall_errno
= SECCOMP_ERROR_NUMBER_KILL
;
4761 numa_policy_reset(&c
->numa_policy
);
4764 void exec_context_done(ExecContext
*c
) {
4767 c
->environment
= strv_free(c
->environment
);
4768 c
->environment_files
= strv_free(c
->environment_files
);
4769 c
->pass_environment
= strv_free(c
->pass_environment
);
4770 c
->unset_environment
= strv_free(c
->unset_environment
);
4772 rlimit_free_all(c
->rlimit
);
4774 for (size_t l
= 0; l
< 3; l
++) {
4775 c
->stdio_fdname
[l
] = mfree(c
->stdio_fdname
[l
]);
4776 c
->stdio_file
[l
] = mfree(c
->stdio_file
[l
]);
4779 c
->working_directory
= mfree(c
->working_directory
);
4780 c
->root_directory
= mfree(c
->root_directory
);
4781 c
->root_image
= mfree(c
->root_image
);
4782 c
->root_image_options
= mount_options_free_all(c
->root_image_options
);
4783 c
->root_hash
= mfree(c
->root_hash
);
4784 c
->root_hash_size
= 0;
4785 c
->root_hash_path
= mfree(c
->root_hash_path
);
4786 c
->root_hash_sig
= mfree(c
->root_hash_sig
);
4787 c
->root_hash_sig_size
= 0;
4788 c
->root_hash_sig_path
= mfree(c
->root_hash_sig_path
);
4789 c
->root_verity
= mfree(c
->root_verity
);
4790 c
->tty_path
= mfree(c
->tty_path
);
4791 c
->syslog_identifier
= mfree(c
->syslog_identifier
);
4792 c
->user
= mfree(c
->user
);
4793 c
->group
= mfree(c
->group
);
4795 c
->supplementary_groups
= strv_free(c
->supplementary_groups
);
4797 c
->pam_name
= mfree(c
->pam_name
);
4799 c
->read_only_paths
= strv_free(c
->read_only_paths
);
4800 c
->read_write_paths
= strv_free(c
->read_write_paths
);
4801 c
->inaccessible_paths
= strv_free(c
->inaccessible_paths
);
4803 bind_mount_free_many(c
->bind_mounts
, c
->n_bind_mounts
);
4804 c
->bind_mounts
= NULL
;
4805 c
->n_bind_mounts
= 0;
4806 temporary_filesystem_free_many(c
->temporary_filesystems
, c
->n_temporary_filesystems
);
4807 c
->temporary_filesystems
= NULL
;
4808 c
->n_temporary_filesystems
= 0;
4809 c
->mount_images
= mount_image_free_many(c
->mount_images
, &c
->n_mount_images
);
4811 cpu_set_reset(&c
->cpu_set
);
4812 numa_policy_reset(&c
->numa_policy
);
4814 c
->utmp_id
= mfree(c
->utmp_id
);
4815 c
->selinux_context
= mfree(c
->selinux_context
);
4816 c
->apparmor_profile
= mfree(c
->apparmor_profile
);
4817 c
->smack_process_label
= mfree(c
->smack_process_label
);
4819 c
->syscall_filter
= hashmap_free(c
->syscall_filter
);
4820 c
->syscall_archs
= set_free(c
->syscall_archs
);
4821 c
->address_families
= set_free(c
->address_families
);
4823 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++)
4824 c
->directories
[t
].paths
= strv_free(c
->directories
[t
].paths
);
4826 c
->log_level_max
= -1;
4828 exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(c
);
4830 c
->log_ratelimit_interval_usec
= 0;
4831 c
->log_ratelimit_burst
= 0;
4833 c
->stdin_data
= mfree(c
->stdin_data
);
4834 c
->stdin_data_size
= 0;
4836 c
->network_namespace_path
= mfree(c
->network_namespace_path
);
4838 c
->log_namespace
= mfree(c
->log_namespace
);
4840 c
->load_credentials
= strv_free(c
->load_credentials
);
4841 c
->set_credentials
= hashmap_free(c
->set_credentials
);
4844 int exec_context_destroy_runtime_directory(const ExecContext
*c
, const char *runtime_prefix
) {
4849 if (!runtime_prefix
)
4852 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->directories
[EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
].paths
) {
4853 _cleanup_free_
char *p
;
4855 if (exec_directory_is_private(c
, EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
))
4856 p
= path_join(runtime_prefix
, "private", *i
);
4858 p
= path_join(runtime_prefix
, *i
);
4862 /* We execute this synchronously, since we need to be sure this is gone when we start the
4864 (void) rm_rf(p
, REMOVE_ROOT
);
4870 int exec_context_destroy_credentials(const ExecContext
*c
, const char *runtime_prefix
, const char *unit
) {
4871 _cleanup_free_
char *p
= NULL
;
4875 if (!runtime_prefix
|| !unit
)
4878 p
= path_join(runtime_prefix
, "credentials", unit
);
4882 /* This is either a tmpfs/ramfs of its own, or a plain directory. Either way, let's first try to
4883 * unmount it, and afterwards remove the mount point */
4884 (void) umount2(p
, MNT_DETACH
|UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW
);
4885 (void) rm_rf(p
, REMOVE_ROOT
|REMOVE_CHMOD
);
4890 static void exec_command_done(ExecCommand
*c
) {
4893 c
->path
= mfree(c
->path
);
4894 c
->argv
= strv_free(c
->argv
);
4897 void exec_command_done_array(ExecCommand
*c
, size_t n
) {
4900 for (i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
4901 exec_command_done(c
+i
);
4904 ExecCommand
* exec_command_free_list(ExecCommand
*c
) {
4908 LIST_REMOVE(command
, c
, i
);
4909 exec_command_done(i
);
4916 void exec_command_free_array(ExecCommand
**c
, size_t n
) {
4917 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
4918 c
[i
] = exec_command_free_list(c
[i
]);
4921 void exec_command_reset_status_array(ExecCommand
*c
, size_t n
) {
4922 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++)
4923 exec_status_reset(&c
[i
].exec_status
);
4926 void exec_command_reset_status_list_array(ExecCommand
**c
, size_t n
) {
4927 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< n
; i
++) {
4930 LIST_FOREACH(command
, z
, c
[i
])
4931 exec_status_reset(&z
->exec_status
);
4935 typedef struct InvalidEnvInfo
{
4940 static void invalid_env(const char *p
, void *userdata
) {
4941 InvalidEnvInfo
*info
= userdata
;
4943 log_unit_error(info
->unit
, "Ignoring invalid environment assignment '%s': %s", p
, info
->path
);
4946 const char* exec_context_fdname(const ExecContext
*c
, int fd_index
) {
4952 if (c
->std_input
!= EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4955 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
] ?: "stdin";
4958 if (c
->std_output
!= EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4961 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
] ?: "stdout";
4964 if (c
->std_error
!= EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
4967 return c
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
] ?: "stderr";
4974 static int exec_context_named_iofds(
4975 const ExecContext
*c
,
4976 const ExecParameters
*p
,
4977 int named_iofds
[static 3]) {
4980 const char* stdio_fdname
[3];
4985 assert(named_iofds
);
4987 targets
= (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
) +
4988 (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
) +
4989 (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
);
4991 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< 3; i
++)
4992 stdio_fdname
[i
] = exec_context_fdname(c
, i
);
4994 n_fds
= p
->n_storage_fds
+ p
->n_socket_fds
;
4996 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< n_fds
&& targets
> 0; i
++)
4997 if (named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] < 0 &&
4998 c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
4999 stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
] &&
5000 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
])) {
5002 named_iofds
[STDIN_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
5005 } else if (named_iofds
[STDOUT_FILENO
] < 0 &&
5006 c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
5007 stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
] &&
5008 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
])) {
5010 named_iofds
[STDOUT_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
5013 } else if (named_iofds
[STDERR_FILENO
] < 0 &&
5014 c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
&&
5015 stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
] &&
5016 streq(p
->fd_names
[i
], stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
])) {
5018 named_iofds
[STDERR_FILENO
] = p
->fds
[i
];
5022 return targets
== 0 ? 0 : -ENOENT
;
5025 static int exec_context_load_environment(const Unit
*unit
, const ExecContext
*c
, char ***l
) {
5026 char **i
, **r
= NULL
;
5031 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->environment_files
) {
5034 bool ignore
= false;
5036 _cleanup_globfree_ glob_t pglob
= {};
5045 if (!path_is_absolute(fn
)) {
5053 /* Filename supports globbing, take all matching files */
5054 k
= safe_glob(fn
, 0, &pglob
);
5063 /* When we don't match anything, -ENOENT should be returned */
5064 assert(pglob
.gl_pathc
> 0);
5066 for (unsigned n
= 0; n
< pglob
.gl_pathc
; n
++) {
5067 k
= load_env_file(NULL
, pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
], &p
);
5075 /* Log invalid environment variables with filename */
5077 InvalidEnvInfo info
= {
5079 .path
= pglob
.gl_pathv
[n
]
5082 p
= strv_env_clean_with_callback(p
, invalid_env
, &info
);
5090 m
= strv_env_merge(2, r
, p
);
5106 static bool tty_may_match_dev_console(const char *tty
) {
5107 _cleanup_free_
char *resolved
= NULL
;
5112 tty
= skip_dev_prefix(tty
);
5114 /* trivial identity? */
5115 if (streq(tty
, "console"))
5118 if (resolve_dev_console(&resolved
) < 0)
5119 return true; /* if we could not resolve, assume it may */
5121 /* "tty0" means the active VC, so it may be the same sometimes */
5122 return path_equal(resolved
, tty
) || (streq(resolved
, "tty0") && tty_is_vc(tty
));
5125 static bool exec_context_may_touch_tty(const ExecContext
*ec
) {
5128 return ec
->tty_reset
||
5130 ec
->tty_vt_disallocate
||
5131 is_terminal_input(ec
->std_input
) ||
5132 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_output
) ||
5133 is_terminal_output(ec
->std_error
);
5136 bool exec_context_may_touch_console(const ExecContext
*ec
) {
5138 return exec_context_may_touch_tty(ec
) &&
5139 tty_may_match_dev_console(exec_context_tty_path(ec
));
5142 static void strv_fprintf(FILE *f
, char **l
) {
5148 fprintf(f
, " %s", *g
);
5151 void exec_context_dump(const ExecContext
*c
, FILE* f
, const char *prefix
) {
5152 char **e
, **d
, buf_clean
[FORMAT_TIMESPAN_MAX
];
5158 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
5162 "%sWorkingDirectory: %s\n"
5163 "%sRootDirectory: %s\n"
5164 "%sNonBlocking: %s\n"
5165 "%sPrivateTmp: %s\n"
5166 "%sPrivateDevices: %s\n"
5167 "%sProtectKernelTunables: %s\n"
5168 "%sProtectKernelModules: %s\n"
5169 "%sProtectKernelLogs: %s\n"
5170 "%sProtectClock: %s\n"
5171 "%sProtectControlGroups: %s\n"
5172 "%sPrivateNetwork: %s\n"
5173 "%sPrivateUsers: %s\n"
5174 "%sProtectHome: %s\n"
5175 "%sProtectSystem: %s\n"
5176 "%sMountAPIVFS: %s\n"
5177 "%sIgnoreSIGPIPE: %s\n"
5178 "%sMemoryDenyWriteExecute: %s\n"
5179 "%sRestrictRealtime: %s\n"
5180 "%sRestrictSUIDSGID: %s\n"
5181 "%sKeyringMode: %s\n"
5182 "%sProtectHostname: %s\n"
5183 "%sProtectProc: %s\n"
5184 "%sProcSubset: %s\n",
5186 prefix
, empty_to_root(c
->working_directory
),
5187 prefix
, empty_to_root(c
->root_directory
),
5188 prefix
, yes_no(c
->non_blocking
),
5189 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_tmp
),
5190 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_devices
),
5191 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_kernel_tunables
),
5192 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_kernel_modules
),
5193 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_kernel_logs
),
5194 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_clock
),
5195 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_control_groups
