]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/openssl.git/blob - ssl/s3_srvr.c
projects / thirdparty / openssl.git / blob
? search:


41a5ba550361945c7900eb54de0c97fd4f938451
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / s3_srvr.c
1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153
154 #include <stdio.h>
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #endif
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
169 #endif
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
171
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
173
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
175 {
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
178 else
179 return(NULL);
180 }
181
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
184 {
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
186
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
188
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
191 {
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
193 {
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
196 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
198 }
199 else
200 {
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
202 }
203 }
204 return ret;
205 }
206 #endif
207
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
209 ssl3_accept,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
212
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
214 {
215 BUF_MEM *buf;
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
218 int ret= -1;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
220
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
222 ERR_clear_error();
223 clear_sys_error();
224
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
226 cb=s->info_callback;
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
229
230 /* init things to blank */
231 s->in_handshake++;
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
233
234 if (s->cert == NULL)
235 {
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
237 return(-1);
238 }
239
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
244 */
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
246 {
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
248 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
249 }
250 #endif
251
252 for (;;)
253 {
254 state=s->state;
255
256 switch (s->state)
257 {
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
259 s->renegotiate=1;
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
261
262 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
263 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
266
267 s->server=1;
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
269
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
271 {
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
273 return -1;
274 }
275 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
276
277 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
278 {
279 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
280 {
281 ret= -1;
282 goto end;
283 }
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
285 {
286 ret= -1;
287 goto end;
288 }
289 s->init_buf=buf;
290 }
291
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
293 {
294 ret= -1;
295 goto end;
296 }
297
298 s->init_num=0;
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
300 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
301
302 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
303 {
304 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
305 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
306 */
307 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
308
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
310 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
311 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
312 }
313 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
314 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
315 {
316 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
317 * client that doesn't support secure
318 * renegotiation.
319 */
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
322 ret = -1;
323 goto end;
324 }
325 else
326 {
327 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
328 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
329 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
331 }
332 break;
333
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
336
337 s->shutdown=0;
338 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
339 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
340 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
341 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
342 s->init_num=0;
343
344 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
345 break;
346
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
348 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
349 break;
350
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
354
355 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
356 {
357 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
358 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
359 }
360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
361 {
362 int al;
363 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
364 {
365 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
366 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
367 goto end;
368 }
369 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
370 {
371 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
372 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
373 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
374 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
376 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
377 ret= -1;
378 goto end;
379 }
380 }
381 #endif
382
383 s->renegotiate = 2;
384 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
385 s->init_num=0;
386 break;
387
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
390 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
391 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
393 if (s->hit)
394 {
395 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
397 else
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
399 }
400 #else
401 if (s->hit)
402 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
403 #endif
404 else
405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
407 #else
408 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
409 #endif
410 s->init_num = 0;
411 break;
412
413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
416 ret = tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(s, &skip);
417 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
418
419 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
420 s->init_num = 0;
421 break;
422 #endif
423
424 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
425 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
426 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
427 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
428 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
429 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
430 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
431 {
432 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
433 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
435 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
436 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
437 else
438 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
439 }
440 else
441 {
442 skip = 1;
443 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
444 }
445 #else
446 }
447 else
448 skip=1;
449
450 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
451 #endif
452 s->init_num=0;
453 break;
454
455 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
456 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
457 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
458
459 /* clear this, it may get reset by
460 * send_server_key_exchange */
461 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
463 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
464 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
465 )
466 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
467 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
468 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
469 * be able to handle this) */
470 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
471 else
472 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
473
474
475 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
476 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
477 *
478 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
479 *
480 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
481 * message only if the cipher suite is either
482 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
483 * server certificate contains the server's
484 * public key for key exchange.
485 */
486 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
487 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
488 * hint if provided */
489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
490 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
491 #endif
492 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
493 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
494 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
495 #endif
496 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
497 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
498 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
499 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
500 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
501 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
502 )
503 )
504 )
505 )
506 {
507 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
508 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
509 }
510 else
511 skip=1;
512
513 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
514 s->init_num=0;
515 break;
516
517 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
518 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
519 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
520 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
521 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
522 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
523 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
524 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
525 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
526 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
527 * and in RFC 2246): */
528 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
529 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
530 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
531 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
532 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
533 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
534 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
535 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
536 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
537 {
538 /* no cert request */
539 skip=1;
540 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
541 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
542 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
543 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
544 return -1;
545 }
546 else
547 {
548 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
549 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
550 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
551 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
552 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
553 #else
554 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
555 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
556 #endif
557 s->init_num=0;
558 }
559 break;
560
561 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
562 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
563 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
564 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
565 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
566 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
567 s->init_num=0;
568 break;
569
570 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
571
572 /* This code originally checked to see if
573 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
574 * and then flushed. This caused problems
575 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
576 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
577 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
578 * still exist. So instead we just flush
579 * unconditionally.
580 */
581
582 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
583 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
584 {
585 ret= -1;
586 goto end;
587 }
588 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
589
590 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
591 break;
592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
593 case SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
594 case SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
595 ret=tls1_get_client_supplemental_data(s);
596 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
597 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
598 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
599 s->init_num=0;
600 break;
601 #endif
602 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
603 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
604 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
605 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
606 if (ret <= 0)
607 goto end;
608 if (ret == 2)
609 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
611 else if (ret == 3)
612 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
613 #endif
614 else {
615 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
616 {
617 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
618 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
619 }
620 s->init_num=0;
621 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
622 }
623 break;
624
625 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
626 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
627 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
628 if (ret <= 0)
629 goto end;
630 if (ret == 2)
631 {
632 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
633 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
634 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
635 * message is not sent.
636 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
637 * the client uses its key from the certificate
638 * for key exchange.
639 */
640 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
641 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
642 #else
643 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
644 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
645 else
646 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
647 #endif
648 s->init_num = 0;
649 }
650 else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
651 {
652 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
653 s->init_num=0;
654 if (!s->session->peer)
655 break;
656 /* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
657 * at this point and digest cached records.
