3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/evp.h>
121 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123 #include <openssl/rand.h>
125 /* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
126 static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1
, const unsigned char *v2
)
128 int ret
, sat
, brw
, i
;
130 if (sizeof(long) == 8)
140 if (is_endian
.little
)
142 /* not reached on little-endians */
144 * following test is redundant, because input is always aligned,
145 * but I take no chances...
147 if (((size_t)v1
| (size_t)v2
) & 0x7)
160 ret
= (int)v1
[7] - (int)v2
[7];
162 brw
= ret
>> 8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
164 for (i
= 6; i
>= 0; i
--) {
165 brw
+= (int)v1
[i
] - (int)v2
[i
];
170 for (i
= 6; i
>= 0; i
--) {
171 brw
+= (int)v1
[i
] - (int)v2
[i
];
176 brw
<<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
181 return brw
+ (ret
& 0xFF);
184 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL
*s
, int type
, unsigned char *buf
,
186 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL
*s
, DTLS1_BITMAP
*bitmap
);
187 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL
*s
, DTLS1_BITMAP
*bitmap
);
188 static DTLS1_BITMAP
*dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL
*s
, SSL3_RECORD
*rr
,
189 unsigned int *is_next_epoch
);
190 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL
*s
, record_pqueue
*q
,
191 unsigned char *priority
);
192 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL
*s
);
194 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
195 static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL
*s
, pitem
*item
)
197 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
*rdata
;
199 rdata
= (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
*)item
->data
;
201 SSL3_BUFFER_release(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s
->rlayer
));
203 s
->packet
= rdata
->packet
;
204 s
->packet_length
= rdata
->packet_length
;
205 memcpy(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s
->rlayer
), &(rdata
->rbuf
),
206 sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER
));
207 memcpy(&(s
->s3
->rrec
), &(rdata
->rrec
), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD
));
209 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
210 memcpy(&(s
->s3
->read_sequence
[2]), &(rdata
->packet
[5]), 6);
216 dtls1_buffer_record(SSL
*s
, record_pqueue
*queue
, unsigned char *priority
)
218 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
*rdata
;
221 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
222 if (pqueue_size(queue
->q
) >= 100)
225 rdata
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
));
226 item
= pitem_new(priority
, rdata
);
227 if (rdata
== NULL
|| item
== NULL
) {
233 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
237 rdata
->packet
= s
->packet
;
238 rdata
->packet_length
= s
->packet_length
;
239 memcpy(&(rdata
->rbuf
), RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s
->rlayer
),
240 sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER
));
241 memcpy(&(rdata
->rrec
), &(s
->s3
->rrec
), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD
));
245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
246 /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
247 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s
)) &&
248 (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
249 || s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
)) {
250 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO
,
251 sizeof(rdata
->recordinfo
), &rdata
->recordinfo
);
256 s
->packet_length
= 0;
257 memset(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s
->rlayer
), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER
));
258 memset(&(s
->s3
->rrec
), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD
));
260 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
)) {
261 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
262 if (rdata
->rbuf
.buf
!= NULL
)
263 OPENSSL_free(rdata
->rbuf
.buf
);
269 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
270 if (pqueue_insert(queue
->q
, item
) == NULL
) {
271 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
272 if (rdata
->rbuf
.buf
!= NULL
)
273 OPENSSL_free(rdata
->rbuf
.buf
);
282 static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL
*s
, record_pqueue
*queue
)
286 item
= pqueue_pop(queue
->q
);
288 dtls1_copy_record(s
, item
);
290 OPENSSL_free(item
->data
);
300 * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not
303 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
304 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
305 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
308 * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie,
311 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
312 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
313 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
315 static int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL
*s
)
319 item
= pqueue_peek(s
->d1
->unprocessed_rcds
.q
);
321 /* Check if epoch is current. */
322 if (s
->d1
->unprocessed_rcds
.epoch
!= s
->d1
->r_epoch
)
323 return (1); /* Nothing to do. */
325 /* Process all the records. */
326 while (pqueue_peek(s
->d1
->unprocessed_rcds
.q
)) {
327 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s
);
328 if (!dtls1_process_record(s
))
330 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s
, &(s
->d1
->processed_rcds
),
331 s
->s3
->rrec
.seq_num
) < 0)
337 * sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been
340 s
->d1
->processed_rcds
.epoch
= s
->d1
->r_epoch
;
341 s
->d1
->unprocessed_rcds
.epoch
= s
->d1
->r_epoch
+ 1;
346 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL
*s
)
352 unsigned int mac_size
;
353 unsigned char md
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
359 * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
360 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
362 rr
->input
= &(s
->packet
[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
]);
365 * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
366 * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
367 * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
368 * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
372 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
373 * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
376 /* check is not needed I believe */
377 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH
) {
378 al
= SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
379 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD
, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
383 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
384 rr
->data
= rr
->input
;
385 rr
->orig_len
= rr
->length
;
387 enc_err
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, 0);
390 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
391 * 1: if the padding is valid
392 * -1: if the padding is invalid
395 /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
397 s
->packet_length
= 0;
401 printf("dec %d\n", rr
