2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
16 #include "statem_locl.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 #include <openssl/trace.h>
26 #include <internal/cryptlib.h>
28 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
29 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
31 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
32 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
33 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
37 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
43 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
45 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
46 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
47 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
48 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
55 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
61 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
63 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
66 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
67 * ciphersuite or for SRP
69 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
78 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
79 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
80 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
81 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
83 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
84 * (transition not allowed)
86 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
88 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
91 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
92 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
93 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
96 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
100 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
102 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
103 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
105 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
106 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
111 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
112 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
) {
113 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
118 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
120 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
121 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
125 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
126 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
129 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
130 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
136 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
137 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
138 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
144 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
145 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
;
150 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
151 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
152 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
158 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
159 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
162 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
163 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
;
166 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
167 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
168 # error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
170 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT
) {
171 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
;
173 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
174 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
175 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
176 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
178 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
179 /* SSLfatal() already called */
182 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
189 /* No valid transition found */
194 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
195 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
196 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
197 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
199 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
200 * (transition not allowed)
202 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
204 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
208 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
209 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
211 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
212 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
217 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
221 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
222 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
223 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
227 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
228 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
229 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
235 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
237 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
238 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
241 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
242 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
247 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
249 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
250 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
251 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
254 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
255 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
259 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
260 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
262 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
263 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
264 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
265 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
267 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
268 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
269 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
270 * the server is resuming.
273 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
275 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
276 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
277 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
278 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
282 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
283 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
285 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
286 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
287 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
288 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
291 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
292 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
293 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
295 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
296 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
305 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
306 * |ext.status_expected| is set
308 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
309 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
314 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
315 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
316 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
317 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
318 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
319 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
320 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
327 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
328 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
329 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
330 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
337 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
338 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
339 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
344 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
345 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
346 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
347 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
350 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
351 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
356 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
357 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
358 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
363 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
364 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
365 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
371 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) {
372 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
;
379 /* No valid transition found */
380 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
384 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
385 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
388 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
389 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
390 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
391 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
394 SSLfatal(s
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
395 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION
,
396 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
401 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
402 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
405 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
407 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
410 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
411 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
412 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
414 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
416 /* Shouldn't happen */
417 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
418 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
419 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
420 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
422 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
423 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
424 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
425 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
428 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
429 * we already sent close_notify
431 if (!ossl_assert((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0)) {
432 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
433 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
434 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
435 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
436 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
438 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
441 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
442 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
443 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
444 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
;
445 else if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
446 && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
)
447 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
449 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
450 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
451 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
453 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
454 if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
455 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
460 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
461 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
462 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
463 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
464 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
467 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
468 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
469 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
470 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
472 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
473 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
474 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
476 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
477 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
478 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
479 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
483 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
484 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
485 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
486 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
487 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
490 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
491 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
492 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
495 /* Try to read from the server instead */
496 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
501 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
502 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
504 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
506 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
509 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
510 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
514 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s
);
516 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
518 /* Shouldn't happen */
519 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
520 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
521 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
522 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
525 if (!s
->renegotiate
) {
527 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
528 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
530 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
535 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
536 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
538 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
539 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
541 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
542 * actually selected a version yet.
544 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0)
545 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
547 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
548 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
551 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
554 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
556 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
558 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
559 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
560 * because we did early data.
562 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
563 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
564 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
566 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
567 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
569 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
570 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
572 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
573 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
574 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
576 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
577 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
578 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
580 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
584 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
587 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
589 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
590 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
593 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
594 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
595 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
596 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
598 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
599 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
601 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
603 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
604 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
606 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
608 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
609 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
610 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
612 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
613 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
614 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
615 } else if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
616 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
618 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
619 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
621 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->npn_seen
)
622 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
624 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
627 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
629 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
630 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
631 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
632 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
635 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
637 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
638 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
640 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
643 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
645 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
646 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
648 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
649 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
652 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
654 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
657 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
, 1)) {
658 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
659 /* SSLfatal() already called */
660 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
662 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
663 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
665 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
666 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
671 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
672 * the client to the server.
674 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
676 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
678 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
680 /* No pre work to be done */
683 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
685 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
686 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
687 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
688 /* SSLfatal() already called */
694 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
695 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
698 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
699 * messages unless we need to.
