2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
125 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
129 #include "ssl_locl.h"
130 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
131 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
132 #include <openssl/rand.h>
133 #include <openssl/objects.h>
134 #include <openssl/evp.h>
135 #include <openssl/x509.h>
136 #include <openssl/dh.h>
137 #include <openssl/bn.h>
138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
139 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
141 #include <openssl/md5.h>
143 static SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
144 static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
);
145 static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL
*s
);
146 static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
);
147 static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
);
148 static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
);
149 static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
);
150 static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
);
151 static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
);
152 static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
);
153 static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
);
155 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
156 static int nid2curve_id(int nid
);
159 static SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
161 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
162 return(SSLv3_server_method());
167 SSL_METHOD
*SSLv3_server_method(void)
170 static SSL_METHOD SSLv3_server_data
;
174 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD
);
178 memcpy((char *)&SSLv3_server_data
,(char *)sslv3_base_method(),
180 SSLv3_server_data
.ssl_accept
=ssl3_accept
;
181 SSLv3_server_data
.get_ssl_method
=ssl3_get_server_method
;
185 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD
);
187 return(&SSLv3_server_data
);
190 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
193 unsigned long l
,Time
=time(NULL
);
194 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
197 int new_state
,state
,skip
=0;
199 RAND_add(&Time
,sizeof(Time
),0);
203 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
205 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
206 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
208 /* init things to blank */
210 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) SSL_clear(s
);
214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
);
224 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
226 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
230 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
231 case SSL_ST_OK
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
234 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
,1);
236 if ((s
->version
>>8) != 3)
238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
241 s
->type
=SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
243 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
)
245 if ((buf
=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
)
250 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
))
258 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
266 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
)
268 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
269 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
271 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
,1)) { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
273 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
274 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
275 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
279 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
280 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
281 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
282 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
286 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
287 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
290 ret
=ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
291 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
292 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
293 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
296 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
299 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
303 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
304 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
305 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
308 ret
=ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
309 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
311 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
315 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
316 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
317 ret
=ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
318 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
321 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
323 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
327 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
328 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
329 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH */
330 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
& SSL_aNULL
))
332 ret
=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
333 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
337 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
341 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
342 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
343 l
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
;
345 /* clear this, it may get reset by
346 * send_server_key_exchange */
347 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
)
348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
350 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
352 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
353 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
354 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
355 * be able to handle this) */
356 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
358 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=0;
361 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
362 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
364 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
365 * message only if the cipher suite is either
366 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
367 * server certificate contains the server's
368 * public key for key exchange.
370 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
372 || (l
& (SSL_DH
|SSL_kFZA
))
374 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
375 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
376 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
382 ret
=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
383 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
388 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
392 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
393 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
394 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
395 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
396 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
397 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
398 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
399 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
400 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
401 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
402 * and in RFC 2246): */
403 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
404 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
405 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
406 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
407 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
408 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
& SSL_aKRB5
))
410 /* no cert request */
412 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=0;
413 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
417 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=1;
418 ret
=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
419 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
420 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
421 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
423 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
424 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
430 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
431 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
432 ret
=ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
433 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
434 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
435 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
439 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
440 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
441 num1
=BIO_ctrl(s
->wbio
,BIO_CTRL_INFO
,0,NULL
);
444 s
->rwstate
=SSL_WRITING
;
445 num1
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
);
446 if (num1
<= 0) { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
447 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
450 s
->state
=s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
453 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
454 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
455 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
456 ret
= ssl3_check_client_hello(s
);
460 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
;
462 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
464 ret
=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
465 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
468 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
472 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
473 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
474 ret
=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
479 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
480 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
481 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
482 * message is not sent.
