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Merge pull request #24654 from fbuihuu/mount_followup_for_pr_19983
[thirdparty/systemd.git] / src / resolve / resolved-dns-transaction.c
1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
2
3 #include "sd-messages.h"
4
5 #include "af-list.h"
6 #include "alloc-util.h"
7 #include "dns-domain.h"
8 #include "errno-list.h"
9 #include "errno-util.h"
10 #include "fd-util.h"
11 #include "glyph-util.h"
12 #include "random-util.h"
13 #include "resolved-dns-cache.h"
14 #include "resolved-dns-transaction.h"
15 #include "resolved-dnstls.h"
16 #include "resolved-llmnr.h"
17 #include "string-table.h"
18
19 #define TRANSACTIONS_MAX 4096
20 #define TRANSACTION_TCP_TIMEOUT_USEC (10U*USEC_PER_SEC)
21
22 /* After how much time to repeat classic DNS requests */
23 #define DNS_TIMEOUT_USEC (SD_RESOLVED_QUERY_TIMEOUT_USEC / DNS_TRANSACTION_ATTEMPTS_MAX)
24
25 static void dns_transaction_reset_answer(DnsTransaction *t) {
26 assert(t);
27
28 t->received = dns_packet_unref(t->received);
29 t->answer = dns_answer_unref(t->answer);
30 t->answer_rcode = 0;
31 t->answer_dnssec_result = _DNSSEC_RESULT_INVALID;
32 t->answer_source = _DNS_TRANSACTION_SOURCE_INVALID;
33 t->answer_query_flags = 0;
34 t->answer_nsec_ttl = UINT32_MAX;
35 t->answer_errno = 0;
36 }
37
38 static void dns_transaction_flush_dnssec_transactions(DnsTransaction *t) {
39 DnsTransaction *z;
40
41 assert(t);
42
43 while ((z = set_steal_first(t->dnssec_transactions))) {
44 set_remove(z->notify_transactions, t);
45 set_remove(z->notify_transactions_done, t);
46 dns_transaction_gc(z);
47 }
48 }
49
50 static void dns_transaction_close_connection(
51 DnsTransaction *t,
52 bool use_graveyard) { /* Set use_graveyard = false when you know the connection is already
53 * dead, for example because you got a connection error back from the
54 * kernel. In that case there's no point in keeping the fd around,
55 * hence don't. */
56 int r;
57
58 assert(t);
59
60 if (t->stream) {
61 /* Let's detach the stream from our transaction, in case something else keeps a reference to it. */
62 LIST_REMOVE(transactions_by_stream, t->stream->transactions, t);
63
64 /* Remove packet in case it's still in the queue */
65 dns_packet_unref(ordered_set_remove(t->stream->write_queue, t->sent));
66
67 t->stream = dns_stream_unref(t->stream);
68 }
69
70 t->dns_udp_event_source = sd_event_source_disable_unref(t->dns_udp_event_source);
71
72 /* If we have an UDP socket where we sent a packet, but never received one, then add it to the socket
73 * graveyard, instead of closing it right away. That way it will stick around for a moment longer,
74 * and the reply we might still get from the server will be eaten up instead of resulting in an ICMP
75 * port unreachable error message. */
76
77 if (use_graveyard && t->dns_udp_fd >= 0 && t->sent && !t->received) {
78 r = manager_add_socket_to_graveyard(t->scope->manager, t->dns_udp_fd);
79 if (r < 0)
80 log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add UDP socket to graveyard, closing immediately: %m");
81 else
82 TAKE_FD(t->dns_udp_fd);
83 }
84
85 t->dns_udp_fd = safe_close(t->dns_udp_fd);
86 }
87
88 static void dns_transaction_stop_timeout(DnsTransaction *t) {
89 assert(t);
90
91 t->timeout_event_source = sd_event_source_disable_unref(t->timeout_event_source);
92 }
93
94 DnsTransaction* dns_transaction_free(DnsTransaction *t) {
95 DnsQueryCandidate *c;
96 DnsZoneItem *i;
97 DnsTransaction *z;
98
99 if (!t)
100 return NULL;
101
102 log_debug("Freeing transaction %" PRIu16 ".", t->id);
103
104 dns_transaction_close_connection(t, true);
105 dns_transaction_stop_timeout(t);
106
107 dns_packet_unref(t->sent);
108 dns_transaction_reset_answer(t);
109
110 dns_server_unref(t->server);
111
112 if (t->scope) {
113 if (t->key) {
114 DnsTransaction *first;
115
116 first = hashmap_get(t->scope->transactions_by_key, t->key);
117 LIST_REMOVE(transactions_by_key, first, t);
118 if (first)
119 hashmap_replace(t->scope->transactions_by_key, first->key, first);
120 else
121 hashmap_remove(t->scope->transactions_by_key, t->key);
122 }
123
124 LIST_REMOVE(transactions_by_scope, t->scope->transactions, t);
125
126 if (t->id != 0)
127 hashmap_remove(t->scope->manager->dns_transactions, UINT_TO_PTR(t->id));
128 }
129
130 while ((c = set_steal_first(t->notify_query_candidates)))
131 set_remove(c->transactions, t);
132 set_free(t->notify_query_candidates);
133
134 while ((c = set_steal_first(t->notify_query_candidates_done)))
135 set_remove(c->transactions, t);
136 set_free(t->notify_query_candidates_done);
137
138 while ((i = set_steal_first(t->notify_zone_items)))
139 i->probe_transaction = NULL;
140 set_free(t->notify_zone_items);
141
142 while ((i = set_steal_first(t->notify_zone_items_done)))
143 i->probe_transaction = NULL;
144 set_free(t->notify_zone_items_done);
145
146 while ((z = set_steal_first(t->notify_transactions)))
147 set_remove(z->dnssec_transactions, t);
148 set_free(t->notify_transactions);
149
150 while ((z = set_steal_first(t->notify_transactions_done)))
151 set_remove(z->dnssec_transactions, t);
152 set_free(t->notify_transactions_done);
153
154 dns_transaction_flush_dnssec_transactions(t);
155 set_free(t->dnssec_transactions);
156
157 dns_answer_unref(t->validated_keys);
158 dns_resource_key_unref(t->key);
159 dns_packet_unref(t->bypass);
160
161 return mfree(t);
162 }
163
164 DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(DnsTransaction*, dns_transaction_free);
165
166 DnsTransaction* dns_transaction_gc(DnsTransaction *t) {
167 assert(t);
168
169 /* Returns !NULL if we can't gc yet. */
170
171 if (t->block_gc > 0)
172 return t;
173
174 if (set_isempty(t->notify_query_candidates) &&
175 set_isempty(t->notify_query_candidates_done) &&
176 set_isempty(t->notify_zone_items) &&
177 set_isempty(t->notify_zone_items_done) &&
178 set_isempty(t->notify_transactions) &&
179 set_isempty(t->notify_transactions_done))
180 return dns_transaction_free(t);
181
182 return t;
183 }
184
185 static uint16_t pick_new_id(Manager *m) {
186 uint16_t new_id;
187
188 /* Find a fresh, unused transaction id. Note that this loop is bounded because there's a limit on the
189 * number of transactions, and it's much lower than the space of IDs. */
190
191 assert_cc(TRANSACTIONS_MAX < 0xFFFF);
192
193 do
194 random_bytes(&new_id, sizeof(new_id));
195 while (new_id == 0 ||
196 hashmap_get(m->dns_transactions, UINT_TO_PTR(new_id)));
197
198 return new_id;
199 }
200
201 static int key_ok(
202 DnsScope *scope,
203 DnsResourceKey *key) {
204
205 /* Don't allow looking up invalid or pseudo RRs */
206 if (!dns_type_is_valid_query(key->type))
207 return -EINVAL;
208 if (dns_type_is_obsolete(key->type))
209 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
210
211 /* We only support the IN class */
212 if (!IN_SET(key->class, DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_CLASS_ANY))
213 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
214
215 /* Don't allows DNSSEC RRs to be looked up via LLMNR/mDNS. They don't really make sense
216 * there, and it speeds up our queries if we refuse this early */
217 if (scope->protocol != DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS &&
218 dns_type_is_dnssec(key->type))
219 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
220
221 return 0;
222 }
223
224 int dns_transaction_new(
225 DnsTransaction **ret,
226 DnsScope *s,
227 DnsResourceKey *key,
228 DnsPacket *bypass,
229 uint64_t query_flags) {
230
231 _cleanup_(dns_transaction_freep) DnsTransaction *t = NULL;
232 int r;
233
234 assert(ret);
235 assert(s);
236
237 if (key) {
238 assert(!bypass);
239
240 r = key_ok(s, key);
241 if (r < 0)
242 return r;
243 } else {
244 DnsResourceKey *qk;
245 assert(bypass);
246
247 r = dns_packet_validate_query(bypass);
248 if (r < 0)
249 return r;
250
251 DNS_QUESTION_FOREACH(qk, bypass->question) {
252 r = key_ok(s, qk);
253 if (r < 0)
254 return r;
255 }
256 }
257
258 if (hashmap_size(s->manager->dns_transactions) >= TRANSACTIONS_MAX)
259 return -EBUSY;
260
261 r = hashmap_ensure_allocated(&s->manager->dns_transactions, NULL);
262 if (r < 0)
263 return r;
264
265 if (key) {
266 r = hashmap_ensure_allocated(&s->transactions_by_key, &dns_resource_key_hash_ops);
267 if (r < 0)
268 return r;
269 }
270
271 t = new(DnsTransaction, 1);
272 if (!t)
273 return -ENOMEM;
274
275 *t = (DnsTransaction) {
276 .dns_udp_fd = -1,
277 .answer_source = _DNS_TRANSACTION_SOURCE_INVALID,
278 .answer_dnssec_result = _DNSSEC_RESULT_INVALID,
279 .answer_nsec_ttl = UINT32_MAX,
280 .key = dns_resource_key_ref(key),
281 .query_flags = query_flags,
282 .bypass = dns_packet_ref(bypass),
283 .current_feature_level = _DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_INVALID,
284 .clamp_feature_level_servfail = _DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_INVALID,
285 .clamp_feature_level_nxdomain = _DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_INVALID,
286 .id = pick_new_id(s->manager),
287 };
288
289 r = hashmap_put(s->manager->dns_transactions, UINT_TO_PTR(t->id), t);
290 if (r < 0) {
291 t->id = 0;
292 return r;
293 }
294
295 if (t->key) {
296 DnsTransaction *first;
297
298 first = hashmap_get(s->transactions_by_key, t->key);
299 LIST_PREPEND(transactions_by_key, first, t);
300
301 r = hashmap_replace(s->transactions_by_key, first->key, first);
302 if (r < 0) {
303 LIST_REMOVE(transactions_by_key, first, t);
304 return r;
305 }
306 }
307
308 LIST_PREPEND(transactions_by_scope, s->transactions, t);
309 t->scope = s;
310
311 s->manager->n_transactions_total++;
312
313 if (ret)
314 *ret = t;
315
316 TAKE_PTR(t);
317 return 0;
318 }
319
320 static void dns_transaction_shuffle_id(DnsTransaction *t) {
321 uint16_t new_id;
322 assert(t);
323
324 /* Pick a new ID for this transaction. */
325
326 new_id = pick_new_id(t->scope->manager);
327 assert_se(hashmap_remove_and_put(t->scope->manager->dns_transactions, UINT_TO_PTR(t->id), UINT_TO_PTR(new_id), t) >= 0);
328
329 log_debug("Transaction %" PRIu16 " is now %" PRIu16 ".", t->id, new_id);
330 t->id = new_id;
331
332 /* Make sure we generate a new packet with the new ID */
333 t->sent = dns_packet_unref(t->sent);
334 }
335
336 static void dns_transaction_tentative(DnsTransaction *t, DnsPacket *p) {
337 char key_str[DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_STRING_MAX];
338 DnsZoneItem *z;
339
340 assert(t);
341 assert(p);
342 assert(t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR);
343
344 if (manager_packet_from_local_address(t->scope->manager, p) != 0)
345 return;
346
347 log_debug("Transaction %" PRIu16 " for <%s> on scope %s on %s/%s got tentative packet from %s.",
348 t->id,
349 dns_resource_key_to_string(dns_transaction_key(t), key_str, sizeof key_str),
350 dns_protocol_to_string(t->scope->protocol),
351 t->scope->link ? t->scope->link->ifname : "*",
352 af_to_name_short(t->scope->family),
353 IN_ADDR_TO_STRING(p->family, &p->sender));
354
355 /* RFC 4795, Section 4.1 says that the peer with the
356 * lexicographically smaller IP address loses */
357 if (memcmp(&p->sender, &p->destination, FAMILY_ADDRESS_SIZE(p->family)) >= 0) {
358 log_debug("Peer has lexicographically larger IP address and thus lost in the conflict.");
359 return;
360 }
361
362 log_debug("We have the lexicographically larger IP address and thus lost in the conflict.");
363
364 t->block_gc++;
365
366 while ((z = set_first(t->notify_zone_items))) {
367 /* First, make sure the zone item drops the reference
368 * to us */
369 dns_zone_item_probe_stop(z);
370
371 /* Secondly, report this as conflict, so that we might
372 * look for a different hostname */
373 dns_zone_item_conflict(z);
374 }
375 t->block_gc--;
376
377 dns_transaction_gc(t);
378 }
379
380 void dns_transaction_complete(DnsTransaction *t, DnsTransactionState state) {
381 DnsQueryCandidate *c;
382 DnsZoneItem *z;
383 DnsTransaction *d;
384 const char *st;
385 char key_str[DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_STRING_MAX];
386
387 assert(t);
388 assert(!DNS_TRANSACTION_IS_LIVE(state));
389
390 if (state == DNS_TRANSACTION_DNSSEC_FAILED) {
391 dns_resource_key_to_string(dns_transaction_key(t), key_str, sizeof key_str);
392
393 log_struct(LOG_NOTICE,
394 "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_DNSSEC_FAILURE_STR,
395 LOG_MESSAGE("DNSSEC validation failed for question %s: %s",
396 key_str, dnssec_result_to_string(t->answer_dnssec_result)),
397 "DNS_TRANSACTION=%" PRIu16, t->id,
398 "DNS_QUESTION=%s", key_str,
399 "DNSSEC_RESULT=%s", dnssec_result_to_string(t->answer_dnssec_result),
400 "DNS_SERVER=%s", strna(dns_server_string_full(t->server)),
401 "DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL=%s", dns_server_feature_level_to_string(t->server->possible_feature_level));
402 }
403
404 /* Note that this call might invalidate the query. Callers
405 * should hence not attempt to access the query or transaction
406 * after calling this function. */
407
408 if (state == DNS_TRANSACTION_ERRNO)
409 st = errno_to_name(t->answer_errno);
410 else
411 st = dns_transaction_state_to_string(state);
412
413 log_debug("%s transaction %" PRIu16 " for <%s> on scope %s on %s/%s now complete with <%s> from %s (%s; %s).",
414 t->bypass ? "Bypass" : "Regular",
415 t->id,
416 dns_resource_key_to_string(dns_transaction_key(t), key_str, sizeof key_str),
417 dns_protocol_to_string(t->scope->protocol),
418 t->scope->link ? t->scope->link->ifname : "*",
419 af_to_name_short(t->scope->family),
420 st,
421 t->answer_source < 0 ? "none" : dns_transaction_source_to_string(t->answer_source),
422 FLAGS_SET(t->query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_NO_VALIDATE) ? "not validated" :
423 (FLAGS_SET(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED) ? "authenticated" : "unsigned"),
424 FLAGS_SET(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_CONFIDENTIAL) ? "confidential" : "non-confidential");
425
426 t->state = state;
427
428 dns_transaction_close_connection(t, true);
429 dns_transaction_stop_timeout(t);
430
431 /* Notify all queries that are interested, but make sure the
432 * transaction isn't freed while we are still looking at it */
433 t->block_gc++;
434
435 SET_FOREACH_MOVE(c, t->notify_query_candidates_done, t->notify_query_candidates)
436 dns_query_candidate_notify(c);
437 SWAP_TWO(t->notify_query_candidates, t->notify_query_candidates_done);
438
439 SET_FOREACH_MOVE(z, t->notify_zone_items_done, t->notify_zone_items)
440 dns_zone_item_notify(z);
441 SWAP_TWO(t->notify_zone_items, t->notify_zone_items_done);
442 if (t->probing && t->state == DNS_TRANSACTION_ATTEMPTS_MAX_REACHED)
443 (void) dns_scope_announce(t->scope, false);
444
445 SET_FOREACH_MOVE(d, t->notify_transactions_done, t->notify_transactions)
446 dns_transaction_notify(d, t);
447 SWAP_TWO(t->notify_transactions, t->notify_transactions_done);
448
449 t->block_gc--;
450 dns_transaction_gc(t);
451 }
452
453 static void dns_transaction_complete_errno(DnsTransaction *t, int error) {
454 assert(t);
455 assert(error != 0);
456
457 t->answer_errno = abs(error);
