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Merge pull request #29427 from ddstreet/cryptenroll_specify_handle_index
[thirdparty/systemd.git] / src / core / namespace.c
1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
2
3 #include <errno.h>
4 #include <linux/loop.h>
5 #include <sched.h>
6 #include <stdio.h>
7 #include <sys/file.h>
8 #include <sys/mount.h>
9 #include <unistd.h>
10 #if WANT_LINUX_FS_H
11 #include <linux/fs.h>
12 #endif
13
14 #include "alloc-util.h"
15 #include "base-filesystem.h"
16 #include "chase.h"
17 #include "dev-setup.h"
18 #include "devnum-util.h"
19 #include "env-util.h"
20 #include "escape.h"
21 #include "extension-util.h"
22 #include "fd-util.h"
23 #include "format-util.h"
24 #include "glyph-util.h"
25 #include "label-util.h"
26 #include "list.h"
27 #include "lock-util.h"
28 #include "loop-util.h"
29 #include "loopback-setup.h"
30 #include "missing_syscall.h"
31 #include "mkdir-label.h"
32 #include "mount-util.h"
33 #include "mountpoint-util.h"
34 #include "namespace-util.h"
35 #include "namespace.h"
36 #include "nsflags.h"
37 #include "nulstr-util.h"
38 #include "os-util.h"
39 #include "path-util.h"
40 #include "selinux-util.h"
41 #include "socket-util.h"
42 #include "sort-util.h"
43 #include "stat-util.h"
44 #include "string-table.h"
45 #include "string-util.h"
46 #include "strv.h"
47 #include "tmpfile-util.h"
48 #include "umask-util.h"
49 #include "user-util.h"
50
51 #define DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS (MS_NOSUID|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOEXEC)
52
53 typedef enum MountMode {
54 /* This is ordered by priority! */
55 INACCESSIBLE,
56 OVERLAY_MOUNT,
57 MOUNT_IMAGES,
58 BIND_MOUNT,
59 BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE,
60 PRIVATE_TMP,
61 PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY,
62 PRIVATE_DEV,
63 BIND_DEV,
64 EMPTY_DIR,
65 PRIVATE_SYSFS,
66 BIND_SYSFS,
67 PROCFS,
68 READONLY,
69 READWRITE,
70 NOEXEC,
71 EXEC,
72 TMPFS,
73 RUN,
74 EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES, /* Bind-mounted outside the root directory, and used by subsequent mounts */
75 EXTENSION_IMAGES, /* Mounted outside the root directory, and used by subsequent mounts */
76 MQUEUEFS,
77 READWRITE_IMPLICIT, /* Should have the lowest priority. */
78 _MOUNT_MODE_MAX,
79 } MountMode;
80
81 typedef struct MountEntry {
82 const char *path_const; /* Memory allocated on stack or static */
83 MountMode mode:5;
84 bool ignore:1; /* Ignore if path does not exist? */
85 bool has_prefix:1; /* Already is prefixed by the root dir? */
86 bool read_only:1; /* Shall this mount point be read-only? */
87 bool nosuid:1; /* Shall set MS_NOSUID on the mount itself */
88 bool noexec:1; /* Shall set MS_NOEXEC on the mount itself */
89 bool exec:1; /* Shall clear MS_NOEXEC on the mount itself */
90 bool applied:1; /* Already applied */
91 char *path_malloc; /* Use this instead of 'path_const' if we had to allocate memory */
92 const char *unprefixed_path_const; /* If the path was amended with a prefix, these will save the original */
93 char *unprefixed_path_malloc;
94 const char *source_const; /* The source path, for bind mounts or images */
95 char *source_malloc;
96 const char *options_const;/* Mount options for tmpfs */
97 char *options_malloc;
98 unsigned long flags; /* Mount flags used by EMPTY_DIR and TMPFS. Do not include MS_RDONLY here, but please use read_only. */
99 unsigned n_followed;
100 LIST_HEAD(MountOptions, image_options);
101 } MountEntry;
102
103 /* If MountAPIVFS= is used, let's mount /sys, /proc, /dev and /run into the it, but only as a fallback if the user hasn't mounted
104 * something there already. These mounts are hence overridden by any other explicitly configured mounts. */
105 static const MountEntry apivfs_table[] = {
106 { "/proc", PROCFS, false },
107 { "/dev", BIND_DEV, false },
108 { "/sys", BIND_SYSFS, false },
109 { "/run", RUN, false, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_RUN, .flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
110 };
111
112 /* ProtectKernelTunables= option and the related filesystem APIs */
113 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table[] = {
114 { "/proc/acpi", READONLY, true },
115 { "/proc/apm", READONLY, true }, /* Obsolete API, there's no point in permitting access to this, ever */
116 { "/proc/asound", READONLY, true },
117 { "/proc/bus", READONLY, true },
118 { "/proc/fs", READONLY, true },
119 { "/proc/irq", READONLY, true },
120 { "/proc/kallsyms", INACCESSIBLE, true },
121 { "/proc/kcore", INACCESSIBLE, true },
122 { "/proc/latency_stats", READONLY, true },
123 { "/proc/mtrr", READONLY, true },
124 { "/proc/scsi", READONLY, true },
125 { "/proc/sys", READONLY, true },
126 { "/proc/sysrq-trigger", READONLY, true },
127 { "/proc/timer_stats", READONLY, true },
128 };
129
130 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table[] = {
131 { "/sys", READONLY, false },
132 { "/sys/fs/bpf", READONLY, true },
133 { "/sys/fs/cgroup", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* READONLY is set by ProtectControlGroups= option */
134 { "/sys/fs/selinux", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true },
135 { "/sys/kernel/debug", READONLY, true },
136 { "/sys/kernel/tracing", READONLY, true },
137 };
138
139 /* ProtectKernelModules= option */
140 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_modules_table[] = {
141 { "/usr/lib/modules", INACCESSIBLE, true },
142 };
143
144 /* ProtectKernelLogs= option */
145 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_logs_proc_table[] = {
146 { "/proc/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true },
147 };
148
149 static const MountEntry protect_kernel_logs_dev_table[] = {
150 { "/dev/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true },
151 };
152
153 /*
154 * ProtectHome=read-only table, protect $HOME and $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR and rest of
155 * system should be protected by ProtectSystem=
156 */
157 static const MountEntry protect_home_read_only_table[] = {
158 { "/home", READONLY, true },
159 { "/run/user", READONLY, true },
160 { "/root", READONLY, true },
161 };
162
163 /* ProtectHome=tmpfs table */
164 static const MountEntry protect_home_tmpfs_table[] = {
165 { "/home", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
166 { "/run/user", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
167 { "/root", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0700" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME },
168 };
169
170 /* ProtectHome=yes table */
171 static const MountEntry protect_home_yes_table[] = {
172 { "/home", INACCESSIBLE, true },
173 { "/run/user", INACCESSIBLE, true },
174 { "/root", INACCESSIBLE, true },
175 };
176
177 /* ProtectSystem=yes table */
178 static const MountEntry protect_system_yes_table[] = {
179 { "/usr", READONLY, false },
180 { "/boot", READONLY, true },
181 { "/efi", READONLY, true },
182 };
183
184 /* ProtectSystem=full includes ProtectSystem=yes */
185 static const MountEntry protect_system_full_table[] = {
186 { "/usr", READONLY, false },
187 { "/boot", READONLY, true },
188 { "/efi", READONLY, true },
189 { "/etc", READONLY, false },
190 };
191
192 /*
193 * ProtectSystem=strict table. In this strict mode, we mount everything
194 * read-only, except for /proc, /dev, /sys which are the kernel API VFS,
195 * which are left writable, but PrivateDevices= + ProtectKernelTunables=
196 * protect those, and these options should be fully orthogonal.
197 * (And of course /home and friends are also left writable, as ProtectHome=
198 * shall manage those, orthogonally).
199 */
200 static const MountEntry protect_system_strict_table[] = {
201 { "/", READONLY, false },
202 { "/proc", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */
203 { "/sys", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */
204 { "/dev", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* PrivateDevices= */
205 { "/home", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
206 { "/run/user", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
207 { "/root", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */
208 };
209
210 static const char * const mount_mode_table[_MOUNT_MODE_MAX] = {
211 [INACCESSIBLE] = "inaccessible",
212 [OVERLAY_MOUNT] = "overlay",
213 [MOUNT_IMAGES] = "mount-images",
214 [BIND_MOUNT] = "bind",
215 [BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE] = "rbind",
216 [PRIVATE_TMP] = "private-tmp",
217 [PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY] = "private-tmp-read-only",
218 [PRIVATE_DEV] = "private-dev",
219 [BIND_DEV] = "bind-dev",
220 [EMPTY_DIR] = "empty",
221 [PRIVATE_SYSFS] = "private-sysfs",
222 [BIND_SYSFS] = "bind-sysfs",
223 [PROCFS] = "procfs",
224 [READONLY] = "read-only",
225 [READWRITE] = "read-write",
226 [NOEXEC] = "noexec",
227 [EXEC] = "exec",
228 [TMPFS] = "tmpfs",
229 [RUN] = "run",
230 [EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES] = "extension-directories",
231 [EXTENSION_IMAGES] = "extension-images",
232 [MQUEUEFS] = "mqueuefs",
233 [READWRITE_IMPLICIT] = "read-write-implicit",
234 };
235
236 /* Helper struct for naming simplicity and reusability */
237 static const struct {
238 const char *level_env;
239 const char *level_env_print;
240 } image_class_info[_IMAGE_CLASS_MAX] = {
241 [IMAGE_SYSEXT] = {
242 .level_env = "SYSEXT_LEVEL",
243 .level_env_print = " SYSEXT_LEVEL=",
244 },
245 [IMAGE_CONFEXT] = {
246 .level_env = "CONFEXT_LEVEL",
247 .level_env_print = " CONFEXT_LEVEL=",
248 }
249 };
250
251 DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(mount_mode, MountMode);
252
253 static const char *mount_entry_path(const MountEntry *p) {
254 assert(p);
255
256 /* Returns the path of this bind mount. If the malloc()-allocated ->path_buffer field is set we return that,
257 * otherwise the stack/static ->path field is returned. */
258
259 return p->path_malloc ?: p->path_const;
260 }
261
262 static const char *mount_entry_unprefixed_path(const MountEntry *p) {
263 assert(p);
264
265 /* Returns the unprefixed path (ie: before prefix_where_needed() ran), if any */
266
267 return p->unprefixed_path_malloc ?: p->unprefixed_path_const ?: mount_entry_path(p);
268 }
269
270 static void mount_entry_consume_prefix(MountEntry *p, char *new_path) {
271 assert(p);
272 assert(p->path_malloc || p->path_const);
273 assert(new_path);
274
275 /* Saves current path in unprefixed_ variable, and takes over new_path */
276
277 free_and_replace(p->unprefixed_path_malloc, p->path_malloc);
278 /* If we didn't have a path on the heap, then it's a static one */
279 if (!p->unprefixed_path_malloc)
280 p->unprefixed_path_const = p->path_const;
281 p->path_malloc = new_path;
282 p->has_prefix = true;
283 }
284
285 static bool mount_entry_read_only(const MountEntry *p) {
286 assert(p);
287
288 return p->read_only || IN_SET(p->mode, READONLY, INACCESSIBLE, PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY);
289 }
290
291 static bool mount_entry_noexec(const MountEntry *p) {
292 assert(p);
293
294 return p->noexec || IN_SET(p->mode, NOEXEC, INACCESSIBLE, PRIVATE_SYSFS, BIND_SYSFS, PROCFS);
295 }
296
297 static bool mount_entry_exec(const MountEntry *p) {
298 assert(p);
299
300 return p->exec || p->mode == EXEC;
301 }
302
303 static const char *mount_entry_source(const MountEntry *p) {
304 assert(p);
305
306 return p->source_malloc ?: p->source_const;
307 }
308
309 static const char *mount_entry_options(const MountEntry *p) {
310 assert(p);
311
312 return p->options_malloc ?: p->options_const;
313 }
314
315 static void mount_entry_done(MountEntry *p) {
316 assert(p);
317
318 p->path_malloc = mfree(p->path_malloc);
319 p->unprefixed_path_malloc = mfree(p->unprefixed_path_malloc);
320 p->source_malloc = mfree(p->source_malloc);
321 p->options_malloc = mfree(p->options_malloc);
322 p->image_options = mount_options_free_all(p->image_options);
323 }
324
325 static int append_access_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv, MountMode mode, bool forcibly_require_prefix) {
326 assert(p);
327
328 /* Adds a list of user-supplied READWRITE/READWRITE_IMPLICIT/READONLY/INACCESSIBLE entries */
329
330 STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) {
331 bool ignore = false, needs_prefix = false;
332 const char *e = *i;
333
334 /* Look for any prefixes */
335 if (startswith(e, "-")) {
336 e++;
337 ignore = true;
338 }
339 if (startswith(e, "+")) {
340 e++;
341 needs_prefix = true;
342 }
343
344 if (!path_is_absolute(e))
345 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
346 "Path is not absolute: %s", e);
347
348 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
349 .path_const = e,
350 .mode = mode,
351 .ignore = ignore,
352 .has_prefix = !needs_prefix && !forcibly_require_prefix,
353 };
354 }
355
356 return 0;
357 }
358
359 static int append_empty_dir_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv) {
360 assert(p);
361
362 /* Adds tmpfs mounts to provide readable but empty directories. This is primarily used to implement the
363 * "/private/" boundary directories for DynamicUser=1. */
364
365 STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) {
366
367 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
368 .path_const = *i,
369 .mode = EMPTY_DIR,
370 .ignore = false,
371 .read_only = true,
372 .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST,
373 .flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME,
374 };
375 }
376
377 return 0;
378 }
379
380 static int append_bind_mounts(MountEntry **p, const BindMount *binds, size_t n) {
381 assert(p);
382
383 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
384 const BindMount *b = binds + i;
385
386 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
387 .path_const = b->destination,
388 .mode = b->recursive ? BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE : BIND_MOUNT,
389 .read_only = b->read_only,
390 .nosuid = b->nosuid,
391 .source_const = b->source,
392 .ignore = b->ignore_enoent,
393 };
394 }
395
396 return 0;
397 }
398
399 static int append_mount_images(MountEntry **p, const MountImage *mount_images, size_t n) {
400 assert(p);
401
402 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
403 const MountImage *m = mount_images + i;
404
405 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
406 .path_const = m->destination,
407 .mode = MOUNT_IMAGES,
408 .source_const = m->source,
409 .image_options = m->mount_options,
410 .ignore = m->ignore_enoent,
411 };
412 }
413
414 return 0;
415 }
416
417 static int append_extensions(
418 MountEntry **p,
419 const char *root,
420 const char *extension_dir,
421 char **hierarchies,
422 const MountImage *mount_images,
423 size_t n,
424 char **extension_directories) {
425
426 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **overlays = NULL;
427 int r;
428
429 if (n == 0 && strv_isempty(extension_directories))
430 return 0;
431
432 assert(p);
433 assert(extension_dir);
434
435 /* Prepare a list of overlays, that will have as each element a string suitable for being
436 * passed as a lowerdir= parameter, so start with the hierarchy on the root.
