2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include <openssl/evp.h>
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include "record_locl.h"
19 #include "../packet_locl.h"
21 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
22 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
23 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
24 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
26 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
27 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
30 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
, SSL
*s
)
33 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s
->rlayer
);
34 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
37 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
39 rl
->rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
42 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
43 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
48 rl
->packet_length
= 0;
50 memset(rl
->handshake_fragment
, 0, sizeof(rl
->handshake_fragment
));
51 rl
->handshake_fragment_len
= 0;
57 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl
->rbuf
);
58 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
60 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
62 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl
);
63 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl
);
66 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl
);
69 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
71 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl
->rbuf
))
72 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl
->s
);
73 if (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
74 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl
->s
);
75 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl
->rrec
, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
);
78 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
79 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
81 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->rbuf
) != 0;
84 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
85 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
87 size_t curr_rec
= 0, num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl
);
88 const SSL3_RECORD
*rr
= rl
->rrec
;
90 while (curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr
[curr_rec
]))
93 return curr_rec
< num_recs
;
96 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
98 return (rl
->numwpipes
> 0)
99 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl
->wbuf
[rl
->numwpipes
- 1]) != 0;
102 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
104 memset(rl
->read_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->read_sequence
));
107 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
109 memset(rl
->write_sequence
, 0, sizeof(rl
->write_sequence
));
112 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL
*s
)
116 if (s
->rlayer
.rstate
== SSL_ST_READ_BODY
)
119 for (i
= 0; i
< RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
); i
++) {
120 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
])
121 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
123 num
+= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s
->rlayer
.rrec
[i
]);
129 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, size_t len
)
131 ctx
->default_read_buf_len
= len
;
134 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL
*s
, size_t len
)
136 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s
->rlayer
), len
);
139 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL
*s
)
141 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
142 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
143 return "read header";
144 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
146 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
153 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL
*s
)
155 switch (s
->rlayer
.rstate
) {
156 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
:
158 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY
:
160 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE
:
168 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
170 int ssl3_read_n(SSL
*s
, size_t n
, size_t max
, int extend
, int clearold
,
174 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
175 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
176 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
177 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
178 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
179 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
180 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
182 size_t len
, left
, align
= 0;
189 rb
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
191 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
195 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
196 align
= (size_t)rb
->buf
+ SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
197 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
201 /* start with empty packet ... */
204 else if (align
!= 0 && left
>= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
206 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
209 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
210 if (pkt
[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
211 && (pkt
[3] << 8 | pkt
[4]) >= 128) {
213 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
214 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
215 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
216 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
217 * overrun can be triggered.
219 memmove(rb
->buf
+ align
, pkt
, left
);
223 s
->rlayer
.packet
= rb
->buf
+ rb
->offset
;
224 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
= 0;
225 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
228 len
= s
->rlayer
.packet_length
;
229 pkt
= rb
->buf
+ align
;
231 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
232 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
234 if (s
->rlayer
.packet
!= pkt
&& clearold
== 1) {
235 memmove(pkt
, s
->rlayer
.packet
, len
+ left
);
236 s
->rlayer
.packet
= pkt
;
237 rb
->offset
= len
+ align
;
241 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
242 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
245 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
246 if (left
== 0 && extend
)
248 if (left
> 0 && n
> left
)
252 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
254 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
261 /* else we need to read more data */
263 if (n
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
) { /* does not happen */
264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
268 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
269 if (!s
->rlayer
.read_ahead
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
270 /* ignore max parameter */
275 if (max
> rb
->len
- rb
->offset
)
276 max
= rb
->len
- rb
->offset
;
284 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
285 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
290 if (s
->rbio
!= NULL
) {
291 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
292 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
293 ret
= BIO_read(s
->rbio
, pkt
+ len
+ left
, max
- left
);
297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N
, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET
);
303 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
305 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
310 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
311 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
312 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
314 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
316 n
= left
; /* makes the while condition false */
320 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
323 s
->rlayer
.packet_length
+= n
;
324 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
330 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
331 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
333 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, const void *buf_
, size_t len
,
336 const unsigned char *buf
= buf_
;
338 size_t n
, split_send_fragment
, maxpipes
;
339 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
340 size_t max_send_fragment
, nw
;
342 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
346 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
347 tot
= s
->rlayer
.wnum
;
349 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
350 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
351 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
352 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
353 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
354 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
355 * report the error in a way the user will notice
357 if ((len
< s
->rlayer
.wnum
)
358 || ((wb
->left
!= 0) && (len
< (s
->rlayer
.wnum
+ s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
)))) {
359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
363 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
364 && !early_data_count_ok(s
, len
, 0, NULL
))
370 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
371 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
374 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)
375 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING
) {
376 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
386 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
387 * will happen with non blocking IO
390 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
,
393 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
394 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
397 tot
+= tmpwrit
; /* this might be last fragment */
399 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
401 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
402 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
403 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
404 * compromise is considered worthy.
