1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
151 #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152 #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
155 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
156 #include "ssl_locl.h"
157 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
158 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
159 #include <openssl/rand.h>
160 #include <openssl/objects.h>
161 #include <openssl/evp.h>
162 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
163 #include <openssl/x509.h>
164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
165 #include <openssl/dh.h>
167 #include <openssl/bn.h>
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
169 #include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
171 #include <openssl/md5.h>
173 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
);
175 static const SSL_METHOD
*ssl3_get_server_method(int ver
)
177 if (ver
== SSL3_VERSION
)
178 return(SSLv3_server_method());
183 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
184 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
,int *al
)
186 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
188 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
190 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
191 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
))
193 if(s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
)
195 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
196 we do so if There is no srp login name */
198 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
202 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
,al
);
209 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method
,
211 ssl_undefined_function
,
212 ssl3_get_server_method
)
214 int ssl3_accept(SSL
*s
)
217 unsigned long alg_k
,Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
);
218 void (*cb
)(const SSL
*ssl
,int type
,int val
)=NULL
;
220 int new_state
,state
,skip
=0;
222 RAND_add(&Time
,sizeof(Time
),0);
226 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
228 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
229 cb
=s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
231 /* init things to blank */
233 if (!SSL_in_init(s
) || SSL_in_before(s
)) SSL_clear(s
);
237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET
);
241 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
242 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
243 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
244 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
246 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
)
248 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
259 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
:
261 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
265 case SSL_ST_BEFORE
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
266 case SSL_ST_OK
|SSL_ST_ACCEPT
:
269 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
,1);
271 if ((s
->version
>>8) != 3)
273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
276 s
->type
=SSL_ST_ACCEPT
;
278 if (s
->init_buf
== NULL
)
280 if ((buf
=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
)
285 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf
,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
))
293 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s
))
300 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
;
301 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
;
303 if (s
->state
!= SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE
)
305 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
306 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
308 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s
,1)) { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
310 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
311 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
;
312 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
++;
314 else if (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
&&
315 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
))
317 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
318 * client that doesn't support secure
321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
322 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
328 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
329 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
330 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
++;
331 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
;
335 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
:
336 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
:
339 ret
=ssl3_send_hello_request(s
);
340 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
341 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
;
342 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
345 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
348 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C
:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
:
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
:
354 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
:
356 if (s
->rwstate
!= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
)
358 ret
=ssl3_get_client_hello(s
);
359 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
364 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
,&al
)) < 0)
366 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
367 s
->rwstate
=SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
370 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
)
372 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
373 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
374 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
375 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
377 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
;
385 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
;
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
:
390 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
:
391 ret
=ssl3_send_server_hello(s
);
392 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
396 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
397 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
399 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
403 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
406 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
;
410 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
:
411 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
:
412 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
413 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
414 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
415 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)
416 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
))
418 ret
=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s
);
419 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
421 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
422 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
;
424 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
429 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
436 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
441 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
:
442 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
:
443 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
445 /* clear this, it may get reset by
446 * send_server_key_exchange */
447 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
)
448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
449 && !(alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
450 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
452 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
453 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
454 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
455 * be able to handle this) */
456 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
458 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=0;
461 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
462 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
464 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
466 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
467 * message only if the cipher suite is either
468 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
469 * server certificate contains the server's
470 * public key for key exchange.
472 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
473 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
474 * hint if provided */
475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
476 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) && s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
)
478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
479 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
480 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
482 || (alg_k
& SSL_kEDH
)
483 || (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
484 || ((alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
485 && (s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
== NULL
486 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
487 && EVP_PKEY_size(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
)
493 ret
=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s
);
494 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
499 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
;
503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
:
504 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
:
505 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
506 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) ||
507 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
508 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
509 ((s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) &&
510 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
)) ||
511 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
512 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
513 * and in RFC 2246): */
514 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
) &&
515 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
516 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
517 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) ||
518 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
519 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aKRB5
)
520 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
521 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
522 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
524 /* no cert request */
526 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=0;
527 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
528 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
529 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
534 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
=1;
535 ret
=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s
);
536 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
537 #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
538 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
;
540 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
541 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
547 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
:
548 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
:
549 ret
=ssl3_send_server_done(s
);
550 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
551 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
;
552 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
556 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
:
558 /* This code originally checked to see if
559 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
560 * and then flushed. This caused problems
561 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
562 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
563 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
564 * still exist. So instead we just flush
568 s
->rwstate
=SSL_WRITING
;
569 if (BIO_flush(s
->wbio
) <= 0)
574 s
->rwstate
=SSL_NOTHING
;
576 s
->state
=s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
;
579 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A
:
580 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B
:
581 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
582 ret
= ssl3_check_client_hello(s
);
586 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
;
588 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
590 ret
=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s
);
591 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
594 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
;
598 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
:
599 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
:
600 ret
=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s
);
605 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
606 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
607 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
608 * message is not sent.
