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1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153
154 #include <stdio.h>
155 #include "ssl_locl.h"
156 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
157 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
158 #include <openssl/rand.h>
159 #include <openssl/objects.h>
160 #include <openssl/evp.h>
161 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
162 #include <openssl/x509.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164 #include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #endif
166 #include <openssl/bn.h>
167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
169 #endif
170 #include <openssl/md5.h>
171
172 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
173
174 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
175 {
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
178 else
179 return(NULL);
180 }
181
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
184 {
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
186
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
188
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
191 {
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
193 {
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
196 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
198 }
199 else
200 {
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
202 }
203 }
204 return ret;
205 }
206 #endif
207
208 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
209 ssl3_accept,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
212
213 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
214 {
215 BUF_MEM *buf;
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
218 int ret= -1;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
220
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
222 ERR_clear_error();
223 clear_sys_error();
224
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
226 cb=s->info_callback;
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
229
230 /* init things to blank */
231 s->in_handshake++;
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
233
234 if (s->cert == NULL)
235 {
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
237 return(-1);
238 }
239
240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
244 */
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
246 {
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
248 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
249 }
250 #endif
251
252 for (;;)
253 {
254 state=s->state;
255
256 switch (s->state)
257 {
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
259 s->renegotiate=1;
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
261
262 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
263 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
266
267 s->server=1;
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
269
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
271 {
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
273 return -1;
274 }
275 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
276
277 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
278 {
279 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
280 {
281 ret= -1;
282 goto end;
283 }
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
285 {
286 ret= -1;
287 goto end;
288 }
289 s->init_buf=buf;
290 }
291
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
293 {
294 ret= -1;
295 goto end;
296 }
297
298 s->init_num=0;
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
300 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
301
302 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
303 {
304 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
305 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
306 */
307 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
308
309 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
310 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
311 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
312 }
313 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
314 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
315 {
316 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
317 * client that doesn't support secure
318 * renegotiation.
319 */
320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
321 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
322 ret = -1;
323 goto end;
324 }
325 else
326 {
327 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
328 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
329 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
330 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
331 }
332 break;
333
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
336
337 s->shutdown=0;
338 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
339 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
340 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
341 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
342 s->init_num=0;
343
344 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
345 break;
346
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
348 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
349 break;
350
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
354
355 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
356 {
357 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
358 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
359 }
360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
361 {
362 int al;
363 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
364 {
365 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
366 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
367 goto end;
368 }
369 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
370 {
371 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
372 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
373 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
374 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
376 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
377 ret= -1;
378 goto end;
379 }
380 }
381 #endif
382
383 s->renegotiate = 2;
384 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
385 s->init_num=0;
386 break;
387
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
390 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
391 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
393 if (s->hit)
394 {
395 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
397 else
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
399 }
400 #else
401 if (s->hit)
402 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
403 #endif
404 else
405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A;
407 #else
408 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
409 #endif
410 s->init_num = 0;
411 break;
412
413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
414 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A:
415 case SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B:
416 /* We promised to send an audit proof in the hello. */
417 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client)
418 {
419 ret = tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(s);
420 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
421 }
422 else
423 skip = 1;
424
425 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
426 s->init_num = 0;
427 break;
428 #endif
429
430 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
431 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
432 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
433 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
434 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
435 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
436 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
437 {
438 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
439 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
441 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
442 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
443 else
444 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
445 }
446 else
447 {
448 skip = 1;
449 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
450 }
451 #else
452 }
453 else
454 skip=1;
455
456 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
457 #endif
458 s->init_num=0;
459 break;
460
461 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
462 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
463 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
464
465 /* clear this, it may get reset by
466 * send_server_key_exchange */
467 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
468 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
469 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
470 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
471 )
472 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
473 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
474 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
475 * be able to handle this) */
476 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
477 else
478 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
479
480
481 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
482 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
483 *
484 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
485 *
486 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
487 * message only if the cipher suite is either
488 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
489 * server certificate contains the server's
490 * public key for key exchange.
491 */
492 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
493 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
494 * hint if provided */
495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
496 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
497 #endif
498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
499 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
500 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
501 #endif
502 || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH)
503 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
504 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
505 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
506 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
507 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
508 )
509 )
510 )
511 )
512 {
513 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
514 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
515 }
516 else
517 skip=1;
518
519 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
520 s->init_num=0;
521 break;
522
523 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
524 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
525 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
526 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
527 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
528 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
529 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
530 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
531 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
532 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
533 * and in RFC 2246): */
534 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
535 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
536 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
537 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
538 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
539 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
540 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
541 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
542 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
543 {
544 /* no cert request */
545 skip=1;
546 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
547 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
548 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
549 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
550 return -1;
551 }
552 else
553 {
554 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
555 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
556 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
557 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
558 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
559 #else
560 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
561 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
562 #endif
563 s->init_num=0;
564 }
565 break;
566
567 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
568 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
569 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
570 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
571 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
572 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
573 s->init_num=0;
574 break;
575
576 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
577
578 /* This code originally checked to see if
579 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
580 * and then flushed. This caused problems
581 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
582 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
583 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
584 * still exist. So instead we just flush
585 * unconditionally.
586 */
587
588 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
589 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
590 {
591 ret= -1;
592 goto end;
593 }
594 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
595
596 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
597 break;
598
599 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
600 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
601 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
602 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
603 if (ret <= 0)
604 goto end;
605 if (ret == 2)
606 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
607 else {
608 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
609 {
610 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
611 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
612 }
613 s->init_num=0;
614 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
615 }
616 break;
617
618 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
619 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
620 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
621 if (ret <= 0)
622 goto end;
623 if (ret == 2)
624 {
625 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
626 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
627 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
628 * message is not sent.
629 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
630 * the client uses its key from the certificate
631 * for key exchange.
632 */
633 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
634 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
635 #else
636 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
637 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
638 else
639 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
640 #endif
641 s->init_num = 0;
642 }
643 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
644 {
645 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
646 s->init_num=0;
647 if (!s->session->peer)
648 break;
649 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
650 * at this point and digest cached records.