),
5196 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_network
),
5197 prefix
, yes_no(c
->private_users
),
5198 prefix
, protect_home_to_string(c
->protect_home
),
5199 prefix
, protect_system_to_string(c
->protect_system
),
5200 prefix
, yes_no(exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(c
)),
5201 prefix
, yes_no(c
->ignore_sigpipe
),
5202 prefix
, yes_no(c
->memory_deny_write_execute
),
5203 prefix
, yes_no(c
->restrict_realtime
),
5204 prefix
, yes_no(c
->restrict_suid_sgid
),
5205 prefix
, exec_keyring_mode_to_string(c
->keyring_mode
),
5206 prefix
, yes_no(c
->protect_hostname
),
5207 prefix
, protect_proc_to_string(c
->protect_proc
),
5208 prefix
, proc_subset_to_string(c
->proc_subset
));
5211 fprintf(f
, "%sRootImage: %s\n", prefix
, c
->root_image
);
5213 if (c
->root_image_options
) {
5216 fprintf(f
, "%sRootImageOptions:", prefix
);
5217 LIST_FOREACH(mount_options
, o
, c
->root_image_options
)
5218 if (!isempty(o
->options
))
5219 fprintf(f
, " %s:%s",
5220 partition_designator_to_string(o
->partition_designator
),
5226 _cleanup_free_
char *encoded
= NULL
;
5227 encoded
= hexmem(c
->root_hash
, c
->root_hash_size
);
5229 fprintf(f
, "%sRootHash: %s\n", prefix
, encoded
);
5232 if (c
->root_hash_path
)
5233 fprintf(f
, "%sRootHash: %s\n", prefix
, c
->root_hash_path
);
5235 if (c
->root_hash_sig
) {
5236 _cleanup_free_
char *encoded
= NULL
;
5238 len
= base64mem(c
->root_hash_sig
, c
->root_hash_sig_size
, &encoded
);
5240 fprintf(f
, "%sRootHashSignature: base64:%s\n", prefix
, encoded
);
5243 if (c
->root_hash_sig_path
)
5244 fprintf(f
, "%sRootHashSignature: %s\n", prefix
, c
->root_hash_sig_path
);
5247 fprintf(f
, "%sRootVerity: %s\n", prefix
, c
->root_verity
);
5249 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment
)
5250 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
5252 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->environment_files
)
5253 fprintf(f
, "%sEnvironmentFile: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
5255 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->pass_environment
)
5256 fprintf(f
, "%sPassEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
5258 STRV_FOREACH(e
, c
->unset_environment
)
5259 fprintf(f
, "%sUnsetEnvironment: %s\n", prefix
, *e
);
5261 fprintf(f
, "%sRuntimeDirectoryPreserve: %s\n", prefix
, exec_preserve_mode_to_string(c
->runtime_directory_preserve_mode
));
5263 for (ExecDirectoryType dt
= 0; dt
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; dt
++) {
5264 fprintf(f
, "%s%sMode: %04o\n", prefix
, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt
), c
->directories
[dt
].mode
);
5266 STRV_FOREACH(d
, c
->directories
[dt
].paths
)
5267 fprintf(f
, "%s%s: %s\n", prefix
, exec_directory_type_to_string(dt
), *d
);
5271 "%sTimeoutCleanSec: %s\n",
5272 prefix
, format_timespan(buf_clean
, sizeof(buf_clean
), c
->timeout_clean_usec
, USEC_PER_SEC
));
5279 if (c
->oom_score_adjust_set
)
5281 "%sOOMScoreAdjust: %i\n",
5282 prefix
, c
->oom_score_adjust
);
5284 if (c
->coredump_filter_set
)
5286 "%sCoredumpFilter: 0x%"PRIx64
"\n",
5287 prefix
, c
->coredump_filter
);
5289 for (unsigned i
= 0; i
< RLIM_NLIMITS
; i
++)
5291 fprintf(f
, "%sLimit%s: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
5292 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_max
);
5293 fprintf(f
, "%sLimit%sSoft: " RLIM_FMT
"\n",
5294 prefix
, rlimit_to_string(i
), c
->rlimit
[i
]->rlim_cur
);
5297 if (c
->ioprio_set
) {
5298 _cleanup_free_
char *class_str
= NULL
;
5300 r
= ioprio_class_to_string_alloc(IOPRIO_PRIO_CLASS(c
->ioprio
), &class_str
);
5302 fprintf(f
, "%sIOSchedulingClass: %s\n", prefix
, class_str
);
5304 fprintf(f
, "%sIOPriority: %lu\n", prefix
, IOPRIO_PRIO_DATA(c
->ioprio
));
5307 if (c
->cpu_sched_set
) {
5308 _cleanup_free_
char *policy_str
= NULL
;
5310 r
= sched_policy_to_string_alloc(c
->cpu_sched_policy
, &policy_str
);
5312 fprintf(f
, "%sCPUSchedulingPolicy: %s\n", prefix
, policy_str
);
5315 "%sCPUSchedulingPriority: %i\n"
5316 "%sCPUSchedulingResetOnFork: %s\n",
5317 prefix
, c
->cpu_sched_priority
,
5318 prefix
, yes_no(c
->cpu_sched_reset_on_fork
));
5321 if (c
->cpu_set
.set
) {
5322 _cleanup_free_
char *affinity
= NULL
;
5324 affinity
= cpu_set_to_range_string(&c
->cpu_set
);
5325 fprintf(f
, "%sCPUAffinity: %s\n", prefix
, affinity
);
5328 if (mpol_is_valid(numa_policy_get_type(&c
->numa_policy
))) {
5329 _cleanup_free_
char *nodes
= NULL
;
5331 nodes
= cpu_set_to_range_string(&c
->numa_policy
.nodes
);
5332 fprintf(f
, "%sNUMAPolicy: %s\n", prefix
, mpol_to_string(numa_policy_get_type(&c
->numa_policy
)));
5333 fprintf(f
, "%sNUMAMask: %s\n", prefix
, strnull(nodes
));
5336 if (c
->timer_slack_nsec
!= NSEC_INFINITY
)
5337 fprintf(f
, "%sTimerSlackNSec: "NSEC_FMT
"\n", prefix
, c
->timer_slack_nsec
);
5340 "%sStandardInput: %s\n"
5341 "%sStandardOutput: %s\n"
5342 "%sStandardError: %s\n",
5343 prefix
, exec_input_to_string(c
->std_input
),
5344 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_output
),
5345 prefix
, exec_output_to_string(c
->std_error
));
5347 if (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
)
5348 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardInputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
5349 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
5350 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
5351 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
)
5352 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFileDescriptorName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_fdname
