2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/md5.h>
21 #include <openssl/dh.h>
22 #include <openssl/bn.h>
23 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
26 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
28 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
29 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
30 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
34 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
40 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
42 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
43 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
44 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
45 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
52 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
58 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
60 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
63 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
64 * ciphersuite or for SRP
66 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
75 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
76 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
77 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
78 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
80 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
81 * (transition not allowed)
83 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
85 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
88 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
89 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
90 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
93 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
97 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
99 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
100 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
102 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
103 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
108 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
109 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
) {
110 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
115 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
117 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
118 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
122 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
123 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
126 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
127 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
133 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
134 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
135 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
141 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
142 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
148 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
149 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
155 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
156 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
159 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
160 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
;
166 /* No valid transition found */
171 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
172 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
173 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
174 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
176 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
177 * (transition not allowed)
179 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
181 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
185 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
186 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
188 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
189 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
194 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
198 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
199 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
200 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
204 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
205 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
206 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
212 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
214 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
215 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
218 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
219 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
224 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
226 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
227 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
228 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
231 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
232 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
236 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
237 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
239 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
240 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
241 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
242 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
244 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
245 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
246 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
247 * the server is resuming.
250 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
252 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
253 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
254 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
255 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
259 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
260 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
262 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
263 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
264 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
265 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
268 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
269 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
270 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
272 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
273 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
282 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
283 * |ext.status_expected| is set
285 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
286 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
291 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
292 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
293 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
294 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
295 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
296 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
297 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
304 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
305 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
306 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
307 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
314 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
315 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
316 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
321 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
322 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
323 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
324 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
327 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
328 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
333 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
334 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
335 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
340 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
341 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
342 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
348 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) {
349 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
;
356 /* No valid transition found */
357 SSLfatal(s
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
358 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION
,
359 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
364 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
365 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
368 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
370 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
373 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
374 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
375 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
377 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
379 /* Shouldn't happen */
380 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
381 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
382 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
383 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
385 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
386 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
387 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
388 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
;
389 else if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
390 && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
)
391 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
393 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
394 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
395 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
397 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
398 if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
399 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
400 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
404 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
405 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
406 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
407 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
411 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
412 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
413 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
414 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
416 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
417 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
418 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
420 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
421 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
422 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
427 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
428 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
429 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
430 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
431 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
434 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
435 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
436 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
439 /* Try to read from the server instead */
440 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
445 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
446 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
448 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
450 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
453 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
454 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
458 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s
);
460 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
462 /* Shouldn't happen */
463 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
464 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
465 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
466 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
469 if (!s
->renegotiate
) {
471 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
472 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
474 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
479 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
480 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
482 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
483 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
485 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
486 * actually selected a version yet.
488 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0)
489 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
491 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
492 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
495 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
498 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
500 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
501 /* We only get here in TLSv1.3 */
502 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
503 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
505 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
506 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
508 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
509 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
510 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
512 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
513 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
514 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
516 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
517 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
520 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
521 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
523 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
525 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
526 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
529 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
530 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
531 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
532 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
534 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
535 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
537 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
539 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
540 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
542 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
544 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
545 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
546 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
548 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
549 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
550 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
552 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
553 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
555 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->npn_seen
)
556 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
558 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
563 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
564 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
565 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
566 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
569 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
571 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
572 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
574 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
577 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
579 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
582 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
583 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
586 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
588 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
591 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
, 1)) {
592 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
593 /* SSLfatal() already called */
594 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
596 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
597 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
599 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
600 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
605 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
606 * the client to the server.
608 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
610 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
612 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
614 /* No pre work to be done */
617 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
619 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
620 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
621 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
622 /* SSLfatal() already called */
628 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
629 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
632 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
633 * messages unless we need to.
637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
638 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
639 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
640 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
646 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
648 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
649 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
650 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
652 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
653 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
)
654 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
657 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
659 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
660 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1);
663 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
667 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
668 * client to the server.