658 */
659 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
660 {
661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
662 return -1;
663 }
664 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
665 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
666 return -1;
667 }
668 else
669 {
670 int offset=0;
671 int dgst_num;
672
673 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
674 s->init_num=0;
675
676 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
677 * a client cert, it can be verified
678 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
679 * should be generalized. But it is next step
680 */
681 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
682 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
683 return -1;
684 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
685 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
686 {
687 int dgst_size;
688
689 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
690 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
691 if (dgst_size < 0)
692 {
693 ret = -1;
694 goto end;
695 }
696 offset+=dgst_size;
697 }
698 }
699 break;
700
701 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
702 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
703
704 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
705 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
706 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
707
708 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
709 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
710 #else
711 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
712 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
713 else
714 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
715 #endif
716 s->init_num=0;
717 break;
718
719 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
720 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
721 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
722 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
723 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
724 s->init_num = 0;
725 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
726 break;
727 #endif
728
729 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
730 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
731 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
732 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
733 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
734 if (s->hit)
735 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
737 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
738 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
739 #endif
740 else
741 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
742 s->init_num=0;
743 break;
744
745 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
746 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
747 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
748 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
749 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
750 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
751 s->init_num=0;
752 break;
753
754 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
755 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
756 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
757 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
758 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
759 s->init_num=0;
760 break;
761
762 #endif
763
764 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
765 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
766
767 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
768 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
769 { ret= -1; goto end; }
770
771 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
772 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
773
774 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
775 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
776 s->init_num=0;
777
778 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
779 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
780 {
781 ret= -1;
782 goto end;
783 }
784
785 break;
786
787 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
788 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
789 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
790 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
791 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
792 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
793 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
794 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
795 if (s->hit)
796 {
797 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
798 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
799 #else
800 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
801 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
802 else
803 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
804 #endif
805 }
806 else
807 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
808 s->init_num=0;
809 break;
810
811 case SSL_ST_OK:
812 /* clean a few things up */
813 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
814
815 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
816 s->init_buf=NULL;
817
818 /* remove buffering on output */
819 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
820
821 s->init_num=0;
822
823 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
824 {
825 s->renegotiate=0;
826 s->new_session=0;
827
828 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
829
830 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
831 /* s->server=1; */
832 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
833
834 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
835 }
836
837 ret = 1;
838 goto end;
839 /* break; */
840
841 default:
842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
843 ret= -1;
844 goto end;
845 /* break; */
846 }
847
848 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
849 {
850 if (s->debug)
851 {
852 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
853 goto end;
854 }
855
856
857 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
858 {
859 new_state=s->state;
860 s->state=state;
861 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
862 s->state=new_state;
863 }
864 }
865 skip=0;
866 }
867 end:
868 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
869
870 s->in_handshake--;
871 if (cb != NULL)
872 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
873 return(ret);
874 }
875
876 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
877 {
878
879 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
880 {
881 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
882 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
883 }
884
885 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
886 return ssl_do_write(s);
887 }
888
889 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
890 {
891 int ok;
892 long n;
893
894 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
895 * so permit appropriate message length */
896 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
897 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
898 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
899 -1,
900 s->max_cert_list,
901 &ok);
902 if (!ok) return((int)n);
903 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
905 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA)
906 return 3;
907 #endif
908 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
909 {
910 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
911 * negotiation. */
912 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
913 {
914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
915 return -1;
916 }
917 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
918 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
920 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
921 {
922 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
923 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
924 }
925 #endif
926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
927 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
928 {
929 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
930 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
931 }
932 #endif
933 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
934 return 2;
935 }
936 return 1;
937 }
938
939 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
940 {
941 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
942 unsigned int cookie_len;
943 long n;
944 unsigned long id;
945 unsigned char *p,*d;
946 SSL_CIPHER *c;
947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
948 unsigned char *q;
949 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
950 #endif
951 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
952
953 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
954 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
955 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
956 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
957 * TLSv1.
958 */
959 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
960 )
961 {
962 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
963 }
964 s->first_packet=1;
965 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
966 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
967 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
968 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
969 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
970 &ok);
971
972 if (!ok) return((int)n);
973 s->first_packet=0;
974 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
975
976 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
977 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
978 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
979 p+=2;
980
981 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
982 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
983 : (s->client_version < s->version))
984 {
985 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
986 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
987 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
988 {
989 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
990 s->version = s->client_version;
991 }
992 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
993 goto f_err;
994 }
995
996 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
997 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
998 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
999 */
1000 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
1001 {
1002 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
1003
1004 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1005 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
1006
1007 if (cookie_length == 0)
1008 return 1;
1009 }
1010
1011 /* load the client random */
1012 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1013 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1014
1015 /* get the session-id */
1016 j= *(p++);
1017
1018 s->hit=0;
1019 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1020 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1021 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1022 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1023 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1024 *
1025 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1026 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1027 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1028 * setting will be ignored.
1029 */
1030 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1031 {
1032 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1033 goto err;
1034 }
1035 else
1036 {
1037 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1038 if (i == 1)
1039 { /* previous session */
1040 s->hit=1;
1041 }
1042 else if (i == -1)
1043 goto err;
1044 else /* i == 0 */
1045 {
1046 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1047 goto err;
1048 }
1049 }
1050
1051 p+=j;
1052
1053 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1054 {
1055 /* cookie stuff */
1056 cookie_len = *(p++);
1057
1058 /*
1059 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1060 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1061 * does not cause an overflow.
1062 */
1063 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1064 {
1065 /* too much data */
1066 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1068 goto f_err;
1069 }
1070
1071 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1072 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1073 cookie_len > 0)
1074 {
1075 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1076
1077 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1078 {
1079 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1080 cookie_len) == 0)
1081 {
1082 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1084 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1085 goto f_err;
1086 }
1087 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1088 }
1089 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1090 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1091 {
1092 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1094 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1095 goto f_err;
1096 }
1097 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1098 ret = -2;
1099 }
1100
1101 p += cookie_len;
1102 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1103 {
1104 /* Select version to use */
1105 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1106 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1107 {
1108 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1109 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1110 }
1111 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1112 {
1113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1114 s->version = s->client_version;
1115 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1116 goto f_err;
1117 }
1118 else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1119 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1120 {
1121 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1122 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1123 }
1124 else
1125 {
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1127 s->version = s->client_version;
1128 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1129 goto f_err;
1130 }
1131 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1132 }
1133 }
1134
1135 n2s(p,i);
1136 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1137 {
1138 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1139 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1141 goto f_err;
1142 }
1143 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
1144 {
1145 /* not enough data */
1146 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1148 goto f_err;
1149 }
1150 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1151 == NULL))
1152 {
1153 goto err;
1154 }
1155 p+=i;
1156
1157 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1158 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1159 {
1160 j=0;
1161 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1162
1163 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1164 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1165 #endif
1166 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1167 {
1168 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1169 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1170 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1171 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1172 #endif
1173 if (c->id == id)
1174 {
1175 j=1;
1176 break;
1177 }
1178 }
1179 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1180 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1181 */
1182 #if 0
1183 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1184 {
1185 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1186 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1187 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1188 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1189 * enabled, though. */
1190 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1191 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1192 {
1193 s->session->cipher = c;
1194 j = 1;
1195 }
1196 }
1197 #endif
1198 if (j == 0)
1199 {
1200 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1201 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1202 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1204 goto f_err;
1205 }
1206 }
1207
1208 /* compression */
1209 i= *(p++);
1210 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
1211 {
1212 /* not enough data */
1213 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1215 goto f_err;
1216 }
1217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1218 q=p;
1219 #endif
1220 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
1221 {
1222 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1223 }
1224
1225 p+=i;
1226 if (j >= i)
1227 {
1228 /* no compress */
1229 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1231 goto f_err;
1232 }
1233
1234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1235 /* TLS extensions*/
1236 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1237 {
1238 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1239 {
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1241 goto err;
1242 }
1243 }
1244
1245 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1246 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1247 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1248 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1249 {
1250 unsigned char *pos;
1251 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1252 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1253 {
1254 goto f_err;
1255 }
1256 }
1257
1258 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1259 {
1260 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1261
1262 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1263 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1264 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1265 {
1266 s->hit=1;
1267 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1268 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1269
1270 ciphers=NULL;
1271
1272 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1273 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1274 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1275 {
1276 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1278 goto f_err;
1279 }
1280
1281 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1282
1283 if (s->cipher_list)
1284 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1285
1286 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1287 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1288
1289 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1290 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1291 }
1292 }
1293 #endif
1294
1295 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1296 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1297 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1298 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1300 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1301 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1302 {
1303 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1304 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1305 /* Can't disable compression */
1306 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1307 {
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1309 goto f_err;
1310 }
1311 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1312 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1313 {
1314 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1315 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1316 {
1317 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1318 break;
1319 }
1320 }
1321 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1322 {
1323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1324 goto f_err;
1325 }
1326 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1327 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1328 {
1329 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1330 break;
1331 }
1332 if (m >= i)
1333 {
1334 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1336 goto f_err;
1337 }
1338 }
1339 else if (s->hit)
1340 comp = NULL;
1341 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1342 { /* See if we have a match */
1343 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1344
1345 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1346 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1347 {
1348 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1349 v=comp->id;
1350 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
1351 {
1352 if (v == q[o])
1353 {
1354 done=1;
1355 break;
1356 }
1357 }
1358 if (done) break;
1359 }
1360 if (done)
1361 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1362 else
1363 comp=NULL;
1364 }
1365 #else
1366 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1367 * using compression.
