2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/md5.h>
21 #include <openssl/dh.h>
22 #include <openssl/bn.h>
23 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
26 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
28 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
29 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
30 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
34 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
40 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
42 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
43 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
44 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
45 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
52 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
58 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
60 long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
63 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
64 * ciphersuite or for SRP
66 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
75 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
76 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
77 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
78 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
80 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
81 * (transition not allowed)
83 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
85 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
88 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
89 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
90 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
93 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
97 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
99 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
100 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
102 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
103 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
108 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
109 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
) {
110 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
115 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
117 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
118 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
122 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
123 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
126 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
127 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
133 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
134 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
135 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
141 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
142 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
148 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
149 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
155 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
156 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
159 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
160 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
;
166 /* No valid transition found */
171 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
172 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
173 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
174 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
176 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
177 * (transition not allowed)
179 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
181 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
185 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
186 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
188 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
189 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
194 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
198 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
199 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
200 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
204 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
205 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
206 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
210 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
) {
211 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
;
217 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
219 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
220 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
223 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
224 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
227 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
) {
228 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
;
233 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
235 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
236 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
237 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
240 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
241 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
245 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
246 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
248 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
249 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
250 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
251 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
253 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
254 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
255 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
256 * the server is resuming.
259 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
261 } else if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
262 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
263 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
264 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
268 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
269 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
271 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
272 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
273 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
274 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
277 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
278 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
279 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
281 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
282 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
291 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
292 * |ext.status_expected| is set
294 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
295 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
300 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
301 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
302 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
303 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
304 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
305 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
306 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
313 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
314 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
315 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
316 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
323 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
324 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
325 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
330 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
331 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
332 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
333 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
336 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
337 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
342 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
343 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
344 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
349 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
350 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
351 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
357 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) {
358 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
;
365 /* No valid transition found */
366 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
367 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
372 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
373 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
376 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
378 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
381 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
382 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
383 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
385 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
387 /* Shouldn't happen */
388 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
390 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
391 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
392 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
394 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
395 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
396 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
398 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
399 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
400 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
401 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
;
403 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
404 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
405 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
407 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
408 if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
409 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
410 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
414 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
415 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
416 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
417 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
420 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
421 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
422 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
425 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
426 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
427 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
429 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
430 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
431 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
432 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
436 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
437 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
438 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
439 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
440 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
443 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
444 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
445 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
448 /* Try to read from the server instead */
449 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
454 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
455 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
457 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
459 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
462 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
463 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
467 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s
);
469 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
471 /* Shouldn't happen */
472 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
475 if (!s
->renegotiate
) {
477 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
478 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
480 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
485 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
488 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
489 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
491 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
492 * actually selected a version yet.
494 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
495 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
498 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
501 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
503 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
504 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
506 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
507 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
508 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
510 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
511 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
)
512 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
514 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
515 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
518 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
519 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
521 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
523 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
524 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
527 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
528 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
529 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
530 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
532 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
533 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
535 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
537 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
538 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
540 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
542 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
543 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
544 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
546 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
547 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
549 hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
551 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
->npn_seen
)
552 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
554 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
556 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
558 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
559 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
560 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
564 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
566 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
567 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
569 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
572 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
574 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
577 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
578 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
581 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
583 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
586 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
, 1)) {
587 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
588 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
589 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
591 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
592 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
594 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
600 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
601 * the client to the server.
603 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
605 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
607 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
609 /* No pre work to be done */
612 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
614 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
615 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
616 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
617 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
623 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
624 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
627 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
628 * messages unless we need to.
632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
633 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
634 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
639 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
641 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
642 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
643 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
645 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
646 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
)
647 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
650 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
652 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1);
655 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
659 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
660 * client to the server.
662 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
664 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
668 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
670 /* No post work to be done */
673 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
674 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& statem_flush(s
) != 1)
677 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
678 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
682 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
683 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
685 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
686 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
687 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
689 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
690 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
695 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
697 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
698 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
700 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
701 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
704 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
705 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0)
709 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
710 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
711 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
712 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
714 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
715 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
717 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
719 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
))
722 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
723 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
726 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
730 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
733 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
738 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
742 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
744 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
746 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
749 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
753 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
756 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
757 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
758 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
763 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
764 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
766 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1))
771 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
775 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
778 * Valid return values are:
782 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
783 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
785 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
787 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
789 /* Shouldn't happen */
792 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
794 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
796 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
797 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
800 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
801 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_hello
;
802 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
;
805 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
806 *confunc
= tls_construct_end_of_early_data
;
807 *mt
= SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
810 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
816 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_certificate
;
817 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
820 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
821 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_key_exchange
;
822 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
825 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
826 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
827 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
830 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
831 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
832 *confunc
= tls_construct_next_proto
;
833 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
836 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
837 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
838 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
841 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
842 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
843 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
851 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
852 * reading. Excludes the message header.
