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[thirdparty/systemd.git] / src / core / namespace.c
1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
2
3 #include <errno.h>
4 #include <linux/loop.h>
5 #include <sched.h>
6 #include <stdio.h>
7 #include <sys/file.h>
8 #include <sys/mount.h>
9 #include <unistd.h>
10 #if WANT_LINUX_FS_H
11 #include <linux/fs.h>
12 #endif
13
14 #include "alloc-util.h"
15 #include "base-filesystem.h"
16 #include "chase.h"
17 #include "dev-setup.h"
18 #include "devnum-util.h"
19 #include "env-util.h"
20 #include "escape.h"
21 #include "extension-util.h"
22 #include "fd-util.h"
23 #include "format-util.h"
24 #include "glyph-util.h"
25 #include "label-util.h"
26 #include "list.h"
27 #include "lock-util.h"
28 #include "loop-util.h"
29 #include "loopback-setup.h"
30 #include "missing_syscall.h"
31 #include "mkdir-label.h"
32 #include "mount-util.h"
33 #include "mountpoint-util.h"
34 #include "namespace-util.h"
35 #include "namespace.h"
36 #include "nsflags.h"
37 #include "nulstr-util.h"
38 #include "os-util.h"
39 #include "path-util.h"
40 #include "selinux-util.h"
41 #include "socket-util.h"
42 #include "sort-util.h"
43 #include "stat-util.h"
44 #include "string-table.h"
45 #include "string-util.h"
46 #include "strv.h"
47 #include "tmpfile-util.h"
48 #include "umask-util.h"
49 #include "user-util.h"
50
51 #define DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS (MS_NOSUID|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOEXEC)
52
53 typedef enum MountMode {
54 /* This is ordered by priority! */
55 INACCESSIBLE,
56 OVERLAY_MOUNT,
57 MOUNT_IMAGES,
58 BIND_MOUNT,
59 BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE,
60 PRIVATE_TMP,
61 PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY,
62 PRIVATE_DEV,
63 BIND_DEV,
64 EMPTY_DIR,
65 PRIVATE_SYSFS,
66 BIND_SYSFS,
67 PROCFS,
68 READONLY,
69 READWRITE,
70 NOEXEC,
71 EXEC,
72 TMPFS,
73 RUN,
74 EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES, /* Bind-mounted outside the root directory, and used by subsequent mounts */
75 EXTENSION_IMAGES, /* Mounted outside the root directory, and used by subsequent mounts */
76 MQUEUEFS,
77 READWRITE_IMPLICIT, /* Should have the lowest priority. */
78 _MOUNT_MODE_MAX,
79 } MountMode;
80
81 typedef struct MountEntry {
82 const char *path_const; /* Memory allocated on stack or static */
83 MountMode mode:5;
84 bool ignore:1; /* Ignore if path does not exist? */
85 bool has_prefix:1; /* Already is prefixed by the root dir? */
86 bool read_only:1; /* Shall this mount point be read-only? */
87 bool nosuid:1; /* Shall set MS_NOSUID on the mount itself */
88 bool noexec:1; /* Shall set MS_NOEXEC on the mount itself */
89 bool exec:1; /* Shall clear MS_NOEXEC on the mount itself */
90 bool applied:1; /* Already applied */
91 char *path_malloc; /* Use this instead of 'path_const' if we had to allocate memory */
92 const char *unprefixed_path_const; /* If the path was amended with a prefix, these will save the original */
93 char *unprefixed_path_malloc;
94 const char *source_const; /* The source path, for bind mounts or images */
95 char *source_malloc;
96 const char *options_const;/* Mount options for tmpfs */
97 char *options_malloc;
98 unsigned long flags; /* Mount flags used by EMPTY_DIR and TMPFS. Do not include MS_RDONLY here, but please use read_only. */
99 unsigned n_followed;
100 LIST_HEAD(MountOptions, image_options);
101 } MountEntry;
102
103 /* If MountAPIVFS= is used, let's mount /sys, /proc, /dev and /run into the it, but only as a fallback if the user hasn't mounted
104 * something there already. These mounts are hence overridden by any other explicitly configured mounts. */
105 static const MountEntry apivfs_table[] = {
106 { "/proc", PROCFS, false },
107 { "/dev", BIND_DEV, false },
108 { "/sys", BIND_SYSFS, false },
109 { "/run", RUN, false, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_RUN, .flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
110 };
111
112 /* ProtectKernelTunables= option and the related filesystem APIs */
113 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table[] = {
114 { "/proc/acpi", READONLY, true },
115 { "/proc/apm", READONLY, true }, /* Obsolete API, there's no point in permitting access to this, ever */
116 { "/proc/asound", READONLY, true },
117 { "/proc/bus", READONLY, true },
118 { "/proc/fs", READONLY, true },
119 { "/proc/irq", READONLY, true },
120 { "/proc/kallsyms", INACCESSIBLE, true },
121 { "/proc/kcore", INACCESSIBLE, true },
122 { "/proc/latency_stats", READONLY, true },
123 { "/proc/mtrr", READONLY, true },
124 { "/proc/scsi", READONLY, true },
125 { "/proc/sys", READONLY, true },
126 { "/proc/sysrq-trigger", READONLY, true },
127 { "/proc/timer_stats", READONLY, true },
128 };
129
130 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table[] = {
131 { "/sys", READONLY, false },
132 { "/sys/fs/bpf", READONLY, true },
133 { "/sys/fs/cgroup", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* READONLY is set by ProtectControlGroups= option */
134 { "/sys/fs/selinux", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true },
135 { "/sys/kernel/debug", READONLY, true },
136 { "/sys/kernel/tracing", READONLY, true },
137 };
138
139 /* ProtectKernelModules= option */
140 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_modules_table[] = {
141 { "/usr/lib/modules", INACCESSIBLE, true },
142 };
143
144 /* ProtectKernelLogs= option */
145 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_logs_proc_table[] = {
146 { "/proc/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true },
147 };
148
149 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_logs_dev_table[] = {
150 { "/dev/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true },
151 };
152
153 /*
154 * ProtectHome=read-only table, protect $HOME and $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR and rest of
155 * system should be protected by ProtectSystem=
156 */
157 static const MountEntry protect_home_read_only_table[] = {
158 { "/home", READONLY, true },
159 { "/run/user", READONLY, true },
160 { "/root", READONLY, true },
161 };
162
163 /* ProtectHome=tmpfs table */
164 static const MountEntry protect_home_tmpfs_table[] = {
165 { "/home", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
166 { "/run/user", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
167 { "/root", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0700" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
168 };
169
170 /* ProtectHome=yes table */
171 static const MountEntry protect_home_yes_table[] = {
172 { "/home", INACCESSIBLE, true },
173 { "/run/user", INACCESSIBLE, true },
174 { "/root", INACCESSIBLE, true },
175 };
176
177 /* ProtectSystem=yes table */
178 static const MountEntry protect_system_yes_table[] = {
179 { "/usr", READONLY, false },
180 { "/boot", READONLY, true },
181 { "/efi", READONLY, true },
182 };
183
184 /* ProtectSystem=full includes ProtectSystem=yes */
185 static const MountEntry protect_system_full_table[] = {
186 { "/usr", READONLY, false },
187 { "/boot", READONLY, true },
188 { "/efi", READONLY, true },
189 { "/etc", READONLY, false },
190 };
191
192 /*
193 * ProtectSystem=strict table. In this strict mode, we mount everything
194 * read-only, except for /proc, /dev, /sys which are the kernel API VFS,
195 * which are left writable, but PrivateDevices= + ProtectKernelTunables=
196 * protect those, and these options should be fully orthogonal.
197 * (And of course /home and friends are also left writable, as ProtectHome=
198 * shall manage those, orthogonally).
199 */
200 static const MountEntry protect_system_strict_table[] = {
201 { "/", READONLY, false },
202 { "/proc", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */
203 { "/sys", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */
204 { "/dev", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* PrivateDevices= */
205 { "/home", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
206 { "/run/user", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
207 { "/root", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
208 };
209
210 static const char * const mount_mode_table[_MOUNT_MODE_MAX] = {
211 [INACCESSIBLE] = "inaccessible",
212 [OVERLAY_MOUNT] = "overlay",
213 [MOUNT_IMAGES] = "mount-images",
214 [BIND_MOUNT] = "bind",
215 [BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE] = "rbind",
216 [PRIVATE_TMP] = "private-tmp",
217 [PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY] = "private-tmp-read-only",
218 [PRIVATE_DEV] = "private-dev",
219 [BIND_DEV] = "bind-dev",
220 [EMPTY_DIR] = "empty",
221 [PRIVATE_SYSFS] = "private-sysfs",
222 [BIND_SYSFS] = "bind-sysfs",
223 [PROCFS] = "procfs",
224 [READONLY] = "read-only",
225 [READWRITE] = "read-write",
226 [NOEXEC] = "noexec",
227 [EXEC] = "exec",
228 [TMPFS] = "tmpfs",
229 [RUN] = "run",
230 [EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES] = "extension-directories",
231 [EXTENSION_IMAGES] = "extension-images",
232 [MQUEUEFS] = "mqueuefs",
233 [READWRITE_IMPLICIT] = "read-write-implicit",
234 };
235
236 /* Helper struct for naming simplicity and reusability */
237 static const struct {
238 const char *level_env;
239 const char *level_env_print;
240 } image_class_info[_IMAGE_CLASS_MAX] = {
241 [IMAGE_SYSEXT] = {
242 .level_env = "SYSEXT_LEVEL",
243 .level_env_print = " SYSEXT_LEVEL=",
244 },
245 [IMAGE_CONFEXT] = {
246 .level_env = "CONFEXT_LEVEL",
247 .level_env_print = " CONFEXT_LEVEL=",
248 }
249 };
250
251 DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(mount_mode, MountMode);
252
253 static const char *mount_entry_path(const MountEntry *p) {
254 assert(p);
255
256 /* Returns the path of this bind mount. If the malloc()-allocated ->path_buffer field is set we return that,
257 * otherwise the stack/static ->path field is returned. */
258
259 return p->path_malloc ?: p->path_const;
260 }
261
262 static const char *mount_entry_unprefixed_path(const MountEntry *p) {
263 assert(p);
264
265 /* Returns the unprefixed path (ie: before prefix_where_needed() ran), if any */
266
267 return p->unprefixed_path_malloc ?: p->unprefixed_path_const ?: mount_entry_path(p);
268 }
269
270 static void mount_entry_consume_prefix(MountEntry *p, char *new_path) {
271 assert(p);
272 assert(p->path_malloc || p->path_const);
273 assert(new_path);
274
275 /* Saves current path in unprefixed_ variable, and takes over new_path */
276
277 free_and_replace(p->unprefixed_path_malloc, p->path_malloc);
278 /* If we didn't have a path on the heap, then it's a static one */
279 if (!p->unprefixed_path_malloc)
280 p->unprefixed_path_const = p->path_const;
281 p->path_malloc = new_path;
282 p->has_prefix = true;
283 }
284
285 static bool mount_entry_read_only(const MountEntry *p) {
286 assert(p);
287
288 return p->read_only || IN_SET(p->mode, READONLY, INACCESSIBLE, PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY);
289 }
290
291 static bool mount_entry_noexec(const MountEntry *p) {
292 assert(p);
293
294 return p->noexec || IN_SET(p->mode, NOEXEC, INACCESSIBLE, PRIVATE_SYSFS, BIND_SYSFS, PROCFS);
295 }
296
297 static bool mount_entry_exec(const MountEntry *p) {
298 assert(p);
299
300 return p->exec || p->mode == EXEC;
301 }
302
303 static const char *mount_entry_source(const MountEntry *p) {
304 assert(p);
305
306 return p->source_malloc ?: p->source_const;
307 }
308
309 static const char *mount_entry_options(const MountEntry *p) {
310 assert(p);
311
312 return p->options_malloc ?: p->options_const;
313 }
314
315 static void mount_entry_done(MountEntry *p) {
316 assert(p);
317
318 p->path_malloc = mfree(p->path_malloc);
319 p->unprefixed_path_malloc = mfree(p->unprefixed_path_malloc);
320 p->source_malloc = mfree(p->source_malloc);
321 p->options_malloc = mfree(p->options_malloc);
322 p->image_options = mount_options_free_all(p->image_options);
323 }
324
325 static int append_access_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv, MountMode mode, bool forcibly_require_prefix) {
326 assert(p);
327
328 /* Adds a list of user-supplied READWRITE/READWRITE_IMPLICIT/READONLY/INACCESSIBLE entries */
329
330 STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) {
331 bool ignore = false, needs_prefix = false;
332 const char *e = *i;
333
334 /* Look for any prefixes */
335 if (startswith(e, "-")) {
336 e++;
337 ignore = true;
338 }
339 if (startswith(e, "+")) {
340 e++;
341 needs_prefix = true;
342 }
343
344 if (!path_is_absolute(e))
345 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
346 "Path is not absolute: %s", e);
347
348 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
349 .path_const = e,
350 .mode = mode,
351 .ignore = ignore,
352 .has_prefix = !needs_prefix && !forcibly_require_prefix,
353 };
354 }
355
356 return 0;
357 }
358
359 static int append_empty_dir_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv) {
360 assert(p);
361
362 /* Adds tmpfs mounts to provide readable but empty directories. This is primarily used to implement the
363 * "/private/" boundary directories for DynamicUser=1. */
364
365 STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) {
366
367 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
368 .path_const = *i,
369 .mode = EMPTY_DIR,
370 .ignore = false,
371 .read_only = true,
372 .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST,
373 .flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME,
374 };
375 }
376
377 return 0;
378 }
379
380 static int append_bind_mounts(MountEntry **p, const BindMount *binds, size_t n) {
381 assert(p);
382
383 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
384 const BindMount *b = binds + i;
385
386 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
387 .path_const = b->destination,
388 .mode = b->recursive ? BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE : BIND_MOUNT,
389 .read_only = b->read_only,
390 .nosuid = b->nosuid,
391 .source_const = b->source,
392 .ignore = b->ignore_enoent,
393 };
394 }
395
396 return 0;
397 }
398
399 static int append_mount_images(MountEntry **p, const MountImage *mount_images, size_t n) {
400 assert(p);
401
402 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
403 const MountImage *m = mount_images + i;
404
405 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
406 .path_const = m->destination,
407 .mode = MOUNT_IMAGES,
408 .source_const = m->source,
409 .image_options = m->mount_options,
410 .ignore = m->ignore_enoent,
411 };
412 }
413
414 return 0;
415 }
416
417 static int append_extensions(
418 MountEntry **p,
419 const char *root,
420 const char *extension_dir,
421 char **hierarchies,
422 const MountImage *mount_images,
423 size_t n,
424 char **extension_directories) {
425
426 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **overlays = NULL;
427 int r;
428
429 if (n == 0 && strv_isempty(extension_directories))
430 return 0;
431
432 assert(p);
433 assert(extension_dir);
434
435 /* Prepare a list of overlays, that will have as each element a string suitable for being
436 * passed as a lowerdir= parameter, so start with the hierarchy on the root.
