ssl/record/methods/tls1_meth.c

   1 /*
   2  * Copyright 2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
   3  *
   4  * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
   5  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
   6  * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
   7  * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
   8  */
   9
  10 #include <openssl/evp.h>
  11 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
  12 #include <openssl/rand.h>
  13 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
  14 #include "../../ssl_local.h"
  15 #include "../record_local.h"
  16 #include "recmethod_local.h"
  17
  18 static int tls1_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
  19                                  unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
  20                                  unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
  21                                  unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
  22                                  const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
  23                                  size_t taglen,
  24                                  int mactype,
  25                                  const EVP_MD *md,
  26                                  COMP_METHOD *comp)
  27 {
  28     EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
  29     EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
  30     int enc = (rl->direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE) ? 1 : 0;
  31
  32     if (level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION)
  33         return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
  34
  35     if ((rl->enc_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
  36         RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
  37         return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
  38     }
  39
  40     ciph_ctx = rl->enc_ctx;
  41
  42     rl->md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
  43     if (rl->md_ctx == NULL) {
  44         RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  45         return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
  46     }
  47 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
  48     if (comp != NULL) {
  49         rl->compctx = COMP_CTX_new(comp);
  50         if (rl->compctx == NULL) {
  51             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
  52             return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
  53         }
  54     }
  55 #endif
  56
  57     /*
  58      * If we have an AEAD Cipher, then there is no separate MAC, so we can skip
  59      * setting up the MAC key.
  60      */
  61     if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) == 0) {
  62         if (mactype == EVP_PKEY_HMAC) {
  63             mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(rl->libctx, "HMAC",
  64                                                       rl->propq, mackey,
  65                                                       mackeylen);
  66         } else {
  67             /*
  68              * If its not HMAC then the only other types of MAC we support are
  69              * the GOST MACs, so we need to use the old style way of creating
  70              * a MAC key.
  71              */
  72             mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mactype, NULL, mackey,
  73                                            (int)mackeylen);
  74         }
  75         if (mac_key == NULL
  76             || EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(rl->md_ctx, NULL, EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
  77                                      rl->libctx, rl->propq, mac_key,
  78                                      NULL) <= 0) {
  79             EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
  80             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  81             return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
  82         }
  83         EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
  84     }
  85
  86     if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
  87         if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, NULL, enc)
  88                 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
  89                                        (int)ivlen, iv) <= 0) {
  90             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
  91             return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
  92         }
  93     } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
  94         if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, enc)
  95                 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 12,
  96                                        NULL) <= 0
  97                 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
  98                                        (int)taglen, NULL) <= 0
  99                 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
 100                                        (int)ivlen, iv) <= 0
 101                 || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, enc)) {
 102             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 103             return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
 104         }
 105     } else {
 106         if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, iv, enc)) {
 107             ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 108             return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
 109         }
 110     }
 111     /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
 112     if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0
 113         && mackeylen != 0
 114         && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
 115                                (int)mackeylen, mackey) <= 0) {
 116         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 117         return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
 118     }
 119     if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(ciph) != NULL
 120             && !ossl_set_tls_provider_parameters(rl, ciph_ctx, ciph, md))
 121         return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
 122
 123     /* Calculate the explict IV length */
 124     if (RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl)) {
 125         int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ciph_ctx);
 126         int eivlen = 0;
 127
 128         if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
 129             eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ciph_ctx);
 130             if (eivlen < 0) {
 131                 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
 132                 return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
 133             }
 134             if (eivlen <= 1)
 135                 eivlen = 0;
 136         } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
 137             /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
 138             eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 139         } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
 140             eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 141         }
 142         rl->eivlen = (size_t)eivlen;
 143     }
 144
 145     return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS;
 146 }
 147
 148 #define MAX_PADDING 256
 149 /*-
 150  * tls1_cipher encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Calls RLAYERfatal on
 151  * internal error, but not otherwise. It is the responsibility of the caller to
 152  * report a bad_record_mac - if appropriate (DTLS just drops the record).
 153  *
 154  * Returns:
 155  *    0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error, or AEAD
 156  *       decryption failed, or Encrypt-then-mac decryption failed.