->length
);
404 for (z
= 0; z
< rr
->length
; z
++)
405 printf("%02X%c", rr
->data
[z
], ((z
+ 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
410 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
411 if ((sess
!= NULL
) &&
412 (s
->enc_read_ctx
!= NULL
) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->read_hash
) != NULL
)) {
413 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
414 unsigned char *mac
= NULL
;
415 unsigned char mac_tmp
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
416 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->read_hash
);
417 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
420 * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
421 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
422 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
423 * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
425 if (rr
->orig_len
< mac_size
||
426 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
427 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_read_ctx
) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
&&
428 rr
->orig_len
< mac_size
+ 1)) {
429 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
430 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
434 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_read_ctx
) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
436 * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
437 * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
438 * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
439 * contents of the padding bytes.
442 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp
, rr
, mac_size
);
443 rr
->length
-= mac_size
;
446 * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals
447 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
450 rr
->length
-= mac_size
;
451 mac
= &rr
->data
[rr
->length
];
454 i
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, md
, 0 /* not send */ );
455 if (i
< 0 || mac
== NULL
456 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md
, mac
, (size_t)mac_size
) != 0)
458 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
+ mac_size
)
463 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
465 s
->packet_length
= 0;
469 /* r->length is now just compressed */
470 if (s
->expand
!= NULL
) {
471 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
) {
472 al
= SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
473 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD
,
474 SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
477 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s
)) {
478 al
= SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE
;
479 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD
, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION
);
484 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
) {
485 al
= SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
;
486 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
492 * So at this point the following is true
493 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
494 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
495 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
496 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
500 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
501 s
->packet_length
= 0;
505 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
511 * Call this to get a new input record.
512 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
513 * or non-blocking IO.
514 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
515 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
516 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
517 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
519 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
520 int dtls1_get_record(SSL
*s
)
522 int ssl_major
, ssl_minor
;
525 unsigned char *p
= NULL
;
526 unsigned short version
;
527 DTLS1_BITMAP
*bitmap
;
528 unsigned int is_next_epoch
;
533 * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records.
534 * This is a non-blocking operation.
536 if (dtls1_process_buffered_records(s
) < 0)
539 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
540 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s
))
543 /* get something from the wire */
545 /* check if we have the header */
546 if ((s
->rstate
!= SSL_ST_READ_BODY
) ||
547 (s
->packet_length
< DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
548 n
= ssl3_read_n(s
, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
,
549 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s
->rlayer
)), 0);
550 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
552 return (n
); /* error or non-blocking */
554 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
555 if (s
->packet_length
!= DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
556 s
->packet_length
= 0;
560 s
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_BODY
;
565 s
->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, p
, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
,
566 s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
568 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
572 version
= (ssl_major
<< 8) | ssl_minor
;
574 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
577 memcpy(&(s
->s3
->read_sequence
[2]), p
, 6);
582 /* Lets check version */
583 if (!s
->first_packet
) {
584 if (version
!= s
->version
) {
585 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
587 s
->packet_length
= 0;
592 if ((version
& 0xff00) != (s
->version
& 0xff00)) {
593 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
595 s
->packet_length
= 0;
599 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH
) {
600 /* record too long, silently discard it */
602 s
->packet_length
= 0;
606 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
609 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
611 if (rr
->length
> s
->packet_length
- DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
612 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
614 n
= ssl3_read_n(s
, i
, i
, 1);
615 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
618 s
->packet_length
= 0;
623 * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length ==
624 * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
627 s
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
; /* set state for later operations */
629 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
630 bitmap
= dtls1_get_bitmap(s
, rr
, &is_next_epoch
);
631 if (bitmap
== NULL
) {
633 s
->packet_length
= 0; /* dump this record */
634 goto again
; /* get another record */
636 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
637 /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
638 if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
641 * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. Don't check if
642 * we're listening and this message is a ClientHello. They can look
643 * as if they're replayed, since they arrive from different
644 * connections and would be dropped unnecessarily.
