1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
172 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
174 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
176 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
185 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
187 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
189 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
190 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
))
192 if(s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
)
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
197 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
201 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
,al
);
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method
,
210 ssl_undefined_function
,
211 ssl3_get_server_method
)
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
216 unsigned long alg_k
,Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
);
217 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
219 int new_state
,state
,skip
=0;
221 RAND_add(&Time
,sizeof(Time
),0);
225 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
227 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
228 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
230 /* init things to blank */
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) SSL_clear(s
);
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
);
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
245 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
)
247 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
265 case SSL_ST_OK
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
268 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
,1);
270 if ((s
->version
>>8) != 3)
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
275 s
->type
=SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
277 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
)
279 if ((buf
=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
)
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
))
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
299 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
;
300 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
302 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
)
304 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
305 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
307 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
,1)) { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
310 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
311 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
313 else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
314 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
))
316 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
317 * client that doesn't support secure
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
327 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
328 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
329 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
330 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
338 ret
=ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
339 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
340 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
341 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
344 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
355 ret
=ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
356 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
358 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D
;
359 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D
:
362 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
,&al
)) < 0)
364 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
365 s
->rwstate
=SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
368 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
)
370 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
371 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
372 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
373 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
375 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
;
383 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
387 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
389 ret
=ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
390 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
394 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
395 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
397 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
401 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
405 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A
;
407 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
413 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A
:
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B
:
415 ret
= tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(s
, &skip
);
416 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
418 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
423 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
424 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
425 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
426 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
427 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
428 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)
429 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
431 ret
=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
432 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
434 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
435 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
;
437 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
442 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
449 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
454 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
455 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
456 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
458 /* clear this, it may get reset by
459 * send_server_key_exchange */
460 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
)
461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
462 && !(alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
463 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
465 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
466 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
467 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
468 * be able to handle this) */
469 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
471 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=0;
474 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
475 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
477 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
479 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
480 * message only if the cipher suite is either
481 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
482 * server certificate contains the server's
483 * public key for key exchange.
485 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
486 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
487 * hint if provided */
488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
489 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) && s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
492 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
493 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
495 || (alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
)
496 || (alg_k
& SSL_kECDHE
)
497 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
498 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
499 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
500 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
506 ret
=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
507 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
512 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
516 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
517 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
518 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
519 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
520 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
521 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
522 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
523 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
524 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
525 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
526 * and in RFC 2246): */
527 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
528 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
529 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
530 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
531 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
532 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
)
533 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
534 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
535 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
537 /* no cert request */
539 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=0;
540 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
541 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
542 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
547 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=1;
548 ret
=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
549 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
550 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
551 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
553 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
554 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
560 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
561 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
562 ret
=ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
563 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
564 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
565 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
569 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
571 /* This code originally checked to see if
572 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
573 * and then flushed. This caused problems
574 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
575 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
576 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
577 * still exist. So instead we just flush
581 s
->rwstate
=SSL_WRITING
;
582 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0)
587 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
589 s
->state
=s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
592 case SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A
:
593 case SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B
:
594 ret
=tls1_get_client_supplemental_data(s
);
595 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
596 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
597 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
601 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
602 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
603 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
604 ret
= ssl3_check_client_hello(s
);
608 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
;
609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
611 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A
;
614 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
616 ret
=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
617 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
620 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
624 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
625 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
626 ret
=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
631 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
632 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
633 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
634 * message is not sent.
635 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
636 * the client uses its key from the certificate
639 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
640 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
642 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
643 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
645 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
649 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
651 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
653 if (!s
->session
->peer
)
655 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
656 * at this point and digest cached records.
