3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/evp.h>
121 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123 #include <openssl/rand.h>
125 /* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
126 static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1
,const unsigned char *v2
)
129 if (sizeof(long) == 8) do
130 { const union { long one
; char little
; } is_endian
= {1};
133 if (is_endian
.little
) break;
134 /* not reached on little-endians */
135 /* following test is redundant, because input is
136 * always aligned, but I take no chances... */
137 if (((size_t)v1
|(size_t)v2
)&0x7) break;
141 if (l
>128) return 128;
142 else if (l
<-128) return -128;
146 ret
= (int)v1
[7]-(int)v2
[7];
148 brw
= ret
>>8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
151 { brw
+= (int)v1
[i
]-(int)v2
[i
];
158 { brw
+= (int)v1
[i
]-(int)v2
[i
];
163 brw
<<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
165 if (sat
&0xff) return brw
| 0x80;
166 else return brw
+ (ret
&0xFF);
169 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL
*s
, int type
, unsigned char *buf
,
171 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL
*s
, DTLS1_BITMAP
*bitmap
);
172 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL
*s
, DTLS1_BITMAP
*bitmap
);
173 static DTLS1_BITMAP
*dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL
*s
, SSL3_RECORD
*rr
,
174 unsigned int *is_next_epoch
);
176 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL
*s
, SSL3_RECORD
*rr
,
177 unsigned short *priority
, unsigned long *offset
);
179 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL
*s
, record_pqueue
*q
,
180 unsigned char *priority
);
181 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL
*s
);
182 static void dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL
*s
);
184 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
186 dtls1_copy_record(SSL
*s
, pitem
*item
)
188 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
*rdata
;
190 rdata
= (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
*)item
->data
;
192 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.buf
!= NULL
)
193 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->rbuf
.buf
);
195 s
->packet
= rdata
->packet
;
196 s
->packet_length
= rdata
->packet_length
;
197 memcpy(&(s
->s3
->rbuf
), &(rdata
->rbuf
), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER
));
198 memcpy(&(s
->s3
->rrec
), &(rdata
->rrec
), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD
));
205 dtls1_buffer_record(SSL
*s
, record_pqueue
*queue
, unsigned char *priority
)
207 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
*rdata
;
210 rdata
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
));
211 item
= pitem_new(priority
, rdata
);
212 if (rdata
== NULL
|| item
== NULL
)
214 if (rdata
!= NULL
) OPENSSL_free(rdata
);
215 if (item
!= NULL
) pitem_free(item
);
217 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
221 rdata
->packet
= s
->packet
;
222 rdata
->packet_length
= s
->packet_length
;
223 memcpy(&(rdata
->rbuf
), &(s
->s3
->rbuf
), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER
));
224 memcpy(&(rdata
->rrec
), &(s
->s3
->rrec
), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD
));
228 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
229 if (pqueue_insert(queue
->q
, item
) == NULL
)
237 s
->packet_length
= 0;
238 memset(&(s
->s3
->rbuf
), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER
));
239 memset(&(s
->s3
->rrec
), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD
));
241 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
243 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
254 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL
*s
, record_pqueue
*queue
)
258 item
= pqueue_pop(queue
->q
);
261 dtls1_copy_record(s
, item
);
263 OPENSSL_free(item
->data
);
273 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
275 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
276 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
277 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
279 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
280 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
281 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
282 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
285 dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL
*s
)
289 item
= pqueue_peek(s
->d1
->unprocessed_rcds
.q
);
292 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
*rdata
;
293 rdata
= (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
*)item
->data
;
295 /* Check if epoch is current. */
296 if (s
->d1
->unprocessed_rcds
.epoch
!= s
->d1
->r_epoch
)
297 return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
299 /* Process all the records. */
300 while (pqueue_peek(s
->d1
->unprocessed_rcds
.q
))
302 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s
);
303 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s
))
305 dtls1_buffer_record(s
, &(s
->d1
->processed_rcds
),
306 s
->s3
->rrec
.seq_num
);
310 /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
311 * have been processed */
312 s
->d1
->processed_rcds
.epoch
= s
->d1
->r_epoch
;
313 s
->d1
->unprocessed_rcds
.epoch
= s
->d1
->r_epoch
+ 1;
322 dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL
*s
)
326 (((PQ_64BIT
)s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
) << 32) |
327 ((PQ_64BIT
)s
->d1
->r_msg_hdr
.frag_off
);
329 if ( ! SSL_in_init(s
)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating,
334 item
= pqueue_peek(s
->d1
->rcvd_records
);
335 if (item
&& item
->priority
== priority
)
337 /* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be
338 * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without
340 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
*rdata
;
341 item
= pqueue_pop(s
->d1
->rcvd_records
);
342 rdata
= (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
*)item
->data
;
344 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.buf
!= NULL
)
345 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->rbuf
.buf
);
347 s
->packet
= rdata
->packet
;
348 s
->packet_length
= rdata
->packet_length
;
349 memcpy(&(s
->s3
->rbuf
), &(rdata
->rbuf
), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER
));
350 memcpy(&(s
->s3
->rrec
), &(rdata
->rrec
), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD
));
352 OPENSSL_free(item
->data
);
355 /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
365 dtls1_process_record(SSL
*s
)
372 unsigned int mac_size
;
373 unsigned char md
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
379 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
380 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
382 rr
->input
= &(s
->packet
[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
]);
384 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
385 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
386 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
387 * the decryption or by the decompression
388 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
389 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