437 * The overlays vector will have the same number of elements and will correspond to the
438 * hierarchies vector, so they can be iterated upon together. */
439 STRV_FOREACH(hierarchy, hierarchies) {
440 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL;
441
442 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(root, *hierarchy);
443 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
444 return -ENOMEM;
445
446 r = strv_consume(&overlays, TAKE_PTR(prefixed_hierarchy));
447 if (r < 0)
448 return r;
449 }
450
451 /* First, prepare a mount for each image, but these won't be visible to the unit, instead
452 * they will be mounted in our propagate directory, and used as a source for the overlay. */
453 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
454 _cleanup_free_ char *mount_point = NULL;
455 const MountImage *m = mount_images + i;
456
457 r = asprintf(&mount_point, "%s/%zu", extension_dir, i);
458 if (r < 0)
459 return -ENOMEM;
460
461 for (size_t j = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[j]; ++j) {
462 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL, *escaped = NULL, *lowerdir = NULL;
463
464 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(mount_point, hierarchies[j]);
465 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
466 return -ENOMEM;
467
468 escaped = shell_escape(prefixed_hierarchy, ",:");
469 if (!escaped)
470 return -ENOMEM;
471
472 /* Note that lowerdir= parameters are in 'reverse' order, so the
473 * top-most directory in the overlay comes first in the list. */
474 lowerdir = strjoin(escaped, ":", overlays[j]);
475 if (!lowerdir)
476 return -ENOMEM;
477
478 free_and_replace(overlays[j], lowerdir);
479 }
480
481 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
482 .path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(mount_point),
483 .image_options = m->mount_options,
484 .ignore = m->ignore_enoent,
485 .source_const = m->source,
486 .mode = EXTENSION_IMAGES,
487 .has_prefix = true,
488 };
489 }
490
491 /* Secondly, extend the lowerdir= parameters with each ExtensionDirectory.
492 * Bind mount them in the same location as the ExtensionImages, so that we
493 * can check that they are valid trees (extension-release.d). */
494 STRV_FOREACH(extension_directory, extension_directories) {
495 _cleanup_free_ char *mount_point = NULL, *source = NULL;
496 const char *e = *extension_directory;
497 bool ignore_enoent = false;
498
499 /* Pick up the counter where the ExtensionImages left it. */
500 r = asprintf(&mount_point, "%s/%zu", extension_dir, n++);
501 if (r < 0)
502 return -ENOMEM;
503
504 /* Look for any prefixes */
505 if (startswith(e, "-")) {
506 e++;
507 ignore_enoent = true;
508 }
509 /* Ignore this for now */
510 if (startswith(e, "+"))
511 e++;
512
513 source = strdup(e);
514 if (!source)
515 return -ENOMEM;
516
517 for (size_t j = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[j]; ++j) {
518 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL, *escaped = NULL, *lowerdir = NULL;
519
520 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(mount_point, hierarchies[j]);
521 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
522 return -ENOMEM;
523
524 escaped = shell_escape(prefixed_hierarchy, ",:");
525 if (!escaped)
526 return -ENOMEM;
527
528 /* Note that lowerdir= parameters are in 'reverse' order, so the
529 * top-most directory in the overlay comes first in the list. */
530 lowerdir = strjoin(escaped, ":", overlays[j]);
531 if (!lowerdir)
532 return -ENOMEM;
533
534 free_and_replace(overlays[j], lowerdir);
535 }
536
537 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
538 .path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(mount_point),
539 .source_malloc = TAKE_PTR(source),
540 .mode = EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES,
541 .ignore = ignore_enoent,
542 .has_prefix = true,
543 .read_only = true,
544 };
545 }
546
547 /* Then, for each hierarchy, prepare an overlay with the list of lowerdir= strings
548 * set up earlier. */
549 for (size_t i = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[i]; ++i) {
550 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL;
551
552 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(root, hierarchies[i]);
553 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
554 return -ENOMEM;
555
556 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
557 .path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(prefixed_hierarchy),
558 .options_malloc = TAKE_PTR(overlays[i]),
559 .mode = OVERLAY_MOUNT,
560 .has_prefix = true,
561 .ignore = true, /* If the source image doesn't set the ignore bit it will fail earlier. */
562 };
563 }
564
565 return 0;
566 }
567
568 static int append_tmpfs_mounts(MountEntry **p, const TemporaryFileSystem *tmpfs, size_t n) {
569 assert(p);
570
571 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
572 const TemporaryFileSystem *t = tmpfs + i;
573 _cleanup_free_ char *o = NULL, *str = NULL;
574 unsigned long flags;
575 bool ro = false;
576 int r;
577
578 if (!path_is_absolute(t->path))
579 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
580 "Path is not absolute: %s",
581 t->path);
582
583 str = strjoin("mode=0755" NESTED_TMPFS_LIMITS ",", t->options);
584 if (!str)
585 return -ENOMEM;
586
587 r = mount_option_mangle(str, MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME, &flags, &o);
588 if (r < 0)
589 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse mount option '%s': %m", str);
590
591 ro = flags & MS_RDONLY;
592 if (ro)
593 flags ^= MS_RDONLY;
594
595 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
596 .path_const = t->path,
597 .mode = TMPFS,
598 .read_only = ro,
599 .options_malloc = TAKE_PTR(o),
600 .flags = flags,
601 };
602 }
603
604 return 0;
605 }
606
607 static int append_static_mounts(MountEntry **p, const MountEntry *mounts, size_t n, bool ignore_protect) {
608 assert(p);
609 assert(mounts);
610
611 /* Adds a list of static pre-defined entries */
612
613 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++)
614 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
615 .path_const = mount_entry_path(mounts+i),
616 .mode = mounts[i].mode,
617 .ignore = mounts[i].ignore || ignore_protect,
618 };
619
620 return 0;
621 }
622
623 static int append_protect_home(MountEntry **p, ProtectHome protect_home, bool ignore_protect) {
624 assert(p);
625
626 switch (protect_home) {
627
628 case PROTECT_HOME_NO:
629 return 0;
630
631 case PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY:
632 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_read_only_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table), ignore_protect);
633
634 case PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS:
635 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_tmpfs_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table), ignore_protect);
636
637 case PROTECT_HOME_YES:
638 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table), ignore_protect);
639
640 default:
641 assert_not_reached();
642 }
643 }
644
645 static int append_protect_system(MountEntry **p, ProtectSystem protect_system, bool ignore_protect) {
646 assert(p);
647
648 switch (protect_system) {
649
650 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO:
651 return 0;
652
653 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT:
654 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_strict_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table), ignore_protect);
655
656 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES:
657 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table), ignore_protect);
658
659 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL:
660 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_full_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table), ignore_protect);
661
662 default:
663 assert_not_reached();
664 }
665 }
666
667 static int mount_path_compare(const MountEntry *a, const MountEntry *b) {
668 int d;
669
670 /* ExtensionImages/Directories will be used by other mounts as a base, so sort them first
671 * regardless of the prefix - they are set up in the propagate directory anyway */
672 d = -CMP(a->mode == EXTENSION_IMAGES, b->mode == EXTENSION_IMAGES);
673 if (d != 0)
674 return d;
675 d = -CMP(a->mode == EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES, b->mode == EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES);
676 if (d != 0)
677 return d;
678
679 /* If the paths are not equal, then order prefixes first */
680 d = path_compare(mount_entry_path(a), mount_entry_path(b));
681 if (d != 0)
682 return d;
683
684 /* If the paths are equal, check the mode */
685 return CMP((int) a->mode, (int) b->mode);
686 }
687
688 static int prefix_where_needed(MountEntry *m, size_t n, const char *root_directory) {
689 /* Prefixes all paths in the bind mount table with the root directory if the entry needs that. */
690
691 assert(m || n == 0);
692
693 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
694 char *s;
695
696 if (m[i].has_prefix)
697 continue;
698
699 s = path_join(root_directory, mount_entry_path(m+i));
700 if (!s)
701 return -ENOMEM;
702
703 mount_entry_consume_prefix(&m[i], s);
704 }
705
706 return 0;
707 }
708
709 static void drop_duplicates(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
710 MountEntry *f, *t, *previous;
711
712 assert(m);
713 assert(n);
714
715 /* Drops duplicate entries. Expects that the array is properly ordered already. */
716
717 for (f = m, t = m, previous = NULL; f < m + *n; f++) {
718
719 /* The first one wins (which is the one with the more restrictive mode), see mount_path_compare()
720 * above. Note that we only drop duplicates that haven't been mounted yet. */
721 if (previous &&
722 path_equal(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(previous)) &&
723 !f->applied && !previous->applied) {
724 log_debug("%s (%s) is duplicate.", mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode));
725 /* Propagate the flags to the remaining entry */
726 previous->read_only = previous->read_only || mount_entry_read_only(f);
727 previous->noexec = previous->noexec || mount_entry_noexec(f);
728 previous->exec = previous->exec || mount_entry_exec(f);
729 mount_entry_done(f);
730 continue;
731 }
732
733 *t = *f;
734 previous = t;
735 t++;
736 }
737
738 *n = t - m;
739 }
740
741 static void drop_inaccessible(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
742 MountEntry *f, *t;
743 const char *clear = NULL;
744
745 assert(m);
746 assert(n);
747
748 /* Drops all entries obstructed by another entry further up the tree. Expects that the array is properly
749 * ordered already. */
750
751 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
752
753 /* If we found a path set for INACCESSIBLE earlier, and this entry has it as prefix we should drop
754 * it, as inaccessible paths really should drop the entire subtree. */
755 if (clear && path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), clear)) {
756 log_debug("%s is masked by %s.", mount_entry_path(f), clear);
757 mount_entry_done(f);
758 continue;
759 }
760
761 clear = f->mode == INACCESSIBLE ? mount_entry_path(f) : NULL;
762
763 *t = *f;
764 t++;
765 }
766
767 *n = t - m;
768 }
769
770 static void drop_nop(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
771 MountEntry *f, *t;
772
773 assert(m);
774 assert(n);
775
776 /* Drops all entries which have an immediate parent that has the same type, as they are redundant. Assumes the
777 * list is ordered by prefixes. */
778
779 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
780
781 /* Only suppress such subtrees for READONLY, READWRITE and READWRITE_IMPLICIT entries */
782 if (IN_SET(f->mode, READONLY, READWRITE, READWRITE_IMPLICIT)) {
783 MountEntry *found = NULL;
784
785 /* Now let's find the first parent of the entry we are looking at. */
786 for (MountEntry *p = PTR_SUB1(t, m); p; p = PTR_SUB1(p, m))
787 if (path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(p))) {
788 found = p;
789 break;
790 }
791
792 /* We found it, let's see if it's the same mode, if so, we can drop this entry */
793 if (found && found->mode == f->mode) {
794 log_debug("%s (%s) is made redundant by %s (%s)",
795 mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode),
796 mount_entry_path(found), mount_mode_to_string(found->mode));
797 mount_entry_done(f);
798 continue;
799 }
800 }
801
802 *t = *f;
803 t++;
804 }
805
806 *n = t - m;
807 }
808
809 static void drop_outside_root(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
810 MountEntry *f, *t;
811
812 assert(m);
813 assert(n);
814
815 /* Nothing to do */
816 if (!root_directory)
817 return;
818
819 /* Drops all mounts that are outside of the root directory. */
820
821 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
822
823 /* ExtensionImages/Directories bases are opened in /run/systemd/unit-extensions on the host */
824 if (!IN_SET(f->mode, EXTENSION_IMAGES, EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES) && !path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), root_directory)) {
825 log_debug("%s is outside of root directory.", mount_entry_path(f));
826 mount_entry_done(f);
827 continue;
828 }
829
830 *t = *f;
831 t++;
832 }
833
834 *n = t - m;
835 }
836
837 static int clone_device_node(
838 const char *d,
839 const char *temporary_mount,
840 bool *make_devnode) {
841
842 _cleanup_free_ char *sl = NULL;
843 const char *dn, *bn, *t;
844 struct stat st;
845 int r;
846
847 if (stat(d, &st) < 0) {
848 if (errno == ENOENT) {
849 log_debug_errno(errno, "Device node '%s' to clone does not exist, ignoring.", d);
850 return -ENXIO;
851 }
852
853 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to stat() device node '%s' to clone, ignoring: %m", d);
854 }
855
856 if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode) &&
857 !S_ISCHR(st.st_mode))
858 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
859 "Device node '%s' to clone is not a device node, ignoring.",
860 d);
861
862 dn = strjoina(temporary_mount, d);
863
864 /* First, try to create device node properly */
865 if (*make_devnode) {
866 mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(d, st.st_mode);
867 r = mknod(dn, st.st_mode, st.st_rdev);
868 mac_selinux_create_file_clear();
869 if (r >= 0)
870 goto add_symlink;
871 if (errno != EPERM)
872 return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod failed for %s: %m", d);
873
874 /* This didn't work, let's not try this again for the next iterations. */
875 *make_devnode = false;
876 }
877
878 /* We're about to fall back to bind-mounting the device node. So create a dummy bind-mount target.