854 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
856 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
858 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
860 /* Shouldn't happen */
863 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
864 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
866 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
867 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
869 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
870 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
873 return s
->max_cert_list
;
875 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
876 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
878 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
879 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
881 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
882 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
884 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
886 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
887 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
888 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
890 return s
->max_cert_list
;
892 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
893 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
895 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
896 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
898 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
900 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
901 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
903 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
904 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
906 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
907 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH
;
909 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
910 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
915 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
917 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
919 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
921 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
923 /* Shouldn't happen */
924 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
926 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
927 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
929 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
930 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
932 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
933 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s
, pkt
);
936 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
938 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
939 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
941 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
942 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
944 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
945 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
947 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
948 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
950 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
951 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
953 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
954 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
956 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
957 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
959 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
960 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
962 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
963 return tls_process_hello_req(s
, pkt
);
965 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
966 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s
, pkt
);
968 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
969 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
974 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
977 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
979 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
981 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
983 /* Shouldn't happen */
986 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
987 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
991 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
996 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
997 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1000 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
1002 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt
, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
)) {
1003 /* Should not happen */
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1008 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1009 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
1010 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1016 || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
)
1017 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess
)) {
1018 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0))
1021 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1023 p
= s
->s3
->client_random
;
1026 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1027 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1029 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1032 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
); idx
++) {
1041 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
),
1042 DOWNGRADE_NONE
) <= 0)
1046 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1047 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1048 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1049 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1050 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1051 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1052 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1053 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1056 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1057 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1058 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1059 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1060 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1061 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1062 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1063 * know that is maximum server supports.
1064 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1065 * containing version 1.0.
1067 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1068 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1069 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1070 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1071 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1072 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1073 * the negotiated version.
1075 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1076 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1078 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->client_version
)
1079 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1085 if (s
->new_session
|| s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1088 sess_id_len
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1089 if (sess_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
1090 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1091 || (sess_id_len
!= 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
,
1093 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1098 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1099 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1100 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)
1101 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1102 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1108 /* Ciphers supported */
1109 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1113 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1114 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), pkt
))
1116 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1117 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1122 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
1123 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1127 if (ssl_allow_compression(s
)
1128 && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
1129 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) || s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
1130 int compnum
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1131 for (i
= 0; i
< compnum
; i
++) {
1132 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1133 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, comp
->id
)) {
1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1140 /* Add the NULL method */
1141 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1146 /* TLS extensions */
1147 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
, NULL
, 0, &al
)) {
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1155 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1161 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1162 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1163 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1168 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1169 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1170 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1171 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1175 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1176 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1180 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1182 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1184 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1185 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1186 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1189 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *cipherchars
)
1191 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1192 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1195 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1197 /* unknown cipher */
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1202 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1203 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1205 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
, 1)) {
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1210 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1211 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1213 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1218 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
1219 && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= c
->id
) {
1220 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1226 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1227 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1228 * set and use it for comparison.
1230 if (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)
1231 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1232 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1233 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1235 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1236 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1238 if (ssl_md(c
->algorithm2
)
1239 != ssl_md(s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
)) {
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1241 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED
);
1246 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1250 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1254 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1259 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1261 PACKET session_id
, extpkt
;
1262 size_t session_id_len
;
1263 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1264 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1265 unsigned int compression
;
1266 unsigned int sversion
;
1267 unsigned int context
;
1269 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1274 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1275 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1280 /* load the server random */
1281 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1282 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1288 * We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in.
1289 * Must be done after reading the random data so we can check for the
1290 * TLSv1.3 downgrade sentinels
1292 protverr
= ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
, 1, &al
);
1293 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1294 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, protverr
);
1299 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of the
1300 * message must be on a record boundary.
