2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "ssl_locl.h"
153 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
154 #include <openssl/rand.h>
155 #include <openssl/objects.h>
156 #include <openssl/evp.h>
157 #include <openssl/md5.h>
158 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
159 # include <openssl/dh.h>
161 #include <openssl/bn.h>
162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
163 # include <openssl/engine.h>
166 static int ssl_set_version(SSL
*s
);
167 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
);
168 static int ssl3_check_change(SSL
*s
);
169 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
173 int ssl3_connect(SSL
*s
)
176 unsigned long Time
= (unsigned long)time(NULL
);
177 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
179 int new_state
, state
, skip
= 0;
181 RAND_add(&Time
, sizeof(Time
), 0);
185 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
186 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
187 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
188 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
191 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) {
196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
198 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
199 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
202 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
) {
203 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
212 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
214 s
->state
= SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
215 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
++;
219 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
| SSL_ST_CONNECT
:
220 case SSL_ST_OK
| SSL_ST_CONNECT
:
224 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
, 1);
226 if ((s
->version
>> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
227 && s
->version
!= TLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
229 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
234 if (s
->version
!= TLS_ANY_VERSION
&&
235 !ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, s
->version
, NULL
)) {
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
);
240 /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
241 s
->type
= SSL_ST_CONNECT
;
243 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
) {
244 if ((buf
= BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
) {
246 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
249 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
251 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
258 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
)) {
263 /* setup buffing BIO */
264 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
, 0)) {
266 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
270 /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
272 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
274 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
275 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
++;
278 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
280 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
283 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
284 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
287 ret
= ssl3_client_hello(s
);
290 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
293 /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
294 if (s
->bbio
!= s
->wbio
)
295 s
->wbio
= BIO_push(s
->bbio
, s
->wbio
);
299 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
300 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
301 ret
= ssl3_get_server_hello(s
);
306 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_A
;
307 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
308 /* receive renewed session ticket */
309 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
312 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A
;
316 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A
:
317 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B
:
318 /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
319 ret
= ssl3_check_change(s
);
324 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_A
;
329 /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
331 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
&
332 (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
333 ret
= ssl3_get_server_certificate(s
);
337 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
338 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
;
340 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
343 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
349 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
350 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
351 ret
= ssl3_get_key_exchange(s
);
354 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
;
358 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
361 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
363 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
368 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
:
369 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B
:
370 ret
= ssl3_get_certificate_request(s
);
373 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
;
377 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
:
378 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B
:
379 ret
= ssl3_get_server_done(s
);
382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
383 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
384 if ((ret
= SRP_Calc_A_param(s
)) <= 0) {
385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
386 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
387 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
392 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
393 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
;
395 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
400 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
:
401 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
:
402 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
:
403 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D
:
404 ret
= ssl3_send_client_certificate(s
);
407 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
411 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
412 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
413 ret
= ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s
);
417 * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
420 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
421 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
424 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
425 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
426 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
427 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
429 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
430 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
;
432 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
434 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
435 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
441 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
:
442 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B
:
443 ret
= ssl3_send_client_verify(s
);
446 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
450 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
:
451 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B
:
452 ret
= ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
454 SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B
);
458 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
459 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
461 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
462 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
464 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
468 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
469 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
470 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
472 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
473 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
475 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
477 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
479 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
483 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
484 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
487 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
493 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
494 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
495 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
496 ret
= ssl3_send_next_proto(s
);
499 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
;
503 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
:
504 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B
:
505 ret
= ssl3_send_finished(s
,
506 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A
,
507 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B
,
509 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
,
511 ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
);
514 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH
;
517 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
520 * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
522 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
523 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
525 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_A
;
530 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
531 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
532 ret
= ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s
);
535 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_A
;
539 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
:
540 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B
:
541 ret
= ssl3_get_cert_status(s
);
544 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
548 case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_A
:
549 case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_B
:
550 ret
= ssl3_get_change_cipher_spec(s
, SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_A
,
551 SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE_B
);
555 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
;
559 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
:
560 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B
:
561 ret
= ssl3_get_finished(s
, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A
,
562 SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B
);
567 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A
;
569 s
->state
= SSL_ST_OK
;
573 case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH
:
574 s
->rwstate
= SSL_WRITING
;
575 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0) {
579 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
580 s
->state
= s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
584 /* clean a few things up */
585 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
586 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
589 /* remove the buffering */
590 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
596 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
598 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
602 s
->handshake_func
= ssl3_connect
;
603 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
606 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
619 /* did we do anything */
620 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
) {
622 if ((ret
= BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
626 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
)) {
627 new_state
= s
->state
;
629 cb(s
, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP
, 1);
630 s
->state
= new_state
;
639 cb(s
, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT
, ret
);
644 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if
645 * the version is currently set to (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION.
