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Merge pull request #29502 from keszybz/sd-boot-config-tweaks
[thirdparty/systemd.git] / src / core / namespace.c
1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
2
3 #include <errno.h>
4 #include <linux/loop.h>
5 #include <sched.h>
6 #include <stdio.h>
7 #include <sys/file.h>
8 #include <sys/mount.h>
9 #include <unistd.h>
10 #if WANT_LINUX_FS_H
11 #include <linux/fs.h>
12 #endif
13
14 #include "alloc-util.h"
15 #include "base-filesystem.h"
16 #include "chase.h"
17 #include "dev-setup.h"
18 #include "devnum-util.h"
19 #include "env-util.h"
20 #include "escape.h"
21 #include "extension-util.h"
22 #include "fd-util.h"
23 #include "format-util.h"
24 #include "glyph-util.h"
25 #include "label-util.h"
26 #include "list.h"
27 #include "lock-util.h"
28 #include "loop-util.h"
29 #include "loopback-setup.h"
30 #include "missing_syscall.h"
31 #include "mkdir-label.h"
32 #include "mount-util.h"
33 #include "mountpoint-util.h"
34 #include "namespace-util.h"
35 #include "namespace.h"
36 #include "nsflags.h"
37 #include "nulstr-util.h"
38 #include "os-util.h"
39 #include "path-util.h"
40 #include "selinux-util.h"
41 #include "socket-util.h"
42 #include "sort-util.h"
43 #include "stat-util.h"
44 #include "string-table.h"
45 #include "string-util.h"
46 #include "strv.h"
47 #include "tmpfile-util.h"
48 #include "umask-util.h"
49 #include "user-util.h"
50
51 #define DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS (MS_NOSUID|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOEXEC)
52
53 typedef enum MountMode {
54 /* This is ordered by priority! */
55 INACCESSIBLE,
56 OVERLAY_MOUNT,
57 MOUNT_IMAGES,
58 BIND_MOUNT,
59 BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE,
60 PRIVATE_TMP,
61 PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY,
62 PRIVATE_DEV,
63 BIND_DEV,
64 EMPTY_DIR,
65 PRIVATE_SYSFS,
66 BIND_SYSFS,
67 PROCFS,
68 READONLY,
69 READWRITE,
70 NOEXEC,
71 EXEC,
72 TMPFS,
73 RUN,
74 EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES, /* Bind-mounted outside the root directory, and used by subsequent mounts */
75 EXTENSION_IMAGES, /* Mounted outside the root directory, and used by subsequent mounts */
76 MQUEUEFS,
77 READWRITE_IMPLICIT, /* Should have the lowest priority. */
78 _MOUNT_MODE_MAX,
79 } MountMode;
80
81 typedef struct MountEntry {
82 const char *path_const; /* Memory allocated on stack or static */
83 MountMode mode:5;
84 bool ignore:1; /* Ignore if path does not exist? */
85 bool has_prefix:1; /* Already is prefixed by the root dir? */
86 bool read_only:1; /* Shall this mount point be read-only? */
87 bool nosuid:1; /* Shall set MS_NOSUID on the mount itself */
88 bool noexec:1; /* Shall set MS_NOEXEC on the mount itself */
89 bool exec:1; /* Shall clear MS_NOEXEC on the mount itself */
90 bool applied:1; /* Already applied */
91 char *path_malloc; /* Use this instead of 'path_const' if we had to allocate memory */
92 const char *unprefixed_path_const; /* If the path was amended with a prefix, these will save the original */
93 char *unprefixed_path_malloc;
94 const char *source_const; /* The source path, for bind mounts or images */
95 char *source_malloc;
96 const char *options_const;/* Mount options for tmpfs */
97 char *options_malloc;
98 unsigned long flags; /* Mount flags used by EMPTY_DIR and TMPFS. Do not include MS_RDONLY here, but please use read_only. */
99 unsigned n_followed;
100 LIST_HEAD(MountOptions, image_options);
101 } MountEntry;
102
103 /* If MountAPIVFS= is used, let's mount /sys, /proc, /dev and /run into the it, but only as a fallback if the user hasn't mounted
104 * something there already. These mounts are hence overridden by any other explicitly configured mounts. */
105 static const MountEntry apivfs_table[] = {
106 { "/proc", PROCFS, false },
107 { "/dev", BIND_DEV, false },
108 { "/sys", BIND_SYSFS, false },
109 { "/run", RUN, false, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_RUN, .flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
110 };
111
112 /* ProtectKernelTunables= option and the related filesystem APIs */
113 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table[] = {
114 { "/proc/acpi", READONLY, true },
115 { "/proc/apm", READONLY, true }, /* Obsolete API, there's no point in permitting access to this, ever */
116 { "/proc/asound", READONLY, true },
117 { "/proc/bus", READONLY, true },
118 { "/proc/fs", READONLY, true },
119 { "/proc/irq", READONLY, true },
120 { "/proc/kallsyms", INACCESSIBLE, true },
121 { "/proc/kcore", INACCESSIBLE, true },
122 { "/proc/latency_stats", READONLY, true },
123 { "/proc/mtrr", READONLY, true },
124 { "/proc/scsi", READONLY, true },
125 { "/proc/sys", READONLY, true },
126 { "/proc/sysrq-trigger", READONLY, true },
127 { "/proc/timer_stats", READONLY, true },
128 };
129
130 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table[] = {
131 { "/sys", READONLY, false },
132 { "/sys/fs/bpf", READONLY, true },
133 { "/sys/fs/cgroup", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* READONLY is set by ProtectControlGroups= option */
134 { "/sys/fs/selinux", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true },
135 { "/sys/kernel/debug", READONLY, true },
136 { "/sys/kernel/tracing", READONLY, true },
137 };
138
139 /* ProtectKernelModules= option */
140 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_modules_table[] = {
141 { "/usr/lib/modules", INACCESSIBLE, true },
142 };
143
144 /* ProtectKernelLogs= option */
145 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_logs_proc_table[] = {
146 { "/proc/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true },
147 };
148
149 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_logs_dev_table[] = {
150 { "/dev/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true },
151 };
152
153 /*
154 * ProtectHome=read-only table, protect $HOME and $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR and rest of
155 * system should be protected by ProtectSystem=
156 */
157 static const MountEntry protect_home_read_only_table[] = {
158 { "/home", READONLY, true },
159 { "/run/user", READONLY, true },
160 { "/root", READONLY, true },
161 };
162
163 /* ProtectHome=tmpfs table */
164 static const MountEntry protect_home_tmpfs_table[] = {
165 { "/home", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
166 { "/run/user", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
167 { "/root", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0700" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
168 };
169
170 /* ProtectHome=yes table */
171 static const MountEntry protect_home_yes_table[] = {
172 { "/home", INACCESSIBLE, true },
173 { "/run/user", INACCESSIBLE, true },
174 { "/root", INACCESSIBLE, true },
175 };
176
177 /* ProtectSystem=yes table */
178 static const MountEntry protect_system_yes_table[] = {
179 { "/usr", READONLY, false },
180 { "/boot", READONLY, true },
181 { "/efi", READONLY, true },
182 };
183
184 /* ProtectSystem=full includes ProtectSystem=yes */
185 static const MountEntry protect_system_full_table[] = {
186 { "/usr", READONLY, false },
187 { "/boot", READONLY, true },
188 { "/efi", READONLY, true },
189 { "/etc", READONLY, false },
190 };
191
192 /*
193 * ProtectSystem=strict table. In this strict mode, we mount everything
194 * read-only, except for /proc, /dev, /sys which are the kernel API VFS,
195 * which are left writable, but PrivateDevices= + ProtectKernelTunables=
196 * protect those, and these options should be fully orthogonal.
197 * (And of course /home and friends are also left writable, as ProtectHome=
198 * shall manage those, orthogonally).
199 */
200 static const MountEntry protect_system_strict_table[] = {
201 { "/", READONLY, false },
202 { "/proc", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */
203 { "/sys", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */
204 { "/dev", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* PrivateDevices= */
205 { "/home", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
206 { "/run/user", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
207 { "/root", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
208 };
209
210 static const char * const mount_mode_table[_MOUNT_MODE_MAX] = {
211 [INACCESSIBLE] = "inaccessible",
212 [OVERLAY_MOUNT] = "overlay",
213 [MOUNT_IMAGES] = "mount-images",
214 [BIND_MOUNT] = "bind",
215 [BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE] = "rbind",
216 [PRIVATE_TMP] = "private-tmp",
217 [PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY] = "private-tmp-read-only",
218 [PRIVATE_DEV] = "private-dev",
219 [BIND_DEV] = "bind-dev",
220 [EMPTY_DIR] = "empty",
221 [PRIVATE_SYSFS] = "private-sysfs",
222 [BIND_SYSFS] = "bind-sysfs",
223 [PROCFS] = "procfs",
224 [READONLY] = "read-only",
225 [READWRITE] = "read-write",
226 [NOEXEC] = "noexec",
227 [EXEC] = "exec",
228 [TMPFS] = "tmpfs",
229 [RUN] = "run",
230 [EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES] = "extension-directories",
231 [EXTENSION_IMAGES] = "extension-images",
232 [MQUEUEFS] = "mqueuefs",
233 [READWRITE_IMPLICIT] = "read-write-implicit",
234 };
235
236 /* Helper struct for naming simplicity and reusability */
237 static const struct {
238 const char *level_env;
239 const char *level_env_print;
240 } image_class_info[_IMAGE_CLASS_MAX] = {
241 [IMAGE_SYSEXT] = {
242 .level_env = "SYSEXT_LEVEL",
243 .level_env_print = " SYSEXT_LEVEL=",
244 },
245 [IMAGE_CONFEXT] = {
246 .level_env = "CONFEXT_LEVEL",
247 .level_env_print = " CONFEXT_LEVEL=",
248 }
249 };
250
251 DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(mount_mode, MountMode);
252
253 static const char *mount_entry_path(const MountEntry *p) {
254 assert(p);
255
256 /* Returns the path of this bind mount. If the malloc()-allocated ->path_buffer field is set we return that,
257 * otherwise the stack/static ->path field is returned. */
258
259 return p->path_malloc ?: p->path_const;
260 }
261
262 static const char *mount_entry_unprefixed_path(const MountEntry *p) {
263 assert(p);
264
265 /* Returns the unprefixed path (ie: before prefix_where_needed() ran), if any */
266
267 return p->unprefixed_path_malloc ?: p->unprefixed_path_const ?: mount_entry_path(p);
268 }
269
270 static void mount_entry_consume_prefix(MountEntry *p, char *new_path) {
271 assert(p);
272 assert(p->path_malloc || p->path_const);
273 assert(new_path);
274
275 /* Saves current path in unprefixed_ variable, and takes over new_path */
276
277 free_and_replace(p->unprefixed_path_malloc, p->path_malloc);
278 /* If we didn't have a path on the heap, then it's a static one */
279 if (!p->unprefixed_path_malloc)
280 p->unprefixed_path_const = p->path_const;
281 p->path_malloc = new_path;
282 p->has_prefix = true;
283 }
284
285 static bool mount_entry_read_only(const MountEntry *p) {
286 assert(p);
287
288 return p->read_only || IN_SET(p->mode, READONLY, INACCESSIBLE, PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY);
289 }
290
291 static bool mount_entry_noexec(const MountEntry *p) {
292 assert(p);
293
294 return p->noexec || IN_SET(p->mode, NOEXEC, INACCESSIBLE, PRIVATE_SYSFS, BIND_SYSFS, PROCFS);
295 }
296
297 static bool mount_entry_exec(const MountEntry *p) {
298 assert(p);
299
300 return p->exec || p->mode == EXEC;
301 }
302
303 static const char *mount_entry_source(const MountEntry *p) {
304 assert(p);
305
306 return p->source_malloc ?: p->source_const;
307 }
308
309 static const char *mount_entry_options(const MountEntry *p) {
310 assert(p);
311
312 return p->options_malloc ?: p->options_const;
313 }
314
315 static void mount_entry_done(MountEntry *p) {
316 assert(p);
317
318 p->path_malloc = mfree(p->path_malloc);
319 p->unprefixed_path_malloc = mfree(p->unprefixed_path_malloc);
320 p->source_malloc = mfree(p->source_malloc);
321 p->options_malloc = mfree(p->options_malloc);
322 p->image_options = mount_options_free_all(p->image_options);
323 }
324
325 static int append_access_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv, MountMode mode, bool forcibly_require_prefix) {
326 assert(p);
327
328 /* Adds a list of user-supplied READWRITE/READWRITE_IMPLICIT/READONLY/INACCESSIBLE entries */
329
330 STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) {
331 bool ignore = false, needs_prefix = false;
332 const char *e = *i;
333
334 /* Look for any prefixes */
335 if (startswith(e, "-")) {
336 e++;
337 ignore = true;
338 }
339 if (startswith(e, "+")) {
340 e++;
341 needs_prefix = true;
342 }
343
344 if (!path_is_absolute(e))
345 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
346 "Path is not absolute: %s", e);
347
348 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
349 .path_const = e,
350 .mode = mode,
351 .ignore = ignore,
352 .has_prefix = !needs_prefix && !forcibly_require_prefix,
353 };
354 }
355
356 return 0;
357 }
358
359 static int append_empty_dir_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv) {
360 assert(p);
361
362 /* Adds tmpfs mounts to provide readable but empty directories. This is primarily used to implement the
363 * "/private/" boundary directories for DynamicUser=1. */
364
365 STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) {
366
367 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
368 .path_const = *i,
369 .mode = EMPTY_DIR,
370 .ignore = false,
371 .read_only = true,
372 .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST,
373 .flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME,
374 };
375 }
376
377 return 0;
378 }
379
380 static int append_bind_mounts(MountEntry **p, const BindMount *binds, size_t n) {
381 assert(p);
382
383 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
384 const BindMount *b = binds + i;
385
386 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
387 .path_const = b->destination,
388 .mode = b->recursive ? BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE : BIND_MOUNT,
389 .read_only = b->read_only,
390 .nosuid = b->nosuid,
391 .source_const = b->source,
392 .ignore = b->ignore_enoent,
393 };
394 }
395
396 return 0;
397 }
398
399 static int append_mount_images(MountEntry **p, const MountImage *mount_images, size_t n) {
400 assert(p);
401
402 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
403 const MountImage *m = mount_images + i;
404
405 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
406 .path_const = m->destination,
407 .mode = MOUNT_IMAGES,
408 .source_const = m->source,
409 .image_options = m->mount_options,
410 .ignore = m->ignore_enoent,
411 };
412 }
413
414 return 0;
415 }
416
417 static int append_extensions(
418 MountEntry **p,
419 const char *root,
420 const char *extension_dir,
421 char **hierarchies,
422 const MountImage *mount_images,
423 size_t n,
424 char **extension_directories) {
425
426 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **overlays = NULL;
427 int r;
428
429 if (n == 0 && strv_isempty(extension_directories))
430 return 0;
431
432 assert(p);
433 assert(extension_dir);
434
435 /* Prepare a list of overlays, that will have as each element a string suitable for being
436 * passed as a lowerdir= parameter, so start with the hierarchy on the root.
