2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include <openssl/evp.h>
15 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
16 #include <openssl/rand.h>
17 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
18 #include "record_local.h"
19 #include "internal/packet.h"
21 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
26 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
29 memset(rl
->handshake_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->handshake_fragment
));
30 rl
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
36 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
38 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl
);
40 if (rl
->rrlmethod
!= NULL
)
41 rl
->rrlmethod
->free(rl
->rrl
); /* Ignore return value */
42 if (rl
->wrlmethod
!= NULL
)
43 rl
->wrlmethod
->free(rl
->wrl
); /* Ignore return value */
44 BIO_free(rl
->rrlnext
);
52 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl
);
55 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
57 if (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
58 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
61 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
62 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
64 return rl
->rrlmethod
->unprocessed_read_pending(rl
->rrl
);
67 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
68 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
70 return (rl
->curr_rec
< rl
->num_recs
)
71 || rl
->rrlmethod
->processed_read_pending(rl
->rrl
);
74 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
76 /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me when DTLS is moved to the write record layer */
77 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(rl
->s
))
78 return (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
79 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->wbuf
[rl
->numwpipes
- 1]) != 0;
80 return rl
->wpend_tot
> 0;
83 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
85 memset(rl
->write_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->write_sequence
));
88 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL
*s
)
91 const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s
);
96 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(sc
)) {
100 iter
= pqueue_iterator(sc
->rlayer
.d
->buffered_app_data
.q
);
101 while ((item
= pqueue_next(&iter
)) != NULL
) {
103 num
+= rdata
->length
;
107 for (i
= 0; i
< sc
->rlayer
.num_recs
; i
++) {
108 if (sc
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[i
].type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
110 num
+= sc
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[i
].length
;
113 num
+= sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->app_data_pending(sc
->rlayer
.rrl
);
118 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, size_t len
)
120 ctx
->default_read_buf_len
= len
;
123 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL
*s
, size_t len
)
125 SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s
);
129 sc
->rlayer
.default_read_buf_len
= len
;
132 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL
*s
)
134 const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s
);
140 if (sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
== NULL
|| sc
->rlayer
.rrl
== NULL
)
143 sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->get_state(sc
->rlayer
.rrl
, NULL
, &lng
);
148 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL
*s
)
150 const SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s
);
156 if (sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
== NULL
|| sc
->rlayer
.rrl
== NULL
)
159 sc
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->get_state(sc
->rlayer
.rrl
, &shrt
, NULL
);
164 static int tls_write_check_pending(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int type
,
165 const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
)
167 if (s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
== 0)
170 /* We have pending data, so do some sanity checks */
171 if ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
> len
)
172 || (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
)
173 && (s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
!= buf
))
174 || (s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
!= type
)) {
175 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
182 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
183 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
185 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*ssl
, int type
, const void *buf_
, size_t len
,
188 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
190 size_t n
, max_send_fragment
, split_send_fragment
, maxpipes
;
192 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl
);
193 OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE tmpls
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
194 unsigned int recversion
;
199 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
200 tot
= s
->rlayer
.wnum
;
202 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
203 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
204 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
205 * this in tls_write_check_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
206 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
207 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
208 * report the error in a way the user will notice
210 if ((len
< s
->rlayer
.wnum
)
211 || ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
!= 0)
212 && (len
< (s
->rlayer
.wnum
+ s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
)))) {
213 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
217 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
218 && !ossl_early_data_count_ok(s
, len
, 0, 1)) {
219 /* SSLfatal() already called */
226 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket then go
227 * into init unless we have writes pending - in which case we should finish
230 if (s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
== 0 && (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
231 || s
->ext
.extra_tickets_expected
> 0))
232 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
235 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
236 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
239 if (SSL_in_init(ssl
) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)
240 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING
) {
241 i
= s
->handshake_func(ssl
);
242 /* SSLfatal() already called */
250 i
= tls_write_check_pending(s
, type
, buf
, len
);
252 /* SSLfatal() already called */
256 i
= HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s
,
257 s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
->retry_write_records(s
->rlayer
.wrl
));
260 tot
+= s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
;
261 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= 0;
262 } /* else no retry required */
266 * We've not previously sent any data for this write so memorize
267 * arguments so that we can detect bad write retries later
269 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= 0;
270 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
271 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= buf
;
272 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= len
;
275 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
280 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
281 if (s
->s3
.alert_dispatch
) {
282 i
= ssl
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(ssl
);
284 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
287 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
292 max_send_fragment
= ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
);
293 split_send_fragment
= ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s
);
295 if (max_send_fragment
== 0
296 || split_send_fragment
== 0
297 || split_send_fragment
> max_send_fragment
) {
299 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
300 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
302 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
307 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
308 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
310 /* TODO(RECLAYER): Does this also need to be in the DTLS equivalent code? */
311 recversion
= (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) ? TLS1_2_VERSION
: s
->version
;
312 if (SSL_get_state(ssl
) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
314 && TLS1_get_version(ssl
) > TLS1_VERSION
315 && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
)
316 recversion
= TLS1_VERSION
;
319 size_t tmppipelen
, remain
;
320 size_t j
, lensofar
= 0;
323 * Ask the record layer how it would like to split the amount of data
324 * that we have, and how many of those records it would like in one go.