658 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
663 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
664 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
672 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
675 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
676 * a client cert, it can be verified
677 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
678 * should be generalized. But it is next step
680 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
681 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
683 for (dgst_num
=0; dgst_num
<SSL_MAX_DIGEST
;dgst_num
++)
684 if (s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
])
688 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]),&(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[offset
]));
689 dgst_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]);
700 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
701 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
703 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
704 ret
=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
705 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
707 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
708 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
710 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
711 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
713 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
718 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
719 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
720 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
721 ret
=ssl3_get_next_proto(s
);
722 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
724 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
728 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
729 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
730 ret
=ssl3_get_finished(s
,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
731 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
732 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
735 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
736 else if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
737 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
740 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
745 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
746 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
747 ret
=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s
);
748 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
749 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
753 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
:
754 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
:
755 ret
=ssl3_send_cert_status(s
);
756 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
757 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
763 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
764 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
766 s
->session
->cipher
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
767 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
768 { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
770 ret
=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
771 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
773 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
774 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
777 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
778 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
786 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
787 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
788 ret
=ssl3_send_finished(s
,
789 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
790 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
791 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
792 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
793 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
796 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
797 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
799 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
800 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
802 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
806 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL_ST_OK
;
811 /* clean a few things up */
812 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
814 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
817 /* remove buffering on output */
818 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
822 if (s
->renegotiate
== 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
827 ssl_update_cache(s
,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
829 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
831 s
->handshake_func
=ssl3_accept
;
833 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
,1);
841 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
847 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
)
851 if ((ret
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
856 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
))
860 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
,1);
867 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
871 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
,ret
);
875 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
878 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
)
880 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
, 0);
881 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
884 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
885 return ssl_do_write(s
);
888 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
893 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
894 * so permit appropriate message length */
895 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
901 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
902 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
904 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA
)
907 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
)
909 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
911 if (s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
)
913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS
);
916 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
917 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
919 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
921 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
922 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
926 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
928 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
929 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
932 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
;
938 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
940 int i
,j
,ok
,al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,ret
= -1;
941 unsigned int cookie_len
;
946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
950 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
=NULL
;
952 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
&& !s
->first_packet
)
955 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
956 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
957 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
958 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
961 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
964 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
967 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
968 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
969 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
970 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
971 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
974 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
976 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
978 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
979 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
980 s
->client_version
=(((int)p
[0])<<8)|(int)p
[1];
983 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) ? (s
->client_version
> s
->version
&&
984 s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
)
985 : (s
->client_version
< s
->version
))
987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
988 if ((s
->client_version
>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
&&
989 !s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
)
991 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
992 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
994 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
998 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
999 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
1000 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
1002 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
)
1004 unsigned int session_length
, cookie_length
;
1006 session_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1007 cookie_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1);
1009 if (cookie_length
== 0)
1013 /* load the client random */
1014 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
,p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1015 p
+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1017 /* get the session-id */
1021 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1022 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1023 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1024 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1025 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1027 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1028 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1029 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1030 * setting will be ignored.
1032 if ((s
->new_session
&& (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
)))
1034 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
1039 i
=ssl_get_prev_session(s
, p
, j
, d
+ n
);
1041 { /* previous session */
1048 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
1058 cookie_len
= *(p
++);
1061 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1062 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1063 * does not cause an overflow.
1065 if ( cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
))
1068 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1073 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1074 if ((SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) &&
1077 memcpy(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, p
, cookie_len
);
1079 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
)
1081 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
,
1084 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1086 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1089 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1091 else if ( memcmp(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1092 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) /* default verification */
1094 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1096 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1099 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1104 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
)
1106 /* Select version to use */
1107 if (s
->client_version
<= DTLS1_2_VERSION
&&
1108 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2
))
1110 s
->version
= DTLS1_2_VERSION
;
1111 s
->method
= DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1113 else if (tls1_suiteb(s
))
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
);
1116 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1117 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1120 else if (s
->client_version
<= DTLS1_VERSION
&&
1121 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1
))
1123 s
->version
= DTLS1_VERSION
;
1124 s
->method
= DTLSv1_server_method();
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
1129 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1130 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1133 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1138 if ((i
== 0) && (j
!= 0))
1140 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1141 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
1147 /* not enough data */
1148 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1149 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1152 if ((i
> 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
,p
,i
,&(ciphers
))
1159 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1160 if ((s
->hit
) && (i
> 0))
1163 id
=s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1166 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers
));
1168 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++)
1170 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
,i
);
1172 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1173 i
,sk_num(ciphers
),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1181 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1182 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1185 if (j
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1))
1187 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1188 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1189 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1190 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1191 * enabled, though. */
1192 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, 0);
1193 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s
), c
) >= 0)
1195 s
->session
->cipher
= c
;
1202 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1203 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1204 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1214 /* not enough data */
1215 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1224 if (p
[j
] == 0) break;
1231 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1238 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
)
1240 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
,&p
,d
,n
))
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1247 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1248 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1249 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1250 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1253 pos
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1254 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0)
1260 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
)
1262 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
=NULL
;
1264 s
->session
->master_key_length
=sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1265 if(s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
1266 ciphers
, &pref_cipher
, s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
))
1269 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1270 s
->session
->verify_result
=X509_V_OK
;
1274 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1275 pref_cipher
=pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1276 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1278 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1283 s
->session
->cipher
=pref_cipher
;
1286 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1288 if (s
->cipher_list_by_id
)
1289 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1291 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1292 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1297 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1298 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1299 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1300 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=NULL
;
1301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1302 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1303 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1305 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1306 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1307 /* Can't disable compression */
1308 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1313 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1314 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++)
1316 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1317 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
)
1319 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1323 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1328 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1329 for (m
= 0; m
< i
; m
++)
1331 if (q
[m
] == comp_id
)
1336 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1343 else if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
1344 { /* See if we have a match */
1345 int m
,nn
,o
,v
,done
=0;
1347 nn
=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1348 for (m
=0; m
<nn
; m
++)
1350 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1363 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1368 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1369 * using compression.