609 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
610 * the client uses its key from the certificate
613 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
614 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
616 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
617 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
619 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
623 else if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
625 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
627 if (!s
->session
->peer
)
629 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
630 * at this point and digest cached records.
632 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
637 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
638 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
646 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
;
649 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
650 * a client cert, it can be verified
651 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
652 * should be generalized. But it is next step
654 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
655 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
657 for (dgst_num
=0; dgst_num
<SSL_MAX_DIGEST
;dgst_num
++)
658 if (s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
])
662 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->cert_verify_mac(s
,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]),&(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[offset
]));
663 dgst_size
=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
[dgst_num
]);
674 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
:
675 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
:
677 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
678 ret
=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s
);
679 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
681 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
682 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
684 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
685 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
687 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
692 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
693 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
:
694 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
:
695 ret
=ssl3_get_next_proto(s
);
696 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
698 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
702 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
:
703 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
:
704 ret
=ssl3_get_finished(s
,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
,
705 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B
);
706 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
710 else if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
711 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
;
714 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
719 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
:
720 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
:
721 ret
=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s
);
722 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
723 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
;
727 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
:
728 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
:
729 ret
=ssl3_send_cert_status(s
);
730 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
731 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
;
737 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
:
738 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
:
740 s
->session
->cipher
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
741 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
742 { ret
= -1; goto end
; }
744 ret
=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s
,
745 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B
);
747 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
748 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
;
751 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
752 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
760 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
:
761 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
:
762 ret
=ssl3_send_finished(s
,
763 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A
,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B
,
764 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
765 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
766 if (ret
<= 0) goto end
;
767 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH
;
770 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
771 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
773 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
774 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
;
776 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
;
780 s
->s3
->tmp
.next_state
=SSL_ST_OK
;
785 /* clean a few things up */
786 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
788 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
791 /* remove buffering on output */
792 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
796 if (s
->renegotiate
== 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
801 ssl_update_cache(s
,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
803 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
805 s
->handshake_func
=ssl3_accept
;
807 if (cb
!= NULL
) cb(s
,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
,1);
815 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE
);
821 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
&& !skip
)
825 if ((ret
=BIO_flush(s
->wbio
)) <= 0)
830 if ((cb
!= NULL
) && (s
->state
!= state
))
834 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP
,1);
841 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
845 cb(s
,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT
,ret
);
849 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
853 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A
)
855 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
856 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
861 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B
;
862 /* number of bytes to write */
867 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
868 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
871 int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
876 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
877 * so permit appropriate message length */
878 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
884 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
885 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
= 1;
886 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
)
888 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
890 if (s
->s3
->flags
& SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
)
892 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS
);
895 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
896 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
897 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
898 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
900 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
901 s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
= NULL
;
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
905 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
907 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
908 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
911 s
->s3
->flags
|= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE
;
917 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
919 int i
,j
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
920 unsigned int cookie_len
;
923 unsigned char *p
,*d
,*q
;
925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
928 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
=NULL
;
930 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
931 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
932 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
933 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
936 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
939 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
;
942 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
943 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B
,
944 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C
,
945 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
946 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
949 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
951 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
953 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
954 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
955 s
->client_version
=(((int)p
[0])<<8)|(int)p
[1];
958 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
> s
->version
) ||
959 (s
->version
!= DTLS1_VERSION
&& s
->client_version
< s
->version
))
961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER
);
962 if ((s
->client_version
>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
)
964 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
965 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
967 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
971 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
972 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
973 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
975 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
)
977 unsigned int session_length
, cookie_length
;
979 session_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
980 cookie_length
= *(p
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ session_length
+ 1);
982 if (cookie_length
== 0)
986 /* load the client random */
987 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
,p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
990 /* get the session-id */
994 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
995 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
996 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
997 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
998 * won't even compile against older library versions).
1000 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1001 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1002 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1003 * setting will be ignored.
1005 if ((s
->new_session
&& (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
)))
1007 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
1012 i
=ssl_get_prev_session(s
, p
, j
, d
+ n
);
1014 { /* previous session */
1021 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
,1))
1028 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
1031 cookie_len
= *(p
++);
1034 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1035 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1036 * does not cause an overflow.