326 maxpipes
= s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
->get_max_records(s
->rlayer
.wrl
, type
, n
,
328 &split_send_fragment
);
330 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
331 * whatever the record layer wants to do. Otherwise we use the smallest
332 * value from the number requested by the record layer, and max number
333 * configured by the user.
335 if (s
->max_pipelines
> 0 && maxpipes
> s
->max_pipelines
)
336 maxpipes
= s
->max_pipelines
;
338 if (maxpipes
> SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
)
339 maxpipes
= SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
;
341 if (split_send_fragment
> max_send_fragment
) {
342 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
346 if (n
/ maxpipes
>= split_send_fragment
) {
348 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
351 for (j
= 0; j
< maxpipes
; j
++) {
352 tmpls
[j
].type
= type
;
353 tmpls
[j
].version
= recversion
;
354 tmpls
[j
].buf
= &(buf
[tot
]) + (j
* split_send_fragment
);
355 tmpls
[j
].buflen
= split_send_fragment
;
357 /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */
358 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= maxpipes
* split_send_fragment
;
360 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
361 tmppipelen
= n
/ maxpipes
;
362 remain
= n
% maxpipes
;
364 * If there is a remainder we add an extra byte to the first few
369 for (j
= 0; j
< maxpipes
; j
++) {
370 tmpls
[j
].type
= type
;
371 tmpls
[j
].version
= recversion
;
372 tmpls
[j
].buf
= &(buf
[tot
]) + lensofar
;
373 tmpls
[j
].buflen
= tmppipelen
;
374 lensofar
+= tmppipelen
;
378 /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */
379 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= n
;
382 i
= HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s
,
383 s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
->write_records(s
->rlayer
.wrl
, tmpls
, maxpipes
));
385 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
386 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
390 if (s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
== n
391 || (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
392 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
) != 0)) {
393 *written
= tot
+ s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
;
394 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= 0;
398 n
-= s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
;
399 tot
+= s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
;
403 int ossl_tls_handle_rlayer_return(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int writing
, int ret
,
404 char *file
, int line
)
406 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
408 if (ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_RETRY
) {
409 s
->rwstate
= writing
? SSL_WRITING
: SSL_READING
;
412 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
413 if (ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF
) {
416 * This shouldn't happen with a writing operation. We treat it
420 ERR_set_debug(file
, line
, 0);
421 ossl_statem_fatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
422 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
, NULL
);
423 ret
= OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL
;
424 } else if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF
) != 0) {
425 SSL_set_shutdown(ssl
, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
);
426 s
->s3
.warn_alert
= SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
;
429 ERR_set_debug(file
, line
, 0);
430 ossl_statem_fatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
431 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING
, NULL
);
433 } else if (ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL
) {
434 int al
= s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->get_alert_code(s
->rlayer
.rrl
);
436 if (al
!= SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
) {
438 ERR_set_debug(file
, line
, 0);
439 ossl_statem_fatal(s
, al
, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE
, NULL
);
442 * else some failure but there is no alert code. We don't log an
443 * error for this. The record layer should have logged an error
444 * already or, if not, its due to some sys call error which will be
445 * reported via SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL and errno.