670 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
672 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
676 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
678 /* No post work to be done */
681 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
682 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& statem_flush(s
) != 1)
685 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
686 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
690 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
691 && s
->max_early_data
> 0
692 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) == 0) {
694 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
695 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
696 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
698 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
699 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
700 /* SSLfatal() already called */
706 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
708 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
709 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
711 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
712 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
715 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
716 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0) {
717 /* SSLfatal() already called */
722 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
725 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
726 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
728 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
729 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
730 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
732 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
733 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
737 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
738 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
739 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
741 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
742 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
744 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
746 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
747 /* SSLfatal() already called */
751 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
752 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
753 /* SSLfatal() already called */
757 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
761 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
764 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
769 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
773 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
775 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
777 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
780 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
784 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
787 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
788 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
789 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
790 /* SSLfatal() already called */
796 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
797 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
799 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1)) {
800 /* SSLfatal() already called */
806 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
810 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
813 * Valid return values are:
817 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
818 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
820 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
822 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
824 /* Shouldn't happen */
825 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
826 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE
,
827 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
830 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
832 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
834 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
835 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
838 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
839 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_hello
;
840 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
;
843 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
844 *confunc
= tls_construct_end_of_early_data
;
845 *mt
= SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
848 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
854 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_certificate
;
855 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
858 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
859 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_key_exchange
;
860 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
863 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
864 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
865 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
868 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
869 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
870 *confunc
= tls_construct_next_proto
;
871 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
874 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
875 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
876 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
879 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
880 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
881 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
889 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
890 * reading. Excludes the message header.
892 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
894 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
896 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
898 /* Shouldn't happen */
901 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
902 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
904 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
905 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
908 return s
->max_cert_list
;
910 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
911 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
913 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
914 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
916 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
917 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
919 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
921 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
922 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
923 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
925 return s
->max_cert_list
;
927 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
928 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
930 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
931 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
933 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
935 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
936 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
938 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
939 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
941 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
942 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH
;
944 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
945 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
950 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
952 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
954 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
956 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
958 /* Shouldn't happen */
959 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
960 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
961 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
962 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
964 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
965 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
967 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
968 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
971 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
973 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
974 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
976 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
977 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
979 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
980 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
982 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
983 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
985 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
986 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
988 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
989 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
991 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
992 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
994 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
995 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
997 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
998 return tls_process_hello_req(s
, pkt
);
1000 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1001 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s
, pkt
);
1003 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1004 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1009 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1012 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1014 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1016 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1018 /* Shouldn't happen */
1019 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1020 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1021 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1024 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1025 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
1029 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1034 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1037 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
1038 unsigned char *session_id
;
1040 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
1041 /* Should not happen */
1042 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1043 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1047 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1048 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
1049 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1050 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1056 || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
)
1057 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess
)) {
1058 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
1059 && !ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1060 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1064 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1066 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
1069 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1070 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1072 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1075 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
1082 i
= (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
);
1085 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
),
1086 DOWNGRADE_NONE
) <= 0) {
1087 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1088 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1093 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1094 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1095 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1096 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1097 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1098 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1099 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1100 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1103 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1104 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1105 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1106 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1107 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1108 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1109 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1110 * know that is maximum server supports.
1111 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1112 * containing version 1.0.
1114 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1115 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1116 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1117 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1118 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1119 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1120 * the negotiated version.