1302 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1303 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
1304 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1308 /* Get the session-id. */
1309 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1310 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1311 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1312 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1315 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1316 if (session_id_len
> sizeof s
->session
->session_id
1317 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1318 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1320 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1324 PACKET_null_init(&session_id
);
1328 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1329 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1330 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1334 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1335 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1337 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1344 /* TLS extensions */
1345 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1346 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt
);
1347 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
1348 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1349 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1350 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1354 context
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1355 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
;
1356 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
, context
, &extensions
, &al
, NULL
, 1))
1361 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1362 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1363 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_psk
,
1364 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1365 extensions
, NULL
, 0, &al
))
1369 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1370 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1371 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1372 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1373 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1374 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1375 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1376 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1377 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1378 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1380 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1381 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->session
->ext
.tick
) {
1382 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1384 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1385 * backwards compat reasons
1387 int master_key_length
;
1388 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1389 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1392 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1393 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1394 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1395 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1396 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1399 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1404 if (session_id_len
!= 0
1405 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1406 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1407 session_id_len
) == 0)
1412 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1413 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1414 /* actually a client application bug */
1415 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1416 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1417 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1422 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1423 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1424 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1425 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1426 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1428 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0
1430 && s
->session
->ext
.tick_identity
1431 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY
)) {
1432 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
++;
1433 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1438 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1439 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1440 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1441 if (session_id_len
> 0)
1442 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1446 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1447 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1448 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1450 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1451 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1455 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1458 s
->s3
->tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1459 s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1461 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1462 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1466 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1467 if (compression
!= 0) {
1468 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1470 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1474 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1475 * using compression.
1477 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1482 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1483 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1484 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1485 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1488 if (compression
== 0)
1490 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1491 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1495 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1498 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1499 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1500 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1501 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1504 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1508 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, context
, extensions
, NULL
, 0, &al
, 1))
1511 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1512 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1513 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1514 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1517 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1520 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1521 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1523 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1524 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1526 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
1529 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1530 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1531 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1536 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1537 * we're done with this message
1540 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
1541 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1542 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
))) {
1543 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
1548 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1549 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1551 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1552 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1553 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1554 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1557 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1559 unsigned int sversion
;
1561 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1562 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1566 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1567 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1572 s
->hello_retry_request
= 1;
1575 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1576 * should not be used.
1578 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
1579 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
1581 /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
1582 errorcode
= ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
, 0, &al
);
1583 if (errorcode
!= 0) {
1584 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, errorcode
);
1588 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1589 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1590 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1594 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1595 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1599 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
1600 /* Must have a non-empty extensions block */
1601 || PACKET_remaining(&extpkt
) == 0
1602 /* Must be no trailing data after extensions */
1603 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1604 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1609 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1610 &extensions
, &al
, NULL
, 1)
1611 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1612 extensions
, NULL
, 0, &al
, 1))
1615 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1618 if (s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
== 0 && s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
1620 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1621 * ClientHello will not change
1623 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1624 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1625 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR
);
1630 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1631 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1633 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
)) {
1634 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1639 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1640 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1641 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1644 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1645 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1646 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1651 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1653 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1654 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1655 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1656 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1659 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1661 int al
, i
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1662 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1664 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1665 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1666 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1667 size_t chainidx
, certidx
;
1668 unsigned int context
= 0;
1669 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
1671 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1676 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &context
))
1678 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1679 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
1680 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1681 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1685 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt
); chainidx
++) {
1686 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1687 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1688 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1690 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1694 certstart
= certbytes
;
1695 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1697 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1701 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1702 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1704 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1708 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1709 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
1712 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
1713 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
1717 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
1718 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
1719 &al
, NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
1720 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
1721 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
, &al
,
1722 PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
1723 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1726 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1729 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1730 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1736 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1738 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1739 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1740 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1741 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1742 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1743 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1744 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1745 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1746 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1747 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1748 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1749 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1751 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1752 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
1753 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1754 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1757 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1759 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1760 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1764 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1766 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1767 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1769 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1772 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1775 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1777 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1779 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1781 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1785 if ((clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &certidx
)) == NULL
) {
1788 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1789 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1793 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1794 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1797 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1798 if ((clu
->amask
& s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0) {
1800 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1802 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1806 s
->session
->peer_type
= certidx
;
1808 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1810 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1811 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1814 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1816 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
1817 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
1818 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
1819 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1824 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1828 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1830 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1833 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1837 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
1839 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1840 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1842 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1844 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1845 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1851 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1852 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1853 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1856 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
