2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
154 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
155 #include <openssl/rand.h>
156 #include <openssl/objects.h>
157 #include <openssl/evp.h>
158 #include <openssl/md5.h>
160 # include <openssl/fips.h>
162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
163 # include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #include <openssl/bn.h>
166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
167 # include <openssl/engine.h>
170 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
);
171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
172 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL
*s
);
175 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
176 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_client_method(int ver
)
178 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
179 return (SSLv3_client_method());
184 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method
,
185 ssl_undefined_function
,
186 ssl3_connect
, ssl3_get_client_method
)
188 int ssl3_connect(SSL
*s
)
191 unsigned long Time
= (unsigned long)time(NULL
);
192 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
194 int new_state
, state
, skip
= 0;
196 RAND_add(&Time
, sizeof(Time
), 0);
200 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
201 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
202 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
203 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
206 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
))
209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
211 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
212 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
215 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
) {
216 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
225 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
227 s
->state
= SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
228 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
++;
232 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
| SSL_ST_CONNECT
:
233 case SSL_ST_OK
| SSL_ST_CONNECT
:
237 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
, 1);
239 if ((s
->version
& 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
241 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
246 /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
247 s
->type
= SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
249 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
) {
250 if ((buf
= BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
) {
252 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
255 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
257 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
264 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
)) {
269 /* setup buffing BIO */
270 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
, 0)) {
272 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
276 /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
278 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
280 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
281 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
++;
283 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
285 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
287 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
290 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
291 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
294 ret
= ssl3_client_hello(s
);
297 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
300 /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
301 if (s
->bbio
!= s
->wbio
)
302 s
->wbio
= BIO_push(s
->bbio
, s
->wbio
);
306 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
307 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
308 ret
= ssl3_get_server_hello(s
);
313 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
315 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
316 /* receive renewed session ticket */
317 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
321 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A
;
325 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A
:
326 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B
:
327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
328 /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
329 ret
= ssl3_check_finished(s
);
334 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
339 /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
343 new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
344 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
345 ret
= ssl3_get_server_certificate(s
);
348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
349 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
350 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
;
352 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
355 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
361 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
366 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
367 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
368 ret
= ssl3_get_key_exchange(s
);
371 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
;
375 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
378 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
380 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
385 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
:
386 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B
:
387 ret
= ssl3_get_certificate_request(s
);
390 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
;
394 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
:
395 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B
:
396 ret
= ssl3_get_server_done(s
);
399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
400 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
401 if ((ret
= SRP_Calc_A_param(s
)) <= 0) {
402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
403 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
404 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
409 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
410 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
;
412 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
417 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
:
418 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
:
419 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
:
420 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D
:
421 ret
= ssl3_send_client_certificate(s
);
424 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
428 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
429 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
430 ret
= ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s
);
434 * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
437 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
438 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
441 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
442 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
443 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
444 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
446 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
447 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
;
449 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
451 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
452 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
458 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
:
459 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B
:
460 ret
= ssl3_send_client_verify(s
);
463 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
467 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
:
468 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B
:
469 ret
= ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
471 SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B
);
475 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
476 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
478 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
479 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
481 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
485 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
486 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
487 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
489 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
490 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
492 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
494 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
496 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
500 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
501 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
504 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
510 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
511 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
512 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
513 ret
= ssl3_send_next_proto(s
);
516 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
520 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
:
521 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B
:
522 ret
= ssl3_send_finished(s
,
523 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
,
524 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B
,
526 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
,
528 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
);
531 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH
;
534 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
;
536 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
537 if (s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED
) {
538 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
539 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
;
540 s
->s3
->delay_buf_pop_ret
= 0;
543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
545 * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
547 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
548 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
552 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
558 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
559 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
560 ret
= ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s
);
563 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
567 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
:
568 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B
:
569 ret
= ssl3_get_cert_status(s
);
572 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
577 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
:
578 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B
:
579 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
580 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
581 ret
= ssl3_get_finished(s
, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
,
582 SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B
);
587 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
589 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
593 case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH
:
594 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
595 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0) {
599 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
600 s
->state
= s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
604 /* clean a few things up */
605 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
607 if (s
->init_buf
!= NULL
) {
608 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
613 * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
616 if (!(s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER
))
617 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
618 /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
624 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
626 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
630 s
->handshake_func
= ssl3_connect
;
631 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
634 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
647 /* did we do anything */
648 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
) {
650 if ((ret
= BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
654 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
)) {
655 new_state
= s
->state
;
657 cb(s
, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP
, 1);
658 s
->state
= new_state
;
668 cb(s
, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT
, ret
);
672 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
675 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
684 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
685 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
) {
686 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
687 if ((sess
== NULL
) || (sess
->ssl_version
!= s
->version
) ||
688 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
689 !sess
->session_id_length
||
692 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
693 * "ticket" without a session ID.