437 * The overlays vector will have the same number of elements and will correspond to the
438 * hierarchies vector, so they can be iterated upon together. */
439 STRV_FOREACH(hierarchy, hierarchies) {
440 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL;
441
442 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(root, *hierarchy);
443 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
444 return -ENOMEM;
445
446 r = strv_consume(&overlays, TAKE_PTR(prefixed_hierarchy));
447 if (r < 0)
448 return r;
449 }
450
451 /* First, prepare a mount for each image, but these won't be visible to the unit, instead
452 * they will be mounted in our propagate directory, and used as a source for the overlay. */
453 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
454 _cleanup_free_ char *mount_point = NULL;
455 const MountImage *m = mount_images + i;
456
457 r = asprintf(&mount_point, "%s/%zu", extension_dir, i);
458 if (r < 0)
459 return -ENOMEM;
460
461 for (size_t j = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[j]; ++j) {
462 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL, *escaped = NULL, *lowerdir = NULL;
463
464 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(mount_point, hierarchies[j]);
465 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
466 return -ENOMEM;
467
468 escaped = shell_escape(prefixed_hierarchy, ",:");
469 if (!escaped)
470 return -ENOMEM;
471
472 /* Note that lowerdir= parameters are in 'reverse' order, so the
473 * top-most directory in the overlay comes first in the list. */
474 lowerdir = strjoin(escaped, ":", overlays[j]);
475 if (!lowerdir)
476 return -ENOMEM;
477
478 free_and_replace(overlays[j], lowerdir);
479 }
480
481 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
482 .path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(mount_point),
483 .image_options = m->mount_options,
484 .ignore = m->ignore_enoent,
485 .source_const = m->source,
486 .mode = EXTENSION_IMAGES,
487 .has_prefix = true,
488 };
489 }
490
491 /* Secondly, extend the lowerdir= parameters with each ExtensionDirectory.
492 * Bind mount them in the same location as the ExtensionImages, so that we
493 * can check that they are valid trees (extension-release.d). */
494 STRV_FOREACH(extension_directory, extension_directories) {
495 _cleanup_free_ char *mount_point = NULL, *source = NULL;
496 const char *e = *extension_directory;
497 bool ignore_enoent = false;
498
499 /* Pick up the counter where the ExtensionImages left it. */
500 r = asprintf(&mount_point, "%s/%zu", extension_dir, n++);
501 if (r < 0)
502 return -ENOMEM;
503
504 /* Look for any prefixes */
505 if (startswith(e, "-")) {
506 e++;
507 ignore_enoent = true;
508 }
509 /* Ignore this for now */
510 if (startswith(e, "+"))
511 e++;
512
513 source = strdup(e);
514 if (!source)
515 return -ENOMEM;
516
517 for (size_t j = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[j]; ++j) {
518 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL, *escaped = NULL, *lowerdir = NULL;
519
520 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(mount_point, hierarchies[j]);
521 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
522 return -ENOMEM;
523
524 escaped = shell_escape(prefixed_hierarchy, ",:");
525 if (!escaped)
526 return -ENOMEM;
527
528 /* Note that lowerdir= parameters are in 'reverse' order, so the
529 * top-most directory in the overlay comes first in the list. */
530 lowerdir = strjoin(escaped, ":", overlays[j]);
531 if (!lowerdir)
532 return -ENOMEM;
533
534 free_and_replace(overlays[j], lowerdir);
535 }
536
537 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
538 .path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(mount_point),
539 .source_malloc = TAKE_PTR(source),
540 .mode = EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES,
541 .ignore = ignore_enoent,
542 .has_prefix = true,
543 .read_only = true,
544 };
545 }
546
547 /* Then, for each hierarchy, prepare an overlay with the list of lowerdir= strings
548 * set up earlier. */
549 for (size_t i = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[i]; ++i) {
550 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL;
551
552 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(root, hierarchies[i]);
553 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
554 return -ENOMEM;
555
556 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
557 .path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(prefixed_hierarchy),
558 .options_malloc = TAKE_PTR(overlays[i]),
559 .mode = OVERLAY_MOUNT,
560 .has_prefix = true,
561 .ignore = true, /* If the source image doesn't set the ignore bit it will fail earlier. */
562 };
563 }
564
565 return 0;
566 }
567
568 static int append_tmpfs_mounts(MountEntry **p, const TemporaryFileSystem *tmpfs, size_t n) {
569 assert(p);
570
571 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
572 const TemporaryFileSystem *t = tmpfs + i;
573 _cleanup_free_ char *o = NULL, *str = NULL;
574 unsigned long flags;
575 bool ro = false;
576 int r;
577
578 if (!path_is_absolute(t->path))
579 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
580 "Path is not absolute: %s",
581 t->path);
582
583 str = strjoin("mode=0755" NESTED_TMPFS_LIMITS ",", t->options);
584 if (!str)
585 return -ENOMEM;
586
587 r = mount_option_mangle(str, MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME, &flags, &o);
588 if (r < 0)
589 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse mount option '%s': %m", str);
590
591 ro = flags & MS_RDONLY;
592 if (ro)
593 flags ^= MS_RDONLY;
594
595 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
596 .path_const = t->path,
597 .mode = TMPFS,
598 .read_only = ro,
599 .options_malloc = TAKE_PTR(o),
600 .flags = flags,
601 };
602 }
603
604 return 0;
605 }
606
607 static int append_static_mounts(MountEntry **p, const MountEntry *mounts, size_t n, bool ignore_protect) {
608 assert(p);
609 assert(mounts);
610
611 /* Adds a list of static pre-defined entries */
612
613 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++)
614 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
615 .path_const = mount_entry_path(mounts+i),
616 .mode = mounts[i].mode,
617 .ignore = mounts[i].ignore || ignore_protect,
618 };
619
620 return 0;
621 }
622
623 static int append_protect_home(MountEntry **p, ProtectHome protect_home, bool ignore_protect) {
624 assert(p);
625
626 switch (protect_home) {
627
628 case PROTECT_HOME_NO:
629 return 0;
630
631 case PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY:
632 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_read_only_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table), ignore_protect);
633
634 case PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS:
635 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_tmpfs_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table), ignore_protect);
636
637 case PROTECT_HOME_YES:
638 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table), ignore_protect);
639
640 default:
641 assert_not_reached();
642 }
643 }
644
645 static int append_protect_system(MountEntry **p, ProtectSystem protect_system, bool ignore_protect) {
646 assert(p);
647
648 switch (protect_system) {
649
650 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO:
651 return 0;
652
653 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT:
654 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_strict_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table), ignore_protect);
655
656 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES:
657 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table), ignore_protect);
658
659 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL:
660 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_full_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table), ignore_protect);
661
662 default:
663 assert_not_reached();
664 }
665 }
666
667 static int mount_path_compare(const MountEntry *a, const MountEntry *b) {
668 int d;
669
670 /* ExtensionImages/Directories will be used by other mounts as a base, so sort them first
671 * regardless of the prefix - they are set up in the propagate directory anyway */
672 d = -CMP(a->mode == EXTENSION_IMAGES, b->mode == EXTENSION_IMAGES);
673 if (d != 0)
674 return d;
675 d = -CMP(a->mode == EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES, b->mode == EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES);
676 if (d != 0)
677 return d;
678
679 /* If the paths are not equal, then order prefixes first */
680 d = path_compare(mount_entry_path(a), mount_entry_path(b));
681 if (d != 0)
682 return d;
683
684 /* If the paths are equal, check the mode */
685 return CMP((int) a->mode, (int) b->mode);
686 }
687
688 static int prefix_where_needed(MountEntry *m, size_t n, const char *root_directory) {
689 /* Prefixes all paths in the bind mount table with the root directory if the entry needs that. */
690
691 assert(m || n == 0);
692
693 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
694 char *s;
695
696 if (m[i].has_prefix)
697 continue;
698
699 s = path_join(root_directory, mount_entry_path(m+i));
700 if (!s)
701 return -ENOMEM;
702
703 mount_entry_consume_prefix(&m[i], s);
704 }
705
706 return 0;
707 }
708
709 static void drop_duplicates(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
710 MountEntry *f, *t, *previous;
711
712 assert(m);
713 assert(n);
714
715 /* Drops duplicate entries. Expects that the array is properly ordered already. */
716
717 for (f = m, t = m, previous = NULL; f < m + *n; f++) {
718
719 /* The first one wins (which is the one with the more restrictive mode), see mount_path_compare()
720 * above. Note that we only drop duplicates that haven't been mounted yet. */
721 if (previous &&
722 path_equal(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(previous)) &&
723 !f->applied && !previous->applied) {
724 log_debug("%s (%s) is duplicate.", mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode));
725 /* Propagate the flags to the remaining entry */
726 previous->read_only = previous->read_only || mount_entry_read_only(f);
727 previous->noexec = previous->noexec || mount_entry_noexec(f);
728 previous->exec = previous->exec || mount_entry_exec(f);
729 mount_entry_done(f);
730 continue;
731 }
732
733 *t = *f;
734 previous = t;
735 t++;
736 }
737
738 *n = t - m;
739 }
740
741 static void drop_inaccessible(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
742 MountEntry *f, *t;
743 const char *clear = NULL;
744
745 assert(m);
746 assert(n);
747
748 /* Drops all entries obstructed by another entry further up the tree. Expects that the array is properly
749 * ordered already. */
750
751 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
752
753 /* If we found a path set for INACCESSIBLE earlier, and this entry has it as prefix we should drop
754 * it, as inaccessible paths really should drop the entire subtree. */
755 if (clear && path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), clear)) {
756 log_debug("%s is masked by %s.", mount_entry_path(f), clear);
757 mount_entry_done(f);
758 continue;
759 }
760
761 clear = f->mode == INACCESSIBLE ? mount_entry_path(f) : NULL;
762
763 *t = *f;
764 t++;
765 }
766
767 *n = t - m;
768 }
769
770 static void drop_nop(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
771 MountEntry *f, *t;
772
773 assert(m);
774 assert(n);
775
776 /* Drops all entries which have an immediate parent that has the same type, as they are redundant. Assumes the
777 * list is ordered by prefixes. */
778
779 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
780
781 /* Only suppress such subtrees for READONLY, READWRITE and READWRITE_IMPLICIT entries */
782 if (IN_SET(f->mode, READONLY, READWRITE, READWRITE_IMPLICIT)) {
783 MountEntry *found = NULL;
784
785 /* Now let's find the first parent of the entry we are looking at. */
786 for (MountEntry *p = PTR_SUB1(t, m); p; p = PTR_SUB1(p, m))
787 if (path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(p))) {
788 found = p;
789 break;
790 }
791
792 /* We found it, let's see if it's the same mode, if so, we can drop this entry */
793 if (found && found->mode == f->mode) {
794 log_debug("%s (%s) is made redundant by %s (%s)",
795 mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode),
796 mount_entry_path(found), mount_mode_to_string(found->mode));
797 mount_entry_done(f);
798 continue;
799 }
800 }
801
802 *t = *f;
803 t++;
804 }
805
806 *n = t - m;
807 }
808
809 static void drop_outside_root(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
810 MountEntry *f, *t;
811
812 assert(m);
813 assert(n);
814
815 /* Nothing to do */
816 if (!root_directory)
817 return;
818
819 /* Drops all mounts that are outside of the root directory. */
820
821 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
822
823 /* ExtensionImages/Directories bases are opened in /run/systemd/unit-extensions on the host */
824 if (!IN_SET(f->mode, EXTENSION_IMAGES, EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES) && !path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), root_directory)) {
825 log_debug("%s is outside of root directory.", mount_entry_path(f));
826 mount_entry_done(f);
827 continue;
828 }
829
830 *t = *f;
831 t++;
832 }
833
834 *n = t - m;
835 }
836
837 static int clone_device_node(
838 const char *d,
839 const char *temporary_mount,
840 bool *make_devnode) {
841
842 _cleanup_free_ char *sl = NULL;
843 const char *dn, *bn, *t;
844 struct stat st;
845 int r;
846
847 if (stat(d, &st) < 0) {
848 if (errno == ENOENT) {
849 log_debug_errno(errno, "Device node '%s' to clone does not exist, ignoring.", d);
850 return -ENXIO;
851 }
852
853 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to stat() device node '%s' to clone, ignoring: %m", d);
854 }
855
856 if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode) &&
857 !S_ISCHR(st.st_mode))
858 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
859 "Device node '%s' to clone is not a device node, ignoring.",
860 d);
861
862 dn = strjoina(temporary_mount, d);
863
864 /* First, try to create device node properly */
865 if (*make_devnode) {
866 mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(d, st.st_mode);
867 r = mknod(dn, st.st_mode, st.st_rdev);
868 mac_selinux_create_file_clear();
869 if (r >= 0)
870 goto add_symlink;
871 if (errno != EPERM)
872 return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod failed for %s: %m", d);
873
874 /* This didn't work, let's not try this again for the next iterations. */
875 *make_devnode = false;
876 }
877
878 /* We're about to fall back to bind-mounting the device node. So create a dummy bind-mount target.