406 if (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
407 len
>= 4 * (max_send_fragment
= s
->max_send_fragment
) &&
408 s
->compress
== NULL
&& s
->msg_callback
== NULL
&&
409 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) &&
410 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
)) &
411 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
) {
412 unsigned char aad
[13];
413 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param
;
417 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
418 if ((max_send_fragment
& 0xfff) == 0)
419 max_send_fragment
-= 512;
421 if (tot
== 0 || wb
->buf
== NULL
) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
422 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
424 packlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
425 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE
,
426 (int)max_send_fragment
, NULL
);
428 if (len
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
433 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, 1, packlen
)) {
434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
437 } else if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
438 /* free jumbo buffer */
439 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
446 if (n
< 4 * max_send_fragment
) {
447 /* free jumbo buffer */
448 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
452 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
453 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
455 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
460 if (n
>= 8 * max_send_fragment
)
461 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 8);
463 nw
= max_send_fragment
* (mb_param
.interleave
= 4);
465 memcpy(aad
, s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
, 8);
467 aad
[9] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
>> 8);
468 aad
[10] = (unsigned char)(s
->version
);
475 packleni
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
476 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD
,
477 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
);
478 packlen
= (size_t)packleni
;
479 if (packleni
<= 0 || packlen
> wb
->len
) { /* never happens */
480 /* free jumbo buffer */
481 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
485 mb_param
.out
= wb
->buf
;
486 mb_param
.inp
= &buf
[tot
];
489 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s
->enc_write_ctx
,
490 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT
,
491 sizeof(mb_param
), &mb_param
) <= 0)
494 s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] += mb_param
.interleave
;
495 if (s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[7] < mb_param
.interleave
) {
497 while (j
>= 0 && (++s
->rlayer
.write_sequence
[j
--]) == 0) ;
503 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= nw
;
504 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= &buf
[tot
];
505 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
506 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= nw
;
508 i
= ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, &buf
[tot
], nw
, &tmpwrit
);
510 if (i
< 0 && (!s
->wbio
|| !BIO_should_retry(s
->wbio
))) {
511 /* free jumbo buffer */
512 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
514 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
518 /* free jumbo buffer */
519 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
520 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
528 if (tot
== len
) { /* done? */
529 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
530 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
538 split_send_fragment
= s
->split_send_fragment
;
540 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
541 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
542 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
545 maxpipes
= s
->max_pipelines
;
546 if (maxpipes
> SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
) {
548 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
555 || s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
556 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s
->enc_write_ctx
))
557 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE
)
558 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
))
560 if (s
->max_send_fragment
== 0 || split_send_fragment
> s
->max_send_fragment
561 || split_send_fragment
== 0) {
563 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
564 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
571 size_t pipelens
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
], tmppipelen
, remain
;
577 numpipes
= ((n
- 1) / split_send_fragment
) + 1;
578 if (numpipes
> maxpipes
)
581 if (n
/ numpipes
>= s
->max_send_fragment
) {
583 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
586 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
587 pipelens
[j
] = s
->max_send_fragment
;
590 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
591 tmppipelen
= n
/ numpipes
;
592 remain
= n
% numpipes
;
593 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
594 pipelens
[j
] = tmppipelen
;
600 i
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, &(buf
[tot
]), pipelens
, numpipes
, 0,
603 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
604 s
->rlayer
.wnum
= tot
;
609 (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&&
610 (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE
))) {
612 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
613 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
615 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 0;
617 if ((i
== (int)n
) && s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
&&
619 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s
);
621 *written
= tot
+ tmpwrit
;
630 int do_ssl3_write(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
,
631 size_t *pipelens
, size_t numpipes
,
632 int create_empty_fragment
, size_t *written
)
634 WPACKET pkt
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
635 SSL3_RECORD wr
[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES
];
638 unsigned char *recordstart
;
639 int i
, mac_size
, clear
= 0;
640 size_t prefix_len
= 0;
645 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, wpinited
= 0;
648 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++)
649 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
651 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
652 * will happen with non blocking IO
654 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s
->rlayer
))