695 (!sess
->session_id_length
&& !sess
->tlsext_tick
) ||
697 (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
698 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
701 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
702 /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
703 int options
= s
->options
;
704 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
705 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
) {
706 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
,
708 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
712 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
714 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
) {
715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
719 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
721 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
722 s
->version
= DTLS1_VERSION
;
725 * We only support one version: update method
727 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
)
728 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
729 s
->version
= DTLS1_2_VERSION
;
731 s
->client_version
= s
->version
;
733 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
735 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
738 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
739 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
741 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
744 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
753 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
,
754 sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
)) <= 0)
757 /* Do the message type and length last */
758 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
761 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
762 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
763 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
764 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
765 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
766 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
767 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
768 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
771 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
772 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
773 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
774 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
775 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
776 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
777 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
778 * know that is maximum server supports.
779 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
780 * containing version 1.0.
782 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
783 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
784 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
785 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
786 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
787 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
788 * the negotiated version.
791 *(p
++) = s
->version
>> 8;
792 *(p
++) = s
->version
& 0xff;
793 s
->client_version
= s
->version
;
795 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
>> 8;
796 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
800 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
801 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
807 i
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
810 if (i
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
811 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
814 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, i
);
818 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
819 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
820 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
824 *(p
++) = s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
825 memcpy(p
, s
->d1
->cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie_len
);
826 p
+= s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
829 /* Ciphers supported */
830 i
= ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), &(p
[2]), 0);
832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
835 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
837 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
838 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
841 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
842 && i
> OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
)
843 i
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
849 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
853 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
854 || !s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
857 j
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
859 for (i
= 0; i
< j
; i
++) {
860 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
864 *(p
++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
866 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
868 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
873 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
875 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
876 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
882 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
, l
);
883 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
886 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
887 return ssl_do_write(s
);
889 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
893 int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
895 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
898 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
899 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ok
;
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
906 * Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not match so set
907 * first packet if we're negotiating version.
912 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
913 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
,
914 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B
, -1, 20000, &ok
);
919 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
921 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
922 if (s
->d1
->send_cookie
== 0) {
923 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
925 } else { /* already sent a cookie */
927 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
934 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
935 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
940 d
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
941 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
942 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
943 int hversion
= (p
[0] << 8) | p
[1];
944 int options
= s
->options
;
945 if (hversion
== DTLS1_2_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
))
946 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
947 else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
949 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
950 s
->version
= hversion
;
951 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
953 } else if (hversion
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
))
954 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
957 s
->version
= hversion
;
958 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
961 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
964 if ((p
[0] != (s
->version
>> 8)) || (p
[1] != (s
->version
& 0xff))) {
965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
966 s
->version
= (s
->version
& 0xff00) | p
[1];
967 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
972 /* load the server hello data */
973 /* load the server random */
974 memcpy(s
->s3
->server_random
, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
975 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
979 /* get the session-id */
982 if ((j
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
) || (j
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
)) {
983 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
989 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
990 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
991 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
992 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
993 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
994 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
995 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
996 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
997 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
998 * server wants to resume.
1000 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
&&
1001 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
1002 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1003 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1004 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1005 &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
1007 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
1008 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1009 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, p
+ j
);
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1012 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1016 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
1018 if (j
!= 0 && j
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1019 && memcmp(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, j
) == 0) {
1020 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1021 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1022 /* actually a client application bug */
1023 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1024 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1025 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1031 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1032 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1033 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1034 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1035 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1037 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1038 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1042 s
->session
->session_id_length
= j
;
1043 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, p
, j
); /* j could be 0 */
1046 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, p
);
1048 /* unknown cipher */
1049 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1053 /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
1054 if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s
))
1055 ct
->mask_ssl
= SSL_TLSV1_2
;
1059 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1062 if (c
->algorithm_ssl
& ct
->mask_ssl
||
1063 c
->algorithm_mkey
& ct
->mask_k
|| c
->algorithm_auth
& ct
->mask_a
) {
1064 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1068 p
+= ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s
, NULL
, NULL
);
1070 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1071 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1073 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1074 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1080 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1081 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1082 * set and use it for comparison.
1084 if (s
->session
->cipher
)
1085 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1086 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1087 /* Workaround is now obsolete */
1089 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
))
1092 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1094 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1098 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1100 * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
1103 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1105 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1107 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1109 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1111 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1115 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1116 * using compression.