1368 */
1369 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1370 {
1371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1372 goto f_err;
1373 }
1374 #endif
1375
1376 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1377 * pick a cipher */
1378
1379 if (!s->hit)
1380 {
1381 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1382 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1383 #else
1384 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1385 #endif
1386 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1387 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1388 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1389 if (ciphers == NULL)
1390 {
1391 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1393 goto f_err;
1394 }
1395 ciphers=NULL;
1396 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1397 if (s->cert->cert_cb
1398 && s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg) <= 0)
1399 {
1400 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1402 goto f_err;
1403 }
1404 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1405 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1406
1407 if (c == NULL)
1408 {
1409 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1411 goto f_err;
1412 }
1413 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1414 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1415 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1416 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1417 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)) != 0));
1418 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1419 /* do not send a session ticket */
1420 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1421 }
1422 else
1423 {
1424 /* Session-id reuse */
1425 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1426 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1427 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1428 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1429
1430 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1431 {
1432 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1433 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1434 {
1435 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1436 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1437 nc=c;
1438 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1439 ec=c;
1440 }
1441 if (nc != NULL)
1442 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1443 else if (ec != NULL)
1444 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1445 else
1446 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1447 }
1448 else
1449 #endif
1450 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1451 }
1452
1453 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1454 {
1455 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1456 goto f_err;
1457 }
1458
1459 /* we now have the following setup.
1460 * client_random
1461 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1462 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1463 * compression - basically ignored right now
1464 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1465 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1466 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1467 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1468 */
1469
1470 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1471 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1472 {
1473 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1474 {
1475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1476 goto err;
1477 }
1478 }
1479
1480 if (ret < 0) ret=-ret;
1481 if (0)
1482 {
1483 f_err:
1484 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1485 }
1486 err:
1487 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1488 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1489 }
1490
1491 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1492 {
1493 unsigned char *buf;
1494 unsigned char *p,*d;
1495 int i,sl;
1496 unsigned long l;
1497
1498 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1499 {
1500 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1501 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1502 p=s->s3->server_random;
1503 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1504 return -1;
1505 #endif
1506 /* Do the message type and length last */
1507 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1508
1509 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1510 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1511
1512 /* Random stuff */
1513 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1514 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1515
1516 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1517 * back in the server hello:
1518 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1519 * we send back the old session ID.
1520 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1521 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1522 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1523 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1524 * session ID.
1525 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1526 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1527 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1528 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1529 * to send back.
1530 */
1531 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1532 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1533 && !s->hit))
1534 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1535
1536 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1537 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1538 {
1539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1540 return -1;
1541 }
1542 *(p++)=sl;
1543 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1544 p+=sl;
1545
1546 /* put the cipher */
1547 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1548 p+=i;
1549
1550 /* put the compression method */
1551 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1552 *(p++)=0;
1553 #else
1554 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1555 *(p++)=0;
1556 else
1557 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1558 #endif
1559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1560 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1561 {
1562 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1563 return -1;
1564 }
1565 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1566 {
1567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1568 return -1;
1569 }
1570 #endif
1571 /* do the header */
1572 l=(p-d);
1573 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1574 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1575 }
1576
1577 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1578 return ssl_do_write(s);
1579 }
1580
1581 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1582 {
1583
1584 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1585 {
1586 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1587 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1588 }
1589
1590 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1591 return ssl_do_write(s);
1592 }
1593
1594 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1595 {
1596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1597 unsigned char *q;
1598 int j,num;
1599 RSA *rsa;
1600 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1601 unsigned int u;
1602 #endif
1603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1604 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1605 #endif
1606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1607 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1608 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1609 int encodedlen = 0;
1610 int curve_id = 0;
1611 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1612 #endif
1613 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1614 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1615 unsigned char *p,*d;
1616 int al,i;
1617 unsigned long type;
1618 int n;
1619 CERT *cert;
1620 BIGNUM *r[4];
1621 int nr[4],kn;
1622 BUF_MEM *buf;
1623 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1624
1625 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1626 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1627 {
1628 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1629 cert=s->cert;
1630
1631 buf=s->init_buf;
1632
1633 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1634 n=0;
1635 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1636 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1637 {
1638 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1639 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1640 {
1641 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1642 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1643 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1644 if(rsa == NULL)
1645 {
1646 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1648 goto f_err;
1649 }
1650 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1651 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1652 }
1653 if (rsa == NULL)
1654 {
1655 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1657 goto f_err;
1658 }
1659 r[0]=rsa->n;
1660 r[1]=rsa->e;
1661 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1662 }
1663 else
1664 #endif
1665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1666 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1667 {
1668 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1669 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1670 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1671 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1672 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1673 if (dhp == NULL)
1674 {
1675 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1677 goto f_err;
1678 }
1679
1680 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1681 {
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1683 goto err;
1684 }
1685
1686 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1687 {
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1689 goto err;
1690 }
1691
1692 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1693 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1694 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1695 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1696 {
1697 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1698 {
1699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1700 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1701 goto err;
1702 }
1703 }
1704 else
1705 {
1706 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1707 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1708 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1709 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1710 {
1711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1712 goto err;
1713 }
1714 }
1715 r[0]=dh->p;
1716 r[1]=dh->g;
1717 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1718 }
1719 else
1720 #endif
1721 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1722 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1723 {
1724 const EC_GROUP *group;
1725
1726 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1727 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1728 {
1729 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1730 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1731 if (nid != NID_undef)
1732 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1733 }
1734 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1735 {
1736 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1737 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1738 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1739 }
1740 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1741 {
1742 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1744 goto f_err;
1745 }
1746
1747 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1748 {
1749 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1750 goto err;
1751 }
1752
1753 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1754 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1755 {
1756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1757 goto err;
1758 }
1759 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1760 ecdh = ecdhp;
1761 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1762 {
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1764 goto err;
1765 }
1766
1767 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1768 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1769 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1770 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1771 {
1772 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1773 {
1774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1775 goto err;
1776 }
1777 }
1778
1779 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1780 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1781 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1782 {
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1784 goto err;
1785 }
1786
1787 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1788 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1789 {
1790 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1791 goto err;
1792 }
1793
1794 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1795 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1796 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1797 */
1798 if ((curve_id =
1799 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1800 == 0)
1801 {
1802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1803 goto err;
1804 }
1805
1806 /* Encode the public key.