651 */
652 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
653 {
654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
655 return -1;
656 }
657 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
658 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
659 return -1;
660 }
661 else
662 {
663 int offset=0;
664 int dgst_num;
665
666 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
667 s->init_num=0;
668
669 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
670 * a client cert, it can be verified
671 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
672 * should be generalized. But it is next step
673 */
674 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
675 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
676 return -1;
677 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
678 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
679 {
680 int dgst_size;
681
682 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
683 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
684 if (dgst_size < 0)
685 {
686 ret = -1;
687 goto end;
688 }
689 offset+=dgst_size;
690 }
691 }
692 break;
693
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
695 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
696
697 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
698 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
699 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
700
701 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
702 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
703 #else
704 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
705 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
706 else
707 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
708 #endif
709 s->init_num=0;
710 break;
711
712 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
713 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
714 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
715 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
716 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
717 s->init_num = 0;
718 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
719 break;
720 #endif
721
722 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
723 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
724 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
725 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
726 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
727 if (s->hit)
728 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
730 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
731 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
732 #endif
733 else
734 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
735 s->init_num=0;
736 break;
737
738 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
739 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
740 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
741 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
742 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
743 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
744 s->init_num=0;
745 break;
746
747 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
748 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
749 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
750 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
751 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
752 s->init_num=0;
753 break;
754
755 #endif
756
757 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
758 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
759
760 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
761 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
762 { ret= -1; goto end; }
763
764 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
765 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
766
767 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
768 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
769 s->init_num=0;
770
771 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
772 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
773 {
774 ret= -1;
775 goto end;
776 }
777
778 break;
779
780 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
781 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
782 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
783 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
784 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
785 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
786 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
787 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
788 if (s->hit)
789 {
790 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
791 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
792 #else
793 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
794 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
795 else
796 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
797 #endif
798 }
799 else
800 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
801 s->init_num=0;
802 break;
803
804 case SSL_ST_OK:
805 /* clean a few things up */
806 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
807
808 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
809 s->init_buf=NULL;
810
811 /* remove buffering on output */
812 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
813
814 s->init_num=0;
815
816 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
817 {
818 s->renegotiate=0;
819 s->new_session=0;
820
821 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
822
823 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
824 /* s->server=1; */
825 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
826
827 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
828 }
829
830 ret = 1;
831 goto end;
832 /* break; */
833
834 default:
835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
836 ret= -1;
837 goto end;
838 /* break; */
839 }
840
841 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
842 {
843 if (s->debug)
844 {
845 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
846 goto end;
847 }
848
849
850 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
851 {
852 new_state=s->state;
853 s->state=state;
854 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
855 s->state=new_state;
856 }
857 }
858 skip=0;
859 }
860 end:
861 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
862
863 s->in_handshake--;
864 if (cb != NULL)
865 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
866 return(ret);
867 }
868
869 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
870 {
871
872 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
873 {
874 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0);
875 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
876 }
877
878 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
879 return ssl_do_write(s);
880 }
881
882 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
883 {
884 int ok;
885 long n;
886
887 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
888 * so permit appropriate message length */
889 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
890 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
891 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
892 -1,
893 s->max_cert_list,
894 &ok);
895 if (!ok) return((int)n);
896 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
897 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
898 {
899 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
900 * negotiation. */
901 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
902 {
903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
904 return -1;
905 }
906 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
907 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
909 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
910 {
911 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
912 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
913 }
914 #endif
915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
916 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
917 {
918 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
919 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
920 }
921 #endif
922 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
923 return 2;
924 }
925 return 1;
926 }
927
928 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
929 {
930 int i,j,ok,al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ret= -1;
931 unsigned int cookie_len;
932 long n;
933 unsigned long id;
934 unsigned char *p,*d;
935 SSL_CIPHER *c;
936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
937 unsigned char *q;
938 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
939 #endif
940 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
941
942 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
943 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
944 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
945 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
946 * TLSv1.
947 */
948 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
949 )
950 {
951 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
952 }
953 s->first_packet=1;
954 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
955 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
956 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
957 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
958 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
959 &ok);
960
961 if (!ok) return((int)n);
962 s->first_packet=0;
963 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
964
965 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
966 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
967 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
968 p+=2;
969
970 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
971 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
972 {
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
974 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
975 {
976 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
977 s->version = s->client_version;
978 }
979 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
980 goto f_err;
981 }
982
983 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
984 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
985 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
986 */
987 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
988 {
989 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
990
991 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
992 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
993
994 if (cookie_length == 0)
995 return 1;
996 }
997
998 /* load the client random */
999 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1000 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1001
1002 /* get the session-id */
1003 j= *(p++);
1004
1005 s->hit=0;
1006 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
1007 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
1008 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1009 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
1010 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1011 *
1012 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1013 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1014 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1015 * setting will be ignored.
1016 */
1017 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1018 {
1019 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1020 goto err;
1021 }
1022 else
1023 {
1024 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1025 if (i == 1)
1026 { /* previous session */
1027 s->hit=1;
1028 }
1029 else if (i == -1)
1030 goto err;
1031 else /* i == 0 */
1032 {
1033 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1034 goto err;
1035 }
1036 }
1037
1038 p+=j;
1039
1040 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1041 {
1042 /* cookie stuff */
1043 cookie_len = *(p++);
1044
1045 /*
1046 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1047 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1048 * does not cause an overflow.