437 * The overlays vector will have the same number of elements and will correspond to the
438 * hierarchies vector, so they can be iterated upon together. */
439 STRV_FOREACH(hierarchy, hierarchies) {
440 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL;
441
442 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(root, *hierarchy);
443 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
444 return -ENOMEM;
445
446 r = strv_consume(&overlays, TAKE_PTR(prefixed_hierarchy));
447 if (r < 0)
448 return r;
449 }
450
451 /* First, prepare a mount for each image, but these won't be visible to the unit, instead
452 * they will be mounted in our propagate directory, and used as a source for the overlay. */
453 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
454 _cleanup_free_ char *mount_point = NULL;
455 const MountImage *m = mount_images + i;
456
457 r = asprintf(&mount_point, "%s/%zu", extension_dir, i);
458 if (r < 0)
459 return -ENOMEM;
460
461 for (size_t j = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[j]; ++j) {
462 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL, *escaped = NULL, *lowerdir = NULL;
463
464 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(mount_point, hierarchies[j]);
465 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
466 return -ENOMEM;
467
468 escaped = shell_escape(prefixed_hierarchy, ",:");
469 if (!escaped)
470 return -ENOMEM;
471
472 /* Note that lowerdir= parameters are in 'reverse' order, so the
473 * top-most directory in the overlay comes first in the list. */
474 lowerdir = strjoin(escaped, ":", overlays[j]);
475 if (!lowerdir)
476 return -ENOMEM;
477
478 free_and_replace(overlays[j], lowerdir);
479 }
480
481 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
482 .path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(mount_point),
483 .image_options = m->mount_options,
484 .ignore = m->ignore_enoent,
485 .source_const = m->source,
486 .mode = EXTENSION_IMAGES,
487 .has_prefix = true,
488 };
489 }
490
491 /* Secondly, extend the lowerdir= parameters with each ExtensionDirectory.
492 * Bind mount them in the same location as the ExtensionImages, so that we
493 * can check that they are valid trees (extension-release.d). */
494 STRV_FOREACH(extension_directory, extension_directories) {
495 _cleanup_free_ char *mount_point = NULL, *source = NULL;
496 const char *e = *extension_directory;
497 bool ignore_enoent = false;
498
499 /* Pick up the counter where the ExtensionImages left it. */
500 r = asprintf(&mount_point, "%s/%zu", extension_dir, n++);
501 if (r < 0)
502 return -ENOMEM;
503
504 /* Look for any prefixes */
505 if (startswith(e, "-")) {
506 e++;
507 ignore_enoent = true;
508 }
509 /* Ignore this for now */
510 if (startswith(e, "+"))
511 e++;
512
513 source = strdup(e);
514 if (!source)
515 return -ENOMEM;
516
517 for (size_t j = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[j]; ++j) {
518 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL, *escaped = NULL, *lowerdir = NULL;
519
520 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(mount_point, hierarchies[j]);
521 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
522 return -ENOMEM;
523
524 escaped = shell_escape(prefixed_hierarchy, ",:");
525 if (!escaped)
526 return -ENOMEM;
527
528 /* Note that lowerdir= parameters are in 'reverse' order, so the
529 * top-most directory in the overlay comes first in the list. */
530 lowerdir = strjoin(escaped, ":", overlays[j]);
531 if (!lowerdir)
532 return -ENOMEM;
533
534 free_and_replace(overlays[j], lowerdir);
535 }
536
537 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
538 .path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(mount_point),
539 .source_malloc = TAKE_PTR(source),
540 .mode = EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES,
541 .ignore = ignore_enoent,
542 .has_prefix = true,
543 .read_only = true,
544 };
545 }
546
547 /* Then, for each hierarchy, prepare an overlay with the list of lowerdir= strings
548 * set up earlier. */
549 for (size_t i = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[i]; ++i) {
550 _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL;
551
552 prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(root, hierarchies[i]);
553 if (!prefixed_hierarchy)
554 return -ENOMEM;
555
556 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
557 .path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(prefixed_hierarchy),
558 .options_malloc = TAKE_PTR(overlays[i]),
559 .mode = OVERLAY_MOUNT,
560 .has_prefix = true,
561 .ignore = true, /* If the source image doesn't set the ignore bit it will fail earlier. */
562 };
563 }
564
565 return 0;
566 }
567
568 static int append_tmpfs_mounts(MountEntry **p, const TemporaryFileSystem *tmpfs, size_t n) {
569 assert(p);
570
571 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
572 const TemporaryFileSystem *t = tmpfs + i;
573 _cleanup_free_ char *o = NULL, *str = NULL;
574 unsigned long flags;
575 bool ro = false;
576 int r;
577
578 if (!path_is_absolute(t->path))
579 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
580 "Path is not absolute: %s",
581 t->path);
582
583 str = strjoin("mode=0755" NESTED_TMPFS_LIMITS ",", t->options);
584 if (!str)
585 return -ENOMEM;
586
587 r = mount_option_mangle(str, MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME, &flags, &o);
588 if (r < 0)
589 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse mount option '%s': %m", str);
590
591 ro = flags & MS_RDONLY;
592 if (ro)
593 flags ^= MS_RDONLY;
594
595 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
596 .path_const = t->path,
597 .mode = TMPFS,
598 .read_only = ro,
599 .options_malloc = TAKE_PTR(o),
600 .flags = flags,
601 };
602 }
603
604 return 0;
605 }
606
607 static int append_static_mounts(MountEntry **p, const MountEntry *mounts, size_t n, bool ignore_protect) {
608 assert(p);
609 assert(mounts);
610
611 /* Adds a list of static pre-defined entries */
612
613 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++)
614 *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) {
615 .path_const = mount_entry_path(mounts+i),
616 .mode = mounts[i].mode,
617 .ignore = mounts[i].ignore || ignore_protect,
618 };
619
620 return 0;
621 }
622
623 static int append_protect_home(MountEntry **p, ProtectHome protect_home, bool ignore_protect) {
624 assert(p);
625
626 switch (protect_home) {
627
628 case PROTECT_HOME_NO:
629 return 0;
630
631 case PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY:
632 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_read_only_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table), ignore_protect);
633
634 case PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS:
635 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_tmpfs_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table), ignore_protect);
636
637 case PROTECT_HOME_YES:
638 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table), ignore_protect);
639
640 default:
641 assert_not_reached();
642 }
643 }
644
645 static int append_protect_system(MountEntry **p, ProtectSystem protect_system, bool ignore_protect) {
646 assert(p);
647
648 switch (protect_system) {
649
650 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO:
651 return 0;
652
653 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT:
654 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_strict_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table), ignore_protect);
655
656 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES:
657 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table), ignore_protect);
658
659 case PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL:
660 return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_full_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table), ignore_protect);
661
662 default:
663 assert_not_reached();
664 }
665 }
666
667 static int mount_path_compare(const MountEntry *a, const MountEntry *b) {
668 int d;
669
670 /* ExtensionImages/Directories will be used by other mounts as a base, so sort them first
671 * regardless of the prefix - they are set up in the propagate directory anyway */
672 d = -CMP(a->mode == EXTENSION_IMAGES, b->mode == EXTENSION_IMAGES);
673 if (d != 0)
674 return d;
675 d = -CMP(a->mode == EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES, b->mode == EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES);
676 if (d != 0)
677 return d;
678
679 /* If the paths are not equal, then order prefixes first */
680 d = path_compare(mount_entry_path(a), mount_entry_path(b));
681 if (d != 0)
682 return d;
683
684 /* If the paths are equal, check the mode */
685 return CMP((int) a->mode, (int) b->mode);
686 }
687
688 static int prefix_where_needed(MountEntry *m, size_t n, const char *root_directory) {
689 /* Prefixes all paths in the bind mount table with the root directory if the entry needs that. */
690
691 assert(m || n == 0);
692
693 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
694 char *s;
695
696 if (m[i].has_prefix)
697 continue;
698
699 s = path_join(root_directory, mount_entry_path(m+i));
700 if (!s)
701 return -ENOMEM;
702
703 mount_entry_consume_prefix(&m[i], s);
704 }
705
706 return 0;
707 }
708
709 static void drop_duplicates(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
710 MountEntry *f, *t, *previous;
711
712 assert(m);
713 assert(n);
714
715 /* Drops duplicate entries. Expects that the array is properly ordered already. */
716
717 for (f = m, t = m, previous = NULL; f < m + *n; f++) {
718
719 /* The first one wins (which is the one with the more restrictive mode), see mount_path_compare()
720 * above. Note that we only drop duplicates that haven't been mounted yet. */
721 if (previous &&
722 path_equal(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(previous)) &&
723 !f->applied && !previous->applied) {
724 log_debug("%s (%s) is duplicate.", mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode));
725 /* Propagate the flags to the remaining entry */
726 previous->read_only = previous->read_only || mount_entry_read_only(f);
727 previous->noexec = previous->noexec || mount_entry_noexec(f);
728 previous->exec = previous->exec || mount_entry_exec(f);
729 mount_entry_done(f);
730 continue;
731 }
732
733 *t = *f;
734 previous = t;
735 t++;
736 }
737
738 *n = t - m;
739 }
740
741 static void drop_inaccessible(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
742 MountEntry *f, *t;
743 const char *clear = NULL;
744
745 assert(m);
746 assert(n);
747
748 /* Drops all entries obstructed by another entry further up the tree. Expects that the array is properly
749 * ordered already. */
750
751 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
752
753 /* If we found a path set for INACCESSIBLE earlier, and this entry has it as prefix we should drop
754 * it, as inaccessible paths really should drop the entire subtree. */
755 if (clear && path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), clear)) {
756 log_debug("%s is masked by %s.", mount_entry_path(f), clear);
757 mount_entry_done(f);
758 continue;
759 }
760
761 clear = f->mode == INACCESSIBLE ? mount_entry_path(f) : NULL;
762
763 *t = *f;
764 t++;
765 }
766
767 *n = t - m;
768 }
769
770 static void drop_nop(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
771 MountEntry *f, *t;
772
773 assert(m);
774 assert(n);
775
776 /* Drops all entries which have an immediate parent that has the same type, as they are redundant. Assumes the
777 * list is ordered by prefixes. */
778
779 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
780
781 /* Only suppress such subtrees for READONLY, READWRITE and READWRITE_IMPLICIT entries */
782 if (IN_SET(f->mode, READONLY, READWRITE, READWRITE_IMPLICIT)) {
783 MountEntry *found = NULL;
784
785 /* Now let's find the first parent of the entry we are looking at. */
786 for (MountEntry *p = PTR_SUB1(t, m); p; p = PTR_SUB1(p, m))
787 if (path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(p))) {
788 found = p;
789 break;
790 }
791
792 /* We found it, let's see if it's the same mode, if so, we can drop this entry */
793 if (found && found->mode == f->mode) {
794 log_debug("%s (%s) is made redundant by %s (%s)",
795 mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode),
796 mount_entry_path(found), mount_mode_to_string(found->mode));
797 mount_entry_done(f);
798 continue;
799 }
800 }
801
802 *t = *f;
803 t++;
804 }
805
806 *n = t - m;
807 }
808
809 static void drop_outside_root(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *m, size_t *n) {
810 MountEntry *f, *t;
811
812 assert(m);
813 assert(n);
814
815 /* Nothing to do */
816 if (!root_directory)
817 return;
818
819 /* Drops all mounts that are outside of the root directory. */
820
821 for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) {
822
823 /* ExtensionImages/Directories bases are opened in /run/systemd/unit-extensions on the host */
824 if (!IN_SET(f->mode, EXTENSION_IMAGES, EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES) && !path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), root_directory)) {
825 log_debug("%s is outside of root directory.", mount_entry_path(f));
826 mount_entry_done(f);
827 continue;
828 }
829
830 *t = *f;
831 t++;
832 }
833
834 *n = t - m;
835 }
836
837 static int clone_device_node(
838 const char *d,
839 const char *temporary_mount,
840 bool *make_devnode) {
841
842 _cleanup_free_ char *sl = NULL;
843 const char *dn, *bn, *t;
844 struct stat st;
845 int r;
846
847 if (stat(d, &st) < 0) {
848 if (errno == ENOENT) {
849 log_debug_errno(errno, "Device node '%s' to clone does not exist, ignoring.", d);
850 return -ENXIO;
851 }
852
853 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to stat() device node '%s' to clone, ignoring: %m", d);
854 }
855
856 if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode) &&
857 !S_ISCHR(st.st_mode))
858 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
859 "Device node '%s' to clone is not a device node, ignoring.",
860 d);
861
862 dn = strjoina(temporary_mount, d);
863
864 /* First, try to create device node properly */
865 if (*make_devnode) {
866 mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(d, st.st_mode);
867 r = mknod(dn, st.st_mode, st.st_rdev);
868 mac_selinux_create_file_clear();
869 if (r >= 0)
870 goto add_symlink;
871 if (errno != EPERM)
872 return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod failed for %s: %m", d);
873
874 /* This didn't work, let's not try this again for the next iterations. */
875 *make_devnode = false;
876 }
877
878 /* We're about to fall back to bind-mounting the device node. So create a dummy bind-mount target.
