2 * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_local.h"
16 #include "statem_local.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/engine.h>
26 #include <openssl/trace.h>
27 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
28 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
29 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
31 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
33 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
36 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
);
37 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
);
38 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
42 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
48 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
50 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
51 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
52 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
53 || (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
60 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
66 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
68 long alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
71 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
72 * ciphersuite or for SRP
74 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
83 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
84 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
85 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
86 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
88 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
89 * (transition not allowed)
91 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int mt
)
93 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
96 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
97 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
98 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
101 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
105 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
107 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
108 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
110 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
111 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
116 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
117 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
) {
118 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
123 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
125 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
126 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
130 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
131 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
134 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
135 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
139 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
140 && s
->ext
.compress_certificate_sent
) {
141 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT
;
148 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
149 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
150 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
153 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
154 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
155 && s
->ext
.compress_certificate_sent
) {
156 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT
;
163 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT
:
164 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
165 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
;
170 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
171 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
172 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
178 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
179 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
182 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
183 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
;
186 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
187 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
188 /* Restore digest for PHA before adding message.*/
189 # error Internal DTLS version error
191 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
192 && s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT
) {
193 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
;
195 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
196 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
197 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
198 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
200 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
201 /* SSLfatal() already called */
204 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
211 /* No valid transition found */
216 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
217 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
218 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
219 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
221 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
222 * (transition not allowed)
224 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, int mt
)
226 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
230 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
231 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
233 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
234 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
239 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
243 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
244 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
245 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
249 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
250 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
251 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
257 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
259 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
260 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
263 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
264 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
269 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
271 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
272 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
273 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
276 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
277 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
281 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
282 && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
283 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
285 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
286 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
287 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
288 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
290 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
291 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
292 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
293 * the server is resuming.
296 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
298 } else if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
299 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
300 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
301 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
305 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
306 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
308 || ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
309 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
310 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
311 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
314 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
315 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
316 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
318 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
319 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
327 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT
:
329 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
330 * |ext.status_expected| is set
332 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
333 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
338 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
339 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
340 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
341 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
342 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
343 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
344 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
351 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
352 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
353 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
354 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
361 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
362 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
363 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
368 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
369 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
370 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
371 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
374 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
375 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
380 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
381 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
382 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
387 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
388 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
389 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
395 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) {
396 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
;
403 /* No valid transition found */
404 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
408 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
409 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
412 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
413 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
));
414 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
415 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
418 SSLfatal(s
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
423 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
424 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
427 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
429 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
432 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
433 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
434 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
436 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
438 /* Shouldn't happen */
439 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
440 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
442 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
443 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
444 if (s
->ext
.compress_certificate_from_peer
[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none
)
445 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT
;
447 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
448 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
451 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
452 * we already sent close_notify
454 if (!ossl_assert((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0)) {
455 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
456 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
457 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
459 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
462 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
463 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
464 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
465 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
;
466 else if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
467 && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
)
468 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
469 else if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 0)
470 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
471 else if (s
->ext
.compress_certificate_from_peer
[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none
)
472 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT
;
474 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
475 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
477 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
478 if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
479 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
480 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
484 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
485 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
486 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 0)
487 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
488 else if (s
->ext
.compress_certificate_from_peer
[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none
)
489 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT
;
491 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
492 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
494 case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT
:
496 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
497 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
498 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
499 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
501 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
502 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
503 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
505 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
506 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
507 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
508 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
509 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
510 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
513 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
514 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
515 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
518 /* Try to read from the server instead */
519 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
524 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
525 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
527 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
529 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
532 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
533 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
536 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
))
537 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s
);
539 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
541 /* Shouldn't happen */
542 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
543 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
546 if (!s
->renegotiate
) {
548 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
549 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
551 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
556 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
559 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
560 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
562 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
563 * actually selected a version yet.
565 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0)
566 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
568 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
569 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
572 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
575 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
577 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
579 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
580 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
581 * because we did early data.
583 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
584 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
585 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
587 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
588 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
590 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
591 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
593 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
594 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
597 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
598 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
)
599 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
601 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
602 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
605 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
606 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
608 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
610 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
611 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
614 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
615 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
616 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
617 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
619 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
620 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
622 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
624 if (s
->s3
.flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
625 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
627 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
629 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
630 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
631 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
633 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
634 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
635 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
636 } else if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
637 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
639 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
640 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
642 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
.npn_seen
)
643 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
645 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
648 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
650 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
651 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
652 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
656 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
658 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
659 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
661 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
664 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
666 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
667 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
669 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
670 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
673 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
675 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
678 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
), 1)) {
679 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
680 /* SSLfatal() already called */
681 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
683 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
684 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
686 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
687 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
692 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
693 * the client to the server.
695 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
697 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
699 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
701 /* No pre work to be done */
704 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
706 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
707 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
708 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
709 /* SSLfatal() already called */
712 } else if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED
) {
714 * This must be a second ClientHello after an HRR following an
715 * earlier rejected attempt to send early data. Since we were
716 * previously encrypting the early data we now need to reset the
717 * write record layer in order to write in plaintext again.