449 * The record layer distinguishes the cases of EOF, non-fatal
450 * err and retry. Upper layers do not.
451 * If we got a retry or success then *ret is already correct,
452 * otherwise we need to convert the return value.
454 if (ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR
|| ret
== OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF
)
456 else if (ret
< OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR
)
463 void ssl_release_record(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, TLS_RECORD
*rr
)
465 if (rr
->rechandle
!= NULL
) {
466 /* The record layer allocated the buffers for this record */
467 s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->release_record(s
->rlayer
.rrl
, rr
->rechandle
);
469 /* We allocated the buffers for this record (only happens with DTLS) */
470 OPENSSL_free(rr
->data
);
472 s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
++;
476 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
477 * 'type' is one of the following:
479 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
480 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
481 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
483 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
484 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
486 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
487 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
488 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recvd_type|
489 * argument is non NULL.
490 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
491 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
492 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
493 * Change cipher spec protocol
494 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
496 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
498 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
499 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
500 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
501 * Application data protocol
502 * none of our business
504 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int *recvd_type
, unsigned char *buf
,
505 size_t len
, int peek
, size_t *readbytes
)
508 size_t n
, curr_rec
, totalbytes
;
510 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
512 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl
);
514 is_tls13
= SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
);
517 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
518 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
))
519 || (peek
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
520 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
524 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
525 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
527 unsigned char *src
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
528 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
533 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
536 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
--;
539 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
540 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
541 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
543 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
544 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
;
551 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
554 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
) && SSL_in_init(ssl
)) {
555 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
556 i
= s
->handshake_func(ssl
);
557 /* SSLfatal() already called */
564 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
567 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
568 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
570 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
571 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
573 /* get new records if necessary */
574 if (s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
>= s
->rlayer
.num_recs
) {
575 s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
= s
->rlayer
.num_recs
= 0;
577 rr
= &s
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[s
->rlayer
.num_recs
];
579 ret
= HANDLE_RLAYER_READ_RETURN(s
,
580 s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->read_record(s
->rlayer
.rrl
,
582 &rr
->version
, &rr
->type
,
583 &rr
->data
, &rr
->length
,
586 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
590 s
->rlayer
.num_recs
++;
591 } while (s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->processed_read_pending(s
->rlayer
.rrl
)
592 && s
->rlayer
.num_recs
< SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
594 rr
= &s
->rlayer
.tlsrecs
[s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
];
596 if (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0
597 && rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
598 && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
599 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
600 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA
);
605 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
606 * record that isn't an alert.
608 if (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
&& rr
->length
!= 0)
609 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
= 0;
611 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
613 if (s
->s3
.change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
614 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
615 && (rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
616 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
617 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
622 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
625 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
626 s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
++;
627 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
632 || (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
633 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& recvd_type
!= NULL
636 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
637 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
638 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
641 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
642 * doing a handshake for the first time
644 if (SSL_in_init(ssl
) && type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
645 && s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
) {
646 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
650 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
651 && rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
652 && s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0) {
653 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
657 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
658 *recvd_type
= rr
->type
;
662 * Skip a zero length record. This ensures multiple calls to
663 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
664 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
667 ssl_release_record(s
, rr
);
673 curr_rec
= s
->rlayer
.curr_rec
;
675 if (len
- totalbytes
> rr
->length
)
678 n
= len
- totalbytes
;
680 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
683 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
685 ssl_release_record(s
, rr
);
687 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT
)
688 OPENSSL_cleanse(&(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
692 ssl_release_record(s
, rr
);
695 || (peek
&& n
== rr
->length
)) {
700 } while (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
701 && curr_rec
< s
->rlayer
.num_recs
702 && totalbytes
< len
);
703 if (totalbytes
== 0) {
704 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
707 *readbytes
= totalbytes
;
712 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
713 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
714 * were actually expecting a CCS).