879 * Do not prepare device-node SELinux label (see issue 13762) */
880 r = mknod(dn, S_IFREG, 0);
881 if (r < 0 && errno != EEXIST)
882 return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod() fallback failed for '%s': %m", d);
883
884 /* Fallback to bind-mounting: The assumption here is that all used device nodes carry standard
885 * properties. Specifically, the devices nodes we bind-mount should either be owned by root:root or
886 * root:tty (e.g. /dev/tty, /dev/ptmx) and should not carry ACLs. */
887 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, d, dn, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
888 if (r < 0)
889 return r;
890
891 add_symlink:
892 bn = path_startswith(d, "/dev/");
893 if (!bn)
894 return 0;
895
896 /* Create symlinks like /dev/char/1:9 → ../urandom */
897 if (asprintf(&sl, "%s/dev/%s/" DEVNUM_FORMAT_STR,
898 temporary_mount,
899 S_ISCHR(st.st_mode) ? "char" : "block",
900 DEVNUM_FORMAT_VAL(st.st_rdev)) < 0)
901 return log_oom();
902
903 (void) mkdir_parents(sl, 0755);
904
905 t = strjoina("../", bn);
906 if (symlink(t, sl) < 0)
907 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to symlink '%s' to '%s', ignoring: %m", t, sl);
908
909 return 0;
910 }
911
912 static char *settle_runtime_dir(RuntimeScope scope) {
913 char *runtime_dir;
914
915 if (scope != RUNTIME_SCOPE_USER)
916 return strdup("/run/");
917
918 if (asprintf(&runtime_dir, "/run/user/" UID_FMT, geteuid()) < 0)
919 return NULL;
920
921 return runtime_dir;
922 }
923
924 static int mount_private_dev(MountEntry *m, RuntimeScope scope) {
925 static const char devnodes[] =
926 "/dev/null\0"
927 "/dev/zero\0"
928 "/dev/full\0"
929 "/dev/random\0"
930 "/dev/urandom\0"
931 "/dev/tty\0";
932
933 _cleanup_free_ char *runtime_dir = NULL, *temporary_mount = NULL;
934 const char *dev = NULL, *devpts = NULL, *devshm = NULL, *devhugepages = NULL, *devmqueue = NULL, *devlog = NULL, *devptmx = NULL;
935 bool can_mknod = true;
936 int r;
937
938 assert(m);
939
940 runtime_dir = settle_runtime_dir(scope);
941 if (!runtime_dir)
942 return log_oom_debug();
943
944 temporary_mount = path_join(runtime_dir, "systemd/namespace-dev-XXXXXX");
945 if (!temporary_mount)
946 return log_oom_debug();
947
948 if (!mkdtemp(temporary_mount))
949 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create temporary directory '%s': %m", temporary_mount);
950
951 dev = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev");
952 (void) mkdir(dev, 0755);
953 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "tmpfs", dev, "tmpfs", DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS, "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_PRIVATE_DEV);
954 if (r < 0)
955 goto fail;
956
957 r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, dev, "/dev", 0);
958 if (r < 0) {
959 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as /dev: %m", dev);
960 goto fail;
961 }
962
963 devpts = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/pts");
964 (void) mkdir(devpts, 0755);
965 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/pts", devpts, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
966 if (r < 0)
967 goto fail;
968
969 /* /dev/ptmx can either be a device node or a symlink to /dev/pts/ptmx.
970 * When /dev/ptmx a device node, /dev/pts/ptmx has 000 permissions making it inaccessible.
971 * Thus, in that case make a clone.
972 * In nspawn and other containers it will be a symlink, in that case make it a symlink. */
973 r = is_symlink("/dev/ptmx");
974 if (r < 0) {
975 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect whether /dev/ptmx is a symlink or not: %m");
976 goto fail;
977 } else if (r > 0) {
978 devptmx = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/ptmx");
979 if (symlink("pts/ptmx", devptmx) < 0) {
980 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to pts/ptmx: %m", devptmx);
981 goto fail;
982 }
983 } else {
984 r = clone_device_node("/dev/ptmx", temporary_mount, &can_mknod);
985 if (r < 0)
986 goto fail;
987 }
988
989 devshm = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/shm");
990 (void) mkdir(devshm, 0755);
991 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/shm", devshm, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
992 if (r < 0)
993 goto fail;
994
995 devmqueue = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/mqueue");
996 (void) mkdir(devmqueue, 0755);
997 (void) mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/mqueue", devmqueue, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
998
999 devhugepages = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/hugepages");
1000 (void) mkdir(devhugepages, 0755);
1001 (void) mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/hugepages", devhugepages, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
1002
1003 devlog = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/log");
1004 if (symlink("/run/systemd/journal/dev-log", devlog) < 0)
1005 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to /run/systemd/journal/dev-log, ignoring: %m", devlog);
1006
1007 NULSTR_FOREACH(d, devnodes) {
1008 r = clone_device_node(d, temporary_mount, &can_mknod);
1009 /* ENXIO means the *source* is not a device file, skip creation in that case */
1010 if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO)
1011 goto fail;
1012 }
1013
1014 r = dev_setup(temporary_mount, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
1015 if (r < 0)
1016 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up basic device tree at '%s', ignoring: %m", temporary_mount);
1017
1018 /* Make the bind mount read-only. */
1019 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, NULL, dev, NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, NULL);
1020 if (r < 0)
1021 return r;
1022
1023 /* Create the /dev directory if missing. It is more likely to be missing when the service is started
1024 * with RootDirectory. This is consistent with mount units creating the mount points when missing. */
1025 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1026
1027 /* Unmount everything in old /dev */
1028 r = umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0);
1029 if (r < 0)
1030 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to unmount directories below '%s', ignoring: %m", mount_entry_path(m));
1031
1032 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, dev, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL);
1033 if (r < 0)
1034 goto fail;
1035
1036 (void) rmdir(dev);
1037 (void) rmdir(temporary_mount);
1038
1039 return 0;
1040
1041 fail:
1042 if (devpts)
1043 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devpts, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1044
1045 if (devshm)
1046 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devshm, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1047
1048 if (devhugepages)
1049 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devhugepages, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1050
1051 if (devmqueue)
1052 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devmqueue, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1053
1054 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, dev, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1055 (void) rmdir(dev);
1056 (void) rmdir(temporary_mount);
1057
1058 return r;
1059 }
1060
1061 static int mount_bind_dev(const MountEntry *m) {
1062 int r;
1063
1064 assert(m);
1065
1066 /* Implements the little brother of mount_private_dev(): simply bind mounts the host's /dev into the
1067 * service's /dev. This is only used when RootDirectory= is set. */
1068
1069 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1070
1071 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
1072 if (r < 0)
1073 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /dev is already mounted: %m");
1074 if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /dev is already a mount point */
1075 return 0;
1076
1077 return mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
1078 }
1079
1080 static int mount_bind_sysfs(const MountEntry *m) {
1081 int r;
1082
1083 assert(m);
1084
1085 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1086
1087 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
1088 if (r < 0)
1089 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /sys is already mounted: %m");
1090 if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /sys is already a mount point */
1091 return 0;
1092
1093 /* Bind mount the host's version so that we get all child mounts of it, too. */
1094 return mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/sys", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
1095 }
1096
1097 static int mount_private_sysfs(const MountEntry *m) {
1098 const char *entry_path = mount_entry_path(ASSERT_PTR(m));
1099 int r, n;
1100
1101 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
1102
1103 n = umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
1104
1105 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "sysfs", entry_path, "sysfs", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, NULL);
1106 if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_PRIVILEGE(r)) {
1107 /* When we do not have enough privileges to mount sysfs, fall back to use existing /sys. */
1108
1109 if (n > 0)
1110 /* /sys or some of sub-mounts are umounted in the above. Refuse incomplete tree.
1111 * Propagate the original error code returned by mount() in the above. */
1112 return r;
1113
1114 return mount_bind_sysfs(m);
1115
1116 } else if (r < 0)
1117 return r;
1118
1119 /* We mounted a new instance now. Let's bind mount the children over now. */
1120 (void) bind_mount_submounts("/sys", entry_path);
1121 return 0;
1122 }
1123
1124 static int mount_procfs(const MountEntry *m, const NamespaceParameters *p) {
1125 _cleanup_free_ char *opts = NULL;
1126 const char *entry_path;
1127 int r, n;
1128
1129 assert(m);
1130 assert(p);
1131
1132 if (p->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
1133 p->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL) {
1134
1135 /* Starting with kernel 5.8 procfs' hidepid= logic is truly per-instance (previously it
1136 * pretended to be per-instance but actually was per-namespace), hence let's make use of it
1137 * if requested. To make sure this logic succeeds only on kernels where hidepid= is
1138 * per-instance, we'll exclusively use the textual value for hidepid=, since support was
1139 * added in the same commit: if it's supported it is thus also per-instance. */
1140
1141 const char *hpv = p->protect_proc == PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ?