1122 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1123 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1125 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->client_version
)
1126 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1127 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1128 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1133 session_id
= s
->session
->session_id
;
1134 if (s
->new_session
|| s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1135 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1136 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0) {
1137 sess_id_len
= sizeof(s
->tmp_session_id
);
1138 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= sess_id_len
;
1139 session_id
= s
->tmp_session_id
;
1140 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
1141 && ssl_randbytes(s
, s
->tmp_session_id
,
1142 sess_id_len
) <= 0) {
1143 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1144 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1145 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1152 sess_id_len
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1153 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1154 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= sess_id_len
;
1155 memcpy(s
->tmp_session_id
, s
->session
->session_id
, sess_id_len
);
1158 if (sess_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
1159 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1160 || (sess_id_len
!= 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, session_id
,
1162 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1163 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1164 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1168 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1169 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1170 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)
1171 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1172 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1173 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1174 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1179 /* Ciphers supported */
1180 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1181 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1182 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1186 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), pkt
)) {
1187 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1190 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1191 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1192 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1197 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
1198 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1199 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1203 if (ssl_allow_compression(s
)
1204 && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
1205 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) || s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
1206 int compnum
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1207 for (i
= 0; i
< compnum
; i
++) {
1208 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1209 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, comp
->id
)) {
1210 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1211 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1212 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1218 /* Add the NULL method */
1219 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1220 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1221 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1225 /* TLS extensions */
1226 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
, NULL
, 0)) {
1227 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1234 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1239 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1240 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1241 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1242 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1243 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1246 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1247 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1248 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1249 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1250 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1253 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1254 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1255 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1256 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1258 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1260 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1263 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *cipherchars
)
1265 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1266 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1269 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1271 /* unknown cipher */
1272 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1273 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1277 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1278 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1280 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
, 1)) {
1281 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1282 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1286 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1287 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1289 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1290 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1291 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1295 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
1296 && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= c
->id
) {
1297 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1298 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1299 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1304 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1305 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1306 * set and use it for comparison.
1308 if (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)
1309 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1310 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1311 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1313 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1314 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1316 if (ssl_md(c
->algorithm2
)
1317 != ssl_md(s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
)) {
1318 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1319 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1320 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED
);
1325 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1328 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1329 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1333 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1338 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1340 PACKET session_id
, extpkt
;
1341 size_t session_id_len
;
1342 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1344 unsigned int compression
;
1345 unsigned int sversion
;
1346 unsigned int context
;
1348 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1353 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1354 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1355 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1359 /* load the server random */
1360 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1361 && sversion
== TLS1_2_VERSION
1362 && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1363 && memcmp(hrrrandom
, PACKET_data(pkt
), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) == 0) {
1364 s
->hello_retry_request
= SSL_HRR_PENDING
;
1366 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1367 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1368 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1372 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1373 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1374 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1379 /* Get the session-id. */
1380 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1381 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1382 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1385 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1386 if (session_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
1387 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1388 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1389 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1393 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1394 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1395 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1399 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1400 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1401 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1405 /* TLS extensions */
1406 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0 && !hrr
) {
1407 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt
);
1408 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
1409 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1410 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1416 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
1417 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1418 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1419 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)) {
1420 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1424 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
, extensions
)) {
1425 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1430 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || hrr
) {
1431 if (compression
!= 0) {
1432 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1433 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1434 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1438 if (session_id_len
!= s
->tmp_session_id_len
1439 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->tmp_session_id
,
1440 session_id_len
) != 0) {
1441 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1442 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID
);
1448 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1449 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1453 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s
, &extpkt
);
1457 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1458 * are appropriate for this version.
1460 context
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1461 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
;
1462 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s
, context
, extensions
)) {
1463 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1464 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1470 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1472 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1473 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1475 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1476 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1477 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1478 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1482 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1483 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_psk
,
1484 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1485 extensions
, NULL
, 0)) {
1486 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1491 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1492 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1493 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1494 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1495 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1496 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1497 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1498 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1499 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1500 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1502 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1503 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->session
->ext
.tick
) {
1504 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1506 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1507 * backwards compat reasons
1509 int master_key_length
;
1510 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1511 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1514 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1515 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1516 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1517 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1518 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1520 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1521 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1526 if (session_id_len
!= 0
1527 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1528 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1529 session_id_len
) == 0)
1534 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1535 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1536 /* actually a client application bug */
1537 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1538 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1539 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1544 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1545 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1546 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1547 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1548 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1550 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0
1552 && s
->session
->ext
.tick_identity
1553 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY
)) {
1554 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
, 1, &discard
,
1555 s
->session_ctx
->lock
);
1556 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1557 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1562 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1564 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1565 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1566 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1567 * used for resumption.