719 if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s
,
721 OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE
,
722 OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE
,
723 NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0,
724 NID_undef
, NULL
, NULL
)) {
725 /* SSLfatal already called */
731 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
732 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
735 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
736 * messages unless we need to.
740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
741 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)))) {
742 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
743 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
749 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
751 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
752 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
753 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
755 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
756 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
)
757 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
760 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
761 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 0, 1);
764 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
765 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1, 1);
768 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
772 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
773 * client to the server.
775 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
777 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
778 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
782 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
784 /* No post work to be done */
787 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
788 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
789 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
791 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
792 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
793 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
795 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) == 0) {
796 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
797 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
798 /* SSLfatal() already called */
802 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
803 } else if (!statem_flush(s
)) {
807 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
808 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
813 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
814 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0) {
815 /* SSLfatal() already called */
820 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
821 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
822 || s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
824 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
825 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
827 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
828 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
829 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
831 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
832 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
836 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
;
837 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
838 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
840 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
841 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
843 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
845 if (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
846 /* SSLfatal() already called */
850 if (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
851 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
852 /* SSLfatal() already called */
856 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
857 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
860 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
863 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
868 dtls1_increment_epoch(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
872 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
873 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
874 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
876 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
879 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
883 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
886 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
887 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
888 /* SSLfatal() already called */
891 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
892 if (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
893 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
894 /* SSLfatal() already called */
901 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
902 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
904 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1)) {
905 /* SSLfatal() already called */
911 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
915 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
918 * Valid return values are:
922 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
923 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
925 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
927 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
929 /* Shouldn't happen */
930 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
933 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
934 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
))
935 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
937 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
938 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
941 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
942 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_hello
;
943 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
;
946 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
947 *confunc
= tls_construct_end_of_early_data
;
948 *mt
= SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
951 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
957 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_certificate
;
958 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
961 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
962 case TLS_ST_CW_COMP_CERT
:
963 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate
;
964 *mt
= SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
;
968 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
969 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_key_exchange
;
970 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
973 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
974 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
975 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
978 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
979 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
980 *confunc
= tls_construct_next_proto
;
981 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
984 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
985 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
986 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
989 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
990 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
991 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
999 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1000 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1002 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
1004 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1006 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1008 /* Shouldn't happen */
1011 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
1012 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
1014 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
1015 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
1017 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT
:
1018 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT
:
1019 return s
->max_cert_list
;
1021 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
1022 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1024 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
1025 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1027 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
1028 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
1030 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1032 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
1033 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
1034 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
1036 return s
->max_cert_list
;
1038 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
1039 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1041 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
1042 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
1044 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1046 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
1047 return (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) ? SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS13
1048 : SESSION_TICKET_MAX_LENGTH_TLS12
;
1050 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
1051 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
1053 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1054 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1056 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1057 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1062 * Process a message that the client has received from the server.
1064 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1067 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1069 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1071 /* Shouldn't happen */
1072 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1073 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1075 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
1076 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
1078 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
1079 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
1081 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT
:
1082 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1084 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
1085 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT
:
1086 return tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1089 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
1090 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
1092 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
1093 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
1095 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
1096 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
1098 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1099 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
1101 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
1102 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
1104 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
1105 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
1107 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
1108 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
1110 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
1111 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
1113 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
1114 return tls_process_hello_req(s
, pkt
);
1116 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1117 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s
, pkt
);
1119 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1120 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1125 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1128 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1131 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1133 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1135 /* Shouldn't happen */
1136 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1139 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT
:
1140 case TLS_ST_CR_COMP_CERT
:
1141 return tls_post_process_server_certificate(s
, wst
);
1143 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
1144 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1145 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
1149 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1157 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
1158 unsigned char *session_id
;
1159 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1161 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1162 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
1163 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1164 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, protverr
);
1165 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1169 || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
, NULL
)
1170 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess
)) {
1171 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
1172 && !ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1173 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1174 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1177 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1179 p
= s
->s3
.client_random
;
1182 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1183 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1185 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1188 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
.client_random
); idx
++) {
1195 i
= (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
);
1198 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
.client_random
),
1199 DOWNGRADE_NONE
) <= 0) {
1200 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1201 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1205 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1206 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1207 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1208 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1209 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1210 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1211 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1212 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1215 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1216 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1217 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1218 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1219 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1220 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1221 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1222 * know that is maximum server supports.
1223 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1224 * containing version 1.0.
1226 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1227 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1228 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1229 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1230 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1231 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1232 * the negotiated version.