1142 "off" :
1143 protect_proc_to_string(p->protect_proc);
1144
1145 /* hidepid= support was added in 5.8, so we can use fsconfig()/fsopen() (which were added in
1146 * 5.2) to check if hidepid= is supported. This avoids a noisy dmesg log by the kernel when
1147 * trying to use hidepid= on systems where it isn't supported. The same applies for subset=.
1148 * fsopen()/fsconfig() was also backported on some distros which allows us to detect
1149 * hidepid=/subset= support in even more scenarios. */
1150
1151 if (mount_option_supported("proc", "hidepid", hpv) != 0) {
1152 opts = strjoin("hidepid=", hpv);
1153 if (!opts)
1154 return -ENOMEM;
1155 }
1156
1157 if (p->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID &&
1158 mount_option_supported("proc", "subset", "pid") != 0)
1159 if (!strextend_with_separator(&opts, ",", "subset=pid"))
1160 return -ENOMEM;
1161 }
1162
1163 entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
1164 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
1165
1166 /* Mount a new instance, so that we get the one that matches our user namespace, if we are running in
1167 * one. i.e we don't reuse existing mounts here under any condition, we want a new instance owned by
1168 * our user namespace and with our hidepid= settings applied. Hence, let's get rid of everything
1169 * mounted on /proc/ first. */
1170
1171 n = umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
1172
1173 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "proc", entry_path, "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, opts);
1174 if (r == -EINVAL && opts)
1175 /* If this failed with EINVAL then this likely means the textual hidepid= stuff is
1176 * not supported by the kernel, and thus the per-instance hidepid= neither, which
1177 * means we really don't want to use it, since it would affect our host's /proc
1178 * mount. Hence let's gracefully fallback to a classic, unrestricted version. */
1179 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "proc", entry_path, "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, NULL);
1180 if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_PRIVILEGE(r)) {
1181 /* When we do not have enough privileges to mount /proc, fall back to use existing /proc. */
1182
1183 if (n > 0)
1184 /* /proc or some of sub-mounts are umounted in the above. Refuse incomplete tree.
1185 * Propagate the original error code returned by mount() in the above. */
1186 return r;
1187
1188 r = path_is_mount_point(entry_path, NULL, 0);
1189 if (r < 0)
1190 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /proc is already mounted: %m");
1191 if (r > 0)
1192 return 0;
1193
1194 /* We lack permissions to mount a new instance of /proc, and it is not already mounted. But
1195 * we can access the host's, so as a final fallback bind-mount it to the destination, as most
1196 * likely we are inside a user manager in an unprivileged user namespace. */
1197 return mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/proc", entry_path, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
1198
1199 } else if (r < 0)
1200 return r;
1201
1202 /* We mounted a new instance now. Let's bind mount the children over now. This matters for nspawn
1203 * where a bunch of files are overmounted, in particular the boot id */
1204 (void) bind_mount_submounts("/proc", entry_path);
1205 return 0;
1206 }
1207
1208 static int mount_tmpfs(const MountEntry *m) {
1209 const char *entry_path, *inner_path;
1210 int r;
1211
1212 assert(m);
1213
1214 entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
1215 inner_path = mount_entry_unprefixed_path(m);
1216
1217 /* First, get rid of everything that is below if there is anything. Then, overmount with our new
1218 * tmpfs */
1219
1220 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
1221 (void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
1222
1223 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "tmpfs", entry_path, "tmpfs", m->flags, mount_entry_options(m));
1224 if (r < 0)
1225 return r;
1226
1227 r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, entry_path, inner_path, 0);
1228 if (r < 0)
1229 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as '%s': %m", entry_path, inner_path);
1230
1231 return 0;
1232 }
1233
1234 static int mount_run(const MountEntry *m) {
1235 int r;
1236
1237 assert(m);
1238
1239 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
1240 if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT)
1241 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /run is already mounted: %m");
1242 if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /run is already a mount point */
1243 return 0;
1244
1245 return mount_tmpfs(m);
1246 }
1247
1248 static int mount_mqueuefs(const MountEntry *m) {
1249 int r;
1250 const char *entry_path;
1251
1252 assert(m);
1253
1254 entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
1255
1256 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
1257 (void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
1258
1259 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "mqueue", entry_path, "mqueue", m->flags, mount_entry_options(m));
1260 if (r < 0)
1261 return r;
1262
1263 return 0;
1264 }
1265
1266 static int mount_image(
1267 const MountEntry *m,
1268 const char *root_directory,
1269 const ImagePolicy *image_policy) {
1270
1271 _cleanup_free_ char *host_os_release_id = NULL, *host_os_release_version_id = NULL,
1272 *host_os_release_sysext_level = NULL, *host_os_release_confext_level = NULL,
1273 *extension_name = NULL;
1274 int r;
1275
1276 assert(m);
1277
1278 r = path_extract_filename(mount_entry_source(m), &extension_name);
1279 if (r < 0)
1280 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to extract extension name from %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
1281
1282 if (m->mode == EXTENSION_IMAGES) {
1283 r = parse_os_release(
1284 empty_to_root(root_directory),
1285 "ID", &host_os_release_id,
1286 "VERSION_ID", &host_os_release_version_id,
1287 image_class_info[IMAGE_SYSEXT].level_env, &host_os_release_sysext_level,
1288 image_class_info[IMAGE_CONFEXT].level_env, &host_os_release_confext_level,
1289 NULL);
1290 if (r < 0)
1291 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to acquire 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
1292 if (isempty(host_os_release_id))
1293 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "'ID' field not found or empty in 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
1294 }
1295
1296 r = verity_dissect_and_mount(
1297 /* src_fd= */ -1,
1298 mount_entry_source(m),
1299 mount_entry_path(m),
1300 m->image_options,
1301 image_policy,
1302 host_os_release_id,
1303 host_os_release_version_id,
1304 host_os_release_sysext_level,
1305 host_os_release_confext_level,
1306 /* required_sysext_scope= */ NULL,
1307 /* ret_image= */ NULL);
1308 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1309 return 0;
1310 if (r == -ESTALE && host_os_release_id)
1311 return log_error_errno(r,
1312 "Failed to mount image %s, extension-release metadata does not match the lower layer's: ID=%s%s%s%s%s%s%s",
1313 mount_entry_source(m),
1314 host_os_release_id,
1315 host_os_release_version_id ? " VERSION_ID=" : "",
1316 strempty(host_os_release_version_id),
1317 host_os_release_sysext_level ? image_class_info[IMAGE_SYSEXT].level_env_print : "",
1318 strempty(host_os_release_sysext_level),
1319 host_os_release_confext_level ? image_class_info[IMAGE_CONFEXT].level_env_print : "",
1320 strempty(host_os_release_confext_level));
1321 if (r < 0)
1322 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount image %s on %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m), mount_entry_path(m));
1323
1324 return 0;
1325 }
1326
1327 static int mount_overlay(const MountEntry *m) {
1328 const char *options;
1329 int r;
1330
1331 assert(m);
1332
1333 options = strjoina("lowerdir=", mount_entry_options(m));
1334
1335 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1336
1337 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "overlay", mount_entry_path(m), "overlay", MS_RDONLY, options);
1338 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1339 return 0;
1340
1341 return r;
1342 }
1343
1344 static int follow_symlink(
1345 const char *root_directory,
1346 MountEntry *m) {
1347
1348 _cleanup_free_ char *target = NULL;
1349 int r;
1350
1351 /* Let's chase symlinks, but only one step at a time. That's because depending where the symlink points we
1352 * might need to change the order in which we mount stuff. Hence: let's normalize piecemeal, and do one step at
1353 * a time by specifying CHASE_STEP. This function returns 0 if we resolved one step, and > 0 if we reached the
1354 * end and already have a fully normalized name. */
1355
1356 r = chase(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, CHASE_STEP|CHASE_NONEXISTENT, &target, NULL);
1357 if (r < 0)
1358 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to chase symlinks '%s': %m", mount_entry_path(m));
1359 if (r > 0) /* Reached the end, nothing more to resolve */
1360 return 1;
1361
1362 if (m->n_followed >= CHASE_MAX) /* put a boundary on things */
1363 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP),
1364 "Symlink loop on '%s'.",
1365 mount_entry_path(m));
1366
1367 log_debug("Followed mount entry path symlink %s %s %s.",
1368 mount_entry_path(m), special_glyph(SPECIAL_GLYPH_ARROW_RIGHT), target);
1369
1370 mount_entry_consume_prefix(m, TAKE_PTR(target));
1371
1372 m->n_followed ++;
1373
1374 return 0;
1375 }
1376
1377 static int apply_one_mount(
1378 const char *root_directory,
1379 MountEntry *m,
1380 const NamespaceParameters *p) {
1381
1382 _cleanup_free_ char *inaccessible = NULL;
1383 bool rbind = true, make = false;
1384 const char *what;
1385 int r;
1386
1387 assert(m);
1388 assert(p);
1389
1390 log_debug("Applying namespace mount on %s", mount_entry_path(m));
1391
1392 switch (m->mode) {
1393
1394 case INACCESSIBLE: {
1395 _cleanup_free_ char *runtime_dir = NULL;
1396 struct stat target;
1397
1398 /* First, get rid of everything that is below if there
1399 * is anything... Then, overmount it with an
1400 * inaccessible path. */
1401 (void) umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0);
1402
1403 if (lstat(mount_entry_path(m), &target) < 0) {
1404 if (errno == ENOENT && m->ignore)
1405 return 0;
1406
1407 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to lstat() %s to determine what to mount over it: %m",
1408 mount_entry_path(m));
1409 }
1410
1411 /* We don't pass the literal runtime scope through here but one based purely on our UID. This
1412 * means that the root user's --user services will use the host's inaccessible inodes rather
1413 * then root's private ones. This is preferable since it means device nodes that are
1414 * overmounted to make them inaccessible will be overmounted with a device node, rather than
1415 * an AF_UNIX socket inode. */
1416 runtime_dir = settle_runtime_dir(geteuid() == 0 ? RUNTIME_SCOPE_SYSTEM : RUNTIME_SCOPE_USER);
1417 if (!runtime_dir)
1418 return log_oom_debug();
1419
1420 r = mode_to_inaccessible_node(runtime_dir, target.st_mode, &inaccessible);
1421 if (r < 0)
1422 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP),
1423 "File type not supported for inaccessible mounts. Note that symlinks are not allowed");
1424 what = inaccessible;
1425 break;
1426 }
1427
1428 case READONLY:
1429 case READWRITE:
1430 case READWRITE_IMPLICIT:
1431 case EXEC:
1432 case NOEXEC:
1433 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, 0);
1434 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1435 return 0;
1436 if (r < 0)
1437 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine whether %s is already a mount point: %m",
1438 mount_entry_path(m));
1439 if (r > 0) /* Nothing to do here, it is already a mount. We just later toggle the MS_RDONLY
1440 * and MS_NOEXEC bits for the mount point if needed. */
1441 return 0;
1442 /* This isn't a mount point yet, let's make it one. */
1443 what = mount_entry_path(m);
1444 break;
1445
1446 case EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES: {
1447 _cleanup_free_ char *host_os_release_id = NULL, *host_os_release_version_id = NULL,
1448 *host_os_release_level = NULL, *extension_name = NULL;
1449 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **extension_release = NULL;
1450 ImageClass class = IMAGE_SYSEXT;
1451
1452 r = path_extract_filename(mount_entry_source(m), &extension_name);
1453 if (r < 0)
1454 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to extract extension name from %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
1455
1456 r = load_extension_release_pairs(mount_entry_source(m), IMAGE_SYSEXT, extension_name, /* relax_extension_release_check= */ false, &extension_release);
1457 if (r == -ENOENT) {
1458 r = load_extension_release_pairs(mount_entry_source(m), IMAGE_CONFEXT, extension_name, /* relax_extension_release_check= */ false, &extension_release);
1459 if (r >= 0)
1460 class = IMAGE_CONFEXT;
1461 }
1462 if (r < 0)
1463 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to acquire 'extension-release' data of extension tree %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
