]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/openssl.git/blob - ssl/s3_pkt.c
projects / thirdparty / openssl.git / blob
? search:


561ba5cf255a9aa611254bac5599c0608293c11f
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / s3_pkt.c
1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112 #include <stdio.h>
113 #include <errno.h>
114 #define USE_SOCKETS
115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
118
119 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
120 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
121 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
122
123 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
124 {
125 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
126 * packet by another n bytes.
127 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
128 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
129 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
130 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
131 */
132 int i,len,left;
133 long align=0;
134 unsigned char *pkt;
135 SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
136
137 if (n <= 0) return n;
138
139 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
140 if (rb->buf == NULL)
141 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
142 return -1;
143
144 left = rb->left;
145 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
146 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
147 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
148 #endif
149
150 if (!extend)
151 {
152 /* start with empty packet ... */
153 if (left == 0)
154 rb->offset = align;
155 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
156 {
157 /* check if next packet length is large
158 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
159 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
160 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
161 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
162 {
163 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
164 * and its length field is insane, we can
165 * only be led to wrong decision about
166 * whether memmove will occur or not.
167 * Header values has no effect on memmove
168 * arguments and therefore no buffer
169 * overrun can be triggered. */
170 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
171 rb->offset = align;
172 }
173 }
174 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
175 s->packet_length = 0;
176 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
177 }
178
179 /* extend reads should not span multiple packets for DTLS */
180 if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION &&
181 extend)
182 {
183 if ( left > 0 && n > left)
184 n = left;
185 }
186
187 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
188 if (left >= n)
189 {
190 s->packet_length+=n;
191 rb->left=left-n;
192 rb->offset+=n;
193 return(n);
194 }
195
196 /* else we need to read more data */
197
198 len = s->packet_length;
199 pkt = rb->buf+align;
200 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
201 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
202 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
203 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
204 {
205 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
206 s->packet = pkt;
207 rb->offset = len + align;
208 }
209
210 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
211 if (n > max) /* does not happen */
212 {
213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
214 return -1;
215 }
216
217 if (!s->read_ahead)
218 max=n;
219
220 while (left < n)
221 {
222 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
223 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
224 * len+max if possible) */
225
226 clear_sys_error();
227 if (s->rbio != NULL)
228 {
229 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
230 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
231 }
232 else
233 {
234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
235 i = -1;
236 }
237
238 if (i <= 0)
239 {
240 rb->left = left;
241 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
242 if (len+left == 0)
243 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
244 return(i);
245 }
246 left+=i;
247 }
248
249 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
250 rb->offset += n;
251 rb->left = left - n;
252 s->packet_length += n;
253 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
254 return(n);
255 }
256
257 /* Call this to get a new input record.
258 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
259 * or non-blocking IO.
260 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
261 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
262 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
263 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
264 */
265 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
266 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
267 {
268 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
269 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
270 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
271 SSL_SESSION *sess;
272 unsigned char *p;
273 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
274 short version;
275 unsigned int mac_size;
276 int clear=0;
277 size_t extra;
278 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
279 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
280
281 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
282 sess=s->session;
283
284 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
285 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
286 else
287 extra=0;
288 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
289 {
290 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
291 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
293 return -1;
294 }
295
296 again:
297 /* check if we have the header */
298 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
299 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
300 {
301 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
302 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
303 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
304
305 p=s->packet;
306
307 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
308 rr->type= *(p++);
309 ssl_major= *(p++);
310 ssl_minor= *(p++);
311 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
312 n2s(p,rr->length);
313 #if 0
314 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
315 #endif
316
317 /* Lets check version */
318 if (!s->first_packet)
319 {
320 if (version != s->version)
321 {
322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
323 /* Send back error using their
324 * version number :-) */
325 s->version=version;
326 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
327 goto f_err;
328 }
329 }
330
331 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
332 {
333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
334 goto err;
335 }
336
337 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
338 {
339 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
341 goto f_err;
342 }
343
344 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
345 }
346
347 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
348
349 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
350 {
351 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
352 i=rr->length;
353 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
354 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
355 /* now n == rr->length,
356 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
357 }
358
359 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
360
361 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
362 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
363 */
364 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
365
366 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
367 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
368 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
369 * the decryption or by the decompression
370 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
371 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
372
373 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
374 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
375
376 /* check is not needed I believe */
377 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
378 {
379 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
381 goto f_err;
382 }
383
384 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
385 rr->data=rr->input;
386
387 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
388 if (enc_err <= 0)
389 {
390 if (enc_err == 0)
391 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
392 goto err;
393
394 /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
395 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
396 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
397 * the MAC computation anyway. */
398 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
399 }
400
401 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
402 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
403 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
404 printf("\n");
405 #endif
406
407 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
408 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
409 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
410 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL))
411 clear=1;
412
413 if (!clear)
414 {
415 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
416
417 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
418 {
419 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
420 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
422 goto f_err;
423 #else
424 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
425 #endif
426 }
427 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
428 if (rr->length >= mac_size)
429 {
430 rr->length -= mac_size;
431 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
432 }
433 else
434 {
435 /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
436 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
437 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
439 goto f_err;
440 #else
441 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
442 rr->length = 0;
443 #endif
444 }
445 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
446 if (mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
447 {
448 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
449 }
450 }
451
452 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
453 {
454 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
455 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
456 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
457 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
458 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
459 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
461 goto f_err;
462 }
463
464 /* r->length is now just compressed */
465 if (s->expand != NULL)
466 {
467 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
468 {
469 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
471 goto f_err;
472 }
473 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
474 {
475 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
477 goto f_err;
478 }
479 }
480
481 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
482 {
483 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
485 goto f_err;
486 }
487
488 rr->off=0;
489 /* So at this point the following is true
490 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
491 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
492 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
493 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
494 * after use :-).
