2 * Copyright 2018-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 #include "../../ssl_local.h"
12 #include "../record_local.h"
13 #include "recmethod_local.h"
15 /* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
16 static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1
, const unsigned char *v2
)
26 /* We do not permit wrap-around */
27 if (l1
> l2
&& ret
< 0)
29 else if (l2
> l1
&& ret
> 0)
40 static int dtls_record_replay_check(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, DTLS_BITMAP
*bitmap
)
44 const unsigned char *seq
= rl
->sequence
;
46 cmp
= satsub64be(seq
, bitmap
->max_seq_num
);
48 ossl_tls_rl_record_set_seq_num(&rl
->rrec
[0], seq
);
49 return 1; /* this record in new */
52 if (shift
>= sizeof(bitmap
->map
) * 8)
53 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
54 else if (bitmap
->map
& ((uint64_t)1 << shift
))
55 return 0; /* record previously received */
57 ossl_tls_rl_record_set_seq_num(&rl
->rrec
[0], seq
);
61 static void dtls_record_bitmap_update(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
*rl
,
66 const unsigned char *seq
= rl
->sequence
;
68 cmp
= satsub64be(seq
, bitmap
->max_seq_num
);
71 if (shift
< sizeof(bitmap
->map
) * 8)
72 bitmap
->map
<<= shift
, bitmap
->map
|= 1UL;
75 memcpy(bitmap
->max_seq_num
, seq
, SEQ_NUM_SIZE
);
78 if (shift
< sizeof(bitmap
->map
) * 8)
79 bitmap
->map
|= (uint64_t)1 << shift
;
83 static DTLS_BITMAP
*dtls_get_bitmap(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, TLS_RL_RECORD
*rr
,
84 unsigned int *is_next_epoch
)
88 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
89 if (rr
->epoch
== rl
->epoch
)
93 * Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch and only if we
94 * have already processed all of the unprocessed records from the last
97 else if (rr
->epoch
== (unsigned long)(rl
->epoch
+ 1)
98 && rl
->unprocessed_rcds
.epoch
!= rl
->epoch
99 && (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
|| rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
101 return &rl
->next_bitmap
;
107 static void dtls_set_in_init(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, int in_init
)
109 rl
->in_init
= in_init
;
112 static int dtls_process_record(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, DTLS_BITMAP
*bitmap
)
119 unsigned char md
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
120 SSL_MAC_BUF macbuf
= { NULL
, 0 };
126 * At this point, rl->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length,
127 * and we have that many bytes in rl->packet
129 rr
->input
= &(rl
->packet
[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
]);
132 * ok, we can now read from 'rl->packet' data into 'rr'. rr->input
133 * points at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by
134 * either the decryption or by the decompression. When the data is 'copied'
135 * into the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
139 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
140 * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
143 /* check is not needed I believe */
144 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH
) {
145 RLAYERfatal(rl
, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
149 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
150 rr
->data
= rr
->input
;
151 rr
->orig_len
= rr
->length
;
153 if (rl
->md_ctx
!= NULL
) {
154 const EVP_MD
*tmpmd
= EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(rl
->md_ctx
);
157 imac_size
= EVP_MD_get_size(tmpmd
);
158 if (!ossl_assert(imac_size
>= 0 && imac_size
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)) {
159 RLAYERfatal(rl
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
162 mac_size
= (size_t)imac_size
;
166 if (rl
->use_etm
&& rl
->md_ctx
!= NULL
) {
169 if (rr
->orig_len
< mac_size
) {
170 RLAYERfatal(rl
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
173 rr
->length
-= mac_size
;
174 mac
= rr
->data
+ rr
->length
;
175 i
= rl
->funcs
->mac(rl
, rr
, md
, 0 /* not send */);
176 if (i
== 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md
, mac
, (size_t)mac_size
) != 0) {
177 RLAYERfatal(rl
, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC
,
178 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC
);
182 * We've handled the mac now - there is no MAC inside the encrypted
189 * Set a mark around the packet decryption attempt. This is DTLS, so
190 * bad packets are just ignored, and we don't want to leave stray
191 * errors in the queue from processing bogus junk that we ignored.
194 enc_err
= rl
->funcs
->cipher(rl
, rr
, 1, 0, &macbuf
, mac_size
);
198 * 0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error, or AEAD
199 * decryption failed, or ETM decryption failed.