646 if (!(s
->d1
->listen
&& rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&&
647 s
->packet_length
> DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
&&
648 s
->packet
[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) &&
649 !dtls1_record_replay_check(s
, bitmap
)) {
651 s
->packet_length
= 0; /* dump this record */
652 goto again
; /* get another record */
654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
658 /* just read a 0 length packet */
663 * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a
664 * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be
665 * processed at this time. However, do not buffer anything while
669 if ((SSL_in_init(s
) || s
->in_handshake
) && !s
->d1
->listen
) {
670 if (dtls1_buffer_record
671 (s
, &(s
->d1
->unprocessed_rcds
), rr
->seq_num
) < 0)
673 /* Mark receipt of record. */
674 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s
, bitmap
);
677 s
->packet_length
= 0;
681 if (!dtls1_process_record(s
)) {
683 s
->packet_length
= 0; /* dump this record */
684 goto again
; /* get another record */
686 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s
, bitmap
); /* Mark receipt of record. */
693 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
694 * 'type' is one of the following:
696 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
697 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
698 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
700 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
701 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
703 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
704 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
705 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
706 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
707 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
708 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
709 * Change cipher spec protocol
710 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
712 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
714 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
715 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
716 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
717 * Application data protocol
718 * none of our business
720 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, unsigned char *buf
, int len
, int peek
)
725 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
727 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s
->rlayer
))) {
728 /* Not initialized yet */
729 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
733 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
734 (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) ||
735 (peek
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
736 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
741 * check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting
743 if ((ret
= have_handshake_fragment(s
, type
, buf
, len
, peek
)))
747 * Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
752 * Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read app data with
755 if ((!s
->in_handshake
&& SSL_in_init(s
)) ||
756 (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s
)) &&
757 (s
->state
== DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK
758 || s
->state
== DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK
)
759 && s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
!= 2))
761 if (!s
->in_handshake
&& SSL_in_init(s
))
764 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
765 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
769 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
775 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
778 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
779 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
780 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
781 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
786 * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered
787 * during the last handshake in advance, if any.
789 if (s
->state
== SSL_ST_OK
&& rr
->length
== 0) {
791 item
= pqueue_pop(s
->d1
->buffered_app_data
.q
);
793 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
794 /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
795 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
796 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
*rdata
= (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA
*)item
->data
;
797 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO
,
798 sizeof(rdata
->recordinfo
), &rdata
->recordinfo
);
802 dtls1_copy_record(s
, item
);
804 OPENSSL_free(item
->data
);
809 /* Check for timeout */
810 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s
) > 0)
813 /* get new packet if necessary */
814 if ((rr
->length
== 0) || (s
->rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
)) {
815 ret
= dtls1_get_record(s
);
817 ret
= dtls1_read_failed(s
, ret
);
818 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
826 if (s
->d1
->listen
&& rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
831 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
833 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
834 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
835 && (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
837 * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely
838 * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application
839 * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection.
841 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s
, &(s
->d1
->buffered_app_data
), rr
->seq_num
) <
843 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
851 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
854 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
856 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
860 if (type
== rr
->type
) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
861 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
863 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
864 * doing a handshake for the first time
866 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
867 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
)) {
868 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
869 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
876 if ((unsigned int)len
> rr
->length
)
879 n
= (unsigned int)len
;
881 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
885 if (rr
->length
== 0) {
886 s
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
892 * We were about to renegotiate but had to read belated application
893 * data first, so retry.
895 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s
)) &&
896 rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
897 (s
->state
== DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK
898 || s
->state
== DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK
)) {
899 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
900 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
901 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
905 * We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered
906 * app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read
907 * anymore, finally set shutdown.