1049 */
1050 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1051 {
1052 /* too much data */
1053 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1055 goto f_err;
1056 }
1057
1058 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1059 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1060 cookie_len > 0)
1061 {
1062 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1063
1064 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1065 {
1066 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1067 cookie_len) == 0)
1068 {
1069 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1071 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1072 goto f_err;
1073 }
1074 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1075 }
1076 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1077 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1078 {
1079 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1081 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1082 goto f_err;
1083 }
1084
1085 ret = 2;
1086 }
1087
1088 p += cookie_len;
1089 }
1090
1091 n2s(p,i);
1092 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1093 {
1094 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1095 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1096 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1097 goto f_err;
1098 }
1099 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
1100 {
1101 /* not enough data */
1102 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1104 goto f_err;
1105 }
1106 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1107 == NULL))
1108 {
1109 goto err;
1110 }
1111 p+=i;
1112
1113 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1114 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1115 {
1116 j=0;
1117 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1118
1119 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1120 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1121 #endif
1122 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1123 {
1124 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1125 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1126 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1127 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1128 #endif
1129 if (c->id == id)
1130 {
1131 j=1;
1132 break;
1133 }
1134 }
1135 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1136 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1137 */
1138 #if 0
1139 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1140 {
1141 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1142 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1143 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1144 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1145 * enabled, though. */
1146 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1147 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1148 {
1149 s->session->cipher = c;
1150 j = 1;
1151 }
1152 }
1153 #endif
1154 if (j == 0)
1155 {
1156 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1157 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1158 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1160 goto f_err;
1161 }
1162 }
1163
1164 /* compression */
1165 i= *(p++);
1166 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
1167 {
1168 /* not enough data */
1169 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1171 goto f_err;
1172 }
1173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1174 q=p;
1175 #endif
1176 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
1177 {
1178 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1179 }
1180
1181 p+=i;
1182 if (j >= i)
1183 {
1184 /* no compress */
1185 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1187 goto f_err;
1188 }
1189
1190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1191 /* TLS extensions*/
1192 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1193 {
1194 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n))
1195 {
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1197 goto err;
1198 }
1199 }
1200
1201 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1202 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1203 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1204 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1205 {
1206 unsigned long Time;
1207 unsigned char *pos;
1208 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1209 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1210 l2n(Time,pos);
1211 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1212 {
1213 goto f_err;
1214 }
1215 }
1216
1217 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1218 {
1219 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1220
1221 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1222 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1223 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1224 {
1225 s->hit=1;
1226 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1227 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1228
1229 ciphers=NULL;
1230
1231 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1232 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1233 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1234 {
1235 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1237 goto f_err;
1238 }
1239
1240 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1241
1242 if (s->cipher_list)
1243 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1244
1245 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1246 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1247
1248 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1249 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1250 }
1251 }
1252 #endif
1253
1254 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1255 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1256 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1257 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1259 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1260 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1261 {
1262 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1263 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1264 /* Can't disable compression */
1265 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1266 {
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1268 goto f_err;
1269 }
1270 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1271 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1272 {
1273 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1274 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1275 {
1276 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1277 break;
1278 }
1279 }
1280 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1281 {
1282 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1283 goto f_err;
1284 }
1285 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1286 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1287 {
1288 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1289 break;
1290 }
1291 if (m >= i)
1292 {
1293 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1295 goto f_err;
1296 }
1297 }
1298 else if (s->hit)
1299 comp = NULL;
1300 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1301 { /* See if we have a match */
1302 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1303
1304 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1305 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1306 {
1307 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1308 v=comp->id;
1309 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
1310 {
1311 if (v == q[o])
1312 {
1313 done=1;
1314 break;
1315 }
1316 }
1317 if (done) break;
1318 }
1319 if (done)
1320 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1321 else
1322 comp=NULL;
1323 }
1324 #else
1325 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1326 * using compression.
1327 */
1328 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1329 {
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1331 goto f_err;
1332 }
1333 #endif
1334
1335 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1336 * pick a cipher */
1337
1338 if (!s->hit)
1339 {
1340 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1341 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1342 #else
1343 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1344 #endif
1345 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1346 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1347 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1348 if (ciphers == NULL)
1349 {
1350 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1352 goto f_err;
1353 }
1354 ciphers=NULL;
1355 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1356 if (s->cert->cert_cb
1357 && s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg) <= 0)
1358 {
1359 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1361 goto f_err;
1362 }
1363 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1364 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1365
1366 if (c == NULL)
1367 {
1368 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1369 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1370 goto f_err;
1371 }
1372 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1373 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1374 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1375 s->session->not_resumable=s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1376 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)) != 0));
1377 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1378 /* do not send a session ticket */
1379 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1380 }
1381 else
1382 {
1383 /* Session-id reuse */
1384 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1385 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1386 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1387 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1388
1389 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1390 {
1391 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1392 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1393 {
1394 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1395 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1396 nc=c;
1397 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1398 ec=c;
1399 }
1400 if (nc != NULL)
1401 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1402 else if (ec != NULL)
1403 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1404 else
1405 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1406 }
1407 else
1408 #endif
1409 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1410 }
1411
1412 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1413 {
1414 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1415 goto f_err;
1416 }
1417
1418 /* we now have the following setup.
1419 * client_random
1420 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1421 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1422 * compression - basically ignored right now
1423 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1424 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1425 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1426 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1427 */
1428
1429 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1430 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1431 {
1432 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1433 {
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1435 goto err;
1436 }
1437 }
1438
1439 if (ret < 0) ret=1;
1440 if (0)
1441 {
1442 f_err:
1443 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1444 }
1445 err:
1446 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1447 return(ret);
1448 }
1449
1450 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1451 {
1452 unsigned char *buf;
1453 unsigned char *p,*d;
1454 int i,sl;
1455 unsigned long l;
1456 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1457 unsigned long Time;
1458 #endif
1459
1460 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1461 {
1462 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1463 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1464 p=s->s3->server_random;
1465 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1466 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1467 l2n(Time,p);
1468 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1469 return -1;
1470 #endif
1471 /* Do the message type and length last */
1472 d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s);
1473
1474 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1475 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1476
1477 /* Random stuff */
1478 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1479 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1480
1481 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1482 * back in the server hello:
1483 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1484 * we send back the old session ID.
1485 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1486 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1487 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1488 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1489 * session ID.
1490 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1491 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1492 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1493 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1494 * to send back.