1569 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1570 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1571 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1572 if (session_id_len
> 0)
1573 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1578 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1579 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1580 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1581 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1585 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1588 s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1589 s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1591 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1592 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1596 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1597 if (compression
!= 0) {
1598 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1599 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1603 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1604 * using compression.
1606 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1607 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1608 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1612 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1613 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1614 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1617 if (compression
== 0)
1619 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1620 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1621 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1624 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1627 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1628 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1629 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1632 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1636 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, context
, extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1637 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1641 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1642 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1643 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1644 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1647 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1650 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1651 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1653 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1654 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1656 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1657 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1658 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1662 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1663 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1664 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1669 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1670 * we're done with this message
1673 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
1674 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1675 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
))) {
1676 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1680 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1681 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1683 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1684 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1687 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
,
1690 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1693 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1694 * should not be used.
1696 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
1697 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
1699 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, extpkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1700 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)
1701 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1702 extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1703 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1707 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1710 if (s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
== 0
1711 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1712 && s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
1716 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1717 * ClientHello will not change
1719 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1720 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1721 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR
);
1726 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1727 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1729 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
)) {
1730 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1735 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1736 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1737 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1740 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1741 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1742 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1746 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1748 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1749 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1752 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1755 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1756 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1758 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1759 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1760 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1761 size_t chainidx
, certidx
;
1762 unsigned int context
= 0;
1763 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
1765 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1766 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1767 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1771 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &context
))
1773 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1774 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
1775 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1776 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1777 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1780 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt
); chainidx
++) {
1781 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1782 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1783 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1784 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1785 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1789 certstart
= certbytes
;
1790 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1792 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
,
1793 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1796 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1797 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1798 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1799 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1803 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1804 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
1807 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
1808 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1809 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1813 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
1814 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
1815 NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
1816 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
1817 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
,
1818 PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
1819 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1820 /* SSLfatal already called */
1823 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1826 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1827 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1828 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1829 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1835 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1837 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1838 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1839 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1840 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1841 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1842 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1843 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1844 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1845 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1846 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1847 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1848 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1850 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1851 SSLfatal(s
, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
),
1852 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1853 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1856 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1858 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1859 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1863 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1865 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1866 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1868 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1871 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1873 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1875 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1876 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1880 if ((clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &certidx
)) == NULL
) {
1882 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1883 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1884 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1888 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1889 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1892 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1893 if ((clu
->amask
& s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0) {
1895 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1896 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1897 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1901 s
->session
->peer_type
= certidx
;
1903 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1905 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1906 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1909 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1911 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
1912 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
1913 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
1914 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1918 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1922 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1926 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1929 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1931 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1933 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1934 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
1935 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1940 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1941 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1942 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1945 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1946 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1947 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
1948 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1952 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
1953 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
1954 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1955 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
1956 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
1957 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
1958 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1964 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
1965 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1970 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
1972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1973 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
1975 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1976 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1977 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
1978 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
1979 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
1980 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1984 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1986 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
1987 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
1989 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
1990 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
1992 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
1993 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
1995 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
1996 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1997 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
2002 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
)) {
2003 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2007 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2008 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2009 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2013 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
2014 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2019 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2021 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2022 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
2023 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2026 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
2030 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
2031 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
2032 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
2033 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2034 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2038 peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2041 if (peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
2042 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2043 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2047 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2048 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
2049 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
2051 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
2052 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
);
2053 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
2054 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2059 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2060 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key
)) {
2061 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2062 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2066 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2067 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2073 if (DH_check_params(dh
, &check_bits
) == 0 || check_bits
!= 0) {
2074 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2075 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2079 if (!DH_set0_key(dh
, bnpub_key
, NULL
)) {
2080 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2086 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
2087 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2088 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2092 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
2093 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2098 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
2101 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2102 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2104 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2105 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2106 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2115 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
2119 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2120 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2125 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2129 unsigned int curve_type
, curve_id
;
2132 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2133 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2134 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2136 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &curve_type
) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &curve_id
)) {
2137 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2138 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2142 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2143 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2145 if (curve_type
!= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
|| !tls1_check_group_id(s
, curve_id
)) {
2146 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2151 if ((s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id
)) == NULL
) {
2152 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2153 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
2157 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
2158 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2159 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2163 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
,
2164 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
2165 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
2166 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2172 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2173 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2176 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
2177 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2178 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
2179 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2180 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2184 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2185 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2190 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2193 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2194 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= NULL
;
2195 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2196 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
2198 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2200 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
2202 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2203 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
);
2204 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2207 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2208 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
)) {
2209 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2214 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2215 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2216 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2217 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2218 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2221 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2222 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2223 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2226 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2227 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2228 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2232 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2233 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2237 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2241 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2247 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2248 * equals the length of the parameters.