458 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_ERRNO);
459 }
460
461 static int dns_transaction_pick_server(DnsTransaction *t) {
462 DnsServer *server;
463
464 assert(t);
465 assert(t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS);
466
467 /* Pick a DNS server and a feature level for it. */
468
469 server = dns_scope_get_dns_server(t->scope);
470 if (!server)
471 return -ESRCH;
472
473 /* If we changed the server invalidate the feature level clamping, as the new server might have completely
474 * different properties. */
475 if (server != t->server) {
476 t->clamp_feature_level_servfail = _DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_INVALID;
477 t->clamp_feature_level_nxdomain = _DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_INVALID;
478 }
479
480 t->current_feature_level = dns_server_possible_feature_level(server);
481
482 /* Clamp the feature level if that is requested. */
483 if (t->clamp_feature_level_servfail != _DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_INVALID &&
484 t->current_feature_level > t->clamp_feature_level_servfail)
485 t->current_feature_level = t->clamp_feature_level_servfail;
486 if (t->clamp_feature_level_nxdomain != _DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_INVALID &&
487 t->current_feature_level > t->clamp_feature_level_nxdomain)
488 t->current_feature_level = t->clamp_feature_level_nxdomain;
489
490 log_debug("Using feature level %s for transaction %u.", dns_server_feature_level_to_string(t->current_feature_level), t->id);
491
492 if (server == t->server)
493 return 0;
494
495 dns_server_unref(t->server);
496 t->server = dns_server_ref(server);
497
498 t->n_picked_servers ++;
499
500 log_debug("Using DNS server %s for transaction %u.", strna(dns_server_string_full(t->server)), t->id);
501
502 return 1;
503 }
504
505 static void dns_transaction_retry(DnsTransaction *t, bool next_server) {
506 int r;
507
508 assert(t);
509
510 /* Retries the transaction as it is, possibly on a different server */
511
512 if (next_server && t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS)
513 log_debug("Retrying transaction %" PRIu16 ", after switching servers.", t->id);
514 else
515 log_debug("Retrying transaction %" PRIu16 ".", t->id);
516
517 /* Before we try again, switch to a new server. */
518 if (next_server)
519 dns_scope_next_dns_server(t->scope, t->server);
520
521 r = dns_transaction_go(t);
522 if (r < 0)
523 dns_transaction_complete_errno(t, r);
524 }
525
526 static bool dns_transaction_limited_retry(DnsTransaction *t) {
527 assert(t);
528
529 /* If we haven't tried all different servers yet, let's try again with a different server */
530
531 if (t->n_picked_servers >= dns_scope_get_n_dns_servers(t->scope))
532 return false;
533
534 dns_transaction_retry(t, /* next_server= */ true);
535 return true;
536 }
537
538 static int dns_transaction_maybe_restart(DnsTransaction *t) {
539 int r;
540
541 assert(t);
542
543 /* Restarts the transaction, under a new ID if the feature level of the server changed since we first
544 * tried, without changing DNS server. Returns > 0 if the transaction was restarted, 0 if not. */
545
546 if (!t->server)
547 return 0;
548
549 if (t->current_feature_level <= dns_server_possible_feature_level(t->server))
550 return 0;
551
552 /* The server's current feature level is lower than when we sent the original query. We learnt something from
553 the response or possibly an auxiliary DNSSEC response that we didn't know before. We take that as reason to
554 restart the whole transaction. This is a good idea to deal with servers that respond rubbish if we include
555 OPT RR or DO bit. One of these cases is documented here, for example:
556 https://open.nlnetlabs.nl/pipermail/dnssec-trigger/2014-November/000376.html */
557
558 log_debug("Server feature level is now lower than when we began our transaction. Restarting with new ID.");
559 dns_transaction_shuffle_id(t);
560
561 r = dns_transaction_go(t);
562 if (r < 0)
563 return r;
564
565 return 1;
566 }
567
568 static void on_transaction_stream_error(DnsTransaction *t, int error) {
569 assert(t);
570
571 dns_transaction_close_connection(t, true);
572
573 if (ERRNO_IS_DISCONNECT(error)) {
574 if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR) {
575 /* If the LLMNR/TCP connection failed, the host doesn't support LLMNR, and we cannot answer the
576 * question on this scope. */
577 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_NOT_FOUND);
578 return;
579 }
580
581 dns_transaction_retry(t, true);
582 return;
583 }
584 if (error != 0)
585 dns_transaction_complete_errno(t, error);
586 }
587
588 static int dns_transaction_on_stream_packet(DnsTransaction *t, DnsStream *s, DnsPacket *p) {
589 bool encrypted;
590
591 assert(t);
592 assert(s);
593 assert(p);
594
595 encrypted = s->encrypted;
596
597 dns_transaction_close_connection(t, true);
598
599 if (dns_packet_validate_reply(p) <= 0) {
600 log_debug("Invalid TCP reply packet.");
601 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_INVALID_REPLY);
602 return 0;
603 }
604
605 dns_scope_check_conflicts(t->scope, p);
606
607 t->block_gc++;
608 dns_transaction_process_reply(t, p, encrypted);
609 t->block_gc--;
610
611 /* If the response wasn't useful, then complete the transition
612 * now. After all, we are the worst feature set now with TCP
613 * sockets, and there's really no point in retrying. */
614 if (t->state == DNS_TRANSACTION_PENDING)
615 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_INVALID_REPLY);
616 else
617 dns_transaction_gc(t);
618
619 return 0;
620 }
621
622 static int on_stream_complete(DnsStream *s, int error) {
623 assert(s);
624
625 if (ERRNO_IS_DISCONNECT(error) && s->protocol != DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR) {
626 log_debug_errno(error, "Connection failure for DNS TCP stream: %m");
627
628 if (s->transactions) {
629 DnsTransaction *t;
630
631 t = s->transactions;
632 dns_server_packet_lost(t->server, IPPROTO_TCP, t->current_feature_level);
633 }
634 }
635
636 if (error != 0)
637 LIST_FOREACH(transactions_by_stream, t, s->transactions)
638 on_transaction_stream_error(t, error);
639
640 return 0;
641 }
642
643 static int on_stream_packet(DnsStream *s, DnsPacket *p) {
644 DnsTransaction *t;
645
646 assert(s);
647 assert(s->manager);
648 assert(p);
649
650 t = hashmap_get(s->manager->dns_transactions, UINT_TO_PTR(DNS_PACKET_ID(p)));
651 if (t && t->stream == s) /* Validate that the stream we got this on actually is the stream the
652 * transaction was using. */
653 return dns_transaction_on_stream_packet(t, s, p);
654
655 /* Ignore incorrect transaction id as an old transaction can have been canceled. */
656 log_debug("Received unexpected TCP reply packet with id %" PRIu16 ", ignoring.", DNS_PACKET_ID(p));
657 return 0;
658 }
659
660 static uint16_t dns_transaction_port(DnsTransaction *t) {
661 assert(t);
662
663 if (t->server->port > 0)
664 return t->server->port;
665
666 return DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_IS_TLS(t->current_feature_level) ? 853 : 53;
667 }
668
669 static int dns_transaction_emit_tcp(DnsTransaction *t) {
670 usec_t stream_timeout_usec = DNS_STREAM_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_USEC;
671 _cleanup_(dns_stream_unrefp) DnsStream *s = NULL;
672 _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
673 union sockaddr_union sa;
674 DnsStreamType type;
675 int r;
676
677 assert(t);
678 assert(t->sent);
679
680 dns_transaction_close_connection(t, true);
681
682 switch (t->scope->protocol) {
683
684 case DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS:
685 r = dns_transaction_pick_server(t);
686 if (r < 0)
687 return r;
688
689 if (manager_server_is_stub(t->scope->manager, t->server))
690 return -ELOOP;
691
692 if (!t->bypass) {
693 if (!dns_server_dnssec_supported(t->server) && dns_type_is_dnssec(dns_transaction_key(t)->type))
694 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
695
696 r = dns_server_adjust_opt(t->server, t->sent, t->current_feature_level);
697 if (r < 0)
698 return r;
699 }
700
701 if (t->server->stream && (DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_IS_TLS(t->current_feature_level) == t->server->stream->encrypted))
702 s = dns_stream_ref(t->server->stream);
703 else
704 fd = dns_scope_socket_tcp(t->scope, AF_UNSPEC, NULL, t->server, dns_transaction_port(t), &sa);
705
706 /* Lower timeout in DNS-over-TLS opportunistic mode. In environments where DoT is blocked
707 * without ICMP response overly long delays when contacting DoT servers are nasty, in
708 * particular if multiple DNS servers are defined which we try in turn and all are
709 * blocked. Hence, substantially lower the timeout in that case. */
710 if (DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_IS_TLS(t->current_feature_level) &&
711 dns_server_get_dns_over_tls_mode(t->server) == DNS_OVER_TLS_OPPORTUNISTIC)
712 stream_timeout_usec = DNS_STREAM_OPPORTUNISTIC_TLS_TIMEOUT_USEC;
713
714 type = DNS_STREAM_LOOKUP;
715 break;
716
717 case DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR:
718 /* When we already received a reply to this (but it was truncated), send to its sender address */
719 if (t->received)
720 fd = dns_scope_socket_tcp(t->scope, t->received->family, &t->received->sender, NULL, t->received->sender_port, &sa);
721 else {
722 union in_addr_union address;
723 int family = AF_UNSPEC;
724
725 /* Otherwise, try to talk to the owner of a
726 * the IP address, in case this is a reverse
727 * PTR lookup */
728
729 r = dns_name_address(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t)), &family, &address);
730 if (r < 0)
731 return r;
732 if (r == 0)
733 return -EINVAL;
734 if (family != t->scope->family)
735 return -ESRCH;
736
737 fd = dns_scope_socket_tcp(t->scope, family, &address, NULL, LLMNR_PORT, &sa);
738 }
739
740 type = DNS_STREAM_LLMNR_SEND;
741 break;
742
743 default:
744 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
745 }
746
747 if (!s) {
748 if (fd < 0)
749 return fd;
750
751 r = dns_stream_new(t->scope->manager, &s, type, t->scope->protocol, fd, &sa,
752 on_stream_packet, on_stream_complete, stream_timeout_usec);
753 if (r < 0)
754 return r;
755
756 fd = -1;
757
758 #if ENABLE_DNS_OVER_TLS
759 if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS &&
760 DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_IS_TLS(t->current_feature_level)) {
761
762 assert(t->server);
763 r = dnstls_stream_connect_tls(s, t->server);
764 if (r < 0)
765 return r;
766 }
767 #endif
768
769 if (t->server) {
770 dns_server_unref_stream(t->server);
771 s->server = dns_server_ref(t->server);
772 t->server->stream = dns_stream_ref(s);
773 }
774
775 /* The interface index is difficult to determine if we are
776 * connecting to the local host, hence fill this in right away
777 * instead of determining it from the socket */
778 s->ifindex = dns_scope_ifindex(t->scope);
779 }
780
781 t->stream = TAKE_PTR(s);
782 LIST_PREPEND(transactions_by_stream, t->stream->transactions, t);
783
784 r = dns_stream_write_packet(t->stream, t->sent);
785 if (r < 0) {
786 dns_transaction_close_connection(t, /* use_graveyard= */ false);
787 return r;
788 }
789
790 dns_transaction_reset_answer(t);
791
792 t->tried_stream = true;
793
794 return 0;
795 }
796
797 static void dns_transaction_cache_answer(DnsTransaction *t) {
798 assert(t);
799
800 /* For mDNS we cache whenever we get the packet, rather than
801 * in each transaction. */
802 if (!IN_SET(t->scope->protocol, DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS, DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR))
803 return;
804
805 /* Caching disabled? */
806 if (t->scope->manager->enable_cache == DNS_CACHE_MODE_NO)
807 return;
808
809 /* If validation is turned off for this transaction, but DNSSEC is on, then let's not cache this */
810 if (FLAGS_SET(t->query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_NO_VALIDATE) && t->scope->dnssec_mode != DNSSEC_NO)
811 return;
812
813 /* Packet from localhost? */
814 if (!t->scope->manager->cache_from_localhost &&
815 in_addr_is_localhost(t->received->family, &t->received->sender) != 0)
816 return;
817
818 dns_cache_put(&t->scope->cache,
819 t->scope->manager->enable_cache,
820 t->scope->protocol,
821 dns_transaction_key(t),
822 t->answer_rcode,
823 t->answer,
824 DNS_PACKET_CD(t->received) ? t->received : NULL, /* only cache full packets with CD on,
825 * since our usecase for caching them
826 * is "bypass" mode which is only
827 * enabled for CD packets. */
828 t->answer_query_flags,
829 t->answer_dnssec_result,
830 t->answer_nsec_ttl,
831 t->received->family,
832 &t->received->sender);
833 }
834
835 static bool dns_transaction_dnssec_is_live(DnsTransaction *t) {
836 DnsTransaction *dt;
837
838 assert(t);
839
840 SET_FOREACH(dt, t->dnssec_transactions)
841 if (DNS_TRANSACTION_IS_LIVE(dt->state))
842 return true;
843
844 return false;
845 }
846
847 static int dns_transaction_dnssec_ready(DnsTransaction *t) {
848 DnsTransaction *dt;
849 int r;
850
851 assert(t);
852
853 /* Checks whether the auxiliary DNSSEC transactions of our transaction have completed, or are still
854 * ongoing. Returns 0, if we aren't ready for the DNSSEC validation, positive if we are. */
855
856 SET_FOREACH(dt, t->dnssec_transactions) {
857
858 switch (dt->state) {
859
860 case DNS_TRANSACTION_NULL:
861 case DNS_TRANSACTION_PENDING:
862 case DNS_TRANSACTION_VALIDATING:
863 /* Still ongoing */
864 return 0;
865
866 case DNS_TRANSACTION_RCODE_FAILURE:
867 if (!IN_SET(dt->answer_rcode, DNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN, DNS_RCODE_SERVFAIL)) {
868 log_debug("Auxiliary DNSSEC RR query failed with rcode=%s.", FORMAT_DNS_RCODE(dt->answer_rcode));
869 goto fail;
870 }
871
872 /* Fall-through: NXDOMAIN/SERVFAIL is good enough for us. This is because some DNS servers
873 * erroneously return NXDOMAIN/SERVFAIL for empty non-terminals (Akamai...) or missing DS
874 * records (Facebook), and we need to handle that nicely, when asking for parent SOA or similar
875 * RRs to make unsigned proofs. */
876
877 case DNS_TRANSACTION_SUCCESS:
878 /* All good. */
879 break;
880
881 case DNS_TRANSACTION_DNSSEC_FAILED:
882 /* We handle DNSSEC failures different from other errors, as we care about the DNSSEC
883 * validation result */
884
885 log_debug("Auxiliary DNSSEC RR query failed validation: %s", dnssec_result_to_string(dt->answer_dnssec_result));
886 t->answer_dnssec_result = dt->answer_dnssec_result; /* Copy error code over */
887 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_DNSSEC_FAILED);
888 return 0;
889
890 default:
891 log_debug("Auxiliary DNSSEC RR query failed with %s", dns_transaction_state_to_string(dt->state));
892 goto fail;
893 }
894 }
895
896 /* All is ready, we can go and validate */
897 return 1;
898
899 fail:
900 /* Some auxiliary DNSSEC transaction failed for some reason. Maybe we learned something about the
901 * server due to this failure, and the feature level is now different? Let's see and restart the
902 * transaction if so. If not, let's propagate the auxiliary failure.