879 * Do not prepare device-node SELinux label (see issue 13762) */
880 r = mknod(dn, S_IFREG, 0);
881 if (r < 0 && errno != EEXIST)
882 return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod() fallback failed for '%s': %m", d);
883
884 /* Fallback to bind-mounting: The assumption here is that all used device nodes carry standard
885 * properties. Specifically, the devices nodes we bind-mount should either be owned by root:root or
886 * root:tty (e.g. /dev/tty, /dev/ptmx) and should not carry ACLs. */
887 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, d, dn, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
888 if (r < 0)
889 return r;
890
891 add_symlink:
892 bn = path_startswith(d, "/dev/");
893 if (!bn)
894 return 0;
895
896 /* Create symlinks like /dev/char/1:9 → ../urandom */
897 if (asprintf(&sl, "%s/dev/%s/" DEVNUM_FORMAT_STR,
898 temporary_mount,
899 S_ISCHR(st.st_mode) ? "char" : "block",
900 DEVNUM_FORMAT_VAL(st.st_rdev)) < 0)
901 return log_oom();
902
903 (void) mkdir_parents(sl, 0755);
904
905 t = strjoina("../", bn);
906 if (symlink(t, sl) < 0)
907 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to symlink '%s' to '%s', ignoring: %m", t, sl);
908
909 return 0;
910 }
911
912 static int mount_private_dev(MountEntry *m) {
913 static const char devnodes[] =
914 "/dev/null\0"
915 "/dev/zero\0"
916 "/dev/full\0"
917 "/dev/random\0"
918 "/dev/urandom\0"
919 "/dev/tty\0";
920
921 char temporary_mount[] = "/tmp/namespace-dev-XXXXXX";
922 const char *dev = NULL, *devpts = NULL, *devshm = NULL, *devhugepages = NULL, *devmqueue = NULL, *devlog = NULL, *devptmx = NULL;
923 bool can_mknod = true;
924 int r;
925
926 assert(m);
927
928 if (!mkdtemp(temporary_mount))
929 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create temporary directory '%s': %m", temporary_mount);
930
931 dev = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev");
932 (void) mkdir(dev, 0755);
933 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "tmpfs", dev, "tmpfs", DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS, "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_PRIVATE_DEV);
934 if (r < 0)
935 goto fail;
936
937 r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, dev, "/dev", 0);
938 if (r < 0) {
939 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as /dev: %m", dev);
940 goto fail;
941 }
942
943 devpts = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/pts");
944 (void) mkdir(devpts, 0755);
945 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/pts", devpts, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
946 if (r < 0)
947 goto fail;
948
949 /* /dev/ptmx can either be a device node or a symlink to /dev/pts/ptmx.
950 * When /dev/ptmx a device node, /dev/pts/ptmx has 000 permissions making it inaccessible.
951 * Thus, in that case make a clone.
952 * In nspawn and other containers it will be a symlink, in that case make it a symlink. */
953 r = is_symlink("/dev/ptmx");
954 if (r < 0) {
955 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect whether /dev/ptmx is a symlink or not: %m");
956 goto fail;
957 } else if (r > 0) {
958 devptmx = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/ptmx");
959 if (symlink("pts/ptmx", devptmx) < 0) {
960 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to pts/ptmx: %m", devptmx);
961 goto fail;
962 }
963 } else {
964 r = clone_device_node("/dev/ptmx", temporary_mount, &can_mknod);
965 if (r < 0)
966 goto fail;
967 }
968
969 devshm = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/shm");
970 (void) mkdir(devshm, 0755);
971 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/shm", devshm, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
972 if (r < 0)
973 goto fail;
974
975 devmqueue = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/mqueue");
976 (void) mkdir(devmqueue, 0755);
977 (void) mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/mqueue", devmqueue, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
978
979 devhugepages = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/hugepages");
980 (void) mkdir(devhugepages, 0755);
981 (void) mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/hugepages", devhugepages, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
982
983 devlog = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/log");
984 if (symlink("/run/systemd/journal/dev-log", devlog) < 0)
985 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to /run/systemd/journal/dev-log, ignoring: %m", devlog);
986
987 NULSTR_FOREACH(d, devnodes) {
988 r = clone_device_node(d, temporary_mount, &can_mknod);
989 /* ENXIO means the *source* is not a device file, skip creation in that case */
990 if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO)
991 goto fail;
992 }
993
994 r = dev_setup(temporary_mount, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
995 if (r < 0)
996 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up basic device tree at '%s', ignoring: %m", temporary_mount);
997
998 /* Create the /dev directory if missing. It is more likely to be missing when the service is started
999 * with RootDirectory. This is consistent with mount units creating the mount points when missing. */
1000 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1001
1002 /* Unmount everything in old /dev */
1003 r = umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0);
1004 if (r < 0)
1005 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to unmount directories below '%s', ignoring: %m", mount_entry_path(m));
1006
1007 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, dev, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL);
1008 if (r < 0)
1009 goto fail;
1010
1011 (void) rmdir(dev);
1012 (void) rmdir(temporary_mount);
1013
1014 return 0;
1015
1016 fail:
1017 if (devpts)
1018 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devpts, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1019
1020 if (devshm)
1021 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devshm, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1022
1023 if (devhugepages)
1024 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devhugepages, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1025
1026 if (devmqueue)
1027 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devmqueue, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1028
1029 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, dev, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1030 (void) rmdir(dev);
1031 (void) rmdir(temporary_mount);
1032
1033 return r;
1034 }
1035
1036 static int mount_bind_dev(const MountEntry *m) {
1037 int r;
1038
1039 assert(m);
1040
1041 /* Implements the little brother of mount_private_dev(): simply bind mounts the host's /dev into the
1042 * service's /dev. This is only used when RootDirectory= is set. */
1043
1044 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1045
1046 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
1047 if (r < 0)
1048 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /dev is already mounted: %m");
1049 if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /dev is already a mount point */
1050 return 0;
1051
1052 return mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
1053 }
1054
1055 static int mount_bind_sysfs(const MountEntry *m) {
1056 int r;
1057
1058 assert(m);
1059
1060 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1061
1062 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
1063 if (r < 0)
1064 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /sys is already mounted: %m");
1065 if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /sys is already a mount point */
1066 return 0;
1067
1068 /* Bind mount the host's version so that we get all child mounts of it, too. */
1069 return mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/sys", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
1070 }
1071
1072 static int mount_private_sysfs(const MountEntry *m) {
1073 const char *entry_path = mount_entry_path(ASSERT_PTR(m));
1074 int r, n;
1075
1076 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
1077
1078 n = umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
1079
1080 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "sysfs", entry_path, "sysfs", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, NULL);
1081 if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_PRIVILEGE(r)) {
1082 /* When we do not have enough privileges to mount sysfs, fall back to use existing /sys. */
1083
1084 if (n > 0)
1085 /* /sys or some of sub-mounts are umounted in the above. Refuse incomplete tree.
1086 * Propagate the original error code returned by mount() in the above. */
1087 return r;
1088
1089 return mount_bind_sysfs(m);
1090
1091 } else if (r < 0)
1092 return r;
1093
1094 /* We mounted a new instance now. Let's bind mount the children over now. */
1095 (void) bind_mount_submounts("/sys", entry_path);
1096 return 0;
1097 }
1098
1099 static int mount_procfs(const MountEntry *m, const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
1100 _cleanup_free_ char *opts = NULL;
1101 const char *entry_path;
1102 int r, n;
1103
1104 assert(m);
1105 assert(ns_info);
1106
1107 if (ns_info->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
1108 ns_info->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL) {
1109
1110 /* Starting with kernel 5.8 procfs' hidepid= logic is truly per-instance (previously it
1111 * pretended to be per-instance but actually was per-namespace), hence let's make use of it
1112 * if requested. To make sure this logic succeeds only on kernels where hidepid= is
1113 * per-instance, we'll exclusively use the textual value for hidepid=, since support was
1114 * added in the same commit: if it's supported it is thus also per-instance. */
1115
1116 const char *hpv = ns_info->protect_proc == PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ?
1117 "off" :
1118 protect_proc_to_string(ns_info->protect_proc);
1119
1120 /* hidepid= support was added in 5.8, so we can use fsconfig()/fsopen() (which were added in
1121 * 5.2) to check if hidepid= is supported. This avoids a noisy dmesg log by the kernel when
1122 * trying to use hidepid= on systems where it isn't supported. The same applies for subset=.