1118 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1124 if (s
->hit
&& j
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1125 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1127 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1132 else if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) {
1133 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1137 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, j
);
1139 if ((j
!= 0) && (comp
== NULL
)) {
1140 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1142 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1145 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1150 /* TLS extensions */
1151 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s
, &p
, d
, n
)) {
1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1158 /* wrong packet length */
1159 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH
);
1166 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1168 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1172 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
1174 int al
, i
, ok
, ret
= -1;
1175 unsigned long n
, nc
, llen
, l
;
1177 const unsigned char *q
, *p
;
1179 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1181 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1182 int need_cert
= 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
1185 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1188 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
1193 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) ||
1194 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
) &&
1195 (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
))) {
1196 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1200 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
1201 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
1205 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1207 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1213 if (llen
+ 3 != n
) {
1214 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1218 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
1220 if ((l
+ nc
+ 3) > llen
) {
1221 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1223 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1228 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, &q
, l
);
1230 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1235 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1237 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1240 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1249 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1250 if ((s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
) && (i
<= 0)
1251 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1252 && !((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
) &&
1253 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
1254 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1256 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1258 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1261 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1263 sc
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1267 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
)
1268 ssl_sess_cert_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
);
1269 s
->session
->sess_cert
= sc
;
1271 sc
->cert_chain
= sk
;
1273 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1274 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1276 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1279 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1282 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(x
);
1284 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
1285 need_cert
= ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
) &&
1286 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
1290 fprintf(stderr
, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey
, x
);
1291 fprintf(stderr
, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
));
1292 fprintf(stderr
, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
1293 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->name
,
1294 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
,
1295 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
, need_cert
);
1296 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1298 if (need_cert
&& ((pkey
== NULL
) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
))) {
1301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1302 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1306 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1307 if (need_cert
&& i
< 0) {
1310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1311 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1316 int exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1317 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
) {
1319 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1321 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1324 sc
->peer_cert_type
= i
;
1325 CRYPTO_add(&x
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
1327 * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
1330 if (sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
!= NULL
)
1331 X509_free(sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
);
1332 sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
= x
;
1333 sc
->peer_key
= &(sc
->peer_pkeys
[i
]);
1335 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
1336 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1337 CRYPTO_add(&x
->references
, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509
);
1338 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1340 sc
->peer_cert_type
= i
;
1341 sc
->peer_key
= NULL
;
1343 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
1344 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1345 s
->session
->peer
= NULL
;
1347 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1353 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1355 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1358 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1360 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1364 int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1367 unsigned char *q
, md_buf
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
* 2];
1370 unsigned char *param
, *p
;
1372 long i
, param_len
, n
, alg_k
, alg_a
;
1373 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1374 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1375 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1378 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1382 EC_KEY
*ecdh
= NULL
;
1383 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1384 EC_POINT
*srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1386 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
1389 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1392 * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
1393 * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
1395 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1396 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
1397 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
1398 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
1402 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1404 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
1406 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
1409 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) {
1410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1411 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1416 * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
1417 * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
1420 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1421 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1422 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
1423 OPENSSL_free(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1424 s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1427 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1431 param
= p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1432 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
!= NULL
) {
1433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1434 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
!= NULL
) {
1435 RSA_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
);
1436 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
= NULL
;
1439 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1440 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
) {
1441 DH_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
);
1442 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
= NULL
;
1445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1446 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
) {
1447 EC_KEY_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
);
1448 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
= NULL
;
1452 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
1455 /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
1458 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
1460 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1463 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
1465 if (param_len
> n
) {
1466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1472 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1473 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1474 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1477 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1478 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1482 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1484 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH
);
1489 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strndup((char *)p
, i
);
1490 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
1491 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1499 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1500 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1501 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1503 if (param_len
> n
) {
1504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1509 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH
);
1515 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.N
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1521 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1529 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH
);
1535 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.g
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1541 if (1 > n
- param_len
) {
1542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1547 i
= (unsigned int)(p
[0]);
1550 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH
);
1556 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.s
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1562 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1570 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH
);
1576 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.B
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1583 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, &al
)) {
1584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1588 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1589 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1590 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1592 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1593 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1597 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1598 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
)
1600 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1601 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
].
1605 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1607 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
1608 /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
1609 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
1610 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1611 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1614 if ((rsa
= RSA_new()) == NULL
) {
1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1620 if (param_len
> n
) {
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1626 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH
);
1632 if (!(rsa
->n
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, rsa
->n
))) {
1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1638 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1646 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH
);
1652 if (!(rsa
->e
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, rsa
->e
))) {
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1659 /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
1660 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1662 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1663 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1669 if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey
) <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
1670 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1675 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
= rsa
;
1678 #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
1681 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1682 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kEDH
) {
1683 if ((dh
= DH_new()) == NULL
) {
1684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1689 if (param_len
> n
) {
1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1695 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH
);
1701 if (!(dh
->p
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1707 if (BN_is_zero(dh
->p
)) {
1708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE
);
1713 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1721 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH
);
1727 if (!(dh
->g
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1733 if (BN_is_zero(dh
->g
)) {
1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE
);
1738 if (2 > n
- param_len
) {
1739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1746 if (i
> n
- param_len
) {
1747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH
);
1752 if (!(dh
->pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(p
, i
, NULL
))) {
1753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1759 if (BN_is_zero(dh
->pub_key
)) {
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE
);
1764 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1765 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1767 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1768 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1772 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1773 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
)
1775 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1776 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
].