646 * Returns 1 on success
649 static int ssl_set_version(SSL
*s
)
651 unsigned long mask
, options
= s
->options
;
653 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
655 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are
656 * some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order
657 * to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So
658 * that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of
659 * TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the
660 * answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3.
662 mask
= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
| SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
663 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
667 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT)
668 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
) {
669 if ((options
& mask
) != mask
) {
670 s
->version
= TLS1_1_VERSION
;
672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
);
676 s
->version
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
679 if ((options
& mask
) == mask
) {
680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
);
683 s
->version
= TLS1_1_VERSION
;
686 mask
&= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
;
687 if ((options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
) && (options
& mask
) != mask
)
688 s
->version
= TLS1_VERSION
;
689 mask
&= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
;
690 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
691 if ((options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
) && (options
& mask
) != mask
)
692 s
->version
= SSL3_VERSION
;
695 if (s
->version
!= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
,
697 SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
701 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
&& FIPS_mode()) {
702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE
);
706 } else if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
707 /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
708 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
709 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
) {
710 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
,
712 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
716 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
718 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
) {
719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
723 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
725 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
726 s
->version
= DTLS1_VERSION
;
729 * We only support one version: update method
731 if (options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
)
732 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
733 s
->version
= DTLS1_2_VERSION
;
737 s
->client_version
= s
->version
;
742 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
745 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
754 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
755 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A
) {
756 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
758 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
759 if (ssl_set_version(s
) == 0)
762 if ((sess
== NULL
) || (sess
->ssl_version
!= s
->version
) ||
764 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
765 * "ticket" without a session ID.
767 (!sess
->session_id_length
&& !sess
->tlsext_tick
) ||
768 (sess
->not_resumable
)) {
769 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
772 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
774 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
777 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
778 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
780 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
783 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
792 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
,
793 sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
)) <= 0)
796 /* Do the message type and length last */
797 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
800 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
801 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
802 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
803 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
804 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
805 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
806 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
807 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
810 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
811 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
812 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
813 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
814 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
815 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
816 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
817 * know that is maximum server supports.
818 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
819 * containing version 1.0.
821 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
822 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
823 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
824 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
825 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
826 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
827 * the negotiated version.
829 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
>> 8;
830 *(p
++) = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
833 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
834 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
840 i
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
843 if (i
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
847 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, i
);
851 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
852 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
853 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
857 *(p
++) = s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
858 memcpy(p
, s
->d1
->cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie_len
);
859 p
+= s
->d1
->cookie_len
;
862 /* Ciphers supported */
863 i
= ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), &(p
[2]));
865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
868 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
870 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
871 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
874 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
875 && i
> OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
)
876 i
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
882 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
886 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
) || !s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
889 j
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
891 for (i
= 0; i
< j
; i
++) {
892 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
896 *(p
++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
899 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
900 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
904 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
906 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
912 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
, l
)) {
913 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
917 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
920 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
921 return ssl_do_write(s
);
923 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
927 int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
929 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
932 unsigned char *session_id
, *cipherchars
;
933 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ok
;
936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
940 * Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not match so set
941 * first packet if we're negotiating version.
945 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
946 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A
,
947 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B
, -1, 20000, &ok
);
953 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
954 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
955 if (s
->d1
->send_cookie
== 0) {
956 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
958 } else { /* already sent a cookie */
960 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
967 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
968 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
973 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt
, s
->init_msg
, n
)) {
974 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
979 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
980 unsigned int sversion
;
982 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt
, &sversion
)) {
983 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
988 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
989 #error Code needs updating for new TLS version
991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
992 if ((sversion
== SSL3_VERSION
) && !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
)) {
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
995 SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE
);
996 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
999 s
->method
= SSLv3_client_method();
1002 if ((sversion
== TLS1_VERSION
) && !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
)) {
1003 s
->method
= TLSv1_client_method();
1004 } else if ((sversion
== TLS1_1_VERSION
) &&
1005 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
)) {
1006 s
->method
= TLSv1_1_client_method();
1007 } else if ((sversion
== TLS1_2_VERSION
) &&
1008 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
)) {
1009 s
->method
= TLSv1_2_client_method();
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
);
1012 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1015 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
1017 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, s
->version
, NULL
)) {
1018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
);
1019 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1022 } else if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1023 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
1024 unsigned int hversion
;
1027 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt
, &hversion
)) {
1028 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1033 options
= s
->options
;
1034 if (hversion
== DTLS1_2_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
))
1035 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_client_method();
1036 else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1038 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
1039 s
->version
= hversion
;
1040 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1042 } else if (hversion
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& !(options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
))
1043 s
->method
= DTLSv1_client_method();
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
1046 s
->version
= hversion
;
1047 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1050 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
1052 unsigned char *vers
;
1054 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt
, &vers
, 2)) {
1055 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1059 if ((vers
[0] != (s
->version
>> 8))
1060 || (vers
[1] != (s
->version
& 0xff))) {
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
1062 s
->version
= (s
->version
& 0xff00) | vers
[1];
1063 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1068 /* load the server hello data */
1069 /* load the server random */
1070 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1071 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1078 /* get the session-id length */
1079 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt
, &j
)
1080 || (j
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
)
1081 || (j
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
)) {
1082 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1088 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
1089 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1090 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1091 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1092 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1093 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
1094 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
1095 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
1096 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
1097 * server wants to resume.
