2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
16 #include "statem_locl.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/engine.h>
26 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
27 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
29 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
30 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
31 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
35 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
41 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
43 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
44 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
45 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
46 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
53 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
59 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
61 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
64 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
65 * ciphersuite or for SRP
67 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
76 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
77 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
78 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
79 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
81 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
82 * (transition not allowed)
84 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
86 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
89 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
90 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
91 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
94 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
98 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
100 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
101 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
103 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
104 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
109 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
110 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
) {
111 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
116 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
118 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
119 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
123 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
124 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
127 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
128 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
134 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
135 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
136 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
142 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
143 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
;
148 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
149 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
150 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
156 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
157 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
160 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
161 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
;
164 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
165 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
166 # error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
168 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT
) {
169 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
;
171 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
172 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
173 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
174 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
176 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
177 /* SSLfatal() already called */
180 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
187 /* No valid transition found */
192 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
193 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
194 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
195 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
197 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
198 * (transition not allowed)
200 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
202 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
206 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
207 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
209 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
210 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
215 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
219 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
220 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
221 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
225 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
226 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
227 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
233 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
235 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
236 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
239 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
240 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
245 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
247 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
248 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
249 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
252 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
253 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
257 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
258 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
260 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
261 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
262 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
263 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
265 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
266 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
267 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
268 * the server is resuming.
271 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
273 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
274 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
275 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
276 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
280 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
281 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
283 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
284 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
285 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
286 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
289 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
290 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
291 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
293 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
294 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
303 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
304 * |ext.status_expected| is set
306 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
307 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
312 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
313 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
314 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
315 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
316 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
317 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
318 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
325 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
326 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
327 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
328 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
335 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
336 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
337 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
342 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
343 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
344 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
345 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
348 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
349 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
354 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
355 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
356 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
361 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
362 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
363 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
369 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) {
370 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
;
377 /* No valid transition found */
378 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
382 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
383 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
386 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
387 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
388 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
389 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
392 SSLfatal(s
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
393 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION
,
394 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
399 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
400 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
403 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
405 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
408 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
409 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
410 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
412 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
414 /* Shouldn't happen */
415 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
416 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
417 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
418 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
420 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
421 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
422 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
425 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
426 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
427 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
428 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
429 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
431 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
432 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
433 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
434 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
;
435 else if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
436 && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
)
437 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
439 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
440 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
441 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
443 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
444 if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
445 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
450 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
451 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
452 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
453 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
454 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
457 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
458 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
459 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
462 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
463 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
464 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
466 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
467 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
468 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
469 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
473 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
474 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
475 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
476 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
477 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
480 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
481 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
482 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
485 /* Try to read from the server instead */
486 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
491 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
492 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
494 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
496 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
499 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
500 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
504 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s
);
506 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
508 /* Shouldn't happen */
509 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
510 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
511 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
512 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
515 if (!s
->renegotiate
) {
517 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
518 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
520 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
525 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
526 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
528 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
529 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
531 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
532 * actually selected a version yet.
534 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0)
535 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
537 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
538 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
541 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
544 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
546 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
548 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
549 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
550 * because we did early data.
552 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
553 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
554 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
556 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
559 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
560 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
562 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
563 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
564 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
566 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
567 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
568 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
570 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
571 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
574 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
577 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
579 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
580 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
583 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
584 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
585 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
586 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
588 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
589 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
591 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
593 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
594 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
596 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
598 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
599 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
600 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
602 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
603 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
604 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
605 } else if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
606 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
608 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
609 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
611 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->npn_seen
)
612 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
614 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
617 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
619 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
620 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
621 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
622 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
625 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
627 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
628 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
630 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
633 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
635 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
636 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
638 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
639 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
642 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
644 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
647 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
, 1)) {
648 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
649 /* SSLfatal() already called */
650 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
652 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
655 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
656 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
661 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
662 * the client to the server.
664 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
666 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
668 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
670 /* No pre work to be done */
673 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
675 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
676 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
677 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
678 /* SSLfatal() already called */
684 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
685 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
688 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
689 * messages unless we need to.