879 * Do not prepare device-node SELinux label (see issue 13762) */
880 r = mknod(dn, S_IFREG, 0);
881 if (r < 0 && errno != EEXIST)
882 return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod() fallback failed for '%s': %m", d);
883
884 /* Fallback to bind-mounting: The assumption here is that all used device nodes carry standard
885 * properties. Specifically, the devices nodes we bind-mount should either be owned by root:root or
886 * root:tty (e.g. /dev/tty, /dev/ptmx) and should not carry ACLs. */
887 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, d, dn, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
888 if (r < 0)
889 return r;
890
891 add_symlink:
892 bn = path_startswith(d, "/dev/");
893 if (!bn)
894 return 0;
895
896 /* Create symlinks like /dev/char/1:9 → ../urandom */
897 if (asprintf(&sl, "%s/dev/%s/" DEVNUM_FORMAT_STR,
898 temporary_mount,
899 S_ISCHR(st.st_mode) ? "char" : "block",
900 DEVNUM_FORMAT_VAL(st.st_rdev)) < 0)
901 return log_oom();
902
903 (void) mkdir_parents(sl, 0755);
904
905 t = strjoina("../", bn);
906 if (symlink(t, sl) < 0)
907 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to symlink '%s' to '%s', ignoring: %m", t, sl);
908
909 return 0;
910 }
911
912 static char *settle_runtime_dir(RuntimeScope scope) {
913 char *runtime_dir;
914
915 if (scope != RUNTIME_SCOPE_USER)
916 return strdup("/run/");
917
918 if (asprintf(&runtime_dir, "/run/user/" UID_FMT, geteuid()) < 0)
919 return NULL;
920
921 return runtime_dir;
922 }
923
924 static int mount_private_dev(MountEntry *m, RuntimeScope scope) {
925 static const char devnodes[] =
926 "/dev/null\0"
927 "/dev/zero\0"
928 "/dev/full\0"
929 "/dev/random\0"
930 "/dev/urandom\0"
931 "/dev/tty\0";
932
933 _cleanup_free_ char *runtime_dir = NULL, *temporary_mount = NULL;
934 const char *dev = NULL, *devpts = NULL, *devshm = NULL, *devhugepages = NULL, *devmqueue = NULL, *devlog = NULL, *devptmx = NULL;
935 bool can_mknod = true;
936 int r;
937
938 assert(m);
939
940 runtime_dir = settle_runtime_dir(scope);
941 if (!runtime_dir)
942 return log_oom_debug();
943
944 temporary_mount = path_join(runtime_dir, "systemd/namespace-dev-XXXXXX");
945 if (!temporary_mount)
946 return log_oom_debug();
947
948 if (!mkdtemp(temporary_mount))
949 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create temporary directory '%s': %m", temporary_mount);
950
951 dev = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev");
952 (void) mkdir(dev, 0755);
953 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "tmpfs", dev, "tmpfs", DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS, "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_PRIVATE_DEV);
954 if (r < 0)
955 goto fail;
956
957 r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, dev, "/dev", 0);
958 if (r < 0) {
959 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as /dev: %m", dev);
960 goto fail;
961 }
962
963 devpts = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/pts");
964 (void) mkdir(devpts, 0755);
965 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/pts", devpts, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
966 if (r < 0)
967 goto fail;
968
969 /* /dev/ptmx can either be a device node or a symlink to /dev/pts/ptmx.
970 * When /dev/ptmx a device node, /dev/pts/ptmx has 000 permissions making it inaccessible.
971 * Thus, in that case make a clone.
972 * In nspawn and other containers it will be a symlink, in that case make it a symlink. */
973 r = is_symlink("/dev/ptmx");
974 if (r < 0) {
975 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect whether /dev/ptmx is a symlink or not: %m");
976 goto fail;
977 } else if (r > 0) {
978 devptmx = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/ptmx");
979 if (symlink("pts/ptmx", devptmx) < 0) {
980 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to pts/ptmx: %m", devptmx);
981 goto fail;
982 }
983 } else {
984 r = clone_device_node("/dev/ptmx", temporary_mount, &can_mknod);
985 if (r < 0)
986 goto fail;
987 }
988
989 devshm = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/shm");
990 (void) mkdir(devshm, 0755);
991 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/shm", devshm, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
992 if (r < 0)
993 goto fail;
994
995 devmqueue = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/mqueue");
996 (void) mkdir(devmqueue, 0755);
997 (void) mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/mqueue", devmqueue, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
998
999 devhugepages = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/hugepages");
1000 (void) mkdir(devhugepages, 0755);
1001 (void) mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/hugepages", devhugepages, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL);
1002
1003 devlog = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/log");
1004 if (symlink("/run/systemd/journal/dev-log", devlog) < 0)
1005 log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to /run/systemd/journal/dev-log, ignoring: %m", devlog);
1006
1007 NULSTR_FOREACH(d, devnodes) {
1008 r = clone_device_node(d, temporary_mount, &can_mknod);
1009 /* ENXIO means the *source* is not a device file, skip creation in that case */
1010 if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO)
1011 goto fail;
1012 }
1013
1014 r = dev_setup(temporary_mount, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
1015 if (r < 0)
1016 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up basic device tree at '%s', ignoring: %m", temporary_mount);
1017
1018 /* Make the bind mount read-only. */
1019 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, NULL, dev, NULL, MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND|MS_RDONLY, NULL);
1020 if (r < 0)
1021 return r;
1022
1023 /* Create the /dev directory if missing. It is more likely to be missing when the service is started
1024 * with RootDirectory. This is consistent with mount units creating the mount points when missing. */
1025 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1026
1027 /* Unmount everything in old /dev */
1028 r = umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0);
1029 if (r < 0)
1030 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to unmount directories below '%s', ignoring: %m", mount_entry_path(m));
1031
1032 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, dev, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL);
1033 if (r < 0)
1034 goto fail;
1035
1036 (void) rmdir(dev);
1037 (void) rmdir(temporary_mount);
1038
1039 return 0;
1040
1041 fail:
1042 if (devpts)
1043 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devpts, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1044
1045 if (devshm)
1046 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devshm, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1047
1048 if (devhugepages)
1049 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devhugepages, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1050
1051 if (devmqueue)
1052 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devmqueue, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1053
1054 (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, dev, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW);
1055 (void) rmdir(dev);
1056 (void) rmdir(temporary_mount);
1057
1058 return r;
1059 }
1060
1061 static int mount_bind_dev(const MountEntry *m) {
1062 int r;
1063
1064 assert(m);
1065
1066 /* Implements the little brother of mount_private_dev(): simply bind mounts the host's /dev into the
1067 * service's /dev. This is only used when RootDirectory= is set. */
1068
1069 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1070
1071 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
1072 if (r < 0)
1073 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /dev is already mounted: %m");
1074 if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /dev is already a mount point */
1075 return 0;
1076
1077 return mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
1078 }
1079
1080 static int mount_bind_sysfs(const MountEntry *m) {
1081 int r;
1082
1083 assert(m);
1084
1085 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1086
1087 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
1088 if (r < 0)
1089 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /sys is already mounted: %m");
1090 if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /sys is already a mount point */
1091 return 0;
1092
1093 /* Bind mount the host's version so that we get all child mounts of it, too. */
1094 return mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/sys", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
1095 }
1096
1097 static int mount_private_sysfs(const MountEntry *m) {
1098 const char *entry_path = mount_entry_path(ASSERT_PTR(m));
1099 int r, n;
1100
1101 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
1102
1103 n = umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
1104
1105 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "sysfs", entry_path, "sysfs", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, NULL);
1106 if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_PRIVILEGE(r)) {
1107 /* When we do not have enough privileges to mount sysfs, fall back to use existing /sys. */
1108
1109 if (n > 0)
1110 /* /sys or some of sub-mounts are umounted in the above. Refuse incomplete tree.
1111 * Propagate the original error code returned by mount() in the above. */
1112 return r;
1113
1114 return mount_bind_sysfs(m);
1115
1116 } else if (r < 0)
1117 return r;
1118
1119 /* We mounted a new instance now. Let's bind mount the children over now. */
1120 (void) bind_mount_submounts("/sys", entry_path);
1121 return 0;
1122 }
1123
1124 static int mount_procfs(const MountEntry *m, const NamespaceParameters *p) {
1125 _cleanup_free_ char *opts = NULL;
1126 const char *entry_path;
1127 int r, n;
1128
1129 assert(m);
1130 assert(p);
1131
1132 if (p->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
1133 p->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL) {
1134
1135 /* Starting with kernel 5.8 procfs' hidepid= logic is truly per-instance (previously it
1136 * pretended to be per-instance but actually was per-namespace), hence let's make use of it
1137 * if requested. To make sure this logic succeeds only on kernels where hidepid= is
1138 * per-instance, we'll exclusively use the textual value for hidepid=, since support was
1139 * added in the same commit: if it's supported it is thus also per-instance. */
1140
1141 const char *hpv = p->protect_proc == PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ?