2250 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
2251 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
2252 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
2253 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2254 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2258 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2259 unsigned int sigalg
;
2261 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
2262 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2263 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2266 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
) <=0) {
2267 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2271 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2273 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
2274 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2275 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2279 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
2280 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2281 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2285 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
2286 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2287 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2288 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2291 maxsig
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2293 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2294 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2299 * Check signature length
2301 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)maxsig
) {
2302 /* wrong packet length */
2303 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2304 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
2308 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2309 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2310 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2311 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2315 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2316 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2320 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
2321 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2322 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
2323 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2324 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2325 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2329 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
2330 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
));
2332 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2336 rv
= EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
2337 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), tbs
, tbslen
);
2340 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2341 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2344 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2347 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2348 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
2349 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
2350 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2351 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2352 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2355 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2358 /* still data left over */
2359 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2360 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2361 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2366 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2368 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2369 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2372 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2376 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2377 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2378 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2380 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2381 PACKET reqctx
, extensions
;
2382 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
2384 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2385 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
);
2386 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
= NULL
;
2387 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
= 0;
2389 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2390 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &reqctx
)) {
2391 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2392 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2393 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2394 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2397 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
2398 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2399 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2401 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2403 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
2404 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2406 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2407 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2408 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2409 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2410 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2412 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2413 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2414 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2415 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2417 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2422 /* get the certificate types */
2423 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ctypes
)) {
2424 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2425 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2426 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2427 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2430 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
)) {
2431 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2432 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2433 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2434 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2437 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2440 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &sigalgs
)) {
2441 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2442 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2443 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2444 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2447 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
)) {
2448 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2449 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2450 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2451 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2453 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2454 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2455 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2456 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2457 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2461 /* get the CA RDNs */
2462 if (!parse_ca_names(s
, pkt
)) {
2463 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2464 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2468 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2469 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2470 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2471 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2472 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2475 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2476 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2478 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2481 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2483 unsigned int ticklen
;
2484 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
, age_add
= 0;
2485 unsigned int sess_len
;
2486 RAW_EXTENSION
*exts
= NULL
;
2489 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2491 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &age_add
)
2492 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &nonce
)
2493 || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce
, &s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce
,
2494 &s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce_len
)))
2495 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2496 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
)
2498 && (ticklen
== 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) < ticklen
))) {
2499 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2500 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2505 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2506 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2507 * be 0 here in that instance
2510 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2513 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2514 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2515 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2516 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2517 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2520 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2521 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
2522 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2524 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2527 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2528 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2529 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2530 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2534 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
2536 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2538 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2541 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2542 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2546 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2547 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2549 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
2551 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.tick
);
2552 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= NULL
;
2553 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= 0;
2555 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2556 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
2557 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2558 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2561 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
2562 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2563 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2567 s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2568 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add
;
2569 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
2571 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2574 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
2575 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0
2576 || !tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
2577 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2579 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
,
2580 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2581 exts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2582 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2588 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2589 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2590 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2591 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2592 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2593 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2594 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2595 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2596 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2599 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2600 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2602 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
,
2603 s
->session
->session_id
, &sess_len
,
2604 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
2605 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2609 s
->session
->session_id_length
= sess_len
;
2611 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2612 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2614 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
2615 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2618 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2621 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2625 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2626 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2628 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2633 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2634 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2635 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2636 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2639 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &resplen
)
2640 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2641 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2642 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2645 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2646 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
== NULL
) {
2647 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2648 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2651 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
, resplen
)) {
2652 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2653 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2656 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= resplen
;
2662 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2664 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
2665 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2666 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2669 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2673 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2674 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2675 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2678 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL
*s
)
2681 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2684 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2685 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2690 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2691 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2692 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2694 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2695 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2696 int ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2699 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