1857 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1858 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1862 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
1863 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
1864 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
1865 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
1866 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
1867 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1873 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1874 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1879 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1881 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1882 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
1884 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1885 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1886 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
1887 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
1888 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1889 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1893 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1895 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
1896 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
1898 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
1899 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
1901 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
1902 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
1904 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
1905 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
1906 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1907 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1911 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
, al
)) {
1912 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
1916 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1917 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
1918 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
1922 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1923 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1928 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
1930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1931 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
1932 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
1935 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
1939 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
1940 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
1941 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
1942 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1943 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1947 peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1950 if (peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
1951 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1956 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1957 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
1958 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
1960 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
1961 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
);
1962 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
1963 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1968 /* test non-zero pubkey */
1969 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key
)) {
1970 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
1975 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
1976 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1977 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1982 if (DH_check_params(dh
, &check_bits
) == 0 || check_bits
!= 0) {
1983 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
1988 if (!DH_set0_key(dh
, bnpub_key
, NULL
)) {
1989 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
1995 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
1996 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1997 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2001 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
2002 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2003 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2007 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
2010 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2011 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2013 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2014 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2015 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2024 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
2028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2029 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2034 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
, int *al
)
2036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2038 const unsigned char *ecparams
;
2040 unsigned int curve_flags
;
2041 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2044 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2045 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
2046 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2048 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &ecparams
, 3)) {
2049 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2050 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2054 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
2055 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
2057 if (!tls1_check_curve(s
, ecparams
, 3)) {
2058 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2059 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
2063 curve_nid
= tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams
+ 2), &curve_flags
);
2065 if (curve_nid
== 0) {
2066 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2067 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2068 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
2072 if ((curve_flags
& TLS_CURVE_TYPE
) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM
) {
2073 EVP_PKEY
*key
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2075 if (key
== NULL
|| !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key
, curve_nid
)) {
2076 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2077 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2081 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= key
;
2083 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2084 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC
, NULL
);
2086 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx
) <= 0
2087 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx
, curve_nid
) <= 0
2088 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx
, &s
->s3
->peer_tmp
) <= 0) {
2089 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2090 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2091 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2094 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2098 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
2099 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2100 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2104 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
,
2105 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
2106 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
2107 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT
);
2113 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2114 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2117 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
2118 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2119 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
2120 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2121 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2125 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2126 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2131 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2135 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2136 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= NULL
;
2137 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2138 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
2140 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2142 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
2144 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2145 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->peer_tmp
);
2146 s
->s3
->peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2149 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2150 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2154 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2155 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2156 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2157 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
2159 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2160 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
2162 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2163 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
, &al
))
2166 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
2167 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2171 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2175 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2181 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2182 * equals the length of the parameters.
2184 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
2185 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
2186 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
2187 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2188 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2192 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2193 unsigned int sigalg
;
2195 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
2196 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2197 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2200 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
);
2202 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2204 } else if (rv
== 0) {
2205 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2209 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2211 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
2212 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2216 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
2217 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2221 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
2222 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2223 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2224 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2227 maxsig
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2229 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2235 * Check signature length
2237 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)maxsig
) {
2238 /* wrong packet length */
2239 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2240 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2241 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
2245 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2246 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2247 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2248 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2252 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2253 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2254 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2257 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
2258 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2259 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
2260 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2261 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2262 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2266 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
2267 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
));
2269 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2270 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2274 rv
= EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
2275 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), tbs
, tbslen
);
2278 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2279 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2282 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2285 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2286 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
2287 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
2288 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2289 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2290 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2291 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2292 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2294 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2298 /* still data left over */
2299 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2300 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2301 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2306 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2309 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2310 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2311 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2312 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2315 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2317 int ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2318 int al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2321 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2322 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2323 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2325 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2326 PACKET reqctx
, extensions
;
2327 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
2329 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2330 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
);
2331 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
= NULL
;
2332 s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
= 0;
2334 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2335 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &reqctx
)) {
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2337 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2341 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
2342 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
2345 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
2346 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2347 &rawexts
, &al
, NULL
, 1)
2348 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2349 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, &al
, 1)) {
2350 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2353 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2354 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2355 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2362 /* get the certificate types */
2363 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ctypes
)) {
2364 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2365 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2369 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_len
)) {
2370 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2375 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2378 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &sigalgs
)) {
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2380 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2384 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
)) {
2385 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2386 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2389 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2390 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2391 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2392 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2397 /* get the CA RDNs */
2398 if (!parse_ca_names(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2402 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2407 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2408 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2410 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2413 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2414 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2419 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2421 int al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2422 unsigned int ticklen
;
2423 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
, age_add
= 0;