1142 "off" :
1143 protect_proc_to_string(p->protect_proc);
1144
1145 /* hidepid= support was added in 5.8, so we can use fsconfig()/fsopen() (which were added in
1146 * 5.2) to check if hidepid= is supported. This avoids a noisy dmesg log by the kernel when
1147 * trying to use hidepid= on systems where it isn't supported. The same applies for subset=.
1148 * fsopen()/fsconfig() was also backported on some distros which allows us to detect
1149 * hidepid=/subset= support in even more scenarios. */
1150
1151 if (mount_option_supported("proc", "hidepid", hpv) != 0) {
1152 opts = strjoin("hidepid=", hpv);
1153 if (!opts)
1154 return -ENOMEM;
1155 }
1156
1157 if (p->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID &&
1158 mount_option_supported("proc", "subset", "pid") != 0)
1159 if (!strextend_with_separator(&opts, ",", "subset=pid"))
1160 return -ENOMEM;
1161 }
1162
1163 entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
1164 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
1165
1166 /* Mount a new instance, so that we get the one that matches our user namespace, if we are running in
1167 * one. i.e we don't reuse existing mounts here under any condition, we want a new instance owned by
1168 * our user namespace and with our hidepid= settings applied. Hence, let's get rid of everything
1169 * mounted on /proc/ first. */
1170
1171 n = umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
1172
1173 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "proc", entry_path, "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, opts);
1174 if (r == -EINVAL && opts)
1175 /* If this failed with EINVAL then this likely means the textual hidepid= stuff is
1176 * not supported by the kernel, and thus the per-instance hidepid= neither, which
1177 * means we really don't want to use it, since it would affect our host's /proc
1178 * mount. Hence let's gracefully fallback to a classic, unrestricted version. */
1179 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "proc", entry_path, "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, NULL);
1180 if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_PRIVILEGE(r)) {
1181 /* When we do not have enough privileges to mount /proc, fall back to use existing /proc. */
1182
1183 if (n > 0)
1184 /* /proc or some of sub-mounts are umounted in the above. Refuse incomplete tree.
1185 * Propagate the original error code returned by mount() in the above. */
1186 return r;
1187
1188 r = path_is_mount_point(entry_path, NULL, 0);
1189 if (r < 0)
1190 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /proc is already mounted: %m");
1191 if (r > 0)
1192 return 0;
1193
1194 /* We lack permissions to mount a new instance of /proc, and it is not already mounted. But
1195 * we can access the host's, so as a final fallback bind-mount it to the destination, as most
1196 * likely we are inside a user manager in an unprivileged user namespace. */
1197 return mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/proc", entry_path, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
1198
1199 } else if (r < 0)
1200 return r;
1201
1202 /* We mounted a new instance now. Let's bind mount the children over now. This matters for nspawn
1203 * where a bunch of files are overmounted, in particular the boot id */
1204 (void) bind_mount_submounts("/proc", entry_path);
1205 return 0;
1206 }
1207
1208 static int mount_tmpfs(const MountEntry *m) {
1209 const char *entry_path, *inner_path;
1210 int r;
1211
1212 assert(m);
1213
1214 entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
1215 inner_path = mount_entry_unprefixed_path(m);
1216
1217 /* First, get rid of everything that is below if there is anything. Then, overmount with our new
1218 * tmpfs */
1219
1220 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
1221 (void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
1222
1223 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "tmpfs", entry_path, "tmpfs", m->flags, mount_entry_options(m));
1224 if (r < 0)
1225 return r;
1226
1227 r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, entry_path, inner_path, 0);
1228 if (r < 0)
1229 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as '%s': %m", entry_path, inner_path);
1230
1231 return 0;
1232 }
1233
1234 static int mount_run(const MountEntry *m) {
1235 int r;
1236
1237 assert(m);
1238
1239 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0);
1240 if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT)
1241 return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /run is already mounted: %m");
1242 if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /run is already a mount point */
1243 return 0;
1244
1245 return mount_tmpfs(m);
1246 }
1247
1248 static int mount_mqueuefs(const MountEntry *m) {
1249 int r;
1250 const char *entry_path;
1251
1252 assert(m);
1253
1254 entry_path = mount_entry_path(m);
1255
1256 (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755);
1257 (void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0);
1258
1259 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "mqueue", entry_path, "mqueue", m->flags, mount_entry_options(m));
1260 if (r < 0)
1261 return r;
1262
1263 return 0;
1264 }
1265
1266 static int mount_image(
1267 const MountEntry *m,
1268 const char *root_directory,
1269 const ImagePolicy *image_policy) {
1270
1271 _cleanup_free_ char *host_os_release_id = NULL, *host_os_release_version_id = NULL,
1272 *host_os_release_level = NULL, *extension_name = NULL;
1273 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **extension_release = NULL;
1274 ImageClass class = IMAGE_SYSEXT;
1275 int r;
1276
1277 assert(m);
1278
1279 r = path_extract_filename(mount_entry_source(m), &extension_name);
1280 if (r < 0)
1281 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to extract extension name from %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
1282
1283 if (m->mode == EXTENSION_IMAGES) {
1284 r = load_extension_release_pairs(mount_entry_source(m), IMAGE_SYSEXT, extension_name, /* relax_extension_release_check= */ false, &extension_release);
1285 if (r == -ENOENT) {
1286 r = load_extension_release_pairs(mount_entry_source(m), IMAGE_CONFEXT, extension_name, /* relax_extension_release_check= */ false, &extension_release);
1287 if (r >= 0)
1288 class = IMAGE_CONFEXT;
1289 }
1290 if (r == -ENOENT)
1291 return r;
1292
1293 r = parse_os_release(
1294 empty_to_root(root_directory),
1295 "ID", &host_os_release_id,
1296 "VERSION_ID", &host_os_release_version_id,
1297 image_class_info[class].level_env, &host_os_release_level,
1298 NULL);
1299 if (r < 0)
1300 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to acquire 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
1301 if (isempty(host_os_release_id))
1302 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "'ID' field not found or empty in 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
1303 }
1304
1305 r = verity_dissect_and_mount(
1306 /* src_fd= */ -1,
1307 mount_entry_source(m),
1308 mount_entry_path(m),
1309 m->image_options,
1310 image_policy,
1311 host_os_release_id,
1312 host_os_release_version_id,
1313 host_os_release_level,
1314 /* required_sysext_scope= */ NULL,
1315 /* ret_image= */ NULL);
1316 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1317 return 0;
1318 if (r == -ESTALE && host_os_release_id)
1319 return log_error_errno(r,
1320 "Failed to mount image %s, extension-release metadata does not match the lower layer's: ID=%s%s%s%s%s",
1321 mount_entry_source(m),
1322 host_os_release_id,
1323 host_os_release_version_id ? " VERSION_ID=" : "",
1324 strempty(host_os_release_version_id),
1325 host_os_release_level ? image_class_info[class].level_env_print : "",
1326 strempty(host_os_release_level));
1327 if (r < 0)
1328 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount image %s on %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m), mount_entry_path(m));
1329
1330 return 0;
1331 }
1332
1333 static int mount_overlay(const MountEntry *m) {
1334 const char *options;
1335 int r;
1336
1337 assert(m);
1338
1339 options = strjoina("lowerdir=", mount_entry_options(m));
1340
1341 (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1342
1343 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "overlay", mount_entry_path(m), "overlay", MS_RDONLY, options);
1344 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1345 return 0;
1346
1347 return r;
1348 }
1349
1350 static int follow_symlink(
1351 const char *root_directory,
1352 MountEntry *m) {
1353
1354 _cleanup_free_ char *target = NULL;
1355 int r;
1356
1357 /* Let's chase symlinks, but only one step at a time. That's because depending where the symlink points we
1358 * might need to change the order in which we mount stuff. Hence: let's normalize piecemeal, and do one step at
1359 * a time by specifying CHASE_STEP. This function returns 0 if we resolved one step, and > 0 if we reached the
1360 * end and already have a fully normalized name. */
1361
1362 r = chase(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, CHASE_STEP|CHASE_NONEXISTENT, &target, NULL);
1363 if (r < 0)
1364 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to chase symlinks '%s': %m", mount_entry_path(m));
1365 if (r > 0) /* Reached the end, nothing more to resolve */
1366 return 1;
1367
1368 if (m->n_followed >= CHASE_MAX) /* put a boundary on things */
1369 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP),
1370 "Symlink loop on '%s'.",
1371 mount_entry_path(m));
1372
1373 log_debug("Followed mount entry path symlink %s %s %s.",
1374 mount_entry_path(m), special_glyph(SPECIAL_GLYPH_ARROW_RIGHT), target);
1375
1376 mount_entry_consume_prefix(m, TAKE_PTR(target));
1377
1378 m->n_followed ++;
1379
1380 return 0;
1381 }
1382
1383 static int apply_one_mount(
1384 const char *root_directory,
1385 MountEntry *m,
1386 const NamespaceParameters *p) {
1387
1388 _cleanup_free_ char *inaccessible = NULL;
1389 bool rbind = true, make = false;
1390 const char *what;
1391 int r;
1392
1393 assert(m);
1394 assert(p);
1395
1396 log_debug("Applying namespace mount on %s", mount_entry_path(m));
1397
1398 switch (m->mode) {
1399
1400 case INACCESSIBLE: {
1401 _cleanup_free_ char *runtime_dir = NULL;
1402 struct stat target;
1403
1404 /* First, get rid of everything that is below if there
1405 * is anything... Then, overmount it with an
1406 * inaccessible path. */
1407 (void) umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0);
1408
1409 if (lstat(mount_entry_path(m), &target) < 0) {
1410 if (errno == ENOENT && m->ignore)
1411 return 0;
1412
1413 return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to lstat() %s to determine what to mount over it: %m",
1414 mount_entry_path(m));
1415 }
1416
1417 /* We don't pass the literal runtime scope through here but one based purely on our UID. This
1418 * means that the root user's --user services will use the host's inaccessible inodes rather
1419 * then root's private ones. This is preferable since it means device nodes that are
1420 * overmounted to make them inaccessible will be overmounted with a device node, rather than
1421 * an AF_UNIX socket inode. */
1422 runtime_dir = settle_runtime_dir(geteuid() == 0 ? RUNTIME_SCOPE_SYSTEM : RUNTIME_SCOPE_USER);
1423 if (!runtime_dir)
1424 return log_oom_debug();
1425
1426 r = mode_to_inaccessible_node(runtime_dir, target.st_mode, &inaccessible);
1427 if (r < 0)
1428 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP),
1429 "File type not supported for inaccessible mounts. Note that symlinks are not allowed");
1430 what = inaccessible;
1431 break;
1432 }
1433
1434 case READONLY:
1435 case READWRITE:
1436 case READWRITE_IMPLICIT:
1437 case EXEC:
1438 case NOEXEC:
1439 r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, 0);
1440 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1441 return 0;
1442 if (r < 0)
1443 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine whether %s is already a mount point: %m",
1444 mount_entry_path(m));
1445 if (r > 0) /* Nothing to do here, it is already a mount. We just later toggle the MS_RDONLY
1446 * and MS_NOEXEC bits for the mount point if needed. */
1447 return 0;
1448 /* This isn't a mount point yet, let's make it one. */
1449 what = mount_entry_path(m);
1450 break;
1451
1452 case EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES: {
1453 _cleanup_free_ char *host_os_release_id = NULL, *host_os_release_version_id = NULL,
1454 *host_os_release_level = NULL, *extension_name = NULL;
1455 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **extension_release = NULL;
1456 ImageClass class = IMAGE_SYSEXT;
1457
1458 r = path_extract_filename(mount_entry_source(m), &extension_name);
1459 if (r < 0)
1460 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to extract extension name from %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
1461
1462 r = load_extension_release_pairs(mount_entry_source(m), IMAGE_SYSEXT, extension_name, /* relax_extension_release_check= */ false, &extension_release);
1463 if (r == -ENOENT) {
1464 r = load_extension_release_pairs(mount_entry_source(m), IMAGE_CONFEXT, extension_name, /* relax_extension_release_check= */ false, &extension_release);
1465 if (r >= 0)