1371 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1378 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1383 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1384 s
->session
->compress_meth
=0;
1386 s
->session
->compress_meth
=(comp
== NULL
)?0:comp
->id
;
1388 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
1389 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1390 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1391 if (ciphers
== NULL
)
1393 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED
);
1398 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1400 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
)
1402 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
1405 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
1411 s
->rwstate
=SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1414 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1416 c
=ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,s
->session
->ciphers
,
1417 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1421 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1425 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=c
;
1426 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1427 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1428 s
->session
->not_resumable
=s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
1429 ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) != 0));
1430 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
1431 /* do not send a session ticket */
1432 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
1436 /* Session-id reuse */
1437 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1438 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1439 SSL_CIPHER
*nc
=NULL
;
1440 SSL_CIPHER
*ec
=NULL
;
1442 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
1444 sk
=s
->session
->ciphers
;
1445 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++)
1447 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
,i
);
1448 if (c
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_eNULL
)
1450 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c
))
1454 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=nc
;
1455 else if (ec
!= NULL
)
1456 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=ec
;
1458 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1462 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1465 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
))
1467 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1471 /* we now have the following setup.
1473 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1474 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1475 * compression - basically ignored right now
1476 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1477 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1478 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1479 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1482 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1483 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
)
1485 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s
) <= 0)
1487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1492 if (ret
< 0) ret
=-ret
;
1496 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1499 if (ciphers
!= NULL
) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1500 return ret
< 0 ? -1 : ret
;
1503 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1506 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1511 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1513 buf
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1514 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1515 p
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1516 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, p
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0)
1519 /* Do the message type and length last */
1520 d
=p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1522 *(p
++)=s
->version
>>8;
1523 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
1526 memcpy(p
,s
->s3
->server_random
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1527 p
+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1529 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1530 * back in the server hello:
1531 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1532 * we send back the old session ID.
1533 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1534 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1535 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1536 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1538 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1539 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1540 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1541 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1544 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
1545 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1547 s
->session
->session_id_length
=0;
1549 sl
=s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1550 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
))
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1556 memcpy(p
,s
->session
->session_id
,sl
);
1559 /* put the cipher */
1560 i
=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,p
);
1563 /* put the compression method */
1564 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1567 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1570 *(p
++)=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1573 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0)
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1578 if ((p
= ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
, &al
)) == NULL
)
1580 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1587 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
, l
);
1588 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
;
1591 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1592 return ssl_do_write(s
);
1595 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1598 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
)
1600 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
, 0);
1601 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1604 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1605 return ssl_do_write(s
);
1608 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1614 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1621 EC_KEY
*ecdh
=NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1622 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1625 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1628 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1629 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1639 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1640 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
)
1642 type
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1647 r
[0]=r
[1]=r
[2]=r
[3]=NULL
;
1649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1650 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
)
1653 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1655 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1656 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1657 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1660 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1669 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1675 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
1679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1680 if (type
& SSL_kDHE
)
1682 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
)
1684 dhp
= ssl_get_auto_dh(s
);
1687 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1694 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1695 dhp
=s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1696 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1697 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1700 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1705 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
1707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1711 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
)
1713 else if ((dh
=DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
)
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1720 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1721 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1722 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
)))
1724 if(!DH_generate_key(dh
))
1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1733 dh
->pub_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1734 dh
->priv_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1735 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) ||
1736 (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
))
1738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1749 if (type
& SSL_kECDHE
)
1751 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1753 ecdhp
=cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1754 if (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_auto
)
1756 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1757 int nid
= tls1_shared_curve(s
, -2);
1758 if (nid
!= NID_undef
)
1759 ecdhp
= EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid
);
1761 else if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
)
1763 ecdhp
=s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1764 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1765 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1769 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1774 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
1776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1780 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1786 if (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_auto
)
1788 else if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp
)) == NULL
)
1790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1794 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
=ecdh
;
1795 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1796 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1797 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
))
1799 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
))
1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1806 if (((group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
)) == NULL
) ||
1807 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1808 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
))
1810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1814 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1815 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163))
1817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1821 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1822 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1823 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1826 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group
)))
1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1833 /* Encode the public key.