693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
694 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
695 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
696 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
702 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
704 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
705 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
706 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
708 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
709 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
)
710 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
713 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
714 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 0, 1);
717 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
718 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1, 1);
721 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
725 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
726 * client to the server.
728 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
730 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
734 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
736 /* No post work to be done */
739 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
740 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
741 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
743 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
744 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
745 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
747 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) == 0) {
748 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
749 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
750 /* SSLfatal() already called */
754 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
755 } else if (!statem_flush(s
)) {
759 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
760 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
765 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
767 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
768 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
770 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
771 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
774 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
775 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0) {
776 /* SSLfatal() already called */
781 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
782 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
784 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
785 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
787 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
788 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
789 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
791 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
792 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
796 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
797 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
798 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
800 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
801 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
803 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
805 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
806 /* SSLfatal() already called */
810 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
811 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
812 /* SSLfatal() already called */
816 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
820 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
823 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
828 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
832 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
834 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
836 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
839 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
843 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
846 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
847 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
848 /* SSLfatal() already called */
851 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
852 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
853 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
854 /* SSLfatal() already called */
861 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
862 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
864 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1)) {
865 /* SSLfatal() already called */
871 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
875 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
878 * Valid return values are:
882 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
883 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
885 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
887 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
889 /* Shouldn't happen */
890 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
891 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE
,
892 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
895 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
897 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
899 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
900 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
903 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
904 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_hello
;
905 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
;
908 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
909 *confunc
= tls_construct_end_of_early_data
;
910 *mt
= SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
913 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
919 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_certificate
;
920 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
923 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
924 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_key_exchange
;
925 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
928 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
929 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
930 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
933 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
934 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
935 *confunc
= tls_construct_next_proto
;
936 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
939 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
940 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
941 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
944 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
945 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
946 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
954 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
955 * reading. Excludes the message header.
957 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
959 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
961 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
963 /* Shouldn't happen */
966 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
967 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
969 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
970 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
973 return s
->max_cert_list
;
975 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
976 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
978 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
979 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
981 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
982 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
984 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
986 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
987 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
988 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
990 return s
->max_cert_list
;
992 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
993 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
995 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
996 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
998 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1000 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
1001 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1003 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
1004 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
1006 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1007 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1009 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1010 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1015 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
1017 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1019 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1021 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1023 /* Shouldn't happen */
1024 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1025 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1026 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1027 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1029 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
1030 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
1032 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
1033 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
1035 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT
:
1036 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1038 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
1039 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
1041 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
1042 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
1044 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
1045 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
1047 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1048 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
1050 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
1051 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
1053 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
1054 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
1056 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
1057 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
1059 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
1060 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
1062 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
1063 return tls_process_hello_req(s
, pkt
);
1065 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1066 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s
, pkt
);
1068 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1069 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1074 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1077 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1079 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1081 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1083 /* Shouldn't happen */
1084 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1085 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1086 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1089 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1090 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
1094 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1099 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1102 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
1103 unsigned char *session_id
;
1105 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
1106 /* Should not happen */
1107 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1108 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1112 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1113 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
1114 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1115 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1121 || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
)
1122 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess
)) {
1123 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
1124 && !ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1125 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1129 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1131 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
1134 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1135 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1137 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1140 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
1147 i
= (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
);
1150 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
),
1151 DOWNGRADE_NONE
) <= 0) {
1152 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1153 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1158 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1159 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1160 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1161 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1162 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1163 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1164 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1165 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1168 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1169 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1170 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1171 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1172 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1173 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1174 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1175 * know that is maximum server supports.
1176 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1177 * containing version 1.0.
1179 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1180 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1181 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1182 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1183 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1184 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1185 * the negotiated version.