200 * 1: Success or MTE decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
204 if (rl
->alert
!= SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
) {
205 /* RLAYERfatal() already called */
208 /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
210 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
213 ERR_clear_last_mark();
214 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS
) {
215 BIO_printf(trc_out
, "dec %zd\n", rr
->length
);
216 BIO_dump_indent(trc_out
, rr
->data
, rr
->length
, 4);
217 } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS
);
219 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
221 && (rl
->enc_ctx
!= NULL
)
222 && (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(rl
->md_ctx
) != NULL
)) {
223 /* rl->md_ctx != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
225 i
= rl
->funcs
->mac(rl
, rr
, md
, 0 /* not send */);
226 if (i
== 0 || macbuf
.mac
== NULL
227 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md
, macbuf
.mac
, mac_size
) != 0)
229 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
+ mac_size
)
234 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
236 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
240 /* r->length is now just compressed */
241 if (rl
->compctx
!= NULL
) {
242 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH
) {
243 RLAYERfatal(rl
, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
,
244 SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
247 if (!tls_do_uncompress(rl
, rr
)) {
248 RLAYERfatal(rl
, SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE
, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION
);
254 * Check if the received packet overflows the current Max Fragment
257 if (rr
->length
> rl
->max_frag_len
) {
258 RLAYERfatal(rl
, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
264 * So at this point the following is true
265 * ssl->s3.rrec.type is the type of record
266 * ssl->s3.rrec.length == number of bytes in record
267 * ssl->s3.rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
268 * ssl->s3.rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
272 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
273 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
275 /* Mark receipt of record. */
276 dtls_record_bitmap_update(rl
, bitmap
);
281 OPENSSL_free(macbuf
.mac
);
285 static int dtls_rlayer_buffer_record(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, record_pqueue
*queue
,
286 unsigned char *priority
)
288 DTLS_RLAYER_RECORD_DATA
*rdata
;
291 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
292 if (pqueue_size(queue
->q
) >= 100)
295 rdata
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*rdata
));
296 item
= pitem_new(priority
, rdata
);
297 if (rdata
== NULL
|| item
== NULL
) {
300 RLAYERfatal(rl
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
304 rdata
->packet
= rl
->packet
;
305 rdata
->packet_length
= rl
->packet_length
;
306 memcpy(&(rdata
->rbuf
), &rl
->rbuf
, sizeof(TLS_BUFFER
));
307 memcpy(&(rdata
->rrec
), &rl
->rrec
[0], sizeof(TLS_RL_RECORD
));
312 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
313 memset(&rl
->rbuf
, 0, sizeof(TLS_BUFFER
));
314 memset(&rl
->rrec
[0], 0, sizeof(rl
->rrec
[0]));
316 if (!tls_setup_read_buffer(rl
)) {
317 /* RLAYERfatal() already called */
318 OPENSSL_free(rdata
->rbuf
.buf
);
324 if (pqueue_insert(queue
->q
, item
) == NULL
) {
325 /* Must be a duplicate so ignore it */
326 OPENSSL_free(rdata
->rbuf
.buf
);
334 /* copy buffered record into OSSL_RECORD_LAYER structure */
335 static int dtls_copy_rlayer_record(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, pitem
*item
)
337 DTLS_RLAYER_RECORD_DATA
*rdata
;
339 rdata
= (DTLS_RLAYER_RECORD_DATA
*)item
->data
;
341 ossl_tls_buffer_release(&rl
->rbuf
);
343 rl
->packet
= rdata
->packet
;
344 rl
->packet_length
= rdata
->packet_length
;
345 memcpy(&rl
->rbuf
, &(rdata
->rbuf
), sizeof(TLS_BUFFER
));
346 memcpy(&rl
->rrec
[0], &(rdata
->rrec
), sizeof(TLS_RL_RECORD
));
348 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
349 memcpy(&(rl
->sequence
[2]), &(rdata
->packet
[5]), 6);
354 static int dtls_retrieve_rlayer_buffered_record(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
*rl
,
355 record_pqueue
*queue
)
359 item
= pqueue_pop(queue
->q
);
361 dtls_copy_rlayer_record(rl
, item
);
363 OPENSSL_free(item
->data
);
373 * Call this to get a new input record.
374 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
375 * or non-blocking IO.