1495 */
1496 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1497 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1498 && !s->hit))
1499 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1500
1501 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1502 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1503 {
1504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1505 return -1;
1506 }
1507 *(p++)=sl;
1508 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1509 p+=sl;
1510
1511 /* put the cipher */
1512 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1513 p+=i;
1514
1515 /* put the compression method */
1516 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1517 *(p++)=0;
1518 #else
1519 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1520 *(p++)=0;
1521 else
1522 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1523 #endif
1524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1525 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1526 {
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1528 return -1;
1529 }
1530 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1531 {
1532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1533 return -1;
1534 }
1535 #endif
1536 /* do the header */
1537 l=(p-d);
1538 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l);
1539 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1540 }
1541
1542 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1543 return ssl_do_write(s);
1544 }
1545
1546 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1547 {
1548
1549 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1550 {
1551 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0);
1552 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1553 }
1554
1555 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1556 return ssl_do_write(s);
1557 }
1558
1559 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1560 {
1561 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1562 unsigned char *q;
1563 int j,num;
1564 RSA *rsa;
1565 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1566 unsigned int u;
1567 #endif
1568 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1569 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1570 #endif
1571 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1572 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1573 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1574 int encodedlen = 0;
1575 int curve_id = 0;
1576 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1577 #endif
1578 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1579 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1580 unsigned char *p,*d;
1581 int al,i;
1582 unsigned long type;
1583 int n;
1584 CERT *cert;
1585 BIGNUM *r[4];
1586 int nr[4],kn;
1587 BUF_MEM *buf;
1588 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1589
1590 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1591 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1592 {
1593 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1594 cert=s->cert;
1595
1596 buf=s->init_buf;
1597
1598 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1599 n=0;
1600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1601 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1602 {
1603 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1604 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1605 {
1606 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1607 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1608 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1609 if(rsa == NULL)
1610 {
1611 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1613 goto f_err;
1614 }
1615 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1616 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1617 }
1618 if (rsa == NULL)
1619 {
1620 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1622 goto f_err;
1623 }
1624 r[0]=rsa->n;
1625 r[1]=rsa->e;
1626 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1627 }
1628 else
1629 #endif
1630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1631 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1632 {
1633 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1634 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1635 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1636 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1637 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1638 if (dhp == NULL)
1639 {
1640 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1642 goto f_err;
1643 }
1644
1645 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1646 {
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1648 goto err;
1649 }
1650
1651 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1652 {
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1654 goto err;
1655 }
1656
1657 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1658 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1659 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1660 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1661 {
1662 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1663 {
1664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1665 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1666 goto err;
1667 }
1668 }
1669 else
1670 {
1671 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1672 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1673 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1674 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1675 {
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1677 goto err;
1678 }
1679 }
1680 r[0]=dh->p;
1681 r[1]=dh->g;
1682 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1683 }
1684 else
1685 #endif
1686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1687 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1688 {
1689 const EC_GROUP *group;
1690
1691 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1692 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1693 {
1694 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1695 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1696 if (nid != NID_undef)
1697 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1698 }
1699 else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
1700 {
1701 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1702 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1703 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1704 }
1705 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1706 {
1707 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1709 goto f_err;
1710 }
1711
1712 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1713 {
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1715 goto err;
1716 }
1717
1718 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1719 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1720 {
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1722 goto err;
1723 }
1724 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1725 ecdh = ecdhp;
1726 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1727 {
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1729 goto err;
1730 }
1731
1732 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1733 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1734 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1735 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1736 {
1737 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1738 {
1739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1740 goto err;
1741 }
1742 }
1743
1744 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1745 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1746 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1747 {
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1749 goto err;
1750 }
1751
1752 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1753 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1754 {
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1756 goto err;
1757 }
1758
1759 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1760 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1761 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1762 */
1763 if ((curve_id =
1764 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1765 == 0)
1766 {
1767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1768 goto err;
1769 }
1770
1771 /* Encode the public key.
1772 * First check the size of encoding and
1773 * allocate memory accordingly.
1774 */
1775 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1776 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1777 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1778 NULL, 0, NULL);
1779
1780 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1781 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1782 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1783 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1784 {
1785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1786 goto err;
1787 }
1788
1789
1790 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1791 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1792 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1793 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1794
1795 if (encodedlen == 0)
1796 {
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1798 goto err;
1799 }
1800
1801 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1802
1803 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1804 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1805 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1806 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1807 * structure.
1808 */
1809 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1810
1811 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1812 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1813 */
1814 r[0]=NULL;
1815 r[1]=NULL;
1816 r[2]=NULL;
1817 r[3]=NULL;
1818 }
1819 else
1820 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1821 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1822 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1823 {
1824 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1825 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1826 }
1827 else
1828 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1830 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1831 {
1832 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1833 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1834 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1835 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1836 {
1837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1838 goto err;
1839 }
1840 r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;
1841 r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;
1842 r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;
1843 r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;
1844 }
1845 else
1846 #endif
1847 {
1848 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1850 goto f_err;
1851 }
1852 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1853 {
1854 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1855 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1856 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1857 n+=1+nr[i];
1858 else
1859 #endif
1860 n+=2+nr[i];
1861 }
1862
1863 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1864 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1865 {
1866 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1867 == NULL)
1868 {
1869 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1870 goto f_err;
1871 }
1872 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1873 }
1874 else
1875 {
1876 pkey=NULL;
1877 kn=0;
1878 }
1879
1880 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+kn))
1881 {
1882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1883 goto err;
1884 }
1885 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1886
1887 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL && i<4; i++)
1888 {
1889 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1890 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1891 {
1892 *p = nr[i];
1893 p++;
1894 }
1895 else
1896 #endif
1897 s2n(nr[i],p);
1898 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1899 p+=nr[i];
1900 }
1901
1902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1903 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1904 {
1905 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1906 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1907 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1908 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1909 * the actual encoded point itself
1910 */
1911 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1912 p += 1;
1913 *p = 0;
1914 p += 1;
1915 *p = curve_id;
1916 p += 1;
1917 *p = encodedlen;
1918 p += 1;
1919 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1920 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1921 encodedlen);
1922 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1923 encodedPoint = NULL;
1924 p += encodedlen;
1925 }
1926 #endif
1927
1928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1929 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1930 {
1931 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1932 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1933 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1934 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1935 }
1936 #endif
1937
1938 /* not anonymous */
1939 if (pkey != NULL)
1940 {
1941 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1942 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1944 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1945 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1946 {
1947 q=md_buf;
1948 j=0;
1949 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1950 {
1951 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1952 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1953 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1954 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1955 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1956 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1957 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
1958 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1959 (unsigned int *)&i);
1960 q+=i;
1961 j+=i;
1962 }
1963 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1964 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1965 {
1966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1967 goto err;
1968 }
1969 s2n(u,p);
1970 n+=u+2;
1971 }
1972 else
1973 #endif
1974 if (md)
1975 {
1976 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1977 * algorithm */
1978 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1979 {
1980 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1981 {
1982 /* Should never happen */
1983 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1985 goto f_err;
1986 }
1987 p+=2;
1988 }
1989 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
1990 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
1991 EVP_MD_name(md));
1992 #endif
1993 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1994 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1995 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1996 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,d,n);
1997 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1998 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1999 {
2000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
2001 goto err;
2002 }
2003 s2n(i,p);
2004 n+=i+2;
2005 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2006 n+= 2;
2007 }
2008 else
2009 {