718 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
720 if (rr
->version
== SSL2_VERSION
) {
722 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
723 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
724 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
725 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
727 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
731 if (ssl
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
732 && (s
->server
|| rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
734 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
735 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing
736 * with. We shouldn't be receiving anything other than a ClientHello
737 * if we are a server.
739 s
->version
= rr
->version
;
740 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
745 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
746 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
749 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
750 unsigned int alert_level
, alert_descr
;
751 unsigned char *alert_bytes
= rr
->data
755 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert
, alert_bytes
, rr
->length
)
756 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_level
)
757 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_descr
)
758 || PACKET_remaining(&alert
) != 0) {
759 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT
);
764 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, alert_bytes
, 2, ssl
,
765 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
767 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
768 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
769 else if (ssl
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
770 cb
= ssl
->ctx
->info_callback
;
773 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
774 cb(ssl
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
777 if ((!is_tls13
&& alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
)
778 || (is_tls13
&& alert_descr
== SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED
)) {
779 s
->s3
.warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
780 ssl_release_record(s
, rr
);
782 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
++;
783 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_count
== MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT
) {
784 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
785 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS
);
791 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
792 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
794 if (is_tls13
&& alert_descr
== SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED
) {
796 } else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
797 && (is_tls13
|| alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
)) {
798 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
800 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
|| is_tls13
) {
801 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
802 s
->s3
.fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
803 SSLfatal_data(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
,
804 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
,
805 "SSL alert number %d", alert_descr
);
806 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
807 ssl_release_record(s
, rr
);
808 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
810 } else if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
812 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
813 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
814 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
815 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
816 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
817 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
819 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
821 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
822 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
826 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
830 if ((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0) {
831 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
835 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
836 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
837 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
838 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
841 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
842 ssl_release_record(s
, rr
);
844 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
) != 0)
847 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
848 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(ssl
);
849 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
850 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
855 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
856 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
857 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
859 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
861 ssl_release_record(s
, rr
);
862 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
,
863 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY
);
869 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
870 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
871 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
872 * that we're just going to discard.
874 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
875 size_t dest_maxlen
= sizeof(s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
);
876 unsigned char *dest
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
877 size_t *dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
;
879 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
881 n
= rr
->length
; /* available bytes */
883 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
884 memcpy(dest
+ *dest_len
, rr
->data
+ rr
->off
, n
);
889 ssl_release_record(s
, rr
);
891 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
892 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
895 if (rr
->type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
896 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
901 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
902 * protocol violation)
904 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4)
905 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
906 int ined
= (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
);
908 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
909 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
911 i
= s
->handshake_func(ssl
);
912 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
920 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
921 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
922 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
927 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
928 if (!RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
931 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
932 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
933 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
934 * problems in the blocking world
936 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
937 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(ssl
);
938 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
939 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
949 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
950 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
951 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
952 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
953 * record types, using up resources processing them.
955 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
957 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
959 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
961 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
962 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
963 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
965 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
967 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
969 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
970 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
971 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
972 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
973 * started), we will indulge it.
975 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s
)) {
976 s
->s3
.in_read_app_data
= 2;
978 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s
)) {
980 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
981 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
982 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
983 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
984 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
985 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
988 if (!ossl_early_data_count_ok(s
, rr
->length
,
989 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD
, 0)) {
990 /* SSLfatal() already called */
993 ssl_release_record(s
, rr
);
996 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1002 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq
)
1006 for (i
= 7; i
>= 0; i
--) {
1014 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1015 * format and false otherwise.