 157  *    1: Success or Mac-then-encrypt decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
 158  */
 159 static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs,
 160                        int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *macs, size_t macsize)
 161 {
 162     EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
 163     size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
 164     unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN];
 165     int i, pad = 0, tmpr, provided;
 166     size_t bs, ctr, padnum, loop;
 167     unsigned char padval;
 168     const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
 169
 170     if (n_recs == 0) {
 171         RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 172         return 0;
 173     }
 174
 175     if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(rl->md_ctx)) {
 176         int n = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(rl->md_ctx);
 177
 178         if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
 179             RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 180             return 0;
 181         }
 182     }
 183     ds = rl->enc_ctx;
 184     if (!ossl_assert(rl->enc_ctx != NULL)) {
 185         RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 186         return 0;
 187     }
 188
 189     enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(rl->enc_ctx);
 190
 191     if (sending) {
 192         int ivlen;
 193
 194         /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
 195         if (RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl)
 196             && EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
 197             ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(enc);
 198         else
 199             ivlen = 0;
 200         if (ivlen > 1) {
 201             for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
 202                 if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) {
 203                     RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 204                     return 0;
 205                 } else if (RAND_bytes_ex(rl->libctx, recs[ctr].input,
 206                                          ivlen, 0) <= 0) {
 207                     RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 208                     return 0;
 209                 }
 210             }
 211         }
 212     }
 213     if (!ossl_assert(enc != NULL)) {
 214         RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 215         return 0;
 216     }
 217
 218     provided = (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL);
 219
 220     bs = EVP_CIPHER_get_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds));
 221
 222     if (n_recs > 1) {
 223         if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
 224                  & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) == 0) {
 225             /*
 226              * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the
 227              * cipher doesn't support pipelining
 228              */
 229             RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
 230             return 0;
 231         }
 232     }
 233     for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
 234         reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length;
 235
 236         if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
 237                  & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0) {
 238             unsigned char *seq;
 239
 240             seq = rl->sequence;
 241
 242             if (rl->isdtls) {
 243                 unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
 244
 245                 s2n(rl->epoch, p);
 246                 memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
 247                 memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8);
 248             } else {
 249                 memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8);
 250                 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */
 251                     ++seq[i];
 252                     if (seq[i] != 0)
 253                         break;
 254                 }
 255             }
 256
 257             buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type;
 258             buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(rl->version >> 8);
 259             buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(rl->version);
 260             buf[ctr][11] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length >> 8);
 261             buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff);
 262             pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
 263                                       EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]);
 264             if (pad <= 0) {
 265                 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 266                 return 0;
 267             }
 268
 269             if (sending) {
 270                 reclen[ctr] += pad;
 271                 recs[ctr].length += pad;
 272             }
 273         } else if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
 274             /*
 275              * We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
 276              * padding on the provider side.
 277              */
 278             padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs);
 279
 280             /* Add weird padding of up to 256 bytes */
 281
 282             if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) {
 283                 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 284                 return 0;
 285             }
 286             /* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */
 287             padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1);
 288             for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++)
 289                 recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval;
 290             reclen[ctr] += padnum;
 291             recs[ctr].length += padnum;
 292         }
 293
 294         if (!sending) {
 295             if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) {
 296                 /* Publicly invalid */
 297                 return 0;
 298             }
 299         }
 300     }
 301     if (n_recs > 1) {
 302         unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
 303
 304         /* Set the output buffers */
 305         for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++)
 306             data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data;
 307
 308         if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS,
 309                                 (int)n_recs, data) <= 0) {
 310             RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
 311             return 0;
 312         }
 313         /* Set the input buffers */
 314         for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++)
 315             data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input;
 316
 317         if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS,
 318                                 (int)n_recs, data) <= 0
 319             || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS,
 320                                    (int)n_recs, reclen) <= 0) {
 321             RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
 322             return 0;
 323         }
 324     }
 325
 326     if (!rl->isdtls && rl->tlstree) {
 327         unsigned char *seq;
 328         int decrement_seq = 0;
 329
 330         /*
 331          * When sending, seq is incremented after MAC calculation.
 332          * So if we are in ETM mode, we use seq 'as is' in the ctrl-function.