1807 * First check the size of encoding and
1808 * allocate memory accordingly.
1809 */
1810 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1811 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1812 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1813 NULL, 0, NULL);
1814
1815 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1816 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1817 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1818 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1819 {
1820 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1821 goto err;
1822 }
1823
1824
1825 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1826 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1827 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1828 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1829
1830 if (encodedlen == 0)
1831 {
1832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1833 goto err;
1834 }
1835
1836 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1837
1838 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1839 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1840 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1841 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1842 * structure.
1843 */
1844 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1845
1846 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1847 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1848 */
1849 r[0]=NULL;
1850 r[1]=NULL;
1851 r[2]=NULL;
1852 r[3]=NULL;
1853 }
1854 else
1855 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1857 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1858 {
1859 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1860 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1861 }
1862 else
1863 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1865 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1866 {
1867 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1868 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1869 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1870 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1871 {
1872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1873 goto err;
1874 }
1875 r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;
1876 r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;
1877 r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;
1878 r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;
1879 }
1880 else
1881 #endif
1882 {
1883 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1884 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1885 goto f_err;
1886 }
1887 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1888 {
1889 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1891 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1892 n+=1+nr[i];
1893 else
1894 #endif
1895 n+=2+nr[i];
1896 }
1897
1898 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1899 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1900 {
1901 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1902 == NULL)
1903 {
1904 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1905 goto f_err;
1906 }
1907 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1908 }
1909 else
1910 {
1911 pkey=NULL;
1912 kn=0;
1913 }
1914
1915 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1916 {
1917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1918 goto err;
1919 }
1920 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1921
1922 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1923 {
1924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1925 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1926 {
1927 *p = nr[i];
1928 p++;
1929 }
1930 else
1931 #endif
1932 s2n(nr[i],p);
1933 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1934 p+=nr[i];
1935 }
1936
1937 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1938 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1939 {
1940 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1941 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1942 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1943 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1944 * the actual encoded point itself
1945 */
1946 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1947 p += 1;
1948 *p = 0;
1949 p += 1;
1950 *p = curve_id;
1951 p += 1;
1952 *p = encodedlen;
1953 p += 1;
1954 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1955 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1956 encodedlen);
1957 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1958 encodedPoint = NULL;
1959 p += encodedlen;
1960 }
1961 #endif
1962
1963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1964 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1965 {
1966 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1967 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1968 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1969 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1970 }
1971 #endif
1972
1973 /* not anonymous */
1974 if (pkey != NULL)
1975 {
1976 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1977 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1978 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1979 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1980 {
1981 q=md_buf;
1982 j=0;
1983 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1984 {
1985 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1986 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1987 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1988 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1989 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1990 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1991 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
1992 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1993 (unsigned int *)&i);
1994 q+=i;
1995 j+=i;
1996 }
1997 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1998 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1999 {
2000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
2001 goto err;
2002 }
2003 s2n(u,p);
2004 n+=u+2;
2005 }
2006 else
2007 #endif
2008 if (md)
2009 {
2010 /* send signature algorithm */
2011 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2012 {
2013 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
2014 {
2015 /* Should never happen */
2016 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2018 goto f_err;
2019 }
2020 p+=2;
2021 }
2022 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
2023 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
2024 EVP_MD_name(md));
2025 #endif
2026 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2027 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2028 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2029 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
2030 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
2031 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
2032 {
2033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2034 goto err;
2035 }
2036 s2n(i,p);
2037 n+=i+2;
2038 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2039 n+= 2;
2040 }
2041 else
2042 {
2043 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2044 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2046 goto f_err;
2047 }
2048 }
2049
2050 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2051 }
2052
2053 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2054 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2055 return ssl_do_write(s);
2056 f_err:
2057 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2058 err:
2059 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2060 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2061 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2062 #endif
2063 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2064 return(-1);
2065 }
2066
2067 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2068 {
2069 unsigned char *p,*d;
2070 int i,j,nl,off,n;
2071 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2072 X509_NAME *name;
2073 BUF_MEM *buf;
2074
2075 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2076 {
2077 buf=s->init_buf;
2078
2079 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2080
2081 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2082 p++;
2083 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2084 d[0]=n;
2085 p+=n;
2086 n++;
2087
2088 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2089 {
2090 const unsigned char *psigs;
2091 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2092 s2n(nl, p);
2093 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2094 p += nl;
2095 n += nl + 2;
2096 }
2097
2098 off=n;
2099 p+=2;
2100 n+=2;
2101
2102 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2103 nl=0;
2104 if (sk != NULL)
2105 {
2106 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2107 {
2108 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2109 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2110 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
2111 {
2112 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2113 goto err;
2114 }
2115 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2116 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2117 {
2118 s2n(j,p);
2119 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2120 n+=2+j;
2121 nl+=2+j;
2122 }
2123 else
2124 {
2125 d=p;
2126 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2127 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2128 n+=j;
2129 nl+=j;
2130 }
2131 }
2132 }
2133 /* else no CA names */
2134 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2135 s2n(nl,p);
2136
2137 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2138
2139 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2140 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2141 {
2142 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2143 /* do the header */
2144 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2145 *(p++)=0;
2146 *(p++)=0;
2147 *(p++)=0;
2148 s->init_num += 4;
2149 }
2150 #endif
2151
2152 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2153 }
2154
2155 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2156 return ssl_do_write(s);
2157 err:
2158 return(-1);
2159 }
2160
2161 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2162 {
2163 int i,al,ok;
2164 long n;
2165 unsigned long alg_k;
2166 unsigned char *p;
2167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2168 RSA *rsa=NULL;
2169 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2170 #endif
2171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2172 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
2173 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2174 #endif
2175 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2176 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
2177 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2178
2179 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2180 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2181 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2182 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2183 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2184 #endif
2185
2186 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2187 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2188 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2189 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2190 2048, /* ??? */
2191 &ok);
2192
2193 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2194 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2195
2196 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2197
2198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2199 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2200 {
2201 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2202 int decrypt_len, decrypt_good_mask;
2203 unsigned char version_good;
2204
2205 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2206 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2207 {
2208 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2209 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2210 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2211 * be sent already */
2212 if (rsa == NULL)
2213 {
2214 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2216 goto f_err;
2217
2218 }
2219 }
2220 else
2221 {
2222 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2223 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2224 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2225 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2226 {
2227 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2229 goto f_err;
2230 }
2231 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
2232 }
2233
2234 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2235 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2236 {
2237 n2s(p,i);
2238 if (n != i+2)
2239 {
2240 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2241 {
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2243 goto err;
2244 }
2245 else
2246 p-=2;
2247 }
2248 else
2249 n=i;
2250 }
2251
2252 /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because
2253 * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see
2254 * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of
2255 * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the
2256 * case that the decrypt fails. See
2257 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */
2258
2259 /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */
2260 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2261 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2262 goto err;
2263 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2264 ERR_clear_error();
2265
2266 /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH.