2010 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2011 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2012 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2013 goto f_err;
2014 }
2015 }
2016
2017 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
2018 }
2019
2020 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2021 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2022 return ssl_do_write(s);
2023 f_err:
2024 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2025 err:
2026 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2027 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2028 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2029 #endif
2030 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2031 return(-1);
2032 }
2033
2034 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2035 {
2036 unsigned char *p,*d;
2037 int i,j,nl,off,n;
2038 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2039 X509_NAME *name;
2040 BUF_MEM *buf;
2041
2042 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2043 {
2044 buf=s->init_buf;
2045
2046 d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
2047
2048 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2049 p++;
2050 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2051 d[0]=n;
2052 p+=n;
2053 n++;
2054
2055 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2056 {
2057 const unsigned char *psigs;
2058 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2059 s2n(nl, p);
2060 memcpy(p, psigs, nl);
2061 p += nl;
2062 n += nl + 2;
2063 }
2064
2065 off=n;
2066 p+=2;
2067 n+=2;
2068
2069 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2070 nl=0;
2071 if (sk != NULL)
2072 {
2073 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2074 {
2075 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2076 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2077 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2078 {
2079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2080 goto err;
2081 }
2082 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2083 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2084 {
2085 s2n(j,p);
2086 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2087 n+=2+j;
2088 nl+=2+j;
2089 }
2090 else
2091 {
2092 d=p;
2093 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2094 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2095 n+=j;
2096 nl+=j;
2097 }
2098 }
2099 }
2100 /* else no CA names */
2101 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2102 s2n(nl,p);
2103
2104 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
2105
2106 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2107 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
2108 {
2109 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2110 /* do the header */
2111 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2112 *(p++)=0;
2113 *(p++)=0;
2114 *(p++)=0;
2115 s->init_num += 4;
2116 }
2117 #endif
2118
2119 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2120 }
2121
2122 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2123 return ssl_do_write(s);
2124 err:
2125 return(-1);
2126 }
2127
2128 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2129 {
2130 int i,al,ok;
2131 long n;
2132 unsigned long alg_k;
2133 unsigned char *p;
2134 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2135 RSA *rsa=NULL;
2136 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2137 #endif
2138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2139 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
2140 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2141 #endif
2142 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2143 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
2144 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2145
2146 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2147 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2148 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2149 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2150 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2151 #endif
2152
2153 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2154 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2155 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2156 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2157 2048, /* ??? */
2158 &ok);
2159
2160 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2161 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2162
2163 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2164
2165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2166 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2167 {
2168 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2169 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2170 {
2171 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2172 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2173 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2174 * be sent already */
2175 if (rsa == NULL)
2176 {
2177 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2179 goto f_err;
2180
2181 }
2182 }
2183 else
2184 {
2185 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2186 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2187 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2188 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2189 {
2190 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2192 goto f_err;
2193 }
2194 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
2195 }
2196
2197 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2198 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2199 {
2200 n2s(p,i);
2201 if (n != i+2)
2202 {
2203 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2204 {
2205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2206 goto err;
2207 }
2208 else
2209 p-=2;
2210 }
2211 else
2212 n=i;
2213 }
2214
2215 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2216
2217 al = -1;
2218
2219 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2220 {
2221 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2222 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2223 }
2224
2225 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2226 {
2227 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2228 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2229 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2230 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2231 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2232 * protocol version.
2233 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2234 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2235 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2236 {
2237 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2238 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2239
2240 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2241 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2242 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2243 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2244 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2245 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2246 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2247 }
2248 }
2249
2250 if (al != -1)
2251 {
2252 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2253 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2254 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2255 ERR_clear_error();
2256 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2257 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2258 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2259 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2260 goto err;
2261 }
2262
2263 s->session->master_key_length=
2264 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2265 s->session->master_key,
2266 p,i);
2267 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2268 }
2269 else
2270 #endif
2271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2272 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2273 {
2274 int idx = -1;
2275 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2276 if (n)
2277 n2s(p,i);
2278 else
2279 i = 0;
2280 if (n && n != i+2)
2281 {
2282 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2283 {
2284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2285 goto err;
2286 }
2287 else
2288 {
2289 p-=2;
2290 i=(int)n;
2291 }
2292 }
2293 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2294 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2295 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2296 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2297 if (idx >= 0)
2298 {
2299 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2300 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2301 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) ||
2302 (skey->pkey.dh == NULL))
2303 {
2304 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2306 goto f_err;
2307 }
2308 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2309 }
2310 else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2311 {
2312 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2314 goto f_err;
2315 }
2316 else
2317 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2318
2319 if (n == 0L)
2320 {
2321 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2322 EVP_PKEY *clkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2323 if (clkey)
2324 {
2325 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2326 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2327 }
2328 if (dh_clnt == NULL)
2329 {
2330 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2332 goto f_err;
2333 }
2334 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2335 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2336 }
2337 else
2338 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2339 if (pub == NULL)
2340 {
2341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2342 goto err;
2343 }
2344
2345 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2346
2347 if (i <= 0)
2348 {
2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2350 BN_clear_free(pub);
2351 goto err;
2352 }
2353
2354 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2355 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
2356 if (dh_clnt)
2357 DH_free(dh_clnt);
2358 else
2359 BN_clear_free(pub);
2360 pub=NULL;
2361 s->session->master_key_length=
2362 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2363 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2364 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2365 if (dh_clnt)
2366 return 2;
2367 }
2368 else
2369 #endif
2370 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2371 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2372 {
2373 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2374 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2375 krb5_data authenticator;
2376 krb5_data enc_pms;
2377 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2378 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2379 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2380 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2381 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2382 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2383 int padl, outl;
2384 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2385 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2386
2387 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2388
2389 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2390
2391 n2s(p,i);
2392 enc_ticket.length = i;
2393
2394 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2395 {
2396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2397 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2398 goto err;
2399 }
2400
2401 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2402 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2403
2404 n2s(p,i);
2405 authenticator.length = i;
2406
2407 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2408 {
2409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2410 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2411 goto err;
2412 }
2413
2414 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2415 p+=authenticator.length;
2416
2417 n2s(p,i);
2418 enc_pms.length = i;
2419 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2420 p+=enc_pms.length;
2421
2422 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2423 ** after decryption
2424 */
2425 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2426 {
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2428 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2429 goto err;
2430 }
2431
2432 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2433 enc_pms.length + 6))
2434 {
2435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2436 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2437 goto err;
2438 }
2439
2440 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2441 &kssl_err)) != 0)
2442 {
2443 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2444 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2445 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2446 if (kssl_err.text)
2447 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2448 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2450 kssl_err.reason);
2451 goto err;
2452 }
2453
2454 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2455 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2456 */
2457 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2458 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2459 {
2460 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2461 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2462 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2463 if (kssl_err.text)
2464 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2465 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2467 kssl_err.reason);
2468 goto err;
2469 }
2470
2471 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2472 {
2473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2474 goto err;
2475 }
2476
2477 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2478 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2479 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2480
2481 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2482 if (enc == NULL)
2483 goto err;
2484
2485 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2486
2487 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2488 {
2489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2490 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2491 goto err;
2492 }
2493 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2494 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2495 {
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2497 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2498 goto err;
2499 }
2500 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2501 {
2502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2503 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2504 goto err;
2505 }
2506 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2507 {
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2509 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2510 goto err;
2511 }
2512 outl += padl;
2513 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2514 {
2515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2516 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2517 goto err;
2518 }
2519 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2520 {
2521 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2522 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2523 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2524 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2525 * the protocol version.