655 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
657 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
658 if (s
->s3
->alert_dispatch
) {
659 i
= s
->method
->ssl_dispatch_alert(s
);
662 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
665 if (s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
< numpipes
)
666 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s
, numpipes
, 0))
669 if (totlen
== 0 && !create_empty_fragment
)
674 if ((sess
== NULL
) ||
675 (s
->enc_write_ctx
== NULL
) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s
->write_hash
) == NULL
)) {
676 clear
= s
->enc_write_ctx
? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
679 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
680 mac_size
= EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->write_hash
);
686 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
688 if (!clear
&& !create_empty_fragment
&& !s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
) {
690 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
691 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
694 if (s
->s3
->need_empty_fragments
&& type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) {
696 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
697 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
698 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
701 size_t tmppipelen
= 0;
704 ret
= do_ssl3_write(s
, type
, buf
, &tmppipelen
, 1, 1, &prefix_len
);
709 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD
)) {
710 /* insufficient space */
711 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
716 s
->s3
->empty_fragment_done
= 1;
719 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
720 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
721 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
723 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
724 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
725 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
727 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
728 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
730 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
731 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
732 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
733 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], align
, NULL
)) {
734 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
738 } else if (prefix_len
) {
739 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[0];
740 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt
[0],
741 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
742 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
743 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt
[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb
)
744 + prefix_len
, NULL
)) {
745 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
750 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
753 wb
= &s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
];
754 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
755 align
= (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
756 align
= SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
- 1 - ((align
- 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD
);
758 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb
, align
);
759 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt
, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb
),
760 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb
), 0)
761 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, align
, NULL
)) {
762 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
769 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
770 if (s
->enc_write_ctx
&& SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s
) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
)) {
771 int mode
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
772 if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
) {
773 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
774 eivlen
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
777 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
) {
778 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
779 eivlen
= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
780 } else if (mode
== EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
) {
781 eivlen
= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
;
786 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
787 memset(wr
, 0, sizeof wr
);
788 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
789 unsigned int version
= SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
) ? TLS1_VERSION
: s
->version
;
790 unsigned char *compressdata
= NULL
;
792 unsigned int rectype
;
797 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr
, type
);
799 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
802 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
) && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
)
803 rectype
= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
;
807 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
808 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
810 if (SSL_get_state(s
) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
811 && !s
->renegotiate
&& TLS1_get_version(s
) > TLS1_VERSION
)
812 version
= TLS1_VERSION
;
814 maxcomplen
= pipelens
[j
];
815 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
)
816 maxcomplen
+= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD
;
818 /* write the header */
819 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt
, rectype
)
820 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt
, version
)
821 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt
)
823 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, eivlen
, NULL
))
825 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt
, maxcomplen
,
827 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
831 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
832 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr
, compressdata
);
833 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr
, pipelens
[j
]);
834 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr
, (unsigned char *)&buf
[totlen
]);
835 totlen
+= pipelens
[j
];
838 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
842 /* first we compress */
843 if (s
->compress
!= NULL
) {
845 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we prevent compression!!!