1187 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1188 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1190 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->client_version
)
1191 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1192 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1193 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1198 session_id
= s
->session
->session_id
;
1199 if (s
->new_session
|| s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1200 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1201 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0) {
1202 sess_id_len
= sizeof(s
->tmp_session_id
);
1203 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= sess_id_len
;
1204 session_id
= s
->tmp_session_id
;
1205 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
1206 && RAND_bytes(s
->tmp_session_id
, sess_id_len
) <= 0) {
1207 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1208 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1209 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1216 assert(s
->session
->session_id_length
<= sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
));
1217 sess_id_len
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1218 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1219 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= sess_id_len
;
1220 memcpy(s
->tmp_session_id
, s
->session
->session_id
, sess_id_len
);
1223 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1224 || (sess_id_len
!= 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, session_id
,
1226 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1227 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1228 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1232 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1233 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1234 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)
1235 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1236 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1237 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1238 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1243 /* Ciphers supported */
1244 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1245 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1246 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1250 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), pkt
)) {
1251 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1254 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1255 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1256 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1261 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
1262 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1263 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1267 if (ssl_allow_compression(s
)
1268 && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
1269 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) || s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
1270 int compnum
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1271 for (i
= 0; i
< compnum
; i
++) {
1272 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1273 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, comp
->id
)) {
1274 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1275 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1276 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1282 /* Add the NULL method */
1283 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1284 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1285 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1289 /* TLS extensions */
1290 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
, NULL
, 0)) {
1291 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1298 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1303 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1304 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1305 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1306 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1307 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1310 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1311 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1312 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1313 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1314 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1317 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1318 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1319 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1320 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1322 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1324 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1327 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *cipherchars
)
1329 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1330 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1333 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1335 /* unknown cipher */
1336 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1337 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1341 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1342 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1344 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
, 1)) {
1345 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1346 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1350 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1351 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1353 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1354 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1355 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1359 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
1360 && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= c
->id
) {
1361 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1362 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1363 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1368 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1369 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1370 * set and use it for comparison.
1372 if (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)
1373 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1374 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1375 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1377 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1378 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1380 if (ssl_md(c
->algorithm2
)
1381 != ssl_md(s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
)) {
1382 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1383 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1384 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED
);
1389 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1392 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1393 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1397 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1402 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1404 PACKET session_id
, extpkt
;
1405 size_t session_id_len
;
1406 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1408 unsigned int compression
;
1409 unsigned int sversion
;
1410 unsigned int context
;
1412 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1417 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1418 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1419 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1423 /* load the server random */
1424 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1425 && sversion
== TLS1_2_VERSION
1426 && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1427 && memcmp(hrrrandom
, PACKET_data(pkt
), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) == 0) {
1428 s
->hello_retry_request
= SSL_HRR_PENDING
;
1430 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1431 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1432 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1436 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1437 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1438 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1443 /* Get the session-id. */
1444 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1445 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1446 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1449 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1450 if (session_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
1451 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1452 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1453 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1457 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1458 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1459 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1463 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1464 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1465 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1469 /* TLS extensions */
1470 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0 && !hrr
) {
1471 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt
);
1472 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
1473 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1474 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1480 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
1481 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1482 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1483 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)) {
1484 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1488 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
, extensions
)) {
1489 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1494 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || hrr
) {
1495 if (compression
!= 0) {
1496 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1497 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1498 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1502 if (session_id_len
!= s
->tmp_session_id_len
1503 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->tmp_session_id
,
1504 session_id_len
) != 0) {
1505 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1506 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID
);
1512 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1513 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1517 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s
, &extpkt
);
1521 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1522 * are appropriate for this version.
1524 context
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1525 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
;
1526 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s
, context
, extensions
)) {
1527 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1528 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1534 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1536 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1537 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1539 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1540 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1541 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1542 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1546 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1547 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_psk
,
1548 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1549 extensions
, NULL
, 0)) {
1550 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1555 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1556 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1557 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1558 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1559 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1560 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1561 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1562 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1563 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1564 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1566 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1567 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->session
->ext
.tick
) {
1568 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1570 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1571 * backwards compat reasons
1573 int master_key_length
;
1574 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1575 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1578 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1579 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1580 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1581 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1582 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1584 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1585 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1590 if (session_id_len
!= 0
1591 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1592 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1593 session_id_len
) == 0)
1598 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1599 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1600 /* actually a client application bug */
1601 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1602 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1603 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1608 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1609 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1610 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1611 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1612 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1614 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0
1616 && s
->session
->ext
.tick_identity
1617 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY
)) {
1618 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
, 1, &discard
,
1619 s
->session_ctx
->lock
);
1620 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1621 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1626 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1628 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1629 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1630 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1631 * used for resumption.