1038 if ( cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
))
1041 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1046 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1047 if ((SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) &&
1050 memcpy(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, p
, cookie_len
);
1052 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
)
1054 if ( s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
,
1057 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1059 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1062 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1064 else if ( memcmp(s
->d1
->rcvd_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1065 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) /* default verification */
1067 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1069 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1080 if ((i
== 0) && (j
!= 0))
1082 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1083 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
1089 /* not enough data */
1090 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1094 if ((i
> 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
,p
,i
,&(ciphers
))
1101 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1102 if ((s
->hit
) && (i
> 0))
1105 id
=s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1108 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers
));
1110 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++)
1112 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
,i
);
1114 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1115 i
,sk_num(ciphers
),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1123 /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1124 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1127 if (j
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
) == 1))
1129 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1130 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1131 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1132 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1133 * enabled, though. */
1134 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, 0);
1135 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s
), c
) >= 0)
1137 s
->session
->cipher
= c
;
1144 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1145 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1146 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1156 /* not enough data */
1157 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1164 if (p
[j
] == 0) break;
1171 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1178 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
)
1180 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
,&p
,d
,n
))
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1187 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1188 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1189 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1190 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1194 Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
); /* Time */
1195 pos
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1197 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-4) <= 0)
1199 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1204 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
)
1206 SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
=NULL
;
1208 s
->session
->master_key_length
=sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1209 if(s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, &s
->session
->master_key_length
,
1210 ciphers
, &pref_cipher
, s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
))
1213 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1214 s
->session
->verify_result
=X509_V_OK
;
1218 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1219 pref_cipher
=pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1220 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1222 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1227 s
->session
->cipher
=pref_cipher
;
1230 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1232 if (s
->cipher_list_by_id
)
1233 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1235 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1236 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1241 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1242 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1243 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1244 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=NULL
;
1245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1246 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1247 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1249 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1250 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1251 /* Can't disable compression */
1252 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1254 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1258 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1259 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++)
1261 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1262 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
)
1264 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1268 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1270 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1274 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1275 for (m
= 0; m
< i
; m
++)
1277 if (q
[m
] == comp_id
)
1282 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1289 else if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
)
1290 { /* See if we have a match */
1291 int m
,nn
,o
,v
,done
=0;
1293 nn
=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1294 for (m
=0; m
<nn
; m
++)
1296 comp
=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
,m
);
1309 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
=comp
;
1314 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1315 * using compression.
1317 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0)
1319 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1325 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1330 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1331 s
->session
->compress_meth
=0;
1333 s
->session
->compress_meth
=(comp
== NULL
)?0:comp
->id
;
1335 if (s
->session
->ciphers
!= NULL
)
1336 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1337 s
->session
->ciphers
=ciphers
;
1338 if (ciphers
== NULL
)
1340 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED
);
1345 c
=ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,s
->session
->ciphers
,
1346 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1350 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO
,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1354 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=c
;
1355 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1356 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1357 s
->session
->not_resumable
=s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
1358 ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kEDH
| SSL_kEECDH
)) != 0));
1359 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
1360 /* do not send a session ticket */
1361 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
1365 /* Session-id reuse */
1366 #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1367 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1368 SSL_CIPHER
*nc
=NULL
;
1369 SSL_CIPHER
*ec
=NULL
;
1371 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
)
1373 sk
=s
->session
->ciphers
;
1374 for (i
=0; i
<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
); i
++)
1376 c
=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
,i
);
1377 if (c
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_eNULL
)
1379 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c
))
1383 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=nc
;
1384 else if (ec
!= NULL
)
1385 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=ec
;
1387 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1391 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
=s
->session
->cipher
;
1394 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) < TLS1_2_VERSION
|| !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
))
1396 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
1400 /* we now have the following setup.
1402 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1403 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1404 * compression - basically ignored right now
1405 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1406 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1407 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1408 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1415 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
1418 if (ciphers
!= NULL
) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1422 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1425 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1428 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1432 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A
)
1434 buf
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1435 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1436 p
=s
->s3
->server_random
;
1437 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1438 Time
=(unsigned long)time(NULL
); /* Time */
1440 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-4) <= 0)
1443 /* Do the message type and length last */
1446 *(p
++)=s
->version
>>8;
1447 *(p
++)=s
->version
&0xff;
1450 memcpy(p
,s
->s3
->server_random
,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1451 p
+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1453 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1454 * back in the server hello:
1455 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1456 * we send back the old session ID.
