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1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <errno.h>
114 #define USE_SOCKETS
115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
118 #include <openssl/rand.h>
119
120 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
121 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
122 #endif
123
124 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
125 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
126 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
127 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
128 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
129 )
130 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
131 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
132 #endif
133
134 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
135 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
136 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
137
138 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
139 {
140 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
141 * packet by another n bytes.
142 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
143 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
144 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
145 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
146 */
147 int i,len,left;
148 long align=0;
149 unsigned char *pkt;
150 SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
151
152 if (n <= 0) return n;
153
154 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
155 if (rb->buf == NULL)
156 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
157 return -1;
158
159 left = rb->left;
160 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
161 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
162 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
163 #endif
164
165 if (!extend)
166 {
167 /* start with empty packet ... */
168 if (left == 0)
169 rb->offset = align;
170 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
171 {
172 /* check if next packet length is large
173 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
174 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
175 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
176 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
177 {
178 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
179 * and its length field is insane, we can
180 * only be led to wrong decision about
181 * whether memmove will occur or not.
182 * Header values has no effect on memmove
183 * arguments and therefore no buffer
184 * overrun can be triggered. */
185 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
186 rb->offset = align;
187 }
188 }
189 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
190 s->packet_length = 0;
191 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
192 }
193
194 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
195 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
196 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
197 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
198 {
199 if (left > 0 && n > left)
200 n = left;
201 }
202
203 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
204 if (left >= n)
205 {
206 s->packet_length+=n;
207 rb->left=left-n;
208 rb->offset+=n;
209 return(n);
210 }
211
212 /* else we need to read more data */
213
214 len = s->packet_length;
215 pkt = rb->buf+align;
216 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
217 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
218 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
219 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
220 {
221 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
222 s->packet = pkt;
223 rb->offset = len + align;
224 }
225
226 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
227 {
228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
229 return -1;
230 }
231
232 if (!s->read_ahead)
233 /* ignore max parameter */
234 max = n;
235 else
236 {
237 if (max < n)
238 max = n;
239 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
240 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
241 }
242
243 while (left < n)
244 {
245 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
246 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
247 * len+max if possible) */
248
249 clear_sys_error();
250 if (s->rbio != NULL)
251 {
252 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
253 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
254 }
255 else
256 {
257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
258 i = -1;
259 }
260
261 if (i <= 0)
262 {
263 rb->left = left;
264 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
265 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
266 if (len+left == 0)
267 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
268 return(i);
269 }
270 left+=i;
271 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
272 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
273 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
274 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
275 {
276 if (n > left)
277 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
278 }
279 }
280
281 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
282 rb->offset += n;
283 rb->left = left - n;
284 s->packet_length += n;
285 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
286 return(n);
287 }
288
289 /* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will
290 * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker
291 * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause
292 * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */
293 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
294
295 /* Call this to get a new input record.
296 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
297 * or non-blocking IO.
298 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
299 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
300 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
301 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
302 */
303 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
304 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
305 {
306 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
307 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
308 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
309 SSL_SESSION *sess;
310 unsigned char *p;
311 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
312 short version;
313 unsigned mac_size;
314 size_t extra;
315 unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
316
317 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
318 sess=s->session;
319
320 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
321 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
322 else
323 extra=0;
324 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
325 {
326 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
327 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
329 return -1;
330 }
331
332 again:
333 /* check if we have the header */
334 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
335 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
336 {
337 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
338 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
339 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
340
341 p=s->packet;
342 if (s->msg_callback)
343 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
344
345 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
346 rr->type= *(p++);
347 ssl_major= *(p++);
348 ssl_minor= *(p++);
349 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
350 n2s(p,rr->length);
351 #if 0
352 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
353 #endif
354
355 /* Lets check version */
356 if (!s->first_packet)
357 {
358 if (version != s->version)
359 {
360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
361 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
362 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
363 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
364 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
365 goto f_err;
366 }
367 }
368
369 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
370 {
371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
372 goto err;
373 }
374
375 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
376 {
377 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
379 goto f_err;
380 }
381
382 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
383 }
384
385 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
386
387 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
388 {
389 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
390 i=rr->length;
391 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
392 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
393 /* now n == rr->length,
394 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
395 }
396
397 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
398
399 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
400 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
401 */
402 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
403
404 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
405 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
406 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
407 * the decryption or by the decompression
408 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
409 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
410
411 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
412 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
413
414 /* check is not needed I believe */
415 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
416 {
417 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
419 goto f_err;
420 }
421
422 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
423 rr->data=rr->input;
424 rr->orig_len=rr->length;
425 /* If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record.
