2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include <openssl/evp.h>
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include "record_locl.h"
20 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
21 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
24 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
25 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
26 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
27 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
29 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
30 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
33 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, SSL
*s
)
36 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s
->rlayer
);
37 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
40 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
42 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
45 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
46 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
51 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
53 memset(rl
->alert_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->alert_fragment
));
54 rl
->alert_fragment_len
= 0;
55 memset(rl
->handshake_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->handshake_fragment
));
56 rl
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
62 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl
->rbuf
);
63 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
65 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
67 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl
);
68 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl
);
71 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl
);
74 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
76 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl
->rbuf
))
77 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl
->s
);
78 if (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
79 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
80 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
83 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
85 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->rbuf
) != 0;
88 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
90 return (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
91 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->wbuf
[rl
->numwpipes
- 1]) != 0;
94 int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, const unsigned char *buf
,
97 rl
->packet_length
= len
;
99 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
100 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl
->rbuf
))
101 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl
->s
))
105 rl
->packet
= SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl
->rbuf
);
106 SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl
->rbuf
, buf
, len
);
111 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
113 memset(rl
->read_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->read_sequence
));
116 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
118 memset(rl
->write_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->write_sequence
));
121 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL
*s
)
125 if (s
->rlayer
.rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
)
128 for (i
= 0; i
< RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
); i
++) {
129 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
])
130 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
132 num
+= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
]);
138 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, size_t len
)
140 ctx
->default_read_buf_len
= len
;
143 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL
*s
, size_t len
)
145 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s
->rlayer
), len
);
148 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL
*s
)
150 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
151 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
152 return "read header";
153 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
155 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
162 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL
*s
)
164 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
165 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
167 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
169 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
177 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
179 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, size_t n
, size_t max
, int extend
, int clearold
,
183 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
184 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
185 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
186 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
187 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
188 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
189 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
191 size_t len
, left
, align
= 0;
198 rb
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
200 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
204 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
205 align
= (size_t)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
206 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
210 /* start with empty packet ... */
213 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
215 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
218 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
219 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
220 && (pkt
[3] << 8 | pkt
[4]) >= 128) {
222 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
223 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
224 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
225 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
226 * overrun can be triggered.
228 memmove(rb
->buf
+ align
, pkt
, left
);
232 s
->rlayer
.packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
233 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
= 0;
234 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
237 len
= s
->rlayer
.packet_length
;
238 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ align
;
240 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
241 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
243 if (s
->rlayer
.packet
!= pkt
&& clearold
== 1) {
244 memmove(pkt
, s
->rlayer
.packet
, len
+ left
);
245 s
->rlayer
.packet
= pkt
;
246 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
250 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
251 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
254 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
255 if (left
== 0 && extend
)
257 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
261 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
263 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
270 /* else we need to read more data */
272 if (n
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
) { /* does not happen */
273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
277 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
278 if (!s
->rlayer
.read_ahead
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
279 /* ignore max parameter */
284 if (max
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)
285 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
293 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
294 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
299 if (s
->rbio
!= NULL
) {
300 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
301 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
302 ret
= BIO_read(s
->rbio
, pkt
+ len
+ left
, max
- left
);
306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
312 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
314 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
319 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
320 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
321 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
323 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
325 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
329 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
332 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
333 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
339 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
340 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
342 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, size_t len
,
345 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
347 size_t n
, split_send_fragment
, maxpipes
;
348 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
349 size_t max_send_fragment
, nw
;
351 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
355 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
356 tot
= s
->rlayer
.wnum
;
358 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
359 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
360 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
361 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
362 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
363 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
364 * report the error in a way the user will notice
366 if (len
< s
->rlayer
.wnum
) {
367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
373 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
374 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
384 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
385 * will happen with non blocking IO
388 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
,
391 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
392 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
395 tot
+= tmpwrit
; /* this might be last fragment */
397 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
399 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
400 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
401 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
402 * compromise is considered worthy.