1834 * First check the size of encoding and
1835 * allocate memory accordingly.
1837 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1838 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1839 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1842 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1843 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
*sizeof(unsigned char));
1844 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1845 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
))
1847 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1852 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1853 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1854 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1855 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1857 if (encodedlen
== 0)
1859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1863 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
); bn_ctx
=NULL
;
1865 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1866 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1867 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1868 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1873 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1874 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1882 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1883 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1884 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1886 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1887 n
+=2+strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1890 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1892 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
)
1894 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
1895 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
1896 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) ||
1897 (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
))
1899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
1910 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1911 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1914 for (i
=0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1916 nr
[i
]=BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1917 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1918 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1925 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
1926 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
1928 if ((pkey
=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
,s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,&md
))
1931 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1934 kn
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1942 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,n
+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
)+kn
))
1944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1947 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1949 for (i
=0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1951 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1952 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1965 if (type
& SSL_kECDHE
)
1967 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1968 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1969 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1970 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1971 * the actual encoded point itself
1973 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1981 memcpy((unsigned char*)p
,
1982 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
,
1984 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1985 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1991 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1993 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1994 s2n(strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
), p
);
1995 strncpy((char *)p
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
, strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
));
1996 p
+=strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2003 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
2004 * and p points to the space at the end. */
2005 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2006 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
&& !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2010 for (num
=2; num
> 0; num
--)
2012 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
,
2013 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
2014 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
,(num
== 2)
2015 ?s
->ctx
->md5
:s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
2016 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2017 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2018 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,d
,n
);
2019 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
,q
,
2020 (unsigned int *)&i
);
2024 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
2025 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0)
2027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_RSA
);
2037 /* send signature algorithm */
2038 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2040 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
))
2042 /* Should never happen */
2043 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2044 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2050 fprintf(stderr
, "Using hash %s\n",
2053 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
);
2054 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2055 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2056 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,d
,n
);
2057 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
2058 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
2060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_EVP
);
2065 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2070 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2071 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
2077 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
);
2080 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
2081 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2082 return ssl_do_write(s
);
2084 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2086 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2087 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2088 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2090 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2094 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2096 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
2098 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
=NULL
;
2102 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
)
2106 d
=p
=ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2108 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2110 n
=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
,p
);
2115 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2117 const unsigned char *psigs
;
2118 nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &psigs
);
2120 memcpy(p
, psigs
, nl
);
2129 sk
=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2133 for (i
=0; i
<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++)
2135 name
=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
,i
);
2136 j
=i2d_X509_NAME(name
,NULL
);
2137 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
)+n
+j
+2))
2139 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
2142 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + n
;
2143 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
))
2146 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
2153 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
2154 j
-=2; s2n(j
,d
); j
+=2;
2160 /* else no CA names */
2161 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + off
;
2164 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, n
);
2166 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2167 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
))
2169 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ s
->init_num
;
2171 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
2179 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
2182 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2183 return ssl_do_write(s
);
2188 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2192 unsigned long alg_k
;
2194 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2196 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2200 DH
*dh_srvr
, *dh_clnt
= NULL
;
2202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2204 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2206 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2207 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
2208 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2209 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2210 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2213 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2214 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
2215 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
2216 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2220 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2221 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2223 alg_k
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2226 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
2228 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2229 int decrypt_len
, decrypt_good_mask
;
2230 unsigned char version_good
;
2232 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2233 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
)
2235 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
2236 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
2237 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2238 * be sent already */
2241 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
2249 pkey
=s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
2250 if ( (pkey
== NULL
) ||
2251 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) ||
2252 (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
))
2254 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2261 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2262 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