1457 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1458 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1459 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1460 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1462 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1463 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1464 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1465 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1468 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
1469 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1471 s
->session
->session_id_length
=0;
1473 sl
=s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1474 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
))
1476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1480 memcpy(p
,s
->session
->session_id
,sl
);
1483 /* put the cipher */
1484 i
=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,p
);
1487 /* put the compression method */
1488 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1491 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1494 *(p
++)=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1497 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0)
1499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1502 if ((p
= ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) == NULL
)
1504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1511 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
1514 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B
;
1515 /* number of bytes to write */
1520 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1521 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1524 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1528 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A
)
1530 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1533 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1538 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B
;
1539 /* number of bytes to write */
1544 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1545 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
1548 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1554 unsigned char md_buf
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
1557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1561 EC_KEY
*ecdh
=NULL
, *ecdhp
;
1562 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1565 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
1568 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1569 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
1579 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx
);
1580 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A
)
1582 type
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1587 r
[0]=r
[1]=r
[2]=r
[3]=NULL
;
1589 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1590 if (type
& SSL_kRSA
)
1593 if ((rsa
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1595 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp_cb(s
,
1596 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1597 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1600 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1601 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1609 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY
);
1615 s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
=1;
1619 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1620 if (type
& SSL_kEDH
)
1623 if ((dhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
))
1624 dhp
=s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
,
1625 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1626 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1629 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1634 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
!= NULL
)
1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1640 if ((dh
=DHparams_dup(dhp
)) == NULL
)
1642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1647 if ((dhp
->pub_key
== NULL
||
1648 dhp
->priv_key
== NULL
||
1649 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
)))
1651 if(!DH_generate_key(dh
))
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1660 dh
->pub_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->pub_key
);
1661 dh
->priv_key
=BN_dup(dhp
->priv_key
);
1662 if ((dh
->pub_key
== NULL
) ||
1663 (dh
->priv_key
== NULL
))
1665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
1675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1676 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
)
1678 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
1680 ecdhp
=cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
1681 if (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_auto
)
1683 /* Get NID of first shared curve */
1684 int nid
= tls1_shared_curve(s
, 0);
1685 if (nid
!= NID_undef
)
1686 ecdhp
= EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid
);
1688 else if ((ecdhp
== NULL
) && s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
)
1690 ecdhp
=s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb(s
,
1691 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
),
1692 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
));
1696 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
1701 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
!= NULL
)
1703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1707 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1713 if (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_auto
)
1715 else if ((ecdh
= EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp
)) == NULL
)
1717 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1721 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
=ecdh
;
1722 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1723 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1724 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
))
1726 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh
))
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1733 if (((group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh
)) == NULL
) ||
1734 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
) == NULL
) ||
1735 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh
) == NULL
))
1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1741 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
) &&
1742 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
) > 163))
1744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER
);
1748 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1749 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1750 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1753 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group
)))
1756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1760 /* Encode the public key.
1761 * First check the size of encoding and
1762 * allocate memory accordingly.
1764 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1765 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1766 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1769 encodedPoint
= (unsigned char *)
1770 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen
*sizeof(unsigned char));
1771 bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new();
1772 if ((encodedPoint
== NULL
) || (bn_ctx
== NULL
))
1774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1779 encodedlen
= EC_POINT_point2oct(group
,
1780 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh
),
1781 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1782 encodedPoint
, encodedlen
, bn_ctx
);
1784 if (encodedlen
== 0)
1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB
);
1790 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
); bn_ctx
=NULL
;
1792 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1793 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1794 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1795 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1800 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1801 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1809 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1810 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1811 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1813 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1814 n
+=2+strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1817 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1819 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
)
1821 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
1822 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
1823 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) ||
1824 (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
))
1826 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
1837 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1841 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
&& i
<4; i
++)
1843 nr
[i
]=BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1844 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1845 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1852 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
1853 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
))
1855 if ((pkey
=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
,s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
,&md
))
1858 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1861 kn
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1869 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,n
+4+kn
))
1871 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1874 d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1877 for (i
=0; r
[i
] != NULL
&& i
<4; i
++)
1879 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1880 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1892 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1893 if (type
& SSL_kEECDH
)
1895 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1896 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1897 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1898 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1899 * the actual encoded point itself
1901 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1909 memcpy((unsigned char*)p
,
1910 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint
,
1912 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1913 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1919 if (type
& SSL_kPSK
)
1921 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1922 s2n(strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
), p
);
1923 strncpy((char *)p
, s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
, strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
));
1924 p
+=strlen(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