703 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
704 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
705 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
706 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
712 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
714 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
715 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
716 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
718 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
719 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
)
720 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
723 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
724 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 0, 1);
727 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
728 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1, 1);
731 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
735 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
736 * client to the server.
738 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
740 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
744 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
746 /* No post work to be done */
749 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
750 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
751 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
753 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
754 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
755 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
757 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) == 0) {
758 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
759 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
760 /* SSLfatal() already called */
764 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
765 } else if (!statem_flush(s
)) {
769 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
770 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
775 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
777 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
778 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
780 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
781 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
784 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
785 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0) {
786 /* SSLfatal() already called */
791 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
792 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
794 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
795 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
797 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
798 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
799 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
801 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
802 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
806 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
807 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
808 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
810 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
811 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
813 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
815 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
816 /* SSLfatal() already called */
820 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
821 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
822 /* SSLfatal() already called */
826 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
827 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
830 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
833 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
838 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
842 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
843 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
844 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
846 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
849 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
853 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
856 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
857 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
858 /* SSLfatal() already called */
861 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
862 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
863 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
864 /* SSLfatal() already called */
871 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
872 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
874 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1)) {
875 /* SSLfatal() already called */
881 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
885 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
888 * Valid return values are:
892 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
893 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
895 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
897 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
899 /* Shouldn't happen */
900 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
901 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE
,
902 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
905 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
907 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
909 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
910 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
913 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
914 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_hello
;
915 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
;
918 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
919 *confunc
= tls_construct_end_of_early_data
;
920 *mt
= SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
923 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
929 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_certificate
;
930 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
933 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
934 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_key_exchange
;
935 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
938 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
939 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
940 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
943 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
944 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
945 *confunc
= tls_construct_next_proto
;
946 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
949 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
950 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
951 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
954 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
955 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
956 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
964 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
965 * reading. Excludes the message header.
967 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
969 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
971 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
973 /* Shouldn't happen */
976 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
977 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
979 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
980 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
983 return s
->max_cert_list
;
985 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
986 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
988 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
989 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
991 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
992 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
994 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
996 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
997 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
998 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
1000 return s
->max_cert_list
;
1002 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
1003 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1005 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
1006 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
1008 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1010 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
1011 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1013 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
1014 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
1016 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1017 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1019 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1020 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1025 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
1027 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1029 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1031 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1033 /* Shouldn't happen */
1034 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1035 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1036 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1037 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1039 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
1040 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
1042 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
1043 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
1045 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT
:
1046 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1048 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
1049 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
1051 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
1052 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
1054 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
1055 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
1057 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1058 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
1060 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
1061 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
1063 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
1064 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
1066 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
1067 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
1069 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
1070 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
1072 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
1073 return tls_process_hello_req(s
, pkt
);
1075 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1076 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s
, pkt
);
1078 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1079 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1084 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1087 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1089 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1091 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1093 /* Shouldn't happen */
1094 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1095 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1096 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1099 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
1100 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1101 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
1105 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1110 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1113 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
1114 unsigned char *session_id
;
1116 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1117 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
1118 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1119 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1125 || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
, NULL
)
1126 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess
)) {
1127 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
1128 && !ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1129 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1133 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1135 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
1138 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1139 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1141 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1144 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
1151 i
= (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
);
1154 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
),
1155 DOWNGRADE_NONE
) <= 0) {
1156 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1157 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1162 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1163 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1164 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1165 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1166 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1167 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1168 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1169 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1172 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1173 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1174 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1175 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1176 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1177 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1178 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1179 * know that is maximum server supports.
1180 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1181 * containing version 1.0.
1183 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1184 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1185 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1186 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1187 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1188 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1189 * the negotiated version.
