2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
16 #include "statem_locl.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 #include <openssl/trace.h>
26 #include <internal/cryptlib.h>
28 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
29 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
);
31 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
);
32 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
);
33 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
,
37 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
43 static ossl_inline
int cert_req_allowed(SSL
*s
)
45 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
46 if ((s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
47 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
))
48 || (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
)))
55 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
61 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL
*s
)
63 long alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
66 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
67 * ciphersuite or for SRP
69 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
78 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
79 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
80 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
81 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
83 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
84 * (transition not allowed)
86 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
88 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
91 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
92 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
93 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
96 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
100 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
102 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
103 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
105 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
106 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
111 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
112 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
) {
113 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
118 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
120 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
121 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
125 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
126 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
129 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
130 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
136 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
137 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
138 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
144 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
145 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
;
150 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
151 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
152 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
158 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
159 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
162 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
163 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
;
166 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
167 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
168 # error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
170 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT
) {
171 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
;
173 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
174 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
175 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
176 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
178 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
179 /* SSLfatal() already called */
182 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
189 /* No valid transition found */
194 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
195 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
196 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
197 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
199 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
200 * (transition not allowed)
202 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
204 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
208 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
209 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
211 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
212 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
217 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
221 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
222 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
223 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
227 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
228 if (mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
229 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
235 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
237 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
238 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
241 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
) {
242 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
;
247 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
249 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
250 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
251 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
254 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
255 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
259 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
) {
260 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
262 } else if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
263 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
264 && s
->session
->ext
.tick
!= NULL
265 && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
267 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
268 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
269 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
270 * the server is resuming.
273 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
275 } else if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
276 & (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
277 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
278 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT
;
282 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
283 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
285 || ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
286 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
287 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
288 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
291 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
292 && cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
293 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
295 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
296 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
305 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
306 * |ext.status_expected| is set
308 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
&& mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
) {
309 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
;
314 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
315 ske_expected
= key_exchange_expected(s
);
316 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
317 if (ske_expected
|| ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)
318 && mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
)) {
319 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
320 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
;
327 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
328 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
) {
329 if (cert_req_allowed(s
)) {
330 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
;
337 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
338 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
) {
339 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
;
344 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
345 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
346 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
) {
347 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
;
350 } else if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
351 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
356 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
357 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
358 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
;
363 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
364 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
365 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
;
371 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
) {
372 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
;
379 /* No valid transition found */
380 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
384 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
385 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
388 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
389 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
390 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
391 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
394 SSLfatal(s
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
395 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION
,
396 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
401 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
402 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
405 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
407 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
410 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
411 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
412 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
414 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
416 /* Shouldn't happen */
417 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
418 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
419 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
420 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
422 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
423 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
424 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
425 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
428 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
429 * we already sent close_notify
431 if (!ossl_assert((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0)) {
432 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
433 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
434 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
435 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
436 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
438 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
441 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
442 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
443 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
444 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
;
445 else if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
446 && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
)
447 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
449 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
450 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
451 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
453 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
454 if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
455 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
460 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
461 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
462 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
!= 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
463 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
464 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
467 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
468 st
->hand_state
= (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
469 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
470 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
472 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
473 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
474 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
476 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
477 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
478 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
479 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
480 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
481 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
484 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
485 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
489 /* Try to read from the server instead */
490 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
495 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
496 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
498 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
500 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
503 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
504 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
508 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s
);
510 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
512 /* Shouldn't happen */
513 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
514 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
515 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
516 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
519 if (!s
->renegotiate
) {
521 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
522 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
524 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
529 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
530 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
532 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
533 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
535 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
536 * actually selected a version yet.
538 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0)
539 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
541 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
542 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
545 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
548 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
550 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
552 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
553 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
554 * because we did early data.
556 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
557 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
)
558 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
560 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
563 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
564 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
566 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
567 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
568 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
570 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
571 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
)
572 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT
;
574 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
578 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
;
579 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
581 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
583 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
584 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
587 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
588 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
589 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
590 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
592 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 1) {
593 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
;
595 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
597 if (s
->s3
.flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY
) {
598 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
600 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
602 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
603 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
604 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
606 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
607 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
608 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
609 } else if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
) {
610 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
612 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
613 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
615 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
.npn_seen
)
616 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
;
618 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
621 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
623 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
624 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
625 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
;
626 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
629 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
631 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
632 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
634 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
637 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
639 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
;
640 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
642 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
643 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
646 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
648 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
651 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s
, 1)) {
652 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
653 /* SSLfatal() already called */
654 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
656 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
;
657 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
659 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
660 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
665 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
666 * the client to the server.
668 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
670 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
672 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
674 /* No pre work to be done */
677 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
679 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
680 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
681 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
682 /* SSLfatal() already called */
688 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
689 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
692 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
693 * messages unless we need to.