2267 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
))
2269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2279 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2280 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2281 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2282 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2283 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2284 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2286 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2287 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret
,
2288 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0)
2290 decrypt_len
= RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
,p
,p
,rsa
,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2293 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2294 * decrypt_good_mask will be zero if so and non-zero otherwise. */
2295 decrypt_good_mask
= decrypt_len
^ SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2297 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2298 * then version_good will be zero. The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa
2299 * extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2300 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2301 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2302 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2303 * decryption error. */
2304 version_good
= p
[0] ^ (s
->client_version
>>8);
2305 version_good
|= p
[1] ^ (s
->client_version
&0xff);
2307 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2308 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2309 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2310 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2311 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2312 * support the requested protocol version. If
2313 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2314 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
)
2316 unsigned char workaround_mask
= version_good
;
2317 unsigned char workaround
;
2319 /* workaround_mask will be 0xff if version_good is
2320 * non-zero (i.e. the version match failed). Otherwise
2322 workaround_mask
|= workaround_mask
>> 4;
2323 workaround_mask
|= workaround_mask
>> 2;
2324 workaround_mask
|= workaround_mask
>> 1;
2325 workaround_mask
= ~((workaround_mask
& 1) - 1);
2327 workaround
= p
[0] ^ (s
->version
>>8);
2328 workaround
|= p
[1] ^ (s
->version
&0xff);
2330 /* If workaround_mask is 0xff (i.e. there was a version
2331 * mismatch) then we copy the value of workaround over
2333 version_good
= (workaround
& workaround_mask
) |
2334 (version_good
& ~workaround_mask
);
2337 /* If any bits in version_good are set then they'll poision
2338 * decrypt_good_mask and cause rand_premaster_secret to be
2340 decrypt_good_mask
|= version_good
;
2342 /* decrypt_good_mask will be zero iff decrypt_len ==
2343 * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed. We
2344 * fold the bottom 32 bits of it with an OR so that the LSB
2345 * will be zero iff everything is good. This assumes that we'll
2346 * never decrypt a value > 2**31 bytes, which seems safe. */
2347 decrypt_good_mask
|= decrypt_good_mask
>> 16;
2348 decrypt_good_mask
|= decrypt_good_mask
>> 8;
2349 decrypt_good_mask
|= decrypt_good_mask
>> 4;
2350 decrypt_good_mask
|= decrypt_good_mask
>> 2;
2351 decrypt_good_mask
|= decrypt_good_mask
>> 1;
2352 /* Now select only the LSB and subtract one. If decrypt_len ==
2353 * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed then
2354 * decrypt_good_mask will be all ones. Otherwise it'll be all
2356 decrypt_good_mask
&= 1;
2357 decrypt_good_mask
--;
2359 /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
2360 * decrypt_good_mask. */
2361 for (i
= 0; i
< (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); i
++)
2363 p
[i
] = (p
[i
] & decrypt_good_mask
) |
2364 (rand_premaster_secret
[i
] & ~decrypt_good_mask
);
2367 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2368 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2369 s
->session
->master_key
,
2371 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2375 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2376 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
|SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
))
2379 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
2386 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
))
2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2397 if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
)
2398 idx
= SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA
;
2399 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
)
2400 idx
= SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA
;
2403 skey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
;
2404 if ((skey
== NULL
) ||
2405 (skey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_DH
) ||
2406 (skey
->pkey
.dh
== NULL
))
2408 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2412 dh_srvr
= skey
->pkey
.dh
;
2414 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
)
2416 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2421 dh_srvr
=s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
2425 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2426 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2429 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey
, skey
) == 1)
2430 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey
);
2432 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
)
2434 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2438 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey
);
2439 pub
= dh_clnt
->pub_key
;
2442 pub
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
);
2445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2449 i
=DH_compute_key(p
,pub
,dh_srvr
);
2453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2458 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
2465 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2466 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2467 s
->session
->master_key
,p
,i
);
2468 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2475 if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
2477 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2478 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
2479 krb5_data authenticator
;
2481 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2482 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2483 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2484 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2485 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2486 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
2488 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
2489 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
2491 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2493 if (!kssl_ctx
) kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
2496 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
2498 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ 6))
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2501 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2505 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
2506 p
+=enc_ticket
.length
;
2509 authenticator
.length
= i
;
2511 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+ 6))
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2514 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2518 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
2519 p
+=authenticator
.length
;
2523 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
2526 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2529 if(enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
)
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2532 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2536 if (n
!= (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
2537 enc_pms
.length
+ 6))
2539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2540 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2544 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
2548 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2549 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2551 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2552 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2558 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2559 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2561 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
2562 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0)
2565 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2566 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2568 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2569 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2575 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0)
2577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
2582 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
2583 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2585 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2589 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2591 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
,enc
,NULL
,kssl_ctx
->key
,iv
))
2593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2594 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2597 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
,&outl
,
2598 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
2600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2601 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2604 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2607 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2610 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
,&(pms
[outl
]),&padl
))
2612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2613 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2617 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2620 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2623 if (!((pms
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (pms
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2625 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2626 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2627 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2628 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2629 * the protocol version.