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
5354 if (c
->std_input
== EXEC_INPUT_FILE
)
5355 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardInputFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDIN_FILENO
]);
5356 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
)
5357 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
5358 if (c
->std_output
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
5359 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardOutputFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDOUT_FILENO
]);
5360 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
)
5361 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFile: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
5362 if (c
->std_error
== EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
)
5363 fprintf(f
, "%sStandardErrorFileToAppend: %s\n", prefix
, c
->stdio_file
[STDERR_FILENO
]);
5369 "%sTTYVHangup: %s\n"
5370 "%sTTYVTDisallocate: %s\n",
5371 prefix
, c
->tty_path
,
5372 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_reset
),
5373 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vhangup
),
5374 prefix
, yes_no(c
->tty_vt_disallocate
));
5376 if (IN_SET(c
->std_output
,
5378 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
,
5379 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
5380 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
) ||
5381 IN_SET(c
->std_error
,
5383 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
,
5384 EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
,
5385 EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
)) {
5387 _cleanup_free_
char *fac_str
= NULL
, *lvl_str
= NULL
;
5389 r
= log_facility_unshifted_to_string_alloc(c
->syslog_priority
>> 3, &fac_str
);
5391 fprintf(f
, "%sSyslogFacility: %s\n", prefix
, fac_str
);
5393 r
= log_level_to_string_alloc(LOG_PRI(c
->syslog_priority
), &lvl_str
);
5395 fprintf(f
, "%sSyslogLevel: %s\n", prefix
, lvl_str
);
5398 if (c
->log_level_max
>= 0) {
5399 _cleanup_free_
char *t
= NULL
;
5401 (void) log_level_to_string_alloc(c
->log_level_max
, &t
);
5403 fprintf(f
, "%sLogLevelMax: %s\n", prefix
, strna(t
));
5406 if (c
->log_ratelimit_interval_usec
> 0) {
5407 char buf_timespan
[FORMAT_TIMESPAN_MAX
];
5410 "%sLogRateLimitIntervalSec: %s\n",
5411 prefix
, format_timespan(buf_timespan
, sizeof(buf_timespan
), c
->log_ratelimit_interval_usec
, USEC_PER_SEC
));
5414 if (c
->log_ratelimit_burst
> 0)
5415 fprintf(f
, "%sLogRateLimitBurst: %u\n", prefix
, c
->log_ratelimit_burst
);
5417 for (size_t j
= 0; j
< c
->n_log_extra_fields
; j
++) {
5418 fprintf(f
, "%sLogExtraFields: ", prefix
);
5419 fwrite(c
->log_extra_fields
[j
].iov_base
,
5420 1, c
->log_extra_fields
[j
].iov_len
,
5425 if (c
->log_namespace
)
5426 fprintf(f
, "%sLogNamespace: %s\n", prefix
, c
->log_namespace
);
5428 if (c
->secure_bits
) {
5429 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
5431 r
= secure_bits_to_string_alloc(c
->secure_bits
, &str
);
5433 fprintf(f
, "%sSecure Bits: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
5436 if (c
->capability_bounding_set
!= CAP_ALL
) {
5437 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
5439 r
= capability_set_to_string_alloc(c
->capability_bounding_set
, &str
);
5441 fprintf(f
, "%sCapabilityBoundingSet: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
5444 if (c
->capability_ambient_set
!= 0) {
5445 _cleanup_free_
char *str
= NULL
;
5447 r
= capability_set_to_string_alloc(c
->capability_ambient_set
, &str
);
5449 fprintf(f
, "%sAmbientCapabilities: %s\n", prefix
, str
);
5453 fprintf(f
, "%sUser: %s\n", prefix
, c
->user
);
5455 fprintf(f
, "%sGroup: %s\n", prefix
, c
->group
);
5457 fprintf(f
, "%sDynamicUser: %s\n", prefix
, yes_no(c
->dynamic_user
));
5459 if (!strv_isempty(c
->supplementary_groups
)) {
5460 fprintf(f
, "%sSupplementaryGroups:", prefix
);
5461 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->supplementary_groups
);
5466 fprintf(f
, "%sPAMName: %s\n", prefix
, c
->pam_name
);
5468 if (!strv_isempty(c
->read_write_paths
)) {
5469 fprintf(f
, "%sReadWritePaths:", prefix
);
5470 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_write_paths
);
5474 if (!strv_isempty(c
->read_only_paths
)) {
5475 fprintf(f
, "%sReadOnlyPaths:", prefix
);
5476 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->read_only_paths
);
5480 if (!strv_isempty(c
->inaccessible_paths
)) {
5481 fprintf(f
, "%sInaccessiblePaths:", prefix
);
5482 strv_fprintf(f
, c
->inaccessible_paths
);
5486 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< c
->n_bind_mounts
; i
++)
5487 fprintf(f
, "%s%s: %s%s:%s:%s\n", prefix
,
5488 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].read_only
? "BindReadOnlyPaths" : "BindPaths",
5489 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].ignore_enoent
? "-": "",
5490 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].source
,
5491 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].destination
,
5492 c
->bind_mounts
[i
].recursive
? "rbind" : "norbind");
5494 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< c
->n_temporary_filesystems
; i
++) {
5495 const TemporaryFileSystem
*t
= c
->temporary_filesystems
+ i
;
5497 fprintf(f
, "%sTemporaryFileSystem: %s%s%s\n", prefix
,
5499 isempty(t
->options
) ? "" : ":",
5500 strempty(t
->options
));
5505 "%sUtmpIdentifier: %s\n",
5506 prefix
, c
->utmp_id
);
5508 if (c
->selinux_context
)
5510 "%sSELinuxContext: %s%s\n",
5511 prefix
, c
->selinux_context_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->selinux_context
);