1779 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1781 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
= dh
;
1783 } else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
) || (alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
)) {
1784 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1786 SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER
);
1789 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1791 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1792 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
) {
1794 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1796 if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1802 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1803 * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
1804 * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
1808 * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
1809 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
1810 * byte for the length of the encoded point
1813 if (param_len
> n
) {
1814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1818 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1819 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1821 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, p
, 3)) {
1822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1826 if ((curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p
+ 2))) == 0) {
1827 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1828 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1829 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
1833 ngroup
= EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid
);
1834 if (ngroup
== NULL
) {
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1838 if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh
, ngroup
) == 0) {
1839 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1842 EC_GROUP_free(ngroup
);
1844 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
);
1846 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1847 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163)) {
1848 al
= SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
;
1849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1850 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1856 /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
1857 if (((srvr_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
) ||
1858 ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)) {
1859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1863 encoded_pt_len
= *p
; /* length of encoded point */
1866 if ((encoded_pt_len
> n
- param_len
) ||
1867 (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
, srvr_ecpoint
,
1868 p
, encoded_pt_len
, bn_ctx
) == 0)) {
1869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1872 param_len
+= encoded_pt_len
;
1875 p
+= encoded_pt_len
;
1878 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1879 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1883 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1884 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1886 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1887 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].x509
);
1889 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1890 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
)
1892 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
1893 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].x509
);
1895 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1896 EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh
, srvr_ecpoint
);
1897 s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
= ecdh
;
1899 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1901 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint
);
1902 srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1904 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1908 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1910 /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
1912 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1914 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1920 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, p
, pkey
);
1927 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1935 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1940 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1943 * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
1945 if ((i
!= n
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0)) {
1946 /* wrong packet length */
1947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
1950 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1951 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
&& !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1957 for (num
= 2; num
> 0; num
--) {
1958 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
1959 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
,
1960 (num
== 2) ? s
->ctx
->md5
: s
->ctx
->sha1
,
1962 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1963 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1964 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1965 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1966 || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, param
, param_len
) <= 0
1967 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
, q
, &size
) <= 0) {
1968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1969 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1970 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1976 i
= RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
, p
, n
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
);
1978 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1979 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
1984 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1985 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1991 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
1992 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1993 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1994 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1995 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1996 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, param
, param_len
) <= 0) {
1997 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2001 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx
, p
, (int)n
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2003 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2009 /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
2010 if (!(alg_a
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) && !(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
2011 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2012 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
))
2013 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2017 /* still data left over */
2019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2023 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2024 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2027 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2029 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2030 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2034 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2038 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2039 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2040 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint
);
2044 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2045 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2049 int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2052 unsigned long n
, nc
, l
;
2053 unsigned int llen
, ctype_num
, i
;
2054 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
2055 const unsigned char *p
, *q
;
2057 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
2059 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2060 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
,
2061 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B
,
2062 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
2067 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
2069 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
2070 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
2072 * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
2073 * wont be doing client auth.
2075 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
2076 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
2082 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
2083 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
2088 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
2089 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2090 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) {
2091 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2093 SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER
);
2098 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2100 if ((ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
2101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2105 /* get the certificate types */
2107 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
) {
2108 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->ctypes
);
2109 s
->cert
->ctypes
= NULL
;
2111 if (ctype_num
> SSL3_CT_NUMBER
) {
2112 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2113 s
->cert
->ctypes
= OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num
);
2114 memcpy(s
->cert
->ctypes
, p
, ctype_num
);
2115 s
->cert
->ctype_num
= (size_t)ctype_num
;
2116 ctype_num
= SSL3_CT_NUMBER
;
2118 for (i
= 0; i
< ctype_num
; i
++)
2119 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
[i
] = p
[i
];
2121 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2124 * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
2127 if ((unsigned long)(p
- d
+ llen
+ 2) > n
) {
2128 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2130 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2133 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2134 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
2135 s
->cert
->pkeys
[i
].digest
= NULL
;
2136 s
->cert
->pkeys
[i
].valid_flags
= 0;
2138 if ((llen
& 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, p
, llen
)) {
2139 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2141 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2144 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2145 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2152 /* get the CA RDNs */
2157 out
= fopen("/tmp/vsign.der", "w");
2158 fwrite(p
, 1, llen
, out
);
2163 if ((unsigned long)(p
- d
+ llen
) != n
) {
2164 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2169 for (nc
= 0; nc
< llen
;) {
2171 if ((l
+ nc
+ 2) > llen
) {
2172 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
))
2173 goto cont
; /* netscape bugs */
2174 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG
);
2181 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, &q
, l
)) == NULL
) {
2182 /* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
2183 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
)
2186 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2193 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2195 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2198 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2212 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2213 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2214 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