484 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
489 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
492 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
493 * a client cert, it can be verified
495 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
496 &(s
->s3
->finish_dgst1
),
497 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[0]));
498 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,
499 &(s
->s3
->finish_dgst2
),
500 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]));
504 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
505 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
507 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
508 ret
=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
509 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
511 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
515 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
516 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
517 ret
=ssl3_get_finished(s
,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
518 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
519 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
523 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
527 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
528 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
530 s
->session
->cipher
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
531 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
532 { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
534 ret
=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
535 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
537 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
538 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
541 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
542 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
550 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
551 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
552 ret
=ssl3_send_finished(s
,
553 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
554 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
555 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
556 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
557 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
559 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
561 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL_ST_OK
;
566 /* clean a few things up */
567 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
569 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
572 /* remove buffering on output */
573 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
577 if (s
->new_session
== 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
579 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
580 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
584 ssl_update_cache(s
,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
586 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
588 s
->handshake_func
=ssl3_accept
;
590 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
,1);
598 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
604 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
)
608 if ((ret
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
613 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
))
617 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
,1);
624 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
628 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
,ret
);
632 static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
636 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
)
638 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
639 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
644 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
645 /* number of bytes to write */
650 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
651 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
654 static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
659 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
660 * so permit appropriate message length */
661 n
=ssl3_get_message(s
,
667 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
668 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
669 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
)
671 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
672 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
673 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
674 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
676 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
678 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
679 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
687 static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
689 int i
,j
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
692 unsigned char *p
,*d
,*q
;
695 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
=NULL
;
697 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
698 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
699 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
700 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
703 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
)
706 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
708 n
=ssl3_get_message(s
,
709 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
710 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
711 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
712 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
715 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
716 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
718 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
719 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
720 s
->client_version
=(((int)p
[0])<<8)|(int)p
[1];
723 if (s
->client_version
< s
->version
)
725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
726 if ((s
->client_version
>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
)
728 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
729 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
731 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
735 /* load the client random */
736 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
,p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
739 /* get the session-id */
743 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
744 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
745 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
746 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
747 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
748 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
749 * an earlier library version)
751 if (j
== 0 || (s
->new_session
&& (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
)))
753 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
758 i
=ssl_get_prev_session(s
,p
,j
);
760 { /* previous session */
767 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
774 if ((i
== 0) && (j
!= 0))
776 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
777 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
783 /* not enough data */
784 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
788 if ((i
> 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
,p
,i
,&(ciphers
))
795 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
796 if ((s
->hit
) && (i
> 0))
799 id
=s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
802 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers
));
804 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++)
806 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
,i
);
808 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
809 i
,sk_num(ciphers
),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
819 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1))
821 /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
822 s
->session
->cipher
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
,
827 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
828 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
829 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
840 /* not enough data */
841 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
848 if (p
[j
] == 0) break;
855 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
860 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
861 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
862 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
863 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=NULL
;
864 if (s
->ctx
->comp_methods
!= NULL
)
865 { /* See if we have a match */
868 nn
=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
871 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
884 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
889 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
890 #if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
891 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
892 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
893 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
897 /* wrong number of bytes,
898 * there could be more to follow */
899 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
900 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
906 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
911 s
->session
->compress_meth
=(comp
== NULL
)?0:comp
->id
;
912 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
913 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
914 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
917 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
918 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED
);
922 c
=ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,s
->session
->ciphers
,
927 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
931 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=c
;
935 /* Session-id reuse */
936 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
937 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
941 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
943 sk
=s
->session
->ciphers
;
944 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++)
946 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
,i
);
947 if (c
->algorithms
& SSL_eNULL
)
949 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c
))
953 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=nc
;
955 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=ec
;
957 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
961 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
964 /* we now have the following setup.