5513 if (c
->apparmor_profile
)
5515 "%sAppArmorProfile: %s%s\n",
5516 prefix
, c
->apparmor_profile_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->apparmor_profile
);
5518 if (c
->smack_process_label
)
5520 "%sSmackProcessLabel: %s%s\n",
5521 prefix
, c
->smack_process_label_ignore
? "-" : "", c
->smack_process_label
);
5523 if (c
->personality
!= PERSONALITY_INVALID
)
5525 "%sPersonality: %s\n",
5526 prefix
, strna(personality_to_string(c
->personality
)));
5529 "%sLockPersonality: %s\n",
5530 prefix
, yes_no(c
->lock_personality
));
5532 if (c
->syscall_filter
) {
5539 "%sSystemCallFilter: ",
5542 if (!c
->syscall_allow_list
)
5546 HASHMAP_FOREACH_KEY(val
, id
, c
->syscall_filter
) {
5547 _cleanup_free_
char *name
= NULL
;
5548 const char *errno_name
= NULL
;
5549 int num
= PTR_TO_INT(val
);
5556 name
= seccomp_syscall_resolve_num_arch(SCMP_ARCH_NATIVE
, PTR_TO_INT(id
) - 1);
5557 fputs(strna(name
), f
);
5560 errno_name
= seccomp_errno_or_action_to_string(num
);
5562 fprintf(f
, ":%s", errno_name
);
5564 fprintf(f
, ":%d", num
);
5572 if (c
->syscall_archs
) {
5578 "%sSystemCallArchitectures:",
5582 SET_FOREACH(id
, c
->syscall_archs
)
5583 fprintf(f
, " %s", strna(seccomp_arch_to_string(PTR_TO_UINT32(id
) - 1)));
5588 if (exec_context_restrict_namespaces_set(c
)) {
5589 _cleanup_free_
char *s
= NULL
;
5591 r
= namespace_flags_to_string(c
->restrict_namespaces
, &s
);
5593 fprintf(f
, "%sRestrictNamespaces: %s\n",
5597 if (c
->network_namespace_path
)
5599 "%sNetworkNamespacePath: %s\n",
5600 prefix
, c
->network_namespace_path
);
5602 if (c
->syscall_errno
> 0) {
5604 const char *errno_name
;
5607 fprintf(f
, "%sSystemCallErrorNumber: ", prefix
);
5610 errno_name
= seccomp_errno_or_action_to_string(c
->syscall_errno
);
5612 fputs(errno_name
, f
);
5614 fprintf(f
, "%d", c
->syscall_errno
);
5619 for (size_t i
= 0; i
< c
->n_mount_images
; i
++) {
5622 fprintf(f
, "%sMountImages: %s%s:%s%s", prefix
,
5623 c
->mount_images
[i
].ignore_enoent
? "-": "",
5624 c
->mount_images
[i
].source
,
5625 c
->mount_images
[i
].destination
,
5626 LIST_IS_EMPTY(c
->mount_images
[i
].mount_options
) ? "": ":");
5627 LIST_FOREACH(mount_options
, o
, c
->mount_images
[i
].mount_options
)
5629 partition_designator_to_string(o
->partition_designator
),
5635 bool exec_context_maintains_privileges(const ExecContext
*c
) {
5638 /* Returns true if the process forked off would run under
5639 * an unchanged UID or as root. */
5644 if (streq(c
->user
, "root") || streq(c
->user
, "0"))
5650 int exec_context_get_effective_ioprio(const ExecContext
*c
) {
5658 p
= ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS
, 0);
5660 return IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_BE
, 4);
5665 bool exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(const ExecContext
*c
) {
5668 /* Explicit setting wins */
5669 if (c
->mount_apivfs_set
)
5670 return c
->mount_apivfs
;
5672 /* Default to "yes" if root directory or image are specified */
5673 if (exec_context_with_rootfs(c
))
5679 void exec_context_free_log_extra_fields(ExecContext
*c
) {
5682 for (size_t l
= 0; l
< c
->n_log_extra_fields
; l
++)
5683 free(c
->log_extra_fields
[l
].iov_base
);
5684 c
->log_extra_fields
= mfree(c
->log_extra_fields
);
5685 c
->n_log_extra_fields
= 0;
5688 void exec_context_revert_tty(ExecContext
*c
) {
5693 /* First, reset the TTY (possibly kicking everybody else from the TTY) */
5694 exec_context_tty_reset(c
, NULL
);
5696 /* And then undo what chown_terminal() did earlier. Note that we only do this if we have a path
5697 * configured. If the TTY was passed to us as file descriptor we assume the TTY is opened and managed
5698 * by whoever passed it to us and thus knows better when and how to chmod()/chown() it back. */
5700 if (exec_context_may_touch_tty(c
)) {
5703 path
= exec_context_tty_path(c
);
5705 r
= chmod_and_chown(path
, TTY_MODE
, 0, TTY_GID
);
5706 if (r
< 0 && r
!= -ENOENT
)
5707 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to reset TTY ownership/access mode of %s, ignoring: %m", path
);
5712 int exec_context_get_clean_directories(
5718 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **l
= NULL
;
5725 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++) {
5728 if (!FLAGS_SET(mask
, 1U << t
))
5734 STRV_FOREACH(i
, c
->directories
[t
].paths
) {
5737 j
= path_join(prefix
[t
], *i
);
5741 r
= strv_consume(&l
, j
);
5745 /* Also remove private directories unconditionally. */
5746 if (t
!= EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
) {
5747 j
= path_join(prefix
[t
], "private", *i
);
5751 r
= strv_consume(&l
, j
);
5762 int exec_context_get_clean_mask(ExecContext
*c
, ExecCleanMask
*ret
) {
5763 ExecCleanMask mask
= 0;
5768 for (ExecDirectoryType t
= 0; t
< _EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
; t
++)
5769 if (!strv_isempty(c
->directories
[t
].paths
))
5776 void exec_status_start(ExecStatus
*s
, pid_t pid
) {
5783 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->start_timestamp
);
5786 void exec_status_exit(ExecStatus
*s
, const ExecContext
*context
, pid_t pid
, int code
, int status
) {
5794 dual_timestamp_get(&s
->exit_timestamp
);
5799 if (context
&& context
->utmp_id
)
5800 (void) utmp_put_dead_process(context
->utmp_id
, pid
, code
, status
);
5803 void exec_status_reset(ExecStatus
*s
) {
5806 *s
= (ExecStatus
) {};
5809 void exec_status_dump(const ExecStatus
*s
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
5810 char buf
[FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_MAX
];
5818 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