404 if (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
405 len
>= 4 * (max_send_fragment
= s
->max_send_fragment
) &&
406 s
->compress
== NULL
&& s
->msg_callback
== NULL
&&
407 !SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) &&
408 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
)) &
409 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
) {
410 unsigned char aad
[13];
411 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param
;
415 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
416 if ((max_send_fragment
& 0xfff) == 0)
417 max_send_fragment
-= 512;
419 if (tot
== 0 || wb
->buf
== NULL
) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
420 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
422 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
423 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE
,
424 (int)max_send_fragment
, NULL
);
426 if (len
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
431 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, 1, packlen
)) {
432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
435 } else if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
436 /* free jumbo buffer */
437 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
444 if (n
< 4 * max_send_fragment
) {
445 /* free jumbo buffer */
446 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
450 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
451 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
453 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
458 if (n
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
459 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 8);
461 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 4);
463 memcpy(aad
, s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
, 8);
465 aad
[9] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
>> 8);
466 aad
[10] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
);
473 packleni
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
474 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD
,
475 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
);
476 packlen
= (size_t)packleni
;
477 if (packleni
<= 0 || packlen
> wb
->len
) { /* never happens */
478 /* free jumbo buffer */
479 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
483 mb_param
.out
= wb
->buf
;
484 mb_param
.inp
= &buf
[tot
];
487 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
488 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT
,
489 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
) <= 0)
492 s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] += mb_param
.interleave
;
493 if (s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] < mb_param
.interleave
) {
495 while (j
>= 0 && (++s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[j
--]) == 0) ;
501 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= nw
;
502 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= &buf
[tot
];
503 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
504 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= nw
;
506 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], nw
, &tmpwrit
);
508 if (i
< 0 && (!s
->wbio
|| !BIO_should_retry(s
->wbio
))) {
509 /* free jumbo buffer */
510 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
512 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
516 /* free jumbo buffer */
517 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
518 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
526 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
527 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
528 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
536 split_send_fragment
= s
->split_send_fragment
;
538 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
539 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
540 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
543 maxpipes
= s
->max_pipelines
;
544 if (maxpipes
> SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
) {
546 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
553 || s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
554 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
))
555 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE
)
556 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
))
558 if (s
->max_send_fragment
== 0 || split_send_fragment
> s
->max_send_fragment
559 || split_send_fragment
== 0) {
561 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
562 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
569 size_t pipelens
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
], tmppipelen
, remain
;
575 numpipes
= ((n
- 1) / split_send_fragment
) + 1;
576 if (numpipes
> maxpipes
)
579 if (n
/ numpipes
>= s
->max_send_fragment
) {
581 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
584 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
585 pipelens
[j
] = s
->max_send_fragment
;
588 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
589 tmppipelen
= n
/ numpipes
;
590 remain
= n
% numpipes
;
591 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
592 pipelens
[j
] = tmppipelen
;
598 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), pipelens
, numpipes
, 0,
601 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
602 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
607 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
608 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
))) {
610 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
611 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
613 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 0;
615 if ((i
== (int)n
) && s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
617 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
619 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
628 int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
629 size_t *pipelens
, size_t numpipes
,
630 int create_empty_fragment
, size_t *written
)
632 WPACKET pkt
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
633 SSL3_RECORD wr
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
636 unsigned char *recordstart
;
637 int i
, mac_size
, clear
= 0;
638 size_t prefix_len
= 0;
643 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, wpinited
= 0;
646 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++)
647 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
649 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
650 * will happen with non blocking IO
652 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s
->rlayer
))
653 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
655 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
656 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
657 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
660 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
663 if (s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
< numpipes
)
664 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, numpipes
, 0))
667 if (totlen
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
672 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
673 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
)) {
674 clear
= s
->enc_write_ctx
? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
677 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
678 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
684 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
686 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
) {
688 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
689 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
692 if (s
->s3
->need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
694 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
695 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
696 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
699 size_t tmppipelen
= 0;
702 ret
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, &tmppipelen
, 1, 1, &prefix_len
);
707 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
)) {
708 /* insufficient space */
709 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
714 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 1;
717 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
718 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
719 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
721 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
722 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
723 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
725 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
726 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
728 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
729 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
730 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
731 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], align
, NULL
)) {
732 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
736 } else if (prefix_len
) {
737 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
738 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0],
739 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
740 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
741 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb
)
742 + prefix_len
, NULL
)) {
743 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
748 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
751 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
];
752 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
753 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
754 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
756 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
757 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt
, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
758 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
759 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, align
, NULL
)) {
760 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
767 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
768 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
)) {
769 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
770 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
771 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
772 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
775 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
) {
776 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
777 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
778 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
) {
779 eivlen
= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
784 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
785 memset(wr
, 0, sizeof wr
);
786 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
787 unsigned int version
= s
->version
;
788 unsigned char *compressdata
= NULL
;
790 unsigned int rectype
;
795 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr
, type
);
797 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
800 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
)
801 rectype
= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
;
805 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
806 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
808 if (SSL_get_state(s
) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
809 && !s
->renegotiate
&& TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
)
810 version
= TLS1_VERSION
;
812 maxcomplen
= pipelens
[j
];
813 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
)
814 pipelens
[j
] += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD
;
816 /* write the header */
817 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt
, rectype
)
818 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt
, version
)
819 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt
)
821 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, eivlen
, NULL
))
823 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt
, maxcomplen
,
825 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
829 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
830 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr
, compressdata
);
831 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr
, pipelens
[j
]);
832 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr
, (unsigned char *)&buf
[totlen
]);
833 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
836 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
840 /* first we compress */
841 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
) {
843 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we prevent compression!!!
