2 * Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_local.h"
12 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
13 #include "statem_local.h"
15 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
16 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
19 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
21 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
23 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
)
24 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
25 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->s3
.previous_client_finished
,
26 s
->s3
.previous_client_finished_len
)
27 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
28 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
29 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
32 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
35 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
36 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
39 if (s
->ext
.hostname
== NULL
)
40 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
42 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
43 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
44 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
45 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
46 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
47 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
48 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
)
49 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->ext
.hostname
,
50 strlen(s
->ext
.hostname
))
51 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
52 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
53 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
54 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
57 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
60 /* Push a Max Fragment Len extension into ClientHello */
61 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
62 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
65 if (s
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
== TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
)
66 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
68 /* Add Max Fragment Length extension if client enabled it. */
70 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
71 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
73 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length
)
74 /* Sub-packet for Max Fragment Length extension (1 byte) */
75 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
76 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
)
77 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
78 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
79 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
82 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
85 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
86 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
87 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
89 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
90 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
)
91 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
93 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp
)
94 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
95 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
96 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
97 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
98 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt
, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH
)
99 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->srp_ctx
.login
,
100 strlen(s
->srp_ctx
.login
))
101 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
102 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
103 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
104 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
107 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
112 static int use_ecc(SSL
*s
, int min_version
, int max_version
)
115 unsigned long alg_k
, alg_a
;
116 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *cipher_stack
= NULL
;
117 const uint16_t *pgroups
= NULL
;
118 size_t num_groups
, j
;
120 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
121 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
124 cipher_stack
= SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(s
);
125 end
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack
);
126 for (i
= 0; i
< end
; i
++) {
127 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack
, i
);
129 alg_k
= c
->algorithm_mkey
;
130 alg_a
= c
->algorithm_auth
;
131 if ((alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
))
132 || (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
)
133 || c
->min_tls
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
138 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_stack
);
142 /* Check we have at least one EC supported group */
143 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pgroups
, &num_groups
);
144 for (j
= 0; j
< num_groups
; j
++) {
145 uint16_t ctmp
= pgroups
[j
];
147 if (tls_valid_group(s
, ctmp
, min_version
, max_version
)
148 && tls_group_allowed(s
, ctmp
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED
))
155 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
156 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
159 const unsigned char *pformats
;
161 int reason
, min_version
, max_version
;
163 reason
= ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &min_version
, &max_version
, NULL
);
165 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, reason
);
166 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
168 if (!use_ecc(s
, min_version
, max_version
))
169 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
171 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
172 tls1_get_formatlist(s
, &pformats
, &num_formats
);
174 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats
)
175 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
176 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
177 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, pformats
, num_formats
)
178 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
179 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
180 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
183 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
187 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
188 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
189 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
192 const uint16_t *pgroups
= NULL
;
193 size_t num_groups
= 0, i
;
194 int min_version
, max_version
, reason
;
196 reason
= ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &min_version
, &max_version
, NULL
);
198 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, reason
);
199 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
202 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
203 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) || max_version
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)
204 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
206 if (!use_ecc(s
, min_version
, max_version
) && max_version
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)
207 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
211 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
213 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pgroups
, &num_groups
);
215 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups
)
216 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
217 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
218 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
219 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt
, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH
)) {
220 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
221 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
223 /* Copy group ID if supported */
224 for (i
= 0; i
< num_groups
; i
++) {
225 uint16_t ctmp
= pgroups
[i
];
227 if (tls_valid_group(s
, ctmp
, min_version
, max_version
)
228 && tls_group_allowed(s
, ctmp
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED
)) {
229 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, ctmp
)) {
230 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
231 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
235 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
236 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
237 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
240 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
244 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
245 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
250 if (!tls_use_ticket(s
))
251 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
253 if (!s
->new_session
&& s
->session
!= NULL
254 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
255 && s
->session
->ssl_version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
256 ticklen
= s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
;
257 } else if (s
->session
&& s
->ext
.session_ticket
!= NULL
258 && s
->ext
.session_ticket
->data
!= NULL
) {
259 ticklen
= s
->ext
.session_ticket
->length
;
260 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
261 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
262 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
263 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
265 memcpy(s
->session
->ext
.tick
,
266 s
->ext
.session_ticket
->data
, ticklen
);
267 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
272 if (ticklen
== 0 && s
->ext
.session_ticket
!= NULL
&&
273 s
->ext
.session_ticket
->data
== NULL
)
274 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
276 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
)
277 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