1017 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1019 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(rl
->s
))
1021 return rl
->tlsrecs
[0].version
== SSL2_VERSION
;
1024 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_msg_callback_fn rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper
;
1025 static void rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper(int write_p
, int version
,
1026 int content_type
, const void *buf
,
1027 size_t len
, void *cbarg
)
1029 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= cbarg
;
1030 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1032 if (s
->msg_callback
!= NULL
)
1033 s
->msg_callback(write_p
, version
, content_type
, buf
, len
, ssl
,
1034 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1037 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_security_fn rlayer_security_wrapper
;
1038 static int rlayer_security_wrapper(void *cbarg
, int op
, int bits
, int nid
,
1041 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= cbarg
;
1043 return ssl_security(s
, op
, bits
, nid
, other
);
1046 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_padding_fn rlayer_padding_wrapper
;
1047 static size_t rlayer_padding_wrapper(void *cbarg
, int type
, size_t len
)
1049 SSL_CONNECTION
*s
= cbarg
;
1050 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1052 return s
->rlayer
.record_padding_cb(ssl
, type
, len
,
1053 s
->rlayer
.record_padding_arg
);
1056 static const OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch
[] = {
1057 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SKIP_EARLY_DATA
, (void (*)(void))ossl_statem_skip_early_data
},
1058 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK
, (void (*)(void))rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper
},
1059 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SECURITY
, (void (*)(void))rlayer_security_wrapper
},
1060 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING
, (void (*)(void))rlayer_padding_wrapper
},
1064 static const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
*ssl_select_next_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1069 if (level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE
) {
1070 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
))
1071 return &ossl_dtls_record_method
;
1073 return &ossl_tls_record_method
;
1076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
1077 /* KTLS does not support renegotiation */
1078 if (level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION
1079 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS
) != 0
1080 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)))
1081 return &ossl_ktls_record_method
;
1084 /* Default to the current OSSL_RECORD_METHOD */
1085 return direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
? s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
1086 : s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
;
1089 static int ssl_post_record_layer_select(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int direction
)
1091 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
*thismethod
;
1092 OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
*thisrl
;
1094 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1095 thismethod
= s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
;
1096 thisrl
= s
->rlayer
.rrl
;
1098 thismethod
= s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
;
1099 thisrl
= s
->rlayer
.wrl
;
1102 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
1104 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1106 if (s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
== &ossl_ktls_record_method
) {
1107 /* KTLS does not support renegotiation so disallow it */
1108 SSL_set_options(ssl
, SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1112 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
) && thismethod
->set_first_handshake
!= NULL
)
1113 thismethod
->set_first_handshake(thisrl
, 1);
1115 if (s
->max_pipelines
!= 0 && thismethod
->set_max_pipelines
!= NULL
)
1116 thismethod
->set_max_pipelines(thisrl
, s
->max_pipelines
);
1121 int ssl_set_new_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int version
,
1122 int direction
, int level
,
1123 unsigned char *key
, size_t keylen
,
1124 unsigned char *iv
, size_t ivlen
,
1125 unsigned char *mackey
, size_t mackeylen
,
1126 const EVP_CIPHER
*ciph
, size_t taglen
,
1127 int mactype
, const EVP_MD
*md
,
1128 const SSL_COMP
*comp
)
1130 OSSL_PARAM options
[5], *opts
= options
;
1131 OSSL_PARAM settings
[6], *set
= settings
;
1132 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
**thismethod
;
1133 OSSL_RECORD_LAYER
**thisrl
, *newrl
= NULL
;
1135 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1136 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD
*meth
;
1137 int use_etm
, stream_mac
= 0, tlstree
= 0;
1138 unsigned int maxfrag
= (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE
)
1139 ? ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s
)
1140 : SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1141 int use_early_data
= 0;
1142 uint32_t max_early_data
;
1143 COMP_METHOD
*compm
= (comp
== NULL
) ? NULL
: comp
->method
;
1145 meth
= ssl_select_next_record_layer(s
, direction
, level
);
1147 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1148 thismethod
= &s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
;
1149 thisrl
= &s
->rlayer
.rrl
;
1152 thismethod
= &s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
;
1153 thisrl
= &s
->rlayer
.wrl
;
1160 if (!ossl_assert(meth
!= NULL
)) {
1161 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1165 /* Parameters that *may* be supported by a record layer if passed */