426 * All the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
427 */
428 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash)
429 {
430 unsigned char *mac;
431 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
432 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
433 if (rr->length < mac_size)
434 {
435 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
437 goto f_err;
438 }
439 rr->length -= mac_size;
440 mac = rr->data + rr->length;
441 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
442 if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
443 {
444 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
446 goto f_err;
447 }
448 }
449
450 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
451 /* enc_err is:
452 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
453 * 1: if the padding is valid
454 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
455 if (enc_err == 0)
456 {
457 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
459 goto f_err;
460 }
461
462 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
463 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
464 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
465 printf("\n");
466 #endif
467
468 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
469 if ((sess != NULL) &&
470 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
471 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s))
472 {
473 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
474 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
475 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
476 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
477 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
478
479 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
480 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
481 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
482 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
483 */
484 if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
485 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
486 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
487 rr->orig_len < mac_size+1))
488 {
489 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
491 goto f_err;
492 }
493
494 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
495 {
496 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
497 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
498 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
499 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
500 * */
501 mac = mac_tmp;
502 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
503 rr->length -= mac_size;
504 }
505 else
506 {
507 /* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len|
508 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
509 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
510 rr->length -= mac_size;
511 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
512 }
513
514 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
515 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
516 enc_err = -1;
517 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
518 enc_err = -1;
519 }
520
521 if (enc_err < 0)
522 {
523 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
524 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
525 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
526 * we should not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this
527 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
528 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
530 goto f_err;
531 }
532
533 /* r->length is now just compressed */
534 if (s->expand != NULL)
535 {
536 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
537 {
538 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
540 goto f_err;
541 }
542 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
543 {
544 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
546 goto f_err;
547 }
548 }
549
550 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
551 {
552 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
554 goto f_err;
555 }
556
557 rr->off=0;
558 /* So at this point the following is true
559 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
560 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
561 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
562 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
563 * after use :-).
564 */
565
566 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
567 s->packet_length=0;
568
569 /* just read a 0 length packet */
570 if (rr->length == 0)
571 {
572 empty_record_count++;
573 if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS)
574 {
575 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_TOO_MANY_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS);
577 goto f_err;
578 }
579 goto again;
580 }
581
582 #if 0
583 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
584 #endif
585
586 return(1);
587
588 f_err:
589 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
590 err:
591 return(ret);
592 }
593
594 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
595 {
596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
597 int i;
598 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
599
600 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
601 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
602 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
603 if (i < 0)
604 return(0);
605 else
606 rr->length=i;
607 rr->data=rr->comp;
608 #endif
609 return(1);
610 }
611
612 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
613 {
614 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
615 int i;
616 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
617
618 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
619 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
620 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
621 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
622 if (i < 0)
623 return(0);
624 else
625 wr->length=i;
626
627 wr->input=wr->data;
628 #endif
629 return(1);
630 }
631
632 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
633 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
634 */
635 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
636 {
637 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
638 int tot;
639 unsigned int n,nw;
640 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
641 unsigned int max_send_fragment;
642 #endif
643 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
644 int i;
645
646 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
647 tot=s->s3->wnum;
648 s->s3->wnum=0;
649
650 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
651 {
652 i=s->handshake_func(s);
653 if (i < 0) return(i);
654 if (i == 0)
655 {
656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
657 return -1;
658 }
659 }
660
661 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
662 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
663 if (wb->left != 0)
664 {
665 i = ssl3_write_pending(s,type,&buf[tot],s->s3->wpend_tot);
666 if (i<=0)
667 {
668 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
669 s->s3->wnum=tot;
670 return i;
671 }
672 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
673 }
674
675 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
676 /*
677 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
678 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
679 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
680 * compromise is considered worthy.