2424 unsigned int sess_len
;
2425 RAW_EXTENSION
*exts
= NULL
;
2428 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2430 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &age_add
)
2431 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &nonce
)
2432 || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce
, &s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce
,
2433 &s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce_len
)))
2434 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2435 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
)
2437 && (ticklen
== 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) < ticklen
))) {
2438 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2443 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2444 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2445 * be 0 here in that instance
2448 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2451 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2452 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2453 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2454 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2455 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2458 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2459 int i
= s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
;
2460 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2462 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2465 if (i
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) {
2467 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2469 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2472 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2473 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2478 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2479 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2483 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2484 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2486 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
2488 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.tick
);
2489 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= NULL
;
2490 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= 0;
2492 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2493 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
2494 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2497 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
2498 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2499 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2503 s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2504 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add
;
2505 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
2507 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2510 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
2511 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0
2512 || !tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
2513 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2514 &exts
, &al
, NULL
, 1)
2515 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
,
2516 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2517 exts
, NULL
, 0, &al
, 1)) {
2518 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
2524 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2525 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2526 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2527 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2528 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2529 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2530 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2531 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2532 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2535 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2536 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2538 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
,
2539 s
->session
->session_id
, &sess_len
,
2540 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2544 s
->session
->session_id_length
= sess_len
;
2546 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2547 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2549 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
2550 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2553 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2555 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2557 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2559 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2563 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2564 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2565 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2567 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2572 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2573 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2574 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2575 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2576 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2579 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &resplen
)
2580 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2581 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2582 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2585 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2586 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
== NULL
) {
2587 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2588 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2591 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
, resplen
)) {
2592 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2593 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2596 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= resplen
;
2602 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2606 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
, &al
)) {
2607 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2608 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2609 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2612 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2616 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2617 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2618 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2621 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
2624 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2627 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2628 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2633 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2634 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2635 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2637 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2638 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2639 int ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2642 *al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
;
2643 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2644 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2648 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2649 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2650 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2655 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2656 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2657 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2658 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2667 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2669 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2671 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2672 /* should contain no data */
2673 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2674 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2678 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2679 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
2680 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC
);
2687 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2689 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
, &al
))
2692 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2695 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2696 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2697 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2700 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2705 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2706 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2709 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2710 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2711 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2712 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2713 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2716 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2717 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2718 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2722 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2724 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2725 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2728 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2729 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2730 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2732 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2733 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2734 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2735 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2739 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2740 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2741 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2742 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2746 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2747 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2748 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2749 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2750 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2754 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2755 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2756 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2758 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2759 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2762 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, identity
, identitylen
)) {
2763 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2764 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2771 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2772 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2773 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2774 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2779 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2784 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2787 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
2788 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2789 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2791 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2794 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2796 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2802 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2803 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2804 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2808 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2809 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2811 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2812 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2816 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2817 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2818 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2819 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, (int)(pmslen
- 2)) <= 0) {
2823 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2824 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2825 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2828 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
2829 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
2830 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2834 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, enclen
, &encdata
)
2835 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, encdata
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
2839 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2842 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2843 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2848 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2849 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s
, encdata
, enclen
, pms
, pmslen
))
2852 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
2853 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
2857 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
2858 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2863 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2868 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2872 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
;
2873 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2874 unsigned char *keybytes
= NULL
;
2876 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2880 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2884 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2886 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
|| ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0)
2889 /* send off the data */
2890 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt
, &pub_key
, NULL
);
2891 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(pub_key
), &keybytes
))
2894 BN_bn2bin(pub_key
, keybytes
);
2895 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2899 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2901 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2902 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2906 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2909 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2910 size_t encoded_pt_len
= 0;
2911 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
2914 skey
= s
->s3
->peer_tmp
;
2916 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2920 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
2922 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2926 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
2927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2931 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2932 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
2934 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
2935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2939 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)) {
2940 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2946 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2947 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2950 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2951 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2956 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2958 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2959 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2960 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
2963 unsigned int md_len
;
2964 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
2965 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
2966 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
2967 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2970 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
2971 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
2974 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2976 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
2978 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
2980 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
2984 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
2985 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2986 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2987 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2991 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2992 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2993 * certificate key for key exchange
2996 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2998 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
3000 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3005 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