5821 "%sPID: "PID_FMT
"\n",
5824 if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s
->start_timestamp
))
5826 "%sStart Timestamp: %s\n",
5827 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->start_timestamp
.realtime
));
5829 if (dual_timestamp_is_set(&s
->exit_timestamp
))
5831 "%sExit Timestamp: %s\n"
5833 "%sExit Status: %i\n",
5834 prefix
, format_timestamp(buf
, sizeof(buf
), s
->exit_timestamp
.realtime
),
5835 prefix
, sigchld_code_to_string(s
->code
),
5839 static char *exec_command_line(char **argv
) {
5847 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
)
5855 STRV_FOREACH(a
, argv
) {
5862 if (strpbrk(*a
, WHITESPACE
)) {
5873 /* FIXME: this doesn't really handle arguments that have
5874 * spaces and ticks in them */
5879 static void exec_command_dump(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
5880 _cleanup_free_
char *cmd
= NULL
;
5881 const char *prefix2
;
5886 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
5887 prefix2
= strjoina(prefix
, "\t");
5889 cmd
= exec_command_line(c
->argv
);
5891 "%sCommand Line: %s\n",
5892 prefix
, cmd
? cmd
: strerror_safe(ENOMEM
));
5894 exec_status_dump(&c
->exec_status
, f
, prefix2
);
5897 void exec_command_dump_list(ExecCommand
*c
, FILE *f
, const char *prefix
) {
5900 prefix
= strempty(prefix
);
5902 LIST_FOREACH(command
, c
, c
)
5903 exec_command_dump(c
, f
, prefix
);
5906 void exec_command_append_list(ExecCommand
**l
, ExecCommand
*e
) {
5913 /* It's kind of important, that we keep the order here */
5914 LIST_FIND_TAIL(command
, *l
, end
);
5915 LIST_INSERT_AFTER(command
, *l
, end
, e
);
5920 int exec_command_set(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
5928 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
5940 free_and_replace(c
->path
, p
);
5942 return strv_free_and_replace(c
->argv
, l
);
5945 int exec_command_append(ExecCommand
*c
, const char *path
, ...) {
5946 _cleanup_strv_free_
char **l
= NULL
;
5954 l
= strv_new_ap(path
, ap
);
5960 r
= strv_extend_strv(&c
->argv
, l
, false);
5967 static void *remove_tmpdir_thread(void *p
) {
5968 _cleanup_free_
char *path
= p
;
5970 (void) rm_rf(path
, REMOVE_ROOT
|REMOVE_PHYSICAL
);
5974 static ExecRuntime
* exec_runtime_free(ExecRuntime
*rt
, bool destroy
) {
5981 (void) hashmap_remove(rt
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, rt
->id
);
5983 /* When destroy is true, then rm_rf tmp_dir and var_tmp_dir. */
5985 if (destroy
&& rt
->tmp_dir
&& !streq(rt
->tmp_dir
, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY
)) {
5986 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->tmp_dir
);
5988 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->tmp_dir
);
5990 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->tmp_dir
);
5995 if (destroy
&& rt
->var_tmp_dir
&& !streq(rt
->var_tmp_dir
, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY
)) {
5996 log_debug("Spawning thread to nuke %s", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
5998 r
= asynchronous_job(remove_tmpdir_thread
, rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
6000 log_warning_errno(r
, "Failed to nuke %s: %m", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
6002 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
6005 rt
->id
= mfree(rt
->id
);
6006 rt
->tmp_dir
= mfree(rt
->tmp_dir
);
6007 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= mfree(rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
6008 safe_close_pair(rt
->netns_storage_socket
);
6012 static void exec_runtime_freep(ExecRuntime
**rt
) {
6013 (void) exec_runtime_free(*rt
, false);
6016 static int exec_runtime_allocate(ExecRuntime
**ret
, const char *id
) {
6017 _cleanup_free_
char *id_copy
= NULL
;
6022 id_copy
= strdup(id
);
6026 n
= new(ExecRuntime
, 1);
6030 *n
= (ExecRuntime
) {
6031 .id
= TAKE_PTR(id_copy
),
6032 .netns_storage_socket
= { -1, -1 },
6039 static int exec_runtime_add(
6044 int netns_storage_socket
[2],
6045 ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
6047 _cleanup_(exec_runtime_freep
) ExecRuntime
*rt
= NULL
;
6053 /* tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir, netns_storage_socket fds are donated on success */
6055 r
= hashmap_ensure_allocated(&m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, &string_hash_ops
);
6059 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(&rt
, id
);
6063 r
= hashmap_put(m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, rt
->id
, rt
);
6067 assert(!!rt
->tmp_dir
== !!rt
->var_tmp_dir
); /* We require both to be set together */
6068 rt
->tmp_dir
= TAKE_PTR(*tmp_dir
);
6069 rt
->var_tmp_dir
= TAKE_PTR(*var_tmp_dir
);
6071 if (netns_storage_socket
) {
6072 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] = TAKE_FD(netns_storage_socket
[0]);
6073 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] = TAKE_FD(netns_storage_socket
[1]);
6080 /* do not remove created ExecRuntime object when the operation succeeds. */
6085 static int exec_runtime_make(
6087 const ExecContext
*c
,
6089 ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
6091 _cleanup_(namespace_cleanup_tmpdirp
) char *tmp_dir
= NULL
, *var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
6092 _cleanup_close_pair_
int netns_storage_socket
[2] = { -1, -1 };
6099 /* It is not necessary to create ExecRuntime object. */
6100 if (!c
->private_network
&& !c
->private_tmp
&& !c
->network_namespace_path
) {
6105 if (c
->private_tmp
&&
6106 !(prefixed_path_strv_contains(c
->inaccessible_paths
, "/tmp") &&
6107 (prefixed_path_strv_contains(c
->inaccessible_paths
, "/var/tmp") ||
6108 prefixed_path_strv_contains(c