1466 class = IMAGE_CONFEXT;
1467 }
1468 if (r == -ENOENT)
1469 return r;
1470
1471 r = parse_os_release(
1472 empty_to_root(root_directory),
1473 "ID", &host_os_release_id,
1474 "VERSION_ID", &host_os_release_version_id,
1475 image_class_info[class].level_env, &host_os_release_level,
1476 NULL);
1477 if (r < 0)
1478 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to acquire 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
1479 if (isempty(host_os_release_id))
1480 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "'ID' field not found or empty in 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory));
1481
1482 r = load_extension_release_pairs(mount_entry_source(m), class, extension_name, /* relax_extension_release_check= */ false, &extension_release);
1483 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1484 return 0;
1485 if (r < 0)
1486 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse directory %s extension-release metadata: %m", extension_name);
1487
1488 r = extension_release_validate(
1489 extension_name,
1490 host_os_release_id,
1491 host_os_release_version_id,
1492 host_os_release_level,
1493 /* host_extension_scope */ NULL, /* Leave empty, we need to accept both system and portable */
1494 extension_release,
1495 class);
1496 if (r == 0)
1497 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESTALE), "Directory %s extension-release metadata does not match the root's", extension_name);
1498 if (r < 0)
1499 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to compare directory %s extension-release metadata with the root's os-release: %m", extension_name);
1500
1501 _fallthrough_;
1502 }
1503
1504 case BIND_MOUNT:
1505 rbind = false;
1506
1507 _fallthrough_;
1508 case BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE: {
1509 _cleanup_free_ char *chased = NULL;
1510
1511 /* Since mount() will always follow symlinks we chase the symlinks on our own first. Note
1512 * that bind mount source paths are always relative to the host root, hence we pass NULL as
1513 * root directory to chase() here. */
1514
1515 r = chase(mount_entry_source(m), NULL, CHASE_TRAIL_SLASH, &chased, NULL);
1516 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) {
1517 log_debug_errno(r, "Path %s does not exist, ignoring.", mount_entry_source(m));
1518 return 0;
1519 }
1520 if (r < 0)
1521 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to follow symlinks on %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m));
1522
1523 log_debug("Followed source symlinks %s %s %s.",
1524 mount_entry_source(m), special_glyph(SPECIAL_GLYPH_ARROW_RIGHT), chased);
1525
1526 free_and_replace(m->source_malloc, chased);
1527
1528 what = mount_entry_source(m);
1529 make = true;
1530 break;
1531 }
1532
1533 case EMPTY_DIR:
1534 case TMPFS:
1535 return mount_tmpfs(m);
1536
1537 case PRIVATE_TMP:
1538 case PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY:
1539 what = mount_entry_source(m);
1540 make = true;
1541 break;
1542
1543 case PRIVATE_DEV:
1544 return mount_private_dev(m, p->runtime_scope);
1545
1546 case BIND_DEV:
1547 return mount_bind_dev(m);
1548
1549 case PRIVATE_SYSFS:
1550 return mount_private_sysfs(m);
1551
1552 case BIND_SYSFS:
1553 return mount_bind_sysfs(m);
1554
1555 case PROCFS:
1556 return mount_procfs(m, p);
1557
1558 case RUN:
1559 return mount_run(m);
1560
1561 case MQUEUEFS:
1562 return mount_mqueuefs(m);
1563
1564 case MOUNT_IMAGES:
1565 return mount_image(m, NULL, p->mount_image_policy);
1566
1567 case EXTENSION_IMAGES:
1568 return mount_image(m, root_directory, p->extension_image_policy);
1569
1570 case OVERLAY_MOUNT:
1571 return mount_overlay(m);
1572
1573 default:
1574 assert_not_reached();
1575 }
1576
1577 assert(what);
1578
1579 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL);
1580 if (r < 0) {
1581 bool try_again = false;
1582
1583 if (r == -ENOENT && make) {
1584 int q;
1585
1586 /* Hmm, either the source or the destination are missing. Let's see if we can create
1587 the destination, then try again. */
1588
1589 (void) mkdir_parents(mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1590
1591 q = make_mount_point_inode_from_path(what, mount_entry_path(m), 0755);
1592 if (q < 0 && q != -EEXIST)
1593 log_error_errno(q, "Failed to create destination mount point node '%s': %m",
1594 mount_entry_path(m));
1595 else
1596 try_again = true;
1597 }
1598
1599 if (try_again)
1600 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL);
1601 if (r < 0)
1602 return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to mount %s to %s: %m", what, mount_entry_path(m));
1603 }
1604
1605 log_debug("Successfully mounted %s to %s", what, mount_entry_path(m));
1606 return 0;
1607 }
1608
1609 static int make_read_only(const MountEntry *m, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
1610 unsigned long new_flags = 0, flags_mask = 0;
1611 bool submounts;
1612 int r;
1613
1614 assert(m);
1615 assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
1616
1617 if (mount_entry_read_only(m) || m->mode == PRIVATE_DEV) {
1618 new_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
1619 flags_mask |= MS_RDONLY;
1620 }
1621
1622 if (m->nosuid) {
1623 new_flags |= MS_NOSUID;
1624 flags_mask |= MS_NOSUID;
1625 }
1626
1627 if (flags_mask == 0) /* No Change? */
1628 return 0;
1629
1630 /* We generally apply these changes recursively, except for /dev, and the cases we know there's
1631 * nothing further down. Set /dev readonly, but not submounts like /dev/shm. Also, we only set the
1632 * per-mount read-only flag. We can't set it on the superblock, if we are inside a user namespace
1633 * and running Linux <= 4.17. */
1634 submounts =
1635 mount_entry_read_only(m) &&
1636 !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS);
1637 if (submounts)
1638 r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1639 else
1640 r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, proc_self_mountinfo);
1641
1642 /* Note that we only turn on the MS_RDONLY flag here, we never turn it off. Something that was marked
1643 * read-only already stays this way. This improves compatibility with container managers, where we
1644 * won't attempt to undo read-only mounts already applied. */
1645
1646 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1647 return 0;
1648 if (r < 0)
1649 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
1650 submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
1651 return 0;
1652 }
1653
1654 static int make_noexec(const MountEntry *m, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
1655 unsigned long new_flags = 0, flags_mask = 0;
1656 bool submounts;
1657 int r;
1658
1659 assert(m);
1660 assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
1661
1662 if (mount_entry_noexec(m)) {
1663 new_flags |= MS_NOEXEC;
1664 flags_mask |= MS_NOEXEC;
1665 } else if (mount_entry_exec(m)) {
1666 new_flags &= ~MS_NOEXEC;
1667 flags_mask |= MS_NOEXEC;
1668 }
1669
1670 if (flags_mask == 0) /* No Change? */
1671 return 0;
1672
1673 submounts = !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS);
1674
1675 if (submounts)
1676 r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1677 else
1678 r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, proc_self_mountinfo);
1679
1680 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1681 return 0;
1682 if (r < 0)
1683 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
1684 submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
1685 return 0;
1686 }
1687
1688 static int make_nosuid(const MountEntry *m, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) {
1689 bool submounts;
1690 int r;
1691
1692 assert(m);
1693 assert(proc_self_mountinfo);
1694
1695 submounts = !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS);
1696
1697 if (submounts)
1698 r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), MS_NOSUID, MS_NOSUID, NULL, proc_self_mountinfo);
1699 else
1700 r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), MS_NOSUID, MS_NOSUID, proc_self_mountinfo);
1701 if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore)
1702 return 0;
1703 if (r < 0)
1704 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m),
1705 submounts ? " and its submounts" : "");
1706 return 0;
1707 }
1708
1709 static bool namespace_parameters_mount_apivfs(const NamespaceParameters *p) {
1710 assert(p);
1711
1712 /*
1713 * ProtectControlGroups= and ProtectKernelTunables= imply MountAPIVFS=,
1714 * since to protect the API VFS mounts, they need to be around in the
1715 * first place...
1716 */
1717
1718 return p->mount_apivfs ||
1719 p->protect_control_groups ||
1720 p->protect_kernel_tunables ||
1721 p->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
1722 p->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL;
1723 }
1724
1725 static size_t namespace_calculate_mounts(
1726 const NamespaceParameters *p,
1727 char **hierarchies,
1728 bool setup_propagate) {
1729
1730 size_t protect_home_cnt;
1731 size_t protect_system_cnt =
1732 (p->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT ?
1733 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table) :
1734 ((p->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL) ?
1735 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table) :
1736 ((p->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES) ?
1737 ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table) : 0)));
1738
1739 protect_home_cnt =
1740 (p->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_YES ?
1741 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table) :
1742 ((p->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY) ?
1743 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table) :
1744 ((p->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS) ?
1745 ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table) : 0)));
1746
1747 return !!p->tmp_dir + !!p->var_tmp_dir +
1748 strv_length(p->read_write_paths) +
1749 strv_length(p->read_only_paths) +
1750 strv_length(p->inaccessible_paths) +
1751 strv_length(p->exec_paths) +
1752 strv_length(p->no_exec_paths) +
1753 strv_length(p->empty_directories) +
1754 p->n_bind_mounts +
1755 p->n_mount_images +
1756 (p->n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(p->extension_directories) ? /* Mount each image and directory plus an overlay per hierarchy */
1757 strv_length(hierarchies) + p->n_extension_images + strv_length(p->extension_directories) : 0) +
1758 p->n_temporary_filesystems +
1759 p->private_dev +
1760 (p->protect_kernel_tunables ?
1761 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table) + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table) : 0) +
1762 (p->protect_kernel_modules ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table) : 0) +
1763 (p->protect_kernel_logs ?
1764 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_proc_table) + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_dev_table) : 0) +
1765 (p->protect_control_groups ? 1 : 0) +
1766 protect_home_cnt + protect_system_cnt +
1767 (p->protect_hostname ? 2 : 0) +
1768 (namespace_parameters_mount_apivfs(p) ? ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table) : 0) +
1769 (p->creds_path ? 2 : 1) +
1770 !!p->log_namespace +
1771 setup_propagate + /* /run/systemd/incoming */
1772 !!p->notify_socket +
1773 !!p->host_os_release_stage +
1774 p->private_network + /* /sys */
1775 p->private_ipc; /* /dev/mqueue */
1776 }
1777
1778 /* Walk all mount entries and dropping any unused mounts. This affects all
1779 * mounts:
1780 * - that are implicitly protected by a path that has been rendered inaccessible
1781 * - whose immediate parent requests the same protection mode as the mount itself
1782 * - that are outside of the relevant root directory
1783 * - which are duplicates
1784 */
1785 static void drop_unused_mounts(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *mounts, size_t *n_mounts) {
1786 assert(root_directory);
1787 assert(n_mounts);
1788 assert(mounts || *n_mounts == 0);
1789
1790 typesafe_qsort(mounts, *n_mounts, mount_path_compare);
1791
1792 drop_duplicates(mounts, n_mounts);
1793 drop_outside_root(root_directory, mounts, n_mounts);
1794 drop_inaccessible(mounts, n_mounts);
1795 drop_nop(mounts, n_mounts);
1796 }
1797
1798 static int create_symlinks_from_tuples(const char *root, char **strv_symlinks) {
1799 int r;
1800
1801 STRV_FOREACH_PAIR(src, dst, strv_symlinks) {
1802 _cleanup_free_ char *src_abs = NULL, *dst_abs = NULL;
1803
1804 src_abs = path_join(root, *src);
1805 dst_abs = path_join(root, *dst);
1806 if (!src_abs || !dst_abs)
1807 return -ENOMEM;
1808
1809 r = mkdir_parents_label(dst_abs, 0755);
1810 if (r < 0)
1811 return log_debug_errno(
1812 r,
1813 "Failed to create parent directory for symlink '%s': %m",
1814 dst_abs);
1815
1816 r = symlink_idempotent(src_abs, dst_abs, true);
1817 if (r < 0)
1818 return log_debug_errno(
1819 r,
1820 "Failed to create symlink from '%s' to '%s': %m",
1821 src_abs,
1822 dst_abs);
1823 }
1824
1825 return 0;
1826 }
1827
1828 static void mount_entry_path_debug_string(const char *root, MountEntry *m, char **error_path) {
1829 assert(m);
1830
1831 /* Create a string suitable for debugging logs, stripping for example the local working directory.