278 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
279 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
282 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
285 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
286 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
290 const uint16_t *salg
;
292 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
293 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
295 salglen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &salg
);
296 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms
)
297 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
298 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
299 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
300 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
301 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, pkt
, salg
, salglen
)
302 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
303 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
304 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
305 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
308 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
312 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
313 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
318 /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */
320 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
322 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
)
323 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
325 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
)
326 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
327 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
328 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
)
329 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
330 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
331 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
332 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
334 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s
->ext
.ocsp
.ids
); i
++) {
335 unsigned char *idbytes
;
336 OCSP_RESPID
*id
= sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s
->ext
.ocsp
.ids
, i
);
337 int idlen
= i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id
, NULL
);
340 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
341 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, idlen
, &idbytes
)
342 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id
, &idbytes
) != idlen
) {
343 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
344 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
347 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)
348 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
349 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
350 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
352 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.exts
) {
353 unsigned char *extbytes
;
354 int extlen
= i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s
->ext
.ocsp
.exts
, NULL
);
357 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
358 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
360 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, extlen
, &extbytes
)
361 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s
->ext
.ocsp
.exts
, &extbytes
)
363 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
364 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
367 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
368 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
369 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
372 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
377 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
378 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
380 if (s
->ctx
->ext
.npn_select_cb
== NULL
|| !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
381 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
384 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
385 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
387 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
)
388 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
389 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
390 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
393 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
397 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
398 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
402 if (s
->ext
.alpn
== NULL
|| !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
403 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
405 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
,
406 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
)
407 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
408 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
409 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->ext
.alpn
, s
->ext
.alpn_len
)
410 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
411 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
412 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
416 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
421 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
422 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
425 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
) *clnt
= SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s
);
429 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
431 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp
)
432 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
433 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
434 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
435 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
436 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
437 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
440 end
= sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt
);
441 for (i
= 0; i
< end
; i
++) {
442 const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
*prof
=
443 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt
, i
);
445 if (prof
== NULL
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, prof
->id
)) {
446 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
447 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
450 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)
451 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
452 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)
453 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
454 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
455 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
458 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
462 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
463 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
465 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
)
466 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
468 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
)
469 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
470 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
471 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
474 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
478 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
479 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
481 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
== NULL
)
482 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
484 /* Not defined for client Certificates */
486 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
488 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp
)
489 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
490 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
491 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
494 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
498 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
499 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
501 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET
)
502 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
504 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret
)
505 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
506 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
507 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
510 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
513 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
514 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
517 int currv
, min_version
, max_version
, reason
;
519 reason
= ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &min_version
, &max_version
, NULL
);
521 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, reason
);
522 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
526 * Don't include this if we can't negotiate TLSv1.3. We can do a straight
527 * comparison here because we will never be called in DTLS.
529 if (max_version
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)
530 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
532 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions
)
533 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
534 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
535 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
536 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
539 for (currv
= max_version
; currv
>= min_version
; currv
--) {
540 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, currv
)) {
541 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
542 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
545 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
546 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
547 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
550 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
554 * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension.