2267 * decrypt_good_mask will be zero if so and non-zero otherwise. */
2268 decrypt_good_mask = decrypt_len ^ SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2269
2270 /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct
2271 * then version_good will be zero. The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa
2272 * extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2273 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2274 * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks
2275 * are done in constant time and are treated like any other
2276 * decryption error. */
2277 version_good = p[0] ^ (s->client_version>>8);
2278 version_good |= p[1] ^ (s->client_version&0xff);
2279
2280 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as
2281 * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks
2282 * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for
2283 * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the
2284 * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not
2285 * support the requested protocol version. If
2286 * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2287 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)
2288 {
2289 unsigned char workaround_mask = version_good;
2290 unsigned char workaround;
2291
2292 /* workaround_mask will be 0xff if version_good is
2293 * non-zero (i.e. the version match failed). Otherwise
2294 * it'll be 0x00. */
2295 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 4;
2296 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 2;
2297 workaround_mask |= workaround_mask >> 1;
2298 workaround_mask = ~((workaround_mask & 1) - 1);
2299
2300 workaround = p[0] ^ (s->version>>8);
2301 workaround |= p[1] ^ (s->version&0xff);
2302
2303 /* If workaround_mask is 0xff (i.e. there was a version
2304 * mismatch) then we copy the value of workaround over
2305 * version_good. */
2306 version_good = (workaround & workaround_mask) |
2307 (version_good & ~workaround_mask);
2308 }
2309
2310 /* If any bits in version_good are set then they'll poision
2311 * decrypt_good_mask and cause rand_premaster_secret to be
2312 * used. */
2313 decrypt_good_mask |= version_good;
2314
2315 /* decrypt_good_mask will be zero iff decrypt_len ==
2316 * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed. We
2317 * fold the bottom 32 bits of it with an OR so that the LSB
2318 * will be zero iff everything is good. This assumes that we'll
2319 * never decrypt a value > 2**31 bytes, which seems safe. */
2320 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 16;
2321 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 8;
2322 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 4;
2323 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 2;
2324 decrypt_good_mask |= decrypt_good_mask >> 1;
2325 /* Now select only the LSB and subtract one. If decrypt_len ==
2326 * SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH and the version check passed then
2327 * decrypt_good_mask will be all ones. Otherwise it'll be all
2328 * zeros. */
2329 decrypt_good_mask &= 1;
2330 decrypt_good_mask--;
2331
2332 /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using
2333 * decrypt_good_mask. */
2334 for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++)
2335 {
2336 p[i] = (p[i] & decrypt_good_mask) |
2337 (rand_premaster_secret[i] & ~decrypt_good_mask);
2338 }
2339
2340 s->session->master_key_length=
2341 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2342 s->session->master_key,
2343 p,i);
2344 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2345 }
2346 else
2347 #endif
2348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2349 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2350 {
2351 int idx = -1;
2352 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2353 if (n)
2354 n2s(p,i);
2355 else
2356 i = 0;
2357 if (n && n != i+2)
2358 {
2359 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2360 {
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2362 goto err;
2363 }
2364 else
2365 {
2366 p-=2;
2367 i=(int)n;
2368 }
2369 }
2370 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2371 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2372 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2373 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2374 if (idx >= 0)
2375 {
2376 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2377 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2378 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2379 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2380 {
2381 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2383 goto f_err;
2384 }
2385 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2386 }
2387 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2388 {
2389 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2391 goto f_err;
2392 }
2393 else
2394 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2395
2396 if (n == 0L)
2397 {
2398 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2399 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2400 if (clkey)
2401 {
2402 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2403 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2404 }
2405 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2406 {
2407 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2409 goto f_err;
2410 }
2411 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2412 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2413 }
2414 else
2415 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2416 if (pub == NULL)
2417 {
2418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2419 goto err;
2420 }
2421
2422 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2423
2424 if (i <= 0)
2425 {
2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2427 BN_clear_free(pub);
2428 goto err;
2429 }
2430
2431 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2432 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
2433 if (dh_clnt)
2434 DH_free(dh_clnt);
2435 else
2436 BN_clear_free(pub);
2437 pub=NULL;
2438 s->session->master_key_length=
2439 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2440 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2441 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2442 if (dh_clnt)
2443 return 2;
2444 }
2445 else
2446 #endif
2447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2448 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2449 {
2450 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2451 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2452 krb5_data authenticator;
2453 krb5_data enc_pms;
2454 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2455 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2456 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2457 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2458 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2459 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2460 int padl, outl;
2461 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2462 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2463
2464 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2465
2466 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2467
2468 n2s(p,i);
2469 enc_ticket.length = i;
2470
2471 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2472 {
2473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2474 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2475 goto err;
2476 }
2477
2478 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2479 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2480
2481 n2s(p,i);
2482 authenticator.length = i;
2483
2484 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2485 {
2486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2487 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2488 goto err;
2489 }
2490
2491 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2492 p+=authenticator.length;
2493
2494 n2s(p,i);
2495 enc_pms.length = i;
2496 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2497 p+=enc_pms.length;
2498
2499 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2500 ** after decryption
2501 */
2502 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2503 {
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2505 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2506 goto err;
2507 }
2508
2509 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2510 enc_pms.length + 6))
2511 {
2512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2513 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2514 goto err;
2515 }
2516
2517 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2518 &kssl_err)) != 0)
2519 {
2520 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2521 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2522 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2523 if (kssl_err.text)
2524 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2525 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2527 kssl_err.reason);
2528 goto err;
2529 }
2530
2531 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2532 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2533 */
2534 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2535 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2536 {
2537 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2538 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2539 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2540 if (kssl_err.text)
2541 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2542 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2544 kssl_err.reason);
2545 goto err;
2546 }
2547
2548 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2549 {
2550 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2551 goto err;
2552 }
2553
2554 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2555 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2556 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2557
2558 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2559 if (enc == NULL)
2560 goto err;
2561
2562 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2563
2564 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2565 {
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2567 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2568 goto err;
2569 }
2570 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2571 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2572 {
2573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2574 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2575 goto err;
2576 }
2577 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2578 {
2579 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2580 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2581 goto err;
2582 }
2583 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2584 {
2585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2586 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2587 goto err;
2588 }
2589 outl += padl;
2590 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2591 {
2592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2593 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2594 goto err;
2595 }
2596 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2597 {
2598 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2599 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2600 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2601 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2602 * the protocol version.