847 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s
, thiswr
)
848 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, thiswr
->length
, NULL
)) {
849 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE
);
853 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt
, thiswr
->input
, thiswr
->length
)) {
854 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
857 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr
[j
]);
860 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
) && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
) {
863 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt
, type
)) {
864 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
867 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, 1);
869 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */
870 rlen
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
);
871 if (rlen
< SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
) {
873 size_t max_padding
= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
- rlen
;
874 if (s
->record_padding_cb
!= NULL
) {
875 padding
= s
->record_padding_cb(s
, type
, rlen
, s
->record_padding_arg
);
876 } else if (s
->block_padding
> 0) {
877 size_t mask
= s
->block_padding
- 1;
880 /* optimize for power of 2 */
881 if ((s
->block_padding
& mask
) == 0)
882 remainder
= rlen
& mask
;
884 remainder
= rlen
% s
->block_padding
;
885 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */
889 padding
= s
->block_padding
- remainder
;
892 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */
893 if (padding
> max_padding
)
894 padding
= max_padding
;
895 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt
, 0, padding
)) {
896 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
899 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, padding
);
905 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
906 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
910 if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
913 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, mac_size
, &mac
)
914 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, thiswr
, mac
, 1)) {
915 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
921 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
922 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
923 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
925 if(!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt
, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE
,
928 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
931 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &len
)) {
932 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
936 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
937 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt
) - len
;
939 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr
, recordstart
);
940 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr
);
941 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr
, len
);
944 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
945 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
) {
947 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
948 * send early data - so we need to use the the tls13enc function.
950 if (tls13_enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1) < 1)
953 if (s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->enc(s
, wr
, numpipes
, 1) < 1)
957 for (j
= 0; j
< numpipes
; j
++) {
963 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
964 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &origlen
)
965 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
966 || origlen
> thiswr
->length
967 || (thiswr
->length
> origlen
968 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
,
969 thiswr
->length
- origlen
, NULL
))) {
970 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
973 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s
) && mac_size
!= 0) {
976 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt
, mac_size
, &mac
)
977 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->mac(s
, thiswr
, mac
, 1)) {
978 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
981 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, mac_size
);
984 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt
, &len
)
985 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt
)) {
986 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
990 if (s
->msg_callback
) {
991 recordstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt
) - len
992 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
;
993 s
->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER
, recordstart
,
994 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
995 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
997 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s
) && s
->enc_write_ctx
!= NULL
) {
998 unsigned char ctype
= type
;
1000 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE
,
1001 &ctype
, 1, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1005 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt
)) {
1006 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1011 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
1012 * is thiswr->length long
1014 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr
, type
); /* not needed but helps for
1016 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr
, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
);
1018 if (create_empty_fragment
) {
1020 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1024 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1028 *written
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
);
1032 /* now let's set up wb */
1033 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s
->rlayer
.wbuf
[j
],
1034 prefix_len
+ SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr
));
1038 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1041 s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
= totlen
;
1042 s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
= buf
;
1043 s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
= type
;
1044 s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
= totlen
;
1046 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1047 return ssl3_write_pending(s
, type
, buf
, totlen
, written
);
1049 for (j
= 0; j
< wpinited
; j
++)
1050 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt
[j
]);
1054 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1056 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1058 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL
*s
, int type
, const unsigned char *buf
, size_t len
,
1062 SSL3_BUFFER
*wb
= s
->rlayer
.wbuf
;
1066 if ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_tot
> len
)
1067 || ((s
->rlayer
.wpend_buf
!= buf
) &&
1068 !(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER
))
1069 || (s
->rlayer
.wpend_type
!= type
)) {
1070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY
);
1075 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1076 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]) == 0
1077 && currbuf
< s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
- 1) {
1082 if (s
->wbio
!= NULL
) {
1083 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
1084 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1085 i
= BIO_write(s
->wbio
, (char *)
1086 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb
[currbuf
])
1087 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb
[currbuf
])]),
1088 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
]));
1092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING
, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET
);
1095 if (i
> 0 && tmpwrit
== SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb
[currbuf
])) {
1096 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1097 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1098 if (currbuf
+ 1 < s
->rlayer
.numwpipes
)
1100 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1101 *written
= s
->rlayer
.wpend_ret
;
1103 } else if (i
<= 0) {
1104 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1106 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1107 * using a datagram service
1109 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb
[currbuf
], 0);
1113 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1114 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb
[currbuf
], tmpwrit
);
1119 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1120 * 'type' is one of the following:
1122 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1123 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1124 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1126 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1127 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1129 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1130 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1131 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1132 * argument is non NULL.