 333          * Otherwise we have to decrease it in the implementation
 334          */
 335         if (sending && !rl->use_etm)
 336             decrement_seq = 1;
 337
 338         seq = rl->sequence;
 339         if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_TLSTREE, decrement_seq, seq) <= 0) {
 340             RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 341             return 0;
 342         }
 343     }
 344
 345     if (provided) {
 346         int outlen;
 347
 348         /* Provided cipher - we do not support pipelining on this path */
 349         if (n_recs > 1) {
 350             RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 351             return 0;
 352         }
 353
 354         if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ds, recs[0].data, &outlen, recs[0].input,
 355                               (unsigned int)reclen[0]))
 356             return 0;
 357         recs[0].length = outlen;
 358
 359         /*
 360          * The length returned from EVP_CipherUpdate above is the actual
 361          * payload length. We need to adjust the data/input ptr to skip over
 362          * any explicit IV
 363          */
 364         if (!sending) {
 365             if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
 366                 recs[0].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 367                 recs[0].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 368             } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
 369                 recs[0].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 370                 recs[0].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 371             } else if (bs != 1 && RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl)) {
 372                 recs[0].data += bs;
 373                 recs[0].input += bs;
 374                 recs[0].orig_len -= bs;
 375             }
 376
 377             /* Now get a pointer to the MAC (if applicable) */
 378             if (macs != NULL) {
 379                 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
 380
 381                 /* Get the MAC */
 382                 macs[0].alloced = 0;
 383
 384                 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC,
 385                                                       (void **)&macs[0].mac,
 386                                                       macsize);
 387                 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
 388
 389                 if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) {
 390                     /* Shouldn't normally happen */
 391                     RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
 392                                 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 393                     return 0;
 394                 }
 395             }
 396         }
 397     } else {
 398         /* Legacy cipher */
 399
 400         tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input,
 401                           (unsigned int)reclen[0]);
 402         if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
 403                  & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) != 0
 404             ? (tmpr < 0)
 405             : (tmpr == 0)) {
 406             /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
 407             return 0;
 408         }
 409
 410         if (!sending) {
 411             for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
 412                 /* Adjust the record to remove the explicit IV/MAC/Tag */
 413                 if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
 414                     recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 415                     recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 416                     recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 417                 } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
 418                     recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 419                     recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 420                     recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 421                 } else if (bs != 1 && RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl)) {
 422                     if (recs[ctr].length < bs)
 423                         return 0;
 424                     recs[ctr].data += bs;
 425                     recs[ctr].input += bs;
 426                     recs[ctr].length -= bs;
 427                     recs[ctr].orig_len -= bs;
 428                 }
 429
 430                 /*
 431                  * If using Mac-then-encrypt, then this will succeed but
 432                  * with a random MAC if padding is invalid
 433                  */
 434                 if (!tls1_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&recs[ctr].length,
 435                                         recs[ctr].orig_len,
 436                                         recs[ctr].data,
 437                                         (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].mac : NULL,
 438                                         (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].alloced
 439                                                        : NULL,
 440                                         bs,
 441                                         pad ? (size_t)pad : macsize,
 442                                         (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(enc)
 443                                         & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0,
 444                                         rl->libctx))
 445                     return 0;
 446             }
 447         }
 448     }
 449     return 1;
 450 }
 451
 452 static int tls1_mac(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
 453                     int sending)
 454 {
 455     unsigned char *seq = rl->sequence;
 456     EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
 457     size_t md_size;
 458     int i;
 459     EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx;
 460     unsigned char header[13];
 461     int t;
 462     int ret = 0;
 463
 464     hash = rl->md_ctx;
 465
 466     t = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hash);
 467     if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0))
 468         return 0;
 469     md_size = t;
 470
 471     if (rl->stream_mac) {
 472         mac_ctx = hash;
 473     } else {
 474         hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
 475         if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) {
 476             goto end;
 477         }
 478         mac_ctx = hmac;
 479     }
 480
 481     if (!rl->isdtls
 482             && rl->tlstree
 483             && EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_TLSTREE, 0, seq) <= 0)
 484         goto end;
 485
 486     if (rl->isdtls) {
 487         unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
 488
 489         s2n(rl->epoch, p);
 490         memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
 491
 492         memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
 493     } else {
 494         memcpy(header, seq, 8);
 495     }
 496
 497     header[8] = rec->type;
 498     header[9] = (unsigned char)(rl->version >> 8);
 499     header[10] = (unsigned char)(rl->version);
 500     header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
 501     header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
 502
 503     if (!sending && !rl->use_etm
 504         && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(rl->enc_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
 505         && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
 506         OSSL_PARAM tls_hmac_params[2], *p = tls_hmac_params;
 507
 508         *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE,