2215 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
!= NULL
)
2216 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2217 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2223 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2226 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2230 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2232 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
));
2235 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2236 int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
)
2238 int ok
, al
, ret
= 0, ticklen
;
2240 const unsigned char *p
;
2242 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2244 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2245 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
,
2246 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B
,
2247 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
, 16384, &ok
);
2253 /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
2254 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2259 p
= d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2261 n2l(p
, ticket_lifetime_hint
);
2263 /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
2264 if (ticklen
+ 6 != n
) {
2265 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2270 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
2274 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2275 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
2276 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2278 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2281 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
2283 * Remove the old session from the cache
2285 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE
) {
2286 if (s
->session_ctx
->remove_session_cb
!= NULL
)
2287 s
->session_ctx
->remove_session_cb(s
->session_ctx
,
2290 /* We carry on if this fails */
2291 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2295 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2296 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2301 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2302 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2305 if (s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
2306 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
);
2307 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= 0;
2309 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2310 if (!s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
2311 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2314 memcpy(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, p
, ticklen
);
2315 s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2316 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= ticklen
;
2318 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2319 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2320 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2321 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2322 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2323 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2324 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2325 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2326 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2328 EVP_Digest(p
, ticklen
,
2329 s
->session
->session_id
, &s
->session
->session_id_length
,
2330 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2331 EVP_sha256(), NULL
);
2338 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2340 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2344 int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
2347 unsigned long resplen
, n
;
2348 const unsigned char *p
;
2350 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2351 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
,
2352 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B
,
2358 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
2360 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
2361 * tlsext_status_expected is set
2363 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
2366 /* need at least status type + length */
2367 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2371 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2372 if (*p
++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2373 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2378 if (resplen
+ 4 != n
) {
2379 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2383 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= BUF_memdup(p
, resplen
);
2384 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
== NULL
) {
2385 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2389 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= resplen
;
2391 if (s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
) {
2393 ret
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
2395 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
;
2396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2400 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2407 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2408 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2413 int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL
*s
)
2418 /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
2419 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2420 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
,
2421 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B
,
2422 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
, 30, &ok
);
2427 /* should contain no data */
2428 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2430 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2438 static DH
*get_server_static_dh_key(SESS_CERT
*scert
)
2441 EVP_PKEY
*spkey
= NULL
;
2442 int idx
= scert
->peer_cert_type
;
2445 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(scert
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
);
2447 dh_srvr
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey
);
2448 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
2450 if (dh_srvr
== NULL
)
2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_STATIC_DH_KEY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2456 int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2460 unsigned long alg_k
;
2461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2463 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2465 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2467 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2468 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2469 EC_KEY
*clnt_ecdh
= NULL
;
2470 const EC_POINT
*srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2471 EVP_PKEY
*srvr_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2472 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2473 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2474 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2477 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
) {
2478 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2480 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2482 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2486 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
2488 unsigned char tmp_buf
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2490 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
2492 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2495 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2499 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
!= NULL
)
2500 rsa
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
;
2503 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
2504 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].
2506 if ((pkey
== NULL
) || (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2507 || (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
)) {
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2509 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2510 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2513 rsa
= pkey
->pkey
.rsa
;
2514 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2517 tmp_buf
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2518 tmp_buf
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2519 if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf
[2]), sizeof tmp_buf
- 2) <= 0)
2522 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof tmp_buf
;
2525 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2526 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
)
2528 n
= RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf
,
2529 tmp_buf
, p
, rsa
, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2531 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
)
2533 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
)
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2538 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2542 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2543 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2548 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2549 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2551 session
->master_key
,
2554 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf
, sizeof tmp_buf
);
2557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2558 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
) {
2559 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2560 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2561 /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
2562 krb5_data
*enc_ticket
;
2563 krb5_data authenticator
, *authp
= NULL
;
2564 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2565 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2566 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2567 unsigned char tmp_buf
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2568 unsigned char epms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2569 int padl
, outl
= sizeof(epms
);
2571 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2574 fprintf(stderr
, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
2576 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2579 # ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
2581 authp
= &authenticator
;
2582 # endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
2584 krb5rc
= kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, authp
, &kssl_err
);
2585 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2590 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc
);
2591 if (krb5rc
&& kssl_err
.text
)
2592 fprintf(stderr
, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
2595 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2598 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2604 * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
2605 * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
2607 * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
2608 * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
2609 * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
2610 * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
2611 * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
2613 * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
2614 * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
2615 * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
2616 * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
2618 * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
2619 * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
2620 * optional authenticator omitted.