845 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
, thiswr
)
846 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, thiswr
->length
, NULL
)) {
847 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
851 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt
, thiswr
->input
, thiswr
->length
)) {
852 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
855 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr
[j
]);
858 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
) {
859 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt
, type
)) {
860 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
863 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, 1);
865 * TODO(TLS1.3): Padding goes here. Do we need an API to add this?
866 * For now, use no padding
871 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
872 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
876 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
879 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, mac_size
, &mac
)
880 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, thiswr
, mac
, 1)) {
881 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
887 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
888 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
889 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
891 if(!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt
, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE
,
894 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
897 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &len
)) {
898 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
902 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
903 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt
) - len
;
905 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr
, recordstart
);
906 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr
);
907 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr
, len
);
910 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1) < 1)
913 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
919 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
920 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &origlen
)
921 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
922 || origlen
> thiswr
->length
923 || (thiswr
->length
> origlen
924 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
,
925 thiswr
->length
- origlen
, NULL
))) {
926 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
929 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
932 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, mac_size
, &mac
)
933 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, thiswr
, mac
, 1)) {
934 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
937 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, mac_size
);
940 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &len
)
941 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt
)) {
942 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
946 if (s
->msg_callback
) {
947 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt
) - len
948 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
949 s
->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, recordstart
,
950 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
951 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
954 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt
)) {
955 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
960 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
961 * is thiswr->length long
963 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr
, type
); /* not needed but helps for
965 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
);
967 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
969 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
973 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
974 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
977 *written
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
);
981 /* now let's set up wb */
982 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
],
983 prefix_len
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
));
987 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
990 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= totlen
;
991 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= buf
;
992 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
993 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= totlen
;
995 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
996 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
998 for (j
= 0; j
< wpinited
; j
++)
999 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt
[j
]);
1003 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1005 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1007 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
,
1011 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= s
->rlayer
.wbuf
;
1015 if ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
> len
)
1016 || ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
!= buf
) &&
1017 !(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
))
1018 || (s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
!= type
)) {
1019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
1024 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1025 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]) == 0
1026 && currbuf
< s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
- 1) {
1031 if (s
->wbio
!= NULL
) {
1032 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
1033 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1034 i
= BIO_write(s
->wbio
, (char *)
1035 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb
[currbuf
])
1036 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb
[currbuf
])]),
1037 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]));
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET
);
1044 if (i
> 0 && tmpwrit
== SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
])) {
1045 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1046 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1047 if (currbuf
+ 1 < s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
)
1049 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1050 *written
= s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
;
1052 } else if (i
<= 0) {
1053 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1055 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1056 * using a datagram service
1058 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1062 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1063 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1068 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1069 * 'type' is one of the following:
1071 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1072 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1073 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1075 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1076 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1078 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1079 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1080 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1081 * argument is non NULL.
1082 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1083 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1084 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1085 * Change cipher spec protocol
1086 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1088 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1089 * Handshake protocol
1090 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1091 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1092 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1093 * Application data protocol
1094 * none of our business
1096 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, int *recvd_type
, unsigned char *buf
,
1097 size_t len
, int peek
, size_t *readbytes
)
1100 size_t n
, curr_rec
, num_recs
, totalbytes
;
1103 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
1105 rbuf
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
1107 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf
)) {
1108 /* Not initialized yet */
1109 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
1113 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
1114 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) || (peek
1116 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
1117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1121 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1122 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1124 unsigned char *src
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1125 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1130 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
1133 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
--;
1136 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1137 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1138 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1140 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1141 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
;
1148 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1151 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
) && SSL_in_init(s
)) {
1152 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1153 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1162 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1165 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1166 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1167 * rr[i].data, - data
1168 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1169 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1171 rr
= s
->rlayer
.rrec
;
1172 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1175 /* get new records if necessary */
1176 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1177 ret
= ssl3_get_record(s
);
1180 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1181 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1182 /* Shouldn't happen */
1183 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1188 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1190 curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr
[curr_rec
]);
1192 if (curr_rec
== num_recs
) {
1193 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
, 0);
1197 } while (num_recs
== 0);
1201 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1202 * record that isn't an alert.