1464
1465 r = parse_os_release(
1466 empty_to_root(root_directory),
1467 "ID", &host_os_release_id,
1468 "VERSION_ID", &host_os_release_version_id,
1469 image_class_info[class].level_env, &host_os_release_level,
1470 NULL);
1471 if (r < 0)
1472 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to acquire 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
1473 if (isempty(host_os_release_id))
1474 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "'ID' field not found or empty in 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
1475
1476 r = load_extension_release_pairs(mount_entry_source(m), class, extension_name, /* relax_extension_release_check= */ false, &extension_release);
1477 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1478 return 0;
1479 if (r < 0)
1480 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse directory %s extension-release metadata: %m", extension_name);
1481
1482 r = extension_release_validate(
1483 extension_name,
1484 host_os_release_id,
1485 host_os_release_version_id,
1486 host_os_release_level,
1487 /* host_extension_scope */ NULL, /* Leave empty, we need to accept both system and portable */
1488 extension_release,
1489 class);
1490 if (r == 0)
1491 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESTALE), "Directory %s extension-release metadata does not match the root's", extension_name);
1492 if (r < 0)
1493 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to compare directory %s extension-release metadata with the root's os-release: %m", extension_name);
1494
1495 _fallthrough_;
1496 }
1497
1498 case BIND_MOUNT:
1499 rbind = false;
1500
1501 _fallthrough_;
1502 case BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE: {
1503 _cleanup_free_ char *chased = NULL;
1504
1505 /* Since mount() will always follow symlinks we chase the symlinks on our own first. Note
1506 * that bind mount source paths are always relative to the host root, hence we pass NULL as
1507 * root directory to chase() here. */
1508
1509 r = chase(mount_entry_source(m), NULL, CHASE_TRAIL_SLASH, &chased, NULL);
1510 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) {
1511 log_debug_errno(r, "Path %s does not exist, ignoring.", mount_entry_source(m));
1512 return 0;
1513 }
1514 if (r < 0)
1515 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to follow symlinks on %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
1516
1517 log_debug("Followed source symlinks %s %s %s.",
1518 mount_entry_source(m), special_glyph(SPECIAL_GLYPH_ARROW_RIGHT), chased);
1519
1520 free_and_replace(m->source_malloc, chased);
1521
1522 what = mount_entry_source(m);
1523 make = true;
1524 break;
1525 }
1526
1527 case EMPTY_DIR:
1528 case TMPFS:
1529 return mount_tmpfs(m);
1530
1531 case PRIVATE_TMP:
1532 case PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY:
1533 what = mount_entry_source(m);
1534 make = true;
1535 break;
1536
1537 case PRIVATE_DEV:
1538 return mount_private_dev(m, p->runtime_scope);
1539
1540 case BIND_DEV:
1541 return mount_bind_dev(m);
1542
1543 case PRIVATE_SYSFS:
1544 return mount_private_sysfs(m);
1545
1546 case BIND_SYSFS:
1547 return mount_bind_sysfs(m);
1548
1549 case PROCFS:
1550 return mount_procfs(m, p);
1551
1552 case RUN:
1553 return mount_run(m);
1554
1555 case MQUEUEFS:
1556 return mount_mqueuefs(m);
1557
1558 case MOUNT_IMAGES:
1559 return mount_image(m, NULL, p->mount_image_policy);
1560
1561 case EXTENSION_IMAGES:
1562 return mount_image(m, root_directory, p->extension_image_policy);
1563
1564 case OVERLAY_MOUNT:
1565 return mount_overlay(m);
1566
1567 default:
1568 assert_not_reached();
1569 }
1570
1571 assert(what);
1572
1573 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL);
1574 if (r < 0) {
1575 bool try_again = false;
1576
1577 if (r == -ENOENT && make) {
1578 int q;
1579
1580 /* Hmm, either the source or the destination are missing. Let's see if we can create
1581 the destination, then try again. */
1582
1583 (void) mkdir_parents(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1584
1585 q = make_mount_point_inode_from_path(what, mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1586 if (q < 0 && q != -EEXIST)
1587 log_error_errno(q, "Failed to create destination mount point node '%s': %m",
1588 mount_entry_path(m));
1589 else
1590 try_again = true;
1591 }
1592
1593 if (try_again)
1594 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL);
1595 if (r < 0)
1596 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to mount %s to %s: %m", what, mount_entry_path(m));
1597 }
1598
1599 log_debug("Successfully mounted %s to %s", what, mount_entry_path(m));
1600 return 0;
1601 }
1602
1603 static int make_read_only(const MountEntry *m, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
1604 unsigned long new_flags = 0, flags_mask = 0;
1605 bool submounts;
1606 int r;
1607
1608 assert(m);
1609 assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
1610
1611 if (mount_entry_read_only(m) || m->mode == PRIVATE_DEV) {
1612 new_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
1613 flags_mask |= MS_RDONLY;
1614 }
1615
1616 if (m->nosuid) {
1617 new_flags |= MS_NOSUID;
1618 flags_mask |= MS_NOSUID;
1619 }
1620
1621 if (flags_mask == 0) /* No Change? */
1622 return 0;
1623
1624 /* We generally apply these changes recursively, except for /dev, and the cases we know there's
1625 * nothing further down. Set /dev readonly, but not submounts like /dev/shm. Also, we only set the
1626 * per-mount read-only flag. We can't set it on the superblock, if we are inside a user namespace
1627 * and running Linux <= 4.17. */
1628 submounts =
1629 mount_entry_read_only(m) &&
1630 !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS);
1631 if (submounts)
1632 r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1633 else
1634 r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, proc_self_mountinfo);
1635
1636 /* Note that we only turn on the MS_RDONLY flag here, we never turn it off. Something that was marked
1637 * read-only already stays this way. This improves compatibility with container managers, where we
1638 * won't attempt to undo read-only mounts already applied. */
1639
1640 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1641 return 0;
1642 if (r < 0)
1643 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
1644 submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
1645 return 0;
1646 }
1647
1648 static int make_noexec(const MountEntry *m, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
1649 unsigned long new_flags = 0, flags_mask = 0;
1650 bool submounts;
1651 int r;
1652
1653 assert(m);
1654 assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
1655
1656 if (mount_entry_noexec(m)) {
1657 new_flags |= MS_NOEXEC;
1658 flags_mask |= MS_NOEXEC;
1659 } else if (mount_entry_exec(m)) {
1660 new_flags &= ~MS_NOEXEC;
1661 flags_mask |= MS_NOEXEC;
1662 }
1663
1664 if (flags_mask == 0) /* No Change? */
1665 return 0;
1666
1667 submounts = !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS);
1668
1669 if (submounts)
1670 r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1671 else
1672 r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, proc_self_mountinfo);
1673
1674 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1675 return 0;
1676 if (r < 0)
1677 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
1678 submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
1679 return 0;
1680 }
1681
1682 static int make_nosuid(const MountEntry *m, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
1683 bool submounts;
1684 int r;
1685
1686 assert(m);
1687 assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
1688
1689 submounts = !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS);
1690
1691 if (submounts)
1692 r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), MS_NOSUID, MS_NOSUID, NULL, proc_self_mountinfo);
1693 else
1694 r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), MS_NOSUID, MS_NOSUID, proc_self_mountinfo);
1695 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1696 return 0;
1697 if (r < 0)
1698 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
1699 submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
1700 return 0;
1701 }
1702
1703 static bool namespace_parameters_mount_apivfs(const NamespaceParameters *p) {
1704 assert(p);
1705
1706 /*
1707 * ProtectControlGroups= and ProtectKernelTunables= imply MountAPIVFS=,
1708 * since to protect the API VFS mounts, they need to be around in the
1709 * first place...
1710 */
1711
1712 return p->mount_apivfs ||
1713 p->protect_control_groups ||
1714 p->protect_kernel_tunables ||
1715 p->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
1716 p->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL;
1717 }
1718
1719 static size_t namespace_calculate_mounts(
1720 const NamespaceParameters *p,
1721 char **hierarchies,
1722 bool setup_propagate) {
1723
1724 size_t protect_home_cnt;
1725 size_t protect_system_cnt =
1726 (p->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT ?
1727 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table) :
1728 ((p->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL) ?
1729 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table) :
1730 ((p->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES) ?
1731 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table) : 0)));
1732
1733 protect_home_cnt =
1734 (p->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_YES ?
1735 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table) :
1736 ((p->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY) ?
1737 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table) :
1738 ((p->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS) ?
1739 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table) : 0)));
1740
1741 return !!p->tmp_dir + !!p->var_tmp_dir +
1742 strv_length(p->read_write_paths) +
1743 strv_length(p->read_only_paths) +
1744 strv_length(p->inaccessible_paths) +
1745 strv_length(p->exec_paths) +
1746 strv_length(p->no_exec_paths) +
1747 strv_length(p->empty_directories) +
1748 p->n_bind_mounts +
1749 p->n_mount_images +
1750 (p->n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(p->extension_directories) ? /* Mount each image and directory plus an overlay per hierarchy */
1751 strv_length(hierarchies) + p->n_extension_images + strv_length(p->extension_directories) : 0) +
1752 p->n_temporary_filesystems +
1753 p->private_dev +
1754 (p->protect_kernel_tunables ?
1755 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table) + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table) : 0) +
1756 (p->protect_kernel_modules ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table) : 0) +
1757 (p->protect_kernel_logs ?
1758 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_proc_table) + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_dev_table) : 0) +
1759 (p->protect_control_groups ? 1 : 0) +
1760 protect_home_cnt + protect_system_cnt +
1761 (p->protect_hostname ? 2 : 0) +
1762 (namespace_parameters_mount_apivfs(p) ? ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table) : 0) +
1763 (p->creds_path ? 2 : 1) +
1764 !!p->log_namespace +
1765 setup_propagate + /* /run/systemd/incoming */
1766 !!p->notify_socket +
1767 !!p->host_os_release_stage +
1768 p->private_network + /* /sys */
1769 p->private_ipc; /* /dev/mqueue */
1770 }
1771
1772 /* Walk all mount entries and dropping any unused mounts. This affects all
1773 * mounts:
1774 * - that are implicitly protected by a path that has been rendered inaccessible
1775 * - whose immediate parent requests the same protection mode as the mount itself
1776 * - that are outside of the relevant root directory
1777 * - which are duplicates
1778 */
1779 static void drop_unused_mounts(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *mounts, size_t *n_mounts) {
1780 assert(root_directory);
1781 assert(n_mounts);
1782 assert(mounts || *n_mounts == 0);
1783
1784 typesafe_qsort(mounts, *n_mounts, mount_path_compare);
1785
1786 drop_duplicates(mounts, n_mounts);
1787 drop_outside_root(root_directory, mounts, n_mounts);
1788 drop_inaccessible(mounts, n_mounts);
1789 drop_nop(mounts, n_mounts);
1790 }
1791
1792 static int create_symlinks_from_tuples(const char *root, char **strv_symlinks) {
1793 int r;
1794
1795 STRV_FOREACH_PAIR(src, dst, strv_symlinks) {
1796 _cleanup_free_ char *src_abs = NULL, *dst_abs = NULL;
1797
1798 src_abs = path_join(root, *src);
1799 dst_abs = path_join(root, *dst);
1800 if (!src_abs || !dst_abs)
1801 return -ENOMEM;
1802
1803 r = mkdir_parents_label(dst_abs, 0755);
1804 if (r < 0)
1805 return log_debug_errno(
1806 r,
1807 "Failed to create parent directory for symlink '%s': %m",
1808 dst_abs);
1809
1810 r = symlink_idempotent(src_abs, dst_abs, true);
1811 if (r < 0)
1812 return log_debug_errno(
1813 r,
1814 "Failed to create symlink from '%s' to '%s': %m",
1815 src_abs,
1816 dst_abs);
1817 }
1818
1819 return 0;
1820 }
1821
1822 static void mount_entry_path_debug_string(const char *root, MountEntry *m, char **error_path) {
1823 assert(m);
1824
1825 /* Create a string suitable for debugging logs, stripping for example the local working directory.