1633 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1634 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1635 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1636 if (session_id_len
> 0)
1637 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1642 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1643 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1644 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1645 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1649 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1652 s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1653 s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1655 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1656 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1660 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1661 if (compression
!= 0) {
1662 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1663 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1667 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1668 * using compression.
1670 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1671 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1672 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1676 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1677 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1678 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1681 if (compression
== 0)
1683 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1684 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1685 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1688 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1691 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1692 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1693 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1696 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1700 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, context
, extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1701 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1706 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1707 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1708 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1711 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1714 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1715 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1717 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1718 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1720 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1721 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1722 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1726 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1727 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1728 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1733 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1734 * we're done with this message
1737 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
1738 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1739 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
))) {
1740 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1744 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1745 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1747 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1748 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1751 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
,
1754 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1757 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1758 * should not be used.
1760 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
1761 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
1763 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, extpkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1764 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)
1765 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1766 extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1767 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1771 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1774 if (s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
== 0
1775 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1776 && s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
1780 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1781 * ClientHello will not change
1783 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1784 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1785 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR
);
1790 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1791 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1793 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0)) {
1794 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1799 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1800 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1801 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1804 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1805 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1806 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1810 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1812 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1813 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1816 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1819 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1820 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1822 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1823 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1824 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1825 size_t chainidx
, certidx
;
1826 unsigned int context
= 0;
1827 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
1829 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1830 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1831 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1835 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &context
))
1837 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1838 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
1839 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1840 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1841 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1844 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt
); chainidx
++) {
1845 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1846 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1847 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1848 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1849 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1853 certstart
= certbytes
;
1854 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1856 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
,
1857 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1860 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1861 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1862 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1863 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1867 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1868 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
1871 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
1872 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1873 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1877 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
1878 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
1879 NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
1880 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
1881 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
,
1882 PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
1883 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1884 /* SSLfatal already called */
1887 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1890 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1891 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1892 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1893 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1899 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1901 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1902 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1903 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1904 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1905 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1906 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1907 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1908 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1909 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1910 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1911 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1912 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1914 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1915 SSLfatal(s
, ssl_x509err2alert(s
->verify_result
),
1916 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1917 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1920 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1922 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1923 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1927 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1929 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1930 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1932 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1935 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1937 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1939 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1940 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1944 if ((clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &certidx
)) == NULL
) {
1946 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1947 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1948 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1952 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1953 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1956 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1957 if ((clu
->amask
& s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0) {
1959 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1960 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1961 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1965 s
->session
->peer_type
= certidx
;
1967 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1969 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1970 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1973 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1975 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
1976 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
1977 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
1978 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1982 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1986 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1990 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1993 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1995 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1997 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1998 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
1999 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2004 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2005 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2006 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2009 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2010 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2011 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2012 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2016 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
2017 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2018 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
2019 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
2020 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
2021 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2022 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2028 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2029 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2034 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2037 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
2039 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
2040 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
2041 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
2042 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
2043 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
2044 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2048 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
2050 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
2051 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
2053 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
2054 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
2056 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
2057 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
2059 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
2060 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
2061 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
2066 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
)) {
2067 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2071 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2072 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2073 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2077 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
2078 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2083 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2086 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
2087 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2090 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
2094 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
2095 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
2096 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
2097 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2098 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2102 peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2105 if (peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
2106 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2107 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2111 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2112 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
2113 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
2115 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
2116 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
);
2117 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
2118 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2123 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2124 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key
)) {
2125 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2126 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2130 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2131 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2137 if (DH_check_params(dh
, &check_bits
) == 0 || check_bits
!= 0) {
2138 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2139 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2143 if (!DH_set0_key(dh
, bnpub_key
, NULL
)) {
2144 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2150 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
2151 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2152 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2156 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
2157 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2162 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
2165 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2166 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2168 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2169 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2170 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2179 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
2183 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2184 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2189 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2191 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2193 unsigned int curve_type
, curve_id
;
2196 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2197 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2198 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2200 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &curve_type
) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &curve_id
)) {
2201 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2202 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2206 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2207 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2209 if (curve_type
!= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2210 || !tls1_check_group_id(s
, curve_id
, 1)) {
2211 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2216 if ((s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id
)) == NULL
) {
2217 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2218 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
2222 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
2223 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2224 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2228 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
,
2229 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
2230 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
2231 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2237 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2238 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2241 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
2242 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2243 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
2244 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2245 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2249 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2250 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2255 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2258 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2259 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= NULL
;
2260 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2261 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
2263 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2265 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
2267 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2268 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
);
2269 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2272 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2273 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
)) {
2274 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2279 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2280 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2281 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2282 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2283 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2286 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2287 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2288 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2291 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2292 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2293 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2297 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2298 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2302 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2306 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2312 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2313 * equals the length of the parameters.