966 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
967 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
968 * compression - basically ignored right now
969 * ssl version is set - sslv3
970 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
971 * s->hit - session reuse flag
972 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
979 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
982 if (ciphers
!= NULL
) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
986 static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
991 unsigned long l
,Time
;
993 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
995 buf
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
996 p
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
997 Time
=time(NULL
); /* Time */
999 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-sizeof(Time
));
1000 /* Do the message type and length last */
1003 *(p
++)=s
->version
>>8;
1004 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
1007 memcpy(p
,s
->s3
->server_random
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1008 p
+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1010 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1011 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1012 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1013 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1014 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1015 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1016 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1018 if (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
))
1019 s
->session
->session_id_length
=0;
1021 sl
=s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1022 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
))
1024 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1028 memcpy(p
,s
->session
->session_id
,sl
);
1031 /* put the cipher */
1032 i
=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,p
);
1035 /* put the compression method */
1036 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1039 *(p
++)=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1044 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
1047 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
1048 /* number of bytes to write */
1053 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1054 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1057 static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1061 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
)
1063 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1066 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1071 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1072 /* number of bytes to write */
1077 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
1078 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1081 static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1087 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1093 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1094 EC_KEY
*ecdh
=NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1095 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1098 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1101 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1111 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1112 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
)
1114 type
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
& SSL_MKEY_MASK
;
1119 r
[0]=r
[1]=r
[2]=r
[3]=NULL
;
1121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1122 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
)
1125 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1127 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1128 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1129 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1132 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1141 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1147 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
1151 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1152 if (type
& SSL_kEDH
)
1155 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1156 dhp
=s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1157 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1158 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1161 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1166 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1173 if ((dh
=DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
)
1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1180 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1181 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1182 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
)))
1184 if(!DH_generate_key(dh
))
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1193 dh
->pub_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1194 dh
->priv_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1195 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) ||
1196 (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
))
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1209 if (type
& SSL_kECDHE
)
1211 ecdhp
=cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1212 if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1214 ecdhp
=s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1215 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1216 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1220 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1225 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
1227 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1232 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1238 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp
))
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1245 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
=ecdh
;
1246 if ((ecdh
->pub_key
== NULL
) ||
1247 (ecdh
->priv_key
== NULL
) ||
1248 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
))
1250 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
))
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1257 if ((ecdh
->group
== NULL
) ||
1258 (ecdh
->pub_key
== NULL
) ||
1259 (ecdh
->priv_key
== NULL
))
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1265 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1266 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(ecdh
->group
) > 163))
1268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1272 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1273 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1274 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1277 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_nid(ecdh
->group
)))
1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1284 /* Encode the public key.
1285 * First check the size of encoding and
1286 * allocate memory accordingly.
1288 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(ecdh
->group
,
1290 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1293 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1294 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
*sizeof(unsigned char));
1295 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1296 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
))
1298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1303 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(ecdh
->group
,
1305 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1306 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1308 if (encodedlen
== 0)
1310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1314 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
); bn_ctx
=NULL
;
1316 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1317 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1318 * In this situation, we need three additional bytes
1319 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1324 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1325 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1332 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1334 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1338 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1340 nr
[i
]=BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1344 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
& SSL_aNULL
))
1346 if ((pkey
=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
,s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
))
1349 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1352 kn
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1360 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,n
+4+kn
))
1362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1365 d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1368 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++)
1375 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1376 if (type
& SSL_kECDHE
)
1378 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1379 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1380 * [1 byte CurveType], [1 byte CurveName]
1381 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1382 * the actual encoded point itself
1384 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1390 memcpy((unsigned char*)p
,
1391 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
,
1393 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1401 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1402 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1404 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1408 for (num
=2; num
> 0; num
--)
1410 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
,(num
== 2)
1411 ?s
->ctx
->md5
:s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1412 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1413 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1414 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1415 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
,q
,
1416 (unsigned int *)&i
);
1420 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
1421 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0)
1423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_RSA
);
1431 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1432 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
1435 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
,EVP_dss1(), NULL
);
1436 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1437 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1438 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1439 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
1440 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
1442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_DSA
);
1450 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1451 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
1453 /* let's do ECDSA */
1454 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL
);
1455 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1456 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1457 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1458 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
1459 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
1461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_ECDSA
);
1470 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1471 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
1477 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
1480 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1486 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
1487 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1488 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1490 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1492 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1493 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1494 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
1496 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
1500 static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
1502 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1504 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
=NULL
;
1508 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
)
1512 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4]);
1514 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1516 n
=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
,p
);
1525 sk
=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
1529 for (i
=0; i
<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++)
1531 name
=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
,i
);
1532 j
=i2d_X509_NAME(name
,NULL
);
1533 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,4+n
+j
+2))
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
1538 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+n
]);
1539 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
))
1542 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
1549 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
1550 j
-=2; s2n(j
,d
); j
+=2;
1556 /* else no CA names */
1557 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+off
]);
1560 d
=(unsigned char *)buf
->data
;
1561 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
1564 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1569 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1570 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ s