1826 * For example, with a BindPaths=/var/bar that does not exist on the host:
1827 *
1828 * Before:
1829 * foo.service: Failed to set up mount namespacing: /run/systemd/unit-root/var/bar: No such file or directory
1830 * After:
1831 * foo.service: Failed to set up mount namespacing: /var/bar: No such file or directory
1832 *
1833 * Note that this is an error path, so no OOM check is done on purpose. */
1834
1835 if (!error_path)
1836 return;
1837
1838 if (!mount_entry_path(m)) {
1839 *error_path = NULL;
1840 return;
1841 }
1842
1843 if (root) {
1844 const char *e = startswith(mount_entry_path(m), root);
1845 if (e) {
1846 *error_path = strdup(e);
1847 return;
1848 }
1849 }
1850
1851 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
1852 return;
1853 }
1854
1855 static int apply_mounts(
1856 const char *root,
1857 const NamespaceParameters *p,
1858 MountEntry *mounts,
1859 size_t *n_mounts,
1860 char **error_path) {
1861
1862 _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *proc_self_mountinfo = NULL;
1863 _cleanup_free_ char **deny_list = NULL;
1864 int r;
1865
1866 if (n_mounts == 0) /* Shortcut: nothing to do */
1867 return 0;
1868
1869 assert(root);
1870 assert(mounts);
1871 assert(n_mounts);
1872
1873 /* Open /proc/self/mountinfo now as it may become unavailable if we mount anything on top of
1874 * /proc. For example, this is the case with the option: 'InaccessiblePaths=/proc'. */
1875 proc_self_mountinfo = fopen("/proc/self/mountinfo", "re");
1876 if (!proc_self_mountinfo) {
1877 r = -errno;
1878
1879 if (error_path)
1880 *error_path = strdup("/proc/self/mountinfo");
1881
1882 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to open /proc/self/mountinfo: %m");
1883 }
1884
1885 /* First round, establish all mounts we need */
1886 for (;;) {
1887 bool again = false;
1888
1889 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1890
1891 if (m->applied)
1892 continue;
1893
1894 /* ExtensionImages/Directories are first opened in the propagate directory, not in the root_directory */
1895 r = follow_symlink(!IN_SET(m->mode, EXTENSION_IMAGES, EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES) ? root : NULL, m);
1896 if (r < 0) {
1897 mount_entry_path_debug_string(root, m, error_path);
1898 return r;
1899 }
1900 if (r == 0) {
1901 /* We hit a symlinked mount point. The entry got rewritten and might
1902 * point to a very different place now. Let's normalize the changed
1903 * list, and start from the beginning. After all to mount the entry
1904 * at the new location we might need some other mounts first */
1905 again = true;
1906 break;
1907 }
1908
1909 r = apply_one_mount(root, m, p);
1910 if (r < 0) {
1911 mount_entry_path_debug_string(root, m, error_path);
1912 return r;
1913 }
1914
1915 m->applied = true;
1916 }
1917
1918 if (!again)
1919 break;
1920
1921 drop_unused_mounts(root, mounts, n_mounts);
1922 }
1923
1924 /* Now that all filesystems have been set up, but before the
1925 * read-only switches are flipped, create the exec dirs and other symlinks.
1926 * Note that when /var/lib is not empty/tmpfs, these symlinks will already
1927 * exist, which means this will be a no-op. */
1928 r = create_symlinks_from_tuples(root, p->symlinks);
1929 if (r < 0)
1930 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up symlinks inside mount namespace: %m");
1931
1932 /* Create a deny list we can pass to bind_mount_recursive() */
1933 deny_list = new(char*, (*n_mounts)+1);
1934 if (!deny_list)
1935 return -ENOMEM;
1936 for (size_t j = 0; j < *n_mounts; j++)
1937 deny_list[j] = (char*) mount_entry_path(mounts+j);
1938 deny_list[*n_mounts] = NULL;
1939
1940 /* Second round, flip the ro bits if necessary. */
1941 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1942 r = make_read_only(m, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1943 if (r < 0) {
1944 mount_entry_path_debug_string(root, m, error_path);
1945 return r;
1946 }
1947 }
1948
1949 /* Third round, flip the noexec bits with a simplified deny list. */
1950 for (size_t j = 0; j < *n_mounts; j++)
1951 if (IN_SET((mounts+j)->mode, EXEC, NOEXEC))
1952 deny_list[j] = (char*) mount_entry_path(mounts+j);
1953 deny_list[*n_mounts] = NULL;
1954
1955 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1956 r = make_noexec(m, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1957 if (r < 0) {
1958 mount_entry_path_debug_string(root, m, error_path);
1959 return r;
1960 }
1961 }
1962
1963 /* Fourth round, flip the nosuid bits without a deny list. */
1964 if (p->mount_nosuid)
1965 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1966 r = make_nosuid(m, proc_self_mountinfo);
1967 if (r < 0) {
1968 mount_entry_path_debug_string(root, m, error_path);
1969 return r;
1970 }
1971 }
1972
1973 return 1;
1974 }
1975
1976 static bool root_read_only(
1977 char **read_only_paths,
1978 ProtectSystem protect_system) {
1979
1980 /* Determine whether the root directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. */
1981
1982 if (protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT)
1983 return true;
1984
1985 if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/"))
1986 return true;
1987
1988 return false;
1989 }
1990
1991 static bool home_read_only(
1992 char** read_only_paths,
1993 char** inaccessible_paths,
1994 char** empty_directories,
1995 const BindMount *bind_mounts,
1996 size_t n_bind_mounts,
1997 const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems,
1998 size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
1999 ProtectHome protect_home) {
2000
2001 /* Determine whether the /home directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. Yes,
2002 * this is a bit sloppy, since we don't bother checking for cases where / is affected by multiple
2003 * settings. */
2004
2005 if (protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO)
2006 return true;
2007
2008 if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/home") ||
2009 prefixed_path_strv_contains(inaccessible_paths, "/home") ||
2010 prefixed_path_strv_contains(empty_directories, "/home"))
2011 return true;
2012
2013 for (size_t i = 0; i < n_temporary_filesystems; i++)
2014 if (path_equal(temporary_filesystems[i].path, "/home"))
2015 return true;
2016
2017 /* If /home is overmounted with some dir from the host it's not writable. */
2018 for (size_t i = 0; i < n_bind_mounts; i++)
2019 if (path_equal(bind_mounts[i].destination, "/home"))
2020 return true;
2021
2022 return false;
2023 }
2024
2025 int setup_namespace(const NamespaceParameters *p, char **error_path) {
2026
2027 _cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *loop_device = NULL;
2028 _cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp) DissectedImage *dissected_image = NULL;
2029 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **hierarchies = NULL;
2030 MountEntry *m = NULL, *mounts = NULL;
2031 bool require_prefix = false;
2032 const char *root;
2033 DissectImageFlags dissect_image_flags =
2034 DISSECT_IMAGE_GENERIC_ROOT |
2035 DISSECT_IMAGE_REQUIRE_ROOT |
2036 DISSECT_IMAGE_DISCARD_ON_LOOP |
2037 DISSECT_IMAGE_RELAX_VAR_CHECK |
2038 DISSECT_IMAGE_FSCK |
2039 DISSECT_IMAGE_USR_NO_ROOT |
2040 DISSECT_IMAGE_GROWFS |
2041 DISSECT_IMAGE_ADD_PARTITION_DEVICES |
2042 DISSECT_IMAGE_PIN_PARTITION_DEVICES;
2043 size_t n_mounts;
2044 int r;
2045
2046 assert(p);
2047
2048 /* Make sure that all mknod(), mkdir() calls we do are unaffected by the umask, and the access modes
2049 * we configure take effect */
2050 BLOCK_WITH_UMASK(0000);
2051
2052 bool setup_propagate = !isempty(p->propagate_dir) && !isempty(p->incoming_dir);
2053 unsigned long mount_propagation_flag = p->mount_propagation_flag != 0 ? p->mount_propagation_flag : MS_SHARED;
2054
2055 if (p->root_image) {
2056 /* Make the whole image read-only if we can determine that we only access it in a read-only fashion. */
2057 if (root_read_only(p->read_only_paths,
2058 p->protect_system) &&
2059 home_read_only(p->read_only_paths, p->inaccessible_paths, p->empty_directories,
2060 p->bind_mounts, p->n_bind_mounts, p->temporary_filesystems, p->n_temporary_filesystems,
2061 p->protect_home) &&
2062 strv_isempty(p->read_write_paths))
2063 dissect_image_flags |= DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY;
2064
2065 SET_FLAG(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE, p->verity && p->verity->data_path);
2066
2067 r = loop_device_make_by_path(
2068 p->root_image,
2069 FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_DEVICE_READ_ONLY) ? O_RDONLY : -1 /* < 0 means writable if possible, read-only as fallback */,
2070 /* sector_size= */ UINT32_MAX,
2071 FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE) ? 0 : LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN,
2072 LOCK_SH,
2073 &loop_device);
2074 if (r < 0)
2075 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create loop device for root image: %m");
2076
2077 r = dissect_loop_device(
2078 loop_device,
2079 p->verity,
2080 p->root_image_options,
2081 p->root_image_policy,
2082 dissect_image_flags,
2083 &dissected_image);
2084 if (r < 0)
2085 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to dissect image: %m");
2086
2087 r = dissected_image_load_verity_sig_partition(
2088 dissected_image,
2089 loop_device->fd,
2090 p->verity);
2091 if (r < 0)
2092 return r;
2093
2094 r = dissected_image_decrypt(
2095 dissected_image,
2096 NULL,
2097 p->verity,
2098 dissect_image_flags);
2099 if (r < 0)
2100 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to decrypt dissected image: %m");
2101 }
2102
2103 if (p->root_directory)
2104 root = p->root_directory;
2105 else {
2106 /* /run/systemd should have been created by PID 1 early on already, but in some cases, like
2107 * when running tests (test-execute), it might not have been created yet so let's make sure
2108 * we create it if it doesn't already exist. */
2109 (void) mkdir_p_label("/run/systemd", 0755);
2110
2111 /* Always create the mount namespace in a temporary directory, instead of operating directly
2112 * in the root. The temporary directory prevents any mounts from being potentially obscured
2113 * my other mounts we already applied. We use the same mount point for all images, which is
2114 * safe, since they all live in their own namespaces after all, and hence won't see each
2115 * other. (Note: this directory is also created by PID 1 early on, we create it here for
2116 * similar reasons as /run/systemd/ first.) */
2117 root = "/run/systemd/mount-rootfs";
2118 (void) mkdir_label(root, 0555);
2119
2120 require_prefix = true;
2121 }
2122
2123 if (p->n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(p->extension_directories)) {
2124 /* Hierarchy population needs to be done for sysext and confext extension images */
2125 r = parse_env_extension_hierarchies(&hierarchies, "SYSTEMD_SYSEXT_AND_CONFEXT_HIERARCHIES");
2126 if (r < 0)
2127 return r;
2128 }
2129
2130 n_mounts = namespace_calculate_mounts(
2131 p,
2132 hierarchies,
2133 setup_propagate);
2134
2135 if (n_mounts > 0) {
2136 m = mounts = new0(MountEntry, n_mounts);
2137 if (!mounts)
2138 return -ENOMEM;
2139
2140 r = append_access_mounts(&m, p->read_write_paths, READWRITE, require_prefix);
2141 if (r < 0)
2142 goto finish;
2143
2144 r = append_access_mounts(&m, p->read_only_paths, READONLY, require_prefix);
2145 if (r < 0)
2146 goto finish;
2147
2148 r = append_access_mounts(&m, p->inaccessible_paths, INACCESSIBLE, require_prefix);
2149 if (r < 0)
2150 goto finish;
2151
2152 r = append_access_mounts(&m, p->exec_paths, EXEC, require_prefix);
2153 if (r < 0)
2154 goto finish;
2155
2156 r = append_access_mounts(&m, p->no_exec_paths, NOEXEC, require_prefix);
2157 if (r < 0)
2158 goto finish;
2159
2160 r = append_empty_dir_mounts(&m, p->empty_directories);
2161 if (r < 0)
2162 goto finish;
2163
2164 r = append_bind_mounts(&m, p->bind_mounts, p->n_bind_mounts);
2165 if (r < 0)
2166 goto finish;
2167
2168 r = append_tmpfs_mounts(&m, p->temporary_filesystems, p->n_temporary_filesystems);
2169 if (r < 0)
2170 goto finish;
2171
2172 if (p->tmp_dir) {
2173 bool ro = streq(p->tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
2174
2175 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2176 .path_const = "/tmp",
2177 .mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP,
2178 .source_const = p->tmp_dir,
2179 };
2180 }
2181
2182 if (p->var_tmp_dir) {
2183 bool ro = streq(p->var_tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
2184