2603 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2604 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2605 */
2606 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2607 {
2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2609 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2610 goto err;
2611 }
2612 }
2613
2614 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2615
2616 s->session->master_key_length=
2617 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2618 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2619
2620 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2621 {
2622 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2623 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2624 {
2625 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2626 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2627 }
2628 }
2629
2630
2631 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2632 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2633 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2634 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2635 */
2636 }
2637 else
2638 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2639
2640 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2641 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2642 {
2643 int ret = 1;
2644 int field_size = 0;
2645 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2646 const EC_GROUP *group;
2647 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2648
2649 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2650 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2651 {
2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2653 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2654 goto err;
2655 }
2656
2657 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2658 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2659 {
2660 /* use the certificate */
2661 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2662 }
2663 else
2664 {
2665 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2666 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2667 */
2668 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2669 }
2670
2671 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2672 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2673
2674 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2675 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2676 {
2677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2678 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2679 goto err;
2680 }
2681
2682 /* Let's get client's public key */
2683 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2684 {
2685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2686 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2687 goto err;
2688 }
2689
2690 if (n == 0L)
2691 {
2692 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2693
2694 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2695 {
2696 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2698 goto f_err;
2699 }
2700 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2701 == NULL) ||
2702 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2703 {
2704 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2705 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2706 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2707 * never executed. When that support is
2708 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2709 * received in the certificate is
2710 * authorized for key agreement.
2711 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2712 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2713 * group.
2714 */
2715 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2717 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2718 goto f_err;
2719 }
2720
2721 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2722 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2723 {
2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2725 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2726 goto err;
2727 }
2728 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2729 }
2730 else
2731 {
2732 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2733 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2734 */
2735 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2736 {
2737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2738 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2739 goto err;
2740 }
2741
2742 /* Get encoded point length */
2743 i = *p;
2744 p += 1;
2745 if (n != 1 + i)
2746 {
2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2748 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2749 goto err;
2750 }
2751 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2752 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2753 {
2754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2755 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2756 goto err;
2757 }
2758 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2759 * currently, so set it to the start
2760 */
2761 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2762 }
2763
2764 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2765 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2766 if (field_size <= 0)
2767 {
2768 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2769 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2770 goto err;
2771 }
2772 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2773 if (i <= 0)
2774 {
2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2776 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2777 goto err;
2778 }
2779
2780 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2781 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2782 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2783 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2784 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2785 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2786
2787 /* Compute the master secret */
2788 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2789 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2790
2791 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2792 return (ret);
2793 }
2794 else
2795 #endif
2796 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2797 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2798 {
2799 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2800 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2801 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2802 int psk_err = 1;
2803 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2804
2805 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2806
2807 n2s(p,i);
2808 if (n != i+2)
2809 {
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2811 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2812 goto psk_err;
2813 }
2814 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2815 {
2816 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2817 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2818 goto psk_err;
2819 }
2820 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2821 {
2822 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2823 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2824 goto psk_err;
2825 }
2826
2827 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2828 * string for the callback */
2829 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2830 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2831 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2832 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2833 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2834
2835 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2836 {
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2838 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2839 goto psk_err;
2840 }
2841 else if (psk_len == 0)
2842 {
2843 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2845 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2846 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2847 goto psk_err;
2848 }
2849
2850 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2851 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2852 t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2853 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2854 s2n(psk_len, t);
2855 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2856 t+=psk_len;
2857 s2n(psk_len, t);
2858
2859 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2860 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2861 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2862 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2863 {
2864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2865 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2866 goto psk_err;
2867 }
2868
2869 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2870 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2871 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2872 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2873 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2874 {
2875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2876 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2877 goto psk_err;
2878 }
2879
2880 s->session->master_key_length=
2881 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2882 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2883 psk_err = 0;
2884 psk_err:
2885 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2886 if (psk_err != 0)
2887 goto f_err;
2888 }
2889 else
2890 #endif
2891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2892 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2893 {
2894 int param_len;
2895
2896 n2s(p,i);
2897 param_len=i+2;
2898 if (param_len > n)
2899 {
2900 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2901 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2902 goto f_err;
2903 }
2904 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2905 {
2906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2907 goto err;
2908 }
2909 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2910 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2911 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2912 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2913 {
2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2915 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2916 goto err;
2917 }
2918
2919 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2920 {
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2922 goto err;
2923 }
2924
2925 p+=i;
2926 }
2927 else
2928 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2929 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2930 {
2931 int ret = 0;
2932 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2933 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2934 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2935 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2936 unsigned long alg_a;
2937
2938 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2939 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2940 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2941 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2942 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2943 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2944
2945 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2946 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2947 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2948 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2949 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2950 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2951 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2952 if (client_pub_pkey)
2953 {
2954 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2955 ERR_clear_error();
2956 }
2957 /* Decrypt session key */
2958 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2959 {
2960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2961 goto gerr;
2962 }
2963 if (p[1] == 0x81)
2964 {
2965 start = p+3;
2966 inlen = p[2];
2967 }
2968 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2969 {
2970 start = p+2;
2971 inlen = p[1];
2972 }
2973 else
2974 {
2975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2976 goto gerr;
2977 }
2978 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2979
2980 {
2981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2982 goto gerr;
2983 }
2984 /* Generate master secret */
2985 s->session->master_key_length=
2986 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2987 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2988 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2989 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2990 ret = 2;
2991 else
2992 ret = 1;
2993 gerr:
2994 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2995 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2996 if (ret)
2997 return ret;
2998 else
2999 goto err;
3000 }
3001 else
3002 {
3003 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3005 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3006 goto f_err;
3007 }
3008
3009 return(1);
3010 f_err:
3011 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3012 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
3013 err:
3014 #endif
3015 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
3016 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
3017 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
3018 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
3019 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
3020 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3021 #endif
3022 return(-1);
3023 }
3024
3025 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
3026 {
3027 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
3028 unsigned char *p;
3029 int al,ok,ret=0;
3030 long n;
3031 int type=0,i,j;
3032 X509 *peer;
3033 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
3034 EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
3035 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3036
3037 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3038 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
3039 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
3040 -1,
3041 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