681 */
682 if (type==SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
683 len >= 4*(max_send_fragment=s->max_send_fragment) &&
684 s->compress==NULL && s->msg_callback==NULL &&
685 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
686 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK)
687 {
688 unsigned char aad[13];
689 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
690 int packlen;
691
692 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
693 if ((max_send_fragment&0xffff) == 0)
694 max_send_fragment -= 512;
695
696 if (tot==0 || wb->buf==NULL) /* allocate jumbo buffer */
697 {
698 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
699
700 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
701 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
702 max_send_fragment,NULL);
703
704 if (len>=8*max_send_fragment) packlen *= 8;
705 else packlen *= 4;
706
707 wb->buf=OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
708 wb->len=packlen;
709 }
710 else if (tot==len) /* done? */
711 {
712 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
713 wb->buf = NULL;
714 return tot;
715 }
716
717 n=(len-tot);
718 for (;;)
719 {
720 if (n < 4*max_send_fragment)
721 {
722 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
723 wb->buf = NULL;
724 break;
725 }
726
727 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
728 {
729 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
730 if (i <= 0)
731 {
732 s->s3->wnum=tot;
733 return i;
734 }
735 }
736
737 if (n >= 8*max_send_fragment)
738 nw = max_send_fragment*(mb_param.interleave=8);
739 else
740 nw = max_send_fragment*(mb_param.interleave=4);
741
742 memcpy(aad,s->s3->write_sequence,8);
743 aad[8]=type;
744 aad[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
745 aad[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
746 aad[11]=0;
747 aad[12]=0;
748 mb_param.out = NULL;
749 mb_param.inp = aad;
750 mb_param.len = nw;
751
752 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
753 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
754 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
755
756 if (packlen<=0 || packlen>wb->len) /* never happens */
757 {
758 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
759 wb->buf = NULL;
760 break;
761 }
762
763 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
764 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
765 mb_param.len = nw;
766
767 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
768 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
769 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param)<=0)
770 return -1;
771
772 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
773 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave)
774 {
775 int j=6;
776 while (j>=0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--])==0) ;
777 }
778
779 wb->offset = 0;
780 wb->left = packlen;
781
782 s->s3->wpend_tot = nw;
783 s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
784 s->s3->wpend_type= type;
785 s->s3->wpend_ret = nw;
786
787 i = ssl3_write_pending(s,type,&buf[tot],nw);
788 if (i<=0)
789 {
790 if (i<0)
791 {
792 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
793 wb->buf = NULL;
794 }
795 s->s3->wnum=tot;
796 return i;
797 }
798 if (i==(int)n)
799 {
800 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
801 wb->buf = NULL;
802 return tot+i;
803 }
804 n-=i;
805 tot+=i;
806 }
807 }
808 else
809 #endif
810 if (tot==len) /* done? */
811 {
812 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
813 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
814 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
815
816 return tot;
817 }
818
819 /* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write
820 * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete
821 * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding
822 * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as
823 * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large
824 * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users
825 * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user
826 * will notice
827 */
828 if ( len < tot)
829 {
830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
831 return(-1);
832 }
833
834 n=(len-tot);
835 for (;;)
836 {
837 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
838 nw=s->max_send_fragment;
839 else
840 nw=n;
841
842 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
843 if (i <= 0)
844 {
845 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
846 s->s3->wnum=tot;
847 return i;
848 }
849
850 if ((i == (int)n) ||
851 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
852 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
853 {
854 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
855 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
856 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
857
858 if ((i==(int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
859 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
860 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
861
862 return tot+i;
863 }
864
865 n-=i;
866 tot+=i;
867 }
868 }
869
870 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
871 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
872 {
873 unsigned char *p,*plen;
874 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
875 int prefix_len=0;
876 int eivlen;
877 long align=0;
878 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
879 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
880 SSL_SESSION *sess;
881
882 if (wb->buf == NULL)
883 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
884 return -1;
885
886 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
887 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
888 if (wb->left != 0)
889 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
890
891 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
892 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
893 {
894 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
895 if (i <= 0)
896 return(i);
897 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
898 }
899
900 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
901 return 0;
902
903 wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
904 sess=s->session;
905
906 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
907 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
908 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
909 {
910 #if 1
911 clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
912 #else
913 clear=1;
914 #endif
915 mac_size=0;
916 }
917 else
918 {
919 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
920 if (mac_size < 0)
921 goto err;
922 }
923
924 #if 0 && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
925 if (type==SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && s->compress==NULL &&
926 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && /*!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) &&*/
927 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK)
928 do {
929 unsigned char aad[13];
930 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param = {NULL,aad,sizeof(aad),0};
931 int packlen;
932
933 memcpy(aad,s->s3->write_sequence,8);
934 aad[8]=type;
935 aad[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
936 aad[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
937 aad[11]=(unsigned char)(len>>8);
938 aad[12]=(unsigned char)len;
939 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
940 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
941 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
942
943 if (packlen==0 || packlen > wb->len) break;
944
945 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
946 mb_param.inp = buf;
947 mb_param.len = len;
948 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
949 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
950 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
951
952 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
953 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave)
954 {
955 int j=6;
956 while (j>=0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--])==0) ;
957 }
958
959 wb->offset=0;
960 wb->left = packlen;
961
962 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
963 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
964 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
965 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
966 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
967
968 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
969 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
970 } while (0);
971 #endif
972
973 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
974 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
975 {
976 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
977 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