391 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
392 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
394 /* check is not needed I believe */
395 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH
)
397 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
398 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD
,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
402 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
405 enc_err
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
,0);
409 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
412 /* otherwise enc_err == -1 */
413 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac
;
417 printf("dec %d\n",rr
->length
);
418 { unsigned int z
; for (z
=0; z
<rr
->length
; z
++) printf("%02X%c",rr
->data
[z
],((z
+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
422 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
423 if ( (sess
== NULL
) ||
424 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
) ||
425 (s
->read_hash
== NULL
))
430 /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
432 t
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->read_hash
);
433 OPENSSL_assert(t
>= 0);
436 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
+mac_size
)
438 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
439 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
440 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD
,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
443 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac
;
446 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
447 if (rr
->length
< mac_size
)
449 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
450 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
451 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD
,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
454 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac
;
457 rr
->length
-=mac_size
;
458 i
=s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
,md
,0);
459 if (i
< 0 || memcmp(md
,&(rr
->data
[rr
->length
]),mac_size
) != 0)
461 goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac
;
465 /* r->length is now just compressed */
466 if (s
->expand
!= NULL
)
468 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
)
470 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
471 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD
,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
474 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s
))
476 al
=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE
;
477 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD
,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION
);
482 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)
484 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
485 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD
,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
490 /* So at this point the following is true
491 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
492 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
493 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
494 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
498 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
500 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s
, &(s
->d1
->bitmap
));/* Mark receipt of record. */
503 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac
:
504 /* Separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
505 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
506 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
507 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
508 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via logfile) */
509 al
=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC
;
510 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC
);
512 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
518 /* Call this to get a new input record.
519 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
520 * or non-blocking IO.
521 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
522 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
523 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
524 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
526 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
527 int dtls1_get_record(SSL
*s
)
529 int ssl_major
,ssl_minor
,al
;
534 unsigned short version
;
535 DTLS1_BITMAP
*bitmap
;
536 unsigned int is_next_epoch
;
541 /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
542 * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
543 if ( ! dtls1_process_buffered_records(s
))
546 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
547 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s
))
550 /* get something from the wire */
552 /* check if we have the header */
553 if ( (s
->rstate
!= SSL_ST_READ_BODY
) ||
554 (s
->packet_length
< DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
))
556 n
=ssl3_read_n(s
, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
->s3
->rbuf
.len
, 0);
557 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
558 if (n
<= 0) return(n
); /* error or non-blocking */
560 OPENSSL_assert(s
->packet_length
== DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
);
562 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_BODY
;
566 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
570 version
=(ssl_major
<<8)|ssl_minor
;
572 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
575 memcpy(&(s
->s3
->read_sequence
[2]), p
, 6);
580 /* Lets check version */
581 if (!s
->first_packet
)
583 if (version
!= s
->version
)
585 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
586 /* Send back error using their
587 * version number :-) */
589 al
=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
594 if ((version
& 0xff00) != (s
->version
& 0xff00))
596 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
600 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH
)
602 al
=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
603 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD
,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
607 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
610 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
612 if (rr
->length
> s
->packet_length
-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
)
614 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
616 n
=ssl3_read_n(s
,i
,i
,1);
617 if (n
<= 0) return(n
); /* error or non-blocking io */
619 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
622 s
->packet_length
= 0;
626 /* now n == rr->length,
627 * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
629 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
; /* set state for later operations */
631 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
632 bitmap
= dtls1_get_bitmap(s
, rr
, &is_next_epoch
);
635 s
->packet_length
= 0; /* dump this record */
636 goto again
; /* get another record */
639 /* check whether this is a repeat, or aged record */