697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
698 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
699 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
700 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
706 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
708 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
709 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
710 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
712 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
713 || s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE
)
714 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
717 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
718 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 0, 1);
721 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
722 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1, 1);
725 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
729 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
730 * client to the server.
732 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
734 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
738 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
740 /* No post work to be done */
743 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
744 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
745 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
747 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
748 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
749 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
751 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) == 0) {
752 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
753 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
754 /* SSLfatal() already called */
758 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
759 } else if (!statem_flush(s
)) {
763 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
764 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
769 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
771 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
772 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
774 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
775 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
778 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
779 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s
) == 0) {
780 /* SSLfatal() already called */
785 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
786 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
788 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
789 && s
->max_early_data
> 0) {
791 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
792 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
793 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
795 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s
,
796 SSL3_CC_EARLY
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))
800 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
;
801 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
802 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
804 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
805 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
807 s
->session
->compress_meth
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
809 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
810 /* SSLfatal() already called */
814 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
815 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
816 /* SSLfatal() already called */
820 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
821 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
824 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
827 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
832 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
836 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
837 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
838 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
&& SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
== 0) {
840 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
843 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
847 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
850 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
851 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
852 /* SSLfatal() already called */
855 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
856 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
857 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
)) {
858 /* SSLfatal() already called */
865 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
866 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
868 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1)) {
869 /* SSLfatal() already called */
875 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
879 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
882 * Valid return values are:
886 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
887 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
889 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
891 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
893 /* Shouldn't happen */
894 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
895 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE
,
896 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
899 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE
:
901 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
903 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
904 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
907 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
:
908 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_hello
;
909 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
;
912 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
913 *confunc
= tls_construct_end_of_early_data
;
914 *mt
= SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
917 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END
:
923 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_certificate
;
924 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
927 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH
:
928 *confunc
= tls_construct_client_key_exchange
;
929 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
932 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
:
933 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
934 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
937 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
938 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO
:
939 *confunc
= tls_construct_next_proto
;
940 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
;
943 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED
:
944 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
945 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
948 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
:
949 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
950 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
958 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
959 * reading. Excludes the message header.
961 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
963 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
965 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
967 /* Shouldn't happen */
970 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
971 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
973 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
974 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH
;
977 return s
->max_cert_list
;
979 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
980 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
982 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
983 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
985 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
986 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
988 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
990 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
991 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
992 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
994 return s
->max_cert_list
;
996 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
997 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH
;
999 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
1000 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
1002 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1004 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
1005 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1007 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
1008 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
1010 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1011 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1013 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1014 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1019 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
1021 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1023 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1025 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1027 /* Shouldn't happen */
1028 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1029 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1030 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1031 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1033 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO
:
1034 return tls_process_server_hello(s
, pkt
);
1036 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
1037 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s
, pkt
);
1039 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT
:
1040 return tls_process_server_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1042 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
1043 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
1045 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS
:
1046 return tls_process_cert_status(s
, pkt
);
1048 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH
:
1049 return tls_process_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
1051 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1052 return tls_process_certificate_request(s
, pkt
);
1054 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE
:
1055 return tls_process_server_done(s
, pkt
);
1057 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE
:
1058 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
1060 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET
:
1061 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s
, pkt
);
1063 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED
:
1064 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
1066 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ
:
1067 return tls_process_hello_req(s
, pkt
);
1069 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1070 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s
, pkt
);
1072 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1073 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1078 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1081 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1083 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1085 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1087 /* Shouldn't happen */
1088 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1089 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1090 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1093 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
:
1094 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ
:
1095 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s
, wst
);
1099 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1107 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= s
->session
;
1108 unsigned char *session_id
;
1110 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1111 protverr
= ssl_set_client_hello_version(s
);
1112 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1113 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1119 || !ssl_version_supported(s
, sess
->ssl_version
, NULL
)
1120 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess
)) {
1121 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
1122 && !ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1123 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1127 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1129 p
= s
->s3
.client_random
;
1132 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1133 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1135 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1138 for (idx
= 0; idx
< sizeof(s
->s3
.client_random
); idx
++) {
1145 i
= (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
);
1148 if (i
&& ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 0, p
, sizeof(s
->s3
.client_random
),
1149 DOWNGRADE_NONE
) <= 0) {
1150 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1151 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1156 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1157 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1158 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1159 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1160 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1161 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1162 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1163 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1166 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1167 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1168 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1169 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1170 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1171 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1172 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1173 * know that is maximum server supports.
1174 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1175 * containing version 1.0.
1177 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1178 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1179 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1180 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1181 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1182 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1183 * the negotiated version.