1931 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1932 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1933 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1934 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
1935 && TLS1_get_version(s
) < TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1939 for (num
=2; num
> 0; num
--)
1941 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx
,
1942 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW
);
1943 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx
,(num
== 2)
1944 ?s
->ctx
->md5
:s
->ctx
->sha1
, NULL
);
1945 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1946 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1947 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1948 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx
,q
,
1949 (unsigned int *)&i
);
1953 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1
, md_buf
, j
,
1954 &(p
[2]), &u
, pkey
->pkey
.rsa
) <= 0)
1956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_RSA
);
1966 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1968 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
1970 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
))
1972 /* Should never happen */
1973 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1974 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1980 fprintf(stderr
, "Using hash %s\n",
1983 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx
, md
, NULL
);
1984 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1985 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1986 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx
,&(d
[4]),n
);
1987 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx
,&(p
[2]),
1988 (unsigned int *)&i
,pkey
))
1990 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_LIB_EVP
);
1995 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2000 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2001 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
2007 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
2010 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2016 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B
;
2017 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2018 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
2020 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2022 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2023 if (encodedPoint
!= NULL
) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2024 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2026 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx
);
2030 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2032 unsigned char *p
,*d
;
2034 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
=NULL
;
2038 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A
)
2042 d
=p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4]);
2044 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2046 n
=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
,p
);
2051 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2053 nl
= tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s
, p
+ 2);
2063 sk
=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2067 for (i
=0; i
<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++)
2069 name
=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
,i
);
2070 j
=i2d_X509_NAME(name
,NULL
);
2071 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
,4+n
+j
+2))
2073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
2076 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+n
]);
2077 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
))
2080 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
2087 i2d_X509_NAME(name
,&p
);
2088 j
-=2; s2n(j
,d
); j
+=2;
2094 /* else no CA names */
2095 p
=(unsigned char *)&(buf
->data
[4+off
]);
2098 d
=(unsigned char *)buf
->data
;
2099 *(d
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
2102 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2107 #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2108 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ s
->init_num
;
2111 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
2118 s
->state
= SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B
;
2121 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2122 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
2127 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
2131 unsigned long alg_k
;
2133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2135 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2139 DH
*dh_srvr
, *dh_clnt
= NULL
;
2141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2143 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2146 EC_KEY
*srvr_ecdh
= NULL
;
2147 EVP_PKEY
*clnt_pub_pkey
= NULL
;
2148 EC_POINT
*clnt_ecpoint
= NULL
;
2149 BN_CTX
*bn_ctx
= NULL
;
2152 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2153 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A
,
2154 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B
,
2155 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2159 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2160 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
2162 alg_k
=s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2165 if (alg_k
& SSL_kRSA
)
2167 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2168 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.use_rsa_tmp
)
2170 if ((s
->cert
!= NULL
) && (s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
!= NULL
))
2171 rsa
=s
->cert
->rsa_tmp
;
2172 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2173 * be sent already */
2176 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY
);
2184 pkey
=s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
;
2185 if ( (pkey
== NULL
) ||
2186 (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
) ||
2187 (pkey
->pkey
.rsa
== NULL
))
2189 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2196 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2197 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
2202 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
))
2204 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2214 i
=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n
,p
,p
,rsa
,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2218 if (i
!= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2220 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2221 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2224 if ((al
== -1) && !((p
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2226 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2227 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2228 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2229 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2230 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2232 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2233 if (!((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) &&
2234 (p
[0] == (s
->version
>>8)) && (p
[1] == (s
->version
& 0xff))))
2236 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2237 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2239 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2240 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2241 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2242 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2243 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2244 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2245 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2251 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2252 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2253 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2255 i
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2256 p
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2257 p
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2258 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p
+2, i
-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2262 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2263 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2264 s
->session
->master_key
,
2266 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2271 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEDH
|SSL_kDHr
|SSL_kDHd
))
2274 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
2281 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
))
2283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2292 if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHr
)
2293 idx
= SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA
;
2294 else if (alg_k
& SSL_kDHd
)
2295 idx
= SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA
;
2298 skey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
;
2299 if ((skey
== NULL
) ||
2300 (skey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_DH
) ||
2301 (skey
->pkey
.dh
== NULL
))
2303 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2307 dh_srvr
= skey
->pkey
.dh
;
2309 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
== NULL
)
2311 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2316 dh_srvr
=s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
;
2320 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2321 EVP_PKEY
*clkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2324 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey
, skey
) == 1)
2325 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey
);
2327 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
)
2329 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2333 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey
);
2334 pub
= dh_clnt
->pub_key
;
2337 pub
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
);
2340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2344 i
=DH_compute_key(p
,pub
,dh_srvr
);
2348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_DH_LIB
);
2353 DH_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.dh
);
2360 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2361 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2362 s
->session
->master_key
,p
,i
);
2363 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
,i
);
2369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2370 if (alg_k
& SSL_kKRB5
)
2372 krb5_error_code krb5rc
;
2373 krb5_data enc_ticket
;
2374 krb5_data authenticator
;
2376 KSSL_CTX
*kssl_ctx
= s
->kssl_ctx
;
2377 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx
;
2378 const EVP_CIPHER
*enc
= NULL
;
2379 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2380 unsigned char pms
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2381 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
];
2383 krb5_timestamp authtime
= 0;
2384 krb5_ticket_times ttimes
;
2386 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx
);
2388 if (!kssl_ctx