2526 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2527 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2528 */
2529 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2530 {
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2532 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2533 goto err;
2534 }
2535 }
2536
2537 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2538
2539 s->session->master_key_length=
2540 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2541 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2542
2543 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2544 {
2545 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2546 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2547 {
2548 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2549 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2550 }
2551 }
2552
2553
2554 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2555 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2556 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2557 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2558 */
2559 }
2560 else
2561 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2562
2563 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2564 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2565 {
2566 int ret = 1;
2567 int field_size = 0;
2568 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2569 const EC_GROUP *group;
2570 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2571
2572 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2573 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2574 {
2575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2576 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2577 goto err;
2578 }
2579
2580 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2581 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2582 {
2583 /* use the certificate */
2584 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2585 }
2586 else
2587 {
2588 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2589 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2590 */
2591 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2592 }
2593
2594 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2595 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2596
2597 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2598 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2599 {
2600 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2601 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2602 goto err;
2603 }
2604
2605 /* Let's get client's public key */
2606 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2607 {
2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2609 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2610 goto err;
2611 }
2612
2613 if (n == 0L)
2614 {
2615 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2616
2617 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2618 {
2619 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2620 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2621 goto f_err;
2622 }
2623 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2624 == NULL) ||
2625 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2626 {
2627 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2628 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2629 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2630 * never executed. When that support is
2631 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2632 * received in the certificate is
2633 * authorized for key agreement.
2634 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2635 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2636 * group.
2637 */
2638 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2640 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2641 goto f_err;
2642 }
2643
2644 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2645 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2646 {
2647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2648 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2649 goto err;
2650 }
2651 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2652 }
2653 else
2654 {
2655 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2656 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2657 */
2658 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2659 {
2660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2661 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2662 goto err;
2663 }
2664
2665 /* Get encoded point length */
2666 i = *p;
2667 p += 1;
2668 if (n != 1 + i)
2669 {
2670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2671 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2672 goto err;
2673 }
2674 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2675 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2676 {
2677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2678 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2679 goto err;
2680 }
2681 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2682 * currently, so set it to the start
2683 */
2684 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2685 }
2686
2687 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2688 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2689 if (field_size <= 0)
2690 {
2691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2692 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2693 goto err;
2694 }
2695 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2696 if (i <= 0)
2697 {
2698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2699 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2700 goto err;
2701 }
2702
2703 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2704 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2705 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2706 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2707 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2708 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2709
2710 /* Compute the master secret */
2711 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2712 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2713
2714 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2715 return (ret);
2716 }
2717 else
2718 #endif
2719 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2720 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2721 {
2722 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2723 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2724 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2725 int psk_err = 1;
2726 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2727
2728 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2729
2730 n2s(p,i);
2731 if (n != i+2)
2732 {
2733 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2734 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2735 goto psk_err;
2736 }
2737 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2738 {
2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2740 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2741 goto psk_err;
2742 }
2743 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2744 {
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2746 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2747 goto psk_err;
2748 }
2749
2750 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2751 * string for the callback */
2752 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2753 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2754 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2755 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2756 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2757
2758 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2759 {
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2761 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2762 goto psk_err;
2763 }
2764 else if (psk_len == 0)
2765 {
2766 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2767 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2768 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2769 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2770 goto psk_err;
2771 }
2772
2773 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2774 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2775 t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2776 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2777 s2n(psk_len, t);
2778 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2779 t+=psk_len;
2780 s2n(psk_len, t);
2781
2782 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2783 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2784 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2785 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2786 {
2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2788 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2789 goto psk_err;
2790 }
2791
2792 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2793 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2794 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2795 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2796 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2797 {
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2799 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2800 goto psk_err;
2801 }
2802
2803 s->session->master_key_length=
2804 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2805 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2806 psk_err = 0;
2807 psk_err:
2808 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2809 if (psk_err != 0)
2810 goto f_err;
2811 }
2812 else
2813 #endif
2814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2815 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2816 {
2817 int param_len;
2818
2819 n2s(p,i);
2820 param_len=i+2;
2821 if (param_len > n)
2822 {
2823 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2825 goto f_err;
2826 }
2827 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2828 {
2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2830 goto err;
2831 }
2832 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2833 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2834 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2835 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2836 {
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2838 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2839 goto err;
2840 }
2841
2842 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2843 {
2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2845 goto err;
2846 }
2847
2848 p+=i;
2849 }
2850 else
2851 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2852 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2853 {
2854 int ret = 0;
2855 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2856 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2857 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2858 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2859 unsigned long alg_a;
2860
2861 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2862 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2863 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2864 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2865 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2866 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2867
2868 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2869 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2870 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2871 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2872 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2873 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2874 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2875 if (client_pub_pkey)
2876 {
2877 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2878 ERR_clear_error();
2879 }
2880 /* Decrypt session key */
2881 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2882 {
2883 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2884 goto gerr;
2885 }
2886 if (p[1] == 0x81)
2887 {
2888 start = p+3;
2889 inlen = p[2];
2890 }
2891 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2892 {
2893 start = p+2;
2894 inlen = p[1];
2895 }
2896 else
2897 {
2898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2899 goto gerr;
2900 }
2901 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2902
2903 {
2904 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2905 goto gerr;
2906 }
2907 /* Generate master secret */
2908 s->session->master_key_length=
2909 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2910 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2911 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2912 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2913 ret = 2;
2914 else
2915 ret = 1;
2916 gerr:
2917 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2918 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2919 if (ret)
2920 return ret;
2921 else
2922 goto err;
2923 }
2924 else
2925 {
2926 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2928 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2929 goto f_err;
2930 }
2931
2932 return(1);
2933 f_err:
2934 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2935 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2936 err:
2937 #endif
2938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2939 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2940 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2941 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2942 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2943 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2944 #endif
2945 return(-1);
2946 }
2947
2948 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2949 {
2950 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2951 unsigned char *p;
2952 int al,ok,ret=0;
2953 long n;
2954 int type=0,i,j;
2955 X509 *peer;
2956 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2957 EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
2958 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2959
2960 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2961 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2962 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2963 -1,
2964 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
2965 &ok);
2966