1123 * fsopen()/fsconfig() was also backported on some distros which allows us to detect
1124 * hidepid=/subset= support in even more scenarios. */
1125
1126 if (mount_option_supported("proc", "hidepid", hpv) != 0) {
1127 opts = strjoin("hidepid=", hpv);
1128 if (!opts)
1129 return -ENOMEM;
1130 }
1131
1132 if (ns_info->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID &&
1133 mount_option_supported("proc", "subset", "pid") != 0)
1134 if (!strextend_with_separator(&opts, ",", "subset=pid"))
1135 return -ENOMEM;
1136 }
1137
1138 entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
1139 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
1140
1141 /* Mount a new instance, so that we get the one that matches our user namespace, if we are running in
1142 * one. i.e we don't reuse existing mounts here under any condition, we want a new instance owned by
1143 * our user namespace and with our hidepid= settings applied. Hence, let's get rid of everything
1144 * mounted on /proc/ first. */
1145
1146 n = umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
1147
1148 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "proc", entry_path, "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, opts);
1149 if (r == -EINVAL && opts)
1150 /* If this failed with EINVAL then this likely means the textual hidepid= stuff is
1151 * not supported by the kernel, and thus the per-instance hidepid= neither, which
1152 * means we really don't want to use it, since it would affect our host's /proc
1153 * mount. Hence let's gracefully fallback to a classic, unrestricted version. */
1154 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "proc", entry_path, "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, NULL);
1155 if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_PRIVILEGE(r)) {
1156 /* When we do not have enough privileges to mount /proc, fall back to use existing /proc. */
1157
1158 if (n > 0)
1159 /* /proc or some of sub-mounts are umounted in the above. Refuse incomplete tree.
1160 * Propagate the original error code returned by mount() in the above. */
1161 return r;
1162
1163 r = path_is_mount_point(entry_path, NULL, 0);
1164 if (r < 0)
1165 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /proc is already mounted: %m");
1166 if (r > 0)
1167 return 0;
1168
1169 /* We lack permissions to mount a new instance of /proc, and it is not already mounted. But
1170 * we can access the host's, so as a final fallback bind-mount it to the destination, as most
1171 * likely we are inside a user manager in an unprivileged user namespace. */
1172 return mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/proc", entry_path, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
1173
1174 } else if (r < 0)
1175 return r;
1176
1177 /* We mounted a new instance now. Let's bind mount the children over now. This matters for nspawn
1178 * where a bunch of files are overmounted, in particular the boot id */
1179 (void) bind_mount_submounts("/proc", entry_path);
1180 return 0;
1181 }
1182
1183 static int mount_tmpfs(const MountEntry *m) {
1184 const char *entry_path, *inner_path;
1185 int r;
1186
1187 assert(m);
1188
1189 entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
1190 inner_path = mount_entry_unprefixed_path(m);
1191
1192 /* First, get rid of everything that is below if there is anything. Then, overmount with our new
1193 * tmpfs */
1194
1195 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
1196 (void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
1197
1198 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "tmpfs", entry_path, "tmpfs", m->flags, mount_entry_options(m));
1199 if (r < 0)
1200 return r;
1201
1202 r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, entry_path, inner_path, 0);
1203 if (r < 0)
1204 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as '%s': %m", entry_path, inner_path);
1205
1206 return 0;
1207 }
1208
1209 static int mount_run(const MountEntry *m) {
1210 int r;
1211
1212 assert(m);
1213
1214 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
1215 if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT)
1216 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /run is already mounted: %m");
1217 if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /run is already a mount point */
1218 return 0;
1219
1220 return mount_tmpfs(m);
1221 }
1222
1223 static int mount_mqueuefs(const MountEntry *m) {
1224 int r;
1225 const char *entry_path;
1226
1227 assert(m);
1228
1229 entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
1230
1231 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
1232 (void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
1233
1234 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "mqueue", entry_path, "mqueue", m->flags, mount_entry_options(m));
1235 if (r < 0)
1236 return r;
1237
1238 return 0;
1239 }
1240
1241 static int mount_image(
1242 const MountEntry *m,
1243 const char *root_directory,
1244 const ImagePolicy *image_policy) {
1245
1246 _cleanup_free_ char *host_os_release_id = NULL, *host_os_release_version_id = NULL,
1247 *host_os_release_level = NULL, *extension_name = NULL;
1248 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **extension_release = NULL;
1249 ImageClass class = IMAGE_SYSEXT;
1250 int r;
1251
1252 assert(m);
1253
1254 r = path_extract_filename(mount_entry_source(m), &extension_name);
1255 if (r < 0)
1256 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to extract extension name from %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
1257
1258 if (m->mode == EXTENSION_IMAGES) {
1259 r = load_extension_release_pairs(mount_entry_source(m), IMAGE_SYSEXT, extension_name, /* relax_extension_release_check= */ false, &extension_release);
1260 if (r == -ENOENT) {
1261 r = load_extension_release_pairs(mount_entry_source(m), IMAGE_CONFEXT, extension_name, /* relax_extension_release_check= */ false, &extension_release);
1262 if (r >= 0)
1263 class = IMAGE_CONFEXT;
1264 }
1265 if (r == -ENOENT)
1266 return r;
1267
1268 r = parse_os_release(
1269 empty_to_root(root_directory),
1270 "ID", &host_os_release_id,
1271 "VERSION_ID", &host_os_release_version_id,
1272 image_class_info[class].level_env, &host_os_release_level,
1273 NULL);
1274 if (r < 0)
1275 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to acquire 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
1276 if (isempty(host_os_release_id))
1277 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "'ID' field not found or empty in 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
1278 }
1279
1280 r = verity_dissect_and_mount(
1281 /* src_fd= */ -1,
1282 mount_entry_source(m),
1283 mount_entry_path(m),
1284 m->image_options,
1285 image_policy,
1286 host_os_release_id,
1287 host_os_release_version_id,
1288 host_os_release_level,
1289 NULL);
1290 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1291 return 0;
1292 if (r == -ESTALE && host_os_release_id)
1293 return log_error_errno(r,
1294 "Failed to mount image %s, extension-release metadata does not match the lower layer's: ID=%s%s%s%s%s",
1295 mount_entry_source(m),
1296 host_os_release_id,
1297 host_os_release_version_id ? " VERSION_ID=" : "",
1298 strempty(host_os_release_version_id),
1299 host_os_release_level ? image_class_info[class].level_env_print : "",
1300 strempty(host_os_release_level));
1301 if (r < 0)
1302 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount image %s on %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m), mount_entry_path(m));
1303
1304 return 0;
1305 }
1306
1307 static int mount_overlay(const MountEntry *m) {
1308 const char *options;
1309 int r;
1310
1311 assert(m);
1312
1313 options = strjoina("lowerdir=", mount_entry_options(m));
1314
1315 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1316
1317 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "overlay", mount_entry_path(m), "overlay", MS_RDONLY, options);
1318 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1319 return 0;
1320
1321 return r;
1322 }
1323
1324 static int follow_symlink(
1325 const char *root_directory,
1326 MountEntry *m) {
1327
1328 _cleanup_free_ char *target = NULL;
1329 int r;
1330
1331 /* Let's chase symlinks, but only one step at a time. That's because depending where the symlink points we
1332 * might need to change the order in which we mount stuff. Hence: let's normalize piecemeal, and do one step at
1333 * a time by specifying CHASE_STEP. This function returns 0 if we resolved one step, and > 0 if we reached the
1334 * end and already have a fully normalized name. */
1335
1336 r = chase(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, CHASE_STEP|CHASE_NONEXISTENT, &target, NULL);
1337 if (r < 0)
1338 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to chase symlinks '%s': %m", mount_entry_path(m));
1339 if (r > 0) /* Reached the end, nothing more to resolve */
1340 return 1;
1341
1342 if (m->n_followed >= CHASE_MAX) /* put a boundary on things */
1343 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP),
1344 "Symlink loop on '%s'.",
1345 mount_entry_path(m));
1346
1347 log_debug("Followed mount entry path symlink %s %s %s.",
1348 mount_entry_path(m), special_glyph(SPECIAL_GLYPH_ARROW_RIGHT), target);
1349
1350 mount_entry_consume_prefix(m, TAKE_PTR(target));
1351
1352 m->n_followed ++;
1353
1354 return 0;
1355 }
1356
1357 static int apply_one_mount(
1358 const char *root_directory,
1359 MountEntry *m,
1360 const ImagePolicy *mount_image_policy,
1361 const ImagePolicy *extension_image_policy,
1362 const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
1363
1364 _cleanup_free_ char *inaccessible = NULL;
1365 bool rbind = true, make = false;
1366 const char *what;
1367 int r;
1368
1369 assert(m);
1370 assert(ns_info);
1371
1372 log_debug("Applying namespace mount on %s", mount_entry_path(m));
1373
1374 switch (m->mode) {
1375
1376 case INACCESSIBLE: {
1377 _cleanup_free_ char *tmp = NULL;
1378 const char *runtime_dir;
1379 struct stat target;
1380
1381 /* First, get rid of everything that is below if there
1382 * is anything... Then, overmount it with an
1383 * inaccessible path. */
1384 (void) umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0);
1385
1386 if (lstat(mount_entry_path(m), &target) < 0) {
1387 if (errno == ENOENT && m->ignore)
1388 return 0;
1389
1390 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to lstat() %s to determine what to mount over it: %m",
1391 mount_entry_path(m));
1392 }
1393
1394 if (geteuid() == 0)
1395 runtime_dir = "/run";
1396 else {
1397 if (asprintf(&tmp, "/run/user/" UID_FMT, geteuid()) < 0)
1398 return -ENOMEM;
1399
1400 runtime_dir = tmp;
1401 }
1402
1403 r = mode_to_inaccessible_node(runtime_dir, target.st_mode, &inaccessible);
1404 if (r < 0)
1405 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP),
1406 "File type not supported for inaccessible mounts. Note that symlinks are not allowed");
1407 what = inaccessible;
1408 break;
1409 }
1410
1411 case READONLY:
1412 case READWRITE:
1413 case READWRITE_IMPLICIT:
1414 case EXEC:
1415 case NOEXEC:
1416 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, 0);
1417 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1418 return 0;
1419 if (r < 0)
1420 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine whether %s is already a mount point: %m",
1421 mount_entry_path(m));
1422 if (r > 0) /* Nothing to do here, it is already a mount. We just later toggle the MS_RDONLY
1423 * and MS_NOEXEC bits for the mount point if needed. */
1424 return 0;
1425 /* This isn't a mount point yet, let's make it one. */
1426 what = mount_entry_path(m);
1427 break;
1428
1429 case EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES: {
1430 _cleanup_free_ char *host_os_release_id = NULL, *host_os_release_version_id = NULL,
1431 *host_os_release_level = NULL, *extension_name = NULL;
1432 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **extension_release = NULL;
1433 ImageClass class = IMAGE_SYSEXT;
1434
1435 r = path_extract_filename(mount_entry_source(m), &extension_name);
1436 if (r < 0)
1437 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to extract extension name from %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
1438
1439 r = load_extension_release_pairs(mount_entry_source(m), IMAGE_SYSEXT, extension_name, /* relax_extension_release_check= */ false, &extension_release);
1440 if (r == -ENOENT) {
1441 r = load_extension_release_pairs(mount_entry_source(m), IMAGE_CONFEXT, extension_name, /* relax_extension_release_check= */ false, &extension_release);
1442 if (r >= 0)
1443 class = IMAGE_CONFEXT;
1444 }
1445 if (r == -ENOENT)
1446 return r;
1447
1448 r = parse_os_release(
1449 empty_to_root(root_directory),
1450 "ID", &host_os_release_id,
1451 "VERSION_ID", &host_os_release_version_id,
1452 image_class_info[class].level_env, &host_os_release_level,
1453 NULL);
1454 if (r < 0)
1455 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to acquire 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
1456 if (isempty(host_os_release_id))
1457 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "'ID' field not found or empty in 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
1458
1459 r = load_extension_release_pairs(mount_entry_source(m), class, extension_name, /* relax_extension_release_check= */ false, &extension_release);
1460 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1461 return 0;
1462 if (r < 0)
1463 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse directory %s extension-release metadata: %m", extension_name);
1464
1465 r = extension_release_validate(
1466 extension_name,
1467 host_os_release_id,
1468 host_os_release_version_id,
1469 host_os_release_level,
1470 /* host_extension_scope */ NULL, /* Leave empty, we need to accept both system and portable */
1471 extension_release,
1472 class);
1473 if (r == 0)
1474 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESTALE), "Directory %s extension-release metadata does not match the root's", extension_name);
1475 if (r < 0)
1476 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to compare directory %s extension-release metadata with the root's os-release: %m", extension_name);
1477
1478 _fallthrough_;
1479 }
1480
1481 case BIND_MOUNT:
1482 rbind = false;
1483
1484 _fallthrough_;
1485 case BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE: {
1486 _cleanup_free_ char *chased = NULL;
1487
1488 /* Since mount() will always follow symlinks we chase the symlinks on our own first. Note
1489 * that bind mount source paths are always relative to the host root, hence we pass NULL as
1490 * root directory to chase() here. */
1491
1492 r = chase(mount_entry_source(m), NULL, CHASE_TRAIL_SLASH, &chased, NULL);