1099 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
&&
1100 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
1101 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1102 PACKET bookmark
= pkt
;
1103 if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt
, j
)
1104 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1105 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1106 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1109 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1110 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1111 &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
1113 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
1114 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1115 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
1117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1118 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1124 /* Get the session id */
1125 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt
, &session_id
, j
)) {
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1127 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1131 if (j
!= 0 && j
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1132 && memcmp(session_id
, s
->session
->session_id
, j
) == 0) {
1133 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1134 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1135 /* actually a client application bug */
1136 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1138 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1144 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1145 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1146 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1147 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1148 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1150 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1151 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1155 s
->session
->session_id_length
= j
;
1156 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, session_id
, j
); /* j could be 0 */
1159 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1161 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1164 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
);
1166 /* unknown cipher */
1167 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1171 /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
1172 if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s
))
1173 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_ssl
= SSL_TLSV1_2
;
1175 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_ssl
= 0;
1177 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1180 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
)) {
1181 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1186 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1187 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1189 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1190 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1196 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1197 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1198 * set and use it for comparison.
1200 if (s
->session
->cipher
)
1201 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1202 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1203 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1205 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1208 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1210 * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
1213 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0))
1215 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1217 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt
, &j
)) {
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1219 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1222 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1224 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1226 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1230 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1231 * using compression.
1233 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1238 if (s
->hit
&& j
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1239 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1241 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1246 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1247 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1251 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, j
);
1253 if ((j
!= 0) && (comp
== NULL
)) {
1254 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
,
1256 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1259 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1263 /* TLS extensions */
1264 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s
, &pkt
)) {
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1269 if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt
) != 0) {
1270 /* wrong packet length */
1271 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH
);
1278 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1280 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1284 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
1286 int al
, i
, ok
, ret
= -1, exp_idx
;
1287 unsigned long n
, cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1289 unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1290 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1291 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1294 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1297 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
1302 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
1303 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1307 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
1308 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
1313 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt
, s
->init_msg
, n
)) {
1314 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1319 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1324 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1325 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt
) != cert_list_len
) {
1326 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1330 while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt
)) {
1331 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&pkt
, &cert_len
)
1332 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1333 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1335 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1339 certstart
= certbytes
;
1340 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1342 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1346 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1347 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1349 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1352 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1359 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1360 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1361 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1363 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1366 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1369 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1373 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1375 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1376 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1378 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1381 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1384 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(x
);
1386 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1390 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1394 i
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pkey
);
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1399 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1403 exp_idx
= ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
);
1404 if (exp_idx
>= 0 && i
!= exp_idx
) {
1406 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1407 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1408 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1411 s
->session
->peer_type
= i
;
1413 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1415 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1416 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1423 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1425 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
1427 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
1429 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1433 int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1436 unsigned char *q
, md_buf
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
* 2];
1439 int al
, j
, verify_ret
, ok
;
1441 long n
, alg_k
, alg_a
;
1442 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1443 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1451 EC_KEY
*ecdh
= NULL
;
1452 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1453 EC_POINT
*srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1455 unsigned int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
1457 PACKET pkt
, save_param_start
;
1458 unsigned char *data
, *param
;
1461 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1464 * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
1465 * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
1467 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
1468 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
1469 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
1470 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
1474 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1476 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
1478 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
1481 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1483 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1487 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
1491 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt
, s
->init_msg
, n
)) {
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1493 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1496 save_param_start
= pkt
;
1498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1499 RSA_free(s
->s3
->peer_rsa_tmp
);
1500 s
->s3
->peer_rsa_tmp