) kssl_ctx
= kssl_ctx_new();
2391 enc_ticket
.length
= i
;
2393 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ 6))
2395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2396 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2400 enc_ticket
.data
= (char *)p
;
2401 p
+=enc_ticket
.length
;
2404 authenticator
.length
= i
;
2406 if (n
< (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+ 6))
2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2409 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2413 authenticator
.data
= (char *)p
;
2414 p
+=authenticator
.length
;
2418 enc_pms
.data
= (char *)p
;
2421 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2424 if(enc_pms
.length
> sizeof pms
)
2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2427 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2431 if (n
!= (long)(enc_ticket
.length
+ authenticator
.length
+
2432 enc_pms
.length
+ 6))
2434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2435 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2439 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx
, &enc_ticket
, &ttimes
,
2443 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2444 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2446 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2447 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2453 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2454 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2456 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx
, &authenticator
,
2457 &authtime
, &kssl_err
)) != 0)
2460 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2461 krb5rc
, kssl_err
.reason
);
2463 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err
.text
);
2464 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2470 if ((krb5rc
= kssl_validate_times(authtime
, &ttimes
)) != 0)
2472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, krb5rc
);
2477 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx
);
2478 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2480 enc
= kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx
->enctype
);
2484 memset(iv
, 0, sizeof iv
); /* per RFC 1510 */
2486 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx
,enc
,NULL
,kssl_ctx
->key
,iv
))
2488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2489 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2492 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx
, pms
,&outl
,
2493 (unsigned char *)enc_pms
.data
, enc_pms
.length
))
2495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2496 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2499 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2502 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2505 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx
,&(pms
[outl
]),&padl
))
2507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2508 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2512 if (outl
> SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
)
2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2515 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2518 if (!((pms
[0] == (s
->client_version
>>8)) && (pms
[1] == (s
->client_version
& 0xff))))
2520 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2521 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2522 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2523 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2524 * the protocol version.
2525 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2526 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2528 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
))
2530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2531 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
2536 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx
);
2538 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2539 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2540 s
->session
->master_key
, pms
, outl
);
2542 if (kssl_ctx
->client_princ
)
2544 size_t len
= strlen(kssl_ctx
->client_princ
);
2545 if ( len
< SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH
)
2547 s
->session
->krb5_client_princ_len
= len
;
2548 memcpy(s
->session
->krb5_client_princ
,kssl_ctx
->client_princ
,len
);
2553 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2554 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2555 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2556 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2560 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2563 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kEECDH
|SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2568 const EC_GROUP
*group
;
2569 const BIGNUM
*priv_key
;
2571 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2572 if ((srvr_ecdh
= EC_KEY_new()) == NULL
)
2574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2575 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2579 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2580 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHr
|SSL_kECDHe
))
2582 /* use the certificate */
2583 tkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
->pkey
.ec
;
2587 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2588 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2590 tkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
;
2593 group
= EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey
);
2594 priv_key
= EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey
);
2596 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh
, group
) ||
2597 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh
, priv_key
))
2599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2604 /* Let's get client's public key */
2605 if ((clnt_ecpoint
= EC_POINT_new(group
)) == NULL
)
2607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2608 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2614 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2616 if (alg_k
& SSL_kEECDH
)
2618 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2622 if (((clnt_pub_pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
))
2624 (clnt_pub_pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
))
2626 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2627 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2628 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2629 * never executed. When that support is
2630 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2631 * received in the certificate is
2632 * authorized for key agreement.
2633 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2634 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2637 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2639 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS
);
2643 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint
,
2644 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey
->pkey
.ec
)) == 0)
2646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2650 ret
= 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2654 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2655 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2657 if ((bn_ctx
= BN_CTX_new()) == NULL
)
2659 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2660 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2664 /* Get encoded point length */
2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2673 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group
,
2674 clnt_ecpoint
, p
, i
, bn_ctx
) == 0)
2676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2680 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2681 * currently, so set it to the start
2683 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
2686 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2687 field_size
= EC_GROUP_get_degree(group
);
2688 if (field_size
<= 0)
2690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2694 i
= ECDH_compute_key(p
, (field_size
+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint
, srvr_ecdh
, NULL
);
2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2702 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2703 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2704 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2705 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2706 EC_KEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
);
2707 s
->s3
->tmp
.ecdh
= NULL
;
2709 /* Compute the master secret */
2710 s
->session
->master_key_length
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
-> \
2711 generate_master_secret(s
, s
->session
->master_key
, p
, i
);
2713 OPENSSL_cleanse(p
, i
);
2718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2719 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)
2721 unsigned char *t
= NULL
;
2722 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
*2+4];
2723 unsigned int pre_ms_len
= 0, psk_len
= 0;
2725 char tmp_id
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1];
2727 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2733 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2736 if (i
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
)
2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2739 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2742 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
)
2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2745 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2749 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2750 * string for the callback */
2751 memcpy(tmp_id
, p
, i
);
2752 memset(tmp_id
+i
, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1-i
);
2753 psk_len
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, tmp_id
,
2754 psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2755 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id
, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+1);
2757 if (psk_len
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
)
2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2760 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2763 else if (psk_len
== 0)
2765 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2767 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2768 al
=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2772 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2773 pre_ms_len
=2+psk_len
+2+psk_len
;
2775 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms
+psk_len
+4, psk_or_pre_ms
, psk_len
);
2777 memset(t
, 0, psk_len
);
2781 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
!= NULL
)
2782 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2783 s
->session
->psk_identity
= BUF_strdup((char *)p
);
2784 if (s
->session
->psk_identity
== NULL
)
2786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2787 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2791 if (s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