2623 /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
2624 s2n(enc_ticket
->length
, p
);
2625 memcpy(p
, enc_ticket
->data
, enc_ticket
->length
);
2626 p
+= enc_ticket
->length
;
2627 n
= enc_ticket
->length
+ 2;
2629 /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
2630 if (authp
&& authp
->length
) {
2631 s2n(authp
->length
, p
);
2632 memcpy(p
, authp
->data
, authp
->length
);
2634 n
+= authp
->length
+ 2;
2640 s2n(0, p
); /* null authenticator length */
2644 tmp_buf
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2645 tmp_buf
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2646 if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf
[2]), sizeof tmp_buf
- 2) <= 0)
2650 * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
2651 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
2652 * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
2653 * kssl_ctx->length);
2654 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
2657 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2658 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
, enc
, NULL
, kssl_ctx
->key
, iv
);
2659 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, epms
, &outl
, tmp_buf
,
2661 EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
, &(epms
[outl
]), &padl
);
2663 if (outl
> (int)sizeof epms
) {
2664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2665 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2668 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2670 /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
2672 memcpy(p
, epms
, outl
);
2676 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2677 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2679 session
->master_key
,
2683 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf
, sizeof tmp_buf
);
2684 OPENSSL_cleanse(epms
, outl
);
2687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2688 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEDH
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
2689 DH
*dh_srvr
, *dh_clnt
;
2690 SESS_CERT
*scert
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
2692 if (scert
== NULL
) {
2693 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2695 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2699 if (scert
->peer_dh_tmp
!= NULL
) {
2700 dh_srvr
= scert
->peer_dh_tmp
;
2702 dh_srvr
= get_server_static_dh_key(scert
);
2703 if (dh_srvr
== NULL
)
2707 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
2708 /* Use client certificate key */
2709 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
2712 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey
);
2713 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
2714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2715 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2719 /* generate a new random key */
2720 if ((dh_clnt
= DHparams_dup(dh_srvr
)) == NULL
) {
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2724 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt
)) {
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2732 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2733 * clear it out afterwards
2736 n
= DH_compute_key(p
, dh_srvr
->pub_key
, dh_clnt
);
2737 if (scert
->peer_dh_tmp
== NULL
)
2741 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2746 /* generate master key from the result */
2747 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2748 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2750 session
->master_key
,
2755 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
)
2758 /* send off the data */
2759 n
= BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt
->pub_key
);
2761 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt
->pub_key
, p
);
2769 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2770 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEECDH
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
2771 const EC_GROUP
*srvr_group
= NULL
;
2773 int ecdh_clnt_cert
= 0;
2776 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
) {
2777 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2779 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2784 * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
2785 * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
2786 * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2788 if ((alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) && (s
->cert
!= NULL
)) {
2790 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
2791 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
2792 * To add such support, one needs to add
2793 * code that checks for appropriate
2794 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2795 * For example, the cert have an ECC
2796 * key on the same curve as the server's
2797 * and the key should be authorized for
2800 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
2801 * to skip sending the certificate verify
2804 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
2805 * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
2806 * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
2807 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
2811 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
!= NULL
) {
2812 tkey
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_ecdh_tmp
;
2814 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2816 X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->
2817 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].x509
);
2818 if ((srvr_pub_pkey
== NULL
)
2819 || (srvr_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
)
2820 || (srvr_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
== NULL
)) {
2821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2822 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2826 tkey
= srvr_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
;
2829 srvr_group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2830 srvr_ecpoint
= EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey
);
2832 if ((srvr_group
== NULL
) || (srvr_ecpoint
== NULL
)) {
2833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2834 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2838 if ((clnt_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
2839 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2840 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2844 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh
, srvr_group
)) {
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2848 if (ecdh_clnt_cert
) {
2850 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
2851 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
2853 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2854 tkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2855 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2856 if (priv_key
== NULL
) {
2857 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2858 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2861 if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh
, priv_key
)) {
2862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2866 /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
2867 if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh
))) {
2868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2875 * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
2876 * clear it out afterwards
2879 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group
);
2880 if (field_size
<= 0) {
2881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2884 n
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+ 7) / 8, srvr_ecpoint
,
2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2891 /* generate master key from the result */
2892 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2893 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2895 session
->master_key
,
2898 memset(p
, 0, n
); /* clean up */
2900 if (ecdh_clnt_cert
) {
2901 /* Send empty client key exch message */
2905 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
2909 EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group
,
2910 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh
),
2911 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2914 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
2915 OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len
* sizeof(unsigned char));
2916 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
2917 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
)) {
2918 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2919 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2923 /* Encode the public key */
2924 n
= EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group
,
2925 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh
),
2926 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2927 encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
, bn_ctx
);
2929 *p
= n
; /* length of encoded point */
2930 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2932 /* copy the point */
2933 memcpy((unsigned char *)p
, encodedPoint
, n
);
2934 /* increment n to account for length field */
2938 /* Free allocated memory */
2939 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2940 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
)
2941 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2942 if (clnt_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2943 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh
);
2944 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey
);
2946 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
2947 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2948 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2949 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2952 unsigned int md_len