1166 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint64(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_OPTIONS
,
1168 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MODE
,
1170 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1171 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_READ_BUFFER_LEN
,
1172 &s
->rlayer
.default_read_buf_len
);
1173 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_READ_AHEAD
,
1174 &s
->rlayer
.read_ahead
);
1176 *opts
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_BLOCK_PADDING
,
1177 &s
->rlayer
.block_padding
);
1179 *opts
= OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1181 /* Parameters that *must* be supported by a record layer if passed */
1182 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1183 use_etm
= SSL_READ_ETM(s
) ? 1 : 0;
1184 if ((s
->mac_flags
& SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM
) != 0)
1187 if ((s
->mac_flags
& SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE
) != 0)
1190 use_etm
= SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) ? 1 : 0;
1191 if ((s
->mac_flags
& SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM
) != 0)
1194 if ((s
->mac_flags
& SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE
) != 0)
1199 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_USE_ETM
,
1203 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_STREAM_MAC
,
1207 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_TLSTREE
,
1211 * We only need to do this for the read side. The write side should already
1212 * have the correct value due to the ssl_get_max_send_fragment() call above
1214 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
1215 && s
->session
!= NULL
1216 && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s
->session
))
1217 maxfrag
= GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s
->session
);
1220 if (maxfrag
!= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)
1221 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_FRAG_LEN
,
1225 * The record layer must check the amount of early data sent or received
1226 * using the early keys. A server also needs to worry about rejected early
1227 * data that might arrive when the handshake keys are in force.
1229 if (s
->server
&& direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1230 use_early_data
= (level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY
1231 || level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE
);
1232 } else if (!s
->server
&& direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE
) {
1233 use_early_data
= (level
== OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY
);
1235 if (use_early_data
) {
1236 max_early_data
= ossl_get_max_early_data(s
);
1238 if (max_early_data
!= 0)
1239 *set
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_EARLY_DATA
,
1243 *set
= OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1249 unsigned int epoch
= 0;
1250 OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch_tmp
[OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch
)];
1253 if (direction
== OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
) {
1254 prev
= s
->rlayer
.rrlnext
;
1255 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
1256 && level
!= OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE
)
1257 epoch
= DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s
->rlayer
) + 1; /* new epoch */
1259 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
))
1260 next
= BIO_new(BIO_s_dgram_mem());
1262 next
= BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
1266 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1269 s
->rlayer
.rrlnext
= next
;
1273 * Create a copy of the dispatch array, missing out wrappers for
1274 * callbacks that we don't need.
1276 for (i
= 0, j
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch
); i
++) {
1277 switch (rlayer_dispatch
[i
].function_id
) {
1278 case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK
:
1279 if (s
->msg_callback
== NULL
)
1282 case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING
:
1283 if (s
->rlayer
.record_padding_cb
== NULL
)
1289 rlayer_dispatch_tmp
[j
++] = rlayer_dispatch
[i
];
1292 rlret
= meth
->new_record_layer(sctx
->libctx
, sctx
->propq
, version
,
1293 s
->server
, direction
, level
, epoch
,
1294 key
, keylen
, iv
, ivlen
, mackey
,
1295 mackeylen
, ciph
, taglen
, mactype
, md
,
1296 compm
, prev
, thisbio
, next
, NULL
, NULL
,
1297 settings
, options
, rlayer_dispatch_tmp
,
1301 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL
:
1302 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE
);
1305 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR
:
1306 if (*thismethod
!= meth
&& *thismethod
!= NULL
) {
1308 * We tried a new record layer method, but it didn't work out,
1309 * so we fallback to the original method and try again
1314 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_RECORD_LAYER
);
1317 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS
:
1321 /* Should not happen */
1322 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1328 if (*thismethod
!= NULL
&& !(*thismethod
)->free(*thisrl
)) {
1329 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1336 return ssl_post_record_layer_select(s
, direction
);
1339 int ssl_set_record_protocol_version(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int vers
)
1341 if (!ossl_assert(s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
!= NULL
)
1342 || !ossl_assert(s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
!= NULL
))
1344 s
->rlayer
.rrlmethod
->set_protocol_version(s
->rlayer
.rrl
, s
->version
);
1345 s
->rlayer
.wrlmethod
->set_protocol_version(s
->rlayer
.wrl
, s
->version
);