2185 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2186 .path_const = "/var/tmp",
2187 .mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP,
2188 .source_const = p->var_tmp_dir,
2189 };
2190 }
2191
2192 r = append_mount_images(&m, p->mount_images, p->n_mount_images);
2193 if (r < 0)
2194 goto finish;
2195
2196 r = append_extensions(&m, root, p->extension_dir, hierarchies, p->extension_images, p->n_extension_images, p->extension_directories);
2197 if (r < 0)
2198 goto finish;
2199
2200 if (p->private_dev)
2201 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2202 .path_const = "/dev",
2203 .mode = PRIVATE_DEV,
2204 .flags = DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS,
2205 };
2206
2207 /* In case /proc is successfully mounted with pid tree subset only (ProcSubset=pid), the
2208 protective mounts to non-pid /proc paths would fail. But the pid only option may have
2209 failed gracefully, so let's try the mounts but it's not fatal if they don't succeed. */
2210 bool ignore_protect_proc = p->ignore_protect_paths || p->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID;
2211 if (p->protect_kernel_tunables) {
2212 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2213 protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table,
2214 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table),
2215 ignore_protect_proc);
2216 if (r < 0)
2217 goto finish;
2218
2219 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2220 protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table,
2221 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table),
2222 p->ignore_protect_paths);
2223 if (r < 0)
2224 goto finish;
2225 }
2226
2227 if (p->protect_kernel_modules) {
2228 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2229 protect_kernel_modules_table,
2230 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table),
2231 p->ignore_protect_paths);
2232 if (r < 0)
2233 goto finish;
2234 }
2235
2236 if (p->protect_kernel_logs) {
2237 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2238 protect_kernel_logs_proc_table,
2239 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_proc_table),
2240 ignore_protect_proc);
2241 if (r < 0)
2242 goto finish;
2243
2244 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2245 protect_kernel_logs_dev_table,
2246 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_dev_table),
2247 p->ignore_protect_paths);
2248 if (r < 0)
2249 goto finish;
2250 }
2251
2252 if (p->protect_control_groups)
2253 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2254 .path_const = "/sys/fs/cgroup",
2255 .mode = READONLY,
2256 };
2257
2258 r = append_protect_home(&m, p->protect_home, p->ignore_protect_paths);
2259 if (r < 0)
2260 goto finish;
2261
2262 r = append_protect_system(&m, p->protect_system, false);
2263 if (r < 0)
2264 goto finish;
2265
2266 if (namespace_parameters_mount_apivfs(p)) {
2267 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2268 apivfs_table,
2269 ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table),
2270 p->ignore_protect_paths);
2271 if (r < 0)
2272 goto finish;
2273 }
2274
2275 /* Note, if proc is mounted with subset=pid then neither of the
2276 * two paths will exist, i.e. they are implicitly protected by
2277 * the mount option. */
2278 if (p->protect_hostname) {
2279 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2280 .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/hostname",
2281 .mode = READONLY,
2282 .ignore = ignore_protect_proc,
2283 };
2284 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2285 .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/domainname",
2286 .mode = READONLY,
2287 .ignore = ignore_protect_proc,
2288 };
2289 }
2290
2291 if (p->private_network)
2292 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2293 .path_const = "/sys",
2294 .mode = PRIVATE_SYSFS,
2295 };
2296
2297 if (p->private_ipc)
2298 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2299 .path_const = "/dev/mqueue",
2300 .mode = MQUEUEFS,
2301 .flags = MS_NOSUID | MS_NODEV | MS_NOEXEC | MS_RELATIME,
2302 };
2303
2304 if (p->creds_path) {
2305 /* If our service has a credentials store configured, then bind that one in, but hide
2306 * everything else. */
2307
2308 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2309 .path_const = "/run/credentials",
2310 .mode = TMPFS,
2311 .read_only = true,
2312 .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST,
2313 .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC,
2314 };
2315
2316 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2317 .path_const = p->creds_path,
2318 .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
2319 .read_only = true,
2320 .source_const = p->creds_path,
2321 .ignore = true,
2322 };
2323 } else {
2324 /* If our service has no credentials store configured, then make the whole
2325 * credentials tree inaccessible wholesale. */
2326
2327 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2328 .path_const = "/run/credentials",
2329 .mode = INACCESSIBLE,
2330 .ignore = true,
2331 };
2332 }
2333
2334 if (p->log_namespace) {
2335 _cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL;
2336
2337 q = strjoin("/run/systemd/journal.", p->log_namespace);
2338 if (!q) {
2339 r = -ENOMEM;
2340 goto finish;
2341 }
2342
2343 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2344 .path_const = "/run/systemd/journal",
2345 .mode = BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE,
2346 .read_only = true,
2347 .source_malloc = TAKE_PTR(q),
2348 };
2349 }
2350
2351 /* Will be used to add bind mounts at runtime */
2352 if (setup_propagate)
2353 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2354 .source_const = p->propagate_dir,
2355 .path_const = p->incoming_dir,
2356 .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
2357 .read_only = true,
2358 };
2359
2360 if (p->notify_socket)
2361 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2362 .path_const = p->notify_socket,
2363 .source_const = p->notify_socket,
2364 .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
2365 .read_only = true,
2366 };
2367
2368 if (p->host_os_release_stage)
2369 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2370 .path_const = "/run/host/.os-release-stage/",
2371 .source_const = p->host_os_release_stage,
2372 .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
2373 .read_only = true,
2374 .ignore = true, /* Live copy, don't hard-fail if it goes missing */
2375 };
2376
2377 assert(mounts + n_mounts == m);
2378
2379 /* Prepend the root directory where that's necessary */
2380 r = prefix_where_needed(mounts, n_mounts, root);
2381 if (r < 0)
2382 goto finish;
2383
2384 drop_unused_mounts(root, mounts, &n_mounts);
2385 }
2386
2387 /* All above is just preparation, figuring out what to do. Let's now actually start doing something. */
2388
2389 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) < 0) {
2390 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to unshare the mount namespace: %m");
2391 if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r) ||
2392 ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r))
2393 /* If the kernel doesn't support namespaces, or when there's a MAC or seccomp filter
2394 * in place that doesn't allow us to create namespaces (or a missing cap), then
2395 * propagate a recognizable error back, which the caller can use to detect this case
2396 * (and only this) and optionally continue without namespacing applied. */
2397 r = -ENOANO;
2398
2399 goto finish;
2400 }
2401
2402 /* Create the source directory to allow runtime propagation of mounts */
2403 if (setup_propagate)
2404 (void) mkdir_p(p->propagate_dir, 0600);
2405
2406 if (p->n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(p->extension_directories))
2407 /* ExtensionImages/Directories mountpoint directories will be created while parsing the
2408 * mounts to create, so have the parent ready */
2409 (void) mkdir_p(p->extension_dir, 0600);
2410
2411 /* Remount / as SLAVE so that nothing now mounted in the namespace
2412 * shows up in the parent */
2413 if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_SLAVE|MS_REC, NULL) < 0) {
2414 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' as SLAVE: %m");
2415 goto finish;
2416 }
2417
2418 if (p->root_image) {
2419 /* A root image is specified, mount it to the right place */
2420 r = dissected_image_mount(
2421 dissected_image,
2422 root,
2423 /* uid_shift= */ UID_INVALID,
2424 /* uid_range= */ UID_INVALID,
2425 /* userns_fd= */ -EBADF,
2426 dissect_image_flags);
2427 if (r < 0) {
2428 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root image: %m");
2429 goto finish;
2430 }
2431
2432 /* Now release the block device lock, so that udevd is free to call BLKRRPART on the device
2433 * if it likes. */
2434 r = loop_device_flock(loop_device, LOCK_UN);
2435 if (r < 0) {
2436 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to release lock on loopback block device: %m");
2437 goto finish;
2438 }
2439
2440 r = dissected_image_relinquish(dissected_image);
2441 if (r < 0) {
2442 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to relinquish dissected image: %m");
2443 goto finish;
2444 }
2445
2446 } else if (p->root_directory) {
2447
2448 /* A root directory is specified. Turn its directory into bind mount, if it isn't one yet. */
2449 r = path_is_mount_point(root, NULL, AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW);
2450 if (r < 0) {
2451 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect that %s is a mount point or not: %m", root);
2452 goto finish;
2453 }
2454 if (r == 0) {
2455 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, root, root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
2456 if (r < 0)
2457 goto finish;
2458 }
2459
2460 } else {
2461 /* Let's mount the main root directory to the root directory to use */
2462 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/", root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
2463 if (r < 0)
2464 goto finish;
2465 }
2466
2467 /* Try to set up the new root directory before mounting anything else there. */
2468 if (p->root_image || p->root_directory)
2469 (void) base_filesystem_create(root, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
2470
2471 /* Now make the magic happen */
2472 r = apply_mounts(root,
2473 p,
2474 mounts, &n_mounts,
2475 error_path);
2476 if (r < 0)
2477 goto finish;
2478
2479 /* MS_MOVE does not work on MS_SHARED so the remount MS_SHARED will be done later */
2480 r = mount_switch_root(root, /* mount_propagation_flag = */ 0);
2481 if (r == -EINVAL && p->root_directory) {
2482 /* If we are using root_directory and we don't have privileges (ie: user manager in a user
2483 * namespace) and the root_directory is already a mount point in the parent namespace,
2484 * MS_MOVE will fail as we don't have permission to change it (with EINVAL rather than
2485 * EPERM). Attempt to bind-mount it over itself (like we do above if it's not already a
2486 * mount point) and try again. */
2487 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, root, root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
2488 if (r < 0)
2489 goto finish;
2490 r = mount_switch_root(root, /* mount_propagation_flag = */ 0);
2491 }
2492 if (r < 0) {
2493 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root with MS_MOVE: %m");
2494 goto finish;
2495 }
2496
2497 /* Remount / as the desired mode. Note that this will not reestablish propagation from our side to
2498 * the host, since what's disconnected is disconnected. */
2499 if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, mount_propagation_flag | MS_REC, NULL) < 0) {
2500 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' with desired mount flags: %m");
2501 goto finish;
2502 }
2503
2504 /* bind_mount_in_namespace() will MS_MOVE into that directory, and that's only
2505 * supported for non-shared mounts. This needs to happen after remounting / or it will fail. */
2506 if (setup_propagate) {
2507 r = mount(NULL, p->incoming_dir, NULL, MS_SLAVE, NULL);
2508 if (r < 0) {
2509 log_error_errno(r, "Failed to remount %s with MS_SLAVE: %m", p->incoming_dir);
2510 goto finish;
2511 }
2512 }
2513
2514 r = 0;
2515
2516 finish:
2517 if (n_mounts > 0)
2518 for (m = mounts; m < mounts + n_mounts; m++)
2519 mount_entry_done(m);
2520
2521 free(mounts);
2522
2523 return r;
2524 }
2525
2526 void bind_mount_free_many(BindMount *b, size_t n) {
2527 assert(b || n == 0);
2528