495 */
496
497 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
498 s->packet_length=0;
499
500 /* just read a 0 length packet */
501 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
502
503 #if 0
504 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
505 #endif
506
507 return(1);
508
509 f_err:
510 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
511 err:
512 return(ret);
513 }
514
515 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
516 {
517 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
518 int i;
519 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
520
521 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
522 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
523 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
524 if (i < 0)
525 return(0);
526 else
527 rr->length=i;
528 rr->data=rr->comp;
529 #endif
530 return(1);
531 }
532
533 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
534 {
535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
536 int i;
537 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
538
539 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
540 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
541 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
542 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
543 if (i < 0)
544 return(0);
545 else
546 wr->length=i;
547
548 wr->input=wr->data;
549 #endif
550 return(1);
551 }
552
553 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
554 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
555 */
556 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
557 {
558 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
559 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
560 int i;
561
562 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
563 tot=s->s3->wnum;
564 s->s3->wnum=0;
565
566 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
567 {
568 i=s->handshake_func(s);
569 if (i < 0) return(i);
570 if (i == 0)
571 {
572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
573 return -1;
574 }
575 }
576
577 n=(len-tot);
578 for (;;)
579 {
580 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
581 nw=s->max_send_fragment;
582 else
583 nw=n;
584
585 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
586 if (i <= 0)
587 {
588 s->s3->wnum=tot;
589 return i;
590 }
591
592 if ((i == (int)n) ||
593 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
594 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
595 {
596 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
597 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
598 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
599
600 return tot+i;
601 }
602
603 n-=i;
604 tot+=i;
605 }
606 }
607
608 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
609 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
610 {
611 unsigned char *p,*plen;
612 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
613 int prefix_len=0;
614 long align=0;
615 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
616 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
617 SSL_SESSION *sess;
618
619 if (wb->buf == NULL)
620 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
621 return -1;
622
623 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
624 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
625 if (wb->left != 0)
626 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
627
628 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
629 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
630 {
631 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
632 if (i <= 0)
633 return(i);
634 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
635 }
636
637 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
638 return 0;
639
640 wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
641 sess=s->session;
642
643 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
644 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
645 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
646 clear=1;
647
648 if (clear)
649 mac_size=0;
650 else
651 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
652
653 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
654 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
655 {
656 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
657 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
658
659 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
660 {
661 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
662 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
663 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
664 * together with the actual payload) */
665 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
666 if (prefix_len <= 0)
667 goto err;
668
669 if (prefix_len >
670 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
671 {
672 /* insufficient space */
673 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
674 goto err;
675 }
676 }
677
678 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
679 }
680
681 if (create_empty_fragment)
682 {
683 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
684 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
685 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
686 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
687 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
688 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
689 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
690 #endif
691 p = wb->buf + align;
692 wb->offset = align;
693 }
694 else if (prefix_len)
695 {
696 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
697 }
698 else
699 {
700 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
701 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
702 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
703 #endif
704 p = wb->buf + align;
705 wb->offset = align;
706 }
707
708 /* write the header */
709
710 *(p++)=type&0xff;
711 wr->type=type;
712
713 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
714 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
715
716 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
717 plen=p;
718 p+=2;
719
720 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
721 wr->data=p;
722 wr->length=(int)len;
723 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
724
725 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
726 * wr->data */
727
728 /* first we compress */
729 if (s->compress != NULL)
730 {
731 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
732 {
733 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
734 goto err;
735 }
736 }
737 else
738 {
739 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
740 wr->input=wr->data;
741 }
742
743 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
744 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
745 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
746
747 if (mac_size != 0)
748 {
749 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1);
750 wr->length+=mac_size;
751 wr->input=p;
752 wr->data=p;
753 }
754
755 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
756 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
757
758 /* record length after mac and block padding */
759 s2n(wr->length,plen);
760
761 /* we should now have
762 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
763 * wr->length long */
764 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
765 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
766
767 if (create_empty_fragment)
768 {
769 /* we are in a recursive call;
770 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
771 */
772 return wr->length;
773 }
774
775 /* now let's set up wb */
776 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
777
778 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
779 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
780 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
781 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
782 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
783
784 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
785 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
786 err:
787 return -1;
788 }
789
790 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
791 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
792 unsigned int len)
793 {
794 int i;
795 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
796
797 /* XXXX */
798 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
799 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
800 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
801 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
802 {
803 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
804 return(-1);
805 }
806
807 for (;;)
808 {
809 clear_sys_error();
810 if (s->wbio != NULL)
811 {
812 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
813 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
814 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
815 (unsigned int)wb->left);
816 }
817 else
818 {
819 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
820 i= -1;
821 }
822 if (i == wb->left)
823 {
824 wb->left=0;
825 wb->offset+=i;