= NULL
;
1502 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1503 DH_free(s
->s3
->peer_dh_tmp
);
1504 s
->s3
->peer_dh_tmp
= NULL
;
1506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1507 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_ecdh_tmp
);
1508 s
->s3
->peer_ecdh_tmp
= NULL
;
1511 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
1513 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1515 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1516 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1517 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
1519 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt
, &i
)) {
1520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1525 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1526 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1527 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1530 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1531 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1535 if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt
) < i
) {
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1537 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH
);
1541 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
1543 unsigned char *hint
= NULL
;
1545 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt
, &hint
, i
)) {
1546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1549 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strndup((char *)hint
, i
);
1550 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
) {
1551 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1556 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1560 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1561 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
1563 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1565 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1566 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt
, &i
)) {
1567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1571 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
1572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH
);
1576 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1581 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt
, &i
)) {
1582 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1586 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
1587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH
);
1591 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.g
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1596 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt
, &i
)) {
1597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1601 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
1602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH
);
1606 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.s
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1611 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt
, &i
)) {
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1616 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH
);
1621 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.B
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1626 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, &al
)) {
1627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1631 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1632 if (alg_a
& (SSL_aRSA
|SSL_aDSS
))
1633 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1635 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1636 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1637 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
1638 /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
1639 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
1640 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1644 if ((rsa
= RSA_new()) == NULL
) {
1645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1649 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt
, &i
)) {
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1654 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH
);
1659 if ((rsa
->n
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, rsa
->n
)) == NULL
) {
1660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1664 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt
, &i
)) {
1665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1669 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH
);
1674 if ((rsa
->e
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, rsa
->e
)) == NULL
) {
1675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1679 /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
1680 if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1681 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1687 if (EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey
) <= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
1688 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1693 s
->s3
->peer_rsa_tmp
= rsa
;
1696 #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
1699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1700 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
1701 if ((dh
= DH_new()) == NULL
) {
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1706 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt
, &i
)) {
1707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1711 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
1712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH
);
1716 if ((dh
->p
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1717 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1721 if (BN_is_zero(dh
->p
)) {
1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_VALUE
);
1726 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt
, &i
)) {
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1731 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH
);
1736 if ((dh
->g
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1741 if (BN_is_zero(dh
->g
)) {
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_VALUE
);
1746 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt
, &i
)) {
1747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1751 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
1752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH
);
1756 if ((dh
->pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1761 if (BN_is_zero(dh
->pub_key
)) {
1762 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_VALUE
);
1766 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
1767 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1771 if (alg_a
& (SSL_aRSA
|SSL_aDSS
))
1772 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1773 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1775 s
->s3
->peer_dh_tmp
= dh
;
1778 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1780 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1781 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
1783 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1785 if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1791 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1792 * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
1793 * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
1797 * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
1798 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1800 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt
, &data
, 3)) {
1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1805 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1806 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1808 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, data
, 3)) {
1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1813 if ((curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(data
+ 2))) == 0) {
1814 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1816 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
1820 ngroup
= EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid
);
1821 if (ngroup
== NULL
) {
1822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1825 if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh
, ngroup
) == 0) {
1826 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1829 EC_GROUP_free(ngroup
);
1831 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
);
1833 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1834 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163)) {
1835 al
= SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
;
1836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1837 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1841 /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
1842 if (((srvr_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
) ||
1843 ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)) {
1844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1848 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt
, &encoded_pt_len
)) {
1849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1853 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt
, &data
, encoded_pt_len
) ||
1854 (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
, srvr_ecpoint
,
1855 data
, encoded_pt_len
, bn_ctx
) == 0)) {
1856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1861 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1862 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1866 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1867 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1868 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1870 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1871 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
)
1872 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1874 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1875 EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh
, srvr_ecpoint
);
1876 s
->s3
->peer_ecdh_tmp
= ecdh
;
1878 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1880 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint
);
1881 srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1883 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1884 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1887 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1890 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1891 * equals the length of the parameters.