1832 * For example, with a BindPaths=/var/bar that does not exist on the host:
1833 *
1834 * Before:
1835 * foo.service: Failed to set up mount namespacing: /run/systemd/unit-root/var/bar: No such file or directory
1836 * After:
1837 * foo.service: Failed to set up mount namespacing: /var/bar: No such file or directory
1838 *
1839 * Note that this is an error path, so no OOM check is done on purpose. */
1840
1841 if (!error_path)
1842 return;
1843
1844 if (!mount_entry_path(m)) {
1845 *error_path = NULL;
1846 return;
1847 }
1848
1849 if (root) {
1850 const char *e = startswith(mount_entry_path(m), root);
1851 if (e) {
1852 *error_path = strdup(e);
1853 return;
1854 }
1855 }
1856
1857 *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m));
1858 return;
1859 }
1860
1861 static int apply_mounts(
1862 const char *root,
1863 const NamespaceParameters *p,
1864 MountEntry *mounts,
1865 size_t *n_mounts,
1866 char **error_path) {
1867
1868 _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *proc_self_mountinfo = NULL;
1869 _cleanup_free_ char **deny_list = NULL;
1870 int r;
1871
1872 if (n_mounts == 0) /* Shortcut: nothing to do */
1873 return 0;
1874
1875 assert(root);
1876 assert(mounts);
1877 assert(n_mounts);
1878
1879 /* Open /proc/self/mountinfo now as it may become unavailable if we mount anything on top of
1880 * /proc. For example, this is the case with the option: 'InaccessiblePaths=/proc'. */
1881 proc_self_mountinfo = fopen("/proc/self/mountinfo", "re");
1882 if (!proc_self_mountinfo) {
1883 r = -errno;
1884
1885 if (error_path)
1886 *error_path = strdup("/proc/self/mountinfo");
1887
1888 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to open /proc/self/mountinfo: %m");
1889 }
1890
1891 /* First round, establish all mounts we need */
1892 for (;;) {
1893 bool again = false;
1894
1895 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1896
1897 if (m->applied)
1898 continue;
1899
1900 /* ExtensionImages/Directories are first opened in the propagate directory, not in the root_directory */
1901 r = follow_symlink(!IN_SET(m->mode, EXTENSION_IMAGES, EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES) ? root : NULL, m);
1902 if (r < 0) {
1903 mount_entry_path_debug_string(root, m, error_path);
1904 return r;
1905 }
1906 if (r == 0) {
1907 /* We hit a symlinked mount point. The entry got rewritten and might
1908 * point to a very different place now. Let's normalize the changed
1909 * list, and start from the beginning. After all to mount the entry
1910 * at the new location we might need some other mounts first */
1911 again = true;
1912 break;
1913 }
1914
1915 r = apply_one_mount(root, m, p);
1916 if (r < 0) {
1917 mount_entry_path_debug_string(root, m, error_path);
1918 return r;
1919 }
1920
1921 m->applied = true;
1922 }
1923
1924 if (!again)
1925 break;
1926
1927 drop_unused_mounts(root, mounts, n_mounts);
1928 }
1929
1930 /* Now that all filesystems have been set up, but before the
1931 * read-only switches are flipped, create the exec dirs and other symlinks.
1932 * Note that when /var/lib is not empty/tmpfs, these symlinks will already
1933 * exist, which means this will be a no-op. */
1934 r = create_symlinks_from_tuples(root, p->symlinks);
1935 if (r < 0)
1936 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up symlinks inside mount namespace: %m");
1937
1938 /* Create a deny list we can pass to bind_mount_recursive() */
1939 deny_list = new(char*, (*n_mounts)+1);
1940 if (!deny_list)
1941 return -ENOMEM;
1942 for (size_t j = 0; j < *n_mounts; j++)
1943 deny_list[j] = (char*) mount_entry_path(mounts+j);
1944 deny_list[*n_mounts] = NULL;
1945
1946 /* Second round, flip the ro bits if necessary. */
1947 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1948 r = make_read_only(m, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1949 if (r < 0) {
1950 mount_entry_path_debug_string(root, m, error_path);
1951 return r;
1952 }
1953 }
1954
1955 /* Third round, flip the noexec bits with a simplified deny list. */
1956 for (size_t j = 0; j < *n_mounts; j++)
1957 if (IN_SET((mounts+j)->mode, EXEC, NOEXEC))
1958 deny_list[j] = (char*) mount_entry_path(mounts+j);
1959 deny_list[*n_mounts] = NULL;
1960
1961 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1962 r = make_noexec(m, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo);
1963 if (r < 0) {
1964 mount_entry_path_debug_string(root, m, error_path);
1965 return r;
1966 }
1967 }
1968
1969 /* Fourth round, flip the nosuid bits without a deny list. */
1970 if (p->mount_nosuid)
1971 for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
1972 r = make_nosuid(m, proc_self_mountinfo);
1973 if (r < 0) {
1974 mount_entry_path_debug_string(root, m, error_path);
1975 return r;
1976 }
1977 }
1978
1979 return 1;
1980 }
1981
1982 static bool root_read_only(
1983 char **read_only_paths,
1984 ProtectSystem protect_system) {
1985
1986 /* Determine whether the root directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. */
1987
1988 if (protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT)
1989 return true;
1990
1991 if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/"))
1992 return true;
1993
1994 return false;
1995 }
1996
1997 static bool home_read_only(
1998 char** read_only_paths,
1999 char** inaccessible_paths,
2000 char** empty_directories,
2001 const BindMount *bind_mounts,
2002 size_t n_bind_mounts,
2003 const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems,
2004 size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
2005 ProtectHome protect_home) {
2006
2007 /* Determine whether the /home directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. Yes,
2008 * this is a bit sloppy, since we don't bother checking for cases where / is affected by multiple
2009 * settings. */
2010
2011 if (protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO)
2012 return true;
2013
2014 if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/home") ||
2015 prefixed_path_strv_contains(inaccessible_paths, "/home") ||
2016 prefixed_path_strv_contains(empty_directories, "/home"))
2017 return true;
2018
2019 for (size_t i = 0; i < n_temporary_filesystems; i++)
2020 if (path_equal(temporary_filesystems[i].path, "/home"))
2021 return true;
2022
2023 /* If /home is overmounted with some dir from the host it's not writable. */
2024 for (size_t i = 0; i < n_bind_mounts; i++)
2025 if (path_equal(bind_mounts[i].destination, "/home"))
2026 return true;
2027
2028 return false;
2029 }
2030
2031 int setup_namespace(const NamespaceParameters *p, char **error_path) {
2032
2033 _cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *loop_device = NULL;
2034 _cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp) DissectedImage *dissected_image = NULL;
2035 _cleanup_strv_free_ char **hierarchies = NULL;
2036 MountEntry *m = NULL, *mounts = NULL;
2037 bool require_prefix = false;
2038 const char *root;
2039 DissectImageFlags dissect_image_flags =
2040 DISSECT_IMAGE_GENERIC_ROOT |
2041 DISSECT_IMAGE_REQUIRE_ROOT |
2042 DISSECT_IMAGE_DISCARD_ON_LOOP |
2043 DISSECT_IMAGE_RELAX_VAR_CHECK |
2044 DISSECT_IMAGE_FSCK |
2045 DISSECT_IMAGE_USR_NO_ROOT |
2046 DISSECT_IMAGE_GROWFS |
2047 DISSECT_IMAGE_ADD_PARTITION_DEVICES |
2048 DISSECT_IMAGE_PIN_PARTITION_DEVICES;
2049 size_t n_mounts;
2050 int r;
2051
2052 assert(p);
2053
2054 /* Make sure that all mknod(), mkdir() calls we do are unaffected by the umask, and the access modes
2055 * we configure take effect */
2056 BLOCK_WITH_UMASK(0000);
2057
2058 bool setup_propagate = !isempty(p->propagate_dir) && !isempty(p->incoming_dir);
2059 unsigned long mount_propagation_flag = p->mount_propagation_flag != 0 ? p->mount_propagation_flag : MS_SHARED;
2060
2061 if (p->root_image) {
2062 /* Make the whole image read-only if we can determine that we only access it in a read-only fashion. */
2063 if (root_read_only(p->read_only_paths,
2064 p->protect_system) &&
2065 home_read_only(p->read_only_paths, p->inaccessible_paths, p->empty_directories,
2066 p->bind_mounts, p->n_bind_mounts, p->temporary_filesystems, p->n_temporary_filesystems,
2067 p->protect_home) &&
2068 strv_isempty(p->read_write_paths))
2069 dissect_image_flags |= DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY;
2070
2071 SET_FLAG(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE, p->verity && p->verity->data_path);
2072
2073 r = loop_device_make_by_path(
2074 p->root_image,
2075 FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_DEVICE_READ_ONLY) ? O_RDONLY : -1 /* < 0 means writable if possible, read-only as fallback */,
2076 /* sector_size= */ UINT32_MAX,
2077 FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE) ? 0 : LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN,
2078 LOCK_SH,
2079 &loop_device);
2080 if (r < 0)
2081 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create loop device for root image: %m");
2082
2083 r = dissect_loop_device(
2084 loop_device,
2085 p->verity,
2086 p->root_image_options,
2087 p->root_image_policy,
2088 dissect_image_flags,
2089 &dissected_image);
2090 if (r < 0)
2091 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to dissect image: %m");
2092
2093 r = dissected_image_load_verity_sig_partition(
2094 dissected_image,
2095 loop_device->fd,
2096 p->verity);
2097 if (r < 0)
2098 return r;
2099
2100 r = dissected_image_decrypt(
2101 dissected_image,
2102 NULL,
2103 p->verity,
2104 dissect_image_flags);
2105 if (r < 0)
2106 return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to decrypt dissected image: %m");
2107 }
2108
2109 if (p->root_directory)
2110 root = p->root_directory;
2111 else {
2112 /* /run/systemd should have been created by PID 1 early on already, but in some cases, like
2113 * when running tests (test-execute), it might not have been created yet so let's make sure
2114 * we create it if it doesn't already exist. */
2115 (void) mkdir_p_label("/run/systemd", 0755);
2116
2117 /* Always create the mount namespace in a temporary directory, instead of operating directly
2118 * in the root. The temporary directory prevents any mounts from being potentially obscured
2119 * my other mounts we already applied. We use the same mount point for all images, which is
2120 * safe, since they all live in their own namespaces after all, and hence won't see each
2121 * other. (Note: this directory is also created by PID 1 early on, we create it here for
2122 * similar reasons as /run/systemd/ first.) */
2123 root = "/run/systemd/mount-rootfs";
2124 (void) mkdir_label(root, 0555);
2125
2126 require_prefix = true;
2127 }
2128
2129 if (p->n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(p->extension_directories)) {
2130 /* Hierarchy population needs to be done for sysext and confext extension images */
2131 r = parse_env_extension_hierarchies(&hierarchies, "SYSTEMD_SYSEXT_AND_CONFEXT_HIERARCHIES");
2132 if (r < 0)
2133 return r;
2134 }
2135
2136 n_mounts = namespace_calculate_mounts(
2137 p,
2138 hierarchies,
2139 setup_propagate);
2140
2141 if (n_mounts > 0) {
2142 m = mounts = new0(MountEntry, n_mounts);
2143 if (!mounts)
2144 return -ENOMEM;
2145
2146 r = append_access_mounts(&m, p->read_write_paths, READWRITE, require_prefix);
2147 if (r < 0)
2148 goto finish;
2149
2150 r = append_access_mounts(&m, p->read_only_paths, READONLY, require_prefix);
2151 if (r < 0)
2152 goto finish;
2153
2154 r = append_access_mounts(&m, p->inaccessible_paths, INACCESSIBLE, require_prefix);
2155 if (r < 0)
2156 goto finish;
2157
2158 r = append_access_mounts(&m, p->exec_paths, EXEC, require_prefix);
2159 if (r < 0)
2160 goto finish;
2161
2162 r = append_access_mounts(&m, p->no_exec_paths, NOEXEC, require_prefix);
2163 if (r < 0)
2164 goto finish;
2165
2166 r = append_empty_dir_mounts(&m, p->empty_directories);
2167 if (r < 0)
2168 goto finish;
2169
2170 r = append_bind_mounts(&m, p->bind_mounts, p->n_bind_mounts);
2171 if (r < 0)
2172 goto finish;
2173
2174 r = append_tmpfs_mounts(&m, p->temporary_filesystems, p->n_temporary_filesystems);
2175 if (r < 0)
2176 goto finish;
2177
2178 if (p->tmp_dir) {
2179 bool ro = streq(p->tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
2180
2181 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2182 .path_const = "/tmp",
2183 .mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP,
2184 .source_const = p->tmp_dir,
2185 };
2186 }
2187
2188 if (p->var_tmp_dir) {
2189 bool ro = streq(p->var_tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
2190