1191 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1192 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1194 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->client_version
)
1195 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1196 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1197 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1202 session_id
= s
->session
->session_id
;
1203 if (s
->new_session
|| s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1204 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1205 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0) {
1206 sess_id_len
= sizeof(s
->tmp_session_id
);
1207 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= sess_id_len
;
1208 session_id
= s
->tmp_session_id
;
1209 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
1210 && RAND_bytes(s
->tmp_session_id
, sess_id_len
) <= 0) {
1211 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1212 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1213 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1220 assert(s
->session
->session_id_length
<= sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
));
1221 sess_id_len
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1222 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1223 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= sess_id_len
;
1224 memcpy(s
->tmp_session_id
, s
->session
->session_id
, sess_id_len
);
1227 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1228 || (sess_id_len
!= 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, session_id
,
1230 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1231 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1232 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1236 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1237 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1238 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)
1239 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1240 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1241 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1242 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1247 /* Ciphers supported */
1248 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1249 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1250 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1254 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), pkt
)) {
1255 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1258 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1259 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1260 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1265 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
1266 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1271 if (ssl_allow_compression(s
)
1272 && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
1273 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) || s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
1274 int compnum
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1275 for (i
= 0; i
< compnum
; i
++) {
1276 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1277 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, comp
->id
)) {
1278 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1279 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1280 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1286 /* Add the NULL method */
1287 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1288 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1289 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1293 /* TLS extensions */
1294 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
, NULL
, 0)) {
1295 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1302 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1307 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1308 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1309 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1310 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1311 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1314 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1315 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1316 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1317 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1318 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1321 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1322 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1323 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1324 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1326 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1328 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1331 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *cipherchars
)
1333 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1334 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1337 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1339 /* unknown cipher */
1340 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1341 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1345 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1346 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1348 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
, 1)) {
1349 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1350 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1354 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1355 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1357 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1358 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1359 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1363 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
1364 && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= c
->id
) {
1365 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1366 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1367 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1372 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1373 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1374 * set and use it for comparison.
1376 if (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)
1377 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1378 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1379 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1381 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1382 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1384 if (ssl_md(c
->algorithm2
)
1385 != ssl_md(s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
)) {
1386 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1387 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1388 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED
);
1393 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1396 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1397 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1401 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1406 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1408 PACKET session_id
, extpkt
;
1409 size_t session_id_len
;
1410 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1412 unsigned int compression
;
1413 unsigned int sversion
;
1414 unsigned int context
;
1415 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1420 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1421 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1422 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1426 /* load the server random */
1427 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1428 && sversion
== TLS1_2_VERSION
1429 && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1430 && memcmp(hrrrandom
, PACKET_data(pkt
), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) == 0) {
1431 s
->hello_retry_request
= SSL_HRR_PENDING
;
1433 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1434 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1435 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1439 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1440 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1441 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1446 /* Get the session-id. */
1447 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1448 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1449 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1452 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1453 if (session_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
1454 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1455 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1456 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1460 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1461 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1462 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1466 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1467 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1468 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1472 /* TLS extensions */
1473 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0 && !hrr
) {
1474 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt
);
1475 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
1476 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1477 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1483 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
1484 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1485 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1486 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)) {
1487 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1491 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
, extensions
)) {
1492 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1497 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || hrr
) {
1498 if (compression
!= 0) {
1499 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1500 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1501 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1505 if (session_id_len
!= s
->tmp_session_id_len
1506 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->tmp_session_id
,
1507 session_id_len
) != 0) {
1508 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1509 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID
);
1515 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1516 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1520 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s
, &extpkt
);
1524 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1525 * are appropriate for this version.
1527 context
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1528 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
;
1529 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s
, context
, extensions
)) {
1530 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1531 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1537 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1539 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1540 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1542 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1543 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1544 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1545 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1549 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1550 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_psk
,
1551 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1552 extensions
, NULL
, 0)) {
1553 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1558 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1559 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1560 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1561 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1562 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1563 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1564 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1565 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1566 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1567 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1569 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1570 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->session
->ext
.tick
) {
1571 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1573 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1574 * backwards compat reasons
1576 int master_key_length
;
1577 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1578 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1581 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1582 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1583 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1584 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1585 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1587 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1588 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1593 if (session_id_len
!= 0
1594 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1595 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1596 session_id_len
) == 0)
1601 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1602 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1603 /* actually a client application bug */
1604 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1605 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1606 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1611 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1612 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1613 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1614 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1615 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1617 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1618 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
);
1619 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1620 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1625 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1627 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1628 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1629 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1630 * used for resumption.
1632 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1633 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1634 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1635 if (session_id_len
> 0)
1636 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1641 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1642 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1643 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1644 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1648 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1651 s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1652 s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1654 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1655 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1659 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1660 if (compression
!= 0) {
1661 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1662 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1666 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1667 * using compression.