2315 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
2316 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
2317 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
2318 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2319 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2323 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2324 unsigned int sigalg
;
2326 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
2327 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2328 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2331 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
) <=0) {
2332 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2335 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
2336 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2337 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2341 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
2342 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2343 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2347 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2348 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2351 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
2352 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2353 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2354 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2357 maxsig
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2359 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2360 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2365 * Check signature length
2367 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)maxsig
) {
2368 /* wrong packet length */
2369 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2370 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
2374 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2375 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2376 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2377 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2381 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2382 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2386 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
2387 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2388 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
2389 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2390 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2391 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2395 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
2396 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
));
2398 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2402 rv
= EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
2403 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), tbs
, tbslen
);
2406 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2407 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2410 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2413 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2414 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
2415 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
2416 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2417 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2418 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2421 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2424 /* still data left over */
2425 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2426 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2427 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2432 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2434 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2435 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2438 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2442 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2443 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2444 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2446 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2447 PACKET reqctx
, extensions
;
2448 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
2450 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2451 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
);
2452 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
= NULL
;
2453 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
= 0;
2454 OPENSSL_free(s
->pha_context
);
2455 s
->pha_context
= NULL
;
2457 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &reqctx
) ||
2458 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx
, &s
->pha_context
, &s
->pha_context_len
)) {
2459 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2460 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2461 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2462 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2465 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
2466 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2467 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2469 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2471 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
2472 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2474 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2475 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2476 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2477 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2478 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2480 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2481 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2482 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2483 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2485 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2490 /* get the certificate types */
2491 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ctypes
)) {
2492 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2493 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2494 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2495 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2498 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
)) {
2499 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2500 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2501 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2502 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2505 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2508 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &sigalgs
)) {
2509 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2510 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2511 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2512 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2516 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2517 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2519 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
, 0)) {
2520 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2521 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2522 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2523 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2525 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2526 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2527 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2528 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2529 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2533 /* get the CA RDNs */
2534 if (!parse_ca_names(s
, pkt
)) {
2535 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2536 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2540 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2541 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2542 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2543 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2544 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2547 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2548 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2550 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2553 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2555 unsigned int ticklen
;
2556 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
, age_add
= 0;
2557 unsigned int sess_len
;
2558 RAW_EXTENSION
*exts
= NULL
;
2561 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2563 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &age_add
)
2564 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &nonce
)
2565 || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce
, &s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce
,
2566 &s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce_len
)))
2567 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2568 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
)
2570 && (ticklen
== 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) < ticklen
))) {
2571 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2572 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2577 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2578 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2579 * be 0 here in that instance
2582 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2585 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2586 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2587 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2588 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2589 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2592 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2593 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
2594 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2596 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2599 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2600 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2601 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2602 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2606 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
2608 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2610 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2613 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2614 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2618 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2619 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2621 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
2623 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.tick
);
2624 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= NULL
;
2625 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= 0;
2627 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2628 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
2629 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2630 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2633 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
2634 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2635 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2639 s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2640 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add
;
2641 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
2643 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2646 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
2647 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0
2648 || !tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
2649 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2651 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
,
2652 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2653 exts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2654 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2660 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2661 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2662 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2663 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2664 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2665 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2666 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2667 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2668 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2671 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2672 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2674 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
,
2675 s
->session
->session_id
, &sess_len
,
2676 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
2677 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2681 s
->session
->session_id_length
= sess_len
;
2683 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2684 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2686 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
2687 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2690 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2693 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2697 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2698 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2700 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2705 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2706 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2707 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2708 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2711 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &resplen
)
2712 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2713 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2714 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2717 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2718 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
== NULL
) {
2719 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2720 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2723 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
, resplen
)) {
2724 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2725 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2728 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= resplen
;
2734 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2736 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
2737 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2738 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2741 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2745 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2746 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2747 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2750 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL
*s
)