->init_num
;
1573 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1580 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
1583 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1584 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1590 static const int KDF1_SHA1_len
= 20;
1591 static void *KDF1_SHA1(void *in
, size_t inlen
, void *out
, size_t outlen
)
1593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
1594 if (outlen
!= SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
)
1596 return SHA1(in
, inlen
, out
);
1602 static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1610 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
1612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1618 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1621 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
1622 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
1623 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
1624 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1627 n
=ssl3_get_message(s
,
1628 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
1629 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
1630 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1634 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
1635 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
1637 l
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
;
1639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1642 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1643 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
)
1645 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
1646 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
1647 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1648 * be sent already */
1651 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
1659 pkey
=s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
1660 if ( (pkey
== NULL
) ||
1661 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) ||
1662 (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
))
1664 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
1672 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
)
1677 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
))
1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
1689 i
=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
,p
,p
,rsa
,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
1693 if (i
!= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
1695 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1696 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1699 if ((al
== -1) && !((p
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
1701 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1702 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1703 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1704 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1705 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1707 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1708 if (!((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) &&
1709 (p
[0] == (s
->version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->version
& 0xff))))
1711 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1712 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1714 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1715 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1716 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1717 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1718 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1719 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1720 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1726 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1727 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1728 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1730 i
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
1731 p
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
1732 p
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
1733 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
+2, i
-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1736 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
1737 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
1738 s
->session
->master_key
,
1740 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
1744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1745 if (l
& (SSL_kEDH
|SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
))
1750 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
))
1752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
1762 if (n
== 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1764 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1765 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS
);
1770 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
)
1772 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1777 dh_srvr
=s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
1780 pub
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
);
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
1787 i
=DH_compute_key(p
,pub
,dh_srvr
);
1791 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1795 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
1800 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
1801 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
1802 s
->session
->master_key
,p
,i
);
1803 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
1807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1810 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
1811 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
1812 krb5_data authenticator
;
1814 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
1815 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
1816 EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
1817 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
1818 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1819 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
1821 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
1822 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
1824 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
1826 if (!kssl_ctx
) kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
1829 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
1830 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
1831 p
+=enc_ticket
.length
;
1834 authenticator
.length
= i
;
1835 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
1836 p
+=authenticator
.length
;
1840 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
1843 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
1846 if(enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
)
1848 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1849 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1853 if (n
!= enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
1856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1857 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1861 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
1865 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
1866 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
1868 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
1869 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1870 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1875 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
1876 ** but will return authtime == 0.
1878 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
1879 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0)
1882 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
1883 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
1885 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
1886 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1887 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1892 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0)
1894 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
1899 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
1900 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1902 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
1906 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
1908 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
,enc
,NULL
,kssl_ctx
->key
,iv
))
1910 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1911 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
1914 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
,&outl
,
1915 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
1917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1918 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
1921 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
1923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1924 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1927 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
,&(pms
[outl
]),&padl
))
1929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1930 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
1934 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
1936 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1937 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1940 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
1942 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
1943 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
1944 s
->session
->master_key
, pms
, outl
);
1946 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
)
1948 int len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
1949 if ( len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
)
1951 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
1952 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
,kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,len
);
1957 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
1958 ** but it caused problems for apache.
1959 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
1960 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
1964 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1966 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1967 if ((l
& SSL_kECDH
) || (l
& SSL_kECDHE
))
1972 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
1973 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
)
1975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1976 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1980 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
1983 /* use the certificate */
1984 srvr_ecdh
->group
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
-> \
1986 srvr_ecdh
->priv_key
= s
->cert
->key
->privatekey
-> \
1987 pkey
.eckey
->priv_key
;
1991 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
1992 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
1994 srvr_ecdh
->group
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
->group
;
1995 srvr_ecdh
->priv_key
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
->priv_key
;
1998 /* Let's get client's public key */
1999 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(srvr_ecdh
->group
))
2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2003 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2009 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2013 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2017 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2019 (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
))
2021 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2022 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2023 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2024 * never executed. When that support is
2025 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2026 * received in the certificate is
2027 * authorized for key agreement.
2028 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2029 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2032 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2034 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2038 EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2039 clnt_pub_pkey
->pkey
.eckey
->pub_key
);
2040 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2044 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2045 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2047 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
2049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2050 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2054 /* Get encoded point length */
2057 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(srvr_ecdh
->group
,
2058 clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0)
2060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2064 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2065 * currently, so set it to the start
2067 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2070 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2071 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_ecdh
->group
);
2072 if (field_size
<= 0)
2074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2078 /* If field size is not more than 24 octets, then use SHA-1 hash of result;
2079 * otherwise, use result (see section 4.8 of draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt;
2080 * this is new with this version of the Internet Draft).