556 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
557 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
561 int nodhe
= s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX
;
563 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes
)
564 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
565 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
566 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE
)
567 || (nodhe
&& !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE
))
568 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
569 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
570 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
571 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
574 s
->ext
.psk_kex_mode
= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE
;
576 s
->ext
.psk_kex_mode
|= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE
;
579 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
583 static int add_key_share(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int curve_id
)
585 unsigned char *encoded_point
= NULL
;
586 EVP_PKEY
*key_share_key
= NULL
;
589 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
590 if (!ossl_assert(s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)) {
591 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
595 * Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share
597 key_share_key
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
;
599 key_share_key
= ssl_generate_pkey_group(s
, curve_id
);
600 if (key_share_key
== NULL
) {
601 /* SSLfatal() already called */
606 /* Encode the public key. */
607 encodedlen
= EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(key_share_key
,
609 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
610 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
614 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
615 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, curve_id
)
616 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, encoded_point
, encodedlen
)) {
617 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
622 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
623 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
624 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
626 s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
= key_share_key
;
627 s
->s3
.group_id
= curve_id
;
628 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point
);
632 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
== NULL
)
633 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key
);
634 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point
);
639 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
640 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
644 size_t i
, num_groups
= 0;
645 const uint16_t *pgroups
= NULL
;
646 uint16_t curve_id
= 0;
648 /* key_share extension */
649 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
)
650 /* Extension data sub-packet */
651 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
652 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
653 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
654 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
655 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
658 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pgroups
, &num_groups
);
661 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
664 if (s
->s3
.group_id
!= 0) {
665 curve_id
= s
->s3
.group_id
;
667 for (i
= 0; i
< num_groups
; i
++) {
669 if (!tls_group_allowed(s
, pgroups
[i
], SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED
))
672 curve_id
= pgroups
[i
];
678 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE
);
679 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
682 if (!add_key_share(s
, pkt
, curve_id
)) {
683 /* SSLfatal() already called */
684 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
687 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
688 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
689 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
691 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
693 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
697 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
698 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
700 EXT_RETURN ret
= EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
702 /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */
703 if (s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
== 0)
704 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
706 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie
)
707 /* Extension data sub-packet */
708 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
709 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->ext
.tls13_cookie
,
710 s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
)
711 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
712 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
716 ret
= EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
718 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.tls13_cookie
);
719 s
->ext
.tls13_cookie
= NULL
;
720 s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
= 0;
725 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
726 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
730 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
731 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
732 const unsigned char *id
= NULL
;
734 SSL_SESSION
*psksess
= NULL
;
735 SSL_SESSION
*edsess
= NULL
;
736 const EVP_MD
*handmd
= NULL
;
738 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
739 handmd
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
741 if (s
->psk_use_session_cb
!= NULL
742 && (!s
->psk_use_session_cb(s
, handmd
, &id
, &idlen
, &psksess
)
744 && psksess
->ssl_version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
))) {
745 SSL_SESSION_free(psksess
);
746 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_PSK
);
747 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
751 if (psksess
== NULL
&& s
->psk_client_callback
!= NULL
) {
752 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
755 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
756 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, NULL
, identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
759 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
760 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
761 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
762 } else if (psklen
> 0) {
763 const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id
[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
764 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
;
766 idlen
= strlen(identity
);
767 if (idlen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
768 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
769 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
771 id
= (unsigned char *)identity
;
774 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
775 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
777 cipher
= SSL_CIPHER_find(s
, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id
);
778 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
779 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
780 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
783 psksess
= SSL_SESSION_new();
785 || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(psksess
, psk
, psklen
)
786 || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(psksess
, cipher
)
787 || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(psksess
, TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
788 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
789 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
790 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
792 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
795 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
797 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->psksession
);
798 s
->psksession
= psksess
;
799 if (psksess
!= NULL
) {
800 OPENSSL_free(s
->psksession_id
);
801 s
->psksession_id
= OPENSSL_memdup(id
, idlen
);
802 if (s
->psksession_id
== NULL
) {
803 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
804 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
806 s
->psksession_id_len
= idlen
;
809 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
810 || (s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
== 0
811 && (psksess
== NULL
|| psksess
->ext
.max_early_data
== 0))) {
812 s
->max_early_data
= 0;
813 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
815 edsess
= s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
!= 0 ? s
->session
: psksess
;
816 s
->max_early_data
= edsess
->ext
.max_early_data
;
818 if (edsess
->ext
.hostname
!= NULL
) {
819 if (s
->ext
.hostname
== NULL
820 || (s
->ext
.hostname
!= NULL
821 && strcmp(s
->ext
.hostname
, edsess
->ext
.hostname
) != 0)) {
822 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
823 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI
);
824 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
828 if ((s
->ext
.alpn
== NULL
&& edsess
->ext
.alpn_selected
!= NULL
)) {
829 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN
);
830 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
834 * Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early
837 if (edsess
->ext
.alpn_selected
!= NULL
) {
838 PACKET prots
, alpnpkt
;
841 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots
, s
->ext
.alpn
, s
->ext
.alpn_len
)) {
842 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
843 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
845 while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots
, &alpnpkt
)) {
846 if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt
, edsess
->ext
.alpn_selected
,
847 edsess
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
)) {
853 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
854 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN
);
855 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
859 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data
)
860 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
861 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
862 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
863 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
867 * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the
868 * extension, we set it to accepted.