2191 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2192 .path_const = "/var/tmp",
2193 .mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP,
2194 .source_const = p->var_tmp_dir,
2195 };
2196 }
2197
2198 r = append_mount_images(&m, p->mount_images, p->n_mount_images);
2199 if (r < 0)
2200 goto finish;
2201
2202 r = append_extensions(&m, root, p->extension_dir, hierarchies, p->extension_images, p->n_extension_images, p->extension_directories);
2203 if (r < 0)
2204 goto finish;
2205
2206 if (p->private_dev)
2207 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2208 .path_const = "/dev",
2209 .mode = PRIVATE_DEV,
2210 .flags = DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS,
2211 };
2212
2213 /* In case /proc is successfully mounted with pid tree subset only (ProcSubset=pid), the
2214 protective mounts to non-pid /proc paths would fail. But the pid only option may have
2215 failed gracefully, so let's try the mounts but it's not fatal if they don't succeed. */
2216 bool ignore_protect_proc = p->ignore_protect_paths || p->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID;
2217 if (p->protect_kernel_tunables) {
2218 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2219 protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table,
2220 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table),
2221 ignore_protect_proc);
2222 if (r < 0)
2223 goto finish;
2224
2225 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2226 protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table,
2227 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table),
2228 p->ignore_protect_paths);
2229 if (r < 0)
2230 goto finish;
2231 }
2232
2233 if (p->protect_kernel_modules) {
2234 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2235 protect_kernel_modules_table,
2236 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table),
2237 p->ignore_protect_paths);
2238 if (r < 0)
2239 goto finish;
2240 }
2241
2242 if (p->protect_kernel_logs) {
2243 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2244 protect_kernel_logs_proc_table,
2245 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_proc_table),
2246 ignore_protect_proc);
2247 if (r < 0)
2248 goto finish;
2249
2250 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2251 protect_kernel_logs_dev_table,
2252 ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_dev_table),
2253 p->ignore_protect_paths);
2254 if (r < 0)
2255 goto finish;
2256 }
2257
2258 if (p->protect_control_groups)
2259 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2260 .path_const = "/sys/fs/cgroup",
2261 .mode = READONLY,
2262 };
2263
2264 r = append_protect_home(&m, p->protect_home, p->ignore_protect_paths);
2265 if (r < 0)
2266 goto finish;
2267
2268 r = append_protect_system(&m, p->protect_system, false);
2269 if (r < 0)
2270 goto finish;
2271
2272 if (namespace_parameters_mount_apivfs(p)) {
2273 r = append_static_mounts(&m,
2274 apivfs_table,
2275 ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table),
2276 p->ignore_protect_paths);
2277 if (r < 0)
2278 goto finish;
2279 }
2280
2281 /* Note, if proc is mounted with subset=pid then neither of the
2282 * two paths will exist, i.e. they are implicitly protected by
2283 * the mount option. */
2284 if (p->protect_hostname) {
2285 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2286 .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/hostname",
2287 .mode = READONLY,
2288 .ignore = ignore_protect_proc,
2289 };
2290 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2291 .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/domainname",
2292 .mode = READONLY,
2293 .ignore = ignore_protect_proc,
2294 };
2295 }
2296
2297 if (p->private_network)
2298 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2299 .path_const = "/sys",
2300 .mode = PRIVATE_SYSFS,
2301 };
2302
2303 if (p->private_ipc)
2304 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2305 .path_const = "/dev/mqueue",
2306 .mode = MQUEUEFS,
2307 .flags = MS_NOSUID | MS_NODEV | MS_NOEXEC | MS_RELATIME,
2308 };
2309
2310 if (p->creds_path) {
2311 /* If our service has a credentials store configured, then bind that one in, but hide
2312 * everything else. */
2313
2314 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2315 .path_const = "/run/credentials",
2316 .mode = TMPFS,
2317 .read_only = true,
2318 .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST,
2319 .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC,
2320 };
2321
2322 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2323 .path_const = p->creds_path,
2324 .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
2325 .read_only = true,
2326 .source_const = p->creds_path,
2327 .ignore = true,
2328 };
2329 } else {
2330 /* If our service has no credentials store configured, then make the whole
2331 * credentials tree inaccessible wholesale. */
2332
2333 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2334 .path_const = "/run/credentials",
2335 .mode = INACCESSIBLE,
2336 .ignore = true,
2337 };
2338 }
2339
2340 if (p->log_namespace) {
2341 _cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL;
2342
2343 q = strjoin("/run/systemd/journal.", p->log_namespace);
2344 if (!q) {
2345 r = -ENOMEM;
2346 goto finish;
2347 }
2348
2349 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2350 .path_const = "/run/systemd/journal",
2351 .mode = BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE,
2352 .read_only = true,
2353 .source_malloc = TAKE_PTR(q),
2354 };
2355 }
2356
2357 /* Will be used to add bind mounts at runtime */
2358 if (setup_propagate)
2359 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2360 .source_const = p->propagate_dir,
2361 .path_const = p->incoming_dir,
2362 .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
2363 .read_only = true,
2364 };
2365
2366 if (p->notify_socket)
2367 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2368 .path_const = p->notify_socket,
2369 .source_const = p->notify_socket,
2370 .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
2371 .read_only = true,
2372 };
2373
2374 if (p->host_os_release_stage)
2375 *(m++) = (MountEntry) {
2376 .path_const = "/run/host/.os-release-stage/",
2377 .source_const = p->host_os_release_stage,
2378 .mode = BIND_MOUNT,
2379 .read_only = true,
2380 .ignore = true, /* Live copy, don't hard-fail if it goes missing */
2381 };
2382
2383 assert(mounts + n_mounts == m);
2384
2385 /* Prepend the root directory where that's necessary */
2386 r = prefix_where_needed(mounts, n_mounts, root);
2387 if (r < 0)
2388 goto finish;
2389
2390 drop_unused_mounts(root, mounts, &n_mounts);
2391 }
2392
2393 /* All above is just preparation, figuring out what to do. Let's now actually start doing something. */
2394
2395 if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) < 0) {
2396 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to unshare the mount namespace: %m");
2397 if (ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(r) ||
2398 ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r))
2399 /* If the kernel doesn't support namespaces, or when there's a MAC or seccomp filter
2400 * in place that doesn't allow us to create namespaces (or a missing cap), then
2401 * propagate a recognizable error back, which the caller can use to detect this case
2402 * (and only this) and optionally continue without namespacing applied. */
2403 r = -ENOANO;
2404
2405 goto finish;
2406 }
2407
2408 /* Create the source directory to allow runtime propagation of mounts */
2409 if (setup_propagate)
2410 (void) mkdir_p(p->propagate_dir, 0600);
2411
2412 if (p->n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(p->extension_directories))
2413 /* ExtensionImages/Directories mountpoint directories will be created while parsing the
2414 * mounts to create, so have the parent ready */
2415 (void) mkdir_p(p->extension_dir, 0600);
2416
2417 /* Remount / as SLAVE so that nothing now mounted in the namespace
2418 * shows up in the parent */
2419 if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_SLAVE|MS_REC, NULL) < 0) {
2420 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' as SLAVE: %m");
2421 goto finish;
2422 }
2423
2424 if (p->root_image) {
2425 /* A root image is specified, mount it to the right place */
2426 r = dissected_image_mount(
2427 dissected_image,
2428 root,
2429 /* uid_shift= */ UID_INVALID,
2430 /* uid_range= */ UID_INVALID,
2431 /* userns_fd= */ -EBADF,
2432 dissect_image_flags);
2433 if (r < 0) {
2434 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root image: %m");
2435 goto finish;
2436 }
2437
2438 /* Now release the block device lock, so that udevd is free to call BLKRRPART on the device
2439 * if it likes. */
2440 r = loop_device_flock(loop_device, LOCK_UN);
2441 if (r < 0) {
2442 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to release lock on loopback block device: %m");
2443 goto finish;
2444 }
2445
2446 r = dissected_image_relinquish(dissected_image);
2447 if (r < 0) {
2448 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to relinquish dissected image: %m");
2449 goto finish;
2450 }
2451
2452 } else if (p->root_directory) {
2453
2454 /* A root directory is specified. Turn its directory into bind mount, if it isn't one yet. */
2455 r = path_is_mount_point(root, NULL, AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW);
2456 if (r < 0) {
2457 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect that %s is a mount point or not: %m", root);
2458 goto finish;
2459 }
2460 if (r == 0) {
2461 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, root, root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
2462 if (r < 0)
2463 goto finish;
2464 }
2465
2466 } else {
2467 /* Let's mount the main root directory to the root directory to use */
2468 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/", root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
2469 if (r < 0)
2470 goto finish;
2471 }
2472
2473 /* Try to set up the new root directory before mounting anything else there. */
2474 if (p->root_image || p->root_directory)
2475 (void) base_filesystem_create(root, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
2476
2477 /* Now make the magic happen */
2478 r = apply_mounts(root,
2479 p,
2480 mounts, &n_mounts,
2481 error_path);
2482 if (r < 0)
2483 goto finish;
2484
2485 /* MS_MOVE does not work on MS_SHARED so the remount MS_SHARED will be done later */
2486 r = mount_switch_root(root, /* mount_propagation_flag = */ 0);
2487 if (r == -EINVAL && p->root_directory) {
2488 /* If we are using root_directory and we don't have privileges (ie: user manager in a user
2489 * namespace) and the root_directory is already a mount point in the parent namespace,
2490 * MS_MOVE will fail as we don't have permission to change it (with EINVAL rather than
2491 * EPERM). Attempt to bind-mount it over itself (like we do above if it's not already a
2492 * mount point) and try again. */
2493 r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, root, root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL);
2494 if (r < 0)
2495 goto finish;
2496 r = mount_switch_root(root, /* mount_propagation_flag = */ 0);
2497 }
2498 if (r < 0) {
2499 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root with MS_MOVE: %m");
2500 goto finish;
2501 }
2502
2503 /* Remount / as the desired mode. Note that this will not reestablish propagation from our side to
2504 * the host, since what's disconnected is disconnected. */
2505 if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, mount_propagation_flag | MS_REC, NULL) < 0) {
2506 r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' with desired mount flags: %m");
2507 goto finish;
2508 }
2509
2510 /* bind_mount_in_namespace() will MS_MOVE into that directory, and that's only
2511 * supported for non-shared mounts. This needs to happen after remounting / or it will fail. */
2512 if (setup_propagate) {
2513 r = mount(NULL, p->incoming_dir, NULL, MS_SLAVE, NULL);
2514 if (r < 0) {
2515 log_error_errno(r, "Failed to remount %s with MS_SLAVE: %m", p->incoming_dir);
2516 goto finish;
2517 }
2518 }
2519
2520 r = 0;
2521
2522 finish:
2523 if (n_mounts > 0)
2524 for (m = mounts; m < mounts + n_mounts; m++)
2525 mount_entry_done(m);
2526
2527 free(mounts);
2528
2529 return r;
2530 }
2531
2532 void bind_mount_free_many(BindMount *b, size_t n) {
2533 assert(b || n == 0);
2534
2535 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