903 *
904 * This is particularly relevant if an auxiliary request figured out that DNSSEC doesn't work, and we
905 * are in permissive DNSSEC mode, and thus should restart things without DNSSEC magic. */
906 r = dns_transaction_maybe_restart(t);
907 if (r < 0)
908 return r;
909 if (r > 0)
910 return 0; /* don't validate just yet, we restarted things */
911
912 t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_FAILED_AUXILIARY;
913 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_DNSSEC_FAILED);
914 return 0;
915 }
916
917 static void dns_transaction_process_dnssec(DnsTransaction *t) {
918 int r;
919
920 assert(t);
921
922 /* Are there ongoing DNSSEC transactions? If so, let's wait for them. */
923 r = dns_transaction_dnssec_ready(t);
924 if (r < 0)
925 goto fail;
926 if (r == 0) /* We aren't ready yet (or one of our auxiliary transactions failed, and we shouldn't validate now */
927 return;
928
929 /* See if we learnt things from the additional DNSSEC transactions, that we didn't know before, and better
930 * restart the lookup immediately. */
931 r = dns_transaction_maybe_restart(t);
932 if (r < 0)
933 goto fail;
934 if (r > 0) /* Transaction got restarted... */
935 return;
936
937 /* All our auxiliary DNSSEC transactions are complete now. Try
938 * to validate our RRset now. */
939 r = dns_transaction_validate_dnssec(t);
940 if (r == -EBADMSG) {
941 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_INVALID_REPLY);
942 return;
943 }
944 if (r < 0)
945 goto fail;
946
947 if (t->answer_dnssec_result == DNSSEC_INCOMPATIBLE_SERVER &&
948 t->scope->dnssec_mode == DNSSEC_YES) {
949
950 /* We are not in automatic downgrade mode, and the server is bad. Let's try a different server, maybe
951 * that works. */
952
953 if (dns_transaction_limited_retry(t))
954 return;
955
956 /* OK, let's give up, apparently all servers we tried didn't work. */
957 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_DNSSEC_FAILED);
958 return;
959 }
960
961 if (!IN_SET(t->answer_dnssec_result,
962 _DNSSEC_RESULT_INVALID, /* No DNSSEC validation enabled */
963 DNSSEC_VALIDATED, /* Answer is signed and validated successfully */
964 DNSSEC_UNSIGNED, /* Answer is right-fully unsigned */
965 DNSSEC_INCOMPATIBLE_SERVER)) { /* Server does not do DNSSEC (Yay, we are downgrade attack vulnerable!) */
966 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_DNSSEC_FAILED);
967 return;
968 }
969
970 if (t->answer_dnssec_result == DNSSEC_INCOMPATIBLE_SERVER)
971 dns_server_warn_downgrade(t->server);
972
973 dns_transaction_cache_answer(t);
974
975 if (t->answer_rcode == DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS)
976 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_SUCCESS);
977 else
978 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_RCODE_FAILURE);
979
980 return;
981
982 fail:
983 dns_transaction_complete_errno(t, r);
984 }
985
986 static int dns_transaction_has_positive_answer(DnsTransaction *t, DnsAnswerFlags *flags) {
987 int r;
988
989 assert(t);
990
991 /* Checks whether the answer is positive, i.e. either a direct
992 * answer to the question, or a CNAME/DNAME for it */
993
994 r = dns_answer_match_key(t->answer, dns_transaction_key(t), flags);
995 if (r != 0)
996 return r;
997
998 r = dns_answer_find_cname_or_dname(t->answer, dns_transaction_key(t), NULL, flags);
999 if (r != 0)
1000 return r;
1001
1002 return false;
1003 }
1004
1005 static int dns_transaction_fix_rcode(DnsTransaction *t) {
1006 int r;
1007
1008 assert(t);
1009
1010 /* Fix up the RCODE to SUCCESS if we get at least one matching RR in a response. Note that this contradicts the
1011 * DNS RFCs a bit. Specifically, RFC 6604 Section 3 clarifies that the RCODE shall say something about a
1012 * CNAME/DNAME chain element coming after the last chain element contained in the message, and not the first
1013 * one included. However, it also indicates that not all DNS servers implement this correctly. Moreover, when
1014 * using DNSSEC we usually only can prove the first element of a CNAME/DNAME chain anyway, hence let's settle
1015 * on always processing the RCODE as referring to the immediate look-up we do, i.e. the first element of a
1016 * CNAME/DNAME chain. This way, we uniformly handle CNAME/DNAME chains, regardless if the DNS server
1017 * incorrectly implements RCODE, whether DNSSEC is in use, or whether the DNS server only supplied us with an
1018 * incomplete CNAME/DNAME chain.
1019 *
1020 * Or in other words: if we get at least one positive reply in a message we patch NXDOMAIN to become SUCCESS,
1021 * and then rely on the CNAME chasing logic to figure out that there's actually a CNAME error with a new
1022 * lookup. */
1023
1024 if (t->answer_rcode != DNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN)
1025 return 0;
1026
1027 r = dns_transaction_has_positive_answer(t, NULL);
1028 if (r <= 0)
1029 return r;
1030
1031 t->answer_rcode = DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS;
1032 return 0;
1033 }
1034
1035 void dns_transaction_process_reply(DnsTransaction *t, DnsPacket *p, bool encrypted) {
1036 bool retry_with_tcp = false;
1037 int r;
1038
1039 assert(t);
1040 assert(p);
1041 assert(t->scope);
1042 assert(t->scope->manager);
1043
1044 if (t->state != DNS_TRANSACTION_PENDING)
1045 return;
1046
1047 /* Note that this call might invalidate the query. Callers
1048 * should hence not attempt to access the query or transaction
1049 * after calling this function. */
1050
1051 log_debug("Processing incoming packet of size %zu on transaction %" PRIu16" (rcode=%s).",
1052 p->size,
1053 t->id, FORMAT_DNS_RCODE(DNS_PACKET_RCODE(p)));
1054
1055 switch (t->scope->protocol) {
1056
1057 case DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR:
1058 /* For LLMNR we will not accept any packets from other interfaces */
1059
1060 if (p->ifindex != dns_scope_ifindex(t->scope))
1061 return;
1062
1063 if (p->family != t->scope->family)
1064 return;
1065
1066 /* Tentative packets are not full responses but still
1067 * useful for identifying uniqueness conflicts during
1068 * probing. */
1069 if (DNS_PACKET_LLMNR_T(p)) {
1070 dns_transaction_tentative(t, p);
1071 return;
1072 }
1073
1074 break;
1075
1076 case DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS:
1077 /* For mDNS we will not accept any packets from other interfaces */
1078
1079 if (p->ifindex != dns_scope_ifindex(t->scope))
1080 return;
1081
1082 if (p->family != t->scope->family)
1083 return;
1084
1085 break;
1086
1087 case DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS:
1088 /* Note that we do not need to verify the
1089 * addresses/port numbers of incoming traffic, as we
1090 * invoked connect() on our UDP socket in which case
1091 * the kernel already does the needed verification for
1092 * us. */
1093 break;
1094
1095 default:
1096 assert_not_reached();
1097 }
1098
1099 if (t->received != p)
1100 DNS_PACKET_REPLACE(t->received, dns_packet_ref(p));
1101
1102 t->answer_source = DNS_TRANSACTION_NETWORK;
1103
1104 if (p->ipproto == IPPROTO_TCP) {
1105 if (DNS_PACKET_TC(p)) {
1106 /* Truncated via TCP? Somebody must be fucking with us */
1107 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_INVALID_REPLY);
1108 return;
1109 }
1110
1111 if (DNS_PACKET_ID(p) != t->id) {
1112 /* Not the reply to our query? Somebody must be fucking with us */
1113 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_INVALID_REPLY);
1114 return;
1115 }
1116 }
1117
1118 switch (t->scope->protocol) {
1119
1120 case DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS:
1121 assert(t->server);
1122
1123 if (!t->bypass &&
1124 IN_SET(DNS_PACKET_RCODE(p), DNS_RCODE_FORMERR, DNS_RCODE_SERVFAIL, DNS_RCODE_NOTIMP)) {
1125
1126 /* Request failed, immediately try again with reduced features */
1127
1128 if (t->current_feature_level <= DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_UDP) {
1129
1130 /* This was already at UDP feature level? If so, it doesn't make sense to downgrade
1131 * this transaction anymore, but let's see if it might make sense to send the request
1132 * to a different DNS server instead. If not let's process the response, and accept the
1133 * rcode. Note that we don't retry on TCP, since that's a suitable way to mitigate
1134 * packet loss, but is not going to give us better rcodes should we actually have
1135 * managed to get them already at UDP level. */
1136
1137 if (dns_transaction_limited_retry(t))
1138 return;
1139
1140 /* Give up, accept the rcode */
1141 log_debug("Server returned error: %s", FORMAT_DNS_RCODE(DNS_PACKET_RCODE(p)));
1142 break;
1143 }
1144
1145 /* SERVFAIL can happen for many reasons and may be transient.
1146 * To avoid unnecessary downgrades retry once with the initial level.
1147 * Check for clamp_feature_level_servfail having an invalid value as a sign that this is the
1148 * first attempt to downgrade. If so, clamp to the current value so that the transaction
1149 * is retried without actually downgrading. If the next try also fails we will downgrade by
1150 * hitting the else branch below. */
1151 if (DNS_PACKET_RCODE(p) == DNS_RCODE_SERVFAIL &&
1152 t->clamp_feature_level_servfail < 0) {
1153 t->clamp_feature_level_servfail = t->current_feature_level;
1154 log_debug("Server returned error %s, retrying transaction.",
1155 FORMAT_DNS_RCODE(DNS_PACKET_RCODE(p)));
1156 } else {
1157 /* Reduce this feature level by one and try again. */
1158 switch (t->current_feature_level) {
1159 case DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_TLS_DO:
1160 t->clamp_feature_level_servfail = DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_TLS_PLAIN;
1161 break;
1162 case DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_TLS_PLAIN + 1:
1163 /* Skip plain TLS when TLS is not supported */
1164 t->clamp_feature_level_servfail = DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_TLS_PLAIN - 1;
1165 break;
1166 default:
1167 t->clamp_feature_level_servfail = t->current_feature_level - 1;
1168 }
1169
1170 log_debug("Server returned error %s, retrying transaction with reduced feature level %s.",
1171 FORMAT_DNS_RCODE(DNS_PACKET_RCODE(p)),
1172 dns_server_feature_level_to_string(t->clamp_feature_level_servfail));
1173 }
1174
1175 dns_transaction_retry(t, false /* use the same server */);
1176 return;
1177 }
1178
1179 if (DNS_PACKET_RCODE(p) == DNS_RCODE_REFUSED) {
1180 /* This server refused our request? If so, try again, use a different server */
1181 log_debug("Server returned REFUSED, switching servers, and retrying.");
1182
1183 if (dns_transaction_limited_retry(t))
1184 return;
1185
1186 break;
1187 }
1188
1189 if (DNS_PACKET_TC(p))
1190 dns_server_packet_truncated(t->server, t->current_feature_level);
1191
1192 break;
1193
1194 case DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR:
1195 case DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS:
1196 dns_scope_packet_received(t->scope, p->timestamp - t->start_usec);
1197 break;
1198
1199 default:
1200 assert_not_reached();
1201 }
1202
1203 if (DNS_PACKET_TC(p)) {
1204
1205 /* Truncated packets for mDNS are not allowed. Give up immediately. */
1206 if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS) {
1207 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_INVALID_REPLY);
1208 return;
1209 }
1210
1211 /* Response was truncated, let's try again with good old TCP */
1212 log_debug("Reply truncated, retrying via TCP.");
1213 retry_with_tcp = true;
1214
1215 } else if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS &&
1216 DNS_PACKET_IS_FRAGMENTED(p)) {
1217
1218 /* Report the fragment size, so that we downgrade from LARGE to regular EDNS0 if needed */
1219 if (t->server)
1220 dns_server_packet_udp_fragmented(t->server, dns_packet_size_unfragmented(p));
1221
1222 if (t->current_feature_level > DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_UDP) {
1223 /* Packet was fragmented. Let's retry with TCP to avoid fragmentation attack
1224 * issues. (We don't do that on the lowest feature level however, since crappy DNS
1225 * servers often do not implement TCP, hence falling back to TCP on fragmentation is
1226 * counter-productive there.) */
1227
1228 log_debug("Reply fragmented, retrying via TCP. (Largest fragment size: %zu; Datagram size: %zu)",
1229 p->fragsize, p->size);
1230 retry_with_tcp = true;
1231 }
1232 }
1233
1234 if (retry_with_tcp) {
1235 r = dns_transaction_emit_tcp(t);
1236 if (r == -ESRCH) {
1237 /* No servers found? Damn! */
1238 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_NO_SERVERS);
1239 return;
1240 }
1241 if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
1242 /* Tried to ask for DNSSEC RRs, on a server that doesn't do DNSSEC */
1243 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_RR_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED);
1244 return;
1245 }
1246 if (r < 0) {
1247 /* On LLMNR, if we cannot connect to the host,
1248 * we immediately give up */
1249 if (t->scope->protocol != DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS)
1250 goto fail;
1251
1252 /* On DNS, couldn't send? Try immediately again, with a new server */
1253 if (dns_transaction_limited_retry(t))
1254 return;
1255
1256 /* No new server to try, give up */
1257 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_ATTEMPTS_MAX_REACHED);
1258 }
1259
1260 return;
1261 }
1262
1263 /* After the superficial checks, actually parse the message. */
1264 r = dns_packet_extract(p);
1265 if (r < 0) {
1266 if (t->server) {
1267 dns_server_packet_invalid(t->server, t->current_feature_level);
1268
1269 r = dns_transaction_maybe_restart(t);
1270 if (r < 0)
1271 goto fail;
1272 if (r > 0) /* Transaction got restarted... */
1273 return;
1274 }
1275
1276 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_INVALID_REPLY);
1277 return;
1278 }
1279
1280 if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS &&
1281 !t->bypass &&
1282 DNS_PACKET_RCODE(p) == DNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN &&
1283 p->opt && !DNS_PACKET_DO(p) &&
1284 DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_IS_EDNS0(t->current_feature_level) &&
1285 DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_IS_UDP(t->current_feature_level) &&
1286 t->scope->dnssec_mode != DNSSEC_YES) {
1287
1288 /* Some captive portals are special in that the Aruba/Datavalet hardware will miss
1289 * replacing the packets with the local server IP to point to the authenticated side
1290 * of the network if EDNS0 is enabled. Instead they return NXDOMAIN, with DO bit set
1291 * to zero... nothing to see here, yet respond with the captive portal IP, when using
1292 * the more simple UDP level.
1293 *
1294 * Common portal names that fail like so are:
1295 * secure.datavalet.io
1296 * securelogin.arubanetworks.com
1297 * securelogin.networks.mycompany.com
1298 *
1299 * Thus retry NXDOMAIN RCODES with a lower feature level.
1300 *
1301 * Do not lower the server's tracked feature level, as the captive portal should not
1302 * be lying for the wider internet (e.g. _other_ queries were observed fine with
1303 * EDNS0 on these networks, post auth), i.e. let's just lower the level transaction's
1304 * feature level.