870 s
->ext
.early_data
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED
;
871 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 1;
873 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
876 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff
877 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200
880 * PSK pre binder overhead =
881 * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
882 * 2 bytes for extension length
883 * 2 bytes for identities list length
884 * 2 bytes for identity length
885 * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age
886 * 2 bytes for binder list length
887 * 1 byte for binder length
888 * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the
889 * subsequent binder bytes
891 #define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1)
893 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
894 unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
897 unsigned char *padbytes
;
900 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING
) == 0)
901 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
904 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685.
905 * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but
906 * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore
907 * this extension MUST always appear second to last.
909 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &hlen
)) {
910 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
911 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
915 * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this
916 * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be.
918 if (s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
919 && s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
!= 0
920 && s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
) {
921 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_md(s
->ctx
, s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
);
925 * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder
928 hlen
+= PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD
+ s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
933 if (hlen
> F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN
&& hlen
< F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN
) {
934 /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */
935 hlen
= F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN
- hlen
;
938 * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and
939 * 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least
940 * 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x,
941 * 8.x are intolerant of that condition)
948 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
)
949 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, hlen
, &padbytes
)) {
950 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
951 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
953 memset(padbytes
, 0, hlen
);
956 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
960 * Construct the pre_shared_key extension
962 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
963 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
965 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
966 uint32_t now
, agesec
, agems
= 0;
967 size_t reshashsize
= 0, pskhashsize
= 0, binderoffset
, msglen
;
968 unsigned char *resbinder
= NULL
, *pskbinder
= NULL
, *msgstart
= NULL
;
969 const EVP_MD
*handmd
= NULL
, *mdres
= NULL
, *mdpsk
= NULL
;
972 s
->ext
.tick_identity
= 0;
975 * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single
976 * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length
977 * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted.
981 * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume
982 * so don't add this extension.
984 if (s
->session
->ssl_version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
985 || (s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
== 0 && s
->psksession
== NULL
))
986 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
988 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
989 handmd
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
991 if (s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
!= 0) {
992 /* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */
993 if (s
->session
->cipher
== NULL
) {
994 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
995 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
997 mdres
= ssl_md(s
->ctx
, s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
);
1000 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1006 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
&& mdres
!= handmd
) {
1008 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session
1009 * so we can't use it.
1015 * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
1016 * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most
1017 * implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in
1018 * seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do
1019 * this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an
1022 now
= (uint32_t)time(NULL
);
1023 agesec
= now
- (uint32_t)s
->session
->time
;
1025 * We calculate the age in seconds but the server may work in ms. Due to
1026 * rounding errors we could overestimate the age by up to 1s. It is
1027 * better to underestimate it. Otherwise, if the RTT is very short, when
1028 * the server calculates the age reported by the client it could be
1029 * bigger than the age calculated on the server - which should never
1035 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
< agesec
) {
1036 /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
1041 * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
1044 agems
= agesec
* (uint32_t)1000;
1046 if (agesec
!= 0 && agems
/ (uint32_t)1000 != agesec
) {
1048 * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session.
1049 * If so we just ignore it.
1055 * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed
1058 agems
+= s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
;
1060 reshashsize
= EVP_MD_size(mdres
);
1061 s
->ext
.tick_identity
++;
1066 if (!dores
&& s
->psksession
== NULL
)
1067 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1069 if (s
->psksession
!= NULL
) {
1070 mdpsk
= ssl_md(s
->ctx
, s
->psksession
->cipher
->algorithm2
);
1071 if (mdpsk
== NULL
) {
1073 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1074 * If this happens it's an application bug.
1076 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_PSK
);
1077 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1080 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
&& mdpsk
!= handmd
) {
1082 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK
1083 * session. This is an application bug.