1234 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1235 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1237 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->client_version
)
1238 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
.client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1239 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1240 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1244 session_id
= s
->session
->session_id
;
1245 if (s
->new_session
|| s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1246 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1247 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0) {
1248 sess_id_len
= sizeof(s
->tmp_session_id
);
1249 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= sess_id_len
;
1250 session_id
= s
->tmp_session_id
;
1251 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
1252 && RAND_bytes_ex(sctx
->libctx
, s
->tmp_session_id
,
1253 sess_id_len
, 0) <= 0) {
1254 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1255 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1261 assert(s
->session
->session_id_length
<= sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
));
1262 sess_id_len
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1263 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1264 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= sess_id_len
;
1265 memcpy(s
->tmp_session_id
, s
->session
->session_id
, sess_id_len
);
1268 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1269 || (sess_id_len
!= 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, session_id
,
1271 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1272 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1273 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1276 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1277 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1278 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)
1279 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1280 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1281 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1282 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1286 /* Ciphers supported */
1287 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1288 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1289 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1292 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
)),
1294 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1295 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1297 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1298 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1299 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1303 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
1304 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1305 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1308 if (ssl_allow_compression(s
)
1309 && sctx
->comp_methods
1310 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)
1311 || s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
1312 int compnum
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx
->comp_methods
);
1313 for (i
= 0; i
< compnum
; i
++) {
1314 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1315 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, comp
->id
)) {
1316 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1317 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1322 /* Add the NULL method */
1323 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1324 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1325 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1328 /* TLS extensions */
1329 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
, NULL
, 0)) {
1330 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1331 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
1334 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
1337 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1342 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1343 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1344 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1345 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1348 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1349 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1350 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1351 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1354 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1355 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1356 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1358 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1360 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1363 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1364 const unsigned char *cipherchars
)
1366 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1367 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1369 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1371 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1373 /* unknown cipher */
1374 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1378 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1379 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1381 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
, 1)) {
1382 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1386 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1387 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1389 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1390 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1394 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
1395 && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= c
->id
) {
1396 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1397 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1402 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1403 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1404 * set and use it for comparison.
1406 if (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)
1407 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1408 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1409 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1410 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_md(sctx
, c
->algorithm2
);
1413 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1414 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1417 || md
!= ssl_md(sctx
, s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
)) {
1418 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1419 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED
);
1424 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1427 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1428 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1432 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1437 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1439 PACKET session_id
, extpkt
;
1440 size_t session_id_len
;
1441 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1443 unsigned int compression
;
1444 unsigned int sversion
;
1445 unsigned int context
;
1446 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1447 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
1448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1452 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1453 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1457 /* load the server random */
1458 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1459 && sversion
== TLS1_2_VERSION
1460 && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1461 && memcmp(hrrrandom
, PACKET_data(pkt
), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) == 0) {
1462 if (s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
) {
1463 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1466 s
->hello_retry_request
= SSL_HRR_PENDING
;
1467 /* Tell the record layer that we know we're going to get TLSv1.3 */
1468 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s
, s
->version
)) {
1469 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1473 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1474 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1478 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
.server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1479 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1484 /* Get the session-id. */
1485 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1486 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1489 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1490 if (session_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
1491 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1492 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1496 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1497 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1501 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1502 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1506 /* TLS extensions */
1507 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0 && !hrr
) {
1508 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt
);
1509 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
1510 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1511 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1516 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
1517 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1518 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1519 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)) {
1520 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1524 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
, extensions
)) {
1525 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1530 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) || hrr
) {
1531 if (compression
!= 0) {
1532 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1533 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1537 if (session_id_len
!= s
->tmp_session_id_len
1538 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->tmp_session_id
,
1539 session_id_len
) != 0) {
1540 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID
);
1546 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1547 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1551 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s
, &extpkt
);
1555 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1556 * are appropriate for this version.
1558 context
= SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1559 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
;
1560 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s
, context
, extensions
)) {
1561 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1567 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1569 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1570 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1572 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1573 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1574 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1578 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1579 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_psk
,
1580 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1581 extensions
, NULL
, 0)) {
1582 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1587 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1588 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1589 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1590 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1591 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1592 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1593 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1594 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1595 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1596 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1598 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1599 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->session
->ext
.tick
) {
1600 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1602 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1603 * backwards compat reasons
1605 int master_key_length
;
1607 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1608 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(ssl
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1611 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1612 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1613 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1614 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1615 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1617 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1622 if (session_id_len
!= 0
1623 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1624 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1625 session_id_len
) == 0)
1630 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1631 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1632 /* actually a client application bug */
1633 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1634 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1639 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1640 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1641 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1642 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1643 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1645 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1646 ssl_tsan_counter(s
->session_ctx
, &s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
);
1647 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1648 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1653 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1655 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1656 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1657 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1658 * used for resumption.
1660 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1661 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1662 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1663 if (session_id_len
> 0)
1664 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1669 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1670 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1671 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1672 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1676 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1679 s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1680 s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1682 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1683 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1687 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1688 if (compression
!= 0) {
1689 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1690 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1694 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1695 * using compression.