1493 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) {
1494 log_debug_errno(r, "Path %s does not exist, ignoring.", mount_entry_source(m));
1495 return 0;
1496 }
1497 if (r < 0)
1498 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to follow symlinks on %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
1499
1500 log_debug("Followed source symlinks %s %s %s.",
1501 mount_entry_source(m), special_glyph(SPECIAL_GLYPH_ARROW_RIGHT), chased);
1502
1503 free_and_replace(m->source_malloc, chased);
1504
1505 what = mount_entry_source(m);
1506 make = true;
1507 break;
1508 }
1509
1510 case EMPTY_DIR:
1511 case TMPFS:
1512 return mount_tmpfs(m);
1513
1514 case PRIVATE_TMP:
1515 case PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY:
1516 what = mount_entry_source(m);
1517 make = true;
1518 break;
1519
1520 case PRIVATE_DEV:
1521 return mount_private_dev(m);
1522
1523 case BIND_DEV:
1524 return mount_bind_dev(m);
1525
1526 case PRIVATE_SYSFS:
1527 return mount_private_sysfs(m);
1528
1529 case BIND_SYSFS:
1530 return mount_bind_sysfs(m);
1531
1532 case PROCFS:
1533 return mount_procfs(m, ns_info);
1534
1535 case RUN:
1536 return mount_run(m);
1537
1538 case MQUEUEFS:
1539 return mount_mqueuefs(m);
1540
1541 case MOUNT_IMAGES:
1542 return mount_image(m, NULL, mount_image_policy);
1543
1544 case EXTENSION_IMAGES:
1545 return mount_image(m, root_directory, extension_image_policy);
1546
1547 case OVERLAY_MOUNT:
1548 return mount_overlay(m);
1549
1550 default:
1551 assert_not_reached();
1552 }
1553
1554 assert(what);
1555
1556 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL);
1557 if (r < 0) {
1558 bool try_again = false;
1559
1560 if (r == -ENOENT && make) {
1561 int q;
1562
1563 /* Hmm, either the source or the destination are missing. Let's see if we can create
1564 the destination, then try again. */
1565
1566 (void) mkdir_parents(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1567
1568 q = make_mount_point_inode_from_path(what, mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1569 if (q < 0 && q != -EEXIST)
1570 log_error_errno(q, "Failed to create destination mount point node '%s': %m",
1571 mount_entry_path(m));
1572 else
1573 try_again = true;
1574 }
1575
1576 if (try_again)
1577 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL);
1578 if (r < 0)
1579 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to mount %s to %s: %m", what, mount_entry_path(m));
1580 }
1581
1582 log_debug("Successfully mounted %s to %s", what, mount_entry_path(m));
1583 return 0;
1584 }
1585
1586 static int make_read_only(const MountEntry *m, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
1587 unsigned long new_flags = 0, flags_mask = 0;
1588 bool submounts;
1589 int r;
1590
1591 assert(m);
1592 assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
1593
1594 if (mount_entry_read_only(m) || m->mode == PRIVATE_DEV) {
1595 new_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
1596 flags_mask |= MS_RDONLY;
1597 }
1598
1599 if (m->nosuid) {
1600 new_flags |= MS_NOSUID;
1601 flags_mask |= MS_NOSUID;
1602 }
1603
1604 if (flags_mask == 0) /* No Change? */
1605 return 0;
1606
1607 /* We generally apply these changes recursively, except for /dev, and the cases we know there's
1608 * nothing further down. Set /dev readonly, but not submounts like /dev/shm. Also, we only set the
1609 * per-mount read-only flag. We can't set it on the superblock, if we are inside a user namespace
1610 * and running Linux <= 4.17. */
1611 submounts =
1612 mount_entry_read_only(m) &&
1613 !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS);
1614 if (submounts)
1615 r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1616 else
1617 r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, proc_self_mountinfo);
1618
1619 /* Note that we only turn on the MS_RDONLY flag here, we never turn it off. Something that was marked
1620 * read-only already stays this way. This improves compatibility with container managers, where we
1621 * won't attempt to undo read-only mounts already applied. */
1622
1623 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1624 return 0;
1625 if (r < 0)
1626 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
1627 submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
1628 return 0;
1629 }
1630
1631 static int make_noexec(const MountEntry *m, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
1632 unsigned long new_flags = 0, flags_mask = 0;
1633 bool submounts;
1634 int r;
1635
1636 assert(m);
1637 assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
1638
1639 if (mount_entry_noexec(m)) {
1640 new_flags |= MS_NOEXEC;
1641 flags_mask |= MS_NOEXEC;
1642 } else if (mount_entry_exec(m)) {
1643 new_flags &= ~MS_NOEXEC;
1644 flags_mask |= MS_NOEXEC;
1645 }
1646
1647 if (flags_mask == 0) /* No Change? */
1648 return 0;
1649
1650 submounts = !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS);
1651
1652 if (submounts)
1653 r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1654 else
1655 r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, proc_self_mountinfo);
1656
1657 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1658 return 0;
1659 if (r < 0)
1660 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
1661 submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
1662 return 0;
1663 }
1664
1665 static int make_nosuid(const MountEntry *m, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
1666 bool submounts;
1667 int r;
1668
1669 assert(m);
1670 assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
1671
1672 submounts = !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS);
1673
1674 if (submounts)
1675 r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), MS_NOSUID, MS_NOSUID, NULL, proc_self_mountinfo);
1676 else
1677 r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), MS_NOSUID, MS_NOSUID, proc_self_mountinfo);
1678 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1679 return 0;
1680 if (r < 0)
1681 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
1682 submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
1683 return 0;
1684 }
1685
1686 static bool namespace_info_mount_apivfs(const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
1687 assert(ns_info);
1688
1689 /*
1690 * ProtectControlGroups= and ProtectKernelTunables= imply MountAPIVFS=,
1691 * since to protect the API VFS mounts, they need to be around in the
1692 * first place...
1693 */
1694
1695 return ns_info->mount_apivfs ||
1696 ns_info->protect_control_groups ||
1697 ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables ||
1698 ns_info->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
1699 ns_info->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL;
1700 }
1701
1702 static size_t namespace_calculate_mounts(
1703 const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
1704 char** read_write_paths,
1705 char** read_only_paths,
1706 char** inaccessible_paths,
1707 char** exec_paths,
1708 char** no_exec_paths,
1709 char** empty_directories,
1710 size_t n_bind_mounts,
1711 size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
1712 size_t n_mount_images,
1713 size_t n_extension_images,
1714 size_t n_extension_directories,
1715 size_t n_hierarchies,
1716 const char* tmp_dir,
1717 const char* var_tmp_dir,
1718 const char *creds_path,
1719 const char* log_namespace,
1720 bool setup_propagate,
1721 const char* notify_socket,
1722 const char* host_os_release) {
1723
1724 size_t protect_home_cnt;
1725 size_t protect_system_cnt =
1726 (ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT ?
1727 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table) :
1728 ((ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL) ?
1729 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table) :
1730 ((ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES) ?
1731 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table) : 0)));
1732
1733 protect_home_cnt =
1734 (ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_YES ?
1735 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table) :
1736 ((ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY) ?
1737 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table) :
1738 ((ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS) ?
1739 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table) : 0)));
1740
1741 return !!tmp_dir + !!var_tmp_dir +
1742 strv_length(read_write_paths) +
1743 strv_length(read_only_paths) +
1744 strv_length(inaccessible_paths) +
1745 strv_length(exec_paths) +
1746 strv_length(no_exec_paths) +
1747 strv_length(empty_directories) +
1748 n_bind_mounts +
1749 n_mount_images +
1750 (n_extension_images > 0 || n_extension_directories > 0 ? /* Mount each image and directory plus an overlay per hierarchy */
1751 n_hierarchies + n_extension_images + n_extension_directories: 0) +
1752 n_temporary_filesystems +
1753 ns_info->private_dev +
1754 (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables ?
1755 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table) + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table) : 0) +
1756 (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table) : 0) +
1757 (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs ?
1758 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_proc_table) + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_dev_table) : 0) +
1759 (ns_info->protect_control_groups ? 1 : 0) +
1760 protect_home_cnt + protect_system_cnt +
1761 (ns_info->protect_hostname ? 2 : 0) +
1762 (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info) ? ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table) : 0) +
1763 (creds_path ? 2 : 1) +
1764 !!log_namespace +
1765 setup_propagate + /* /run/systemd/incoming */
1766 !!notify_socket +
1767 !!host_os_release +
1768 ns_info->private_network + /* /sys */
1769 ns_info->private_ipc; /* /dev/mqueue */
1770 }
1771
1772 /* Walk all mount entries and dropping any unused mounts. This affects all
1773 * mounts:
1774 * - that are implicitly protected by a path that has been rendered inaccessible
1775 * - whose immediate parent requests the same protection mode as the mount itself
1776 * - that are outside of the relevant root directory
1777 * - which are duplicates
1778 */
1779 static void drop_unused_mounts(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *mounts, size_t *n_mounts) {
1780 assert(root_directory);
1781 assert(n_mounts);
1782 assert(mounts || *n_mounts == 0);
1783
1784 typesafe_qsort(mounts, *n_mounts, mount_path_compare);
1785
1786 drop_duplicates(mounts, n_mounts);
1787 drop_outside_root(root_directory, mounts, n_mounts);
1788 drop_inaccessible(mounts, n_mounts);
1789 drop_nop(mounts, n_mounts);
1790 }
1791
1792 static int create_symlinks_from_tuples(const char *root, char **strv_symlinks) {
1793 int r;
1794
1795 STRV_FOREACH_PAIR(src, dst, strv_symlinks) {
1796 _cleanup_free_ char *src_abs = NULL, *dst_abs = NULL;
1797
1798 src_abs = path_join(root, *src);
1799 dst_abs = path_join(root, *dst);
1800 if (!src_abs || !dst_abs)
1801 return -ENOMEM;
1802
1803 r = mkdir_parents_label(dst_abs, 0755);
1804 if (r < 0)
1805 return r;
1806
1807 r = symlink_idempotent(src_abs, dst_abs, true);
1808 if (r < 0)
1809 return r;
1810 }
1811
1812 return 0;
1813 }
1814
1815 static void mount_entry_path_debug_string(const char *root, MountEntry *m, char **error_path) {
1816 assert(m);
1817
1818 /* Create a string suitable for debugging logs, stripping for example the local working directory.
1819 * For example, with a BindPaths=/var/bar that does not exist on the host:
1820 *
1821 * Before:
1822 * foo.service: Failed to set up mount namespacing: /run/systemd/unit-root/var/bar: No such file or directory
1823 * After:
1824 * foo.service: Failed to set up mount namespacing: /var/bar: No such file or directory
1825 *
1826 * Note that this is an error path, so no OOM check is done on purpose. */
1827
1828 if (!error_path)
1829 return;
1830
1831 if (!mount_entry_path(m)) {
1832 *error_path = NULL;
1833 return;
1834 }
1835
1836 if (root) {
1837 const char *e = startswith(mount_entry_path(m), root);
1838 if (e) {
1839 *error_path = strdup(e);
1840 return;
1841 }
1842 }
1843
1844 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
1845 return;
1846 }
1847
1848 static int apply_mounts(
1849 const char *root,
1850 const ImagePolicy *mount_image_policy,
1851 const ImagePolicy *extension_image_policy,
1852 const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
1853 MountEntry *mounts,
1854 size_t *n_mounts,
1855 char **symlinks,
1856 char **error_path) {
1857
1858 _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *proc_self_mountinfo = NULL;
1859 _cleanup_free_ char **deny_list = NULL;
1860 int r;
1861
1862 if (n_mounts == 0) /* Shortcut: nothing to do */
1863 return 0;
1864
1865 assert(root);
1866 assert(mounts);
1867 assert(n_mounts);
1868
1869 /* Open /proc/self/mountinfo now as it may become unavailable if we mount anything on top of
1870 * /proc. For example, this is the case with the option: 'InaccessiblePaths=/proc'. */
1871 proc_self_mountinfo = fopen("/proc/self/mountinfo", "re");
1872 if (!proc_self_mountinfo) {
1873 r = -errno;
1874
1875 if (error_path)
1876 *error_path = strdup("/proc/self/mountinfo");
1877
1878 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to open /proc/self/mountinfo: %m");
1879 }
1880
1881 /* First round, establish all mounts we need */
1882 for (;;) {
1883 bool again = false;
1884
1885 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1886
1887 if (m->applied)
1888 continue;
1889
1890 /* ExtensionImages/Directories are first opened in the propagate directory, not in the root_directory */
1891 r = follow_symlink(!IN_SET(m->mode, EXTENSION_IMAGES, EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES) ? root : NULL, m);
1892 if (r < 0) {
1893 mount_entry_path_debug_string(root, m, error_path);
1894 return r;
1895 }
1896 if (r == 0) {
1897 /* We hit a symlinked mount point. The entry got rewritten and might
1898 * point to a very different place now. Let's normalize the changed
1899 * list, and start from the beginning. After all to mount the entry
1900 * at the new location we might need some other mounts first */
1901 again = true;
1902 break;
1903 }
1904
1905 r = apply_one_mount(root, m, mount_image_policy, extension_image_policy, ns_info);
1906 if (r < 0) {
1907 mount_entry_path_debug_string(root, m, error_path);
1908 return r;
1909 }
1910
1911 m->applied = true;
1912 }
1913
1914 if (!again)
1915 break;
1916
1917 drop_unused_mounts(root, mounts, n_mounts);
1918 }
1919
1920 /* Now that all filesystems have been set up, but before the
1921 * read-only switches are flipped, create the exec dirs and other symlinks.