3042 &ok);
3043
3044 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3045
3046 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
3047 {
3048 peer=s->session->peer;
3049 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
3050 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
3051 }
3052 else
3053 {
3054 peer=NULL;
3055 pkey=NULL;
3056 }
3057
3058 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
3059 {
3060 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3061 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3062 {
3063 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
3065 goto f_err;
3066 }
3067 ret=1;
3068 goto end;
3069 }
3070
3071 if (peer == NULL)
3072 {
3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
3074 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3075 goto f_err;
3076 }
3077
3078 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3079 {
3080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3081 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3082 goto f_err;
3083 }
3084
3085 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3086 {
3087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3088 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3089 goto f_err;
3090 }
3091
3092 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3093 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3094 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3095 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3096 * signature without length field */
3097 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3098 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3099 {
3100 i=64;
3101 }
3102 else
3103 {
3104 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3105 {
3106 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3107 if (rv == -1)
3108 {
3109 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3110 goto f_err;
3111 }
3112 else if (rv == 0)
3113 {
3114 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3115 goto f_err;
3116 }
3117 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3118 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3119 #endif
3120 p += 2;
3121 n -= 2;
3122 }
3123 n2s(p,i);
3124 n-=2;
3125 if (i > n)
3126 {
3127 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3128 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3129 goto f_err;
3130 }
3131 }
3132 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3133 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3134 {
3135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3136 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3137 goto f_err;
3138 }
3139
3140 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3141 {
3142 long hdatalen = 0;
3143 void *hdata;
3144 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3145 if (hdatalen <= 0)
3146 {
3147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3148 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3149 goto f_err;
3150 }
3151 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3152 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3153 EVP_MD_name(md));
3154 #endif
3155 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3156 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3157 {
3158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3159 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3160 goto f_err;
3161 }
3162
3163 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3164 {
3165 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3167 goto f_err;
3168 }
3169 }
3170 else
3171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3172 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3173 {
3174 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3175 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3176 pkey->pkey.rsa);
3177 if (i < 0)
3178 {
3179 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3181 goto f_err;
3182 }
3183 if (i == 0)
3184 {
3185 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3187 goto f_err;
3188 }
3189 }
3190 else
3191 #endif
3192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3193 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3194 {
3195 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3196 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3197 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3198 if (j <= 0)
3199 {
3200 /* bad signature */
3201 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3203 goto f_err;
3204 }
3205 }
3206 else
3207 #endif
3208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3209 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3210 {
3211 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3212 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3213 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3214 if (j <= 0)
3215 {
3216 /* bad signature */
3217 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3219 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3220 goto f_err;
3221 }
3222 }
3223 else
3224 #endif
3225 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3226 { unsigned char signature[64];
3227 int idx;
3228 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3229 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3230 if (i!=64) {
3231 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3232 }
3233 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3234 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3235 }
3236 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3237 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3238 if (j<=0)
3239 {
3240 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3242 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3243 goto f_err;
3244 }
3245 }
3246 else
3247 {
3248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3249 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3250 goto f_err;
3251 }
3252
3253
3254 ret=1;
3255 if (0)
3256 {
3257 f_err:
3258 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3259 }
3260 end:
3261 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3262 {
3263 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3264 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3265 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3266 }
3267 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3268 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3269 return(ret);
3270 }
3271
3272 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3273 {
3274 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3275 X509 *x=NULL;
3276 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3277 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3278 unsigned char *d;
3279 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3280
3281 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3282 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
3283 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
3284 -1,
3285 s->max_cert_list,
3286 &ok);
3287
3288 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3289
3290 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3291 {
3292 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3293 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3294 {
3295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3296 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3297 goto f_err;
3298 }
3299 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3300 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3301 {
3302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3303 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3304 goto f_err;
3305 }
3306 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3307 return(1);
3308 }
3309
3310 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3311 {
3312 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3314 goto f_err;
3315 }
3316 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3317
3318 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3319 {
3320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3321 goto err;
3322 }
3323
3324 n2l3(p,llen);
3325 if (llen+3 != n)
3326 {
3327 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3329 goto f_err;
3330 }
3331 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3332 {
3333 n2l3(p,l);
3334 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3335 {
3336 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3338 goto f_err;
3339 }
3340
3341 q=p;
3342 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3343 if (x == NULL)
3344 {
3345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3346 goto err;
3347 }
3348 if (p != (q+l))
3349 {
3350 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3352 goto f_err;
3353 }
3354 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3355 {
3356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3357 goto err;
3358 }
3359 x=NULL;
3360 nc+=l+3;
3361 }
3362
3363 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3364 {
3365 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3366 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3367 {
3368 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3370 goto f_err;
3371 }
3372 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3373 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3374 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3375 {
3376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3377 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3378 goto f_err;
3379 }
3380 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3381 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3382 {
3383 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3384 goto f_err;
3385 }
3386 }
3387 else
3388 {
3389 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3390 if (i <= 0)
3391 {
3392 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3394 goto f_err;
3395 }
3396 }
3397
3398 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3399 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3400 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3401 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3402
3403 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3404 * when we arrive here. */
3405 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3406 {
3407 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3408 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3409 {
3410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3411 goto err;
3412 }
3413 }
3414 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3415 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3416 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3417 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3418 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3419
3420 sk=NULL;
3421
3422 ret=1;
3423 if (0)
3424 {
3425 f_err:
3426 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3427 }
3428 err:
3429 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3430 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3431 return(ret);
3432 }
3433
3434 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3435 {
3436 CERT_PKEY *cpk;
3437
3438 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3439 {
3440 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3441 if (cpk == NULL)
3442 {
3443 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3444 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3445 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3446 {
3447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3448 return(0);
3449 }
3450 }
3451
3452 ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
3453 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3454 }
3455
3456 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3457 return ssl_do_write(s);
3458 }
3459
3460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3461 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3462 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3463 {
3464 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3465 {
3466 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3467 const unsigned char *const_p;
3468 int len, slen_full, slen;
3469 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3470 unsigned int hlen;
3471 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3472 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3473 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3474 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3475 unsigned char key_name[16];
3476
3477 /* get session encoding length */
3478 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3479 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3480 * too long
3481 */
3482 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3483 return -1;
3484 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3485 if (!senc)
3486 return -1;
3487 p = senc;
3488 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3489
3490 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3491 const_p = senc;
3492 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3493 if (sess == NULL)
3494 {
3495 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3496 return -1;
3497 }
3498 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3499
3500 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3501 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3502 {
3503 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3504 return -1;
3505 }
3506 p = senc;
3507 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3508 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3509
3510 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3511 * follows handshake_header_length +
3512 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3513 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3514 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3515 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3516 */
3517 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3518 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3519 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3520 return -1;
3521 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3522 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3523 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3524 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3525 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3526 * from parent ctx.