2967 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2968
2969 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2970 {
2971 peer=s->session->peer;
2972 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2973 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2974 }
2975 else
2976 {
2977 peer=NULL;
2978 pkey=NULL;
2979 }
2980
2981 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2982 {
2983 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2984 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2985 {
2986 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2987 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2988 goto f_err;
2989 }
2990 ret=1;
2991 goto end;
2992 }
2993
2994 if (peer == NULL)
2995 {
2996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2997 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2998 goto f_err;
2999 }
3000
3001 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
3002 {
3003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3004 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3005 goto f_err;
3006 }
3007
3008 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3009 {
3010 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3011 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3012 goto f_err;
3013 }
3014
3015 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3016 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3017 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3018 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3019 * signature without length field */
3020 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
3021 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
3022 {
3023 i=64;
3024 }
3025 else
3026 {
3027 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3028 {
3029 int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
3030 if (rv == -1)
3031 {
3032 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3033 goto f_err;
3034 }
3035 else if (rv == 0)
3036 {
3037 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3038 goto f_err;
3039 }
3040 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3041 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3042 #endif
3043 p += 2;
3044 n -= 2;
3045 }
3046 n2s(p,i);
3047 n-=2;
3048 if (i > n)
3049 {
3050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3051 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3052 goto f_err;
3053 }
3054 }
3055 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3056 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3057 {
3058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3059 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3060 goto f_err;
3061 }
3062
3063 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3064 {
3065 long hdatalen = 0;
3066 void *hdata;
3067 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3068 if (hdatalen <= 0)
3069 {
3070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3071 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3072 goto f_err;
3073 }
3074 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3075 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3076 EVP_MD_name(md));
3077 #endif
3078 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3079 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3080 {
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3082 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3083 goto f_err;
3084 }
3085
3086 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3087 {
3088 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3090 goto f_err;
3091 }
3092 }
3093 else
3094 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3095 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3096 {
3097 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3098 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3099 pkey->pkey.rsa);
3100 if (i < 0)
3101 {
3102 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3104 goto f_err;
3105 }
3106 if (i == 0)
3107 {
3108 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3110 goto f_err;
3111 }
3112 }
3113 else
3114 #endif
3115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3116 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3117 {
3118 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3119 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3120 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3121 if (j <= 0)
3122 {
3123 /* bad signature */
3124 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3126 goto f_err;
3127 }
3128 }
3129 else
3130 #endif
3131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3132 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3133 {
3134 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3135 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3136 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3137 if (j <= 0)
3138 {
3139 /* bad signature */
3140 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3142 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3143 goto f_err;
3144 }
3145 }
3146 else
3147 #endif
3148 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3149 { unsigned char signature[64];
3150 int idx;
3151 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3152 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3153 if (i!=64) {
3154 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3155 }
3156 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3157 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3158 }
3159 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3160 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3161 if (j<=0)
3162 {
3163 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3165 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3166 goto f_err;
3167 }
3168 }
3169 else
3170 {
3171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3172 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3173 goto f_err;
3174 }
3175
3176
3177 ret=1;
3178 if (0)
3179 {
3180 f_err:
3181 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3182 }
3183 end:
3184 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3185 {
3186 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3187 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3188 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3189 }
3190 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3191 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3192 return(ret);
3193 }
3194
3195 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3196 {
3197 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3198 X509 *x=NULL;
3199 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3200 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3201 unsigned char *d;
3202 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3203
3204 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3205 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
3206 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
3207 -1,
3208 s->max_cert_list,
3209 &ok);
3210
3211 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3212
3213 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3214 {
3215 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3216 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3217 {
3218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3219 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3220 goto f_err;
3221 }
3222 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3223 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3224 {
3225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3226 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3227 goto f_err;
3228 }
3229 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3230 return(1);
3231 }
3232
3233 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3234 {
3235 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3237 goto f_err;
3238 }
3239 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3240
3241 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3242 {
3243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3244 goto err;
3245 }
3246
3247 n2l3(p,llen);
3248 if (llen+3 != n)
3249 {
3250 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3252 goto f_err;
3253 }
3254 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3255 {
3256 n2l3(p,l);
3257 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3258 {
3259 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3261 goto f_err;
3262 }
3263
3264 q=p;
3265 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3266 if (x == NULL)
3267 {
3268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3269 goto err;
3270 }
3271 if (p != (q+l))
3272 {
3273 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3275 goto f_err;
3276 }
3277 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3278 {
3279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3280 goto err;
3281 }
3282 x=NULL;
3283 nc+=l+3;
3284 }
3285
3286 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3287 {
3288 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3289 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3290 {
3291 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3292 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3293 goto f_err;
3294 }
3295 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3296 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3297 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3298 {
3299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3300 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3301 goto f_err;
3302 }
3303 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3304 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3305 {
3306 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3307 goto f_err;
3308 }
3309 }
3310 else
3311 {
3312 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3313 if (i <= 0)
3314 {
3315 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3317 goto f_err;
3318 }
3319 }
3320
3321 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3322 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3323 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3324 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3325
3326 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3327 * when we arrive here. */
3328 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3329 {
3330 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3331 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3332 {
3333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3334 goto err;
3335 }
3336 }
3337 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3338 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3339 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3340 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3341 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3342
3343 sk=NULL;
3344
3345 ret=1;
3346 if (0)
3347 {
3348 f_err:
3349 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3350 }
3351 err:
3352 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3353 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3354 return(ret);
3355 }
3356
3357 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3358 {
3359 CERT_PKEY *cpk;
3360
3361 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3362 {
3363 cpk=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3364 if (cpk == NULL)
3365 {
3366 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3367 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3368 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3369 {
3370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3371 return(0);
3372 }
3373 }
3374
3375 ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,cpk);
3376 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3377 }
3378
3379 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3380 return ssl_do_write(s);
3381 }
3382
3383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3384 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3385 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3386 {
3387 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3388 {
3389 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3390 const unsigned char *const_p;
3391 int len, slen_full, slen;
3392 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3393 unsigned int hlen;
3394 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3395 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3396 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3397 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3398 unsigned char key_name[16];
3399
3400 /* get session encoding length */
3401 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3402 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3403 * too long
3404 */
3405 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3406 return -1;
3407 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3408 if (!senc)
3409 return -1;
3410 p = senc;
3411 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3412
3413 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3414 const_p = senc;
3415 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3416 if (sess == NULL)
3417 {
3418 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3419 return -1;
3420 }
3421 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3422
3423 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3424 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3425 {
3426 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3427 return -1;
3428 }
3429 p = senc;
3430 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3431 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3432
3433 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3434 * follows handshake_header_length +
3435 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3436 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3437 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3438 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3439 */
3440 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3441 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3442 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3443 return -1;
3444 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3445 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3446 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3447 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3448 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3449 * from parent ctx.