2630 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2631 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2633 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
))
2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2636 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2641 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2643 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2644 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2645 s
->session
->master_key
, pms
, outl
);
2647 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
)
2649 size_t len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
2650 if ( len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
)
2652 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
2653 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
,kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,len
);
2658 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2659 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2660 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2661 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2665 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2668 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
|SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2673 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
2674 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2676 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2677 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
)
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2680 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2684 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2685 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2687 /* use the certificate */
2688 tkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2692 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2693 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2695 tkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
;
2698 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2699 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2701 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh
, group
) ||
2702 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh
, priv_key
))
2704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2709 /* Let's get client's public key */
2710 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
)
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2713 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2719 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2721 if (alg_k
& SSL_kECDHE
)
2723 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2727 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2729 (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
))
2731 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2732 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2733 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2734 * never executed. When that support is
2735 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2736 * received in the certificate is
2737 * authorized for key agreement.
2738 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2739 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2742 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2744 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2748 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2749 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) == 0)
2751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2755 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2759 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2760 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2762 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2765 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2769 /* Get encoded point length */
2774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2778 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
,
2779 clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0)
2781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2785 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2786 * currently, so set it to the start
2788 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2791 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2792 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
);
2793 if (field_size
<= 0)
2795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2799 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
, NULL
);
2802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2807 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2808 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2809 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2810 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2811 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
2812 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
2814 /* Compute the master secret */
2815 s
->session
->master_key_length
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
-> \
2816 generate_master_secret(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, p
, i
);
2818 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2823 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2824 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)
2826 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2827 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
*2+4];
2828 unsigned int pre_ms_len
= 0, psk_len
= 0;
2830 char tmp_id
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1];
2832 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2838 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2841 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
)
2843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2844 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2847 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
)
2849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2850 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2854 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2855 * string for the callback */
2856 memcpy(tmp_id
, p
, i
);
2857 memset(tmp_id
+i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1-i
);
2858 psk_len
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, tmp_id
,
2859 psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2860 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id
, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1);
2862 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
)
2864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2865 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2868 else if (psk_len
== 0)
2870 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2871 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2872 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2873 al
=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2877 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2878 pre_ms_len
=2+psk_len
+2+psk_len
;
2880 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms
+psk_len
+4, psk_or_pre_ms
, psk_len
);
2882 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2886 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
2887 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2888 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup((char *)p
);
2889 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
)
2891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2892 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2896 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
2897 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2898 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2899 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
&&
2900 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2902 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2903 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2907 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2908 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2909 s
->session
->master_key
, psk_or_pre_ms
, pre_ms_len
);
2912 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2919 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
2927 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2931 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.A
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
)))
2933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2936 if (s
->session
->srp_username
!= NULL
)
2937 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2938 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2939 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
)
2941 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2942 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2946 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
= SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s
,s
->session
->master_key
))<0)
2948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2955 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2956 if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
)
2959 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2960 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2961 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32], *start
;
2962 size_t outlen
=32, inlen
;
2963 unsigned long alg_a
;
2965 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2966 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2967 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST94
)
2968 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST94
].privatekey
;
2969 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
)
2970 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2972 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
,NULL
);
2973 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2974 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2975 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2976 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2977 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2978 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2979 if (client_pub_pkey
)
2981 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2984 /* Decrypt session key */
2985 if ((*p
!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)))
2987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2995 else if (p
[1] < 0x80)
3002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3005 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
,premaster_secret
,&outlen
,start
,inlen