1085 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_PSK
);
1086 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1089 pskhashsize
= EVP_MD_size(mdpsk
);
1092 /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */
1093 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
)
1094 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1095 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1096 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1097 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1101 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
,
1102 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
)
1103 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, agems
)) {
1104 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1105 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1109 if (s
->psksession
!= NULL
) {
1110 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->psksession_id
,
1111 s
->psksession_id_len
)
1112 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, 0)) {
1113 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1114 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1116 s
->ext
.tick_identity
++;
1119 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)
1120 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &binderoffset
)
1121 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1123 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, reshashsize
, &resbinder
))
1124 || (s
->psksession
!= NULL
1125 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, pskhashsize
, &pskbinder
))
1126 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
1127 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
1128 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &msglen
)
1130 * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can
1131 * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders
1133 || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt
)) {
1134 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1135 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1138 msgstart
= WPACKET_get_curr(pkt
) - msglen
;
1141 && tls_psk_do_binder(s
, mdres
, msgstart
, binderoffset
, NULL
,
1142 resbinder
, s
->session
, 1, 0) != 1) {
1143 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1144 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1147 if (s
->psksession
!= NULL
1148 && tls_psk_do_binder(s
, mdpsk
, msgstart
, binderoffset
, NULL
,
1149 pskbinder
, s
->psksession
, 1, 1) != 1) {
1150 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1151 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1154 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1156 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1160 EXT_RETURN
tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
1161 unsigned int context
,
1162 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1165 if (!s
->pha_enabled
)
1166 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1168 /* construct extension - 0 length, no contents */
1169 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth
)
1170 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
1171 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1172 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1173 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
1176 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT
;
1178 return EXT_RETURN_SENT
;
1180 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT
;
1186 * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
1188 int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1189 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1191 size_t expected_len
= s
->s3
.previous_client_finished_len
1192 + s
->s3
.previous_server_finished_len
;
1194 const unsigned char *data
;
1196 /* Check for logic errors */
1197 if (!ossl_assert(expected_len
== 0
1198 || s
->s3
.previous_client_finished_len
!= 0)
1199 || !ossl_assert(expected_len
== 0
1200 || s
->s3
.previous_server_finished_len
!= 0)) {
1201 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1205 /* Parse the length byte */
1206 if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt
, &ilen
)) {
1207 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR
);
1211 /* Consistency check */
1212 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ilen
) {
1213 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR
);
1217 /* Check that the extension matches */
1218 if (ilen
!= expected_len
) {
1219 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH
);
1223 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, s
->s3
.previous_client_finished_len
)
1224 || memcmp(data
, s
->s3
.previous_client_finished
,
1225 s
->s3
.previous_client_finished_len
) != 0) {
1226 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH
);
1230 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, s
->s3
.previous_server_finished_len
)
1231 || memcmp(data
, s
->s3
.previous_server_finished
,
1232 s
->s3
.previous_server_finished_len
) != 0) {
1233 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH
);
1236 s
->s3
.send_connection_binding
= 1;
1241 /* Parse the server's max fragment len extension packet */
1242 int tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1243 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1247 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &value
)) {
1248 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1252 /* |value| should contains a valid max-fragment-length code. */
1253 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value
)) {
1254 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1255 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
1259 /* Must be the same value as client-configured one who was sent to server */
1261 * RFC 6066: if a client receives a maximum fragment length negotiation
1262 * response that differs from the length it requested, ...
1263 * It must abort with SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER alert
1265 if (value
!= s
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
) {
1266 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1267 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
1272 * Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation succeeded.
1273 * The negotiated Maximum Fragment Length is binding now.
1275 s
->session
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= value
;
1280 int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1281 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1283 if (s
->ext
.hostname
== NULL
) {
1284 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1288 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
1289 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1294 if (s
->session
->ext
.hostname
!= NULL
) {
1295 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1298 s
->session
->ext
.hostname
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->ext
.hostname
);
1299 if (s
->session
->ext
.hostname
== NULL
) {
1300 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1308 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1309 int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1310 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1312 size_t ecpointformats_len
;
1313 PACKET ecptformatlist
;
1315 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ecptformatlist
)) {
1316 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1320 ecpointformats_len
= PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist
);
1321 if (ecpointformats_len
== 0) {
1322 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1326 s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats_len
= 0;
1327 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
);
1328 s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
= OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len
);
1329 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
== NULL
) {
1330 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1334 s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats_len
= ecpointformats_len
;
1336 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist
,
1337 s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
,
1338 ecpointformats_len
)) {
1339 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1348 int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1349 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1351 if (s
->ext
.session_ticket_cb
!= NULL
&&
1352 !s
->ext
.session_ticket_cb(s
, PACKET_data(pkt
),
1353 PACKET_remaining(pkt
),
1354 s
->ext
.session_ticket_cb_arg
)) {
1355 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1359 if (!tls_use_ticket(s
)) {
1360 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1363 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
1364 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1368 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
1373 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1374 int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1375 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1377 if (context
== SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
1378 /* We ignore this if the server sends a CertificateRequest */
1379 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
1384 * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
1385 * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
1387 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
1388 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1391 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
1392 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1396 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1397 /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
1398 * the chain. We ignore any other responses.