1697 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1698 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1702 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1703 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1704 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1707 if (compression
== 0)
1709 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1710 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1713 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
)->comp_methods
,
1717 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1718 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1719 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1722 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1726 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, context
, extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1727 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1731 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1732 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1733 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1734 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1738 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1741 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1742 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1744 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1745 labellen
= sizeof(labelbuffer
) - 1;
1746 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG
)
1749 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl
, sctpauthkey
,
1750 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1752 labellen
, NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1753 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1757 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl
),
1758 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1759 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1764 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1765 * we're done with this message
1767 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
1768 && (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
1769 || !ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1770 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
))) {
1771 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1775 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1776 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1778 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1779 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1782 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1785 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1788 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1789 * should not be used.
1791 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
1792 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
1794 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, extpkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1795 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)
1796 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1797 extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1798 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1802 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1805 if (s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
== 0 && s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
1807 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1808 * ClientHello will not change
1810 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR
);
1815 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1816 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1818 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0)) {
1819 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1824 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1825 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1826 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1829 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1830 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1831 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1835 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1837 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1838 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1841 /* prepare server cert verification by setting s->session->peer_chain from pkt */
1842 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1845 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1847 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1849 unsigned int context
= 0;
1850 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
1852 if ((s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1853 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
1857 if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &context
))
1859 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1860 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
1861 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1862 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1865 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt
); chainidx
++) {
1866 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1867 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1868 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1872 certstart
= certbytes
;
1873 x
= X509_new_ex(sctx
->libctx
, sctx
->propq
);
1875 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1878 if (d2i_X509(&x
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
,
1879 cert_len
) == NULL
) {
1880 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1884 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1885 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1889 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1890 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
1893 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
1894 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1897 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
1898 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
1899 NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
1900 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
1901 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
,
1902 PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
1903 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1904 /* SSLfatal already called */
1907 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1910 if (!sk_X509_push(s
->session
->peer_chain
, x
)) {
1911 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
1916 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1920 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s
->session
->peer_chain
);
1921 s
->session
->peer_chain
= NULL
;
1922 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1926 * Verify the s->session->peer_chain and check server cert type.
1927 * On success set s->session->peer and s->session->verify_result.
1928 * Else the peer certificate verification callback may request retry.
1930 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
1934 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1935 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
1939 if (s
->rwstate
== SSL_RETRY_VERIFY
)
1940 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1941 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, s
->session
->peer_chain
);
1942 if (i
> 0 && s
->rwstate
== SSL_RETRY_VERIFY
) {
1946 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1947 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1948 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1949 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1950 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1951 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1952 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1953 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1954 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1955 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1956 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1957 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1959 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1960 SSLfatal(s
, ssl_x509err2alert(s
->verify_result
),
1961 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1964 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1967 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1968 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1970 x
= sk_X509_value(s
->session
->peer_chain
, 0);
1972 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1974 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1975 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1976 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1980 if ((clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &certidx
)) == NULL
) {
1981 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1985 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1986 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1989 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1990 if ((clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0) {
1991 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1996 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1998 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1999 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
2001 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
2002 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
2003 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
2004 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
2005 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
2006 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2009 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2012 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
2013 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2015 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2017 BUF_MEM
*buf
= BUF_MEM_new();
2019 if (tls13_process_compressed_certificate(sc
, pkt
, &tmppkt
, buf
) != MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
)
2020 ret
= tls_process_server_certificate(sc
, &tmppkt
);
2027 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2029 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2030 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
2032 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
2034 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
2035 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2040 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2041 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2042 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2045 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2046 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2050 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
2051 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2052 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
2053 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
2054 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
2055 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2061 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2066 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2069 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
2071 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
2072 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
2073 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
2074 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
2075 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2080 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
2081 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
2083 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
2084 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
2086 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
2087 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
2089 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
2090 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
2091 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2095 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
)) {
2096 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2100 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2101 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2102 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2106 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2111 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2113 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
2114 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2115 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
2116 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2117 OSSL_PARAM
*params
= NULL
;
2118 OSSL_PARAM_BLD
*tmpl
= NULL
;
2119 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2122 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
2123 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
2124 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
2125 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2129 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
2130 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
2132 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
2133 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
);
2134 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
2135 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2139 tmpl
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2141 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P
, p
)
2142 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G
, g
)
2143 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY
,
2145 || (params
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl
)) == NULL
) {
2146 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2150 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(sctx
->libctx
, "DH", sctx
->propq
);
2152 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2155 if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx
) <= 0
2156 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx
, &peer_tmp
, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR
, params
) <= 0) {
2157 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2161 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2162 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx
->libctx
, peer_tmp
, sctx
->propq
);
2165 * EVP_PKEY_param_check() will verify that the DH params are using
2166 * a safe prime. In this context, because we're using ephemeral DH,
2167 * we're ok with it not being a safe prime.
2168 * EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick() skips the safe prime check.