2529 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
2530 free(b[i].source);
2531 free(b[i].destination);
2532 }
2533
2534 free(b);
2535 }
2536
2537 int bind_mount_add(BindMount **b, size_t *n, const BindMount *item) {
2538 _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL;
2539 BindMount *c;
2540
2541 assert(b);
2542 assert(n);
2543 assert(item);
2544
2545 s = strdup(item->source);
2546 if (!s)
2547 return -ENOMEM;
2548
2549 d = strdup(item->destination);
2550 if (!d)
2551 return -ENOMEM;
2552
2553 c = reallocarray(*b, *n + 1, sizeof(BindMount));
2554 if (!c)
2555 return -ENOMEM;
2556
2557 *b = c;
2558
2559 c[(*n) ++] = (BindMount) {
2560 .source = TAKE_PTR(s),
2561 .destination = TAKE_PTR(d),
2562 .read_only = item->read_only,
2563 .nosuid = item->nosuid,
2564 .recursive = item->recursive,
2565 .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent,
2566 };
2567
2568 return 0;
2569 }
2570
2571 MountImage* mount_image_free_many(MountImage *m, size_t *n) {
2572 assert(n);
2573 assert(m || *n == 0);
2574
2575 for (size_t i = 0; i < *n; i++) {
2576 free(m[i].source);
2577 free(m[i].destination);
2578 mount_options_free_all(m[i].mount_options);
2579 }
2580
2581 free(m);
2582 *n = 0;
2583 return NULL;
2584 }
2585
2586 int mount_image_add(MountImage **m, size_t *n, const MountImage *item) {
2587 _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL;
2588 _cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *options = NULL;
2589 MountImage *c;
2590
2591 assert(m);
2592 assert(n);
2593 assert(item);
2594
2595 s = strdup(item->source);
2596 if (!s)
2597 return -ENOMEM;
2598
2599 if (item->destination) {
2600 d = strdup(item->destination);
2601 if (!d)
2602 return -ENOMEM;
2603 }
2604
2605 LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, i, item->mount_options) {
2606 _cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *o = NULL;
2607
2608 o = new(MountOptions, 1);
2609 if (!o)
2610 return -ENOMEM;
2611
2612 *o = (MountOptions) {
2613 .partition_designator = i->partition_designator,
2614 .options = strdup(i->options),
2615 };
2616 if (!o->options)
2617 return -ENOMEM;
2618
2619 LIST_APPEND(mount_options, options, TAKE_PTR(o));
2620 }
2621
2622 c = reallocarray(*m, *n + 1, sizeof(MountImage));
2623 if (!c)
2624 return -ENOMEM;
2625
2626 *m = c;
2627
2628 c[(*n) ++] = (MountImage) {
2629 .source = TAKE_PTR(s),
2630 .destination = TAKE_PTR(d),
2631 .mount_options = TAKE_PTR(options),
2632 .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent,
2633 .type = item->type,
2634 };
2635
2636 return 0;
2637 }
2638
2639 void temporary_filesystem_free_many(TemporaryFileSystem *t, size_t n) {
2640 assert(t || n == 0);
2641
2642 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
2643 free(t[i].path);
2644 free(t[i].options);
2645 }
2646
2647 free(t);
2648 }
2649
2650 int temporary_filesystem_add(
2651 TemporaryFileSystem **t,
2652 size_t *n,
2653 const char *path,
2654 const char *options) {
2655
2656 _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *o = NULL;
2657 TemporaryFileSystem *c;
2658
2659 assert(t);
2660 assert(n);
2661 assert(path);
2662
2663 p = strdup(path);
2664 if (!p)
2665 return -ENOMEM;
2666
2667 if (!isempty(options)) {
2668 o = strdup(options);
2669 if (!o)
2670 return -ENOMEM;
2671 }
2672
2673 c = reallocarray(*t, *n + 1, sizeof(TemporaryFileSystem));
2674 if (!c)
2675 return -ENOMEM;
2676
2677 *t = c;
2678
2679 c[(*n) ++] = (TemporaryFileSystem) {
2680 .path = TAKE_PTR(p),
2681 .options = TAKE_PTR(o),
2682 };
2683
2684 return 0;
2685 }
2686
2687 static int make_tmp_prefix(const char *prefix) {
2688 _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
2689 _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF;
2690 int r;
2691
2692 /* Don't do anything unless we know the dir is actually missing */
2693 r = access(prefix, F_OK);
2694 if (r >= 0)
2695 return 0;
2696 if (errno != ENOENT)
2697 return -errno;
2698
2699 WITH_UMASK(000)
2700 r = mkdir_parents(prefix, 0755);
2701 if (r < 0)
2702 return r;
2703
2704 r = tempfn_random(prefix, NULL, &t);
2705 if (r < 0)
2706 return r;
2707
2708 /* umask will corrupt this access mode, but that doesn't matter, we need to call chmod() anyway for
2709 * the suid bit, below. */
2710 fd = open_mkdir_at(AT_FDCWD, t, O_EXCL|O_CLOEXEC, 0777);
2711 if (fd < 0)
2712 return fd;
2713
2714 r = RET_NERRNO(fchmod(fd, 01777));
2715 if (r < 0) {
2716 (void) rmdir(t);
2717 return r;
2718 }
2719
2720 r = RET_NERRNO(rename(t, prefix));
2721 if (r < 0) {
2722 (void) rmdir(t);
2723 return r == -EEXIST ? 0 : r; /* it's fine if someone else created the dir by now */
2724 }
2725
2726 return 0;
2727
2728 }
2729
2730 static int setup_one_tmp_dir(const char *id, const char *prefix, char **path, char **tmp_path) {
2731 _cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL;
2732 _cleanup_free_ char *y = NULL;
2733 sd_id128_t boot_id;
2734 bool rw = true;
2735 int r;
2736
2737 assert(id);
2738 assert(prefix);
2739 assert(path);
2740
2741 /* We include the boot id in the directory so that after a
2742 * reboot we can easily identify obsolete directories. */
2743
2744 r = sd_id128_get_boot(&boot_id);
2745 if (r < 0)
2746 return r;
2747
2748 x = strjoin(prefix, "/systemd-private-", SD_ID128_TO_STRING(boot_id), "-", id, "-XXXXXX");
2749 if (!x)
2750 return -ENOMEM;
2751
2752 r = make_tmp_prefix(prefix);
2753 if (r < 0)
2754 return r;
2755
2756 WITH_UMASK(0077)
2757 if (!mkdtemp(x)) {
2758 if (errno == EROFS || ERRNO_IS_DISK_SPACE(errno))
2759 rw = false;
2760 else
2761 return -errno;
2762 }
2763
2764 if (rw) {
2765 y = strjoin(x, "/tmp");
2766 if (!y)
2767 return -ENOMEM;
2768
2769 WITH_UMASK(0000)
2770 if (mkdir(y, 0777 | S_ISVTX) < 0)
2771 return -errno;
2772
2773 r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, y, prefix, 0);
2774 if (r < 0)
2775 return r;
2776
2777 if (tmp_path)
2778 *tmp_path = TAKE_PTR(y);
2779 } else {
2780 /* Trouble: we failed to create the directory. Instead of failing, let's simulate /tmp being
2781 * read-only. This way the service will get the EROFS result as if it was writing to the real
2782 * file system. */
2783 WITH_UMASK(0000)
2784 r = mkdir_p(RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY, 0500);
2785 if (r < 0)
2786 return r;
2787
2788 r = free_and_strdup(&x, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
2789 if (r < 0)
2790 return r;
2791 }
2792
2793 *path = TAKE_PTR(x);
2794 return 0;
2795 }
2796
2797 int setup_tmp_dirs(const char *id, char **tmp_dir, char **var_tmp_dir) {
2798 _cleanup_(namespace_cleanup_tmpdirp) char *a = NULL;
2799 _cleanup_(rmdir_and_freep) char *a_tmp = NULL;
2800 char *b;
2801 int r;
2802
2803 assert(id);
2804 assert(tmp_dir);
2805 assert(var_tmp_dir);
2806
2807 r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/tmp", &a, &a_tmp);
2808 if (r < 0)
2809 return r;
2810
2811 r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/var/tmp", &b, NULL);
2812 if (r < 0)
2813 return r;
2814
2815 a_tmp = mfree(a_tmp); /* avoid rmdir */
2816 *tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(a);
2817 *var_tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(b);
2818
2819 return 0;
2820 }
2821
2822 int setup_shareable_ns(int ns_storage_socket[static 2], unsigned long nsflag) {
2823 _cleanup_close_ int ns = -EBADF;
2824 int r;
2825 const char *ns_name, *ns_path;
2826
2827 assert(ns_storage_socket);
2828 assert(ns_storage_socket[0] >= 0);
2829 assert(ns_storage_socket[1] >= 0);
2830
2831 ns_name = namespace_single_flag_to_string(nsflag);
2832 assert(ns_name);
2833
2834 /* We use the passed socketpair as a storage buffer for our
2835 * namespace reference fd. Whatever process runs this first
2836 * shall create a new namespace, all others should just join
2837 * it. To serialize that we use a file lock on the socket
2838 * pair.
2839 *
2840 * It's a bit crazy, but hey, works great! */
2841
2842 r = posix_lock(ns_storage_socket[0], LOCK_EX);
2843 if (r < 0)
2844 return r;
2845
2846 CLEANUP_POSIX_UNLOCK(ns_storage_socket[0]);
2847
2848 ns = receive_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[0], MSG_PEEK|MSG_DONTWAIT);
2849 if (ns >= 0) {
2850 /* Yay, found something, so let's join the namespace */
2851 r = RET_NERRNO(setns(ns, nsflag));
2852 if (r < 0)
2853 return r;
2854
2855 return 0;
2856 }
2857
2858 if (ns != -EAGAIN)
2859 return ns;
2860
2861 /* Nothing stored yet, so let's create a new namespace. */
2862
2863 if (unshare(nsflag) < 0)
2864 return -errno;
2865
2866 (void) loopback_setup();
2867
2868 ns_path = strjoina("/proc/self/ns/", ns_name);
2869 ns = open(ns_path, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
2870 if (ns < 0)
2871 return -errno;
2872
2873 r = send_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[1], ns, MSG_DONTWAIT);
2874 if (r < 0)
2875 return r;
2876
2877 return 1;
2878 }
2879
2880 int open_shareable_ns_path(int ns_storage_socket[static 2], const char *path, unsigned long nsflag) {
2881 _cleanup_close_ int ns = -EBADF;
2882 int r;
2883
2884 assert(ns_storage_socket);
2885 assert(ns_storage_socket[0] >= 0);
2886 assert(ns_storage_socket[1] >= 0);
2887 assert(path);
2888
2889 /* If the storage socket doesn't contain a ns fd yet, open one via the file system and store it in
2890 * it. This is supposed to be called ahead of time, i.e. before setup_shareable_ns() which will
2891 * allocate a new anonymous ns if needed. */
2892
2893 r = posix_lock(ns_storage_socket[0], LOCK_EX);
2894 if (r < 0)
2895 return r;
2896
2897 CLEANUP_POSIX_UNLOCK(ns_storage_socket[0]);
2898
2899 ns = receive_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[0], MSG_PEEK|MSG_DONTWAIT);
2900 if (ns >= 0)
2901 return 0;
2902 if (ns != -EAGAIN)
2903 return ns;
2904
2905 /* Nothing stored yet. Open the file from the file system. */
2906
2907 ns = open(path, O_RDONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC);
2908 if (ns < 0)
2909 return -errno;
2910
2911 r = fd_is_ns(ns, nsflag);
2912 if (r == 0)
2913 return -EINVAL;
2914 if (r < 0 && r != -EUCLEAN) /* EUCLEAN: we don't know */
2915 return r;
2916
2917 r = send_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[1], ns, MSG_DONTWAIT);
2918 if (r < 0)
2919 return r;
2920
2921 return 1;
2922 }
2923
2924 bool ns_type_supported(NamespaceType type) {
2925 const char *t, *ns_proc;
2926
2927 t = namespace_type_to_string(type);
2928 if (!t) /* Don't know how to translate this? Then it's not supported */
2929 return false;
2930
2931 ns_proc = strjoina("/proc/self/ns/", t);
2932 return access(ns_proc, F_OK) == 0;
2933 }
2934
2935 static const char *const protect_home_table[_PROTECT_HOME_MAX] = {
2936 [PROTECT_HOME_NO] = "no",
2937 [PROTECT_HOME_YES] = "yes",
2938 [PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY] = "read-only",
2939 [PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS] = "tmpfs",
2940 };
2941
2942 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_home, ProtectHome, PROTECT_HOME_YES);
2943
2944 static const char *const protect_system_table[_PROTECT_SYSTEM_MAX] = {
2945 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO] = "no",
2946 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES] = "yes",
2947 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL] = "full",
2948 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT] = "strict",
2949 };
2950
2951 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_system, ProtectSystem, PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES);
2952
2953 static const char* const namespace_type_table[] = {
2954 [NAMESPACE_MOUNT] = "mnt",
2955 [NAMESPACE_CGROUP] = "cgroup",
2956 [NAMESPACE_UTS] = "uts",
2957 [NAMESPACE_IPC] = "ipc",
2958 [NAMESPACE_USER] = "user",
2959 [NAMESPACE_PID] = "pid",
2960 [NAMESPACE_NET] = "net",
2961 [NAMESPACE_TIME] = "time",
2962 };
2963
2964 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(namespace_type, NamespaceType);
2965
2966 static const char* const protect_proc_table[_PROTECT_PROC_MAX] = {
2967 [PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT] = "default",
2968 [PROTECT_PROC_NOACCESS] = "noaccess",
2969 [PROTECT_PROC_INVISIBLE] = "invisible",
2970 [PROTECT_PROC_PTRACEABLE] = "ptraceable",
2971 };
2972
2973 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(protect_proc, ProtectProc);
2974
2975 static const char* const proc_subset_table[_PROC_SUBSET_MAX] = {
2976 [PROC_SUBSET_ALL] = "all",
2977 [PROC_SUBSET_PID] = "pid",
2978 };
2979
2980 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(proc_subset, ProcSubset);