;
2954 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32], shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2955 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
;
2959 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2963 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[(keytype
= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
)].x509
;
2967 sess_cert
->peer_pkeys
[(keytype
= SSL_PKEY_GOST94
)].x509
;
2969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2970 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2974 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key
=
2975 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2976 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2977 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2978 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2982 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2984 * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2985 * certificate key for key exchange
2988 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2990 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
2991 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
2992 /* Generate session key */
2993 || RAND_bytes(premaster_secret
, 32) <= 0) {
2994 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2996 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3000 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
3002 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
&& s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) {
3003 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
3004 (pkey_ctx
, s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) <= 0) {
3006 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
3013 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3016 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_create();
3017 if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
,
3018 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94
)) <= 0
3019 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
3020 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3021 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
3022 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3023 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
3024 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash
);
3025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3026 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3029 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash
);
3030 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
3031 (pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8,
3033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3037 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3039 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3041 *(p
++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
;
3043 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, premaster_secret
, 32)
3045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3049 if (msglen
>= 0x80) {
3051 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
3054 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
3057 memcpy(p
, tmp
, msglen
);
3058 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3059 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
3060 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0) {
3061 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
3062 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
3064 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3065 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
3066 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
3068 session
->master_key
,
3071 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key
);
3074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3075 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3076 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
!= NULL
) {
3077 /* send off the data */
3078 n
= BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
);
3080 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, p
);
3083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3084 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3087 if (s
->session
->srp_username
!= NULL
)
3088 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3089 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3090 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3092 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3096 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
=
3097 SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s
,
3098 s
->session
->master_key
)) <
3100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3101 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3106 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3107 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
3109 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
3110 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
3113 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 2];
3114 size_t identity_len
;
3115 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
3116 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
* 2 + 4];
3117 unsigned int pre_ms_len
= 0, psk_len
= 0;
3121 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
3122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3123 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
3127 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
3128 psk_len
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
3129 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
3131 sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
3132 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
3133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3134 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3136 } else if (psk_len
== 0) {
3137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3138 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
3141 identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1] = '\0';
3142 identity_len
= strlen(identity
);
3143 if (identity_len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
3144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3145 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3148 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
3149 pre_ms_len
= 2 + psk_len
+ 2 + psk_len
;
3151 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms
+ psk_len
+ 4, psk_or_pre_ms
, psk_len
);
3153 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
3157 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
3158 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
3159 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
=
3160 BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
3161 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
3162 && s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
3163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3164 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3168 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
3169 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
3170 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup(identity
);
3171 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
) {
3172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3173 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3177 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
3178 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
3180 session
->master_key
,
3183 s2n(identity_len
, p
);
3184 memcpy(p
, identity
, identity_len
);
3185 n
= 2 + identity_len
;
3188 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
3189 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
3191 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3197 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
3198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3202 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
);
3203 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
3206 /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
3207 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3210 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
3211 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
)
3212 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
3213 if (clnt_ecdh
!= NULL
)
3214 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh
);
3215 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey
);
3217 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3221 int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL
*s
)
3224 unsigned char data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
3226 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
3232 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
3234 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
) {
3235 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3236 pkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
3237 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
3238 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
3239 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx
) <= 0) {
3240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3243 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx
, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
3244 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
3245 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
3248 [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]));
3253 * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
3254 * digest and cached handshake records.