->inaccessible_paths
, "/var")))) {
6109 r
= setup_tmp_dirs(id
, &tmp_dir
, &var_tmp_dir
);
6114 if (c
->private_network
|| c
->network_namespace_path
) {
6115 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX
, SOCK_DGRAM
|SOCK_CLOEXEC
, 0, netns_storage_socket
) < 0)
6119 r
= exec_runtime_add(m
, id
, &tmp_dir
, &var_tmp_dir
, netns_storage_socket
, ret
);
6126 int exec_runtime_acquire(Manager
*m
, const ExecContext
*c
, const char *id
, bool create
, ExecRuntime
**ret
) {
6134 rt
= hashmap_get(m
->exec_runtime_by_id
, id
);
6136 /* We already have a ExecRuntime object, let's increase the ref count and reuse it */
6144 /* If not found, then create a new object. */
6145 r
= exec_runtime_make(m
, c
, id
, &rt
);
6149 /* When r == 0, it is not necessary to create ExecRuntime object. */
6155 /* increment reference counter. */
6161 ExecRuntime
*exec_runtime_unref(ExecRuntime
*rt
, bool destroy
) {
6165 assert(rt
->n_ref
> 0);
6171 return exec_runtime_free(rt
, destroy
);
6174 int exec_runtime_serialize(const Manager
*m
, FILE *f
, FDSet
*fds
) {
6181 HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt
, m
->exec_runtime_by_id
) {
6182 fprintf(f
, "exec-runtime=%s", rt
->id
);
6185 fprintf(f
, " tmp-dir=%s", rt
->tmp_dir
);
6187 if (rt
->var_tmp_dir
)
6188 fprintf(f
, " var-tmp-dir=%s", rt
->var_tmp_dir
);
6190 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] >= 0) {
6193 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
6197 fprintf(f
, " netns-socket-0=%i", copy
);
6200 if (rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] >= 0) {
6203 copy
= fdset_put_dup(fds
, rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
6207 fprintf(f
, " netns-socket-1=%i", copy
);
6216 int exec_runtime_deserialize_compat(Unit
*u
, const char *key
, const char *value
, FDSet
*fds
) {
6217 _cleanup_(exec_runtime_freep
) ExecRuntime
*rt_create
= NULL
;
6221 /* This is for the migration from old (v237 or earlier) deserialization text.
6222 * Due to the bug #7790, this may not work with the units that use JoinsNamespaceOf=.
6223 * Even if the ExecRuntime object originally created by the other unit, we cannot judge
6224 * so or not from the serialized text, then we always creates a new object owned by this. */
6230 /* Manager manages ExecRuntime objects by the unit id.
6231 * So, we omit the serialized text when the unit does not have id (yet?)... */
6232 if (isempty(u
->id
)) {
6233 log_unit_debug(u
, "Invocation ID not found. Dropping runtime parameter.");
6237 r
= hashmap_ensure_allocated(&u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, &string_hash_ops
);
6239 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, r
, "Failed to allocate storage for runtime parameter: %m");
6243 rt
= hashmap_get(u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, u
->id
);
6245 r
= exec_runtime_allocate(&rt_create
, u
->id
);
6252 if (streq(key
, "tmp-dir")) {
6255 copy
= strdup(value
);
6259 free_and_replace(rt
->tmp_dir
, copy
);
6261 } else if (streq(key
, "var-tmp-dir")) {
6264 copy
= strdup(value
);
6268 free_and_replace(rt
->var_tmp_dir
, copy
);
6270 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-0")) {
6273 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
)) {
6274 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
6278 safe_close(rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0]);
6279 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[0] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
6281 } else if (streq(key
, "netns-socket-1")) {
6284 if (safe_atoi(value
, &fd
) < 0 || !fdset_contains(fds
, fd
)) {
6285 log_unit_debug(u
, "Failed to parse netns socket value: %s", value
);
6289 safe_close(rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1]);
6290 rt
->netns_storage_socket
[1] = fdset_remove(fds
, fd
);
6294 /* If the object is newly created, then put it to the hashmap which manages ExecRuntime objects. */
6296 r
= hashmap_put(u
->manager
->exec_runtime_by_id
, rt_create
->id
, rt_create
);
6298 log_unit_debug_errno(u
, r
, "Failed to put runtime parameter to manager's storage: %m");
6302 rt_create
->manager
= u
->manager
;
6305 TAKE_PTR(rt_create
);
6311 int exec_runtime_deserialize_one(Manager
*m
, const char *value
, FDSet
*fds
) {
6312 _cleanup_free_
char *tmp_dir
= NULL
, *var_tmp_dir
= NULL
;
6314 int r
, fdpair
[] = {-1, -1};
6315 const char *p
, *v
= value
;
6322 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
6323 id
= strndupa(v
, n
);
6328 v
= startswith(p
, "tmp-dir=");
6330 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
6331 tmp_dir
= strndup(v
, n
);
6339 v
= startswith(p
, "var-tmp-dir=");
6341 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
6342 var_tmp_dir
= strndup(v
, n
);
6350 v
= startswith(p
, "netns-socket-0=");
6354 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
6355 buf
= strndupa(v
, n
);
6357 r
= safe_atoi(buf
, &fdpair
[0]);
6359 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Unable to parse exec-runtime specification netns-socket-0=%s: %m", buf
);
6360 if (!fdset_contains(fds
, fdpair
[0]))
6361 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADF
),
6362 "exec-runtime specification netns-socket-0= refers to unknown fd %d: %m", fdpair
[0]);
6363 fdpair
[0] = fdset_remove(fds
, fdpair
[0]);
6369 v
= startswith(p
, "netns-socket-1=");
6373 n
= strcspn(v
, " ");
6374 buf
= strndupa(v
, n
);
6375 r
= safe_atoi(buf
, &fdpair
[1]);
6377 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Unable to parse exec-runtime specification netns-socket-1=%s: %m", buf
);
6378 if (!fdset_contains(fds