2082 if (field_size
<= 24 * 8)
2083 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, KDF1_SHA1_len
, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
, KDF1_SHA1
);
2085 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
, NULL
);
2088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2093 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2094 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2095 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2097 srvr_ecdh
->priv_key
= NULL
;
2098 srvr_ecdh
->group
= NULL
;
2099 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2101 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2103 /* Compute the master secret */
2104 s
->session
->master_key_length
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
-> \
2105 generate_master_secret(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, p
, i
);
2107 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2113 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2115 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2121 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2122 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2126 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2127 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2128 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2130 srvr_ecdh
->priv_key
= NULL
;
2131 srvr_ecdh
->group
= NULL
;
2132 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2134 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2139 static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
2141 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2148 n
=ssl3_get_message(s
,
2149 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
2150 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
2155 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2157 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
2159 peer
=s
->session
->peer
;
2160 pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
2161 type
=X509_certificate_type(peer
,pkey
);
2169 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
)
2171 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
2172 if ((peer
!= NULL
) && (type
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2174 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE
);
2184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED
);
2185 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2189 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
2192 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2196 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
2198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
2199 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2203 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2204 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2210 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2214 j
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2215 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0))
2217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
2218 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2223 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2225 i
=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
2226 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
2230 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2231 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
2236 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
2243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2244 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
2246 j
=DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
2247 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
2248 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
2252 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
2259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2260 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
2262 j
=ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
2263 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
2264 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.eckey
);
2268 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
2270 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
2277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2278 al
=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
2287 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2290 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
2294 static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2296 int i
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
2298 unsigned long l
,nc
,llen
,n
;
2299 const unsigned char *p
,*q
;
2301 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
=NULL
;
2303 n
=ssl3_get_message(s
,
2310 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2312 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
)
2314 if ( (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
2315 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
2317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
2318 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2321 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2322 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
2324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
2325 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2328 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
2332 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
)
2334 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
2338 p
=d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2340 if ((sk
=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
)
2342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2349 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2353 for (nc
=0; nc
<llen
; )
2356 if ((l
+nc
+3) > llen
)
2358 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2364 x
=d2i_X509(NULL
,&p
,l
);
2367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2372 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2376 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
,x
))
2378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2385 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0)
2387 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2388 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
2390 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
2394 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2395 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
2396 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
2398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
2399 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2405 i
=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
,sk
);
2408 al
=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
2409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED
);
2414 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
2415 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
2416 s
->session
->peer
=sk_X509_shift(sk
);
2417 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
2419 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2420 * when we arrive here. */
2421 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
2423 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
2424 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2430 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
2431 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
2432 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
=sk
;
2433 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2434 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2442 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2445 if (x
!= NULL
) X509_free(x
);
2446 if (sk
!= NULL
) sk_X509_pop_free(sk
,X509_free
);
2450 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2455 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
)
2457 x
=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s
);
2459 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2460 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithms
2461 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK
|SSL_AUTH_MASK
))
2462 != (SSL_aKRB5
|SSL_kKRB5
))
2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2468 l
=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,x
);
2469 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
2474 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2475 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
2479 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2480 /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2481 static int nid2curve_id(int nid
)
2483 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2484 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2486 case NID_sect163k1
: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2488 case NID_sect163r1
: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2490 case NID_sect163r2
: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2492 case NID_sect193r1
: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2494 case NID_sect193r2
: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2496 case NID_sect233k1
: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2498 case NID_sect233r1
: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2500 case NID_sect239k1
: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2502 case NID_sect283k1
: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2504 case NID_sect283r1
: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2506 case NID_sect409k1
: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2508 case NID_sect409r1
: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2510 case NID_sect571k1
: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2512 case NID_sect571r1
: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2514 case NID_secp160k1
: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2516 case NID_secp160r1
: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2518 case NID_secp160r2
: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2520 case NID_secp192k1
: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2522 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1
: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2524 case NID_secp224k1
: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2526 case NID_secp224r1
: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2528 case NID_secp256k1
: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2530 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1
: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2532 case NID_secp384r1
: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2534 case NID_secp521r1
: /* secp521r1 (25) */