1669 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1670 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1671 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1675 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1676 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1677 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1680 if (compression
== 0)
1682 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1683 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1684 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1687 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1690 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1691 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1692 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1695 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1699 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, context
, extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1700 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1704 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1705 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1706 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1707 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1711 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1714 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1715 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1717 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1718 labellen
= sizeof(labelbuffer
) - 1;
1719 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG
)
1722 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1723 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1725 labellen
, NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1726 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1727 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1731 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1732 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1733 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1738 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1739 * we're done with this message
1742 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
1743 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1744 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
))) {
1745 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1749 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1750 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1752 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1753 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1756 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
,
1759 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1762 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1763 * should not be used.
1765 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
1766 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
1768 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, extpkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1769 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)
1770 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1771 extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1772 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1776 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1779 if (s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
== 0
1780 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1781 && s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
1785 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1786 * ClientHello will not change
1788 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1789 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1790 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR
);
1795 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1796 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1798 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0)) {
1799 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1804 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1805 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1806 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1809 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1810 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1811 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1815 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1817 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1818 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1821 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1824 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1825 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1827 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1828 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1829 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1830 size_t chainidx
, certidx
;
1831 unsigned int context
= 0;
1832 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
1834 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1835 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1836 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1840 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &context
))
1842 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1843 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
1844 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1845 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1846 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1849 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt
); chainidx
++) {
1850 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1851 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1852 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1853 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1854 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1858 certstart
= certbytes
;
1859 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1861 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
,
1862 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1865 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1866 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1867 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1868 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1872 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1873 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
1876 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
1877 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1878 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1882 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
1883 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
1884 NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
1885 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
1886 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
,
1887 PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
1888 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1889 /* SSLfatal already called */
1892 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1895 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1896 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1897 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1898 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1904 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1906 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1907 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1908 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1909 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1910 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1911 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1912 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1913 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1914 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1915 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1916 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1917 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1919 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1920 SSLfatal(s
, ssl_x509err2alert(s
->verify_result
),
1921 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1922 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1925 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1927 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1928 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1932 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1934 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1935 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1937 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1940 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1942 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1944 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1945 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1949 if ((clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &certidx
)) == NULL
) {
1951 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1952 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1953 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1957 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1958 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1961 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1962 if ((clu
->amask
& s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0) {
1964 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1965 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1966 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1970 s
->session
->peer_type
= certidx
;
1972 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1974 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1975 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1978 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1980 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
1981 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
1982 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
1983 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1987 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1991 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1995 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1997 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1998 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
2000 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
2002 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
2003 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2004 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2009 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2010 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2011 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2014 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2015 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2016 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2017 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2021 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
2022 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2023 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
2024 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
2025 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
2026 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2027 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2033 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2034 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2039 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2041 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2042 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
2044 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
2045 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
2046 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
2047 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
2048 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
2049 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2053 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
2055 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
2056 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
2058 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
2059 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
2061 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
2062 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
2064 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
2065 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
2066 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
2071 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
)) {
2072 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2076 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2077 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2078 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2082 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
2083 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2088 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2091 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
2092 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2095 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
2099 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
2100 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
2101 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
2102 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2103 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2107 peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2110 if (peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
2111 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2112 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2116 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2117 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
2118 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
2120 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
2121 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
);
2122 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
2123 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2128 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2129 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key
)) {
2130 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2131 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2135 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2136 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2142 if (DH_check_params(dh
, &check_bits
) == 0 || check_bits
!= 0) {
2143 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2144 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2148 if (!DH_set0_key(dh
, bnpub_key
, NULL
)) {
2149 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2155 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
2156 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2157 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2161 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
2162 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2167 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
2170 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2171 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2173 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2174 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2175 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2184 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
2188 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2189 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2194 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2198 unsigned int curve_type
, curve_id
;
2201 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2202 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2203 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2205 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &curve_type
) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &curve_id
)) {
2206 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2207 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2211 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2212 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2214 if (curve_type
!= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2215 || !tls1_check_group_id(s
, curve_id
, 1)) {
2216 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2221 if ((s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id
)) == NULL
) {
2222 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2223 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
2227 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
2228 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2229 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2233 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
,
2234 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
2235 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
2236 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2242 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2243 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2246 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
2247 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2248 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
2249 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2250 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2254 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2255 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2260 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2263 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2264 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= NULL
;
2265 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2266 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
2268 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2270 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
2272 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2273 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
);
2274 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2277 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2278 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
)) {
2279 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2284 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2285 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2286 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2287 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2288 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2291 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2292 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2293 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2296 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2297 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2298 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2302 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2303 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2307 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2311 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2317 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2318 * equals the length of the parameters.