,
2700 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2701 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2705 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2706 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2707 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2711 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2712 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2713 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2714 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2715 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2724 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2726 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2727 /* should contain no data */
2728 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2729 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2730 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2733 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2734 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
2735 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2737 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2742 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
)) {
2743 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2744 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2747 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2750 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2752 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2755 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2756 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2759 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2760 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2761 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2762 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2763 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2766 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2767 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2768 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2772 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2774 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2775 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2778 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2779 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2780 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2782 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2783 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2784 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2785 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2789 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2790 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2791 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2792 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2796 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2797 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2798 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2799 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2800 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2804 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2805 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2806 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2808 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2809 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2812 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, identity
, identitylen
)) {
2813 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2814 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2821 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2822 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2823 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2824 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2828 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2829 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2834 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2837 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
2838 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2839 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2841 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2844 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2846 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2848 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2849 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2853 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2854 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2855 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2856 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2860 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2861 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2863 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2864 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2868 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2869 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2870 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2871 if (ssl_randbytes(s
, pms
+ 2, (int)(pmslen
- 2)) <= 0) {
2872 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2873 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2877 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2878 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2879 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2880 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2883 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
2884 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2885 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2886 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2890 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, enclen
, &encdata
)
2891 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, encdata
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2892 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2893 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2896 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2899 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2900 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2901 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2902 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2906 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2907 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s
, encdata
, enclen
, pms
, pmslen
)) {
2908 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2912 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2913 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2917 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2918 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2922 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2923 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2928 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2932 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
;
2933 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2934 unsigned char *keybytes
= NULL
;
2936 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2938 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
2939 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2943 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2945 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
2946 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2950 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2952 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
2953 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
2954 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2958 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
2959 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2963 /* send off the data */
2964 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt
, &pub_key
, NULL
);
2965 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(pub_key
),
2967 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
2968 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2972 BN_bn2bin(pub_key
, keybytes
);
2973 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2977 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2980 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
2981 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2986 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2989 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2990 size_t encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2991 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2994 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2996 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
2997 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3001 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
3003 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3004 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3008 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
3009 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3013 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3014 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
3016 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
3017 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3022 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)) {
3023 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3024 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3030 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
3031 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3034 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3035 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3040 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3042 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3043 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3044 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
3047 unsigned int md_len
;
3048 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
3049 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
3050 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
3051 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3054 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
3055 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
3058 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3060 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
3062 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3063 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
3067 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
3068 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3069 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3070 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3074 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3075 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3076 * certificate key for key exchange
3079 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3081 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
3083 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3084 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3088 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
3089 /* Generate session key
3090 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3092 || ssl_randbytes(s
, pms
, (int)pmslen
) <= 0) {
3093 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3094 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3098 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3101 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3102 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
3103 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
3104 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
3105 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3106 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
3107 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3108 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
3109 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3110 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3113 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3115 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3116 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) < 0) {
3117 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3121 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3123 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3126 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3127 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3132 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
3133 || (msglen
>= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0x81))
3134 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tmp
, msglen
)) {
3135 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3136 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3140 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3141 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3142 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3146 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3147 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3148 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3151 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3152 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3157 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3160 unsigned char *abytes
= NULL
;
3162 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
== NULL
3163 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
),
3165 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3166 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3169 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, abytes
);
3171 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3172 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3173 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3174 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3175 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3181 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3182 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3187 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3189 unsigned long alg_k
;
3191 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3194 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3195 * no need to do so here.