1893 param_len
= PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) - PACKET_remaining(&pkt
);
1895 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1897 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1899 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt
, &data
, 2)) {
1900 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1903 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, data
, pkey
);
1910 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1915 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt
, &i
)) {
1916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1919 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1926 * Check signature length
1928 if (i
> (unsigned int)j
1929 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt
, &data
, i
)
1930 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt
) != 0) {
1931 /* wrong packet length */
1932 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
1935 pkt
= save_param_start
;
1936 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt
, ¶m
, param_len
)) {
1937 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1938 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1941 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1942 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
&& !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1948 for (num
= 2; num
> 0; num
--) {
1949 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
1950 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
, (num
== 2)
1951 ? s
->ctx
->md5
: s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1952 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1954 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1956 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
, param
, param_len
);
1957 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
, q
, &size
);
1962 RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
, data
, i
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
);
1963 if (verify_ret
< 0) {
1964 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
1968 if (verify_ret
== 0) {
1970 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1977 EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
);
1978 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1980 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1982 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx
, param
, param_len
);
1983 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx
, data
, (int)i
, pkey
) <= 0) {
1985 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
1986 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
1991 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1992 if (!(alg_a
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
1993 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1994 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
))
1995 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1999 /* still data left over */
2000 if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt
) != 0) {
2001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2005 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2006 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2009 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2011 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2012 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2015 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2019 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2020 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint
);
2023 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2024 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2028 int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2032 unsigned int list_len
, ctype_num
, i
, name_len
;
2033 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
2034 unsigned char *data
;
2035 unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
2036 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;
2039 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2040 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A
,
2041 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B
,
2042 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
2047 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
2049 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
2050 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
2052 * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
2053 * wont be doing client auth.
2055 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0))
2060 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
2061 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2062 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
2066 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
2067 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2068 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) {
2069 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2071 SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER
);
2076 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt
, s
->init_msg
, n
)) {
2077 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2078 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2082 if ((ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
)) == NULL
) {
2083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2087 /* get the certificate types */
2088 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt
, &ctype_num
)
2089 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt
, &data
, ctype_num
)) {
2090 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2094 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->ctypes
);
2095 s
->cert
->ctypes
= NULL
;
2096 if (ctype_num
> SSL3_CT_NUMBER
) {
2097 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2098 s
->cert
->ctypes
= OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num
);
2099 if (s
->cert
->ctypes
== NULL
) {
2100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2103 memcpy(s
->cert
->ctypes
, data
, ctype_num
);
2104 s
->cert
->ctype_num
= (size_t)ctype_num
;
2105 ctype_num
= SSL3_CT_NUMBER
;
2107 for (i
= 0; i
< ctype_num
; i
++)
2108 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
[i
] = data
[i
];
2110 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2111 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt
, &list_len
)
2112 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt
, &data
, list_len
)) {
2113 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2118 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2119 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
2120 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[i
] = NULL
;
2121 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2123 if ((list_len
& 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, data
, list_len
)) {
2124 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2126 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2129 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2130 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2136 /* get the CA RDNs */
2137 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt
, &list_len
)
2138 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt
) != list_len
) {
2139 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2144 while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt
)) {
2145 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt
, &name_len
)
2146 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
2147 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2152 namestart
= namebytes
;
2154 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes
,
2155 name_len
)) == NULL
) {
2156 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2161 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
2162 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2164 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2167 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2173 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2174 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2175 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
= ctype_num
;
2176 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2177 s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2183 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2185 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2189 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2191 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
));
2194 int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
)
2196 int ok
, al
, ret
= 0;
2197 unsigned int ticklen
;
2201 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2202 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A
,
2203 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B
,
2204 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
, 16384, &ok
);
2209 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt
, s
->init_msg
, n
)) {
2210 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2215 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2216 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
2217 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2219 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2222 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
2224 * Remove the old session from the cache
2226 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE
) {
2227 if (s
->session_ctx
->remove_session_cb
!= NULL
)
2228 s
->session_ctx
->remove_session_cb(s
->session_ctx
,
2231 /* We carry on if this fails */
2232 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2236 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2237 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2242 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2243 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2246 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(&pkt
, &s
->session
->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint
)
2247 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt
, &ticklen
)
2248 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt
) != ticklen
) {
2249 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2253 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
);
2254 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= 0;
2255 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2256 if (!s
->session
->tlsext_tick
) {
2257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2260 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt
, s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
)) {
2261 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2265 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= ticklen
;
2267 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2268 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2269 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2270 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2271 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2272 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2273 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2274 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2275 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2277 EVP_Digest(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
,
2278 s
->session
->session_id
, &s
->session
->session_id_length
,
2279 EVP_sha256(), NULL
);
2283 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2285 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2289 int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
2292 unsigned long resplen
, n
;
2296 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2297 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A
,
2298 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B
,
2299 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
, 16384, &ok
);
2304 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt
, s
->init_msg
, n
)) {
2305 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2309 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt
, &type
)
2310 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2311 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2315 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&pkt
, &resplen
)
2316 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt
) != resplen
) {
2317 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2321 OPENSSL_free(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
);
2322 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2323 if (!s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
) {
2324 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2328 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, resplen
)) {
2329 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2333 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= resplen
;
2334 if (s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
) {
2336 ret
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
2338 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
;
2339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2343 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2350 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2351 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2355 int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL
*s
)
2360 /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
2361 n
= s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2362 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A
,
2363 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B
,
2364 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
, 30, &ok
);
2369 /* should contain no data */
2370 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2372 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2379 int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2384 size_t pskhdrlen
= 0;
2386 unsigned long alg_k
;
2387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2389 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2392 EC_KEY
*clnt_ecdh
= NULL
;
2393 const EC_POINT
*srvr_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2394 EVP_PKEY
*srvr_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2395 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2396 int encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2397 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2399 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2401 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2403 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A
) {
2404 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2408 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2411 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2412 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2415 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2417 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2420 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2422 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2426 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2428 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2429 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2432 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2434 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2436 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2438 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2442 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2443 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= BUF_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2444 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2446 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2447 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2451 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2453 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2454 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2456 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2459 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2460 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup(identity
);
2461 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
) {
2462 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2466 s2n(identitylen
, p
);
2467 memcpy(p
, identity
, identitylen
);
2468 pskhdrlen
= 2 + identitylen
;
2472 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2474 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2478 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2483 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2487 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2489 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2490 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2494 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2496 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2499 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2503 if (s
->s3
->peer_rsa_tmp
!= NULL
)
2504 rsa
= s
->s3
->peer_rsa_tmp
;
2506 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2507 if ((pkey
== NULL
) || (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2508 || (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
)) {
2509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2510 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2513 rsa
= pkey
->pkey
.rsa
;
2514 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2517 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2518 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2519 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2) <= 0)
2523 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2524 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
)
2526 n
= RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen
, pms
, p
, rsa
, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2528 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
)
2530 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
)
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2535 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2539 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2540 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) {
2546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2547 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2548 DH
*dh_srvr
, *dh_clnt
;
2549 if (s
->s3
->peer_dh_tmp
!= NULL
)
2550 dh_srvr
= s
->s3
->peer_dh_tmp
;
2552 /* we get them from the cert */
2553 EVP_PKEY
*spkey
= NULL
;
2555 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2557 dh_srvr
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey
);
2558 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
2560 if (dh_srvr
== NULL
) {
2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2562 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2566 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
2567 /* Use client certificate key */
2568 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
2571 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey
);
2572 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
2573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2574 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2578 /* generate a new random key */
2579 if ((dh_clnt
= DHparams_dup(dh_srvr
)) == NULL
) {
2580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2583 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt
)) {
2584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2590 pmslen
= DH_size(dh_clnt
);
2591 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2596 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2597 * clear it out afterwards
2600 n
= DH_compute_key(pms
, dh_srvr
->pub_key
, dh_clnt
);
2601 if (s
->s3
->peer_dh_tmp
== NULL
)
2605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2611 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
)
2614 /* send off the data */
2615 n
= BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt
->pub_key
);
2617 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt
->pub_key
, p
);
2625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2626 else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2627 const EC_GROUP
*srvr_group
= NULL
;
2629 int ecdh_clnt_cert
= 0;
2632 * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
2633 * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
2634 * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2636 if ((alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) && (s
->cert
!= NULL
)) {
2638 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
2639 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
2640 * To add such support, one needs to add
2641 * code that checks for appropriate
2642 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2643 * For example, the cert have an ECC
2644 * key on the same curve as the server's
2645 * and the key should be authorized for
2648 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
2649 * to skip sending the certificate verify
2652 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
2653 * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
2654 * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
2655 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
2659 if (s
->s3
->peer_ecdh_tmp
!= NULL
) {
2660 tkey
= s
->s3
->peer_ecdh_tmp
;
2662 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2663 srvr_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2664 if ((srvr_pub_pkey
== NULL
)
2665 || (srvr_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
)
2666 || (srvr_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
== NULL
)) {
2667 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2668 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2672 tkey
= srvr_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
;
2675 srvr_group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2676 srvr_ecpoint
= EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey
);
2678 if ((srvr_group
== NULL
) || (srvr_ecpoint
== NULL
)) {
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2680 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2684 if ((clnt_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
) {
2685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2686 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2690 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh
, srvr_group
)) {
2691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2694 if (ecdh_clnt_cert
) {
2696 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
2697 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
2699 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2700 tkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2701 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2702 if (priv_key
== NULL
) {
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2704 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2707 if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh
, priv_key
)) {
2708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2712 /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
2713 if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh
))) {
2714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2721 * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
2722 * clear it out afterwards
2725 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group
);
2726 if (field_size
<= 0) {
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2730 pmslen
= (field_size
+ 7) / 8;
2731 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2734 n
= ECDH_compute_key(pms
, pmslen
, srvr_ecpoint
, clnt_ecdh
, NULL
);
2735 if (n
<= 0 || pmslen
!= (size_t)n
) {
2736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
2740 if (ecdh_clnt_cert
) {
2741 /* Send empty client key exch message */
2745 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
2749 EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group
,
2750 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh
),
2751 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2754 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