, fdpair
[1]))
6379 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADF
),
6380 "exec-runtime specification netns-socket-1= refers to unknown fd %d: %m", fdpair
[1]);
6381 fdpair
[1] = fdset_remove(fds
, fdpair
[1]);
6385 r
= exec_runtime_add(m
, id
, &tmp_dir
, &var_tmp_dir
, fdpair
, NULL
);
6387 return log_debug_errno(r
, "Failed to add exec-runtime: %m");
6391 void exec_runtime_vacuum(Manager
*m
) {
6396 /* Free unreferenced ExecRuntime objects. This is used after manager deserialization process. */
6398 HASHMAP_FOREACH(rt
, m
->exec_runtime_by_id
) {
6402 (void) exec_runtime_free(rt
, false);
6406 void exec_params_clear(ExecParameters
*p
) {
6410 p
->environment
= strv_free(p
->environment
);
6411 p
->fd_names
= strv_free(p
->fd_names
);
6412 p
->fds
= mfree(p
->fds
);
6413 p
->exec_fd
= safe_close(p
->exec_fd
);
6416 ExecSetCredential
*exec_set_credential_free(ExecSetCredential
*sc
) {
6425 DEFINE_HASH_OPS_WITH_VALUE_DESTRUCTOR(exec_set_credential_hash_ops
, char, string_hash_func
, string_compare_func
, ExecSetCredential
, exec_set_credential_free
);
6427 static const char* const exec_input_table
[_EXEC_INPUT_MAX
] = {
6428 [EXEC_INPUT_NULL
] = "null",
6429 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
6430 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FORCE
] = "tty-force",
6431 [EXEC_INPUT_TTY_FAIL
] = "tty-fail",
6432 [EXEC_INPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket",
6433 [EXEC_INPUT_NAMED_FD
] = "fd",
6434 [EXEC_INPUT_DATA
] = "data",
6435 [EXEC_INPUT_FILE
] = "file",
6438 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_input
, ExecInput
);
6440 static const char* const exec_output_table
[_EXEC_OUTPUT_MAX
] = {
6441 [EXEC_OUTPUT_INHERIT
] = "inherit",
6442 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL
] = "null",
6443 [EXEC_OUTPUT_TTY
] = "tty",
6444 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG
] = "kmsg",
6445 [EXEC_OUTPUT_KMSG_AND_CONSOLE
] = "kmsg+console",
6446 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL
] = "journal",
6447 [EXEC_OUTPUT_JOURNAL_AND_CONSOLE
] = "journal+console",
6448 [EXEC_OUTPUT_SOCKET
] = "socket",
6449 [EXEC_OUTPUT_NAMED_FD
] = "fd",
6450 [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE
] = "file",
6451 [EXEC_OUTPUT_FILE_APPEND
] = "append",
6454 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_output
, ExecOutput
);
6456 static const char* const exec_utmp_mode_table
[_EXEC_UTMP_MODE_MAX
] = {
6457 [EXEC_UTMP_INIT
] = "init",
6458 [EXEC_UTMP_LOGIN
] = "login",
6459 [EXEC_UTMP_USER
] = "user",
6462 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_utmp_mode
, ExecUtmpMode
);
6464 static const char* const exec_preserve_mode_table
[_EXEC_PRESERVE_MODE_MAX
] = {
6465 [EXEC_PRESERVE_NO
] = "no",
6466 [EXEC_PRESERVE_YES
] = "yes",
6467 [EXEC_PRESERVE_RESTART
] = "restart",
6470 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(exec_preserve_mode
, ExecPreserveMode
, EXEC_PRESERVE_YES
);
6472 /* This table maps ExecDirectoryType to the setting it is configured with in the unit */
6473 static const char* const exec_directory_type_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
6474 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = "RuntimeDirectory",
6475 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = "StateDirectory",
6476 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = "CacheDirectory",
6477 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = "LogsDirectory",
6478 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = "ConfigurationDirectory",
6481 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_directory_type
, ExecDirectoryType
);
6483 /* And this table maps ExecDirectoryType too, but to a generic term identifying the type of resource. This
6484 * one is supposed to be generic enough to be used for unit types that don't use ExecContext and per-unit
6485 * directories, specifically .timer units with their timestamp touch file. */
6486 static const char* const exec_resource_type_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
6487 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = "runtime",
6488 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = "state",
6489 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = "cache",
6490 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = "logs",
6491 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = "configuration",
6494 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_resource_type
, ExecDirectoryType
);
6496 /* And this table also maps ExecDirectoryType, to the environment variable we pass the selected directory to
6497 * the service payload in. */
6498 static const char* const exec_directory_env_name_table
[_EXEC_DIRECTORY_TYPE_MAX
] = {
6499 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_RUNTIME
] = "RUNTIME_DIRECTORY",
6500 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_STATE
] = "STATE_DIRECTORY",
6501 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CACHE
] = "CACHE_DIRECTORY",
6502 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_LOGS
] = "LOGS_DIRECTORY",
6503 [EXEC_DIRECTORY_CONFIGURATION
] = "CONFIGURATION_DIRECTORY",
6506 DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(exec_directory_env_name
, ExecDirectoryType
);
6508 static const char* const exec_keyring_mode_table
[_EXEC_KEYRING_MODE_MAX
] = {
6509 [EXEC_KEYRING_INHERIT
] = "inherit",
6510 [EXEC_KEYRING_PRIVATE
] = "private",
6511 [EXEC_KEYRING_SHARED
] = "shared",
6514 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(exec_keyring_mode
, ExecKeyringMode
);