1922 * Note that when /var/lib is not empty/tmpfs, these symlinks will already
1923 * exist, which means this will be a no-op. */
1924 r = create_symlinks_from_tuples(root, symlinks);
1925 if (r < 0)
1926 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up symlinks inside mount namespace: %m");
1927
1928 /* Create a deny list we can pass to bind_mount_recursive() */
1929 deny_list = new(char*, (*n_mounts)+1);
1930 if (!deny_list)
1931 return -ENOMEM;
1932 for (size_t j = 0; j < *n_mounts; j++)
1933 deny_list[j] = (char*) mount_entry_path(mounts+j);
1934 deny_list[*n_mounts] = NULL;
1935
1936 /* Second round, flip the ro bits if necessary. */
1937 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1938 r = make_read_only(m, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1939 if (r < 0) {
1940 mount_entry_path_debug_string(root, m, error_path);
1941 return r;
1942 }
1943 }
1944
1945 /* Third round, flip the noexec bits with a simplified deny list. */
1946 for (size_t j = 0; j < *n_mounts; j++)
1947 if (IN_SET((mounts+j)->mode, EXEC, NOEXEC))
1948 deny_list[j] = (char*) mount_entry_path(mounts+j);
1949 deny_list[*n_mounts] = NULL;
1950
1951 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1952 r = make_noexec(m, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1953 if (r < 0) {
1954 mount_entry_path_debug_string(root, m, error_path);
1955 return r;
1956 }
1957 }
1958
1959 /* Fourth round, flip the nosuid bits without a deny list. */
1960 if (ns_info->mount_nosuid)
1961 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1962 r = make_nosuid(m, proc_self_mountinfo);
1963 if (r < 0) {
1964 mount_entry_path_debug_string(root, m, error_path);
1965 return r;
1966 }
1967 }
1968
1969 return 1;
1970 }
1971
1972 static bool root_read_only(
1973 char **read_only_paths,
1974 ProtectSystem protect_system) {
1975
1976 /* Determine whether the root directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. */
1977
1978 if (protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT)
1979 return true;
1980
1981 if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/"))
1982 return true;
1983
1984 return false;
1985 }
1986
1987 static bool home_read_only(
1988 char** read_only_paths,
1989 char** inaccessible_paths,
1990 char** empty_directories,
1991 const BindMount *bind_mounts,
1992 size_t n_bind_mounts,
1993 const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems,
1994 size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
1995 ProtectHome protect_home) {
1996
1997 /* Determine whether the /home directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. Yes,
1998 * this is a bit sloppy, since we don't bother checking for cases where / is affected by multiple
1999 * settings. */
2000
2001 if (protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO)
2002 return true;
2003
2004 if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/home") ||
2005 prefixed_path_strv_contains(inaccessible_paths, "/home") ||
2006 prefixed_path_strv_contains(empty_directories, "/home"))
2007 return true;
2008
2009 for (size_t i = 0; i < n_temporary_filesystems; i++)
2010 if (path_equal(temporary_filesystems[i].path, "/home"))
2011 return true;
2012
2013 /* If /home is overmounted with some dir from the host it's not writable. */
2014 for (size_t i = 0; i < n_bind_mounts; i++)
2015 if (path_equal(bind_mounts[i].destination, "/home"))
2016 return true;
2017
2018 return false;
2019 }
2020
2021 int setup_namespace(
2022 const char* root_directory,
2023 const char* root_image,
2024 const MountOptions *root_image_mount_options,
2025 const ImagePolicy *root_image_policy,
2026 const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
2027 char** read_write_paths,
2028 char** read_only_paths,
2029 char** inaccessible_paths,
2030 char** exec_paths,
2031 char** no_exec_paths,
2032 char** empty_directories,
2033 char** symlinks,
2034 const BindMount *bind_mounts,
2035 size_t n_bind_mounts,
2036 const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems,
2037 size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
2038 const MountImage *mount_images,
2039 size_t n_mount_images,
2040 const ImagePolicy *mount_image_policy,
2041 const char* tmp_dir,
2042 const char* var_tmp_dir,
2043 const char *creds_path,
2044 const char *log_namespace,
2045 unsigned long mount_propagation_flag,
2046 VeritySettings *verity,
2047 const MountImage *extension_images,
2048 size_t n_extension_images,
2049 const ImagePolicy *extension_image_policy,
2050 char **extension_directories,
2051 const char *propagate_dir,
2052 const char *incoming_dir,
2053 const char *extension_dir,
2054 const char *notify_socket,
2055 const char *host_os_release_stage,
2056 char **error_path) {
2057
2058 _cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *loop_device = NULL;
2059 _cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp) DissectedImage *dissected_image = NULL;
2060 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **hierarchies = NULL;
2061 MountEntry *m = NULL, *mounts = NULL;
2062 bool require_prefix = false, setup_propagate = false;
2063 const char *root;
2064 DissectImageFlags dissect_image_flags =
2065 DISSECT_IMAGE_GENERIC_ROOT |
2066 DISSECT_IMAGE_REQUIRE_ROOT |
2067 DISSECT_IMAGE_DISCARD_ON_LOOP |
2068 DISSECT_IMAGE_RELAX_VAR_CHECK |
2069 DISSECT_IMAGE_FSCK |
2070 DISSECT_IMAGE_USR_NO_ROOT |
2071 DISSECT_IMAGE_GROWFS |
2072 DISSECT_IMAGE_ADD_PARTITION_DEVICES |
2073 DISSECT_IMAGE_PIN_PARTITION_DEVICES;
2074 size_t n_mounts;
2075 int r;
2076
2077 assert(ns_info);
2078
2079 /* Make sure that all mknod(), mkdir() calls we do are unaffected by the umask, and the access modes
2080 * we configure take effect */
2081 BLOCK_WITH_UMASK(0000);
2082
2083 if (!isempty(propagate_dir) && !isempty(incoming_dir))
2084 setup_propagate = true;
2085
2086 if (mount_propagation_flag == 0)
2087 mount_propagation_flag = MS_SHARED;
2088
2089 if (root_image) {
2090 /* Make the whole image read-only if we can determine that we only access it in a read-only fashion. */
2091 if (root_read_only(read_only_paths,
2092 ns_info->protect_system) &&
2093 home_read_only(read_only_paths, inaccessible_paths, empty_directories,
2094 bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems,
2095 ns_info->protect_home) &&
2096 strv_isempty(read_write_paths))
2097 dissect_image_flags |= DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY;
2098
2099 SET_FLAG(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE, verity && verity->data_path);
2100
2101 r = loop_device_make_by_path(
2102 root_image,
2103 FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_DEVICE_READ_ONLY) ? O_RDONLY : -1 /* < 0 means writable if possible, read-only as fallback */,
2104 /* sector_size= */ UINT32_MAX,
2105 FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE) ? 0 : LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN,
2106 LOCK_SH,
2107 &loop_device);
2108 if (r < 0)
2109 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create loop device for root image: %m");
2110
2111 r = dissect_loop_device(
2112 loop_device,
2113 verity,
2114 root_image_mount_options,
2115 root_image_policy,
2116 dissect_image_flags,
2117 &dissected_image);
2118 if (r < 0)
2119 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to dissect image: %m");
2120
2121 r = dissected_image_load_verity_sig_partition(
2122 dissected_image,
2123 loop_device->fd,
2124 verity);
2125 if (r < 0)
2126 return r;
2127
2128 r = dissected_image_decrypt(
2129 dissected_image,
2130 NULL,
2131 verity,
2132 dissect_image_flags);
2133 if (r < 0)
2134 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to decrypt dissected image: %m");
2135 }
2136
2137 if (root_directory)
2138 root = root_directory;
2139 else {
2140 /* /run/systemd should have been created by PID 1 early on already, but in some cases, like
2141 * when running tests (test-execute), it might not have been created yet so let's make sure
2142 * we create it if it doesn't already exist. */
2143 (void) mkdir_p_label("/run/systemd", 0755);
2144
2145 /* Always create the mount namespace in a temporary directory, instead of operating directly
2146 * in the root. The temporary directory prevents any mounts from being potentially obscured
2147 * my other mounts we already applied. We use the same mount point for all images, which is
2148 * safe, since they all live in their own namespaces after all, and hence won't see each
2149 * other. (Note: this directory is also created by PID 1 early on, we create it here for
2150 * similar reasons as /run/systemd/ first.) */
2151 root = "/run/systemd/mount-rootfs";
2152 (void) mkdir_label(root, 0555);
2153
2154 require_prefix = true;
2155 }
2156
2157 if (n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(extension_directories)) {
2158 /* Hierarchy population needs to be done for sysext and confext extension images */
2159 r = parse_env_extension_hierarchies(&hierarchies, "SYSTEMD_SYSEXT_AND_CONFEXT_HIERARCHIES");
2160 if (r < 0)
2161 return r;
2162 }
2163
2164 n_mounts = namespace_calculate_mounts(
2165 ns_info,
2166 read_write_paths,
2167 read_only_paths,
2168 inaccessible_paths,
2169 exec_paths,
2170 no_exec_paths,
2171 empty_directories,
2172 n_bind_mounts,
2173 n_temporary_filesystems,
2174 n_mount_images,
2175 n_extension_images,
2176 strv_length(extension_directories),
2177 strv_length(hierarchies),
2178 tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir,
2179 creds_path,
2180 log_namespace,
2181 setup_propagate,
2182 notify_socket,
2183 host_os_release_stage);
2184
2185 if (n_mounts > 0) {
2186 m = mounts = new0(MountEntry, n_mounts);
2187 if (!mounts)
2188 return -ENOMEM;
2189
2190 r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_write_paths, READWRITE, require_prefix);
2191 if (r < 0)
2192 goto finish;
2193
2194 r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_only_paths, READONLY, require_prefix);
2195 if (r < 0)
2196 goto finish;
2197
2198 r = append_access_mounts(&m, inaccessible_paths, INACCESSIBLE, require_prefix);
2199 if (r < 0)
2200 goto finish;
2201
2202 r = append_access_mounts(&m, exec_paths, EXEC, require_prefix);
2203 if (r < 0)
2204 goto finish;
2205
2206 r = append_access_mounts(&m, no_exec_paths, NOEXEC, require_prefix);
2207 if (r < 0)
2208 goto finish;
2209
2210 r = append_empty_dir_mounts(&m, empty_directories);
2211 if (r < 0)
2212 goto finish;
2213
2214 r = append_bind_mounts(&m, bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts);
2215 if (r < 0)
2216 goto finish;
2217
2218 r = append_tmpfs_mounts(&m, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems);
2219 if (r < 0)
2220 goto finish;
2221
2222 if (tmp_dir) {
2223 bool ro = streq(tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
2224
2225 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2226 .path_const = "/tmp",
2227 .mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP,
2228 .source_const = tmp_dir,
2229 };
2230 }
2231
2232 if (var_tmp_dir) {
2233 bool ro = streq(var_tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
2234
2235 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2236 .path_const = "/var/tmp",
2237 .mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP,
2238 .source_const = var_tmp_dir,
2239 };
2240 }
2241
2242 r = append_mount_images(&m, mount_images, n_mount_images);
2243 if (r < 0)
2244 goto finish;
2245
2246 r = append_extensions(&m, root, extension_dir, hierarchies, extension_images, n_extension_images, extension_directories);
2247 if (r < 0)
2248 goto finish;
2249
2250 if (ns_info->private_dev)
2251 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2252 .path_const = "/dev",
2253 .mode = PRIVATE_DEV,
2254 .flags = DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS,
2255 };
2256
2257 /* In case /proc is successfully mounted with pid tree subset only (ProcSubset=pid), the
2258 protective mounts to non-pid /proc paths would fail. But the pid only option may have
2259 failed gracefully, so let's try the mounts but it's not fatal if they don't succeed. */