2753 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2756 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2757 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2762 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2763 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2764 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2766 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2767 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2768 int ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2771 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
,
2772 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2773 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2777 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2778 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2779 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2783 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2784 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2785 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2786 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2787 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2796 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2798 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2799 /* should contain no data */
2800 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2801 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2802 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2805 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2806 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
2807 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2809 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2814 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
)) {
2815 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2816 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2819 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2822 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2827 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2828 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2831 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2832 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2833 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2834 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2835 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2838 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2839 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2840 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2844 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2846 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2847 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2850 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2851 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2852 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2854 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2855 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2856 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2857 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2861 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2862 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2863 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2864 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2868 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2869 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2870 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2871 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2872 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2876 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2877 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2878 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2880 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2881 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2884 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, identity
, identitylen
)) {
2885 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2886 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2893 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2894 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2895 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2896 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2900 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2901 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2906 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2909 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
2910 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2911 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2913 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2916 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2918 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2920 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2921 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2925 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2926 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2927 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2928 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2932 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2933 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2935 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2936 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2940 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2941 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2942 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2943 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, (int)(pmslen
- 2)) <= 0) {
2944 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2945 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2949 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2950 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2951 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2952 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2955 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
2956 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2957 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2958 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2962 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, enclen
, &encdata
)
2963 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, encdata
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2964 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2965 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2968 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2971 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2972 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2973 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2974 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2978 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2979 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s
, encdata
, enclen
, pms
, pmslen
)) {
2980 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2984 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2985 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2989 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2990 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2994 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2995 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3000 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3002 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3004 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
;
3005 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
3006 unsigned char *keybytes
= NULL
;
3008 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
3010 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3011 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3015 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
3017 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3018 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3022 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
3024 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
3025 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3026 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3030 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
3031 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3035 /* send off the data */
3036 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt
, &pub_key
, NULL
);
3037 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(pub_key
),
3039 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3040 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3044 BN_bn2bin(pub_key
, keybytes
);
3045 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3049 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3052 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3053 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3058 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3060 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3061 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
3062 size_t encoded_pt_len
= 0;
3063 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
3066 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
3068 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3069 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3073 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
3075 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3076 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3080 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
3081 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3085 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3086 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
3088 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
3089 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3094 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)) {
3095 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3096 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3102 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
3103 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3106 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3107 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3112 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3114 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3115 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3116 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
3119 unsigned int md_len
;
3120 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
3121 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
3122 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
3123 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3126 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
3127 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
3130 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3132 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
3134 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3135 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
3139 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
3140 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3141 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3142 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3146 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3147 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3148 * certificate key for key exchange
3151 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3153 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
3155 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3156 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3160 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
3161 /* Generate session key
3162 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3164 || RAND_bytes(pms
, (int)pmslen
) <= 0) {
3165 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3166 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3170 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3173 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3174 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
3175 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
3176 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
3177 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3178 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
3179 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3180 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
3181 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3182 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3185 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3187 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3188 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) < 0) {
3189 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3193 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3195 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3198 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3199 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3204 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
3205 || (msglen
>= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0x81))
3206 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tmp
, msglen
)) {
3207 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3208 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3212 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3213 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3214 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3218 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3219 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3220 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3223 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3224 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3229 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3231 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3232 unsigned char *abytes
= NULL
;
3234 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
== NULL
3235 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
),
3237 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3238 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3241 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, abytes
);
3243 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3244 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3245 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3246 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3247 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3253 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3254 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3259 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3261 unsigned long alg_k
;
3263 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3266 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3267 * no need to do so here.