1133 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1134 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1135 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1136 * Change cipher spec protocol
1137 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1139 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1140 * Handshake protocol
1141 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1142 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1143 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1144 * Application data protocol
1145 * none of our business
1147 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL
*s
, int type
, int *recvd_type
, unsigned char *buf
,
1148 size_t len
, int peek
, size_t *readbytes
)
1151 size_t n
, curr_rec
, num_recs
, totalbytes
;
1154 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type2
, int val
) = NULL
;
1156 rbuf
= &s
->rlayer
.rbuf
;
1158 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf
)) {
1159 /* Not initialized yet */
1160 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s
))
1164 if ((type
&& (type
!= SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
)
1165 && (type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) || (peek
1167 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
))) {
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1172 if ((type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0))
1173 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1175 unsigned char *src
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1176 unsigned char *dst
= buf
;
1181 while ((len
> 0) && (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0)) {
1184 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
--;
1187 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1188 for (k
= 0; k
< s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
; k
++)
1189 s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[k
] = *src
++;
1191 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1192 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
;
1199 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1202 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
) && SSL_in_init(s
)) {
1203 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1204 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1213 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1216 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1217 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1218 * rr[i].data, - data
1219 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1220 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1222 rr
= s
->rlayer
.rrec
;
1223 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1226 /* get new records if necessary */
1227 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1228 ret
= ssl3_get_record(s
);
1231 num_recs
= RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
);
1232 if (num_recs
== 0) {
1233 /* Shouldn't happen */
1234 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1239 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1241 curr_rec
< num_recs
&& SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr
[curr_rec
]);
1243 if (curr_rec
== num_recs
) {
1244 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s
->rlayer
, 0);
1248 } while (num_recs
== 0);
1252 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1253 * record that isn't an alert.
1255 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1256 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) != 0)
1257 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
= 0;
1259 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1261 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
/* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1262 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1263 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)) {
1264 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED
);
1270 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1273 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
) {
1274 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1275 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1279 if (type
== SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)
1280 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1281 && type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
&& recvd_type
!= NULL
1282 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))) {
1284 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1285 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1286 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1289 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1290 * doing a handshake for the first time
1292 if (SSL_in_init(s
) && (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
) &&
1293 (s
->enc_read_ctx
== NULL
)) {
1294 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE
);
1299 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1300 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1301 && s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
> 0) {
1302 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1307 if (recvd_type
!= NULL
)
1308 *recvd_type
= SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
);
1315 if (len
- totalbytes
> SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1316 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
);
1318 n
= len
- totalbytes
;
1320 memcpy(buf
, &(rr
->data
[rr
->off
]), n
);
1323 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1324 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1325 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1327 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr
, n
);
1328 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1329 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0) {
1330 s
->rlayer
.rstate
= SSL_ST_READ_HEADER
;
1331 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr
, 0);
1332 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1335 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0
1336 || (peek
&& n
== SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))) {
1341 } while (type
== SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&& curr_rec
< num_recs
1342 && totalbytes
< len
);
1343 if (totalbytes
== 0) {
1344 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1347 if (!peek
&& curr_rec
== num_recs
1348 && (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
)
1349 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0)
1350 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s
);
1351 *readbytes
= totalbytes
;
1356 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1357 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1358 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1362 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1364 if (rr
->rec_version
== SSL2_VERSION
) {
1366 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1367 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1368 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1369 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1371 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1376 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
1377 && (s
->server
|| rr
->type
!= SSL3_RT_ALERT
)) {
1379 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1380 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1381 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1382 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1384 s
->version
= rr
->rec_version
;
1385 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1391 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1392 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1395 size_t dest_maxlen
= 0;
1396 unsigned char *dest
= NULL
;
1397 size_t *dest_len
= NULL
;
1399 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1400 dest_maxlen
= sizeof s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1401 dest
= s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
;
1402 dest_len
= &s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
;
1405 if (dest_maxlen
> 0) {
1406 n
= dest_maxlen
- *dest_len
; /* available space in 'dest' */
1407 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) < n
)
1408 n
= SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
); /* available bytes */
1410 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1411 memcpy(dest
+ *dest_len
,
1412 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