1403 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1404 return tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
);
1407 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1408 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 1;
1415 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1416 int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1419 if (context
== SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
1420 /* We ignore this if the server sends it in a CertificateRequest */
1421 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
1426 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
1427 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
1428 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
1430 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
1431 size_t size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
1433 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
1434 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.scts
);
1437 s
->ext
.scts_len
= (uint16_t)size
;
1439 s
->ext
.scts
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
);
1440 if (s
->ext
.scts
== NULL
1441 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.scts
, size
)) {
1442 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1447 ENDPOINT role
= (context
& SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
) != 0
1448 ? ENDPOINT_CLIENT
: ENDPOINT_BOTH
;
1451 * If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension,
1452 * otherwise this is unsolicited.
1454 if (custom_ext_find(&s
->cert
->custext
, role
,
1455 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp
,
1457 SSLfatal(s
, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1461 if (!custom_ext_parse(s
, context
,
1462 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp
,
1463 PACKET_data(pkt
), PACKET_remaining(pkt
),
1465 /* SSLfatal already called */
1475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1477 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1478 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
1479 * fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1481 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1483 PACKET tmp_protocol
;
1485 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
1486 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &tmp_protocol
)
1487 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol
) == 0) {
1488 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1496 int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1499 unsigned char *selected
;
1500 unsigned char selected_len
;
1503 /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */
1504 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
1507 /* We must have requested it. */
1508 if (s
->ctx
->ext
.npn_select_cb
== NULL
) {
1509 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1513 /* The data must be valid */
1515 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(s
, &tmppkt
)) {
1516 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1519 if (s
->ctx
->ext
.npn_select_cb(s
, &selected
, &selected_len
,
1521 PACKET_remaining(pkt
),
1522 s
->ctx
->ext
.npn_select_cb_arg
) !=
1523 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
1524 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1529 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
1530 * a single Serverhello
1532 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.npn
);
1533 s
->ext
.npn
= OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len
);
1534 if (s
->ext
.npn
== NULL
) {
1535 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1539 memcpy(s
->ext
.npn
, selected
, selected_len
);
1540 s
->ext
.npn_len
= selected_len
;
1547 int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1552 /* We must have requested it. */
1553 if (!s
->s3
.alpn_sent
) {
1554 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1558 * The extension data consists of:
1559 * uint16 list_length
1560 * uint8 proto_length;
1561 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
1563 if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt
, &len
)
1564 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != len
|| !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt
, &len
)
1565 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != len
) {
1566 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1569 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
.alpn_selected
);
1570 s
->s3
.alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
);
1571 if (s
->s3
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
1572 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1575 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
.alpn_selected
, len
)) {
1576 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1579 s
->s3
.alpn_selected_len
= len
;
1581 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
1582 || s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
!= len
1583 || memcmp(s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
, s
->s3
.alpn_selected
, len
)
1585 /* ALPN not consistent with the old session so cannot use early_data */
1586 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;
1590 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have been
1591 * initialised to NULL. We should update it with the selected ALPN.
1593 if (!ossl_assert(s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
)) {
1594 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1597 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
=
1598 OPENSSL_memdup(s
->s3
.alpn_selected
, s
->s3
.alpn_selected_len
);
1599 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
1600 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1603 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= s
->s3
.alpn_selected_len
;
1609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1610 int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1613 unsigned int id
, ct
, mki
;
1615 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
) *clnt
;
1616 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE
*prof
;
1618 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ct
) || ct
!= 2
1619 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &id
)
1620 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mki
)
1621 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1622 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1623 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST
);
1628 /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
1629 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE
);
1633 /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
1634 clnt
= SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s
);
1636 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES
);
1641 * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and
1642 * presumably offered)
1644 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt
); i
++) {
1645 prof
= sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt
, i
);
1647 if (prof
->id
== id
) {
1648 s
->srtp_profile
= prof
;
1653 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1654 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST
);
1659 int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1662 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
1663 if (!(s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
)
1664 && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mac
!= SSL_AEAD
1665 && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
!= SSL_RC4
)
1671 int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1674 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET
)
1676 s
->s3
.flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS
;
1678 s
->session
->flags
|= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS
;
1683 int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1684 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1686 unsigned int version
;
1688 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &version
)
1689 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1690 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1695 * The only protocol version we support which is valid in this extension in
1696 * a ServerHello is TLSv1.3 therefore we shouldn't be getting anything else.