2170 || EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick(pctx
) != 1
2171 || EVP_PKEY_public_check(pctx
) != 1) {
2172 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2176 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
2177 EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(peer_tmp
),
2179 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2183 s
->s3
.peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
2187 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2188 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2190 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2191 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2192 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2197 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl
);
2198 OSSL_PARAM_free(params
);
2199 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
2200 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2208 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2211 unsigned int curve_type
, curve_id
;
2214 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2215 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2216 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2218 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &curve_type
) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &curve_id
)) {
2219 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2223 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2224 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2226 if (curve_type
!= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2227 || !tls1_check_group_id(s
, curve_id
, 1)) {
2228 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
2232 if ((s
->s3
.peer_tmp
= ssl_generate_param_group(s
, curve_id
)) == NULL
) {
2233 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2234 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
2238 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
2239 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2243 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(s
->s3
.peer_tmp
,
2244 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
2245 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
)) <= 0) {
2246 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
2251 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2252 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2255 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
2256 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2257 else if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
2258 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2259 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2261 /* Cache the agreed upon group in the SSL_SESSION */
2262 s
->session
->kex_group
= curve_id
;
2266 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2269 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2270 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= NULL
;
2271 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2272 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
2273 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2275 alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2277 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
2279 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
.peer_tmp
);
2280 s
->s3
.peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2282 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2283 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
)) {
2284 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2289 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2290 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2291 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2292 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2293 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2296 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2297 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2298 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2301 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2302 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2303 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2307 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2311 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2314 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2320 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2321 * equals the length of the parameters.
2323 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
2324 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
2325 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
2326 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2330 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2331 unsigned int sigalg
;
2333 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
2334 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2337 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
) <=0) {
2338 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2341 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
2342 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2346 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
2347 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2348 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM
);
2351 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2352 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2353 md
== NULL
? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md
));
2355 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
2356 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2357 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2361 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2362 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2363 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2367 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx
, &pctx
,
2368 md
== NULL
? NULL
: EVP_MD_get0_name(md
),
2369 sctx
->libctx
, sctx
->propq
, pkey
,
2371 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2374 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
2375 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2376 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
2377 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2378 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2382 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
2383 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
));
2385 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2389 rv
= EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
2390 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), tbs
, tbslen
);
2393 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2396 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2399 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2400 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
2401 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
2402 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2403 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2404 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_DATA
);
2406 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2409 /* still data left over */
2410 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2411 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2416 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2418 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2419 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2422 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
2427 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2428 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2429 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2431 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2432 PACKET reqctx
, extensions
;
2433 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
2435 if ((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0) {
2437 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2438 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2441 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2444 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2445 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
);
2446 s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
= NULL
;
2447 s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
= 0;
2448 OPENSSL_free(s
->pha_context
);
2449 s
->pha_context
= NULL
;
2450 s
->pha_context_len
= 0;
2452 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &reqctx
) ||
2453 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx
, &s
->pha_context
, &s
->pha_context_len
)) {
2454 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2455 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2458 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
2459 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
2460 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2462 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
2463 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2465 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2466 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2467 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2468 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2469 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2471 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2472 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2473 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
2474 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2479 /* get the certificate types */
2480 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ctypes
)) {
2481 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2482 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2485 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
)) {
2486 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2487 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2490 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2493 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &sigalgs
)) {
2494 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2495 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2499 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2500 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2502 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
, 0)) {
2503 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2504 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2505 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2507 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2508 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_SSL_LIB
);
2509 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2513 /* get the CA RDNs */
2514 if (!parse_ca_names(s
, pkt
)) {
2515 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2516 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2520 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2521 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2522 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2525 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2526 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2529 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2530 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2531 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2532 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2533 * SSL_get1_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2536 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
2537 && s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
2538 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2540 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2543 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
2546 unsigned int ticklen
;
2547 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
, age_add
= 0;
2548 unsigned int sess_len
;
2549 RAW_EXTENSION
*exts
= NULL
;
2551 EVP_MD
*sha256
= NULL
;
2552 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2554 PACKET_null_init(&nonce
);
2556 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2557 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
2558 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &age_add
)
2559 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &nonce
)))
2560 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2561 || (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) ? (ticklen
== 0
2562 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) < ticklen
)
2563 : PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
)) {
2564 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2569 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2570 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2571 * be 0 here in that instance
2574 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2577 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2578 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2579 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2580 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2581 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2584 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2585 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2588 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2591 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2592 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_SSL_LIB
);
2596 if ((s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) != 0
2597 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2599 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2600 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2601 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2603 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2606 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2607 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2610 s