826 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
827 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
828 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
829 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
830 }
831 else if (i <= 0) {
832 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) {
833 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the wh
834 ole
835 point in using a datagram service */
836 wb->left = 0;
837 }
838 return(i);
839 }
840 wb->offset+=i;
841 wb->left-=i;
842 }
843 }
844
845 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
846 * 'type' is one of the following:
847 *
848 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
849 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
850 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
851 *
852 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
853 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
854 *
855 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
856 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
857 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
858 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
859 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
860 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
861 * Change cipher spec protocol
862 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
863 * Alert protocol
864 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
865 * Handshake protocol
866 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
867 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
868 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
869 * Application data protocol
870 * none of our business
871 */
872 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
873 {
874 int al,i,j,ret;
875 unsigned int n;
876 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
877 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
878
879 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
880 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
881 return(-1);
882
883 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
884 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
885 {
886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
887 return -1;
888 }
889
890 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
891 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
892 {
893 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
894 unsigned char *dst = buf;
895 unsigned int k;
896
897 /* peek == 0 */
898 n = 0;
899 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
900 {
901 *dst++ = *src++;
902 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
903 n++;
904 }
905 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
906 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
907 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
908 return n;
909 }
910
911 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
912
913 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
914 {
915 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
916 i=s->handshake_func(s);
917 if (i < 0) return(i);
918 if (i == 0)
919 {
920 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
921 return(-1);
922 }
923 }
924 start:
925 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
926
927 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
928 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
929 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
930 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
931 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
932
933 /* get new packet if necessary */
934 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
935 {
936 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
937 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
938 }
939
940 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
941
942 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
943 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
944 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
945 {
946 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
948 goto f_err;
949 }
950
951 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
952 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
953 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
954 {
955 rr->length=0;
956 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
957 return(0);
958 }
959
960
961 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
962 {
963 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
964 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
965 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
966 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
967 {
968 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
970 goto f_err;
971 }
972
973 if (len <= 0) return(len);
974
975 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
976 n = rr->length;
977 else
978 n = (unsigned int)len;
979
980 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
981 if (!peek)
982 {
983 rr->length-=n;
984 rr->off+=n;
985 if (rr->length == 0)
986 {
987 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
988 rr->off=0;
989 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
990 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
991 }
992 }
993 return(n);
994 }
995
996
997 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
998 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
999
1000 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1001 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1002 */
1003 {
1004 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1005 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1006 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1007
1008 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1009 {
1010 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1011 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1012 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1013 }
1014 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1015 {
1016 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1017 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1018 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1019 }
1020
1021 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1022 {
1023 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1024 if (rr->length < n)
1025 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1026
1027 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1028 while (n-- > 0)
1029 {
1030 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1031 rr->length--;
1032 }
1033
1034 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1035 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1036 }
1037 }
1038
1039 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1040 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1041 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1042
1043 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1044 if ((!s->server) &&
1045 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1046 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1047 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1048 {
1049 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1050
1051 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1052 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1053 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1054 {
1055 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1057 goto f_err;
1058 }
1059
1060 if (s->msg_callback)
1061 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1062
1063 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1064 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1065 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1066 {
1067 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1068 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1069 {
1070 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1071 if (i < 0) return(i);
1072 if (i == 0)
1073 {
1074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1075 return(-1);
1076 }
1077
1078 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1079 {
1080 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1081 {
1082 BIO *bio;
1083 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1084 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1085 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1086 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1087 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1088 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1089 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1090 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1091 return(-1);
1092 }
1093 }
1094 }
1095 }
1096 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1097 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1098 goto start;
1099 }
1100
1101 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1102 {
1103 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1104 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1105
1106 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1107
1108 if (s->msg_callback)