) <=0)
3008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3011 /* Generate master secret */
3012 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
3013 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
3014 s
->session
->master_key
,premaster_secret
,32);
3015 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3016 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
3021 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey
);
3022 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3030 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3031 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3032 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
3038 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3039 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
3042 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3043 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
3044 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
3045 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
3046 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
3047 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
3052 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
3054 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
3060 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
3062 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
3064 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3065 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
3066 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
3068 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
3071 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
3073 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
3075 peer
=s
->session
->peer
;
3076 pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
3077 type
=X509_certificate_type(peer
,pkey
);
3085 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
)
3087 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
3088 if ((peer
!= NULL
) && (type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
3090 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE
);
3100 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED
);
3101 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3105 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
3107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
3108 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
3112 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
3114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
3115 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3119 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3120 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3121 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3122 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3123 * signature without length field */
3124 if (n
==64 && (pkey
->type
==NID_id_GostR3410_94
||
3125 pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) )
3131 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
3133 int rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, p
, pkey
);
3136 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3141 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3145 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
3154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3155 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3159 j
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
3160 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0))
3162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
3163 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3167 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
3171 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3175 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3179 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3182 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3183 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
))
3185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3186 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3190 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx
, p
, i
, pkey
) <= 0)
3192 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
3198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3199 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
3201 i
=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
3202 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
3206 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
3212 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
3219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3220 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
3222 j
=DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3223 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3224 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
3228 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
3235 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3236 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
3238 j
=ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3239 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3240 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
3244 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3246 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3252 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
|| pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
)
3253 { unsigned char signature
[64];
3255 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
,NULL
);
3256 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx
);
3258 fprintf(stderr
,"GOST signature length is %d",i
);
3260 for (idx
=0;idx
<64;idx
++) {
3261 signature
[63-idx
]=p
[idx
];
3263 j
=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx
,signature
,64,s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,32);
3264 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3267 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3269 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3276 al
=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
3285 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3288 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
3290 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3291 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3292 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
3294 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3295 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3299 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3301 int i
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
3303 unsigned long l
,nc
,llen
,n
;
3304 const unsigned char *p
,*q
;
3306 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
=NULL
;
3308 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3315 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
3317 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
)
3319 if ( (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3320 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
3322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3323 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3326 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3327 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
3329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
3330 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3333 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
3337 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
)
3339 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
3343 p
=d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3345 if ((sk
=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
)
3347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3354 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3358 for (nc
=0; nc
<llen
; )
3361 if ((l
+nc
+3) > llen
)
3363 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3369 x
=d2i_X509(NULL
,&p
,l
);
3372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3377 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3381 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
,x
))
3383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3390 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0)
3392 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3393 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
3395 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3399 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3400 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3401 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
3403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3404 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3407 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3408 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
3410 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3416 i
=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
,sk
);
3419 al
=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
3425 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
3426 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3427 s
->session
->peer
=sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3428 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3430 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3431 * when we arrive here. */
3432 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3434 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
3435 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3441 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
3442 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
3443 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
=sk
;
3444 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3445 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3453 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3456 if (x
!= NULL
) X509_free(x
);
3457 if (sk
!= NULL
) sk_X509_pop_free(sk
,X509_free
);
3461 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3465 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
)
3467 cpk
=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
3470 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3471 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aKRB5
) ||
3472 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
))
3474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3479 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,cpk
))
3481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3484 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