640 if ( ! dtls1_record_replay_check(s
, bitmap
))
643 s
->packet_length
=0; /* dump this record */
644 goto again
; /* get another record */
647 /* just read a 0 length packet */
648 if (rr
->length
== 0) goto again
;
650 /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
651 * buffer it since it cannot be processed at this time. Records
652 * from the next epoch are marked as received even though they
653 * are not processed, so as to prevent any potential resource
657 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s
, bitmap
);
658 dtls1_buffer_record(s
, &(s
->d1
->unprocessed_rcds
), rr
->seq_num
);
659 s
->packet_length
= 0;
663 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s
))
666 dtls1_clear_timeouts(s
); /* done waiting */
670 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
675 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
676 * 'type' is one of the following:
678 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
679 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
680 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
682 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
683 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
685 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
686 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
687 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
688 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
689 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
690 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
691 * Change cipher spec protocol
692 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
694 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
696 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
697 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
698 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
699 * Application data protocol
700 * none of our business
702 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, unsigned char *buf
, int len
, int peek
)
707 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type2
,int val
)=NULL
;
709 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.buf
== NULL
) /* Not initialized yet */
710 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
713 /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
714 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
715 (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && type
) ||
716 (peek
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)))
718 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
722 /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
723 if ( (ret
= have_handshake_fragment(s
, type
, buf
, len
, peek
)))
726 /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
728 if (!s
->in_handshake
&& SSL_in_init(s
))
730 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
731 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
732 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
735 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
741 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
743 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
744 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
745 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
746 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
749 /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
750 * so process data buffered during the last handshake
751 * in advance, if any.
753 if (s
->state
== SSL_ST_OK
&& rr
->length
== 0)
756 item
= pqueue_pop(s
->d1
->buffered_app_data
.q
);
759 dtls1_copy_record(s
, item
);
761 OPENSSL_free(item
->data
);
766 /* get new packet if necessary */
767 if ((rr
->length
== 0) || (s
->rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
))
769 ret
=dtls1_get_record(s
);
772 ret
= dtls1_read_failed(s
, ret
);
773 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
781 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
783 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
784 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
785 && (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
))
787 /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
788 * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
789 * buffer the application data for later processing rather
790 * than dropping the connection.
792 dtls1_buffer_record(s
, &(s
->d1
->buffered_app_data
), 0);
797 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
798 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
799 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
)
802 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
807 if (type
== rr
->type
) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
809 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
810 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
811 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
812 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
))
814 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
815 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
819 if (len
<= 0) return(len
);
821 if ((unsigned int)len
> rr
->length
)
824 n
= (unsigned int)len
;
826 memcpy(buf
,&(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]),n
);
833 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
841 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
842 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
844 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
845 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
848 unsigned int k
, dest_maxlen
= 0;
849 unsigned char *dest
= NULL
;
850 unsigned int *dest_len
= NULL
;
852 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
854 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
;
855 dest
= s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
;
856 dest_len
= &s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
;
858 else if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
)
860 dest_maxlen
= sizeof(s
->d1
->alert_fragment
);
861 dest
= s
->d1
->alert_fragment
;
862 dest_len
= &s
->d1
->alert_fragment_len
;
864 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
865 else if (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
)
867 /* Application data while renegotiating
868 * is allowed. Try again reading.
870 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
873 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
=2;
875 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
876 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
877 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
881 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
882 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
883 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
889 /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
890 * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
891 if ( rr
->length
< dest_maxlen
)
893 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
895 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
896 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
897 * non-existing alert...