978
979 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
980 {
981 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
982 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
983 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
984 * together with the actual payload) */
985 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
986 if (prefix_len <= 0)
987 goto err;
988
989 if (prefix_len >
990 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
991 {
992 /* insufficient space */
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
994 goto err;
995 }
996 }
997
998 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
999 }
1000
1001 if (create_empty_fragment)
1002 {
1003 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
1004 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
1005 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
1006 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
1007 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
1008 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1009 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
1010 #endif
1011 p = wb->buf + align;
1012 wb->offset = align;
1013 }
1014 else if (prefix_len)
1015 {
1016 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
1017 }
1018 else
1019 {
1020 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
1021 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1022 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
1023 #endif
1024 p = wb->buf + align;
1025 wb->offset = align;
1026 }
1027
1028 /* write the header */
1029
1030 *(p++)=type&0xff;
1031 wr->type=type;
1032
1033 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
1034 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
1035 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
1036 */
1037 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
1038 && !s->renegotiate
1039 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
1040 *(p++) = 0x1;
1041 else
1042 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1043
1044 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
1045 plen=p;
1046 p+=2;
1047 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
1048 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
1049 {
1050 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
1051 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
1052 {
1053 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
1054 if (eivlen <= 1)
1055 eivlen = 0;
1056 }
1057 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
1058 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
1059 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1060 else
1061 eivlen = 0;
1062 }
1063 else
1064 eivlen = 0;
1065
1066 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1067 wr->data=p + eivlen;
1068 wr->length=(int)len;
1069 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1070
1071 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1072 * wr->data */
1073
1074 /* first we compress */
1075 if (s->compress != NULL)
1076 {
1077 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1078 {
1079 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1080 goto err;
1081 }
1082 }
1083 else
1084 {
1085 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1086 wr->input=wr->data;
1087 }
1088
1089 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1090 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1091 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1092
1093 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0)
1094 {
1095 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
1096 goto err;
1097 wr->length+=mac_size;
1098 }
1099
1100 wr->input=p;
1101 wr->data=p;
1102
1103 if (eivlen)
1104 {
1105 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
1106 goto err; */
1107 wr->length += eivlen;
1108 }
1109
1110 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1111 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
1112
1113 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0)
1114 {
1115 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,p + wr->length,1) < 0)
1116 goto err;
1117 wr->length+=mac_size;
1118 }
1119
1120 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1121 s2n(wr->length,plen);
1122
1123 if (s->msg_callback)
1124 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1125
1126 /* we should now have
1127 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1128 * wr->length long */
1129 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1130 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1131
1132 if (create_empty_fragment)
1133 {
1134 /* we are in a recursive call;
1135 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1136 */
1137 return wr->length;
1138 }
1139
1140 /* now let's set up wb */
1141 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1142
1143 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1144 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1145 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1146 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1147 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1148
1149 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1150 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1151 err:
1152 return -1;
1153 }
1154
1155 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
1156 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1157 unsigned int len)
1158 {
1159 int i;
1160 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
1161
1162 /* XXXX */
1163 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
1164 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
1165 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1166 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
1167 {
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1169 return(-1);
1170 }
1171
1172 for (;;)
1173 {
1174 clear_sys_error();
1175 if (s->wbio != NULL)
1176 {
1177 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
1178 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
1179 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
1180 (unsigned int)wb->left);
1181 }
1182 else
1183 {
1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1185 i= -1;
1186 }
1187 if (i == wb->left)
1188 {
1189 wb->left=0;
1190 wb->offset+=i;
1191 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1192 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
1193 }
1194 else if (i <= 0) {
1195 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
1196 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1197 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
1198 point in using a datagram service */
1199 wb->left = 0;
1200 }
1201 return(i);
1202 }
1203 wb->offset+=i;
1204 wb->left-=i;
1205 }
1206 }
1207
1208 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1209 * 'type' is one of the following:
1210 *
1211 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1212 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1213 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1214 *
1215 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1216 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1217 *
1218 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1219 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
1220 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
1221 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1222 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1223 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1224 * Change cipher spec protocol
1225 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1226 * Alert protocol
1227 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1228 * Handshake protocol
1229 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1230 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1231 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1232 * Application data protocol
1233 * none of our business
1234 */
1235 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
1236 {
1237 int al,i,j,ret;
1238 unsigned int n;
1239 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
1240 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
1241
1242 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
1243 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1244 return(-1);
1245
1246 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
1247 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
1248 {
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1250 return -1;
1251 }
1252
1253 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1254 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1255 {
1256 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1257 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1258 unsigned int k;
1259
1260 /* peek == 0 */
1261 n = 0;
1262 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1263 {