)
2792 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2793 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= BUF_strdup(s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
);
2794 if (s
->ctx
->psk_identity_hint
!= NULL
&&
2795 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2798 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2802 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2803 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2804 s
->session
->master_key
, psk_or_pre_ms
, pre_ms_len
);
2807 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms
, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms
));
2813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2814 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
2822 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2826 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.A
=BN_bin2bn(p
,i
,NULL
)))
2828 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2831 if (s
->session
->srp_username
!= NULL
)
2832 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2833 s
->session
->srp_username
= BUF_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2834 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
)
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2837 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2841 if ((s
->session
->master_key_length
= SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s
,s
->session
->master_key
))<0)
2843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2850 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2851 if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
)
2854 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2855 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2856 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32], *start
;
2857 size_t outlen
=32, inlen
;
2858 unsigned long alg_a
;
2860 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2861 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2862 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST94
)
2863 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST94
].privatekey
;
2864 else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
)
2865 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2867 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
,NULL
);
2868 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
);
2869 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2870 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2871 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2872 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2873 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2874 if (client_pub_pkey
)
2876 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2879 /* Decrypt session key */
2880 if ((*p
!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)))
2882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2890 else if (p
[1] < 0x80)
2897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2900 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
,premaster_secret
,&outlen
,start
,inlen
) <=0)
2903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2906 /* Generate master secret */
2907 s
->session
->master_key_length
=
2908 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
2909 s
->session
->master_key
,premaster_secret
,32);
2910 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2911 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2916 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey
);
2917 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2925 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2926 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2927 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2933 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
2934 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2937 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2938 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey
);
2939 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint
);
2940 if (srvr_ecdh
!= NULL
)
2941 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh
);
2942 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx
);
2947 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL
*s
)
2949 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
=NULL
;
2955 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2957 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx
);
2959 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
2960 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A
,
2961 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B
,
2963 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
2966 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
2968 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
)
2970 peer
=s
->session
->peer
;
2971 pkey
=X509_get_pubkey(peer
);
2972 type
=X509_certificate_type(peer
,pkey
);
2980 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
)
2982 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
2983 if ((peer
!= NULL
) && (type
| EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
2985 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2986 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE
);
2995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED
);
2996 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3000 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
))
3002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
3003 al
=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
3007 if (s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
3009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
3010 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3014 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
3015 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3016 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3017 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
3018 * signature without length field */
3019 if (n
==64 && (pkey
->type
==NID_id_GostR3410_94
||
3020 pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) )
3026 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3028 int sigalg
= tls12_get_sigid(pkey
);
3029 /* Should never happen */
3032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3033 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3036 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
3037 if (sigalg
!= (int)p
[1])
3039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
3040 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3043 md
= tls12_get_hash(p
[0]);
3046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
3047 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3051 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
3060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3061 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3065 j
=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
3066 if ((i
> j
) || (n
> j
) || (n
<= 0))
3068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
3069 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3073 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3077 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
3080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3081 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3085 fprintf(stderr
, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3088 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx
, md
, NULL
)
3089 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
))
3091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3092 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3096 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx
, p
, i
, pkey
) <= 0)
3098 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
3104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3105 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
3107 i
=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1
, s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,
3108 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
, p
, i
,
3112 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3113 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT
);
3118 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE
);
3125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3126 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
3128 j
=DSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3129 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3130 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.dsa
);
3134 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE
);
3141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3142 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
)
3144 j
=ECDSA_verify(pkey
->save_type
,
3145 &(s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
]),
3146 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,p
,i
,pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
3150 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3152 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3158 if (pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_94
|| pkey
->type
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
)
3159 { unsigned char signature
[64];
3161 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
,NULL
);
3162 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx
);
3164 fprintf(stderr
,"GOST signature length is %d",i
);
3166 for (idx
=0;idx
<64;idx
++) {
3167 signature
[63-idx
]=p
[idx
];
3169 j
=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx
,signature
,64,s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_verify_md
,32);
3170 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3173 al
=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
3174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,
3175 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE
);
3181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3182 al
=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
3191 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3194 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
)
3196 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
3197 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
3198 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE
;
3200 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx
);
3201 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3205 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3207 int i
,ok
,al
,ret
= -1;
3209 unsigned long l
,nc
,llen
,n
;
3210 const unsigned char *p
,*q
;
3212 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
=NULL
;
3214 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3221 if (!ok
) return((int)n
);