3487 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3488 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3492 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3493 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL
*s
)
3495 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
)
3497 unsigned char *p
, *senc
, *macstart
;
3498 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3499 int len
, slen_full
, slen
;
3504 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3505 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3506 unsigned char key_name
[16];
3508 /* get session encoding length */
3509 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3510 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3513 if (slen_full
> 0xFF00)
3515 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3519 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
);
3521 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3523 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3529 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3531 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3532 if (slen
> slen_full
) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3538 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
);
3539 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3541 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3542 * follows handshake_header_length +
3543 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3544 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3545 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3546 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3548 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
3549 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+
3550 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
3552 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3553 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
3554 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
3555 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3556 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3559 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
)
3561 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, &ctx
,
3570 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv
, 16);
3571 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3572 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
);
3573 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
3574 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL
);
3575 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
3578 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3579 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3580 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3581 * as their sessions. */
3582 l2n(s
->hit
? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
, p
);
3584 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3586 /* Output key name */
3588 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
3591 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
));
3592 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3593 /* Encrypt session data */
3594 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
);
3596 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx
, p
, &len
);
3598 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3600 HMAC_Update(&hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
);
3601 HMAC_Final(&hctx
, p
, &hlen
);
3602 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3605 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3607 len
= p
- ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3608 ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
, len
);
3609 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3610 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + 4;
3612 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
;
3616 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3617 return ssl_do_write(s
);
3620 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3622 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
)
3625 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3626 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3627 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3630 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
))
3633 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3636 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
3637 /* message length */
3638 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
3640 *(p
++)= s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3641 /* length of OCSP response */
3642 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3643 /* actual response */
3644 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3645 /* number of bytes to write */
3646 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3647 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
;
3651 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3652 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3655 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3656 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3657 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3658 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3661 int proto_len
, padding_len
;
3663 const unsigned char *p
;
3665 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3666 * extension in their ClientHello */
3667 if (!s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
3669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION
);
3673 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3674 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
,
3675 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
,
3677 514, /* See the payload format below */
3683 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3684 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3685 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3686 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
3688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
3693 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3695 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3697 /* The payload looks like:
3699 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3700 * uint8 padding_len;
3701 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3704 if (proto_len
+ 2 > s
->init_num
)
3706 padding_len
= p
[proto_len
+ 1];
3707 if (proto_len
+ padding_len
+ 2 != s
->init_num
)
3710 s
->next_proto_negotiated
= OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len
);
3711 if (!s
->next_proto_negotiated
)
3713 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3716 memcpy(s
->next_proto_negotiated
, p
+ 1, proto_len
);
3717 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= proto_len
;
3723 int tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(SSL
*s
, int *skip
)
3726 if (s
->ctx
->srv_supp_data_records_count
)
3728 unsigned char *p
= NULL
;
3729 unsigned char *size_loc
= NULL
;
3730 srv_supp_data_record
*record
= NULL
;
3734 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ctx
->srv_supp_data_records_count
; i
++)
3736 const unsigned char *out
= NULL
;
3737 unsigned short outlen
= 0;
3739 record
= &s
->ctx
->srv_supp_data_records
[i
];
3741 /* NULL callback or -1 omits supp data entry */
3744 cb_retval
= record
->fn1(s
, record
->supp_data_type
,
3745 &out
, &outlen
, &al
, record
->arg
);
3746 if (cb_retval
== -1)
3747 continue; /* skip this supp data entry */
3750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
3753 if (outlen
== 0 || TLSEXT_MAXLEN_supplemental_data
< outlen
+ 4 + length
)
3755 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
3758 /* write supp data entry...
3759 * if first entry, write handshake message type
3760 * jump back to write length at end */
3763 /* 1 byte message type + 3 bytes for
3765 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s
->init_buf
, 4))
3767 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
3770 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3771 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA
;
3772 /* hold on to length field to update later */
3774 /* skip over handshake length field (3
3775 * bytes) and supp_data length field
3780 /* 2 byte supp data type + 2 byte length + outlen */
3781 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, outlen
+ 4))
3783 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
3786 s2n(record
->supp_data_type
, p
);
3788 memcpy(p
, out
, outlen
);
3789 /* update length to supp data type (2 bytes) +
3790 * supp data length (2 bytes) + supp data */
3791 length
+= (outlen
+ 4);
3796 /* write handshake length */
3797 l2n3(length
- 4, size_loc
);
3798 /* supp_data length */
3799 l2n3(length
- 7, size_loc
);
3800 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B
;
3801 s
->init_num
= length
;
3804 return ssl3_do_write(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
);
3808 /* no supp data message sent */
3814 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3818 int tls1_get_client_supplemental_data(SSL
*s
)
3824 const unsigned char *p
, *d
;
3825 unsigned short supp_data_entry_type
= 0;
3826 unsigned short supp_data_entry_len
= 0;
3827 unsigned long supp_data_len
= 0;
3830 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3831 SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A
,
3832 SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B
,
3833 SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA
,
3834 /* use default limit */
3835 TLSEXT_MAXLEN_supplemental_data
,
3838 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
3840 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3843 /* The message cannot be empty */
3846 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3847 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3850 n2l3(p
, supp_data_len
);
3851 while (p
<d
+supp_data_len
)
3853 n2s(p
, supp_data_entry_type
);
3854 n2s(p
, supp_data_entry_len
);
3855 /* if there is a callback for this supp data type, send it */
3856 for (i
=0; i
< s
->ctx
->srv_supp_data_records_count
; i
++)
3858 if (s
->ctx
->srv_supp_data_records
[i
].supp_data_type
== supp_data_entry_type
&& s
->ctx
->srv_supp_data_records
[i
].fn2
)
3860 cb_retval
= s
->ctx
->srv_supp_data_records
[i
].fn2(s
, supp_data_entry_type
, p
, supp_data_entry_len
, &al
, s
->ctx
->srv_supp_data_records
[i
].arg
);
3863 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA
, ERR_R_SSL_LIB
);
3868 p
+=supp_data_entry_len
;
3872 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);