2755 OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len
* sizeof(unsigned char));
2756 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
2757 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
)) {
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2759 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2763 /* Encode the public key */
2764 n
= EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group
,
2765 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh
),
2766 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
2767 encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
, bn_ctx
);
2769 *p
= n
; /* length of encoded point */
2770 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2772 /* copy the point */
2773 memcpy(p
, encodedPoint
, n
);
2774 /* increment n to account for length field */
2778 /* Free allocated memory */
2779 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2780 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2781 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh
);
2782 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey
);
2784 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2785 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2786 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2787 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2790 unsigned int md_len
;
2791 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2792 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
;
2796 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2801 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2803 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
2805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2806 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2810 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key
=
2811 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2813 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2815 * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2816 * certificate key for key exchange
2819 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2821 EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2822 /* Generate session key */
2823 if (RAND_bytes(pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2824 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2825 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2826 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2830 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2832 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
&& s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) {
2833 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2834 (pkey_ctx
, s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
) <= 0) {
2836 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2843 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2846 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_create();
2847 EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
,
2848 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94
));
2849 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
2851 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
2853 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
);
2854 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash
);
2855 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2856 (pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8,
2858 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2862 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2864 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2866 *(p
++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
;
2868 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) < 0) {
2869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2873 if (msglen
>= 0x80) {
2875 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2878 *(p
++) = msglen
& 0xff;
2881 memcpy(p
, tmp
, msglen
);
2882 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2883 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2884 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0) {
2885 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2886 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
2888 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2889 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key
);
2892 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2893 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2894 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
!= NULL
) {
2895 /* send off the data */
2896 n
= BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
);
2898 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, p
);
2901 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2902 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2905 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2906 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2907 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2908 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2909 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2915 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2924 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
)) {
2925 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
2926 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2930 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
2933 /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
2934 n
= ssl_do_write(s
);
2935 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2937 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2939 * If everything written generate master key: no need to save PMS as
2940 * srp_generate_client_master_secret generates it internally.
2943 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
2944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2945 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2951 /* If we haven't written everything save PMS */
2953 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2954 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2956 /* If we don't have a PMS restore */
2958 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
2959 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
2961 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
2962 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2966 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
2967 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2974 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2977 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2978 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
2979 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2980 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2981 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2982 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh
);
2983 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey
);
2985 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2986 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
2987 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
2989 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
2993 int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL
*s
)
2996 unsigned char data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
2998 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
3004 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
3006 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A
) {
3007 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3008 pkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
3009 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
3010 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
3011 EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx
);
3012 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx
, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
3013 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
3014 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
3017 [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]));
3022 * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
3023 * digest and cached handshake records.
3025 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3028 const EVP_MD
*md
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
];
3029 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3030 if (hdatalen
<= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
3031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3036 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
3039 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3040 || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)
3041 || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx
, p
+ 2, &u
, pkey
)) {
3042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3047 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
3048 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0))
3051 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3052 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
) {
3053 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
, NID_md5
, &(data
[0]));
3054 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, data
,
3055 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,
3056 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0) {
3057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_RSA_LIB
);
3064 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3065 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
3066 if (!DSA_sign(pkey
->save_type
,
3067 &(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3068 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, &(p
[2]),
3069 (unsigned int *)&j
, pkey
->pkey
.dsa
)) {
3070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_DSA_LIB
);
3077 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3078 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3079 if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey
->save_type
,
3080 &(data
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3081 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, &(p
[2]),
3082 (unsigned int *)&j
, pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) {
3083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB
);
3090 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
3091 unsigned char signbuf
[64];
3093 size_t sigsize
= 64;
3094 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
3095 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, data
);
3096 if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx
, signbuf
, &sigsize
, data
, 32) <= 0) {
3097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3100 for (i
= 63, j
= 0; i
>= 0; j
++, i
--) {
3101 p
[2 + j
] = signbuf
[i
];
3106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3109 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
, n
)) {
3110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3113 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B
;
3115 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3116 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3117 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3119 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3120 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3121 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3126 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3127 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3128 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3130 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3132 unsigned long alg_k
;
3133 if (!s
->cert
|| !s
->cert
->key
->x509
|| !s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
)
3135 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3136 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
])
3139 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3140 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3142 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3143 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3145 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3146 /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