1305 *
1306 * This is reported as https://github.com/dns-violations/dns-violations/blob/master/2018/DVE-2018-0001.md
1307 */
1308
1309 t->clamp_feature_level_nxdomain = DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_UDP;
1310
1311 log_debug("Server returned error %s in EDNS0 mode, retrying transaction with reduced feature level %s (DVE-2018-0001 mitigation)",
1312 FORMAT_DNS_RCODE(DNS_PACKET_RCODE(p)),
1313 dns_server_feature_level_to_string(t->clamp_feature_level_nxdomain));
1314
1315 dns_transaction_retry(t, false /* use the same server */);
1316 return;
1317 }
1318
1319 if (t->server) {
1320 /* Report that we successfully received a valid packet with a good rcode after we initially got a bad
1321 * rcode and subsequently downgraded the protocol */
1322
1323 if (IN_SET(DNS_PACKET_RCODE(p), DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS, DNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN) &&
1324 t->clamp_feature_level_servfail != _DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_INVALID)
1325 dns_server_packet_rcode_downgrade(t->server, t->clamp_feature_level_servfail);
1326
1327 /* Report that the OPT RR was missing */
1328 if (!p->opt)
1329 dns_server_packet_bad_opt(t->server, t->current_feature_level);
1330
1331 /* Report that the server didn't copy our query DO bit from request to response */
1332 if (DNS_PACKET_DO(t->sent) && !DNS_PACKET_DO(t->received))
1333 dns_server_packet_do_off(t->server, t->current_feature_level);
1334
1335 /* Report that we successfully received a packet. We keep track of the largest packet
1336 * size/fragment size we got. Which is useful for announcing the EDNS(0) packet size we can
1337 * receive to our server. */
1338 dns_server_packet_received(t->server, p->ipproto, t->current_feature_level, dns_packet_size_unfragmented(p));
1339 }
1340
1341 /* See if we know things we didn't know before that indicate we better restart the lookup immediately. */
1342 r = dns_transaction_maybe_restart(t);
1343 if (r < 0)
1344 goto fail;
1345 if (r > 0) /* Transaction got restarted... */
1346 return;
1347
1348 /* When dealing with protocols other than mDNS only consider responses with equivalent query section
1349 * to the request. For mDNS this check doesn't make sense, because the section 6 of RFC6762 states
1350 * that "Multicast DNS responses MUST NOT contain any questions in the Question Section". */
1351 if (t->scope->protocol != DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS) {
1352 r = dns_packet_is_reply_for(p, dns_transaction_key(t));
1353 if (r < 0)
1354 goto fail;
1355 if (r == 0) {
1356 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_INVALID_REPLY);
1357 return;
1358 }
1359 }
1360
1361 /* Install the answer as answer to the transaction. We ref the answer twice here: the main `answer`
1362 * field is later replaced by the DNSSEC validated subset. The 'answer_auxiliary' field carries the
1363 * original complete record set, including RRSIG and friends. We use this when passing data to
1364 * clients that ask for DNSSEC metadata. */
1365 DNS_ANSWER_REPLACE(t->answer, dns_answer_ref(p->answer));
1366 t->answer_rcode = DNS_PACKET_RCODE(p);
1367 t->answer_dnssec_result = _DNSSEC_RESULT_INVALID;
1368 SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED, false);
1369 SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_CONFIDENTIAL, encrypted);
1370
1371 r = dns_transaction_fix_rcode(t);
1372 if (r < 0)
1373 goto fail;
1374
1375 /* Block GC while starting requests for additional DNSSEC RRs */
1376 t->block_gc++;
1377 r = dns_transaction_request_dnssec_keys(t);
1378 t->block_gc--;
1379
1380 /* Maybe the transaction is ready for GC'ing now? If so, free it and return. */
1381 if (!dns_transaction_gc(t))
1382 return;
1383
1384 /* Requesting additional keys might have resulted in this transaction to fail, since the auxiliary
1385 * request failed for some reason. If so, we are not in pending state anymore, and we should exit
1386 * quickly. */
1387 if (t->state != DNS_TRANSACTION_PENDING)
1388 return;
1389 if (r < 0)
1390 goto fail;
1391 if (r > 0) {
1392 /* There are DNSSEC transactions pending now. Update the state accordingly. */
1393 t->state = DNS_TRANSACTION_VALIDATING;
1394 dns_transaction_close_connection(t, true);
1395 dns_transaction_stop_timeout(t);
1396 return;
1397 }
1398
1399 dns_transaction_process_dnssec(t);
1400 return;
1401
1402 fail:
1403 dns_transaction_complete_errno(t, r);
1404 }
1405
1406 static int on_dns_packet(sd_event_source *s, int fd, uint32_t revents, void *userdata) {
1407 _cleanup_(dns_packet_unrefp) DnsPacket *p = NULL;
1408 DnsTransaction *t = ASSERT_PTR(userdata);
1409 int r;
1410
1411 assert(t->scope);
1412
1413 r = manager_recv(t->scope->manager, fd, DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS, &p);
1414 if (ERRNO_IS_DISCONNECT(r)) {
1415 usec_t usec;
1416
1417 /* UDP connection failures get reported via ICMP and then are possibly delivered to us on the
1418 * next recvmsg(). Treat this like a lost packet. */
1419
1420 log_debug_errno(r, "Connection failure for DNS UDP packet: %m");
1421 assert_se(sd_event_now(t->scope->manager->event, CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &usec) >= 0);
1422 dns_server_packet_lost(t->server, IPPROTO_UDP, t->current_feature_level);
1423
1424 dns_transaction_close_connection(t, /* use_graveyard = */ false);
1425
1426 if (dns_transaction_limited_retry(t)) /* Try a different server */
1427 return 0;
1428
1429 dns_transaction_complete_errno(t, r);
1430 return 0;
1431 }
1432 if (r < 0) {
1433 dns_transaction_complete_errno(t, r);
1434 return 0;
1435 }
1436 if (r == 0)
1437 /* Spurious wakeup without any data */
1438 return 0;
1439
1440 r = dns_packet_validate_reply(p);
1441 if (r < 0) {
1442 log_debug_errno(r, "Received invalid DNS packet as response, ignoring: %m");
1443 return 0;
1444 }
1445 if (r == 0) {
1446 log_debug("Received inappropriate DNS packet as response, ignoring.");
1447 return 0;
1448 }
1449
1450 if (DNS_PACKET_ID(p) != t->id) {
1451 log_debug("Received packet with incorrect transaction ID, ignoring.");
1452 return 0;
1453 }
1454
1455 dns_transaction_process_reply(t, p, false);
1456 return 0;
1457 }
1458
1459 static int dns_transaction_emit_udp(DnsTransaction *t) {
1460 int r;
1461
1462 assert(t);
1463
1464 if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS) {
1465
1466 r = dns_transaction_pick_server(t);
1467 if (r < 0)
1468 return r;
1469
1470 if (manager_server_is_stub(t->scope->manager, t->server))
1471 return -ELOOP;
1472
1473 if (t->current_feature_level < DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_UDP || DNS_SERVER_FEATURE_LEVEL_IS_TLS(t->current_feature_level))
1474 return -EAGAIN; /* Sorry, can't do UDP, try TCP! */
1475
1476 if (!t->bypass && !dns_server_dnssec_supported(t->server) && dns_type_is_dnssec(dns_transaction_key(t)->type))
1477 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
1478
1479 if (r > 0 || t->dns_udp_fd < 0) { /* Server changed, or no connection yet. */
1480 int fd;
1481
1482 dns_transaction_close_connection(t, true);
1483
1484 /* Before we allocate a new UDP socket, let's process the graveyard a bit to free some fds */
1485 manager_socket_graveyard_process(t->scope->manager);
1486
1487 fd = dns_scope_socket_udp(t->scope, t->server);
1488 if (fd < 0)
1489 return fd;
1490
1491 r = sd_event_add_io(t->scope->manager->event, &t->dns_udp_event_source, fd, EPOLLIN, on_dns_packet, t);
1492 if (r < 0) {
1493 safe_close(fd);
1494 return r;
1495 }
1496
1497 (void) sd_event_source_set_description(t->dns_udp_event_source, "dns-transaction-udp");
1498 t->dns_udp_fd = fd;
1499 }
1500
1501 if (!t->bypass) {
1502 r = dns_server_adjust_opt(t->server, t->sent, t->current_feature_level);
1503 if (r < 0)
1504 return r;
1505 }
1506 } else
1507 dns_transaction_close_connection(t, true);
1508
1509 r = dns_scope_emit_udp(t->scope, t->dns_udp_fd, t->server ? t->server->family : AF_UNSPEC, t->sent);
1510 if (r < 0)
1511 return r;
1512
1513 dns_transaction_reset_answer(t);
1514
1515 return 0;
1516 }
1517
1518 static int on_transaction_timeout(sd_event_source *s, usec_t usec, void *userdata) {
1519 DnsTransaction *t = ASSERT_PTR(userdata);
1520
1521 assert(s);
1522
1523 if (t->initial_jitter_scheduled && !t->initial_jitter_elapsed) {
1524 log_debug("Initial jitter phase for transaction %" PRIu16 " elapsed.", t->id);
1525 t->initial_jitter_elapsed = true;
1526 } else {
1527 /* Timeout reached? Increase the timeout for the server used */
1528 switch (t->scope->protocol) {
1529
1530 case DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS:
1531 assert(t->server);
1532 dns_server_packet_lost(t->server, t->stream ? IPPROTO_TCP : IPPROTO_UDP, t->current_feature_level);
1533 break;
1534
1535 case DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR:
1536 case DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS:
1537 dns_scope_packet_lost(t->scope, usec - t->start_usec);
1538 break;
1539
1540 default:
1541 assert_not_reached();
1542 }
1543
1544 log_debug("Timeout reached on transaction %" PRIu16 ".", t->id);
1545 }
1546
1547 dns_transaction_retry(t, /* next_server= */ true); /* try a different server, but given this means
1548 * packet loss, let's do so even if we already
1549 * tried a bunch */
1550 return 0;
1551 }
1552
1553 static int dns_transaction_setup_timeout(
1554 DnsTransaction *t,
1555 usec_t timeout_usec /* relative */,
1556 usec_t next_usec /* CLOCK_BOOTTIME */) {
1557
1558 int r;
1559
1560 assert(t);
1561
1562 dns_transaction_stop_timeout(t);
1563
1564 r = sd_event_add_time_relative(
1565 t->scope->manager->event,
1566 &t->timeout_event_source,
1567 CLOCK_BOOTTIME,
1568 timeout_usec, 0,
1569 on_transaction_timeout, t);
1570 if (r < 0)
1571 return r;
1572
1573 (void) sd_event_source_set_description(t->timeout_event_source, "dns-transaction-timeout");
1574
1575 t->next_attempt_after = next_usec;
1576 t->state = DNS_TRANSACTION_PENDING;
1577 return 0;
1578 }
1579
1580 static usec_t transaction_get_resend_timeout(DnsTransaction *t) {
1581 assert(t);
1582 assert(t->scope);
1583
1584 switch (t->scope->protocol) {
1585
1586 case DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS:
1587
1588 /* When we do TCP, grant a much longer timeout, as in this case there's no need for us to quickly
1589 * resend, as the kernel does that anyway for us, and we really don't want to interrupt it in that
1590 * needlessly. */
1591 if (t->stream)
1592 return TRANSACTION_TCP_TIMEOUT_USEC;
1593
1594 return DNS_TIMEOUT_USEC;
1595
1596 case DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS:
1597 if (t->probing)
1598 return MDNS_PROBING_INTERVAL_USEC;
1599
1600 /* See RFC 6762 Section 5.1 suggests that timeout should be a few seconds. */
1601 assert(t->n_attempts > 0);
1602 return (1 << (t->n_attempts - 1)) * USEC_PER_SEC;
1603
1604 case DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR:
1605 return t->scope->resend_timeout;
1606
1607 default:
1608 assert_not_reached();
1609 }
1610 }
1611
1612 static void dns_transaction_randomize_answer(DnsTransaction *t) {
1613 int r;
1614
1615 assert(t);
1616
1617 /* Randomizes the order of the answer array. This is done for all cached responses, so that we return
1618 * a different order each time. We do this only for DNS traffic, in order to do some minimal, crappy
1619 * load balancing. We don't do this for LLMNR or mDNS, since the order (preferring link-local
1620 * addresses, and such like) might have meaning there, and load balancing is pointless. */
1621
1622 if (t->scope->protocol != DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS)
1623 return;
1624
1625 /* No point in randomizing, if there's just one RR */
1626 if (dns_answer_size(t->answer) <= 1)
1627 return;
1628
1629 r = dns_answer_reserve_or_clone(&t->answer, 0);
1630 if (r < 0) /* If this fails, just don't randomize, this is non-essential stuff after all */
1631 return (void) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to clone answer record, not randomizing RR order of answer: %m");
1632
1633 dns_answer_randomize(t->answer);
1634 }
1635
1636 static int dns_transaction_prepare(DnsTransaction *t, usec_t ts) {
1637 int r;
1638
1639 assert(t);
1640
1641 /* Returns 0 if dns_transaction_complete() has been called. In that case the transaction and query
1642 * candidate objects may have been invalidated and must not be accessed. Returns 1 if the transaction
1643 * has been prepared. */
1644
1645 dns_transaction_stop_timeout(t);
1646
1647 if (!dns_scope_network_good(t->scope)) {
1648 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_NETWORK_DOWN);
1649 return 0;
1650 }
1651
1652 if (t->n_attempts >= TRANSACTION_ATTEMPTS_MAX(t->scope->protocol)) {
1653 DnsTransactionState result;
1654
1655 if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR)
1656 /* If we didn't find anything on LLMNR, it's not an error, but a failure to resolve
1657 * the name. */
1658 result = DNS_TRANSACTION_NOT_FOUND;
1659 else
1660 result = DNS_TRANSACTION_ATTEMPTS_MAX_REACHED;
1661
1662 dns_transaction_complete(t, result);
1663 return 0;
1664 }
1665
1666 if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR && t->tried_stream) {
1667 /* If we already tried via a stream, then we don't
1668 * retry on LLMNR. See RFC 4795, Section 2.7. */
1669 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_ATTEMPTS_MAX_REACHED);
1670 return 0;
1671 }
1672
1673 t->n_attempts++;
1674 t->start_usec = ts;
1675
1676 dns_transaction_reset_answer(t);
1677 dns_transaction_flush_dnssec_transactions(t);
1678
1679 /* Check the trust anchor. Do so only on classic DNS, since DNSSEC does not apply otherwise. */
1680 if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS &&
1681 !FLAGS_SET(t->query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_NO_TRUST_ANCHOR)) {
1682 r = dns_trust_anchor_lookup_positive(&t->scope->manager->trust_anchor, dns_transaction_key(t), &t->answer);
1683 if (r < 0)
1684 return r;
1685 if (r > 0) {
1686 t->answer_rcode = DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS;
1687 t->answer_source = DNS_TRANSACTION_TRUST_ANCHOR;
1688 SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED|SD_RESOLVED_CONFIDENTIAL, true);
1689 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_SUCCESS);
1690 return 0;
1691 }
1692
1693 if (dns_name_is_root(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t))) &&
1694 dns_transaction_key(t)->type == DNS_TYPE_DS) {
1695
1696 /* Hmm, this is a request for the root DS? A DS RR doesn't exist in the root zone,
1697 * and if our trust anchor didn't know it either, this means we cannot do any DNSSEC
1698 * logic anymore. */
1699
1700 if (t->scope->dnssec_mode == DNSSEC_ALLOW_DOWNGRADE) {
1701 /* We are in downgrade mode. In this case, synthesize an unsigned empty
1702 * response, so that the any lookup depending on this one can continue
1703 * assuming there was no DS, and hence the root zone was unsigned. */
1704
1705 t->answer_rcode = DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS;
1706 t->answer_source = DNS_TRANSACTION_TRUST_ANCHOR;
1707 SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED, false);
1708 SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_CONFIDENTIAL, true);
1709 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_SUCCESS);
1710 } else
1711 /* If we are not in downgrade mode, then fail the lookup, because we cannot
1712 * reasonably answer it. There might be DS RRs, but we don't know them, and
1713 * the DNS server won't tell them to us (and even if it would, we couldn't
1714 * validate and trust them. */
1715 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_NO_TRUST_ANCHOR);
1716
1717 return 0;
1718 }
1719 }
1720
1721 /* Check the zone. */
1722 if (!FLAGS_SET(t->query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_NO_ZONE)) {
1723 r = dns_zone_lookup(&t->scope->zone, dns_transaction_key(t), dns_scope_ifindex(t->scope), &t->answer, NULL, NULL);
1724 if (r < 0)
1725 return r;
1726 if (r > 0) {
1727 t->answer_rcode = DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS;
1728 t->answer_source = DNS_TRANSACTION_ZONE;
1729 SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED|SD_RESOLVED_CONFIDENTIAL, true);
1730 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_SUCCESS);
1731 return 0;
1732 }
1733 }
1734
1735 /* Check the cache. */
1736 if (!FLAGS_SET(t->query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_NO_CACHE)) {
1737
1738 /* Before trying the cache, let's make sure we figured out a server to use. Should this cause
1739 * a change of server this might flush the cache. */
1740 (void) dns_scope_get_dns_server(t->scope);
1741
1742 /* Let's then prune all outdated entries */
1743 dns_cache_prune(&t->scope->cache);
1744
1745 r = dns_cache_lookup(
1746 &t->scope->cache,
1747 dns_transaction_key(t),
1748 t->query_flags,
1749 &t->answer_rcode,
1750 &t->answer,
1751 &t->received,
1752 &t->answer_query_flags,
1753 &t->answer_dnssec_result);
1754 if (r < 0)
1755 return r;
1756 if (r > 0) {
1757 dns_transaction_randomize_answer(t);
1758
1759 if (t->bypass && t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS && !t->received)
1760 /* When bypass mode is on, do not use cached data unless it came with a full
1761 * packet. */
1762 dns_transaction_reset_answer(t);
1763 else {
1764 t->answer_source = DNS_TRANSACTION_CACHE;
1765 if (t->answer_rcode == DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS)
1766 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_SUCCESS);
1767 else
1768 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_RCODE_FAILURE);
1769 return 0;
1770 }
1771 }
1772 }
1773
1774 if (FLAGS_SET(t->query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_NO_NETWORK)) {
1775 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_NO_SOURCE);
1776 return 0;
1777 }
1778
1779 return 1;
1780 }
1781
1782 static int dns_packet_append_zone(DnsPacket *p, DnsTransaction *t, DnsResourceKey *k, unsigned *nscount) {
1783 _cleanup_(dns_answer_unrefp) DnsAnswer *answer = NULL;
1784 bool tentative;
1785 int r;
1786
1787 assert(p);
1788 assert(t);
1789 assert(k);
1790
1791 if (k->type != DNS_TYPE_ANY)
1792 return 0;
1793
1794 r = dns_zone_lookup(&t->scope->zone, k, t->scope->link->ifindex, &answer, NULL, &tentative);
1795 if (r < 0)
1796 return r;
1797
1798 return dns_packet_append_answer(p, answer, nscount);
1799 }
1800
1801 static int dns_transaction_make_packet_mdns(DnsTransaction *t) {
1802 _cleanup_(dns_packet_unrefp) DnsPacket *p = NULL;
1803 _cleanup_set_free_ Set *keys = NULL;
1804 unsigned qdcount, ancount = 0 /* avoid false maybe-uninitialized warning */, nscount;
1805 bool add_known_answers = false;
1806 usec_t ts;
1807 int r;
1808
1809 assert(t);
1810 assert(t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS);
1811
1812 /* Discard any previously prepared packet, so we can start over and coalesce again */
1813 t->sent = dns_packet_unref(t->sent);
1814
1815 /* First, create a dummy packet to calculate packet size. */
1816 r = dns_packet_new_query(&p, t->scope->protocol, 0, false);
1817 if (r < 0)
1818 return r;
1819
1820 r = dns_packet_append_key(p, dns_transaction_key(t), 0, NULL);
1821 if (r < 0)
1822 return r;
1823
1824 qdcount = 1;
1825
1826 if (dns_key_is_shared(dns_transaction_key(t)))
1827 add_known_answers = true;
1828
1829 r = dns_packet_append_zone(p, t, dns_transaction_key(t), NULL);
1830 if (r < 0)
1831 return r;
1832
1833 /* Save appended keys */
1834 r = set_ensure_put(&keys, &dns_resource_key_hash_ops, dns_transaction_key(t));
1835 if (r < 0)
1836 return r;
1837
1838 /*
1839 * For mDNS, we want to coalesce as many open queries in pending transactions into one single
1840 * query packet on the wire as possible. To achieve that, we iterate through all pending transactions
1841 * in our current scope, and see whether their timing constraints allow them to be sent.