2320 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
2321 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
2322 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
2323 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2324 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2328 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2329 unsigned int sigalg
;
2331 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
2332 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2333 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2336 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
) <=0) {
2337 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2340 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
2341 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2342 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2346 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
2347 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2348 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2351 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2352 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2353 md
== NULL
? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md
));
2355 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
2356 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2357 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2358 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2361 maxsig
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2363 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2364 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2369 * Check signature length
2371 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)maxsig
) {
2372 /* wrong packet length */
2373 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2374 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
2378 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2379 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2380 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2381 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2385 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2386 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2390 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
2391 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2392 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
2393 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2394 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2395 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2399 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
2400 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
));
2402 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2406 rv
= EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
2407 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), tbs
, tbslen
);
2410 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2411 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2414 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2417 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2418 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
2419 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
2420 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2421 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2422 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2425 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2428 /* still data left over */
2429 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2430 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2431 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2436 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2438 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2439 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2442 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2446 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2447 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2448 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2450 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2451 PACKET reqctx
, extensions
;
2452 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
2454 if ((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0) {
2456 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2457 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2460 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2463 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2464 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
);
2465 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
= NULL
;
2466 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
= 0;
2467 OPENSSL_free(s
->pha_context
);
2468 s
->pha_context
= NULL
;
2470 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &reqctx
) ||
2471 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx
, &s
->pha_context
, &s
->pha_context_len
)) {
2472 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2473 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2474 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2475 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2478 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
2479 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2480 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2482 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2484 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
2485 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2487 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2488 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2489 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2490 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2491 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2493 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2494 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2495 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2496 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2498 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2503 /* get the certificate types */
2504 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ctypes
)) {
2505 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2506 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2507 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2508 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2511 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
)) {
2512 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2513 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2514 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2515 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2518 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2521 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &sigalgs
)) {
2522 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2523 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2524 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2525 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2529 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2530 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2532 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
, 0)) {
2533 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2534 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2535 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2536 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2538 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2539 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2540 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2541 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2542 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2546 /* get the CA RDNs */
2547 if (!parse_ca_names(s
, pkt
)) {
2548 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2549 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2553 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2554 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2555 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2556 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2557 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2560 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2561 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2564 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2565 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2566 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2567 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2568 * SSL_get_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2571 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
2572 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2574 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2577 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2579 unsigned int ticklen
;
2580 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
, age_add
= 0;
2581 unsigned int sess_len
;
2582 RAW_EXTENSION
*exts
= NULL
;
2585 PACKET_null_init(&nonce
);
2587 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2589 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &age_add
)
2590 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &nonce
)))
2591 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2592 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? (ticklen
== 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) < ticklen
)
2593 : PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
)) {
2594 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2595 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2600 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2601 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2602 * be 0 here in that instance
2605 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2608 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2609 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2610 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2611 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2612 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2615 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2616 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2619 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2622 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2623 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2624 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2625 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2629 if ((s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) != 0
2630 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2632 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2633 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2634 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2636 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2639 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2640 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2644 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2645 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2647 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
2649 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.tick
);
2650 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= NULL
;
2651 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= 0;
2653 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2654 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
2655 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2656 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2659 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
2660 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2661 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2665 s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2666 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add
;
2667 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
2669 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2672 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
2673 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2674 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2675 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2676 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2680 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
2681 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, &exts
,
2683 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
,
2684 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2685 exts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2686 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2692 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2693 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2694 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2695 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2696 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2697 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2698 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2699 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2700 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2703 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2704 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2706 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
,
2707 s
->session
->session_id
, &sess_len
,
2708 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
2709 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2713 s
->session
->session_id_length
= sess_len
;
2714 s
->session
->not_resumable
= 0;
2716 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2717 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2718 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
2719 int hashleni
= EVP_MD_size(md
);
2721 static const unsigned char nonce_label
[] = "resumption";
2723 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2724 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni
>= 0)) {
2725 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2726 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2727 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2730 hashlen
= (size_t)hashleni
;
2732 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, s
->resumption_master_secret
,
2734 sizeof(nonce_label
) - 1,
2735 PACKET_data(&nonce
),
2736 PACKET_remaining(&nonce
),
2737 s
->session
->master_key
,
2739 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2742 s
->session
->master_key_length
= hashlen
;
2745 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
2746 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2749 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2752 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2756 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2757 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2759 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2764 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2765 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2766 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2767 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2770 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &resplen
)
2771 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2772 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2773 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2776 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2777 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
== NULL
) {
2778 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2779 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2782 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