->session
->time
= ossl_time_now();
2611 ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s
->session
);
2613 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.tick
);
2614 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= NULL
;
2615 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= 0;
2617 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2618 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
2619 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
2622 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
2623 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2627 s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2628 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add
;
2629 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
2631 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2634 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
2635 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2636 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2640 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
2641 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, &exts
,
2643 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
,
2644 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2645 exts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2646 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2652 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2653 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2654 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2655 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2656 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2657 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2658 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2659 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the
2662 sha256
= EVP_MD_fetch(sctx
->libctx
, "SHA2-256", sctx
->propq
);
2663 if (sha256
== NULL
) {
2664 /* Error is already recorded */
2665 SSLfatal_alert(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2669 * We use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2670 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2672 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
,
2673 s
->session
->session_id
, &sess_len
,
2675 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2678 EVP_MD_free(sha256
);
2680 s
->session
->session_id_length
= sess_len
;
2681 s
->session
->not_resumable
= 0;
2683 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2684 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2685 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
2686 int hashleni
= EVP_MD_get_size(md
);
2688 static const unsigned char nonce_label
[] = "resumption";
2690 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2691 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni
>= 0)) {
2692 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2695 hashlen
= (size_t)hashleni
;
2697 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, s
->resumption_master_secret
,
2699 sizeof(nonce_label
) - 1,
2700 PACKET_data(&nonce
),
2701 PACKET_remaining(&nonce
),
2702 s
->session
->master_key
,
2704 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2707 s
->session
->master_key_length
= hashlen
;
2710 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
2711 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2714 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2716 EVP_MD_free(sha256
);
2718 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2722 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2723 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2725 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2730 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2731 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2732 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2735 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &resplen
)
2736 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2737 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2740 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2741 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
== NULL
) {
2742 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= 0;
2743 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
2746 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= resplen
;
2747 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
, resplen
)) {
2748 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2756 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2758 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
2759 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2760 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2763 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2767 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2768 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2769 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2772 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
2774 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2777 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2780 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2781 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2786 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2787 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2788 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2790 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2791 && sctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2792 int ret
= sctx
->ext
.status_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
),
2793 sctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2796 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
,
2797 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2801 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2802 SSL_R_OCSP_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
2806 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2807 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2808 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2809 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2810 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2819 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2821 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2822 /* should contain no data */
2823 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2824 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2826 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2827 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2828 if (ssl_srp_calc_a_param_intern(s
) <= 0) {
2829 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
2830 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2835 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
)) {
2836 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2837 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2840 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2843 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2848 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2849 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2852 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2853 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2854 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2855 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2856 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2859 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2860 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2864 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2866 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
),
2867 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2868 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2871 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2872 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2873 psklen
= PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
; /* Avoid overrunning the array on cleanse */
2875 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2876 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2880 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2881 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2882 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2886 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2887 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2888 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2889 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
2893 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
);
2894 s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2895 s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2897 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2898 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2901 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, identity
, identitylen
)) {
2902 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2909 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2910 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2911 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2912 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2916 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2921 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2923 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
2924 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2925 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2927 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2929 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
2931 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2933 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2935 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2939 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2940 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "RSA")) {
2941 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2945 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2946 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2948 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
2952 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2953 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2954 if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx
->libctx
, pms
+ 2, pmslen
- 2, 0) <= 0) {
2955 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_RAND_LIB
);
2959 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2960 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2961 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2965 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx
->libctx
, pkey
, sctx
->propq
);
2966 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2967 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2968 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2971 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, enclen
, &encdata
)
2972 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, encdata
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2973 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2976 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2979 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2980 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2981 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2985 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2986 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s
, encdata
, enclen
, pms
, pmslen
)) {
2987 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2991 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2992 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2996 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2997 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3002 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3004 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
3005 unsigned char *keybytes
= NULL
;
3007 unsigned char *encoded_pub
= NULL
;
3008 size_t encoded_pub_len
, pad_len
;
3011 skey
= s
->s3
.peer_tmp
;
3013 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3017 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(s
, skey
);
3019 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3023 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
3024 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3028 /* send off the data */
3030 /* Generate encoding of server key */
3031 encoded_pub_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey
, &encoded_pub
);
3032 if (encoded_pub_len
== 0) {
3033 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3034 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3035 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL
;
3039 * For interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
3040 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
3043 prime_len
= EVP_PKEY_get_size(ckey
);
3044 pad_len
= prime_len
- encoded_pub_len
;
3046 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, pad_len
, &keybytes
)) {
3047 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3050 memset(keybytes
, 0, pad_len
);
3053 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, encoded_pub
, encoded_pub_len
)) {
3054 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3060 OPENSSL_free(encoded_pub
);
3061 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3065 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3067 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
3068 size_t encoded_pt_len
= 0;
3069 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
3072 skey
= s
->s3
.peer_tmp
;