3147 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
3148 int i
= s
->session
->peer_type
;
3149 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
= NULL
, *spkey
= NULL
;
3150 clkey
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
;
3151 /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
3152 if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey
) != EVP_PKEY_DH
)
3155 spkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
3157 /* Compare server and client parameters */
3158 i
= EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey
, spkey
);
3159 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey
);
3163 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
3168 int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3171 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3174 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A
) {
3175 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3176 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3177 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3179 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3183 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3184 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3187 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3189 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3190 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
;
3192 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
;
3195 /* We need to get a client cert */
3196 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
) {
3198 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3199 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3202 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3204 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3207 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3208 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3209 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B
;
3210 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3212 } else if (i
== 1) {
3214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3215 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3219 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3220 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3223 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3224 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3225 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3228 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3229 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3230 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3231 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3237 /* Ok, we have a cert */
3238 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
;
3241 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C
) {
3242 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D
;
3243 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,
3244 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
==
3245 2) ? NULL
: s
->cert
->key
)) {
3246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3247 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3248 s
->state
= SSL_ST_ERR
;
3252 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
3253 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3256 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3258 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3262 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3264 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3267 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3270 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3272 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3273 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3275 /* we don't have a certificate */
3276 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aNULL
) || (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
))
3278 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3279 rsa
= s
->s3
->peer_rsa_tmp
;
3281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3282 dh
= s
->s3
->peer_dh_tmp
;
3285 /* This is the passed certificate */
3287 idx
= s
->session
->peer_type
;
3288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3289 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_ECC
) {
3290 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
) == 0) {
3292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3297 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3299 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3301 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
)) {
3302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT
);
3306 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
3307 pkey_bits
= EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey
);
3308 i
= X509_certificate_type(s
->session
->peer
, pkey
);
3309 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3311 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3312 if ((alg_a
& SSL_aRSA
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3314 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3318 else if ((alg_a
& SSL_aDSS
) && !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DSA
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
3319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3320 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT
);
3324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3325 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3326 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
3327 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
)) {
3328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3329 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3331 } else if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3332 if (pkey_bits
<= SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3333 if (!has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_RSA
| EVP_PKT_ENC
)) {
3334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3335 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3339 /* server key exchange is not allowed. */
3340 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3349 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (dh
== NULL
)) {
3350 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3353 } else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3354 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_RSA
)) {
3355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3356 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT
);
3359 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3360 else if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) &&
3361 !has_bits(i
, EVP_PK_DH
| EVP_PKS_DSA
)) {
3362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3363 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT
);
3369 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
3370 pkey_bits
> SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3372 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
) {
3374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3375 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
3377 } else if (RSA_bits(rsa
) >
3378 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3379 /* We have a temporary RSA key but it's too large. */
3380 al
= SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
;
3381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3382 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
3387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3388 if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) {
3390 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)) {
3391 /* We have a temporary DH key but it's too large. */
3392 al
= SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
;
3393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3394 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3397 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kDHd
)) {
3398 /* The cert should have had an export DH key. */
3399 al
= SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION
;
3400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3401 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3407 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
3413 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3418 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
3419 * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
3420 * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
3421 * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
3422 * ssl3_check_change returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
3423 * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server message
3424 * is CCS; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
3426 static int ssl3_check_change(SSL
*s
)
3430 if (s
->version
< TLS1_VERSION
|| !s
->tls_session_secret_cb
||
3431 !s
->session
->tlsext_tick
)
3435 * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
3436 * so permit appropriate message length.
3437 * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
3438 * and not its length.
3440 s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3443 -1, s
->max_cert_list
, &ok
);
3448 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
3450 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
)
3456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3457 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3459 unsigned int len
, padding_len
;
3462 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A
) {
3463 len
= s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
;
3464 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3465 d
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3467 memcpy(d
+ 5, s
->next_proto_negotiated
, len
);
3468 d
[5 + len
] = padding_len
;
3469 memset(d
+ 6 + len
, 0, padding_len
);
3470 *(d
++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
3471 l2n3(2 + len
+ padding_len
, d
);
3472 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B
;
3473 s
->init_num
= 4 + 2 + len
+ padding_len
;
3477 return ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
);
3481 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3484 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3485 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3486 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3487 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3488 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3493 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3494 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3498 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
3504 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3505 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3506 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
3512 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++) {
3513 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3514 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3515 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
))
3517 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3518 if (c
->id
== SSL3_CK_SCSV
) {
3519 if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3522 empty_reneg_info_scsv
= 0;
3525 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, p
);
3529 * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
3533 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3534 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3535 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3537 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, p
);
3539 #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
3541 "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
3544 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3545 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3546 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3548 j
= s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, p
);