, resplen
)) {
2783 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2784 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2787 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= resplen
;
2793 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2795 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
2796 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2797 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2800 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2804 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2805 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2806 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2809 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL
*s
)
2812 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2815 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2816 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2821 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2822 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2823 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2825 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2826 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2827 int ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2830 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
,
2831 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2832 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2836 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2837 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2838 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2842 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2843 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2844 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2845 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2846 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2855 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2857 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2858 /* should contain no data */
2859 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2860 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2861 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2864 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2865 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
2866 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2868 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2873 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
)) {
2874 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2875 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2878 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2881 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2883 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2886 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2887 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2890 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2891 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2892 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2893 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2894 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2897 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2898 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2899 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2903 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2905 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2906 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2909 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2910 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2911 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2913 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2914 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2915 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2916 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2920 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2921 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2922 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2923 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2927 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2928 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2929 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2930 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2931 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2935 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2936 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2937 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2939 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2940 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2943 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, identity
, identitylen
)) {
2944 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2945 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2952 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2953 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2954 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2955 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2959 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2960 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2965 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2968 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
2969 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2970 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2972 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2975 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2977 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2979 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2980 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2984 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2985 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2986 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2987 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2991 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2992 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2994 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2995 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2999 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
3000 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
3001 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3002 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, (int)(pmslen
- 2)) <= 0) {
3003 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
3004 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3008 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3009 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
3010 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
3011 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3014 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
3015 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
3016 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3017 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
3021 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, enclen
, &encdata
)
3022 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, encdata
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3023 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
3024 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
3027 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3030 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3031 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
3032 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
3033 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3037 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
3038 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s
, encdata
, enclen
, pms
, pmslen
)) {
3039 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3043 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3044 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3048 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3049 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3053 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
3054 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3059 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3061 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3063 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
;
3064 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
3065 unsigned char *keybytes
= NULL
;
3067 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
3069 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3070 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3074 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
3076 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3077 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3081 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
3083 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
3084 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3085 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3089 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
3090 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3094 /* send off the data */
3095 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt
, &pub_key
, NULL
);
3096 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(pub_key
),
3098 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3099 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3103 BN_bn2bin(pub_key
, keybytes
);
3104 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3108 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3111 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3112 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3117 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3120 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
3121 size_t encoded_pt_len
= 0;
3122 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
3125 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
3127 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3128 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3132 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
3134 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3135 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3139 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
3140 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3144 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3145 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
3147 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
3148 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3153 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)) {
3154 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3155 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3161 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
3162 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3165 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3166 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3171 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3174 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3175 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
3178 unsigned int md_len
;
3179 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
3180 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
3181 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
3182 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3185 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
3186 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
3189 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3191 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
3193 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3194 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
3198 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
3199 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3200 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3201 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3205 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3206 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3207 * certificate key for key exchange
3210 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3212 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
3214 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3215 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3219 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
3220 /* Generate session key
3221 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3223 || RAND_bytes(pms
, (int)pmslen
) <= 0) {
3224 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3225 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3229 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3232 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3233 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
3234 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
3235 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
3236 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3237 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
3238 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3239 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
3240 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3241 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3244 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3246 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3247 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) < 0) {
3248 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3252 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3254 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3257 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3258 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3263 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
3264 || (msglen
>= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0x81))
3265 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tmp
, msglen
)) {
3266 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3271 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3272 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3273 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3277 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3278 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3279 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3282 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3283 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3288 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3291 unsigned char *abytes
= NULL
;
3293 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
== NULL
3294 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
),
3296 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3297 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3300 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, abytes
);
3302 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3303 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3304 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3305 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3306 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3312 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3313 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3318 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3320 unsigned long alg_k
;
3322 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3325 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3326 * no need to do so here.