909 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s
)) &&
910 s
->d1
->shutdown_received
911 && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
912 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
920 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
921 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
925 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
926 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
929 unsigned int k
, dest_maxlen
= 0;
930 unsigned char *dest
= NULL
;
931 unsigned int *dest_len
= NULL
;
933 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
934 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
;
935 dest
= s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
;
936 dest_len
= &s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
;
937 } else if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
938 dest_maxlen
= sizeof(s
->d1
->alert_fragment
);
939 dest
= s
->d1
->alert_fragment
;
940 dest_len
= &s
->d1
->alert_fragment_len
;
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
943 else if (rr
->type
== TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT
) {
944 /* We allow a 0 return */
945 if(dtls1_process_heartbeat(s
) < 0) {
949 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
951 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
952 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
953 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
957 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
958 else if (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
960 * Application data while renegotiating is allowed. Try again
963 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
965 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
966 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
967 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
968 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
969 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
973 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
974 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
975 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
979 if (dest_maxlen
> 0) {
981 * XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello may be
982 * fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes
984 if (rr
->length
< dest_maxlen
) {
985 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
987 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
988 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
989 * non-existing alert...
993 s
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
998 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
999 for (k
= 0; k
< dest_maxlen
; k
++) {
1000 dest
[k
] = rr
->data
[rr
->off
++];
1003 *dest_len
= dest_maxlen
;
1008 * s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1009 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1010 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1013 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1015 (s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
>= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) &&
1016 (s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) &&
1017 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)) {
1018 s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
1020 if ((s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
[1] != 0) ||
1021 (s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
[2] != 0) ||
1022 (s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
[3] != 0)) {
1023 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1024 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST
);
1029 * no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages
1032 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1033 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
1034 s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
, 4, s
,
1035 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1037 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1038 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
) &&
1039 !s
->s3
->renegotiate
) {
1040 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
1042 ssl3_renegotiate(s
);
1043 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
)) {
1044 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,
1049 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1053 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1054 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(
1055 RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s
->rlayer
)) == 0) {
1056 /* no read-ahead left? */
1059 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1060 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1061 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1062 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1064 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1065 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1066 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1067 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1074 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1075 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1080 if (s
->d1
->alert_fragment_len
>= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
1081 int alert_level
= s
->d1
->alert_fragment
[0];
1082 int alert_descr
= s
->d1
->alert_fragment
[1];
1084 s
->d1
->alert_fragment_len
= 0;
1086 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1087 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
,
1088 s
->d1
->alert_fragment
, 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1090 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1091 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1092 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1093 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1096 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1097 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1100 if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
1101 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1102 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
) {
1103 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1105 * With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
1106 * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so
1107 * that nothing gets discarded.
1109 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s
)) &&
1110 BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
1111 s
->d1
->shutdown_received
= 1;
1112 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1113 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1114 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1118 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1122 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
1123 /* now check if it's a missing record */
1124 if (alert_descr
== DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
) {
1126 unsigned int frag_off
;
1127 unsigned char *p
= &(s
->d1
->alert_fragment
[2]);
1132 dtls1_retransmit_message(s
,
1133 dtls1_get_queue_priority
1134 (frag
->msg_header
.seq
, 0), frag_off
,
1136 if (!found
&& SSL_in_init(s
)) {
1138 * fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s));
1141 * requested a message not yet sent, send an alert
1144 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
,
1145 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
);
1149 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
1152 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1153 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
,
1155 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1156 BIO_snprintf(tmp
, sizeof tmp
, "%d", alert_descr
);
1157 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp
);
1158 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1159 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->ctx
, s
->session
);
1162 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1163 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1170 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) { /* but we have not received a
1172 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1177 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1178 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr
;
1179 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len
= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1181 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr
->data
, &ccs_hdr
);
1183 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
1187 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
1188 * what the record payload has to look like
1190 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1191 if ((rr
->length
!= ccs_hdr_len
) ||
1192 (rr
->off
!= 0) || (rr
->data
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
1193 i
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
1200 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1201 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
1202 rr
->data
, 1, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1205 * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages
1206 * are still missing, so just drop it.