376 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
377 * ssl->s3.rrec.type - is the type of record
378 * ssl->s3.rrec.data - data
379 * ssl->s3.rrec.length - number of bytes
381 int dtls_get_more_records(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
383 int ssl_major
, ssl_minor
;
387 unsigned char *p
= NULL
;
388 unsigned short version
;
390 unsigned int is_next_epoch
;
394 rl
->num_released
= 0;
398 if (rl
->rbuf
.buf
== NULL
) {
399 if (!tls_setup_read_buffer(rl
)) {
400 /* RLAYERfatal() already called */
401 return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL
;
406 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
407 if (dtls_retrieve_rlayer_buffered_record(rl
, &rl
->processed_rcds
)) {
409 return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS
;
412 /* get something from the wire */
414 /* check if we have the header */
415 if ((rl
->rstate
!= SSL_ST_READ_BODY
) ||
416 (rl
->packet_length
< DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
417 rret
= rl
->funcs
->read_n(rl
, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
,
418 TLS_BUFFER_get_len(&rl
->rbuf
), 0, 1, &n
);
419 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
420 if (rret
< OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS
) {
421 /* RLAYERfatal() already called if appropriate */
422 return rret
; /* error or non-blocking */
425 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
426 if (rl
->packet_length
!= DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
427 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
431 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_BODY
;
435 if (rl
->msg_callback
!= NULL
)
436 rl
->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, p
, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
,
439 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
443 version
= (ssl_major
<< 8) | ssl_minor
;
445 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
448 memcpy(&(rl
->sequence
[2]), p
, 6);
454 * Lets check the version. We tolerate alerts that don't have the exact
455 * version number (e.g. because of protocol version errors)
457 if (!rl
->is_first_record
&& rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
458 if (version
!= rl
->version
) {
459 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
461 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
467 (rl
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
? DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR
468 : rl
->version
>> 8)) {
469 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
471 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
475 if (rr
->length
> SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH
) {
476 /* record too long, silently discard it */
478 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
483 * If received packet overflows maximum possible fragment length then
484 * silently discard it
486 if (rr
->length
> rl
->max_frag_len
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
) {
487 /* record too long, silently discard it */
489 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
493 /* now rl->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
496 /* rl->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
498 if (rr
->length
> rl
->packet_length
- DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
499 /* now rl->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
501 rret
= rl
->funcs
->read_n(rl
, more
, more
, 1, 1, &n
);
502 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
503 if (rret
< OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS
|| n
!= more
) {
504 if (rl
->alert
!= SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
) {
505 /* read_n() called RLAYERfatal() */
506 return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL
;
509 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
514 * now n == rr->length,
515 * and rl->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
518 /* set state for later operations */
519 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
521 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
522 bitmap
= dtls_get_bitmap(rl
, rr
, &is_next_epoch
);
523 if (bitmap
== NULL
) {
525 rl
->packet_length
= 0; /* dump this record */
526 goto again
; /* get another record */
528 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
529 /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
530 if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(rl
->bio
)) {
532 /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. */
533 if (!dtls_record_replay_check(rl
, bitmap
)) {
535 rl
->packet_length
= 0; /* dump this record */
536 goto again
; /* get another record */
538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
542 /* just read a 0 length packet */
547 * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a
548 * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be
549 * processed at this time.
553 if (dtls_rlayer_buffer_record(rl
, &(rl
->unprocessed_rcds
),
555 /* RLAYERfatal() already called */
556 return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL
;
560 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
564 if (!dtls_process_record(rl
, bitmap
)) {
565 if (rl
->alert
!= SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
) {
566 /* dtls_process_record() called RLAYERfatal */
567 return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL
;
570 rl
->packet_length
= 0; /* dump this record */
571 goto again
; /* get another record */
575 return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS
;
578 static int dtls_free(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
581 size_t left
, written
;
583 DTLS_RLAYER_RECORD_DATA
*rdata
;
591 * This record layer is closing but we still have data left in our
592 * buffer. It must be destined for the next epoch - so push it there.
594 ret
= BIO_write_ex(rl
->next
, rbuf
->buf
+ rbuf
->offset
, left
, &written
);
598 if (rl
->unprocessed_rcds
.q
!= NULL
) {
599 while ((item
= pqueue_pop(rl
->unprocessed_rcds
.q