3328 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
3329 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
))
3332 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3333 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
))
3335 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3336 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
))
3338 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3339 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
))
3341 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3342 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, pkt
))
3344 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3345 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, pkt
))
3347 } else if (!(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3348 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3349 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3355 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
);
3356 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3358 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
3359 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3364 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
3366 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3369 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
3370 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
3372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3374 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3375 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
3376 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3383 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3384 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3385 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3388 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
3389 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3390 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3399 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3400 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3401 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3405 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3408 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3409 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3411 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3412 labellen
= sizeof(labelbuffer
) - 1;
3413 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG
)
3416 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3417 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3418 labellen
, NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3419 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3420 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
3421 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3425 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3426 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3432 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3433 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3438 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3439 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3440 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3442 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3444 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3445 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, 0) || s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
3448 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3449 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3451 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3452 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3457 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3460 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3463 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3464 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3465 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3466 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3468 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3472 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3473 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3474 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
3477 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3479 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
)) {
3480 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
3481 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
3483 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3486 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3490 /* We need to get a client cert */
3491 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
3493 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3494 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3496 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3498 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3501 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3502 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3503 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3505 } else if (i
== 1) {
3507 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3508 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3512 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3513 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3516 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3517 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3518 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3519 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3521 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3522 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3523 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3529 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
3530 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
3531 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3534 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3535 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3536 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3540 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3542 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3543 if (s
->pha_context
== NULL
) {
3544 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3545 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
3546 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3547 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3550 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
)) {
3551 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3552 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3556 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
,
3557 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 2) ? NULL
3559 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3564 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
3565 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
3566 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
3568 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3569 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3571 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3572 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
3579 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3581 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
3585 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3586 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3588 /* we don't have a certificate */
3589 if (!(alg_a
& SSL_aCERT
))
3592 /* This is the passed certificate */
3593 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
), &idx
);
3595 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3596 if (clu
== NULL
|| (alg_a
& clu
->amask
) == 0) {
3597 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3598 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3599 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT
);
3603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3604 if (clu
->amask
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3605 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
))
3607 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3608 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3613 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) && idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
3614 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3615 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3616 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3621 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
3622 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3623 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3631 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3632 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3634 size_t len
, padding_len
;
3635 unsigned char *padding
= NULL
;
3637 len
= s
->ext
.npn_len
;
3638 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3640 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.npn
, len
)
3641 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, padding_len
, &padding
)) {
3642 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO
,
3643 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3647 memset(padding
, 0, padding_len
);
3653 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_req(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3655 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3656 /* should contain no data */
3657 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ
,
3658 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3659 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3662 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
3663 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
3664 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3668 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3669 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3670 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3671 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3672 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3677 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s
);
3679 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3682 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3685 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3687 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)
3688 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3689 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3690 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3694 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3695 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, &rawexts
,
3697 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3698 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
3699 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3703 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3704 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3707 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3708 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3711 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3714 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3715 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3716 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3717 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3718 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3723 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3724 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3728 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3731 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, maxlen
, maxverok
= 0;
3732 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3734 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3735 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s
)) {
3736 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3737 SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
);
3742 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3743 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3747 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3748 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3749 # error Max cipher length too short
3752 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3753 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3756 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3757 maxlen
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
3760 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3763 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3765 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
)
3768 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) && totlen
< maxlen
; i
++) {
3769 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3771 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3772 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3773 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
3776 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3777 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3778 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3782 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3784 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3785 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
3786 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
))
3789 if (c
->max_tls
>= s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
3790 && c
->min_tls
<= s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
3798 if (totlen
== 0 || !maxverok
) {
3799 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3800 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
3803 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3810 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3811 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3812 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3814 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3815 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3816 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3820 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3821 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3822 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3824 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3825 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3826 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3835 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3837 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3838 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
) {
3839 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3840 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
3841 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
3845 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
;