1208 if (!s
->d1
->change_cipher_spec_ok
) {
1212 s
->d1
->change_cipher_spec_ok
= 0;
1214 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
1215 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
))
1218 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1219 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
1221 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
1222 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
1224 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1226 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
1227 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
1230 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
1237 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1239 if ((s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
>= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) &&
1241 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr
;
1243 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1244 dtls1_get_message_header(rr
->data
, &msg_hdr
);
1245 if (rr
->epoch
!= s
->d1
->r_epoch
) {
1251 * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client
1252 * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1254 if (msg_hdr
.type
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
1255 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s
) < 0)
1258 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s
);
1263 if (((s
->state
& SSL_ST_MASK
) == SSL_ST_OK
) &&
1264 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
)) {
1265 s
->state
= s
->server
? SSL_ST_ACCEPT
: SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
1269 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1277 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1278 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(
1279 RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s
->rlayer
)) == 0) {
1280 /* no read-ahead left? */
1283 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1284 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1285 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1286 * problems in the blocking world
1288 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1289 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1290 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1291 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1300 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1301 if (s
->version
== TLS1_VERSION
) {
1305 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1306 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1308 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1310 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1312 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1313 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
1314 * happen when type != rr->type
1316 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1317 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1319 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1321 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1322 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1323 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1324 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1325 * started), we will indulge it.
1327 if (s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
&&
1328 (s
->s3
->total_renegotiations
!= 0) &&
1329 (((s
->state
& SSL_ST_CONNECT
) &&
1330 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
) &&
1331 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1332 ) || ((s
->state
& SSL_ST_ACCEPT
) &&
1333 (s
->state
<= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
) &&
1334 (s
->state
>= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
)
1337 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
1340 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1348 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1353 int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, int len
)
1357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1359 * Check if we have to continue an interrupted handshake for reading
1360 * belated app data with SCTP.
1362 if ((SSL_in_init(s
) && !s
->in_handshake
) ||
1363 (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)) &&
1364 (s
->state
== DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK
1365 || s
->state
== DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK
)))
1367 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !s
->in_handshake
)
1370 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1374 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES
,
1375 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1380 if (len
> SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
) {
1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES
, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG
);
1385 i
= dtls1_write_bytes(s
, type
, buf_
, len
);
1390 * this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1394 have_handshake_fragment(SSL
*s
, int type
, unsigned char *buf
,
1398 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1399 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1401 unsigned char *src
= s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
;
1402 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1407 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
1410 s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
--;
1413 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1414 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->d1
->handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1415 s
->d1
->handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1423 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
1424 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1426 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf
, int len
)
1430 OPENSSL_assert(len
<= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
);
1431 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1432 i
= do_dtls1_write(s
, type
, buf
, len
, 0);
1436 int do_dtls1_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
1437 unsigned int len
, int create_empty_fragment
)
1439 unsigned char *p
, *pseq
;
1440 int i
, mac_size
, clear
= 0;
1448 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
1449 * will happen with non blocking IO
1451 if (s
->s3
->wbuf
.left
!= 0) {
1452 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1453 return (ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, len
));
1456 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1457 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
1458 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
1461 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1464 if (len
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
1467 wr
= &(s
->s3
->wrec
);
1468 wb
= &(s
->s3
->wbuf
);
1471 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
1472 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
))
1478 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
1483 p
= wb
->buf
+ prefix_len
;
1485 /* write the header */
1487 *(p
++) = type
& 0xff;
1490 * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
1491 * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0
1492 * header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
1494 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1495 *(p
++) = DTLS1_VERSION
>> 8;
1496 *(p
++) = DTLS1_VERSION
& 0xff;
1498 *(p
++) = s
->version
>> 8;
1499 *(p
++) = s
->version
& 0xff;
1502 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1506 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
1507 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
) {
1508 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
1509 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
1510 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
1514 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
1515 else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
)
1516 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
1522 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1523 wr
->data
= p
+ eivlen
; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1524 wr
->length
= (int)len
;
1525 wr
->input
= (unsigned char *)buf
;
1528 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
1531 /* first we compress */
1532 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
) {
1533 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
)) {
1534 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
1538 memcpy(wr
->data
, wr
->input
, wr
->length
);
1539 wr
->input
= wr
->data
;
1543 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
1544 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
1548 if (mac_size
!= 0) {
1549 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, &(p
[wr
->length
+ eivlen
]), 1) < 0)
1551 wr
->length
+= mac_size
;
1554 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1559 wr
->length
+= eivlen
;
1561 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, 1) < 1)
1564 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1566 * if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && !
1570 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1572 s2n(s
->d1
->w_epoch
, pseq
);
1576 * else s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq);
1579 memcpy(pseq
, &(s
->s3
->write_sequence
[2]), 6);
1581 s2n(wr
->length
, pseq
);
1583 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1584 s
->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, pseq
- DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
,
1585 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1588 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1591 wr
->type
= type
; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1592 wr
->length
+= DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1594 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s
->s3
->write_sequence
[0]));
1596 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
1598 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1604 /* now let's set up wb */
1605 wb
->left
= prefix_len
+ wr
->length
;
1609 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1612 s
->s3
->wpend_tot
= len
;
1613 s
->s3
->wpend_buf
= buf
;
1614 s
->s3
->wpend_type
= type
;
1615 s
->s3
->wpend_ret
= len
;
1617 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1618 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, len
);
1623 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL
*s
, DTLS1_BITMAP
*bitmap
)
1627 const unsigned char *seq
= s
->s3
->read_sequence
;
1629 cmp
= satsub64be(seq
, bitmap
->max_seq_num
);
1631 memcpy(s
->s3
->rrec
.seq_num
, seq
, 8);
1632 return 1; /* this record in new */
1635 if (shift
>= sizeof(bitmap
->map
) * 8)
1636 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1637 else if (bitmap
->map
& (1UL << shift
))
1638 return 0; /* record previously received */
1640 memcpy(s
->s3
->rrec
.seq_num
, seq
, 8);
1644 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL
*s
, DTLS1_BITMAP
*bitmap
)
1648 const unsigned char *seq
= s
->s3
->read_sequence
;
1650 cmp
= satsub64be(seq
, bitmap
->max_seq_num
);
1653 if (shift
< sizeof(bitmap
->map
) * 8)
1654 bitmap
->map
<<= shift
, bitmap
->map
|= 1UL;
1657 memcpy(bitmap
->max_seq_num
, seq
, 8);
1660 if (shift
< sizeof(bitmap
->map
) * 8)
1661 bitmap
->map
|= 1UL << shift
;
1665 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL
*s
)
1668 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
1669 unsigned char buf
[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH
];
1670 unsigned char *ptr
= &buf
[0];
1672 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
= 0;
1674 memset(buf
, 0x00, sizeof(buf
));
1675 *ptr
++ = s
->s3
->send_alert
[0];
1676 *ptr
++ = s
->s3
->send_alert
[1];
1678 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1679 if (s
->s3
->send_alert
[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
) {
1680 s2n(s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
, ptr
);
1681 l2n3(s
->d1
->r_msg_hdr
.frag_off
, ptr
);
1685 i
= do_dtls1_write(s
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, &buf
[0], sizeof(buf
), 0);
1687 s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
= 1;
1688 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1690 if (s
->s3
->send_alert
[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1691 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1692 || s
->s3
->send_alert
[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1695 (void)BIO_flush(s
->wbio
);
1697 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1698 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, s
->s3
->send_alert
,
1699 2, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1701 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1702 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1703 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1704 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1707 j
= (s
->s3
->send_alert
[0] << 8) | s
->s3
->send_alert
[1];
1708 cb(s
, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT
, j
);
1714 static DTLS1_BITMAP
*dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL
*s
, SSL3_RECORD
*rr
,
1715 unsigned int *is_next_epoch
)
1720 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1721 if (rr
->epoch
== s
->d1
->r_epoch
)
1722 return &s
->d1
->bitmap
;
1724 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1725 else if (rr
->epoch
== (unsigned long)(s
->d1
->r_epoch
+ 1) &&
1726 (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
|| rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
1728 return &s
->d1
->next_bitmap
;
1734 void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL
*s
, int rw
)
1737 unsigned int seq_bytes
= sizeof(s
->s3
->read_sequence
);
1739 if (rw
& SSL3_CC_READ
) {
1740 seq
= s
->s3
->read_sequence
;
1742 memcpy(&(s
->d1
->bitmap
), &(s
->d1
->next_bitmap
), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP
));
1743 memset(&(s
->d1
->next_bitmap
), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP
));
1745 seq
= s
->s3
->write_sequence
;
1746 memcpy(s
->d1
->last_write_sequence
, seq
,
1747 sizeof(s
->s3
->write_sequence
));
1751 memset(seq
, 0x00, seq_bytes
);