2536 free(b[i].source);
2537 free(b[i].destination);
2538 }
2539
2540 free(b);
2541 }
2542
2543 int bind_mount_add(BindMount **b, size_t *n, const BindMount *item) {
2544 _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL;
2545 BindMount *c;
2546
2547 assert(b);
2548 assert(n);
2549 assert(item);
2550
2551 s = strdup(item->source);
2552 if (!s)
2553 return -ENOMEM;
2554
2555 d = strdup(item->destination);
2556 if (!d)
2557 return -ENOMEM;
2558
2559 c = reallocarray(*b, *n + 1, sizeof(BindMount));
2560 if (!c)
2561 return -ENOMEM;
2562
2563 *b = c;
2564
2565 c[(*n) ++] = (BindMount) {
2566 .source = TAKE_PTR(s),
2567 .destination = TAKE_PTR(d),
2568 .read_only = item->read_only,
2569 .nosuid = item->nosuid,
2570 .recursive = item->recursive,
2571 .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent,
2572 };
2573
2574 return 0;
2575 }
2576
2577 MountImage* mount_image_free_many(MountImage *m, size_t *n) {
2578 assert(n);
2579 assert(m || *n == 0);
2580
2581 for (size_t i = 0; i < *n; i++) {
2582 free(m[i].source);
2583 free(m[i].destination);
2584 mount_options_free_all(m[i].mount_options);
2585 }
2586
2587 free(m);
2588 *n = 0;
2589 return NULL;
2590 }
2591
2592 int mount_image_add(MountImage **m, size_t *n, const MountImage *item) {
2593 _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL;
2594 _cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *options = NULL;
2595 MountImage *c;
2596
2597 assert(m);
2598 assert(n);
2599 assert(item);
2600
2601 s = strdup(item->source);
2602 if (!s)
2603 return -ENOMEM;
2604
2605 if (item->destination) {
2606 d = strdup(item->destination);
2607 if (!d)
2608 return -ENOMEM;
2609 }
2610
2611 LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, i, item->mount_options) {
2612 _cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *o = NULL;
2613
2614 o = new(MountOptions, 1);
2615 if (!o)
2616 return -ENOMEM;
2617
2618 *o = (MountOptions) {
2619 .partition_designator = i->partition_designator,
2620 .options = strdup(i->options),
2621 };
2622 if (!o->options)
2623 return -ENOMEM;
2624
2625 LIST_APPEND(mount_options, options, TAKE_PTR(o));
2626 }
2627
2628 c = reallocarray(*m, *n + 1, sizeof(MountImage));
2629 if (!c)
2630 return -ENOMEM;
2631
2632 *m = c;
2633
2634 c[(*n) ++] = (MountImage) {
2635 .source = TAKE_PTR(s),
2636 .destination = TAKE_PTR(d),
2637 .mount_options = TAKE_PTR(options),
2638 .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent,
2639 .type = item->type,
2640 };
2641
2642 return 0;
2643 }
2644
2645 void temporary_filesystem_free_many(TemporaryFileSystem *t, size_t n) {
2646 assert(t || n == 0);
2647
2648 for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
2649 free(t[i].path);
2650 free(t[i].options);
2651 }
2652
2653 free(t);
2654 }
2655
2656 int temporary_filesystem_add(
2657 TemporaryFileSystem **t,
2658 size_t *n,
2659 const char *path,
2660 const char *options) {
2661
2662 _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *o = NULL;
2663 TemporaryFileSystem *c;
2664
2665 assert(t);
2666 assert(n);
2667 assert(path);
2668
2669 p = strdup(path);
2670 if (!p)
2671 return -ENOMEM;
2672
2673 if (!isempty(options)) {
2674 o = strdup(options);
2675 if (!o)
2676 return -ENOMEM;
2677 }
2678
2679 c = reallocarray(*t, *n + 1, sizeof(TemporaryFileSystem));
2680 if (!c)
2681 return -ENOMEM;
2682
2683 *t = c;
2684
2685 c[(*n) ++] = (TemporaryFileSystem) {
2686 .path = TAKE_PTR(p),
2687 .options = TAKE_PTR(o),
2688 };
2689
2690 return 0;
2691 }
2692
2693 static int make_tmp_prefix(const char *prefix) {
2694 _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
2695 _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF;
2696 int r;
2697
2698 /* Don't do anything unless we know the dir is actually missing */
2699 r = access(prefix, F_OK);
2700 if (r >= 0)
2701 return 0;
2702 if (errno != ENOENT)
2703 return -errno;
2704
2705 WITH_UMASK(000)
2706 r = mkdir_parents(prefix, 0755);
2707 if (r < 0)
2708 return r;
2709
2710 r = tempfn_random(prefix, NULL, &t);
2711 if (r < 0)
2712 return r;
2713
2714 /* umask will corrupt this access mode, but that doesn't matter, we need to call chmod() anyway for
2715 * the suid bit, below. */
2716 fd = open_mkdir_at(AT_FDCWD, t, O_EXCL|O_CLOEXEC, 0777);
2717 if (fd < 0)
2718 return fd;
2719
2720 r = RET_NERRNO(fchmod(fd, 01777));
2721 if (r < 0) {
2722 (void) rmdir(t);
2723 return r;
2724 }
2725
2726 r = RET_NERRNO(rename(t, prefix));
2727 if (r < 0) {
2728 (void) rmdir(t);
2729 return r == -EEXIST ? 0 : r; /* it's fine if someone else created the dir by now */
2730 }
2731
2732 return 0;
2733
2734 }
2735
2736 static int setup_one_tmp_dir(const char *id, const char *prefix, char **path, char **tmp_path) {
2737 _cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL;
2738 _cleanup_free_ char *y = NULL;
2739 sd_id128_t boot_id;
2740 bool rw = true;
2741 int r;
2742
2743 assert(id);
2744 assert(prefix);
2745 assert(path);
2746
2747 /* We include the boot id in the directory so that after a
2748 * reboot we can easily identify obsolete directories. */
2749
2750 r = sd_id128_get_boot(&boot_id);
2751 if (r < 0)
2752 return r;
2753
2754 x = strjoin(prefix, "/systemd-private-", SD_ID128_TO_STRING(boot_id), "-", id, "-XXXXXX");
2755 if (!x)
2756 return -ENOMEM;
2757
2758 r = make_tmp_prefix(prefix);
2759 if (r < 0)
2760 return r;
2761
2762 WITH_UMASK(0077)
2763 if (!mkdtemp(x)) {
2764 if (errno == EROFS || ERRNO_IS_DISK_SPACE(errno))
2765 rw = false;
2766 else
2767 return -errno;
2768 }
2769
2770 if (rw) {
2771 y = strjoin(x, "/tmp");
2772 if (!y)
2773 return -ENOMEM;
2774
2775 WITH_UMASK(0000)
2776 if (mkdir(y, 0777 | S_ISVTX) < 0)
2777 return -errno;
2778
2779 r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, y, prefix, 0);
2780 if (r < 0)
2781 return r;
2782
2783 if (tmp_path)
2784 *tmp_path = TAKE_PTR(y);
2785 } else {
2786 /* Trouble: we failed to create the directory. Instead of failing, let's simulate /tmp being
2787 * read-only. This way the service will get the EROFS result as if it was writing to the real
2788 * file system. */
2789 WITH_UMASK(0000)
2790 r = mkdir_p(RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY, 0500);
2791 if (r < 0)
2792 return r;
2793
2794 r = free_and_strdup(&x, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
2795 if (r < 0)
2796 return r;
2797 }
2798
2799 *path = TAKE_PTR(x);
2800 return 0;
2801 }
2802
2803 int setup_tmp_dirs(const char *id, char **tmp_dir, char **var_tmp_dir) {
2804 _cleanup_(namespace_cleanup_tmpdirp) char *a = NULL;
2805 _cleanup_(rmdir_and_freep) char *a_tmp = NULL;
2806 char *b;
2807 int r;
2808
2809 assert(id);
2810 assert(tmp_dir);
2811 assert(var_tmp_dir);
2812
2813 r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/tmp", &a, &a_tmp);
2814 if (r < 0)
2815 return r;
2816
2817 r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/var/tmp", &b, NULL);
2818 if (r < 0)
2819 return r;
2820
2821 a_tmp = mfree(a_tmp); /* avoid rmdir */
2822 *tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(a);
2823 *var_tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(b);
2824
2825 return 0;
2826 }
2827
2828 int setup_shareable_ns(int ns_storage_socket[static 2], unsigned long nsflag) {
2829 _cleanup_close_ int ns = -EBADF;
2830 int r;
2831 const char *ns_name, *ns_path;
2832
2833 assert(ns_storage_socket);
2834 assert(ns_storage_socket[0] >= 0);
2835 assert(ns_storage_socket[1] >= 0);
2836
2837 ns_name = namespace_single_flag_to_string(nsflag);
2838 assert(ns_name);
2839
2840 /* We use the passed socketpair as a storage buffer for our
2841 * namespace reference fd. Whatever process runs this first
2842 * shall create a new namespace, all others should just join
2843 * it. To serialize that we use a file lock on the socket
2844 * pair.
2845 *
2846 * It's a bit crazy, but hey, works great! */
2847
2848 r = posix_lock(ns_storage_socket[0], LOCK_EX);
2849 if (r < 0)
2850 return r;
2851
2852 CLEANUP_POSIX_UNLOCK(ns_storage_socket[0]);
2853
2854 ns = receive_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[0], MSG_PEEK|MSG_DONTWAIT);
2855 if (ns >= 0) {
2856 /* Yay, found something, so let's join the namespace */
2857 r = RET_NERRNO(setns(ns, nsflag));
2858 if (r < 0)
2859 return r;
2860
2861 return 0;
2862 }
2863
2864 if (ns != -EAGAIN)
2865 return ns;
2866
2867 /* Nothing stored yet, so let's create a new namespace. */
2868
2869 if (unshare(nsflag) < 0)
2870 return -errno;
2871
2872 (void) loopback_setup();
2873
2874 ns_path = strjoina("/proc/self/ns/", ns_name);
2875 ns = open(ns_path, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
2876 if (ns < 0)
2877 return -errno;
2878
2879 r = send_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[1], ns, MSG_DONTWAIT);
2880 if (r < 0)
2881 return r;
2882
2883 return 1;
2884 }
2885
2886 int open_shareable_ns_path(int ns_storage_socket[static 2], const char *path, unsigned long nsflag) {
2887 _cleanup_close_ int ns = -EBADF;
2888 int r;
2889
2890 assert(ns_storage_socket);
2891 assert(ns_storage_socket[0] >= 0);
2892 assert(ns_storage_socket[1] >= 0);
2893 assert(path);
2894
2895 /* If the storage socket doesn't contain a ns fd yet, open one via the file system and store it in
2896 * it. This is supposed to be called ahead of time, i.e. before setup_shareable_ns() which will
2897 * allocate a new anonymous ns if needed. */
2898
2899 r = posix_lock(ns_storage_socket[0], LOCK_EX);
2900 if (r < 0)
2901 return r;
2902
2903 CLEANUP_POSIX_UNLOCK(ns_storage_socket[0]);
2904
2905 ns = receive_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[0], MSG_PEEK|MSG_DONTWAIT);
2906 if (ns >= 0)
2907 return 0;
2908 if (ns != -EAGAIN)
2909 return ns;
2910
2911 /* Nothing stored yet. Open the file from the file system. */
2912
2913 ns = open(path, O_RDONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC);
2914 if (ns < 0)
2915 return -errno;
2916
2917 r = fd_is_ns(ns, nsflag);
2918 if (r == 0)
2919 return -EINVAL;
2920 if (r < 0 && r != -EUCLEAN) /* EUCLEAN: we don't know */
2921 return r;
2922
2923 r = send_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[1], ns, MSG_DONTWAIT);
2924 if (r < 0)
2925 return r;
2926
2927 return 1;
2928 }
2929
2930 bool ns_type_supported(NamespaceType type) {
2931 const char *t, *ns_proc;
2932
2933 t = namespace_type_to_string(type);
2934 if (!t) /* Don't know how to translate this? Then it's not supported */
2935 return false;
2936
2937 ns_proc = strjoina("/proc/self/ns/", t);
2938 return access(ns_proc, F_OK) == 0;
2939 }
2940
2941 static const char *const protect_home_table[_PROTECT_HOME_MAX] = {
2942 [PROTECT_HOME_NO] = "no",
2943 [PROTECT_HOME_YES] = "yes",
2944 [PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY] = "read-only",
2945 [PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS] = "tmpfs",
2946 };
2947
2948 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_home, ProtectHome, PROTECT_HOME_YES);
2949
2950 static const char *const protect_system_table[_PROTECT_SYSTEM_MAX] = {
2951 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO] = "no",
2952 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES] = "yes",
2953 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL] = "full",
2954 [PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT] = "strict",
2955 };
2956
2957 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_system, ProtectSystem, PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES);
2958
2959 static const char* const namespace_type_table[] = {
2960 [NAMESPACE_MOUNT] = "mnt",
2961 [NAMESPACE_CGROUP] = "cgroup",
2962 [NAMESPACE_UTS] = "uts",
2963 [NAMESPACE_IPC] = "ipc",
2964 [NAMESPACE_USER] = "user",
2965 [NAMESPACE_PID] = "pid",
2966 [NAMESPACE_NET] = "net",
2967 [NAMESPACE_TIME] = "time",
2968 };
2969
2970 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(namespace_type, NamespaceType);
2971
2972 static const char* const protect_proc_table[_PROTECT_PROC_MAX] = {
2973 [PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT] = "default",
2974 [PROTECT_PROC_NOACCESS] = "noaccess",
2975 [PROTECT_PROC_INVISIBLE] = "invisible",
2976 [PROTECT_PROC_PTRACEABLE] = "ptraceable",
2977 };
2978
2979 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(protect_proc, ProtectProc);
2980
2981 static const char* const proc_subset_table[_PROC_SUBSET_MAX] = {
2982 [PROC_SUBSET_ALL] = "all",
2983 [PROC_SUBSET_PID] = "pid",
2984 };
2985
2986 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(proc_subset, ProcSubset);