3269 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
3270 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
))
3273 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3274 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
))
3276 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3277 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
))
3279 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3280 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
))
3282 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3283 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, pkt
))
3285 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3286 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, pkt
))
3288 } else if (!(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3289 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3290 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3296 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
);
3297 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3298 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3299 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
3300 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3305 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
3307 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3310 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
3311 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
3313 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3315 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3316 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
3317 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3324 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3325 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3326 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3329 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
3330 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3331 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3340 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3341 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3342 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3345 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3348 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3349 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3351 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3352 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3353 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3354 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3355 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
3356 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3360 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3361 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3367 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3368 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3373 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3374 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3375 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3377 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3379 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3380 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, 0) || s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
3383 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3384 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3386 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3387 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3392 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3395 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3398 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3399 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3400 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3401 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3403 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3407 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3408 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3409 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
3412 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3414 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
)) {
3415 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
3416 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
3418 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3421 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3425 /* We need to get a client cert */
3426 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
3428 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3429 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3431 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3433 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3436 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3437 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3438 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3440 } else if (i
== 1) {
3442 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3443 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3447 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3448 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3451 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3452 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3453 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3454 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3456 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3457 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3458 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3464 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
3465 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
3466 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3469 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3470 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3471 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3475 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3477 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3478 if (s
->pha_context
== NULL
) {
3479 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3480 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
3481 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3482 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3485 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
)) {
3486 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3487 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3491 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
,
3492 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 2) ? NULL
3494 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3499 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
3500 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
3501 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
3503 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3504 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3506 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3507 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
3514 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3516 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
3520 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3521 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3523 /* we don't have a certificate */
3524 if (!(alg_a
& SSL_aCERT
))
3527 /* This is the passed certificate */
3528 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
), &idx
);
3530 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3531 if (clu
== NULL
|| (alg_a
& clu
->amask
) == 0) {
3532 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3533 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3534 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT
);
3538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3539 if (clu
->amask
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3540 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
))
3542 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3543 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3547 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3548 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) && idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
3549 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3550 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3551 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3556 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
3557 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3558 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3567 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3569 size_t len
, padding_len
;
3570 unsigned char *padding
= NULL
;
3572 len
= s
->ext
.npn_len
;
3573 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3575 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.npn
, len
)
3576 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, padding_len
, &padding
)) {
3577 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO
,
3578 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3582 memset(padding
, 0, padding_len
);
3588 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_req(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3590 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3591 /* should contain no data */
3592 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ
,
3593 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3594 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3597 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
3598 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
3599 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3603 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3604 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3605 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3606 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3607 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3612 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s
);
3614 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3617 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3620 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3622 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)
3623 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3624 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3625 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3629 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3630 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, &rawexts
,
3632 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3633 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
3634 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3638 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3639 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3642 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3643 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3646 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3650 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3651 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3652 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3653 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3658 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3659 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3663 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3666 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, maxlen
, maxverok
= 0;
3667 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3669 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3670 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s
)) {
3671 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3672 SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
);
3677 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3678 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3682 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3683 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3684 # error Max cipher length too short
3687 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3688 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3691 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3692 maxlen
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
3695 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3698 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3700 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
)
3703 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) && totlen
< maxlen
; i
++) {
3704 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3706 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3707 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3708 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
3711 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3712 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3713 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3717 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3719 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3720 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
3721 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
))
3724 if (c
->max_tls
>= s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
3725 && c
->min_tls
<= s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
3733 if (totlen
== 0 || !maxverok
) {
3734 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3735 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
3738 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3745 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3746 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3747 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3749 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3750 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3751 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3755 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3756 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3757 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3759 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3760 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3761 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3770 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3772 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3773 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
) {
3774 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3775 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
3776 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
3780 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
;