1109 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1110
1111 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1112 cb=s->info_callback;
1113 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1114 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1115
1116 if (cb != NULL)
1117 {
1118 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1119 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1120 }
1121
1122 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1123 {
1124 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1125 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1126 {
1127 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1128 return(0);
1129 }
1130 }
1131 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1132 {
1133 char tmp[16];
1134
1135 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1136 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1138 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1139 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1140 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1141 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1142 return(0);
1143 }
1144 else
1145 {
1146 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1148 goto f_err;
1149 }
1150
1151 goto start;
1152 }
1153
1154 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1155 {
1156 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1157 rr->length=0;
1158 return(0);
1159 }
1160
1161 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1162 {
1163 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1164 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1165 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1166 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1167 {
1168 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1170 goto f_err;
1171 }
1172
1173 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1174 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1175 {
1176 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1178 goto f_err;
1179 }
1180
1181 rr->length=0;
1182
1183 if (s->msg_callback)
1184 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1185
1186 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1187 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1188 goto err;
1189 else
1190 goto start;
1191 }
1192
1193 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1194 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1195 {
1196 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1197 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1198 {
1199 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1200 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1201 * protocol violations): */
1202 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1203 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1204 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1205 #else
1206 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1207 #endif
1208 s->new_session=1;
1209 }
1210 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1211 if (i < 0) return(i);
1212 if (i == 0)
1213 {
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1215 return(-1);
1216 }
1217
1218 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1219 {
1220 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1221 {
1222 BIO *bio;
1223 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1224 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1225 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1226 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1227 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1228 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1229 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1230 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1231 return(-1);
1232 }
1233 }
1234 goto start;
1235 }
1236
1237 switch (rr->type)
1238 {
1239 default:
1240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1241 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1242 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1243 {
1244 rr->length = 0;
1245 goto start;
1246 }
1247 #endif
1248 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1250 goto f_err;
1251 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1252 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1253 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1254 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1255 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1256 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1257 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1259 goto f_err;
1260 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1261 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1262 * but have application data. If the library was
1263 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1264 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1265 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1266 * we will indulge it.
1267 */
1268 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1269 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1270 ((
1271 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1272 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1273 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1274 ) || (
1275 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1276 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1277 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1278 )
1279 ))
1280 {
1281 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1282 return(-1);
1283 }
1284 else
1285 {
1286 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1288 goto f_err;
1289 }
1290 }
1291 /* not reached */
1292
1293 f_err:
1294 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1295 err:
1296 return(-1);
1297 }
1298
1299 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1300 {
1301 int i;
1302 const char *sender;
1303 int slen;
1304
1305 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1306 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1307 else
1308 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1309
1310 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1311 {
1312 if (s->session == NULL)
1313 {
1314 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1316 return (0);
1317 }
1318
1319 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1320 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1321 }
1322
1323 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1324 return(0);
1325
1326 /* we have to record the message digest at
1327 * this point so we can get it before we read
1328 * the finished message */
1329 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1330 {
1331 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1332 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1333 }
1334 else
1335 {
1336 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1337 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1338 }
1339
1340 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1341 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1342
1343 return(1);
1344 }
1345
1346 void ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1347 {
1348 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1349 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1350 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1351 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1352 if (desc < 0) return;
1353 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1354 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1355 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1356
1357 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1358 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1359 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1360 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1361 s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1362 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1363 * some time in the future */
1364 }
1365
1366 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1367 {
1368 int i,j;
1369 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1370
1371 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1372 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1373 if (i <= 0)
1374 {
1375 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1376 }
1377 else
1378 {
1379 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1380 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1381 * we will not worry too much. */
1382 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1383 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1384
1385 if (s->msg_callback)
1386 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1387
1388 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1389 cb=s->info_callback;
1390 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1391 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1392
1393 if (cb != NULL)
1394 {
1395 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1396 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1397 }
1398 }
1399 return(i);
1400 }
A mirror of the official openssl repository