901 s
->rstate
=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
906 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
907 for ( k
= 0; k
< dest_maxlen
; k
++)
909 dest
[k
] = rr
->data
[rr
->off
++];
912 *dest_len
= dest_maxlen
;
916 /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
917 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
918 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
920 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
922 (s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
>= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) &&
923 (s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) &&
924 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
))
926 s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
928 if ((s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
[1] != 0) ||
929 (s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
[2] != 0) ||
930 (s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
[3] != 0))
932 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST
);
937 /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
940 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
941 s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
, 4, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
943 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
944 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
) &&
948 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
))
950 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
951 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
954 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
958 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
))
960 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
963 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
964 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
965 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
966 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
967 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
969 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
970 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
976 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
977 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
981 if (s
->d1
->alert_fragment_len
>= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH
)
983 int alert_level
= s
->d1
->alert_fragment
[0];
984 int alert_descr
= s
->d1
->alert_fragment
[1];
986 s
->d1
->alert_fragment_len
= 0;
989 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
,
990 s
->d1
->alert_fragment
, 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
992 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
994 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
995 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
999 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1000 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1003 if (alert_level
== 1) /* warning */
1005 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1006 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
)
1008 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1012 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
1013 /* now check if it's a missing record */
1014 if (alert_descr
== DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
)
1017 unsigned int frag_off
;
1018 unsigned char *p
= &(s
->d1
->alert_fragment
[2]);
1023 dtls1_retransmit_message(s
,
1024 dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag
->msg_header
.seq
, 0),
1026 if ( ! found
&& SSL_in_init(s
))
1028 /* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
1029 /* requested a message not yet sent,
1030 send an alert ourselves */
1031 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_WARNING
,
1032 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
);
1037 else if (alert_level
== 2) /* fatal */
1041 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
1042 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1044 BIO_snprintf(tmp
,sizeof tmp
,"%d",alert_descr
);
1045 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp
);
1046 s
->shutdown
|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1047 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->ctx
,s
->session
);
1052 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1060 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1062 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
1067 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
)
1069 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr
;
1070 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len
= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1072 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr
->data
, &ccs_hdr
);
1074 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
1077 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1078 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1079 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1080 if ( (rr
->length
!= ccs_hdr_len
) ||
1081 (rr
->off
!= 0) || (rr
->data
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
))
1083 i
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
1090 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1091 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
1092 rr
->data
, 1, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1094 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
=1;
1095 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
))
1098 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1099 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
1101 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
1102 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
1107 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1108 if ((s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
>= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) &&
1111 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr
;
1113 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1114 dtls1_get_message_header(rr
->data
, &msg_hdr
);
1115 if( rr
->epoch
!= s
->d1
->r_epoch
)
1121 /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
1122 * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1124 if (msg_hdr
.type
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
)
1126 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s
);
1131 if (((s
->state
&SSL_ST_MASK
) == SSL_ST_OK
) &&
1132 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
))
1134 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1135 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1136 * protocol violations): */
1137 s
->state
=SSL_ST_BEFORE
|(s
->server
)
1141 s
->state
= s
->server
? SSL_ST_ACCEPT
: SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
1145 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
1146 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
1149 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1153 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
))
1155 if (s
->s3
->rbuf
.left
== 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1158 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1159 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1160 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1161 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1162 s
->rwstate
=SSL_READING
;
1163 bio
=SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1164 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1165 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1175 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1176 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1177 if (s