1264 *dst++ = *src++;
1265 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
1266 n++;
1267 }
1268 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1269 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1270 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1271 return n;
1272 }
1273
1274 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
1275
1276 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
1277 {
1278 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1279 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1280 if (i < 0) return(i);
1281 if (i == 0)
1282 {
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1284 return(-1);
1285 }
1286 }
1287 start:
1288 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1289
1290 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1291 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1292 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1293 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
1294 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
1295
1296 /* get new packet if necessary */
1297 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
1298 {
1299 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
1300 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
1301 }
1302
1303 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1304
1305 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1306 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1307 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
1308 {
1309 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1311 goto f_err;
1312 }
1313
1314 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1315 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1316 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
1317 {
1318 rr->length=0;
1319 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1320 return(0);
1321 }
1322
1323
1324 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1325 {
1326 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1327 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1328 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1329 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
1330 {
1331 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1333 goto f_err;
1334 }
1335
1336 if (len <= 0) return(len);
1337
1338 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1339 n = rr->length;
1340 else
1341 n = (unsigned int)len;
1342
1343 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1344 if (!peek)
1345 {
1346 rr->length-=n;
1347 rr->off+=n;
1348 if (rr->length == 0)
1349 {
1350 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1351 rr->off=0;
1352 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
1353 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1354 }
1355 }
1356 return(n);
1357 }
1358
1359
1360 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1361 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1362
1363 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1364 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1365 */
1366 {
1367 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1368 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1369 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1370
1371 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1372 {
1373 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1374 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1375 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1376 }
1377 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1378 {
1379 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1380 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1381 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1382 }
1383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1384 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
1385 {
1386 tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1387
1388 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1389 rr->length = 0;
1390 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1391 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1392 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1393 return(-1);
1394 }
1395 #endif
1396
1397 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1398 {
1399 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1400 if (rr->length < n)
1401 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1402
1403 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1404 while (n-- > 0)
1405 {
1406 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1407 rr->length--;
1408 }
1409
1410 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1411 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1412 }
1413 }
1414
1415 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1416 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1417 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1418
1419 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1420 if ((!s->server) &&
1421 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1422 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1423 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1424 {
1425 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1426
1427 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1428 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1429 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1430 {
1431 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1433 goto f_err;
1434 }
1435
1436 if (s->msg_callback)
1437 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1438
1439 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1440 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1441 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1442 {
1443 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1444 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1445 {
1446 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1447 if (i < 0) return(i);
1448 if (i == 0)
1449 {
1450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1451 return(-1);
1452 }
1453
1454 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1455 {
1456 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1457 {
1458 BIO *bio;
1459 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1460 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1461 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1462 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1463 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1464 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1465 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1466 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1467 return(-1);
1468 }
1469 }
1470 }
1471 }
1472 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1473 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1474 goto start;
1475 }
1476 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1477 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1478 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1479 */
1480 if (s->server &&
1481 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1482 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1483 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1484 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1485 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1486 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1487 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1488
1489 {
1490 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1491 rr->length = 0;
1492 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1493 goto start;
1494 }
1495 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1496 {
1497 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1498 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1499
1500 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1501
1502 if (s->msg_callback)
1503 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1504
1505 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1506 cb=s->info_callback;
1507 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1508 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1509
1510 if (cb != NULL)
1511 {
1512 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1513 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1514 }
1515
1516 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1517 {
1518 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1519 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1520 {
1521 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1522 return(0);
1523 }
1524 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1525 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1526 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1527 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1528 * expects it to succeed.