3450 */
3451 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3452 {
3453 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3454 &hctx, 1) < 0)
3455 {
3456 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3457 return -1;
3458 }
3459 }
3460 else
3461 {
3462 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3463 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3464 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3465 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3466 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3467 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3468 }
3469
3470 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3471 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3472 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3473 * as their sessions. */
3474 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3475
3476 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3477 p += 2;
3478 /* Output key name */
3479 macstart = p;
3480 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3481 p += 16;
3482 /* output IV */
3483 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3484 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3485 /* Encrypt session data */
3486 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3487 p += len;
3488 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3489 p += len;
3490 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3491
3492 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3493 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3494 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3495
3496 p += hlen;
3497 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3498 /* Total length */
3499 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3500 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len);
3501 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3502 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3503 s2n(len - 6, p);
3504 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3505 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3506 }
3507
3508 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3509 return ssl_do_write(s);
3510 }
3511
3512 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3513 {
3514 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3515 {
3516 unsigned char *p;
3517 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3518 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3519 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3520 * + (ocsp response)
3521 */
3522 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3523 return -1;
3524
3525 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3526
3527 /* do the header */
3528 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3529 /* message length */
3530 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3531 /* status type */
3532 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3533 /* length of OCSP response */
3534 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3535 /* actual response */
3536 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3537 /* number of bytes to write */
3538 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3539 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3540 s->init_off = 0;
3541 }
3542
3543 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3544 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3545 }
3546
3547 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3548 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3549 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3550 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3551 {
3552 int ok;
3553 int proto_len, padding_len;
3554 long n;
3555 const unsigned char *p;
3556
3557 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3558 * extension in their ClientHello */
3559 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3560 {
3561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3562 return -1;
3563 }
3564
3565 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3566 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3567 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3568 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
3569 514, /* See the payload format below */
3570 &ok);
3571
3572 if (!ok)
3573 return((int)n);
3574
3575 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3576 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3577 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3578 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3579 {
3580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3581 return -1;
3582 }
3583
3584 if (n < 2)
3585 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3586
3587 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3588
3589 /* The payload looks like:
3590 * uint8 proto_len;
3591 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3592 * uint8 padding_len;
3593 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3594 */
3595 proto_len = p[0];
3596 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3597 return 0;
3598 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3599 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3600 return 0;
3601
3602 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3603 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3604 {
3605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3606 return 0;
3607 }
3608 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3609 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3610
3611 return 1;
3612 }
3613 # endif
3614
3615 int tls1_send_server_supplemental_data(SSL *s)
3616 {
3617 size_t length = 0;
3618 const unsigned char *authz, *orig_authz;
3619 unsigned char *p;
3620 size_t authz_length, i;
3621
3622 if (s->state != SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_A)
3623 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3624
3625 orig_authz = authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
3626 if (authz == NULL)
3627 {
3628 /* This should never occur. */
3629 return 0;
3630 }
3631
3632 /* First we walk over the authz data to see how long the handshake
3633 * message will be. */
3634 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
3635 {
3636 unsigned short len;
3637 unsigned char type;
3638
3639 type = *(authz++);
3640 n2s(authz, len);
3641 /* n2s increments authz by 2*/
3642 i += 2;
3643
3644 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
3645 type,
3646 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
3647 length += 1 /* authz type */ + 2 /* length */ + len;
3648
3649 authz += len;
3650 i += len;
3651 }
3652
3653 length += 1 /* handshake type */ +
3654 3 /* handshake length */ +
3655 3 /* supplemental data length */ +
3656 2 /* supplemental entry type */ +
3657 2 /* supplemental entry length */;
3658
3659 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, length))
3660 {
3661 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SEND_SERVER_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
3662 return 0;
3663 }
3664
3665 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3666 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA;
3667 /* Handshake length */
3668 l2n3(length - 4, p);
3669 /* Length of supplemental data */
3670 l2n3(length - 7, p);
3671 /* Supplemental data type */
3672 s2n(TLSEXT_SUPPLEMENTALDATATYPE_authz_data, p);
3673 /* Its length */
3674 s2n(length - 11, p);
3675
3676 authz = orig_authz;
3677
3678 /* Walk over the authz again and append the selected elements. */
3679 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
3680 {
3681 unsigned short len;
3682 unsigned char type;
3683
3684 type = *(authz++);
3685 n2s(authz, len);
3686 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
3687 i += 2;
3688
3689 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
3690 type,
3691 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
3692 {
3693 *(p++) = type;
3694 s2n(len, p);
3695 memcpy(p, authz, len);
3696 p += len;
3697 }
3698
3699 authz += len;
3700 i += len;
3701 }
3702
3703 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA_B;
3704 s->init_num = length;
3705 s->init_off = 0;
3706
3707 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3708 }
3709 #endif
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