3527 */
3528 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3529 {
3530 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3531 &hctx, 1) < 0)
3532 {
3533 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3534 return -1;
3535 }
3536 }
3537 else
3538 {
3539 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3540 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3541 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3542 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3543 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3544 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3545 }
3546
3547 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3548 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3549 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3550 * as their sessions. */
3551 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3552
3553 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3554 p += 2;
3555 /* Output key name */
3556 macstart = p;
3557 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3558 p += 16;
3559 /* output IV */
3560 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3561 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3562 /* Encrypt session data */
3563 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3564 p += len;
3565 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3566 p += len;
3567 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3568
3569 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3570 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3571 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3572
3573 p += hlen;
3574 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3575 /* Total length */
3576 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3577 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3578 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3579 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3580 s2n(len - 6, p);
3581 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3582 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3583 }
3584
3585 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3586 return ssl_do_write(s);
3587 }
3588
3589 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3590 {
3591 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3592 {
3593 unsigned char *p;
3594 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3595 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3596 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3597 * + (ocsp response)
3598 */
3599 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3600 return -1;
3601
3602 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3603
3604 /* do the header */
3605 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3606 /* message length */
3607 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3608 /* status type */
3609 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3610 /* length of OCSP response */
3611 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3612 /* actual response */
3613 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3614 /* number of bytes to write */
3615 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3616 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3617 s->init_off = 0;
3618 }
3619
3620 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3621 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3622 }
3623
3624 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3625 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3626 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3627 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3628 {
3629 int ok;
3630 int proto_len, padding_len;
3631 long n;
3632 const unsigned char *p;
3633
3634 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3635 * extension in their ClientHello */
3636 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3637 {
3638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3639 return -1;
3640 }
3641
3642 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3643 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3644 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3645 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
3646 514, /* See the payload format below */
3647 &ok);
3648
3649 if (!ok)
3650 return((int)n);
3651
3652 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3653 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3654 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3655 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3656 {
3657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3658 return -1;
3659 }
3660
3661 if (n < 2)
3662 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3663
3664 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3665
3666 /* The payload looks like:
3667 * uint8 proto_len;
3668 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3669 * uint8 padding_len;
3670 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3671 */
3672 proto_len = p[0];
3673 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3674 return 0;
3675 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3676 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3677 return 0;
3678
3679 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3680 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3681 {
3682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3683 return 0;
3684 }
3685 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3686 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3687
3688 return 1;
3689 }
3690 # endif
3691
3692 int tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(SSL *s, int *skip)
3693 {
3694 if (s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count)
3695 {
3696 unsigned char *p = NULL;
3697 unsigned char *size_loc = NULL;
3698 srv_supp_data_record *record = NULL;
3699 size_t length = 0;
3700 size_t i = 0;
3701
3702 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count; i++)
3703 {
3704 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
3705 unsigned short outlen = 0;
3706 int cb_retval = 0;
3707 record = &s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i];
3708
3709 /* NULL callback or -1 omits supp data entry */
3710 if (!record->fn1)
3711 continue;
3712 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->supp_data_type,
3713 &out, &outlen,
3714 record->arg);
3715 if (cb_retval == -1)
3716 continue; /* skip this supp data entry */
3717 if (cb_retval == 0)
3718 {
3719 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3720 return 0;
3721 }
3722 if (outlen == 0 || TLSEXT_MAXLEN_supplemental_data < outlen + 4 + length)
3723 {
3724 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3725 return 0;
3726 }
3727 /* write supp data entry...
3728 * if first entry, write handshake message type
3729 * jump back to write length at end */
3730 if (length == 0)
3731 {
3732 /* 1 byte message type + 3 bytes for
3733 * message length */
3734 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, 4))
3735 {
3736 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3737 return 0;
3738 }
3739 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3740 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA;
3741 /* hold on to length field to update later */
3742 size_loc = p;
3743 /* skip over handshake length field (3
3744 * bytes) and supp_data length field
3745 * (3 bytes) */
3746 p += 3 + 3;
3747 length += 1 +3 +3;
3748 }
3749 /* 2 byte supp data type + 2 byte length + outlen */
3750 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, outlen + 4))
3751 {
3752 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3753 return 0;
3754 }
3755 s2n(record->supp_data_type, p);
3756 s2n(outlen, p);
3757 memcpy(p, out, outlen);
3758 /* update length to supp data type (2 bytes) +
3759 * supp data length (2 bytes) + supp data */
3760 length += (outlen + 4);
3761 p += outlen;
3762 }
3763 if (length > 0)
3764 {
3765 /* write handshake length */
3766 l2n3(length - 4, size_loc);
3767 /* supp_data length */
3768 l2n3(length - 7, size_loc);
3769 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B;
3770 s->init_num = length;
3771 s->init_off = 0;
3772
3773 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3774 }
3775 }
3776
3777 /* no supp data message sent */
3778 *skip = 1;
3779 s->init_num = 0;
3780 s->init_off = 0;
3781 return 1;
3782 }
3783
3784 int tls1_get_client_supplemental_data(SSL *s)
3785 {
3786 int al = 0;
3787 int cb_retval = 0;
3788 int ok;
3789 long n;
3790 const unsigned char *p, *d;
3791 unsigned short supp_data_entry_type = 0;
3792 unsigned long supp_data_entry_len = 0;
3793 unsigned long supp_data_len = 0;
3794 size_t i = 0;
3795
3796 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3797 SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A,
3798 SSL3_ST_SR_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B,
3799 SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,
3800 /* use default limit */
3801 TLSEXT_MAXLEN_supplemental_data,
3802 &ok);
3803
3804 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3805
3806 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3807 d = p;
3808
3809 /* The message cannot be empty */
3810 if (n < 3)
3811 {
3812 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3813 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3814 goto f_err;
3815 }
3816 n2l3(p, supp_data_len);
3817 while (p<d+supp_data_len)
3818 {
3819 n2s(p, supp_data_entry_type);
3820 n2s(p, supp_data_entry_len);
3821 /* if there is a callback for this supp data type, send it */
3822 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records_count; i++)
3823 {
3824 if (s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].supp_data_type == supp_data_entry_type && s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].fn2)
3825 {
3826 cb_retval = s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].fn2(s, supp_data_entry_type, p, supp_data_entry_len, &al, s->ctx->srv_supp_data_records[i].arg);
3827 if (cb_retval == 0)
3828 {
3829 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CLIENT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
3830 goto f_err;
3831 }
3832 }
3833 }
3834 p+=supp_data_entry_len;
3835 }
3836 return 1;
3837 f_err:
3838 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3839 return -1;
3840 }
3841 #endif
A mirror of the official openssl repository