1698 if (version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1699 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1700 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER
);
1704 /* We ignore this extension for HRRs except to sanity check it */
1705 if (context
== SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
)
1708 /* We just set it here. We validate it in ssl_choose_client_version */
1709 s
->version
= version
;
1714 int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1718 unsigned int group_id
;
1720 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
, *skey
= NULL
;
1721 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginf
= NULL
;
1724 if (ckey
== NULL
|| s
->s3
.peer_tmp
!= NULL
) {
1725 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1729 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &group_id
)) {
1730 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1734 if ((context
& SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
) != 0) {
1735 const uint16_t *pgroups
= NULL
;
1736 size_t i
, num_groups
;
1738 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1739 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1744 * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we
1745 * already sent in the first ClientHello
1747 if (group_id
== s
->s3
.group_id
) {
1748 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE
);
1752 /* Validate the selected group is one we support */
1753 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pgroups
, &num_groups
);
1754 for (i
= 0; i
< num_groups
; i
++) {
1755 if (group_id
== pgroups
[i
])
1759 || !tls_group_allowed(s
, group_id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED
)) {
1760 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE
);
1764 s
->s3
.group_id
= group_id
;
1765 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
);
1766 s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
1770 if (group_id
!= s
->s3
.group_id
) {
1772 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
1775 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE
);
1779 if ((ginf
= tls1_group_id_lookup(s
->ctx
, group_id
)) == NULL
) {
1780 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE
);
1784 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)
1785 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
) == 0) {
1786 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1790 if (!ginf
->is_kem
) {
1792 skey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1793 if (skey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(skey
, ckey
) <= 0) {
1794 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED
);
1798 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(skey
, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
1799 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
)) <= 0) {
1800 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
1801 EVP_PKEY_free(skey
);
1805 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 1) == 0) {
1806 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1807 EVP_PKEY_free(skey
);
1810 s
->s3
.peer_tmp
= skey
;
1813 const unsigned char *ct
= PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
);
1814 size_t ctlen
= PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
);
1816 if (ssl_decapsulate(s
, ckey
, ct
, ctlen
, 1) == 0) {
1817 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1826 int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1831 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cookie
)
1832 || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie
, &s
->ext
.tls13_cookie
,
1833 &s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
)) {
1834 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1841 int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
,
1842 X509
*x
, size_t chainidx
)
1844 if (context
== SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
) {
1845 unsigned long max_early_data
;
1847 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &max_early_data
)
1848 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1849 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA
);
1853 s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
= max_early_data
;
1858 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1859 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1863 if (!s
->ext
.early_data_ok
1866 * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
1867 * using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the
1868 * server should not be accepting it.
1870 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1874 s
->ext
.early_data
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
;
1879 int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, unsigned int context
, X509
*x
,
1882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1883 unsigned int identity
;
1885 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &identity
) || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1886 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1890 if (identity
>= (unsigned int)s
->ext
.tick_identity
) {
1891 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY
);
1896 * Session resumption tickets are always sent before PSK tickets. If the
1897 * ticket index is 0 then it must be for a session resumption ticket if we
1898 * sent two tickets, or if we didn't send a PSK ticket.
1900 if (identity
== 0 && (s
->psksession
== NULL
|| s
->ext
.tick_identity
== 2)) {
1902 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->psksession
);
1903 s
->psksession
= NULL
;
1907 if (s
->psksession
== NULL
) {
1908 /* Should never happen */
1909 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1914 * If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret
1915 * is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the
1916 * early_secret across that we generated earlier.
1918 if ((s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
1919 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
1920 || s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
> 0
1921 || s
->psksession
->ext
.max_early_data
== 0)
1922 memcpy(s
->early_secret
, s
->psksession
->early_secret
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
1924 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
1925 s
->session
= s
->psksession
;
1926 s
->psksession
= NULL
;
1928 /* Early data is only allowed if we used the first ticket */
1930 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;