1842 */
1843
1844 assert_se(sd_event_now(t->scope->manager->event, CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &ts) >= 0);
1845
1846 for (bool restart = true; restart;) {
1847 restart = false;
1848 LIST_FOREACH(transactions_by_scope, other, t->scope->transactions) {
1849 size_t saved_packet_size;
1850 bool append = false;
1851
1852 /* Skip ourselves */
1853 if (other == t)
1854 continue;
1855
1856 if (other->state != DNS_TRANSACTION_PENDING)
1857 continue;
1858
1859 if (other->next_attempt_after > ts)
1860 continue;
1861
1862 if (!set_contains(keys, dns_transaction_key(other))) {
1863 r = dns_packet_append_key(p, dns_transaction_key(other), 0, &saved_packet_size);
1864 /* If we can't stuff more questions into the packet, just give up.
1865 * One of the 'other' transactions will fire later and take care of the rest. */
1866 if (r == -EMSGSIZE)
1867 break;
1868 if (r < 0)
1869 return r;
1870
1871 r = dns_packet_append_zone(p, t, dns_transaction_key(other), NULL);
1872 if (r == -EMSGSIZE)
1873 break;
1874 if (r < 0)
1875 return r;
1876
1877 append = true;
1878 }
1879
1880 r = dns_transaction_prepare(other, ts);
1881 if (r < 0)
1882 return r;
1883 if (r == 0) {
1884 if (append)
1885 dns_packet_truncate(p, saved_packet_size);
1886
1887 /* In this case, not only this transaction, but multiple transactions may be
1888 * freed. Hence, we need to restart the loop. */
1889 restart = true;
1890 break;
1891 }
1892
1893 usec_t timeout = transaction_get_resend_timeout(other);
1894 r = dns_transaction_setup_timeout(other, timeout, usec_add(ts, timeout));
1895 if (r < 0)
1896 return r;
1897
1898 if (dns_key_is_shared(dns_transaction_key(other)))
1899 add_known_answers = true;
1900
1901 if (append) {
1902 r = set_ensure_put(&keys, &dns_resource_key_hash_ops, dns_transaction_key(other));
1903 if (r < 0)
1904 return r;
1905 }
1906
1907 qdcount++;
1908 if (qdcount >= UINT16_MAX)
1909 break;
1910 }
1911 }
1912
1913 /* Append known answer section if we're asking for any shared record */
1914 if (add_known_answers) {
1915 r = dns_cache_export_shared_to_packet(&t->scope->cache, p, ts, 0);
1916 if (r < 0)
1917 return r;
1918
1919 ancount = be16toh(DNS_PACKET_HEADER(p)->ancount);
1920 }
1921
1922 /* Then, create actual packet. */
1923 p = dns_packet_unref(p);
1924 r = dns_packet_new_query(&p, t->scope->protocol, 0, false);
1925 if (r < 0)
1926 return r;
1927
1928 /* Questions */
1929 DnsResourceKey *k;
1930 SET_FOREACH(k, keys) {
1931 r = dns_packet_append_key(p, k, 0, NULL);
1932 if (r < 0)
1933 return r;
1934 }
1935 DNS_PACKET_HEADER(p)->qdcount = htobe16(qdcount);
1936
1937 /* Known answers */
1938 if (add_known_answers) {
1939 r = dns_cache_export_shared_to_packet(&t->scope->cache, p, ts, ancount);
1940 if (r < 0)
1941 return r;
1942 }
1943
1944 /* Authorities */
1945 nscount = 0;
1946 SET_FOREACH(k, keys) {
1947 r = dns_packet_append_zone(p, t, k, &nscount);
1948 if (r < 0)
1949 return r;
1950 }
1951 DNS_PACKET_HEADER(p)->nscount = htobe16(nscount);
1952
1953 t->sent = TAKE_PTR(p);
1954 return 0;
1955 }
1956
1957 static int dns_transaction_make_packet(DnsTransaction *t) {
1958 _cleanup_(dns_packet_unrefp) DnsPacket *p = NULL;
1959 int r;
1960
1961 assert(t);
1962
1963 if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS)
1964 return dns_transaction_make_packet_mdns(t);
1965
1966 if (t->sent)
1967 return 0;
1968
1969 if (t->bypass && t->bypass->protocol == t->scope->protocol) {
1970 /* If bypass logic is enabled and the protocol if the original packet and our scope match,
1971 * take the original packet, copy it, and patch in our new ID */
1972 r = dns_packet_dup(&p, t->bypass);
1973 if (r < 0)
1974 return r;
1975 } else {
1976 r = dns_packet_new_query(
1977 &p, t->scope->protocol,
1978 /* min_alloc_dsize = */ 0,
1979 /* dnssec_cd = */ !FLAGS_SET(t->query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_NO_VALIDATE) &&
1980 t->scope->dnssec_mode != DNSSEC_NO);
1981 if (r < 0)
1982 return r;
1983
1984 r = dns_packet_append_key(p, dns_transaction_key(t), 0, NULL);
1985 if (r < 0)
1986 return r;
1987
1988 DNS_PACKET_HEADER(p)->qdcount = htobe16(1);
1989 }
1990
1991 DNS_PACKET_HEADER(p)->id = t->id;
1992
1993 t->sent = TAKE_PTR(p);
1994 return 0;
1995 }
1996
1997 int dns_transaction_go(DnsTransaction *t) {
1998 usec_t ts;
1999 int r;
2000 char key_str[DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_STRING_MAX];
2001
2002 assert(t);
2003
2004 /* Returns > 0 if the transaction is now pending, returns 0 if could be processed immediately and has
2005 * finished now. In the latter case, the transaction and query candidate objects must not be accessed.
2006 */
2007
2008 assert_se(sd_event_now(t->scope->manager->event, CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &ts) >= 0);
2009
2010 r = dns_transaction_prepare(t, ts);
2011 if (r <= 0)
2012 return r;
2013
2014 log_debug("Firing %s transaction %" PRIu16 " for <%s> scope %s on %s/%s (validate=%s).",
2015 t->bypass ? "bypass" : "regular",
2016 t->id,
2017 dns_resource_key_to_string(dns_transaction_key(t), key_str, sizeof key_str),
2018 dns_protocol_to_string(t->scope->protocol),
2019 t->scope->link ? t->scope->link->ifname : "*",
2020 af_to_name_short(t->scope->family),
2021 yes_no(!FLAGS_SET(t->query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_NO_VALIDATE)));
2022
2023 if (!t->initial_jitter_scheduled &&
2024 IN_SET(t->scope->protocol, DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR, DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS)) {
2025 usec_t jitter;
2026
2027 /* RFC 4795 Section 2.7 suggests all LLMNR queries should be delayed by a random time from 0 to
2028 * JITTER_INTERVAL.
2029 * RFC 6762 Section 8.1 suggests initial probe queries should be delayed by a random time from
2030 * 0 to 250ms. */
2031
2032 t->initial_jitter_scheduled = true;
2033 t->n_attempts = 0;
2034
2035 switch (t->scope->protocol) {
2036
2037 case DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR:
2038 jitter = random_u64_range(LLMNR_JITTER_INTERVAL_USEC);
2039 break;
2040
2041 case DNS_PROTOCOL_MDNS:
2042 if (t->probing)
2043 jitter = random_u64_range(MDNS_PROBING_INTERVAL_USEC);
2044 else
2045 jitter = 0;
2046 break;
2047 default:
2048 assert_not_reached();
2049 }
2050
2051 r = dns_transaction_setup_timeout(t, jitter, ts);
2052 if (r < 0)
2053 return r;
2054
2055 log_debug("Delaying %s transaction %" PRIu16 " for " USEC_FMT "us.",
2056 dns_protocol_to_string(t->scope->protocol),
2057 t->id,
2058 jitter);
2059 return 1;
2060 }
2061
2062 /* Otherwise, we need to ask the network */
2063 r = dns_transaction_make_packet(t);
2064 if (r < 0)
2065 return r;
2066
2067 if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR &&
2068 (dns_name_endswith(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t)), "in-addr.arpa") > 0 ||
2069 dns_name_endswith(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t)), "ip6.arpa") > 0)) {
2070
2071 /* RFC 4795, Section 2.4. says reverse lookups shall
2072 * always be made via TCP on LLMNR */
2073 r = dns_transaction_emit_tcp(t);
2074 } else {
2075 /* Try via UDP, and if that fails due to large size or lack of
2076 * support try via TCP */
2077 r = dns_transaction_emit_udp(t);
2078 if (r == -EMSGSIZE)
2079 log_debug("Sending query via TCP since it is too large.");
2080 else if (r == -EAGAIN)
2081 log_debug("Sending query via TCP since UDP isn't supported or DNS-over-TLS is selected.");
2082 if (IN_SET(r, -EMSGSIZE, -EAGAIN))
2083 r = dns_transaction_emit_tcp(t);
2084 }
2085 if (r == -ELOOP) {
2086 if (t->scope->protocol != DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS)
2087 return r;
2088
2089 /* One of our own stub listeners */
2090 log_debug_errno(r, "Detected that specified DNS server is our own extra listener, switching DNS servers.");
2091
2092 dns_scope_next_dns_server(t->scope, t->server);
2093
2094 if (dns_scope_get_dns_server(t->scope) == t->server) {
2095 log_debug_errno(r, "Still pointing to extra listener after switching DNS servers, refusing operation.");
2096 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_STUB_LOOP);
2097 return 0;
2098 }
2099
2100 return dns_transaction_go(t);
2101 }
2102 if (r == -ESRCH) {
2103 /* No servers to send this to? */
2104 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_NO_SERVERS);
2105 return 0;
2106 }
2107 if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
2108 /* Tried to ask for DNSSEC RRs, on a server that doesn't do DNSSEC */
2109 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_RR_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED);
2110 return 0;
2111 }
2112 if (t->scope->protocol == DNS_PROTOCOL_LLMNR && ERRNO_IS_DISCONNECT(r)) {
2113 /* On LLMNR, if we cannot connect to a host via TCP when doing reverse lookups. This means we cannot
2114 * answer this request with this protocol. */
2115 dns_transaction_complete(t, DNS_TRANSACTION_NOT_FOUND);
2116 return 0;
2117 }
2118 if (r < 0) {
2119 if (t->scope->protocol != DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS)
2120 return r;
2121
2122 /* Couldn't send? Try immediately again, with a new server */
2123 dns_scope_next_dns_server(t->scope, t->server);
2124
2125 return dns_transaction_go(t);
2126 }
2127
2128 usec_t timeout = transaction_get_resend_timeout(t);
2129 r = dns_transaction_setup_timeout(t, timeout, usec_add(ts, timeout));
2130 if (r < 0)
2131 return r;
2132
2133 return 1;
2134 }
2135
2136 static int dns_transaction_find_cyclic(DnsTransaction *t, DnsTransaction *aux) {
2137 DnsTransaction *n;
2138 int r;
2139
2140 assert(t);
2141 assert(aux);
2142
2143 /* Try to find cyclic dependencies between transaction objects */
2144
2145 if (t == aux)
2146 return 1;
2147
2148 SET_FOREACH(n, aux->dnssec_transactions) {
2149 r = dns_transaction_find_cyclic(t, n);
2150 if (r != 0)
2151 return r;
2152 }
2153
2154 return 0;
2155 }
2156
2157 static int dns_transaction_add_dnssec_transaction(DnsTransaction *t, DnsResourceKey *key, DnsTransaction **ret) {
2158 _cleanup_(dns_transaction_gcp) DnsTransaction *aux = NULL;
2159 int r;
2160
2161 assert(t);
2162 assert(ret);
2163 assert(key);
2164
2165 aux = dns_scope_find_transaction(t->scope, key, t->query_flags);
2166 if (!aux) {
2167 r = dns_transaction_new(&aux, t->scope, key, NULL, t->query_flags);
2168 if (r < 0)
2169 return r;
2170 } else {
2171 if (set_contains(t->dnssec_transactions, aux)) {
2172 *ret = aux;
2173 return 0;
2174 }
2175
2176 r = dns_transaction_find_cyclic(t, aux);
2177 if (r < 0)
2178 return r;
2179 if (r > 0) {
2180 char s[DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_STRING_MAX], saux[DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_STRING_MAX];
2181
2182 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP),
2183 "Potential cyclic dependency, refusing to add transaction %" PRIu16 " (%s) as dependency for %" PRIu16 " (%s).",
2184 aux->id,
2185 dns_resource_key_to_string(dns_transaction_key(t), s, sizeof s),
2186 t->id,
2187 dns_resource_key_to_string(dns_transaction_key(aux), saux, sizeof saux));
2188 }
2189 }
2190
2191 r = set_ensure_allocated(&aux->notify_transactions_done, NULL);
2192 if (r < 0)
2193 return r;
2194
2195 r = set_ensure_put(&t->dnssec_transactions, NULL, aux);
2196 if (r < 0)
2197 return r;
2198
2199 r = set_ensure_put(&aux->notify_transactions, NULL, t);
2200 if (r < 0) {
2201 (void) set_remove(t->dnssec_transactions, aux);
2202 return r;
2203 }
2204
2205 *ret = TAKE_PTR(aux);
2206 return 1;
2207 }
2208
2209 static int dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr(DnsTransaction *t, DnsResourceKey *key) {
2210 _cleanup_(dns_answer_unrefp) DnsAnswer *a = NULL;
2211 DnsTransaction *aux;
2212 int r;
2213
2214 assert(t);
2215 assert(key);
2216
2217 /* Try to get the data from the trust anchor */
2218 r = dns_trust_anchor_lookup_positive(&t->scope->manager->trust_anchor, key, &a);
2219 if (r < 0)
2220 return r;
2221 if (r > 0) {
2222 r = dns_answer_extend(&t->validated_keys, a);
2223 if (r < 0)
2224 return r;
2225
2226 return 0;
2227 }
2228
2229 /* This didn't work, ask for it via the network/cache then. */
2230 r = dns_transaction_add_dnssec_transaction(t, key, &aux);
2231 if (r == -ELOOP) /* This would result in a cyclic dependency */
2232 return 0;
2233 if (r < 0)
2234 return r;
2235
2236 if (aux->state == DNS_TRANSACTION_NULL) {
2237 r = dns_transaction_go(aux);
2238 if (r < 0)
2239 return r;
2240 }
2241
2242 return 1;
2243 }
2244
2245 static int dns_transaction_negative_trust_anchor_lookup(DnsTransaction *t, const char *name) {
2246 int r;
2247
2248 assert(t);
2249
2250 /* Check whether the specified name is in the NTA
2251 * database, either in the global one, or the link-local
2252 * one. */
2253
2254 r = dns_trust_anchor_lookup_negative(&t->scope->manager->trust_anchor, name);
2255 if (r != 0)
2256 return r;
2257
2258 if (!t->scope->link)
2259 return 0;
2260
2261 return link_negative_trust_anchor_lookup(t->scope->link, name);
2262 }
2263
2264 static int dns_transaction_has_negative_answer(DnsTransaction *t) {
2265 int r;
2266
2267 assert(t);
2268
2269 /* Checks whether the answer is negative, and lacks NSEC/NSEC3
2270 * RRs to prove it */
2271
2272 r = dns_transaction_has_positive_answer(t, NULL);
2273 if (r < 0)
2274 return r;
2275 if (r > 0)
2276 return false;
2277
2278 /* Is this key explicitly listed as a negative trust anchor?