2260 bool ignore_protect_proc = ns_info->ignore_protect_paths || ns_info->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID;
2261 if (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables) {
2262 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2263 protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table,
2264 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table),
2265 ignore_protect_proc);
2266 if (r < 0)
2267 goto finish;
2268
2269 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2270 protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table,
2271 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table),
2272 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
2273 if (r < 0)
2274 goto finish;
2275 }
2276
2277 if (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules) {
2278 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2279 protect_kernel_modules_table,
2280 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table),
2281 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
2282 if (r < 0)
2283 goto finish;
2284 }
2285
2286 if (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs) {
2287 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2288 protect_kernel_logs_proc_table,
2289 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_proc_table),
2290 ignore_protect_proc);
2291 if (r < 0)
2292 goto finish;
2293
2294 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2295 protect_kernel_logs_dev_table,
2296 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_dev_table),
2297 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
2298 if (r < 0)
2299 goto finish;
2300 }
2301
2302 if (ns_info->protect_control_groups)
2303 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2304 .path_const = "/sys/fs/cgroup",
2305 .mode = READONLY,
2306 };
2307
2308 r = append_protect_home(&m, ns_info->protect_home, ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
2309 if (r < 0)
2310 goto finish;
2311
2312 r = append_protect_system(&m, ns_info->protect_system, false);
2313 if (r < 0)
2314 goto finish;
2315
2316 if (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info)) {
2317 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2318 apivfs_table,
2319 ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table),
2320 ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
2321 if (r < 0)
2322 goto finish;
2323 }
2324
2325 /* Note, if proc is mounted with subset=pid then neither of the
2326 * two paths will exist, i.e. they are implicitly protected by
2327 * the mount option. */
2328 if (ns_info->protect_hostname) {
2329 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2330 .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/hostname",
2331 .mode = READONLY,
2332 .ignore = ignore_protect_proc,
2333 };
2334 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2335 .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/domainname",
2336 .mode = READONLY,
2337 .ignore = ignore_protect_proc,
2338 };
2339 }
2340
2341 if (ns_info->private_network)
2342 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2343 .path_const = "/sys",
2344 .mode = PRIVATE_SYSFS,
2345 };
2346
2347 if (ns_info->private_ipc)
2348 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2349 .path_const = "/dev/mqueue",
2350 .mode = MQUEUEFS,
2351 .flags = MS_NOSUID | MS_NODEV | MS_NOEXEC | MS_RELATIME,
2352 };
2353
2354 if (creds_path) {
2355 /* If our service has a credentials store configured, then bind that one in, but hide
2356 * everything else. */
2357
2358 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2359 .path_const = "/run/credentials",
2360 .mode = TMPFS,
2361 .read_only = true,
2362 .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST,
2363 .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC,
2364 };
2365
2366 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2367 .path_const = creds_path,
2368 .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
2369 .read_only = true,
2370 .source_const = creds_path,
2371 .ignore = true,
2372 };
2373 } else {
2374 /* If our service has no credentials store configured, then make the whole
2375 * credentials tree inaccessible wholesale. */
2376
2377 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2378 .path_const = "/run/credentials",
2379 .mode = INACCESSIBLE,
2380 .ignore = true,
2381 };
2382 }
2383
2384 if (log_namespace) {
2385 _cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL;
2386
2387 q = strjoin("/run/systemd/journal.", log_namespace);
2388 if (!q) {
2389 r = -ENOMEM;
2390 goto finish;
2391 }
2392
2393 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2394 .path_const = "/run/systemd/journal",
2395 .mode = BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE,
2396 .read_only = true,
2397 .source_malloc = TAKE_PTR(q),
2398 };
2399 }
2400
2401 /* Will be used to add bind mounts at runtime */
2402 if (setup_propagate)
2403 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2404 .source_const = propagate_dir,
2405 .path_const = incoming_dir,
2406 .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
2407 .read_only = true,
2408 };
2409
2410 if (notify_socket)
2411 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2412 .path_const = notify_socket,
2413 .source_const = notify_socket,
2414 .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
2415 .read_only = true,
2416 };
2417
2418 if (host_os_release_stage)
2419 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2420 .path_const = "/run/host/.os-release-stage/",
2421 .source_const = host_os_release_stage,
2422 .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
2423 .read_only = true,
2424 .ignore = true, /* Live copy, don't hard-fail if it goes missing */
2425 };
2426
2427 assert(mounts + n_mounts == m);
2428
2429 /* Prepend the root directory where that's necessary */
2430 r = prefix_where_needed(mounts, n_mounts, root);
2431 if (r < 0)
2432 goto finish;
2433
2434 drop_unused_mounts(root, mounts, &n_mounts);
2435 }
2436
2437 /* All above is just preparation, figuring out what to do. Let's now actually start doing something. */
2438
2439 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) < 0) {
2440 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to unshare the mount namespace: %m");
2441 if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r) ||
2442 ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r))
2443 /* If the kernel doesn't support namespaces, or when there's a MAC or seccomp filter
2444 * in place that doesn't allow us to create namespaces (or a missing cap), then
2445 * propagate a recognizable error back, which the caller can use to detect this case
2446 * (and only this) and optionally continue without namespacing applied. */
2447 r = -ENOANO;
2448
2449 goto finish;
2450 }
2451
2452 /* Create the source directory to allow runtime propagation of mounts */
2453 if (setup_propagate)
2454 (void) mkdir_p(propagate_dir, 0600);
2455
2456 if (n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(extension_directories))
2457 /* ExtensionImages/Directories mountpoint directories will be created while parsing the
2458 * mounts to create, so have the parent ready */
2459 (void) mkdir_p(extension_dir, 0600);
2460
2461 /* Remount / as SLAVE so that nothing now mounted in the namespace
2462 * shows up in the parent */
2463 if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_SLAVE|MS_REC, NULL) < 0) {
2464 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' as SLAVE: %m");
2465 goto finish;
2466 }
2467
2468 if (root_image) {
2469 /* A root image is specified, mount it to the right place */
2470 r = dissected_image_mount(dissected_image, root, UID_INVALID, UID_INVALID, dissect_image_flags);
2471 if (r < 0) {
2472 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root image: %m");
2473 goto finish;
2474 }
2475
2476 /* Now release the block device lock, so that udevd is free to call BLKRRPART on the device
2477 * if it likes. */
2478 r = loop_device_flock(loop_device, LOCK_UN);
2479 if (r < 0) {
2480 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to release lock on loopback block device: %m");
2481 goto finish;
2482 }
2483
2484 r = dissected_image_relinquish(dissected_image);
2485 if (r < 0) {
2486 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to relinquish dissected image: %m");
2487 goto finish;
2488 }
2489
2490 } else if (root_directory) {
2491
2492 /* A root directory is specified. Turn its directory into bind mount, if it isn't one yet. */
2493 r = path_is_mount_point(root, NULL, AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW);
2494 if (r < 0) {
2495 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect that %s is a mount point or not: %m", root);
2496 goto finish;
2497 }
2498 if (r == 0) {
2499 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, root, root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
2500 if (r < 0)
2501 goto finish;
2502 }
2503
2504 } else {
2505 /* Let's mount the main root directory to the root directory to use */
2506 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/", root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
2507 if (r < 0)
2508 goto finish;
2509 }
2510
2511 /* Try to set up the new root directory before mounting anything else there. */
2512 if (root_image || root_directory)
2513 (void) base_filesystem_create(root, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
2514
2515 /* Now make the magic happen */
2516 r = apply_mounts(root, mount_image_policy, extension_image_policy, ns_info, mounts, &n_mounts, symlinks, error_path);
2517 if (r < 0)
2518 goto finish;
2519
2520 /* MS_MOVE does not work on MS_SHARED so the remount MS_SHARED will be done later */
2521 r = mount_switch_root(root, /* mount_propagation_flag = */ 0);
2522 if (r == -EINVAL && root_directory) {
2523 /* If we are using root_directory and we don't have privileges (ie: user manager in a user
2524 * namespace) and the root_directory is already a mount point in the parent namespace,
2525 * MS_MOVE will fail as we don't have permission to change it (with EINVAL rather than
2526 * EPERM). Attempt to bind-mount it over itself (like we do above if it's not already a
2527 * mount point) and try again. */
2528 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, root, root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
2529 if (r < 0)
2530 goto finish;
2531 r = mount_switch_root(root, /* mount_propagation_flag = */ 0);
2532 }
2533 if (r < 0) {
2534 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root with MS_MOVE: %m");
2535 goto finish;
2536 }
2537
2538 /* Remount / as the desired mode. Note that this will not reestablish propagation from our side to
2539 * the host, since what's disconnected is disconnected. */
2540 if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, mount_propagation_flag | MS_REC, NULL) < 0) {
2541 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' with desired mount flags: %m");
2542 goto finish;
2543 }
2544
2545 /* bind_mount_in_namespace() will MS_MOVE into that directory, and that's only
2546 * supported for non-shared mounts. This needs to happen after remounting / or it will fail. */
2547 if (setup_propagate) {
2548 r = mount(NULL, incoming_dir, NULL, MS_SLAVE, NULL);
2549 if (r < 0) {
2550 log_error_errno(r, "Failed to remount %s with MS_SLAVE: %m", incoming_dir);
2551 goto finish;
2552 }
2553 }
2554
2555 r = 0;
2556
2557 finish:
2558 if (n_mounts > 0)
2559 for (m = mounts; m < mounts + n_mounts; m++)
2560 mount_entry_done(m);
2561
2562 free(mounts);
2563
2564 return r;
2565 }
2566
2567 void bind_mount_free_many(BindMount *b, size_t n) {
2568 assert(b || n == 0);
2569
2570 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
2571 free(b[i].source);
2572 free(b[i].destination);
2573 }
2574
2575 free(b);
2576 }
2577
2578 int bind_mount_add(BindMount **b, size_t *n, const BindMount *item) {
2579 _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL;
2580 BindMount *c;
2581
2582 assert(b);
2583 assert(n);
2584 assert(item);
2585
2586 s = strdup(item->source);
2587 if (!s)
2588 return -ENOMEM;