1529 *
1530 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1531 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1532 */
1533 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1534 {
1535 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1537 goto f_err;
1538 }
1539 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1540 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1541 return(0);
1542 #endif
1543 }
1544 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1545 {
1546 char tmp[16];
1547
1548 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1549 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1550 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1551 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1552 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1553 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1554 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1555 return(0);
1556 }
1557 else
1558 {
1559 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1561 goto f_err;
1562 }
1563
1564 goto start;
1565 }
1566
1567 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1568 {
1569 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1570 rr->length=0;
1571 return(0);
1572 }
1573
1574 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1575 {
1576 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1577 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1578 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1579 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1580 {
1581 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1582 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1583 goto f_err;
1584 }
1585
1586 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1587 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1588 {
1589 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1591 goto f_err;
1592 }
1593
1594 rr->length=0;
1595
1596 if (s->msg_callback)
1597 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1598
1599 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1600 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1601 goto err;
1602 else
1603 goto start;
1604 }
1605
1606 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1607 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1608 {
1609 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1610 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1611 {
1612 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1613 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1614 * protocol violations): */
1615 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1616 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1617 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1618 #else
1619 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1620 #endif
1621 s->renegotiate=1;
1622 s->new_session=1;
1623 }
1624 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1625 if (i < 0) return(i);
1626 if (i == 0)
1627 {
1628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1629 return(-1);
1630 }
1631
1632 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1633 {
1634 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1635 {
1636 BIO *bio;
1637 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1638 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1639 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1640 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1641 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1642 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1643 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1644 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1645 return(-1);
1646 }
1647 }
1648 goto start;
1649 }
1650
1651 switch (rr->type)
1652 {
1653 default:
1654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1655 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1656 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1657 */
1658 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
1659 {
1660 rr->length = 0;
1661 goto start;
1662 }
1663 #endif
1664 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1666 goto f_err;
1667 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1668 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1669 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1670 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1671 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1672 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1673 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1674 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1675 goto f_err;
1676 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1677 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1678 * but have application data. If the library was
1679 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1680 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1681 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1682 * we will indulge it.
1683 */
1684 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1685 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1686 ((
1687 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1688 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1689 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1690 ) || (
1691 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1692 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1693 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1694 )
1695 ))
1696 {
1697 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1698 return(-1);
1699 }
1700 else
1701 {
1702 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1704 goto f_err;
1705 }
1706 }
1707 /* not reached */
1708
1709 f_err:
1710 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1711 err:
1712 return(-1);
1713 }
1714
1715 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1716 {
1717 int i;
1718 const char *sender;
1719 int slen;
1720
1721 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1722 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1723 else
1724 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1725
1726 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1727 {
1728 if (s->session == NULL)
1729 {
1730 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1732 return (0);
1733 }
1734
1735 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1736 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1737 }
1738
1739 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1740 return(0);
1741
1742 /* we have to record the message digest at
1743 * this point so we can get it before we read
1744 * the finished message */
1745 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1746 {
1747 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1748 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1749 }
1750 else
1751 {
1752 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1753 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1754 }
1755
1756 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1757 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1758 if (i == 0)
1759 {
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1761 return 0;
1762 }
1763 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
1764
1765 return(1);
1766 }
1767
1768 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1769 {
1770 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1771 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1772 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1773 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1774 if (desc < 0) return -1;
1775 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1776 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1777 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1778
1779 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1780 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1781 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1782 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1783 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1784 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1785 * some time in the future */
1786 return -1;
1787 }
1788
1789 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1790 {
1791 int i,j;
1792 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1793
1794 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1795 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1796 if (i <= 0)
1797 {
1798 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1799 }
1800 else
1801 {
1802 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1803 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1804 * we will not worry too much. */
1805 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1806 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1807
1808 if (s->msg_callback)
1809 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1810
1811 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1812 cb=s->info_callback;
1813 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1814 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1815
1816 if (cb != NULL)
1817 {
1818 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1819 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1820 }
1821 }
1822 return(i);
1823 }
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