2279 * If so, it's nothing we need to care about */
2280 r = dns_transaction_negative_trust_anchor_lookup(t, dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t)));
2281 if (r < 0)
2282 return r;
2283 return !r;
2284 }
2285
2286 static int dns_transaction_is_primary_response(DnsTransaction *t, DnsResourceRecord *rr) {
2287 int r;
2288
2289 assert(t);
2290 assert(rr);
2291
2292 /* Check if the specified RR is the "primary" response,
2293 * i.e. either matches the question precisely or is a
2294 * CNAME/DNAME for it. */
2295
2296 r = dns_resource_key_match_rr(dns_transaction_key(t), rr, NULL);
2297 if (r != 0)
2298 return r;
2299
2300 return dns_resource_key_match_cname_or_dname(dns_transaction_key(t), rr->key, NULL);
2301 }
2302
2303 static bool dns_transaction_dnssec_supported(DnsTransaction *t) {
2304 assert(t);
2305
2306 /* Checks whether our transaction's DNS server is assumed to be compatible with DNSSEC. Returns false as soon
2307 * as we changed our mind about a server, and now believe it is incompatible with DNSSEC. */
2308
2309 if (t->scope->protocol != DNS_PROTOCOL_DNS)
2310 return false;
2311
2312 /* If we have picked no server, then we are working from the cache or some other source, and DNSSEC might well
2313 * be supported, hence return true. */
2314 if (!t->server)
2315 return true;
2316
2317 /* Note that we do not check the feature level actually used for the transaction but instead the feature level
2318 * the server is known to support currently, as the transaction feature level might be lower than what the
2319 * server actually supports, since we might have downgraded this transaction's feature level because we got a
2320 * SERVFAIL earlier and wanted to check whether downgrading fixes it. */
2321
2322 return dns_server_dnssec_supported(t->server);
2323 }
2324
2325 static bool dns_transaction_dnssec_supported_full(DnsTransaction *t) {
2326 DnsTransaction *dt;
2327
2328 assert(t);
2329
2330 /* Checks whether our transaction our any of the auxiliary transactions couldn't do DNSSEC. */
2331
2332 if (!dns_transaction_dnssec_supported(t))
2333 return false;
2334
2335 SET_FOREACH(dt, t->dnssec_transactions)
2336 if (!dns_transaction_dnssec_supported(dt))
2337 return false;
2338
2339 return true;
2340 }
2341
2342 int dns_transaction_request_dnssec_keys(DnsTransaction *t) {
2343 DnsResourceRecord *rr;
2344
2345 int r;
2346
2347 assert(t);
2348
2349 /*
2350 * Retrieve all auxiliary RRs for the answer we got, so that
2351 * we can verify signatures or prove that RRs are rightfully
2352 * unsigned. Specifically:
2353 *
2354 * - For RRSIG we get the matching DNSKEY
2355 * - For DNSKEY we get the matching DS
2356 * - For unsigned SOA/NS we get the matching DS
2357 * - For unsigned CNAME/DNAME/DS we get the parent SOA RR
2358 * - For other unsigned RRs we get the matching SOA RR
2359 * - For SOA/NS queries with no matching response RR, and no NSEC/NSEC3, the DS RR
2360 * - For DS queries with no matching response RRs, and no NSEC/NSEC3, the parent's SOA RR
2361 * - For other queries with no matching response RRs, and no NSEC/NSEC3, the SOA RR
2362 */
2363
2364 if (FLAGS_SET(t->query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_NO_VALIDATE) || t->scope->dnssec_mode == DNSSEC_NO)
2365 return 0;
2366 if (t->answer_source != DNS_TRANSACTION_NETWORK)
2367 return 0; /* We only need to validate stuff from the network */
2368 if (!dns_transaction_dnssec_supported(t))
2369 return 0; /* If we can't do DNSSEC anyway there's no point in getting the auxiliary RRs */
2370
2371 DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, t->answer) {
2372
2373 if (dns_type_is_pseudo(rr->key->type))
2374 continue;
2375
2376 /* If this RR is in the negative trust anchor, we don't need to validate it. */
2377 r = dns_transaction_negative_trust_anchor_lookup(t, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key));
2378 if (r < 0)
2379 return r;
2380 if (r > 0)
2381 continue;
2382
2383 switch (rr->key->type) {
2384
2385 case DNS_TYPE_RRSIG: {
2386 /* For each RRSIG we request the matching DNSKEY */
2387 _cleanup_(dns_resource_key_unrefp) DnsResourceKey *dnskey = NULL;
2388
2389 /* If this RRSIG is about a DNSKEY RR and the
2390 * signer is the same as the owner, then we
2391 * already have the DNSKEY, and we don't have
2392 * to look for more. */
2393 if (rr->rrsig.type_covered == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) {
2394 r = dns_name_equal(rr->rrsig.signer, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key));
2395 if (r < 0)
2396 return r;
2397 if (r > 0)
2398 continue;
2399 }
2400
2401 /* If the signer is not a parent of our
2402 * original query, then this is about an
2403 * auxiliary RRset, but not anything we asked
2404 * for. In this case we aren't interested,
2405 * because we don't want to request additional
2406 * RRs for stuff we didn't really ask for, and
2407 * also to avoid request loops, where
2408 * additional RRs from one transaction result
2409 * in another transaction whose additional RRs
2410 * point back to the original transaction, and
2411 * we deadlock. */
2412 r = dns_name_endswith(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t)), rr->rrsig.signer);
2413 if (r < 0)
2414 return r;
2415 if (r == 0)
2416 continue;
2417
2418 dnskey = dns_resource_key_new(rr->key->class, DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY, rr->rrsig.signer);
2419 if (!dnskey)
2420 return -ENOMEM;
2421
2422 log_debug("Requesting DNSKEY to validate transaction %" PRIu16" (%s, RRSIG with key tag: %" PRIu16 ").",
2423 t->id, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), rr->rrsig.key_tag);
2424 r = dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr(t, dnskey);
2425 if (r < 0)
2426 return r;
2427 break;
2428 }
2429
2430 case DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY: {
2431 /* For each DNSKEY we request the matching DS */
2432 _cleanup_(dns_resource_key_unrefp) DnsResourceKey *ds = NULL;
2433
2434 /* If the DNSKEY we are looking at is not for
2435 * zone we are interested in, nor any of its
2436 * parents, we aren't interested, and don't
2437 * request it. After all, we don't want to end
2438 * up in request loops, and want to keep
2439 * additional traffic down. */
2440
2441 r = dns_name_endswith(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t)), dns_resource_key_name(rr->key));
2442 if (r < 0)
2443 return r;
2444 if (r == 0)
2445 continue;
2446
2447 ds = dns_resource_key_new(rr->key->class, DNS_TYPE_DS, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key));
2448 if (!ds)
2449 return -ENOMEM;
2450
2451 log_debug("Requesting DS to validate transaction %" PRIu16" (%s, DNSKEY with key tag: %" PRIu16 ").",
2452 t->id, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), dnssec_keytag(rr, false));
2453 r = dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr(t, ds);
2454 if (r < 0)
2455 return r;
2456
2457 break;
2458 }
2459
2460 case DNS_TYPE_SOA:
2461 case DNS_TYPE_NS: {
2462 _cleanup_(dns_resource_key_unrefp) DnsResourceKey *ds = NULL;
2463
2464 /* For an unsigned SOA or NS, try to acquire
2465 * the matching DS RR, as we are at a zone cut
2466 * then, and whether a DS exists tells us
2467 * whether the zone is signed. Do so only if
2468 * this RR matches our original question,
2469 * however. */
2470
2471 r = dns_resource_key_match_rr(dns_transaction_key(t), rr, NULL);
2472 if (r < 0)
2473 return r;
2474 if (r == 0) {
2475 /* Hmm, so this SOA RR doesn't match our original question. In this case, maybe this is
2476 * a negative reply, and we need the SOA RR's TTL in order to cache a negative entry?
2477 * If so, we need to validate it, too. */
2478
2479 r = dns_answer_match_key(t->answer, dns_transaction_key(t), NULL);
2480 if (r < 0)
2481 return r;
2482 if (r > 0) /* positive reply, we won't need the SOA and hence don't need to validate
2483 * it. */
2484 continue;
2485
2486 /* Only bother with this if the SOA/NS RR we are looking at is actually a parent of
2487 * what we are looking for, otherwise there's no value in it for us. */
2488 r = dns_name_endswith(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t)), dns_resource_key_name(rr->key));
2489 if (r < 0)
2490 return r;
2491 if (r == 0)
2492 continue;
2493 }
2494
2495 r = dnssec_has_rrsig(t->answer, rr->key);
2496 if (r < 0)
2497 return r;
2498 if (r > 0)
2499 continue;
2500
2501 ds = dns_resource_key_new(rr->key->class, DNS_TYPE_DS, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key));
2502 if (!ds)
2503 return -ENOMEM;
2504
2505 log_debug("Requesting DS to validate transaction %" PRIu16 " (%s, unsigned SOA/NS RRset).",
2506 t->id, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key));
2507 r = dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr(t, ds);
2508 if (r < 0)
2509 return r;
2510
2511 break;
2512 }
2513
2514 case DNS_TYPE_DS:
2515 case DNS_TYPE_CNAME:
2516 case DNS_TYPE_DNAME: {
2517 _cleanup_(dns_resource_key_unrefp) DnsResourceKey *soa = NULL;
2518 const char *name;
2519
2520 /* CNAMEs and DNAMEs cannot be located at a
2521 * zone apex, hence ask for the parent SOA for
2522 * unsigned CNAME/DNAME RRs, maybe that's the
2523 * apex. But do all that only if this is
2524 * actually a response to our original
2525 * question.
2526 *
2527 * Similar for DS RRs, which are signed when
2528 * the parent SOA is signed. */
2529
2530 r = dns_transaction_is_primary_response(t, rr);
2531 if (r < 0)
2532 return r;
2533 if (r == 0)
2534 continue;
2535
2536 r = dnssec_has_rrsig(t->answer, rr->key);
2537 if (r < 0)
2538 return r;
2539 if (r > 0)
2540 continue;
2541
2542 r = dns_answer_has_dname_for_cname(t->answer, rr);
2543 if (r < 0)
2544 return r;
2545 if (r > 0)
2546 continue;
2547
2548 name = dns_resource_key_name(rr->key);
2549 r = dns_name_parent(&name);
2550 if (r < 0)
2551 return r;
2552 if (r == 0)
2553 continue;
2554
2555 soa = dns_resource_key_new(rr->key->class, DNS_TYPE_SOA, name);
2556 if (!soa)
2557 return -ENOMEM;
2558
2559 log_debug("Requesting parent SOA to validate transaction %" PRIu16 " (%s, unsigned CNAME/DNAME/DS RRset).",
2560 t->id, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key));
2561 r = dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr(t, soa);
2562 if (r < 0)
2563 return r;
2564
2565 break;
2566 }
2567
2568 default: {
2569 _cleanup_(dns_resource_key_unrefp) DnsResourceKey *soa = NULL;
2570
2571 /* For other unsigned RRsets (including
2572 * NSEC/NSEC3!), look for proof the zone is
2573 * unsigned, by requesting the SOA RR of the
2574 * zone. However, do so only if they are
2575 * directly relevant to our original
2576 * question. */
2577
2578 r = dns_transaction_is_primary_response(t, rr);
2579 if (r < 0)
2580 return r;
2581 if (r == 0)
2582 continue;
2583
2584 r = dnssec_has_rrsig(t->answer, rr->key);
2585 if (r < 0)
2586 return r;
2587 if (r > 0)
2588 continue;
2589
2590 soa = dns_resource_key_new(rr->key->class, DNS_TYPE_SOA, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key));
2591 if (!soa)
2592 return -ENOMEM;
2593
2594 log_debug("Requesting SOA to validate transaction %" PRIu16 " (%s, unsigned non-SOA/NS RRset <%s>).",
2595 t->id, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key), dns_resource_record_to_string(rr));
2596 r = dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr(t, soa);
2597 if (r < 0)
2598 return r;
2599 break;
2600 }}
2601 }
2602
2603 /* Above, we requested everything necessary to validate what
2604 * we got. Now, let's request what we need to validate what we
2605 * didn't get... */
2606
2607 r = dns_transaction_has_negative_answer(t);
2608 if (r < 0)
2609 return r;
2610 if (r > 0) {
2611 const char *name, *signed_status;
2612 uint16_t type = 0;
2613
2614 name = dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t));
2615 signed_status = dns_answer_contains_nsec_or_nsec3(t->answer) ? "signed" : "unsigned";
2616
2617 /* If this was a SOA or NS request, then check if there's a DS RR for the same domain. Note that this
2618 * could also be used as indication that we are not at a zone apex, but in real world setups there are
2619 * too many broken DNS servers (Hello, incapdns.net!) where non-terminal zones return NXDOMAIN even
2620 * though they have further children. If this was a DS request, then it's signed when the parent zone
2621 * is signed, hence ask the parent SOA in that case. If this was any other RR then ask for the SOA RR,
2622 * to see if that is signed. */
2623
2624 if (dns_transaction_key(t)->type == DNS_TYPE_DS) {
2625 r = dns_name_parent(&name);
2626 if (r > 0) {
2627 type = DNS_TYPE_SOA;
2628 log_debug("Requesting parent SOA (%s %s) to validate transaction %" PRIu16 " (%s, %s empty DS response).",
2629 special_glyph(SPECIAL_GLYPH_ARROW_RIGHT), name, t->id,
2630 dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t)), signed_status);
2631 } else
2632 name = NULL;
2633
2634 } else if (IN_SET(dns_transaction_key(t)->type, DNS_TYPE_SOA, DNS_TYPE_NS)) {
2635
2636 type = DNS_TYPE_DS;
2637 log_debug("Requesting DS (%s %s) to validate transaction %" PRIu16 " (%s, %s empty SOA/NS response).",
2638 special_glyph(SPECIAL_GLYPH_ARROW_RIGHT), name, t->id, name, signed_status);
2639
2640 } else {
2641 type = DNS_TYPE_SOA;
2642 log_debug("Requesting SOA (%s %s) to validate transaction %" PRIu16 " (%s, %s empty non-SOA/NS/DS response).",
2643 special_glyph(SPECIAL_GLYPH_ARROW_RIGHT), name, t->id, name, signed_status);
2644 }
2645
2646 if (name) {
2647 _cleanup_(dns_resource_key_unrefp) DnsResourceKey *soa = NULL;
2648
2649 soa = dns_resource_key_new(dns_transaction_key(t)->class, type, name);
2650 if (!soa)
2651 return -ENOMEM;
2652
2653 r = dns_transaction_request_dnssec_rr(t, soa);
2654 if (r < 0)
2655 return r;
2656 }
2657 }
2658
2659 return dns_transaction_dnssec_is_live(t);
2660 }
2661
2662 void dns_transaction_notify(DnsTransaction *t, DnsTransaction *source) {
2663 assert(t);
2664 assert(source);
2665
2666 /* Invoked whenever any of our auxiliary DNSSEC transactions completed its work. If the state is still PENDING,
2667 we are still in the loop that adds further DNSSEC transactions, hence don't check if we are ready yet. If
2668 the state is VALIDATING however, we should check if we are complete now. */
2669
2670 if (t->state == DNS_TRANSACTION_VALIDATING)
2671 dns_transaction_process_dnssec(t);
2672 }
2673
2674 static int dns_transaction_validate_dnskey_by_ds(DnsTransaction *t) {
2675 DnsAnswerItem *item;
2676 int r;
2677
2678 assert(t);
2679
2680 /* Add all DNSKEY RRs from the answer that are validated by DS
2681 * RRs from the list of validated keys to the list of
2682 * validated keys. */
2683
2684 DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH_ITEM(item, t->answer) {
2685
2686 r = dnssec_verify_dnskey_by_ds_search(item->rr, t->validated_keys);
2687 if (r < 0)
2688 return r;
2689 if (r == 0)
2690 continue;
2691
2692 /* If so, the DNSKEY is validated too. */
2693 r = dns_answer_add_extend(&t->validated_keys, item->rr, item->ifindex, item->flags|DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED, item->rrsig);
2694 if (r < 0)
2695 return r;
2696 }
2697
2698 return 0;
2699 }
2700
2701 static int dns_transaction_requires_rrsig(DnsTransaction *t, DnsResourceRecord *rr) {
2702 int r;
2703
2704 assert(t);
2705 assert(rr);
2706
2707 /* Checks if the RR we are looking for must be signed with an
2708 * RRSIG. This is used for positive responses. */
2709
2710 if (t->scope->dnssec_mode == DNSSEC_NO)
2711 return false;
2712
2713 if (dns_type_is_pseudo(rr->key->type))
2714 return -EINVAL;
2715
2716 r = dns_transaction_negative_trust_anchor_lookup(t, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key));
2717 if (r < 0)
2718 return r;
2719 if (r > 0)
2720 return false;
2721
2722 switch (rr->key->type) {
2723
2724 case DNS_TYPE_RRSIG:
2725 /* RRSIGs are the signatures themselves, they need no signing. */
2726 return false;
2727
2728 case DNS_TYPE_SOA:
2729 case DNS_TYPE_NS: {
2730 DnsTransaction *dt;
2731
2732 /* For SOA or NS RRs we look for a matching DS transaction */
2733
2734 SET_FOREACH(dt, t->dnssec_transactions) {
2735
2736 if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->class != rr->key->class)
2737 continue;
2738 if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->type != DNS_TYPE_DS)
2739 continue;
2740
2741 r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(dt)), dns_resource_key_name(rr->key));
2742 if (r < 0)
2743 return r;
2744 if (r == 0)
2745 continue;
2746
2747 /* We found a DS transactions for the SOA/NS
2748 * RRs we are looking at. If it discovered signed DS
2749 * RRs, then we need to be signed, too. */
2750
2751 if (!FLAGS_SET(dt->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED))
2752 return false;
2753
2754 return dns_answer_match_key(dt->answer, dns_transaction_key(dt), NULL);
2755 }
2756
2757 /* We found nothing that proves this is safe to leave
2758 * this unauthenticated, hence ask inist on
2759 * authentication. */
2760 return true;
2761 }
2762
2763 case DNS_TYPE_DS:
2764 case DNS_TYPE_CNAME:
2765 case DNS_TYPE_DNAME: {
2766 const char *parent = NULL;
2767 DnsTransaction *dt;
2768
2769 /*
2770 * CNAME/DNAME RRs cannot be located at a zone apex, hence look directly for the parent SOA.