->version
== TLS1_VERSION
)
1183 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1186 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1188 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1189 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1190 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1191 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1192 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1193 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1195 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1196 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1197 * but have application data. If the library was
1198 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1199 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1200 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1201 * we will indulge it.
1203 if (s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
&&
1204 (s
->s3
->total_renegotiations
!= 0) &&
1206 (s
->state
& SSL_ST_CONNECT
) &&
1207 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
) &&
1208 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1210 (s
->state
& SSL_ST_ACCEPT
) &&
1211 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
) &&
1212 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
)
1216 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
=2;
1221 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1229 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1235 dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, int len
)
1240 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !s
->in_handshake
)
1242 i
=s
->handshake_func(s
);
1243 if (i
< 0) return(i
);
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES
,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1256 /* dtls1_write_bytes sends one record at a time, sized according to
1257 * the currently known MTU */
1258 i
= dtls1_write_bytes(s
, type
, buf_
, len
);
1259 if (i
<= 0) return i
;
1261 if ((i
== (int)n
) ||
1262 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
1263 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
)))
1265 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
1266 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
1267 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 0;
1279 /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1282 have_handshake_fragment(SSL
*s
, int type
, unsigned char *buf
,
1286 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1287 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1289 unsigned char *src
= s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
;
1290 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1295 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1298 len
--; s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
--;
1301 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1302 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1303 s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1313 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
1314 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1316 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, int len
)
1318 const unsigned char *buf
=buf_
;
1319 unsigned int tot
,n
,nw
;
1323 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
1328 /* handshake layer figures out MTU for itself, but data records
1329 * are also sent through this interface, so need to figure out MTU */
1331 mtu
= BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU
, 0, NULL
);
1332 mtu
+= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
; /* HM already inserted */
1336 if (mtu
> SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)
1337 mtu
= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1344 i
=do_dtls1_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), nw
, 0);
1351 if ( (int)s
->s3
->wnum
+ i
== len
)
1359 int do_dtls1_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
, unsigned int len
, int create_empty_fragment
)
1361 unsigned char *p
,*pseq
;
1362 int i
,mac_size
,clear
=0;
1369 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
1370 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
1371 if (s
->s3
->wbuf
.left
!= 0)
1373 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1374 return(ssl3_write_pending(s
,type
,buf
,len
));
1377 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1378 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
)
1380 i
=s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
1383 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1386 if (len
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
1393 if ( (sess
== NULL
) ||
1394 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) ||
1395 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
))
1402 mac_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
1407 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
1409 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
1410 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
1411 && SSL_version(s
) != DTLS1_VERSION
&& SSL_version(s
) != DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
1413 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
1414 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
1417 if (s
->s3
->need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
1419 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
1420 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
1421 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
1422 * together with the actual payload) */
1423 prefix_len
= s
->method
->do_ssl_write(s
, type
, buf
, 0, 1);
1424 if (prefix_len
<= 0)
1427 if (s
->s3
->wbuf
.len
< (size_t)prefix_len
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE
)
1429 /* insufficient space */
1430 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1435 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 1;
1438 p
= wb
->buf
+ prefix_len
;
1440 /* write the header */
1445 *(p
++)=(s
->version
>>8);
1446 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
1448 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1452 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1454 /* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC.
1455 * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck).
1457 if ( s
->enc_write_ctx
&&
1458 (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s
->enc_write_ctx
->cipher
) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
))
1459 bs
= EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s
->enc_write_ctx
->cipher
);
1463 wr
->data
=p
+ bs
; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1464 wr
->length
=(int)len
;
1465 wr
->input
=(unsigned char *)buf
;
1467 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1470 /* first we compress */
1471 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
)
1473 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
))
1475 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE
,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
1481 memcpy(wr
->data
,wr
->input
,wr
->length
);
1485 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1486 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1487 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1491 if(s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
,&(p
[wr
->length
+ bs
]),1) < 0)
1493 wr
->length
+=mac_size
;
1496 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1501 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1502 if (bs
) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
1504 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
,bs
);
1505 /* master IV and last CBC residue stand for