)) != NULL
) {
600 rdata
= (DTLS_RLAYER_RECORD_DATA
*)item
->data
;
601 /* Push to the next record layer */
602 ret
&= BIO_write_ex(rl
->next
, rdata
->packet
, rdata
->packet_length
,
604 OPENSSL_free(rdata
->rbuf
.buf
);
605 OPENSSL_free(item
->data
);
608 pqueue_free(rl
->unprocessed_rcds
.q
);
611 if (rl
->processed_rcds
.q
!= NULL
) {
612 while ((item
= pqueue_pop(rl
->processed_rcds
.q
)) != NULL
) {
613 rdata
= (DTLS_RLAYER_RECORD_DATA
*)item
->data
;
614 OPENSSL_free(rdata
->rbuf
.buf
);
615 OPENSSL_free(item
->data
);
618 pqueue_free(rl
->processed_rcds
.q
);
621 return tls_free(rl
) && ret
;
625 dtls_new_record_layer(OSSL_LIB_CTX
*libctx
, const char *propq
, int vers
,
626 int role
, int direction
, int level
, uint16_t epoch
,
627 unsigned char *key
, size_t keylen
, unsigned char *iv
,
628 size_t ivlen
, unsigned char *mackey
, size_t mackeylen
,
629 const EVP_CIPHER
*ciph
, size_t taglen
,
631 const EVP_MD
*md
, COMP_METHOD
*comp
, BIO
*prev
,
632 BIO
*transport
, BIO
*next
, BIO_ADDR
*local
, BIO_ADDR
*peer
,
633 const OSSL_PARAM
*settings
, const OSSL_PARAM
*options
,
634 const OSSL_DISPATCH
*fns
, void *cbarg
,
635 OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
**retrl
)
639 ret
= tls_int_new_record_layer(libctx
, propq
, vers
, role
, direction
, level
,
640 key
, keylen
, iv
, ivlen
, mackey
, mackeylen
,
641 ciph
, taglen
, mactype
, md
, comp
, prev
,
642 transport
, next
, local
, peer
, settings
,
643 options
, fns
, cbarg
, retrl
);
645 if (ret
!= OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS
)
648 (*retrl
)->unprocessed_rcds
.q
= pqueue_new();
649 (*retrl
)->processed_rcds
.q
= pqueue_new();
650 if ((*retrl
)->unprocessed_rcds
.q
== NULL
651 || (*retrl
)->processed_rcds
.q
== NULL
) {
654 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_SSL_LIB
);
655 return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL
;
658 (*retrl
)->unprocessed_rcds
.epoch
= epoch
+ 1;
659 (*retrl
)->processed_rcds
.epoch
= epoch
;
661 (*retrl
)->isdtls
= 1;
662 (*retrl
)->epoch
= epoch
;
663 (*retrl
)->in_init
= 1;
666 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
667 (*retrl
)->funcs
= &dtls_any_funcs
;
669 case DTLS1_2_VERSION
:
672 (*retrl
)->funcs
= &dtls_1_funcs
;
675 /* Should not happen */
676 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
677 ret
= OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL
;
681 ret
= (*retrl
)->funcs
->set_crypto_state(*retrl
, level
, key
, keylen
, iv
,
682 ivlen
, mackey
, mackeylen
, ciph
,
683 taglen
, mactype
, md
, comp
);
686 if (ret
!= OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS
) {
687 OPENSSL_free(*retrl
);
693 int dtls_prepare_record_header(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
*rl
,
695 OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE
*templ
,
696 unsigned int rectype
,
697 unsigned char **recdata
)
703 maxcomplen
= templ
->buflen
;
704 if (rl
->compctx
!= NULL
)
705 maxcomplen
+= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD
;
707 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt
, rectype
)
708 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt
, templ
->version
)
709 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt
, rl
->epoch
)
710 || !WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt
, &(rl
->sequence
[2]), 6)
711 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt
)
713 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, rl
->eivlen
, NULL
))
715 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt
, maxcomplen
,
717 RLAYERfatal(rl
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
724 int dtls_post_encryption_processing(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
*rl
,
726 OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE
*thistempl
,
728 TLS_RL_RECORD
*thiswr
)
730 if (!tls_post_encryption_processing_default(rl
, mac_size
, thistempl
,
732 /* RLAYERfatal() already called */
736 return tls_increment_sequence_ctr(rl
);
739 static size_t dtls_get_max_record_overhead(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
741 size_t blocksize
= 0;
743 if (rl
->enc_ctx
!= NULL
&&
744 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(rl
->enc_ctx
) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
))
745 blocksize
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_block_size(rl
->enc_ctx
);
748 * If we have a cipher in place then the tag is mandatory. If the cipher is
749 * CBC mode then an explicit IV is also mandatory. If we know the digest,
750 * then we check it is consistent with the taglen. In the case of stitched
751 * ciphers or AEAD ciphers we don't now the digest (or there isn't one) so
752 * we just trust that the taglen is correct.
754 assert(rl
->enc_ctx
== NULL
|| ((blocksize
== 0 || rl
->eivlen
> 0)
756 assert(rl
->md
== NULL
|| (int)rl
->taglen
== EVP_MD_size(rl
->md
));
759 * Record overhead consists of the record header, the explicit IV, any
760 * expansion due to cbc padding, and the mac/tag len. There could be
761 * further expansion due to compression - but we don't know what this will
762 * be without knowing the length of the data. However when this function is
763 * called we don't know what the length will be yet - so this is a catch-22.
764 * We *could* use SSL_3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD which is an upper limit
765 * for the maximum record size. But this value is larger than our fallback
766 * MTU size - so isn't very helpful. We just ignore potential expansion
767 * due to compression.
769 return DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ rl
->eivlen
+ blocksize
+ rl
->taglen
;
772 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD ossl_dtls_record_method
= {
773 dtls_new_record_layer
,
776 tls_unprocessed_read_pending
,
777 tls_processed_read_pending
,
778 tls_app_data_pending
,
781 tls_retry_write_records
,
786 tls_set_protocol_version
,
788 tls_set_first_handshake
,
789 tls_set_max_pipelines
,
794 tls_set_max_frag_len
,
795 dtls_get_max_record_overhead
,
796 tls_increment_sequence_ctr
,