3256 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3259 const EVP_MD
*md
= s
->cert
->key
->digest
;
3260 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3261 if (hdatalen
<= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
3262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3267 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
3270 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3271 || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)
3272 || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx
, p
+ 2, &u
, pkey
)) {
3273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3278 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
3281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3282 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
3283 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
, NID_md5
, &(data
[0]));
3284 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, data
,
3285 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,
3286 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0) {
3287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_RSA_LIB
);
3294 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3295 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
3296 if (!DSA_sign(pkey
->save_type
,
3297 &(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3298 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, &(p
[2]),
3299 (unsigned int *)&j
, pkey
->pkey
.dsa
)) {
3300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_DSA_LIB
);
3307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3308 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3309 if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey
->save_type
,
3310 &(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3311 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, &(p
[2]),
3312 (unsigned int *)&j
, pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) {
3313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB
);
3320 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
3321 || pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
3322 unsigned char signbuf
[64];
3324 size_t sigsize
= 64;
3325 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
3326 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, data
);
3327 if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx
, signbuf
, &sigsize
, data
, 32) <= 0) {
3328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3331 for (i
= 63, j
= 0; i
>= 0; j
++, i
--) {
3332 p
[2 + j
] = signbuf
[i
];
3337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3340 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
, n
);
3341 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B
;
3343 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3344 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3345 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3347 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3348 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3349 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3354 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3355 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3356 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3358 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3360 unsigned long alg_k
;
3361 if (!s
->cert
|| !s
->cert
->key
->x509
|| !s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
)
3363 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3364 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !s
->cert
->key
->digest
)
3367 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3368 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3370 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3371 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3373 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3374 /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
3375 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
3376 SESS_CERT
*scert
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
3377 int i
= scert
->peer_cert_type
;
3378 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= NULL
, *spkey
= NULL
;
3379 clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
3380 /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
3381 if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey
) != EVP_PKEY_DH
)
3384 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(scert
->peer_pkeys
[i
].x509
);
3386 /* Compare server and client parameters */
3387 i
= EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey
, spkey
);
3388 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
3392 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
3397 int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3400 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3403 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
) {
3404 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3405 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3406 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3408 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3412 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3413 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3416 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3418 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3419 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
;
3421 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
;
3424 /* We need to get a client cert */
3425 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
) {
3427 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3428 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3430 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3432 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3435 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3436 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3437 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
;
3438 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3440 } else if (i
== 1) {
3442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3443 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3449 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3450 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3453 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3454 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3455 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3458 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3462 /* Ok, we have a cert */
3463 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
;
3466 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
) {
3467 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D
;
3468 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,
3469 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
==
3470 2) ? NULL
: s
->cert
->key
)) {
3471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3472 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3473 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3477 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
3478 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3481 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3483 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3487 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3493 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3496 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3498 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3499 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3501 /* we don't have a certificate */
3502 if ((alg_a
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aKRB5
)) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
3505 sc
= s
->session
->sess_cert
;
3507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3510 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3511 rsa
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_rsa_tmp
;
3513 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3514 dh
= s
->session
->sess_cert
->peer_dh_tmp
;
3517 /* This is the passed certificate */
3519 idx
= sc
->peer_cert_type
;
3520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3521 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
3522 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
, s
) == 0) {
3524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3529 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3531 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3533 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
3534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT
);
3538 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
);
3539 pkey_bits
= EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey
);
3540 i
= X509_certificate_type(sc
->peer_pkeys
[idx
].x509
, pkey
);
3541 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3543 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3544 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3546 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3550 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3552 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3557 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
3558 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
3559 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
)) {
3560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3561 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3563 } else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3564 if (pkey_bits
<= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3565 if (!has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
)) {
3566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3567 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3571 /* server key exchange is not allowed. */
3572 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3581 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kEDH
) && dh
== NULL
) {
3582 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3586 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3587 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_RSA
)) {
3588 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3589 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT
);
3592 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3593 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3594 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_DSA
)) {
3595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3596 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT
);
3601 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
3603 if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) {
3604 dh_size
= BN_num_bits(dh
->p
);
3606 DH
*dh_srvr
= get_server_static_dh_key(sc
);
3607 if (dh_srvr
== NULL
)
3609 dh_size
= BN_num_bits(dh_srvr
->p
);
3613 if ((!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) && dh_size
< 768)
3614 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) && dh_size
< 512)) {
3615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
3619 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
3621 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
3622 pkey_bits
> SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3623 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3624 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
3626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3627 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
3629 } else if (BN_num_bits(rsa
->n
) >
3630 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3631 /* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */
3632 al
= SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
;
3633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3634 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
3639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3640 if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) {
3641 if (BN_num_bits(dh
->p
) >
3642 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3643 /* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */
3644 al
= SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
;
3645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3646 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3649 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
3650 /* The cert should have had an export DH key. */
3651 al
= SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
;
3652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3653 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3659 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
3665 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3672 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
3673 * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
3674 * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
3675 * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
3676 * ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
3677 * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message
3678 * is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
3680 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL
*s
)
3684 if (s
->version
< TLS1_VERSION
|| !s
->tls_session_secret_cb
||
3685 !s
->session
->tlsext_tick
)
3688 /* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */
3689 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
3691 * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
3692 * so permit appropriate message length.
3693 * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
3694 * and not its length.
3696 s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3699 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
3700 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK
;
3705 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
3707 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
)
3710 /* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */
3711 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
3712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
3713 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
3720 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3721 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3723 unsigned int len
, padding_len
;
3726 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
) {
3727 len
= s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
;
3728 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3729 d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3731 memcpy(d
+ 5, s
->next_proto_negotiated
, len
);
3732 d
[5 + len
] = padding_len
;
3733 memset(d
+ 6 + len
, 0, padding_len
);
3734 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
3735 l2n3(2 + len
+ padding_len
, d
);
3736 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B
;
3737 s
->init_num
= 4 + 2 + len
+ padding_len
;
3741 return ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
);
3743 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */
3744 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
3746 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3750 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3751 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3752 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3753 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3758 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3759 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);