2771 *
2772 * DS RRs are signed if the parent is signed, hence also look at the parent SOA
2773 */
2774
2775 SET_FOREACH(dt, t->dnssec_transactions) {
2776
2777 if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->class != rr->key->class)
2778 continue;
2779 if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->type != DNS_TYPE_SOA)
2780 continue;
2781
2782 if (!parent) {
2783 parent = dns_resource_key_name(rr->key);
2784 r = dns_name_parent(&parent);
2785 if (r < 0)
2786 return r;
2787 if (r == 0) {
2788 if (rr->key->type == DNS_TYPE_DS)
2789 return true;
2790
2791 /* A CNAME/DNAME without a parent? That's sooo weird. */
2792 return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG),
2793 "Transaction %" PRIu16 " claims CNAME/DNAME at root. Refusing.", t->id);
2794 }
2795 }
2796
2797 r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(dt)), parent);
2798 if (r < 0)
2799 return r;
2800 if (r == 0)
2801 continue;
2802
2803 return FLAGS_SET(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED);
2804 }
2805
2806 return true;
2807 }
2808
2809 default: {
2810 DnsTransaction *dt;
2811
2812 /* Any other kind of RR (including DNSKEY/NSEC/NSEC3). Let's see if our SOA lookup was authenticated */
2813
2814 SET_FOREACH(dt, t->dnssec_transactions) {
2815
2816 if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->class != rr->key->class)
2817 continue;
2818 if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->type != DNS_TYPE_SOA)
2819 continue;
2820
2821 r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(dt)), dns_resource_key_name(rr->key));
2822 if (r < 0)
2823 return r;
2824 if (r == 0)
2825 continue;
2826
2827 /* We found the transaction that was supposed to find the SOA RR for us. It was
2828 * successful, but found no RR for us. This means we are not at a zone cut. In this
2829 * case, we require authentication if the SOA lookup was authenticated too. */
2830 return FLAGS_SET(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED);
2831 }
2832
2833 return true;
2834 }}
2835 }
2836
2837 static int dns_transaction_in_private_tld(DnsTransaction *t, const DnsResourceKey *key) {
2838 DnsTransaction *dt;
2839 const char *tld;
2840 int r;
2841
2842 /* If DNSSEC downgrade mode is on, checks whether the
2843 * specified RR is one level below a TLD we have proven not to
2844 * exist. In such a case we assume that this is a private
2845 * domain, and permit it.
2846 *
2847 * This detects cases like the Fritz!Box router networks. Each
2848 * Fritz!Box router serves a private "fritz.box" zone, in the
2849 * non-existing TLD "box". Requests for the "fritz.box" domain
2850 * are served by the router itself, while requests for the
2851 * "box" domain will result in NXDOMAIN.
2852 *
2853 * Note that this logic is unable to detect cases where a
2854 * router serves a private DNS zone directly under
2855 * non-existing TLD. In such a case we cannot detect whether
2856 * the TLD is supposed to exist or not, as all requests we
2857 * make for it will be answered by the router's zone, and not
2858 * by the root zone. */
2859
2860 assert(t);
2861
2862 if (t->scope->dnssec_mode != DNSSEC_ALLOW_DOWNGRADE)
2863 return false; /* In strict DNSSEC mode what doesn't exist, doesn't exist */
2864
2865 tld = dns_resource_key_name(key);
2866 r = dns_name_parent(&tld);
2867 if (r < 0)
2868 return r;
2869 if (r == 0)
2870 return false; /* Already the root domain */
2871
2872 if (!dns_name_is_single_label(tld))
2873 return false;
2874
2875 SET_FOREACH(dt, t->dnssec_transactions) {
2876
2877 if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->class != key->class)
2878 continue;
2879
2880 r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(dt)), tld);
2881 if (r < 0)
2882 return r;
2883 if (r == 0)
2884 continue;
2885
2886 /* We found an auxiliary lookup we did for the TLD. If
2887 * that returned with NXDOMAIN, we know the TLD didn't
2888 * exist, and hence this might be a private zone. */
2889
2890 return dt->answer_rcode == DNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN;
2891 }
2892
2893 return false;
2894 }
2895
2896 static int dns_transaction_requires_nsec(DnsTransaction *t) {
2897 char key_str[DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_STRING_MAX];
2898 DnsTransaction *dt;
2899 const char *name;
2900 uint16_t type = 0;
2901 int r;
2902
2903 assert(t);
2904
2905 /* Checks if we need to insist on NSEC/NSEC3 RRs for proving
2906 * this negative reply */
2907
2908 if (t->scope->dnssec_mode == DNSSEC_NO)
2909 return false;
2910
2911 if (dns_type_is_pseudo(dns_transaction_key(t)->type))
2912 return -EINVAL;
2913
2914 r = dns_transaction_negative_trust_anchor_lookup(t, dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t)));
2915 if (r < 0)
2916 return r;
2917 if (r > 0)
2918 return false;
2919
2920 r = dns_transaction_in_private_tld(t, dns_transaction_key(t));
2921 if (r < 0)
2922 return r;
2923 if (r > 0) {
2924 /* The lookup is from a TLD that is proven not to
2925 * exist, and we are in downgrade mode, hence ignore
2926 * that fact that we didn't get any NSEC RRs. */
2927
2928 log_info("Detected a negative query %s in a private DNS zone, permitting unsigned response.",
2929 dns_resource_key_to_string(dns_transaction_key(t), key_str, sizeof key_str));
2930 return false;
2931 }
2932
2933 name = dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(t));
2934
2935 if (dns_transaction_key(t)->type == DNS_TYPE_DS) {
2936
2937 /* We got a negative reply for this DS lookup? DS RRs are signed when their parent zone is signed,
2938 * hence check the parent SOA in this case. */
2939
2940 r = dns_name_parent(&name);
2941 if (r < 0)
2942 return r;
2943 if (r == 0)
2944 return true;
2945
2946 type = DNS_TYPE_SOA;
2947
2948 } else if (IN_SET(dns_transaction_key(t)->type, DNS_TYPE_SOA, DNS_TYPE_NS))
2949 /* We got a negative reply for this SOA/NS lookup? If so, check if there's a DS RR for this */
2950 type = DNS_TYPE_DS;
2951 else
2952 /* For all other negative replies, check for the SOA lookup */
2953 type = DNS_TYPE_SOA;
2954
2955 /* For all other RRs we check the SOA on the same level to see
2956 * if it's signed. */
2957
2958 SET_FOREACH(dt, t->dnssec_transactions) {
2959
2960 if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->class != dns_transaction_key(t)->class)
2961 continue;
2962 if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->type != type)
2963 continue;
2964
2965 r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(dt)), name);
2966 if (r < 0)
2967 return r;
2968 if (r == 0)
2969 continue;
2970
2971 return FLAGS_SET(dt->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED);
2972 }
2973
2974 /* If in doubt, require NSEC/NSEC3 */
2975 return true;
2976 }
2977
2978 static int dns_transaction_dnskey_authenticated(DnsTransaction *t, DnsResourceRecord *rr) {
2979 DnsResourceRecord *rrsig;
2980 bool found = false;
2981 int r;
2982
2983 /* Checks whether any of the DNSKEYs used for the RRSIGs for
2984 * the specified RRset is authenticated (i.e. has a matching
2985 * DS RR). */
2986
2987 r = dns_transaction_negative_trust_anchor_lookup(t, dns_resource_key_name(rr->key));
2988 if (r < 0)
2989 return r;
2990 if (r > 0)
2991 return false;
2992
2993 DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rrsig, t->answer) {
2994 DnsTransaction *dt;
2995
2996 r = dnssec_key_match_rrsig(rr->key, rrsig);
2997 if (r < 0)
2998 return r;
2999 if (r == 0)
3000 continue;
3001
3002 SET_FOREACH(dt, t->dnssec_transactions) {
3003
3004 if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->class != rr->key->class)
3005 continue;
3006
3007 if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->type == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) {
3008
3009 r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(dt)), rrsig->rrsig.signer);
3010 if (r < 0)
3011 return r;
3012 if (r == 0)
3013 continue;
3014
3015 /* OK, we found an auxiliary DNSKEY lookup. If that lookup is authenticated,
3016 * report this. */
3017
3018 if (FLAGS_SET(dt->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED))
3019 return true;
3020
3021 found = true;
3022
3023 } else if (dns_transaction_key(dt)->type == DNS_TYPE_DS) {
3024
3025 r = dns_name_equal(dns_resource_key_name(dns_transaction_key(dt)), rrsig->rrsig.signer);
3026 if (r < 0)
3027 return r;
3028 if (r == 0)
3029 continue;
3030
3031 /* OK, we found an auxiliary DS lookup. If that lookup is authenticated and
3032 * non-zero, we won! */
3033
3034 if (!FLAGS_SET(dt->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED))
3035 return false;
3036
3037 return dns_answer_match_key(dt->answer, dns_transaction_key(dt), NULL);
3038 }
3039 }
3040 }
3041
3042 return found ? false : -ENXIO;
3043 }
3044
3045 static int dns_transaction_known_signed(DnsTransaction *t, DnsResourceRecord *rr) {
3046 assert(t);
3047 assert(rr);
3048
3049 /* We know that the root domain is signed, hence if it appears
3050 * not to be signed, there's a problem with the DNS server */
3051
3052 return rr->key->class == DNS_CLASS_IN &&
3053 dns_name_is_root(dns_resource_key_name(rr->key));
3054 }
3055
3056 static int dns_transaction_check_revoked_trust_anchors(DnsTransaction *t) {
3057 DnsResourceRecord *rr;
3058 int r;
3059
3060 assert(t);
3061
3062 /* Maybe warn the user that we encountered a revoked DNSKEY
3063 * for a key from our trust anchor. Note that we don't care
3064 * whether the DNSKEY can be authenticated or not. It's
3065 * sufficient if it is self-signed. */
3066
3067 DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, t->answer) {
3068 r = dns_trust_anchor_check_revoked(&t->scope->manager->trust_anchor, rr, t->answer);
3069 if (r < 0)
3070 return r;
3071 }
3072
3073 return 0;
3074 }
3075
3076 static int dns_transaction_invalidate_revoked_keys(DnsTransaction *t) {
3077 bool changed;
3078 int r;
3079
3080 assert(t);
3081
3082 /* Removes all DNSKEY/DS objects from t->validated_keys that
3083 * our trust anchors database considers revoked. */
3084
3085 do {
3086 DnsResourceRecord *rr;
3087
3088 changed = false;
3089
3090 DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, t->validated_keys) {
3091 r = dns_trust_anchor_is_revoked(&t->scope->manager->trust_anchor, rr);
3092 if (r < 0)
3093 return r;
3094 if (r > 0) {
3095 r = dns_answer_remove_by_rr(&t->validated_keys, rr);
3096 if (r < 0)
3097 return r;
3098
3099 assert(r > 0);
3100 changed = true;
3101 break;
3102 }
3103 }
3104 } while (changed);
3105
3106 return 0;
3107 }
3108
3109 static int dns_transaction_copy_validated(DnsTransaction *t) {
3110 DnsTransaction *dt;
3111 int r;
3112
3113 assert(t);
3114
3115 /* Copy all validated RRs from the auxiliary DNSSEC transactions into our set of validated RRs */
3116
3117 SET_FOREACH(dt, t->dnssec_transactions) {
3118
3119 if (DNS_TRANSACTION_IS_LIVE(dt->state))
3120 continue;
3121
3122 if (!FLAGS_SET(dt->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED))
3123 continue;
3124
3125 r = dns_answer_extend(&t->validated_keys, dt->answer);
3126 if (r < 0)
3127 return r;
3128 }
3129
3130 return 0;
3131 }
3132
3133 typedef enum {
3134 DNSSEC_PHASE_DNSKEY, /* Phase #1, only validate DNSKEYs */
3135 DNSSEC_PHASE_NSEC, /* Phase #2, only validate NSEC+NSEC3 */
3136 DNSSEC_PHASE_ALL, /* Phase #3, validate everything else */
3137 } Phase;
3138
3139 static int dnssec_validate_records(
3140 DnsTransaction *t,
3141 Phase phase,
3142 bool *have_nsec,
3143 DnsAnswer **validated) {
3144
3145 DnsResourceRecord *rr;
3146 int r;
3147
3148 /* Returns negative on error, 0 if validation failed, 1 to restart validation, 2 when finished. */
3149
3150 DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, t->answer) {
3151 _unused_ _cleanup_(dns_resource_record_unrefp) DnsResourceRecord *rr_ref = dns_resource_record_ref(rr);
3152 DnsResourceRecord *rrsig = NULL;
3153 DnssecResult result;
3154
3155 switch (rr->key->type) {
3156 case DNS_TYPE_RRSIG:
3157 continue;
3158
3159 case DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY:
3160 /* We validate DNSKEYs only in the DNSKEY and ALL phases */
3161 if (phase == DNSSEC_PHASE_NSEC)
3162 continue;
3163 break;
3164
3165 case DNS_TYPE_NSEC:
3166 case DNS_TYPE_NSEC3:
3167 *have_nsec = true;
3168
3169 /* We validate NSEC/NSEC3 only in the NSEC and ALL phases */
3170 if (phase == DNSSEC_PHASE_DNSKEY)
3171 continue;
3172 break;
3173
3174 default:
3175 /* We validate all other RRs only in the ALL phases */
3176 if (phase != DNSSEC_PHASE_ALL)
3177 continue;
3178 }
3179
3180 r = dnssec_verify_rrset_search(
3181 t->answer,
3182 rr->key,
3183 t->validated_keys,
3184 USEC_INFINITY,
3185 &result,
3186 &rrsig);
3187 if (r < 0)
3188 return r;
3189
3190 log_debug("Looking at %s: %s", strna(dns_resource_record_to_string(rr)), dnssec_result_to_string(result));
3191
3192 if (result == DNSSEC_VALIDATED) {
3193 assert(rrsig);
3194
3195 if (rr->key->type == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) {
3196 /* If we just validated a DNSKEY RRset, then let's add these keys to
3197 * the set of validated keys for this transaction. */
3198
3199 r = dns_answer_copy_by_key(&t->validated_keys, t->answer, rr->key, DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED, rrsig);
3200 if (r < 0)
3201 return r;
3202
3203 /* Some of the DNSKEYs we just added might already have been revoked,
3204 * remove them again in that case. */
3205 r = dns_transaction_invalidate_revoked_keys(t);
3206 if (r < 0)
3207 return r;
3208 }
3209
3210 /* Add the validated RRset to the new list of validated RRsets, and remove it from
3211 * the unvalidated RRsets. We mark the RRset as authenticated and cacheable. */
3212 r = dns_answer_move_by_key(validated, &t->answer, rr->key, DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED|DNS_ANSWER_CACHEABLE, rrsig);
3213 if (r < 0)
3214 return r;
3215
3216 manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_SECURE, rr->key);
3217
3218 /* Exit the loop, we dropped something from the answer, start from the beginning */
3219 return 1;
3220 }
3221
3222 /* If we haven't read all DNSKEYs yet a negative result of the validation is irrelevant, as
3223 * there might be more DNSKEYs coming. Similar, if we haven't read all NSEC/NSEC3 RRs yet,
3224 * we cannot do positive wildcard proofs yet, as those require the NSEC/NSEC3 RRs. */
3225 if (phase != DNSSEC_PHASE_ALL)
3226 continue;
3227
3228 if (result == DNSSEC_VALIDATED_WILDCARD) {
3229 bool authenticated = false;
3230 const char *source;
3231
3232 assert(rrsig);
3233
3234 /* This RRset validated, but as a wildcard. This means we need
3235 * to prove via NSEC/NSEC3 that no matching non-wildcard RR exists. */