3223 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
)
3225 if ( (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3226 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
3228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3229 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3232 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3233 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
)
3235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
);
3236 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3239 s
->s3
->tmp
.reuse_message
=1;
3243 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
)
3245 al
=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
3246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE
);
3249 p
=d
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3251 if ((sk
=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
)
3253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3260 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3264 for (nc
=0; nc
<llen
; )
3267 if ((l
+nc
+3) > llen
)
3269 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3275 x
=d2i_X509(NULL
,&p
,l
);
3278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3283 al
=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3287 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
,x
))
3289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3296 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0)
3298 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3299 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
3301 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3305 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3306 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3307 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
3309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3310 al
=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3313 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3314 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
))
3316 al
=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3322 i
=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
,sk
);
3325 al
=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED
);
3331 if (s
->session
->peer
!= NULL
) /* This should not be needed */
3332 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3333 s
->session
->peer
=sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3334 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3336 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3337 * when we arrive here. */
3338 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3340 s
->session
->sess_cert
= ssl_sess_cert_new();
3341 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
== NULL
)
3343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3347 if (s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
!= NULL
)
3348 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
, X509_free
);
3349 s
->session
->sess_cert
->cert_chain
=sk
;
3350 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3351 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3359 ssl3_send_alert(s
,SSL3_AL_FATAL
,al
);
3362 if (x
!= NULL
) X509_free(x
);
3363 if (sk
!= NULL
) sk_X509_pop_free(sk
,X509_free
);
3367 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3372 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A
)
3374 cpk
=ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
3377 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3378 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aKRB5
) ||
3379 (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kKRB5
))
3381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3386 l
=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
,cpk
);
3387 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B
;
3392 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3393 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3397 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3398 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL
*s
)
3400 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A
)
3402 unsigned char *p
, *senc
, *macstart
;
3403 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3404 int len
, slen_full
, slen
;
3409 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3410 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3411 unsigned char key_name
[16];
3413 /* get session encoding length */
3414 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3415 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3418 if (slen_full
> 0xFF00)
3420 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3424 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
);
3426 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3428 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3434 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3436 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3437 if (slen
> slen_full
) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3443 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
);
3444 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3446 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3447 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3448 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3449 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3450 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3451 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3453 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
3454 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+
3455 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
3458 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3460 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
3461 /* Skip message length for now */
3463 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
3464 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
3465 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3466 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3469 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
)
3471 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, &ctx
,
3480 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv
, 16);
3481 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3482 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
);
3483 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
3484 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL
);
3485 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16);
3488 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3489 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3490 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3491 * as their sessions. */
3492 l2n(s
->hit
? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
, p
);
3494 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3496 /* Output key name */
3498 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
3501 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
));
3502 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3503 /* Encrypt session data */
3504 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
);
3506 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx
, p
, &len
);
3508 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3510 HMAC_Update(&hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
);
3511 HMAC_Final(&hctx
, p
, &hlen
);
3512 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3515 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3517 len
= p
- (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3518 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ 1;
3519 l2n3(len
- 4, p
); /* Message length */
3521 s2n(len
- 10, p
); /* Ticket length */
3523 /* number of bytes to write */
3525 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B
;
3530 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3531 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3534 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3536 if (s
->state
== SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A
)
3539 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3540 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3541 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3544 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
))
3547 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3550 *(p
++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
3551 /* message length */
3552 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
3554 *(p
++)= s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3555 /* length of OCSP response */
3556 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3557 /* actual response */
3558 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3559 /* number of bytes to write */
3560 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3561 s
->state
=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B
;
3565 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3566 return(ssl3_do_write(s
,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
));
3569 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NPN
3570 /* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3571 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3572 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL
*s
)
3575 int proto_len
, padding_len
;
3577 const unsigned char *p
;
3579 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3580 * extension in their ClientHello */
3581 if (!s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
)
3583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION
);
3587 n
=s
->method
->ssl_get_message(s
,
3588 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A
,
3589 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B
,
3591 514, /* See the payload format below */
3597 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3598 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3599 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3600 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
)
3602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
3607 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3609 p
=(unsigned char *)s
->init_msg
;
3611 /* The payload looks like:
3613 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3614 * uint8 padding_len;
3615 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3618 if (proto_len
+ 2 > s
->init_num
)
3620 padding_len
= p
[proto_len
+ 1];
3621 if (proto_len
+ padding_len
+ 2 != s
->init_num
)
3624 s
->next_proto_negotiated
= OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len
);
3625 if (!s
->next_proto_negotiated
)
3627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO
,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3630 memcpy(s
->next_proto_negotiated
, p
+ 1, proto_len
);
3631 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= proto_len
;