3074 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3078 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(s
, skey
);
3080 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_SSL_LIB
);
3084 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
3085 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3089 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3090 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
3092 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
3093 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
3097 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)) {
3098 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3104 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
3105 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3109 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3112 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3113 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
3116 unsigned int md_len
;
3117 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
3118 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
3119 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
3120 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3122 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3124 if ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
3125 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
3128 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3130 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
3131 if (peer_cert
== NULL
) {
3132 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3133 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
3137 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx
->libctx
,
3138 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
),
3140 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3141 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3145 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3146 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3147 * certificate key for key exchange
3150 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3152 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
3154 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
3158 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
3159 /* Generate session key
3161 || RAND_bytes_ex(sctx
->libctx
, pms
, pmslen
, 0) <= 0) {
3162 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3166 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3169 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3170 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
3171 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
3172 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
.client_random
,
3173 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3174 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
.server_random
,
3175 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3176 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
3177 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3180 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3182 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3183 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) <= 0) {
3184 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3187 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3189 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3192 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3193 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3197 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
3198 || (msglen
>= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0x81))
3199 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tmp
, msglen
)) {
3200 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3204 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3205 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3206 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3210 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3211 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3212 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3215 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3221 int ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
3223 if ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_MAGMA
) != 0)
3224 return NID_magma_ctr
;
3225 else if ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
& SSL_KUZNYECHIK
) != 0)
3226 return NID_kuznyechik_ctr
;
3231 int ossl_gost_ukm(const SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, unsigned char *dgst_buf
)
3233 EVP_MD_CTX
* hash
= NULL
;
3234 unsigned int md_len
;
3235 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3236 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_evp_md_fetch(sctx
->libctx
, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
,
3242 if ((hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL
3243 || EVP_DigestInit(hash
, md
) <= 0
3244 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash
, s
->s3
.client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3245 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash
, s
->s3
.server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3246 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(hash
, dgst_buf
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
3247 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash
);
3248 ssl_evp_md_free(md
);
3252 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash
);
3253 ssl_evp_md_free(md
);
3258 static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3260 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3261 /* GOST 2018 key exchange message creation */
3262 unsigned char rnd_dgst
[32];
3263 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
3264 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
3266 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3269 int cipher_nid
= ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s
);
3270 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3272 if (cipher_nid
== NID_undef
) {
3273 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3277 if (ossl_gost_ukm(s
, rnd_dgst
) <= 0) {
3278 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3282 /* Pre-master secret - random bytes */
3284 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
3286 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
3290 if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx
->libctx
, pms
, pmslen
, 0) <= 0) {
3291 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3295 /* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
3296 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
3297 if (peer_cert
== NULL
) {
3298 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3299 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
3303 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx
->libctx
,
3304 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
),
3306 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3307 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3311 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
3312 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3316 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code */
3317 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3318 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 32, rnd_dgst
) <= 0) {
3319 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3323 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3324 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER
, cipher_nid
, NULL
) <= 0) {
3325 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3329 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, NULL
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3330 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3334 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, msglen
, &encdata
)
3335 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, encdata
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3336 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
3340 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3342 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3343 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3347 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3348 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3351 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3356 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3359 unsigned char *abytes
= NULL
;
3361 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
== NULL
3362 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
),
3364 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3367 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, abytes
);
3369 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3370 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3371 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3372 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB
);
3378 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3383 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
3386 unsigned long alg_k
;
3388 alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3391 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3392 * no need to do so here.
3394 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
3395 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
))
3398 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3399 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
))
3401 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3402 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
))
3404 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3405 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
))
3407 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3408 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, pkt
))
3410 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST18
) {
3411 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost18(s
, pkt
))
3413 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3414 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, pkt
))
3416 } else if (!(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3417 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3421 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
3423 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
);
3424 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3425 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= 0;
3426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3427 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
);
3428 s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3429 s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
= 0;
3431 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3434 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
3436 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3439 pms
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
;
3440 pmslen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
;
3442 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3444 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3445 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
3446 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3453 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3454 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
3457 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
3458 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3459 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3468 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3469 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3470 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3472 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
3475 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3478 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3479 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3481 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3482 labellen
= sizeof(labelbuffer
) - 1;
3483 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG
)
3486 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl
, sctpauthkey
,
3487 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3488 labellen
, NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3489 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3493 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3494 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3500 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3501 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3502 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= 0;
3507 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3508 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3509 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3511 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
3513 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3514 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, 0) || s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
3517 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3518 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3520 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3521 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3526 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3529 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3531 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
3533 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3534 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3535 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3536 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(ssl