3236
3237 /* First step, determine the source of synthesis */
3238 r = dns_resource_record_source(rrsig, &source);
3239 if (r < 0)
3240 return r;
3241
3242 r = dnssec_test_positive_wildcard(*validated,
3243 dns_resource_key_name(rr->key),
3244 source,
3245 rrsig->rrsig.signer,
3246 &authenticated);
3247
3248 /* Unless the NSEC proof showed that the key really doesn't exist something is off. */
3249 if (r == 0)
3250 result = DNSSEC_INVALID;
3251 else {
3252 r = dns_answer_move_by_key(
3253 validated,
3254 &t->answer,
3255 rr->key,
3256 authenticated ? (DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED|DNS_ANSWER_CACHEABLE) : 0,
3257 rrsig);
3258 if (r < 0)
3259 return r;
3260
3261 manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, authenticated ? DNSSEC_SECURE : DNSSEC_INSECURE, rr->key);
3262
3263 /* Exit the loop, we dropped something from the answer, start from the beginning */
3264 return 1;
3265 }
3266 }
3267
3268 if (result == DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE) {
3269 r = dns_transaction_requires_rrsig(t, rr);
3270 if (r < 0)
3271 return r;
3272 if (r == 0) {
3273 /* Data does not require signing. In that case, just copy it over,
3274 * but remember that this is by no means authenticated. */
3275 r = dns_answer_move_by_key(
3276 validated,
3277 &t->answer,
3278 rr->key,
3279 0,
3280 NULL);
3281 if (r < 0)
3282 return r;
3283
3284 manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_INSECURE, rr->key);
3285 return 1;
3286 }
3287
3288 r = dns_transaction_known_signed(t, rr);
3289 if (r < 0)
3290 return r;
3291 if (r > 0) {
3292 /* This is an RR we know has to be signed. If it isn't this means
3293 * the server is not attaching RRSIGs, hence complain. */
3294
3295 dns_server_packet_rrsig_missing(t->server, t->current_feature_level);
3296
3297 if (t->scope->dnssec_mode == DNSSEC_ALLOW_DOWNGRADE) {
3298
3299 /* Downgrading is OK? If so, just consider the information unsigned */
3300
3301 r = dns_answer_move_by_key(validated, &t->answer, rr->key, 0, NULL);
3302 if (r < 0)
3303 return r;
3304
3305 manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_INSECURE, rr->key);
3306 return 1;
3307 }
3308
3309 /* Otherwise, fail */
3310 t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_INCOMPATIBLE_SERVER;
3311 return 0;
3312 }
3313
3314 r = dns_transaction_in_private_tld(t, rr->key);
3315 if (r < 0)
3316 return r;
3317 if (r > 0) {
3318 char s[DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_STRING_MAX];
3319
3320 /* The data is from a TLD that is proven not to exist, and we are in downgrade
3321 * mode, hence ignore the fact that this was not signed. */
3322
3323 log_info("Detected RRset %s is in a private DNS zone, permitting unsigned RRs.",
3324 dns_resource_key_to_string(rr->key, s, sizeof s));
3325
3326 r = dns_answer_move_by_key(validated, &t->answer, rr->key, 0, NULL);
3327 if (r < 0)
3328 return r;
3329
3330 manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_INSECURE, rr->key);
3331 return 1;
3332 }
3333 }
3334
3335 /* https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6840#section-5.2 */
3336 if (result == DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM) {
3337 r = dns_answer_move_by_key(validated, &t->answer, rr->key, 0, NULL);
3338 if (r < 0)
3339 return r;
3340
3341 manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_INSECURE, rr->key);
3342 return 1;
3343 }
3344
3345 if (IN_SET(result,
3346 DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY,
3347 DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED)) {
3348
3349 r = dns_transaction_dnskey_authenticated(t, rr);
3350 if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO)
3351 return r;
3352 if (r == 0) {
3353 /* The DNSKEY transaction was not authenticated, this means there's
3354 * no DS for this, which means it's OK if no keys are found for this signature. */
3355
3356 r = dns_answer_move_by_key(validated, &t->answer, rr->key, 0, NULL);
3357 if (r < 0)
3358 return r;
3359
3360 manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_INSECURE, rr->key);
3361 return 1;
3362 }
3363 }
3364
3365 r = dns_transaction_is_primary_response(t, rr);
3366 if (r < 0)
3367 return r;
3368 if (r > 0) {
3369 /* Look for a matching DNAME for this CNAME */
3370 r = dns_answer_has_dname_for_cname(t->answer, rr);
3371 if (r < 0)
3372 return r;
3373 if (r == 0) {
3374 /* Also look among the stuff we already validated */
3375 r = dns_answer_has_dname_for_cname(*validated, rr);
3376 if (r < 0)
3377 return r;
3378 }
3379
3380 if (r == 0) {
3381 if (IN_SET(result,
3382 DNSSEC_INVALID,
3383 DNSSEC_SIGNATURE_EXPIRED,
3384 DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE))
3385 manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_BOGUS, rr->key);
3386 else /* DNSSEC_MISSING_KEY or DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM */
3387 manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_INDETERMINATE, rr->key);
3388
3389 /* This is a primary response to our question, and it failed validation.
3390 * That's fatal. */
3391 t->answer_dnssec_result = result;
3392 return 0;
3393 }
3394
3395 /* This is a primary response, but we do have a DNAME RR
3396 * in the RR that can replay this CNAME, hence rely on
3397 * that, and we can remove the CNAME in favour of it. */
3398 }
3399
3400 /* This is just some auxiliary data. Just remove the RRset and continue. */
3401 r = dns_answer_remove_by_key(&t->answer, rr->key);
3402 if (r < 0)
3403 return r;
3404
3405 /* We dropped something from the answer, start from the beginning. */
3406 return 1;
3407 }
3408
3409 return 2; /* Finito. */
3410 }
3411
3412 int dns_transaction_validate_dnssec(DnsTransaction *t) {
3413 _cleanup_(dns_answer_unrefp) DnsAnswer *validated = NULL;
3414 Phase phase;
3415 DnsAnswerFlags flags;
3416 int r;
3417 char key_str[DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_STRING_MAX];
3418
3419 assert(t);
3420
3421 /* We have now collected all DS and DNSKEY RRs in t->validated_keys, let's see which RRs we can now
3422 * authenticate with that. */
3423
3424 if (FLAGS_SET(t->query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_NO_VALIDATE) || t->scope->dnssec_mode == DNSSEC_NO)
3425 return 0;
3426
3427 /* Already validated */
3428 if (t->answer_dnssec_result != _DNSSEC_RESULT_INVALID)
3429 return 0;
3430
3431 /* Our own stuff needs no validation */
3432 if (IN_SET(t->answer_source, DNS_TRANSACTION_ZONE, DNS_TRANSACTION_TRUST_ANCHOR)) {
3433 t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_VALIDATED;
3434 SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED, true);
3435 return 0;
3436 }
3437
3438 /* Cached stuff is not affected by validation. */
3439 if (t->answer_source != DNS_TRANSACTION_NETWORK)
3440 return 0;
3441
3442 if (!dns_transaction_dnssec_supported_full(t)) {
3443 /* The server does not support DNSSEC, or doesn't augment responses with RRSIGs. */
3444 t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_INCOMPATIBLE_SERVER;
3445 log_debug("Not validating response for %" PRIu16 ", used server feature level does not support DNSSEC.", t->id);
3446 return 0;
3447 }
3448
3449 log_debug("Validating response from transaction %" PRIu16 " (%s).",
3450 t->id,
3451 dns_resource_key_to_string(dns_transaction_key(t), key_str, sizeof key_str));
3452
3453 /* First, see if this response contains any revoked trust
3454 * anchors we care about */
3455 r = dns_transaction_check_revoked_trust_anchors(t);
3456 if (r < 0)
3457 return r;
3458
3459 /* Third, copy all RRs we acquired successfully from auxiliary RRs over. */
3460 r = dns_transaction_copy_validated(t);
3461 if (r < 0)
3462 return r;
3463
3464 /* Second, see if there are DNSKEYs we already know a
3465 * validated DS for. */
3466 r = dns_transaction_validate_dnskey_by_ds(t);
3467 if (r < 0)
3468 return r;
3469
3470 /* Fourth, remove all DNSKEY and DS RRs again that our trust
3471 * anchor says are revoked. After all we might have marked
3472 * some keys revoked above, but they might still be lingering
3473 * in our validated_keys list. */
3474 r = dns_transaction_invalidate_revoked_keys(t);
3475 if (r < 0)
3476 return r;
3477
3478 phase = DNSSEC_PHASE_DNSKEY;
3479 for (;;) {
3480 bool have_nsec = false;
3481
3482 r = dnssec_validate_records(t, phase, &have_nsec, &validated);
3483 if (r <= 0)
3484 return r;
3485
3486 /* Try again as long as we managed to achieve something */
3487 if (r == 1)
3488 continue;
3489
3490 if (phase == DNSSEC_PHASE_DNSKEY && have_nsec) {
3491 /* OK, we processed all DNSKEYs, and there are NSEC/NSEC3 RRs, look at those now. */
3492 phase = DNSSEC_PHASE_NSEC;
3493 continue;
3494 }
3495
3496 if (phase != DNSSEC_PHASE_ALL) {
3497 /* OK, we processed all DNSKEYs and NSEC/NSEC3 RRs, look at all the rest now.
3498 * Note that in this third phase we start to remove RRs we couldn't validate. */
3499 phase = DNSSEC_PHASE_ALL;
3500 continue;
3501 }
3502
3503 /* We're done */
3504 break;
3505 }
3506
3507 DNS_ANSWER_REPLACE(t->answer, TAKE_PTR(validated));
3508
3509 /* At this point the answer only contains validated
3510 * RRsets. Now, let's see if it actually answers the question
3511 * we asked. If so, great! If it doesn't, then see if
3512 * NSEC/NSEC3 can prove this. */
3513 r = dns_transaction_has_positive_answer(t, &flags);
3514 if (r > 0) {
3515 /* Yes, it answers the question! */
3516
3517 if (flags & DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED) {
3518 /* The answer is fully authenticated, yay. */
3519 t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_VALIDATED;
3520 t->answer_rcode = DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS;
3521 SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED, true);
3522 } else {
3523 /* The answer is not fully authenticated. */
3524 t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_UNSIGNED;
3525 SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED, false);
3526 }
3527
3528 } else if (r == 0) {
3529 DnssecNsecResult nr;
3530 bool authenticated = false;
3531
3532 /* Bummer! Let's check NSEC/NSEC3 */
3533 r = dnssec_nsec_test(t->answer, dns_transaction_key(t), &nr, &authenticated, &t->answer_nsec_ttl);
3534 if (r < 0)
3535 return r;
3536
3537 switch (nr) {
3538
3539 case DNSSEC_NSEC_NXDOMAIN:
3540 /* NSEC proves the domain doesn't exist. Very good. */
3541 log_debug("Proved NXDOMAIN via NSEC/NSEC3 for transaction %u (%s)", t->id, key_str);
3542 t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_VALIDATED;
3543 t->answer_rcode = DNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN;
3544 SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED, authenticated);
3545
3546 manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, authenticated ? DNSSEC_SECURE : DNSSEC_INSECURE, dns_transaction_key(t));
3547 break;
3548
3549 case DNSSEC_NSEC_NODATA:
3550 /* NSEC proves that there's no data here, very good. */
3551 log_debug("Proved NODATA via NSEC/NSEC3 for transaction %u (%s)", t->id, key_str);
3552 t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_VALIDATED;
3553 t->answer_rcode = DNS_RCODE_SUCCESS;
3554 SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED, authenticated);
3555
3556 manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, authenticated ? DNSSEC_SECURE : DNSSEC_INSECURE, dns_transaction_key(t));
3557 break;
3558
3559 case DNSSEC_NSEC_OPTOUT:
3560 /* NSEC3 says the data might not be signed */
3561 log_debug("Data is NSEC3 opt-out via NSEC/NSEC3 for transaction %u (%s)", t->id, key_str);
3562 t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_UNSIGNED;
3563 SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED, false);
3564
3565 manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_INSECURE, dns_transaction_key(t));
3566 break;
3567
3568 case DNSSEC_NSEC_NO_RR:
3569 /* No NSEC data? Bummer! */
3570
3571 r = dns_transaction_requires_nsec(t);
3572 if (r < 0)
3573 return r;
3574 if (r > 0) {
3575 t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_NO_SIGNATURE;
3576 manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_BOGUS, dns_transaction_key(t));
3577 } else {
3578 t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_UNSIGNED;
3579 SET_FLAG(t->answer_query_flags, SD_RESOLVED_AUTHENTICATED, false);
3580 manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_INSECURE, dns_transaction_key(t));
3581 }
3582
3583 break;
3584
3585 case DNSSEC_NSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM:
3586 /* We don't know the NSEC3 algorithm used? */
3587 t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM;
3588 manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_INDETERMINATE, dns_transaction_key(t));
3589 break;
3590
3591 case DNSSEC_NSEC_FOUND:
3592 case DNSSEC_NSEC_CNAME:
3593 /* NSEC says it needs to be there, but we couldn't find it? Bummer! */
3594 t->answer_dnssec_result = DNSSEC_NSEC_MISMATCH;
3595 manager_dnssec_verdict(t->scope->manager, DNSSEC_BOGUS, dns_transaction_key(t));
3596 break;
3597
3598 default:
3599 assert_not_reached();
3600 }
3601 }
3602
3603 return 1;
3604 }
3605
3606 static const char* const dns_transaction_state_table[_DNS_TRANSACTION_STATE_MAX] = {
3607 [DNS_TRANSACTION_NULL] = "null",
3608 [DNS_TRANSACTION_PENDING] = "pending",
3609 [DNS_TRANSACTION_VALIDATING] = "validating",
3610 [DNS_TRANSACTION_RCODE_FAILURE] = "rcode-failure",
3611 [DNS_TRANSACTION_SUCCESS] = "success",
3612 [DNS_TRANSACTION_NO_SERVERS] = "no-servers",
3613 [DNS_TRANSACTION_TIMEOUT] = "timeout",
3614 [DNS_TRANSACTION_ATTEMPTS_MAX_REACHED] = "attempts-max-reached",
3615 [DNS_TRANSACTION_INVALID_REPLY] = "invalid-reply",
3616 [DNS_TRANSACTION_ERRNO] = "errno",
3617 [DNS_TRANSACTION_ABORTED] = "aborted",
3618 [DNS_TRANSACTION_DNSSEC_FAILED] = "dnssec-failed",
3619 [DNS_TRANSACTION_NO_TRUST_ANCHOR] = "no-trust-anchor",
3620 [DNS_TRANSACTION_RR_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED] = "rr-type-unsupported",
3621 [DNS_TRANSACTION_NETWORK_DOWN] = "network-down",
3622 [DNS_TRANSACTION_NOT_FOUND] = "not-found",
3623 [DNS_TRANSACTION_NO_SOURCE] = "no-source",
3624 [DNS_TRANSACTION_STUB_LOOP] = "stub-loop",
3625 };
3626 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(dns_transaction_state, DnsTransactionState);
3627
3628 static const char* const dns_transaction_source_table[_DNS_TRANSACTION_SOURCE_MAX] = {
3629 [DNS_TRANSACTION_NETWORK] = "network",
3630 [DNS_TRANSACTION_CACHE] = "cache",
3631 [DNS_TRANSACTION_ZONE] = "zone",
3632 [DNS_TRANSACTION_TRUST_ANCHOR] = "trust-anchor",
3633 };
3634 DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(dns_transaction_source, DnsTransactionSource);