1506 * the rest of randomness */
1510 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
,1);
1512 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1513 /* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1514 (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
1516 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1518 s2n(s
->d1
->w_epoch
, pseq
);
1522 s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */
1524 memcpy(pseq
, &(s
->s3
->write_sequence
[2]), 6);
1526 s2n(wr
->length
,pseq
);
1528 /* we should now have
1529 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1530 * wr->length long */
1531 wr
->type
=type
; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1532 wr
->length
+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1534 #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
1535 /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
1536 if ( type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
|| type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
)
1537 dtls1_buffer_record(s
, wr
->data
, wr
->length
,
1538 *((PQ_64BIT
*)&(s
->s3
->write_sequence
[0])));
1541 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s
->s3
->write_sequence
[0]));
1543 if (create_empty_fragment
)
1545 /* we are in a recursive call;
1546 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1551 /* now let's set up wb */
1552 wb
->left
= prefix_len
+ wr
->length
;
1555 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1556 s
->s3
->wpend_tot
=len
;
1557 s
->s3
->wpend_buf
=buf
;
1558 s
->s3
->wpend_type
=type
;
1559 s
->s3
->wpend_ret
=len
;
1561 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1562 return ssl3_write_pending(s
,type
,buf
,len
);
1569 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL
*s
, DTLS1_BITMAP
*bitmap
)
1573 const unsigned char *seq
= s
->s3
->read_sequence
;
1575 cmp
= satsub64be(seq
,bitmap
->max_seq_num
);
1578 memcpy (s
->s3
->rrec
.seq_num
,seq
,8);
1579 return 1; /* this record in new */
1582 if (shift
>= sizeof(bitmap
->map
)*8)
1583 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1584 else if (bitmap
->map
& (1UL<<shift
))
1585 return 0; /* record previously received */
1587 memcpy (s
->s3
->rrec
.seq_num
,seq
,8);
1592 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL
*s
, DTLS1_BITMAP
*bitmap
)
1596 const unsigned char *seq
= s
->s3
->read_sequence
;
1598 cmp
= satsub64be(seq
,bitmap
->max_seq_num
);
1602 if (shift
< sizeof(bitmap
->map
)*8)
1603 bitmap
->map
<<= shift
, bitmap
->map
|= 1UL;
1606 memcpy(bitmap
->max_seq_num
,seq
,8);
1610 if (shift
< sizeof(bitmap
->map
)*8)
1611 bitmap
->map
|= 1UL<<shift
;
1616 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL
*s
)
1619 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
1620 unsigned char buf
[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH
];
1621 unsigned char *ptr
= &buf
[0];
1623 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
=0;
1625 memset(buf
, 0x00, sizeof(buf
));
1626 *ptr
++ = s
->s3
->send_alert
[0];
1627 *ptr
++ = s
->s3
->send_alert
[1];
1629 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1630 if (s
->s3
->send_alert
[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
)
1632 s2n(s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
, ptr
);
1634 if ( s
->d1
->r_msg_hdr
.frag_off
== 0) /* waiting for a new msg */
1637 s2n(s
->d1
->r_msg_hdr
.seq
, ptr
); /* partial msg read */
1641 fprintf(stderr
, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
,s
->d1
->r_msg_hdr
.seq
);
1643 l2n3(s
->d1
->r_msg_hdr
.frag_off
, ptr
);
1647 i
= do_dtls1_write(s
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, &buf
[0], sizeof(buf
), 0);
1650 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
=1;
1651 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1655 if (s
->s3
->send_alert
[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1656 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1657 || s
->s3
->send_alert
[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1660 (void)BIO_flush(s
->wbio
);
1662 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1663 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, s
->s3
->send_alert
,
1664 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1666 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1667 cb
=s
->info_callback
;
1668 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1669 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1673 j
=(s
->s3
->send_alert
[0]<<8)|s
->s3
->send_alert
[1];
1674 cb(s
,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT
,j
);
1681 static DTLS1_BITMAP
*
1682 dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL
*s
, SSL3_RECORD
*rr
, unsigned int *is_next_epoch
)
1687 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1688 if (rr
->epoch
== s
->d1
->r_epoch
)
1689 return &s
->d1
->bitmap
;
1691 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1692 else if (rr
->epoch
== (unsigned long)(s
->d1
->r_epoch
+ 1) &&
1693 (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
||
1694 rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
))
1697 return &s
->d1
->next_bitmap
;
1705 dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL
*s
, SSL3_RECORD
*rr
, unsigned short *priority
,
1706 unsigned long *offset
)
1709 /* alerts are passed up immediately */
1710 if ( rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
||
1711 rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
)
1714 /* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway.
1715 * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up
1717 if ( SSL_in_init(s
))
1719 unsigned char *data
= rr
->data
;
1720 /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
1721 if ( rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
||
1722 rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
)
1724 unsigned short seq_num
;
1725 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr
;
1726 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr
;
1728 if ( rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
1730 dtls1_get_message_header(data
, &msg_hdr
);
1731 seq_num
= msg_hdr
.seq
;
1732 *offset
= msg_hdr
.frag_off
;
1736 dtls1_get_ccs_header(data
, &ccs_hdr
);
1737 seq_num
= ccs_hdr
.seq
;
1741 /* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a
1742 * retransmit of something we happened to previously
1743 * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */
1744 if ( seq_num
< s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
)
1746 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&&
1747 seq_num
== s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
&&
1748 msg_hdr
.frag_off
< s
->d1
->r_msg_hdr
.frag_off
)
1750 else if ( seq_num
== s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
&&
1751 (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
||
1752 msg_hdr
.frag_off
== s
->d1
->r_msg_hdr
.frag_off
))
1756 *priority
= seq_num
;
1760 else /* unknown record type */
1769 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL
*s
, int rw
)
1772 unsigned int seq_bytes
= sizeof(s
->s3
->read_sequence
);
1774 if ( rw
& SSL3_CC_READ
)
1776 seq
= s
->s3
->read_sequence
;
1778 memcpy(&(s
->d1
->bitmap
), &(s
->d1
->next_bitmap
), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP
));
1779 memset(&(s
->d1
->next_bitmap
), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP
));
1783 seq
= s
->s3
->write_sequence
;
1784 memcpy(s
->d1
->last_write_sequence
, seq
, sizeof(s
->s3
->write_sequence
));
1788 memset(seq
, 0x00, seq_bytes
);
1793 dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL
*s
)
1795 memset(&(s
->d1
->timeout
), 0x00, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st
));