2589
2590 d = strdup(item->destination);
2591 if (!d)
2592 return -ENOMEM;
2593
2594 c = reallocarray(*b, *n + 1, sizeof(BindMount));
2595 if (!c)
2596 return -ENOMEM;
2597
2598 *b = c;
2599
2600 c[(*n) ++] = (BindMount) {
2601 .source = TAKE_PTR(s),
2602 .destination = TAKE_PTR(d),
2603 .read_only = item->read_only,
2604 .nosuid = item->nosuid,
2605 .recursive = item->recursive,
2606 .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent,
2607 };
2608
2609 return 0;
2610 }
2611
2612 MountImage* mount_image_free_many(MountImage *m, size_t *n) {
2613 assert(n);
2614 assert(m || *n == 0);
2615
2616 for (size_t i = 0; i < *n; i++) {
2617 free(m[i].source);
2618 free(m[i].destination);
2619 mount_options_free_all(m[i].mount_options);
2620 }
2621
2622 free(m);
2623 *n = 0;
2624 return NULL;
2625 }
2626
2627 int mount_image_add(MountImage **m, size_t *n, const MountImage *item) {
2628 _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL;
2629 _cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *options = NULL;
2630 MountImage *c;
2631
2632 assert(m);
2633 assert(n);
2634 assert(item);
2635
2636 s = strdup(item->source);
2637 if (!s)
2638 return -ENOMEM;
2639
2640 if (item->destination) {
2641 d = strdup(item->destination);
2642 if (!d)
2643 return -ENOMEM;
2644 }
2645
2646 LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, i, item->mount_options) {
2647 _cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *o = NULL;
2648
2649 o = new(MountOptions, 1);
2650 if (!o)
2651 return -ENOMEM;
2652
2653 *o = (MountOptions) {
2654 .partition_designator = i->partition_designator,
2655 .options = strdup(i->options),
2656 };
2657 if (!o->options)
2658 return -ENOMEM;
2659
2660 LIST_APPEND(mount_options, options, TAKE_PTR(o));
2661 }
2662
2663 c = reallocarray(*m, *n + 1, sizeof(MountImage));
2664 if (!c)
2665 return -ENOMEM;
2666
2667 *m = c;
2668
2669 c[(*n) ++] = (MountImage) {
2670 .source = TAKE_PTR(s),
2671 .destination = TAKE_PTR(d),
2672 .mount_options = TAKE_PTR(options),
2673 .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent,
2674 .type = item->type,
2675 };
2676
2677 return 0;
2678 }
2679
2680 void temporary_filesystem_free_many(TemporaryFileSystem *t, size_t n) {
2681 assert(t || n == 0);
2682
2683 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
2684 free(t[i].path);
2685 free(t[i].options);
2686 }
2687
2688 free(t);
2689 }
2690
2691 int temporary_filesystem_add(
2692 TemporaryFileSystem **t,
2693 size_t *n,
2694 const char *path,
2695 const char *options) {
2696
2697 _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *o = NULL;
2698 TemporaryFileSystem *c;
2699
2700 assert(t);
2701 assert(n);
2702 assert(path);
2703
2704 p = strdup(path);
2705 if (!p)
2706 return -ENOMEM;
2707
2708 if (!isempty(options)) {
2709 o = strdup(options);
2710 if (!o)
2711 return -ENOMEM;
2712 }
2713
2714 c = reallocarray(*t, *n + 1, sizeof(TemporaryFileSystem));
2715 if (!c)
2716 return -ENOMEM;
2717
2718 *t = c;
2719
2720 c[(*n) ++] = (TemporaryFileSystem) {
2721 .path = TAKE_PTR(p),
2722 .options = TAKE_PTR(o),
2723 };
2724
2725 return 0;
2726 }
2727
2728 static int make_tmp_prefix(const char *prefix) {
2729 _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
2730 _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF;
2731 int r;
2732
2733 /* Don't do anything unless we know the dir is actually missing */
2734 r = access(prefix, F_OK);
2735 if (r >= 0)
2736 return 0;
2737 if (errno != ENOENT)
2738 return -errno;
2739
2740 WITH_UMASK(000)
2741 r = mkdir_parents(prefix, 0755);
2742 if (r < 0)
2743 return r;
2744
2745 r = tempfn_random(prefix, NULL, &t);
2746 if (r < 0)
2747 return r;
2748
2749 /* umask will corrupt this access mode, but that doesn't matter, we need to call chmod() anyway for
2750 * the suid bit, below. */
2751 fd = open_mkdir_at(AT_FDCWD, t, O_EXCL|O_CLOEXEC, 0777);
2752 if (fd < 0)
2753 return fd;
2754
2755 r = RET_NERRNO(fchmod(fd, 01777));
2756 if (r < 0) {
2757 (void) rmdir(t);
2758 return r;
2759 }
2760
2761 r = RET_NERRNO(rename(t, prefix));
2762 if (r < 0) {
2763 (void) rmdir(t);
2764 return r == -EEXIST ? 0 : r; /* it's fine if someone else created the dir by now */
2765 }
2766
2767 return 0;
2768
2769 }
2770
2771 static int setup_one_tmp_dir(const char *id, const char *prefix, char **path, char **tmp_path) {
2772 _cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL;
2773 _cleanup_free_ char *y = NULL;
2774 sd_id128_t boot_id;
2775 bool rw = true;
2776 int r;
2777
2778 assert(id);
2779 assert(prefix);
2780 assert(path);
2781
2782 /* We include the boot id in the directory so that after a
2783 * reboot we can easily identify obsolete directories. */
2784
2785 r = sd_id128_get_boot(&boot_id);
2786 if (r < 0)
2787 return r;
2788
2789 x = strjoin(prefix, "/systemd-private-", SD_ID128_TO_STRING(boot_id), "-", id, "-XXXXXX");
2790 if (!x)
2791 return -ENOMEM;
2792
2793 r = make_tmp_prefix(prefix);
2794 if (r < 0)
2795 return r;
2796
2797 WITH_UMASK(0077)
2798 if (!mkdtemp(x)) {
2799 if (errno == EROFS || ERRNO_IS_DISK_SPACE(errno))
2800 rw = false;
2801 else
2802 return -errno;
2803 }
2804
2805 if (rw) {
2806 y = strjoin(x, "/tmp");
2807 if (!y)
2808 return -ENOMEM;
2809
2810 WITH_UMASK(0000)
2811 if (mkdir(y, 0777 | S_ISVTX) < 0)
2812 return -errno;
2813
2814 r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, y, prefix, 0);
2815 if (r < 0)
2816 return r;
2817
2818 if (tmp_path)
2819 *tmp_path = TAKE_PTR(y);
2820 } else {
2821 /* Trouble: we failed to create the directory. Instead of failing, let's simulate /tmp being
2822 * read-only. This way the service will get the EROFS result as if it was writing to the real
2823 * file system. */
2824 WITH_UMASK(0000)
2825 r = mkdir_p(RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY, 0500);
2826 if (r < 0)
2827 return r;
2828
2829 r = free_and_strdup(&x, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
2830 if (r < 0)
2831 return r;
2832 }
2833
2834 *path = TAKE_PTR(x);
2835 return 0;
2836 }
2837
2838 int setup_tmp_dirs(const char *id, char **tmp_dir, char **var_tmp_dir) {
2839 _cleanup_(namespace_cleanup_tmpdirp) char *a = NULL;
2840 _cleanup_(rmdir_and_freep) char *a_tmp = NULL;
2841 char *b;
2842 int r;
2843
2844 assert(id);
2845 assert(tmp_dir);
2846 assert(var_tmp_dir);
2847
2848 r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/tmp", &a, &a_tmp);
2849 if (r < 0)
2850 return r;
2851
2852 r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/var/tmp", &b, NULL);
2853 if (r < 0)
2854 return r;
2855
2856 a_tmp = mfree(a_tmp); /* avoid rmdir */
2857 *tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(a);
2858 *var_tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(b);
2859
2860 return 0;
2861 }
2862
2863 int setup_shareable_ns(int ns_storage_socket[static 2], unsigned long nsflag) {
2864 _cleanup_close_ int ns = -EBADF;
2865 int r;
2866 const char *ns_name, *ns_path;
2867
2868 assert(ns_storage_socket);
2869 assert(ns_storage_socket[0] >= 0);
2870 assert(ns_storage_socket[1] >= 0);
2871
2872 ns_name = namespace_single_flag_to_string(nsflag);
2873 assert(ns_name);
2874
2875 /* We use the passed socketpair as a storage buffer for our
2876 * namespace reference fd. Whatever process runs this first
2877 * shall create a new namespace, all others should just join
2878 * it. To serialize that we use a file lock on the socket
2879 * pair.
2880 *
2881 * It's a bit crazy, but hey, works great! */
2882
2883 r = posix_lock(ns_storage_socket[0], LOCK_EX);
2884 if (r < 0)
2885 return r;
2886
2887 CLEANUP_POSIX_UNLOCK(ns_storage_socket[0]);
2888
2889 ns = receive_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[0], MSG_PEEK|MSG_DONTWAIT);
2890 if (ns >= 0) {
2891 /* Yay, found something, so let's join the namespace */
2892 r = RET_NERRNO(setns(ns, nsflag));
2893 if (r < 0)
2894 return r;
2895
2896 return 0;
2897 }
2898
2899 if (ns != -EAGAIN)
2900 return ns;
2901
2902 /* Nothing stored yet, so let's create a new namespace. */
2903
2904 if (unshare(nsflag) < 0)
2905 return -errno;
2906
2907 (void) loopback_setup();
2908
2909 ns_path = strjoina("/proc/self/ns/", ns_name);
2910 ns = open(ns_path, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
2911 if (ns < 0)
2912 return -errno;
2913
2914 r = send_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[1], ns, MSG_DONTWAIT);
2915 if (r < 0)
2916 return r;
2917
2918 return 1;
2919 }
2920
2921 int open_shareable_ns_path(int ns_storage_socket[static 2], const char *path, unsigned long nsflag) {
2922 _cleanup_close_ int ns = -EBADF;
2923 int r;
2924
2925 assert(ns_storage_socket);
2926 assert(ns_storage_socket[0] >= 0);
2927 assert(ns_storage_socket[1] >= 0);
2928 assert(path);
2929
2930 /* If the storage socket doesn't contain a ns fd yet, open one via the file system and store it in
2931 * it. This is supposed to be called ahead of time, i.e. before setup_shareable_ns() which will
2932 * allocate a new anonymous ns if needed. */
2933
2934 r = posix_lock(ns_storage_socket[0], LOCK_EX);
2935 if (r < 0)
2936 return r;
2937
2938 CLEANUP_POSIX_UNLOCK(ns_storage_socket[0]);
2939
2940 ns = receive_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[0], MSG_PEEK|MSG_DONTWAIT);
2941 if (ns >= 0)
2942 return 0;
2943 if (ns != -EAGAIN)
2944 return ns;
2945
2946 /* Nothing stored yet. Open the file from the file system. */
2947
2948 ns = open(path, O_RDONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC);
2949 if (ns < 0)
2950 return -errno;
2951
2952 r = fd_is_ns(ns, nsflag);
2953 if (r == 0)
2954 return -EINVAL;
2955 if (r < 0 && r != -EUCLEAN) /* EUCLEAN: we don't know */
2956 return r;
2957
2958 r = send_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[1], ns, MSG_DONTWAIT);
2959 if (r < 0)
2960 return r;
2961
2962 return 1;
2963 }
2964
2965 bool ns_type_supported(NamespaceType type) {
2966 const char *t, *ns_proc;
2967
2968 t = namespace_type_to_string(type);
2969 if (!t) /* Don't know how to translate this? Then it's not supported */
2970 return false;
2971
2972 ns_proc = strjoina("/proc/self/ns/", t);
2973 return access(ns_proc, F_OK) == 0;
2974 }
2975
2976 static const char *const protect_home_table[_PROTECT_HOME_MAX] = {
2977 [PROTECT_HOME_NO] = "no",
2978 [PROTECT_HOME_YES] = "yes",
2979 [PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY] = "read-only",
2980 [PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS] = "tmpfs",
2981 };
2982
2983 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_home, ProtectHome, PROTECT_HOME_YES);
2984
2985 static const char *const protect_system_table[_PROTECT_SYSTEM_MAX] = {
2986 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO] = "no",
2987 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES] = "yes",
2988 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL] = "full",
2989 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT] = "strict",
2990 };
2991
2992 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_system, ProtectSystem, PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES);
2993
2994 static const char* const namespace_type_table[] = {
2995 [NAMESPACE_MOUNT] = "mnt",
2996 [NAMESPACE_CGROUP] = "cgroup",
2997 [NAMESPACE_UTS] = "uts",
2998 [NAMESPACE_IPC] = "ipc",
2999 [NAMESPACE_USER] = "user",
3000 [NAMESPACE_PID] = "pid",
3001 [NAMESPACE_NET] = "net",
3002 [NAMESPACE_TIME] = "time",
3003 };
3004
3005 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(namespace_type, NamespaceType);
3006
3007 static const char* const protect_proc_table[_PROTECT_PROC_MAX] = {
3008 [PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT] = "default",
3009 [PROTECT_PROC_NOACCESS] = "noaccess",
3010 [PROTECT_PROC_INVISIBLE] = "invisible",
3011 [PROTECT_PROC_PTRACEABLE] = "ptraceable",
3012 };
3013
3014 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(protect_proc, ProtectProc);
3015
3016 static const char* const proc_subset_table[_PROC_SUBSET_MAX] = {
3017 [PROC_SUBSET_ALL] = "all",
3018 [PROC_SUBSET_PID] = "pid",
3019 };
3020
3021 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(proc_subset, ProcSubset);