 509                                            &rec->orig_len);
 510         *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
 511
 512         if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(mac_ctx),
 513                                      tls_hmac_params))
 514             goto end;
 515     }
 516
 517     if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
 518         || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
 519         || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0)
 520         goto end;
 521
 522     OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
 523         BIO_printf(trc_out, "seq:\n");
 524         BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, seq, 8, 4);
 525         BIO_printf(trc_out, "rec:\n");
 526         BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rec->data, rec->length, 4);
 527     } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
 528
 529     if (!rl->isdtls) {
 530         for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
 531             ++seq[i];
 532             if (seq[i] != 0)
 533                 break;
 534         }
 535     }
 536     OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
 537         BIO_printf(trc_out, "md:\n");
 538         BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, md, md_size, 4);
 539     } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
 540     ret = 1;
 541  end:
 542     EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
 543     return ret;
 544 }
 545
 546 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
 547 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 548 #  define MAX_PREFIX_LEN ((SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1) \
 549                            + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \
 550                            + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH \
 551                            + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD)
 552 # else
 553 #  define MAX_PREFIX_LEN ((SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1) \
 554                            + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \
 555                            + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
 556 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_COMP */
 557 #else
 558 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 559 #  define MAX_PREFIX_LEN (SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \
 560                            + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH \
 561                            + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD)
 562 # else
 563 #  define MAX_PREFIX_LEN (SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \
 564                            + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
 565 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_COMP */
 566 #endif
 567
 568 /* This function is also used by the SSLv3 implementation */
 569 int tls1_allocate_write_buffers(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl,
 570                                 OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE *templates,
 571                                 size_t numtempl, size_t *prefix)
 572 {
 573     /* Do we need to add an empty record prefix? */
 574     *prefix = rl->need_empty_fragments
 575               && templates[0].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
 576
 577     /*
 578      * In the prefix case we can allocate a much smaller buffer. Otherwise we
 579      * just allocate the default buffer size
 580      */
 581     if (!tls_setup_write_buffer(rl, numtempl + *prefix,
 582                                 *prefix ? MAX_PREFIX_LEN : 0, 0)) {
 583         /* RLAYERfatal() already called */
 584         return 0;
 585     }
 586
 587     return 1;
 588 }
 589
 590 /* This function is also used by the SSLv3 implementation */
 591 int tls1_initialise_write_packets(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl,
 592                                   OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE *templates,
 593                                   size_t numtempl,
 594                                   OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE *prefixtempl,
 595                                   WPACKET *pkt,
 596                                   SSL3_BUFFER *bufs,
 597                                   size_t *wpinited)
 598 {
 599     size_t align = 0;
 600     SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
 601     size_t prefix;
 602
 603     /* Do we need to add an empty record prefix? */
 604     prefix = rl->need_empty_fragments
 605              && templates[0].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
 606
 607     if (prefix) {
 608         /*
 609          * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
 610          * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
 611          */
 612         prefixtempl->buf = NULL;
 613         prefixtempl->version = templates[0].version;
 614         prefixtempl->buflen = 0;
 615         prefixtempl->type = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
 616
 617         wb = &bufs[0];
 618
 619 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
 620         align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
 621         align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1
 622                 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
 623 #endif
 624         SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
 625
 626         if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
 627                                      SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)) {
 628             RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 629             return 0;
 630         }
 631         *wpinited = 1;
 632         if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
 633             RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 634             return 0;
 635         }
 636     }
 637
 638     return tls_initialise_write_packets_default(rl, templates, numtempl,
 639                                                 NULL,
 640                                                 pkt + prefix, bufs + prefix,
 641                                                 wpinited);
 642 }
 643
 644 /* TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 all use the same funcs */
 645 struct record_functions_st tls_1_funcs = {
 646     tls1_set_crypto_state,
 647     tls1_cipher,
 648     tls1_mac,
 649     tls_default_set_protocol_version,
 650     tls_default_read_n,
 651     tls_get_more_records,
 652     tls_default_validate_record_header,
 653     tls_default_post_process_record,
 654     tls_get_max_records_multiblock,
 655     tls_write_records_multiblock, /* Defined in tls_multib.c */
 656     tls1_allocate_write_buffers,
 657     tls1_initialise_write_packets,
 658     NULL,
 659     tls_prepare_record_header_default,
 660     NULL,
 661     tls_prepare_for_encryption_default,
 662     tls_post_encryption_processing_default,
 663     NULL
 664 };
 665
 666 struct record_functions_st dtls_1_funcs = {
 667     tls1_set_crypto_state,
 668     tls1_cipher,
 669     tls1_mac,
 670     tls_default_set_protocol_version,
 671     tls_default_read_n,
 672     dtls_get_more_records,
 673     NULL,
 674     NULL,
 675     NULL,
 676     dtls_write_records,
 677     /*
 678      * Don't use tls1_allocate_write_buffers since that handles empty fragment
 679      * records which aren't needed in DTLS. We just use the default allocation
 680      * instead.
 681      */
 682     tls_allocate_write_buffers_default,
 683     /* Don't use tls1_initialise_write_packets for same reason as above */
 684     tls_initialise_write_packets_default,
 685     NULL,
 686     NULL,
 687     NULL,
 688     NULL,
 689     NULL
 690 };