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3538 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3542 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
3545 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3547 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
)) {
3548 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
3549 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
3551 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3554 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3558 /* We need to get a client cert */
3559 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
3561 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3562 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3564 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3566 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3569 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3570 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3571 if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl
, x509
)
3572 || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl
, pkey
))
3574 } else if (i
== 1) {
3576 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3580 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3581 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3584 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3585 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3586 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3587 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3589 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3590 s
->ext
.compress_certificate_from_peer
[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none
;
3591 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3592 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3598 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
3599 || (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION
) != 0)
3600 s
->ext
.compress_certificate_from_peer
[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none
;
3602 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
3603 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
3604 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3607 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3608 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3612 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
3615 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
3617 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3618 if (s
->pha_context
== NULL
) {
3619 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3620 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
3621 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3622 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3624 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
)) {
3625 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3626 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3629 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
,
3630 (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 2) ? NULL
3631 : s
->cert
->key
, 0)) {
3632 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3633 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3636 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s
)
3637 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
3638 && (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
3639 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
3641 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3642 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3644 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
3645 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3648 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
3651 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
3652 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_client_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION
*sc
,
3655 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(sc
);
3657 BUF_MEM
*buf
= NULL
;
3660 COMP_METHOD
*method
;
3661 COMP_CTX
*comp
= NULL
;
3664 int alg
= sc
->ext
.compress_certificate_from_peer
[0];
3666 /* Note that sc->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2 is checked in write transition */
3668 if ((buf
= BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL
|| !WPACKET_init(&tmppkt
, buf
))
3671 /* Use the |tmppkt| for the to-be-compressed data */
3672 if (sc
->pha_context
== NULL
) {
3673 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3674 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&tmppkt
, 0))
3676 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&tmppkt
, sc
->pha_context
, sc
->pha_context_len
))
3679 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(sc
, &tmppkt
, sc
->cert
->key
, 0)) {
3680 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3684 /* continue with the real |pkt| */
3685 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, alg
)
3686 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&tmppkt
, &length
)
3687 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(pkt
, length
))
3691 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib
:
3692 method
= COMP_zlib();
3694 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli
:
3695 method
= COMP_brotli_oneshot();
3697 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd
:
3698 method
= COMP_zstd_oneshot();
3703 max_length
= ossl_calculate_comp_expansion(alg
, length
);
3705 if ((comp
= COMP_CTX_new(method
)) == NULL
3706 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)
3707 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, max_length
, NULL
))
3710 comp_len
= COMP_compress_block(comp
, WPACKET_get_curr(pkt
), max_length
,
3711 (unsigned char *)buf
->data
, length
);
3715 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, comp_len
, NULL
)
3716 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
3719 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(sc
)
3720 && (!ssl
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(sc
,
3721 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
3723 * This is a fatal error, which leaves sc->enc_write_ctx in an
3724 * inconsistent state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3726 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
3733 SSLfatal(sc
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3736 /* If |buf| is NULL, then |tmppkt| could not have been initialized */
3737 WPACKET_cleanup(&tmppkt
);
3740 COMP_CTX_free(comp
);
3745 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
)
3747 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
3751 alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3752 alg_a
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3754 /* we don't have a certificate */
3755 if (!(alg_a
& SSL_aCERT
))
3758 /* This is the passed certificate */
3759 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
), &idx
);
3761 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3762 if (clu
== NULL
|| (alg_a
& clu
->amask
) == 0) {
3763 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT
);
3767 if (clu
->amask
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3768 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
))
3770 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3774 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) && idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
3775 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3776 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3780 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
.peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
3781 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3789 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3791 size_t len
, padding_len
;
3792 unsigned char *padding
= NULL
;
3794 len
= s
->ext
.npn_len
;
3795 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3797 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.npn
, len
)
3798 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, padding_len
, &padding
)) {
3799 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3800 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3803 memset(padding
, 0, padding_len
);
3805 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;
3809 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_req(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3811 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
3813 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3814 /* should contain no data */
3815 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3816 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3819 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
3820 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
3821 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3825 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3826 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3827 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3828 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3829 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3831 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
))
3832 SSL_renegotiate(ssl
);
3834 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(ssl
);
3836 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3839 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
,
3843 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3845 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)
3846 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3847 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3851 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3852 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, &rawexts
,
3854 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3855 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
3856 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3860 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3861 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3864 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3865 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3868 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3871 SSL_CTX
*sctx
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s
);
3873 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3874 if (sctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3875 i
= tls_engine_load_ssl_client_cert(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3880 if (sctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3881 i
= sctx
->client_cert_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
), px509
, ppkey
);
3885 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
3889 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, maxlen
, maxverok
= 0;
3890 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3891 SSL
*ssl
= SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s
);
3893 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3894 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s
)) {
3895 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
);
3900 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3904 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3905 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3906 # error Max cipher length too short
3909 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3910 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3913 if (TLS1_get_version(ssl
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3914 maxlen
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
3917 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3920 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3922 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
)
3925 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) && totlen
< maxlen
; i
++) {
3926 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3928 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3929 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3930 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
3933 if (!ssl
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3934 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3938 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3940 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3941 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
3942 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
))
3945 if (c
->max_tls
>= s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
3946 && c
->min_tls
<= s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
3954 if (totlen
== 0 || !maxverok
) {
3955 const char *maxvertext
=
3957 ? "No ciphers enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version"
3960 SSLfatal_data(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
,
3966 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3967 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3968 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3970 if (!ssl
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3971 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3975 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3976 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3977 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3979 if (!ssl
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3980 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3989 CON_FUNC_RETURN
tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3991 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3992 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
) {
3993 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
3994 return CON_FUNC_ERROR
;
3997 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
;
3998 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS
;