3006 /* Generate session key
3007 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3009 || RAND_bytes(pms
, (int)pmslen
) <= 0) {
3010 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3015 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3018 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3019 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
3020 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
3021 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->client_random
,
3022 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3023 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
->server_random
,
3024 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3025 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
3026 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3027 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3030 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3032 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3033 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) < 0) {
3034 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3038 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3040 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3043 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3044 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3045 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG
);
3049 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
3050 || (msglen
>= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0x81))
3051 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tmp
, msglen
)) {
3052 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3053 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3057 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3058 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3059 s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3063 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3064 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3065 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3068 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3069 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3074 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
3076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3077 unsigned char *abytes
= NULL
;
3079 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
== NULL
3080 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
),
3082 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3085 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, abytes
);
3087 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3088 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3089 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3090 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3096 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3097 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3102 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3104 unsigned long alg_k
;
3107 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3109 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
3110 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3113 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3114 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3116 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3117 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3119 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3120 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3122 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3123 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3125 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3126 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, pkt
, &al
))
3128 } else if (!(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3129 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3130 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3137 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3138 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
);
3139 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3141 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
3142 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3147 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
3149 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3152 pms
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
;
3153 pmslen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pmslen
;
3155 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3157 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3158 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
3159 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
3160 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3167 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3168 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3169 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3172 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
3173 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3174 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3175 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3183 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3184 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3185 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3186 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3189 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3192 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3193 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3195 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3196 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3197 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0)
3200 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3201 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3207 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3208 s
->s3
->tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3213 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3214 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3215 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3217 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3219 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3220 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, NULL
) || s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
3223 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3224 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3226 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3227 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3232 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3235 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3238 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3239 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3240 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3241 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3243 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3247 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3248 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3251 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3253 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3254 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3256 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3260 /* We need to get a client cert */
3261 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
3263 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3264 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3266 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3268 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3271 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3272 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3273 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3275 } else if (i
== 1) {
3277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3278 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3282 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3283 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3286 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3287 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3288 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3289 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3291 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3292 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3293 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3294 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3300 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3303 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3307 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3309 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3312 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3315 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0))
3316 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
,
3317 (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 2) ? NULL
3320 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3325 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
3326 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
3327 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
3328 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3329 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
3331 * This is a fatal error, which leaves
3332 * enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent state
3333 * and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3340 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3344 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3346 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
3349 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3351 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3352 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3354 /* we don't have a certificate */
3355 if (!(alg_a
& SSL_aCERT
))
3358 /* This is the passed certificate */
3359 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
), &idx
);
3361 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3362 if (clu
== NULL
|| (alg_a
& clu
->amask
) == 0) {
3363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT
);
3367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3368 if (clu
->amask
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3369 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
))
3371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3375 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3376 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) && idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
3377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3378 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3383 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
->peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
3384 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3392 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3397 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3399 size_t len
, padding_len
;
3400 unsigned char *padding
= NULL
;
3402 len
= s
->ext
.npn_len
;
3403 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3405 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.npn
, len
)
3406 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, padding_len
, &padding
)) {
3407 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3411 memset(padding
, 0, padding_len
);
3415 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3420 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_req(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3422 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3423 /* should contain no data */
3424 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3425 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
);
3426 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3427 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3430 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
3431 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
3432 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3436 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3437 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3438 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3439 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3440 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3445 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s
);
3447 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3450 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3452 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3454 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3456 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)
3457 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3458 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3459 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3463 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3464 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, &rawexts
,
3466 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3467 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, &al
, 1))
3470 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3471 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3474 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3475 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3476 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3477 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3480 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3483 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3484 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3485 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3486 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3487 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3492 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3493 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3497 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3500 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, maxlen
, maxverok
= 0;
3501 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3502 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3503 ssl_set_client_disabled(s
);
3508 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3509 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3510 # error Max cipher length too short
3513 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3514 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3517 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3518 maxlen
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
3521 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3524 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3526 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
)
3529 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) && totlen
< maxlen
; i
++) {
3530 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3532 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3533 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3534 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
3537 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3542 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3544 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3545 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
3546 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
))
3549 if (c
->max_tls
>= s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
3550 && c
->min_tls
<= s
->s3
->tmp
.max_ver
)
3558 if (totlen
== 0 || !maxverok
) {
3559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
3562 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3569 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3570 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3571 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3573 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3578 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3579 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3580 0, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3582 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3592 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3594 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3595 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
) {
3596 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
3597 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
3601 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
;