3197 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
3198 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
))
3201 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3202 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
))
3204 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3205 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
))
3207 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3208 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
))
3210 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3211 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, pkt
))
3213 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3214 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, pkt
))
3216 } else if (!(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3217 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3218 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3224 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
);
3225 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3226 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3227 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
3228 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3233 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
3235 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3238 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
3239 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
3241 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3243 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3244 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
3245 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3252 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3253 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3254 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3257 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
3258 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3259 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3267 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3268 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3269 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3270 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3273 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3276 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3277 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3279 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3280 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3281 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3282 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3283 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
3284 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3288 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3289 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3295 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3296 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3301 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3302 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3303 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3305 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3307 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3308 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, 0) || s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
3311 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3312 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3314 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3315 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3320 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3323 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3326 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3327 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3328 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3329 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3331 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3335 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3336 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3337 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
3340 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3342 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3343 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3345 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3349 /* We need to get a client cert */
3350 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
3352 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3353 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3355 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3357 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3360 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3361 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3362 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3364 } else if (i
== 1) {
3366 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3367 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3371 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3372 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3375 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3376 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3377 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3378 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3380 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3381 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3382 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3388 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3391 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3392 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3393 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3397 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3400 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3403 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
3404 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3405 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3408 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
,
3409 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 2) ? NULL
3411 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3416 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
3417 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
3418 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
3420 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3421 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3423 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3424 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
3431 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3433 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
3437 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3438 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3440 /* we don't have a certificate */
3441 if (!(alg_a
& SSL_aCERT
))
3444 /* This is the passed certificate */
3445 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
), &idx
);
3447 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3448 if (clu
== NULL
|| (alg_a
& clu
->amask
) == 0) {
3449 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3450 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3451 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT
);
3455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3456 if (clu
->amask
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3457 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
))
3459 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3460 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3464 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3465 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) && idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
3466 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3467 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3468 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3473 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
3474 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3475 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3484 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3486 size_t len
, padding_len
;
3487 unsigned char *padding
= NULL
;
3489 len
= s
->ext
.npn_len
;
3490 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3492 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.npn
, len
)
3493 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, padding_len
, &padding
)) {
3494 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO
,
3495 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3499 memset(padding
, 0, padding_len
);
3505 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_req(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3507 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3508 /* should contain no data */
3509 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ
,
3510 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3511 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3514 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
3515 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
3516 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3520 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3521 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3522 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3523 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3524 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3529 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s
);
3531 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3534 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3537 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3539 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)
3540 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3541 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3542 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3546 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3547 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, &rawexts
,
3549 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3550 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
3551 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3555 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3556 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3559 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3560 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3563 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3567 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3568 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3569 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3570 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3575 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3576 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3580 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3583 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, maxlen
, maxverok
= 0;
3584 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3585 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3586 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
3589 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3590 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3594 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3595 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3596 # error Max cipher length too short
3599 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3600 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3603 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3604 maxlen
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
3607 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3610 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3612 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
)
3615 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) && totlen
< maxlen
; i
++) {
3616 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3618 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3619 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3620 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
3623 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3624 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3625 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3629 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3631 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3632 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
3633 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
))
3636 if (c
->max_tls
>= s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
3637 && c
->min_tls
<= s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
3645 if (totlen
== 0 || !maxverok
) {
3646 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3647 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
3650 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3657 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3658 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3659 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3661 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3662 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3663 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3667 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3668 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3669 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3671 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3672 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3673 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3682 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3684 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3685 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
) {
3686 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3687 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
3688 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
3692 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
;