1204 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1205 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) != 0)
1206 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
= 0;
1208 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1210 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1211 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1212 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
1213 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
1219 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1222 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
1223 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1224 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1228 if (type
== SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)
1229 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1230 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& recvd_type
!= NULL
)) {
1232 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1233 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1234 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1237 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1238 * doing a handshake for the first time
1240 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
1241 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1242 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
1247 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1248 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1249 && s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0) {
1250 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1255 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1256 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
);
1263 if (len
- totalbytes
> SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1264 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
);
1266 n
= len
- totalbytes
;
1268 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
1271 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1272 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1273 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1275 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr
, n
);
1276 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1277 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0) {
1278 s
->rlayer
.rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
1279 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr
, 0);
1280 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1283 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0
1284 || (peek
&& n
== SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))) {
1289 } while (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&& curr_rec
< num_recs
1290 && totalbytes
< len
);
1291 if (totalbytes
== 0) {
1292 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1295 if (!peek
&& curr_rec
== num_recs
1296 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
)
1297 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0)
1298 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
1299 *readbytes
= totalbytes
;
1304 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1305 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1306 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1310 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1312 if (rr
->rec_version
== SSL2_VERSION
) {
1314 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1315 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1316 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1317 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1319 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1324 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
1325 && (s
->server
|| rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
1327 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1328 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1329 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1330 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1332 s
->version
= rr
->rec_version
;
1333 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1339 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1340 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1343 size_t dest_maxlen
= 0;
1344 unsigned char *dest
= NULL
;
1345 size_t *dest_len
= NULL
;
1347 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1348 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1349 dest
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1350 dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
;
1351 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
1352 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
;
1353 dest
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
;
1354 dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
;
1357 if (dest_maxlen
> 0) {
1358 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1359 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) < n
)
1360 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
); /* available bytes */
1362 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1364 dest
[(*dest_len
)++] =
1365 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
)];
1366 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, 1);
1367 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr
, -1);
1370 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
) {
1371 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1372 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1378 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1379 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1380 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1383 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1385 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1386 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) &&
1387 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)) {
1388 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
1390 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[1] != 0) ||
1391 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[2] != 0) ||
1392 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[3] != 0)) {
1393 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST
);
1398 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1399 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
1400 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
, 4, s
,
1401 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1403 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1404 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
) &&
1405 !s
->s3
->renegotiate
) {
1406 ssl3_renegotiate(s
);
1407 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
)) {
1408 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1416 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1417 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0) {
1418 /* no read-ahead left? */
1421 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1422 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1423 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1424 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1426 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1427 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1428 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1429 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1434 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1437 /* Does this ever happen? */
1438 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1441 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1442 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1447 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1448 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1449 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1452 SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1453 !s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
1454 (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) &&
1455 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1456 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) &&
1457 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
) &&
1458 !(s
->ctx
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
1459 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1460 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1461 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1464 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
>= 2) {
1465 int alert_level
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
[0];
1466 int alert_descr
= s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
[1];
1468 s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment_len
= 0;
1470 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1471 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
,
1472 s
->rlayer
.alert_fragment
, 2, s
,
1473 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1475 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1476 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1477 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1478 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1481 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1482 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1485 if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
1486 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1487 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1489 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
++;
1490 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_count
== MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT
) {
1491 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS
);
1496 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
) {
1497 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1501 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1502 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1503 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1504 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1505 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1506 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1508 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
1509 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1513 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1514 else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
)
1517 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
1520 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1521 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1523 BIO_snprintf(tmp
, sizeof tmp
, "%d", alert_descr
);
1524 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp
);
1525 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1526 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1527 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1530 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1538 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) { /* but we have not received a
1540 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1541 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1542 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1546 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1547 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1553 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1555 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4)
1556 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
1557 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1558 !(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS
)) {
1559 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
1563 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1571 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1572 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0) {
1573 /* no read-ahead left? */
1576 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1577 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1578 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1579 * problems in the blocking world
1581 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1582 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1583 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1584 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1591 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)) {
1594 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1595 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1596 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1597 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1598 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1600 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1601 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1603 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1605 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1607 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1608 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1609 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1611 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1614 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1616 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1617 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1618 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1619 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1620 * started), we will indulge it.
1622 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s
)) {
1623 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
1626 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1634 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1638 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq
)
1642 for (i
= 7; i
>= 0; i
--) {
1650 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1651 * format and false otherwise.
1653 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1655 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl
->rrec
[0]);
1659 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1661 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1663 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl
->rrec
[0]);