), n
);
1413 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr
, n
);
1414 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr
, -n
);
1416 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
) == 0)
1417 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1419 if (*dest_len
< dest_maxlen
)
1420 goto start
; /* fragment was too small */
1425 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1426 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1430 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1431 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1432 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1435 SSL_is_init_finished(s
) &&
1436 !s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
1437 (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) &&
1439 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4) &&
1440 (s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment
[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) &&
1441 (s
->session
!= NULL
) && (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
) &&
1442 !(s
->ctx
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
1443 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1444 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1445 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1448 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_ALERT
) {
1449 unsigned int alert_level
, alert_descr
;
1450 unsigned char *alert_bytes
= SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr
)
1451 + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr
);
1454 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert
, alert_bytes
, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr
))
1455 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_level
)
1456 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert
, &alert_descr
)
1457 || PACKET_remaining(&alert
) != 0) {
1458 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT
);
1463 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1464 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_ALERT
, alert_bytes
, 2, s
,
1465 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1467 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1468 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1469 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1470 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1473 j
= (alert_level
<< 8) | alert_descr
;
1474 cb(s
, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT
, j
);
1477 if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_WARNING
) {
1478 s
->s3
->warn_alert
= alert_descr
;
1479 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1481 s
->rlayer
.alert_count
++;
1482 if (s
->rlayer
.alert_count
== MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT
) {
1483 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS
);
1488 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
) {
1489 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1493 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
1494 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
1496 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && alert_descr
!= SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED
) {
1497 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1502 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1503 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1504 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1505 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1506 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1507 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1509 if (alert_descr
== SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) {
1510 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1514 } else if (alert_level
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
1517 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1518 s
->s3
->fatal_alert
= alert_descr
;
1519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET
+ alert_descr
);
1520 BIO_snprintf(tmp
, sizeof tmp
, "%d", alert_descr
);
1521 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp
);
1522 s
->shutdown
|= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
;
1523 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1524 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1527 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE
);
1535 if (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) { /* but we have not received a
1537 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1538 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr
, 0);
1539 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1543 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1544 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1550 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1551 * protocol violation)
1553 if ((s
->rlayer
.handshake_fragment_len
>= 4)
1554 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
1555 int ined
= (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
);
1557 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1558 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
1560 i
= s
->handshake_func(s
);
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
1569 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
1570 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
1571 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
1576 if (!(s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
)) {
1577 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf
) == 0) {
1578 /* no read-ahead left? */
1581 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1582 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1583 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1584 * problems in the blocking world
1586 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1587 bio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
1588 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio
);
1589 BIO_set_retry_read(bio
);
1596 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr
)) {
1599 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1600 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1601 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1602 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1603 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1605 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1608 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
:
1610 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
:
1612 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1613 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1614 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1616 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1619 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
:
1621 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1622 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1623 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1624 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1625 * started), we will indulge it.
1627 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s
)) {
1628 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
1630 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s
)) {
1632 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1633 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1634 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1635 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1636 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1637 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1640 if (!early_data_count_ok(s
, rr
->length
,
1641 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD
, &al
))
1643 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr
);
1646 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD
);
1654 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1658 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq
)
1662 for (i
= 7; i
>= 0; i
--) {
1670 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1671 * format and false otherwise.
1673 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1675 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl
->rrec
[0]);
1679 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1681 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER
*rl
)
1683 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl
->rrec
[0]);