1185 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1186 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1188 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, s
->client_version
)
1189 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
.client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1190 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1191 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1196 session_id
= s
->session
->session_id
;
1197 if (s
->new_session
|| s
->session
->ssl_version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1198 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1199 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0) {
1200 sess_id_len
= sizeof(s
->tmp_session_id
);
1201 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= sess_id_len
;
1202 session_id
= s
->tmp_session_id
;
1203 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_NONE
1204 && RAND_bytes(s
->tmp_session_id
, sess_id_len
) <= 0) {
1205 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1206 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1207 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1214 assert(s
->session
->session_id_length
<= sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
));
1215 sess_id_len
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1216 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1217 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= sess_id_len
;
1218 memcpy(s
->tmp_session_id
, s
->session
->session_id
, sess_id_len
);
1221 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
1222 || (sess_id_len
!= 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, session_id
,
1224 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1225 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1226 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1230 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1231 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1232 if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)
1233 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1234 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1235 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1236 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1241 /* Ciphers supported */
1242 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
1243 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1244 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1248 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
), pkt
)) {
1249 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1252 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1253 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1254 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1259 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)) {
1260 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1261 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1264 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1265 if (ssl_allow_compression(s
)
1266 && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
1267 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) || s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
< TLS1_3_VERSION
)) {
1268 int compnum
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1269 for (i
= 0; i
< compnum
; i
++) {
1270 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, i
);
1271 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, comp
->id
)) {
1272 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1273 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1274 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1280 /* Add the NULL method */
1281 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1282 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1283 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1287 /* TLS extensions */
1288 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
, NULL
, 0)) {
1289 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1296 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1301 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 2)
1302 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookiepkt
)) {
1303 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1304 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1305 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1308 cookie_len
= PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt
);
1309 if (cookie_len
> sizeof(s
->d1
->cookie
)) {
1310 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1311 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
1312 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1315 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
, cookie_len
)) {
1316 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY
,
1317 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1318 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1320 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_len
;
1322 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1325 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *cipherchars
)
1327 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
1328 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1331 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1333 /* unknown cipher */
1334 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1335 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1339 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1340 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1342 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK
, 1)) {
1343 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1344 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1348 sk
= ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s
);
1349 i
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk
, c
);
1351 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1352 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1353 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1357 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
1358 && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= c
->id
) {
1359 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1360 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1361 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED
);
1366 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1367 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1368 * set and use it for comparison.
1370 if (s
->session
->cipher
!= NULL
)
1371 s
->session
->cipher_id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1372 if (s
->hit
&& (s
->session
->cipher_id
!= c
->id
)) {
1373 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1375 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1376 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1378 if (ssl_md(c
->algorithm2
)
1379 != ssl_md(s
->session
->cipher
->algorithm2
)) {
1380 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1381 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1382 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED
);
1387 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1390 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE
,
1391 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED
);
1395 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
= c
;
1400 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1402 PACKET session_id
, extpkt
;
1403 size_t session_id_len
;
1404 const unsigned char *cipherchars
;
1406 unsigned int compression
;
1407 unsigned int sversion
;
1408 unsigned int context
;
1409 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1414 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sversion
)) {
1415 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1416 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1420 /* load the server random */
1421 if (s
->version
== TLS1_3_VERSION
1422 && sversion
== TLS1_2_VERSION
1423 && PACKET_remaining(pkt
) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1424 && memcmp(hrrrandom
, PACKET_data(pkt
), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) == 0) {
1425 s
->hello_retry_request
= SSL_HRR_PENDING
;
1427 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1428 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1429 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1433 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
.server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1434 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1435 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1440 /* Get the session-id. */
1441 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1442 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1443 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1446 session_id_len
= PACKET_remaining(&session_id
);
1447 if (session_id_len
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)
1448 || session_id_len
> SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE
) {
1449 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1450 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG
);
1454 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &cipherchars
, TLS_CIPHER_LEN
)) {
1455 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1456 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1460 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1461 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1462 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1466 /* TLS extensions */
1467 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0 && !hrr
) {
1468 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt
);
1469 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
1470 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1471 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1477 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
1478 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1479 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1480 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)) {
1481 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1485 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s
, sversion
, extensions
)) {
1486 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1491 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || hrr
) {
1492 if (compression
!= 0) {
1493 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1494 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1495 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1499 if (session_id_len
!= s
->tmp_session_id_len
1500 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->tmp_session_id
,
1501 session_id_len
) != 0) {
1502 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1503 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID
);
1509 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1510 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1514 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s
, &extpkt
);
1518 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1519 * are appropriate for this version.
1521 context
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1522 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
;
1523 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s
, context
, extensions
)) {
1524 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1525 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION
);
1531 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1533 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1534 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1536 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1537 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1538 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1539 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1543 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1544 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_psk
,
1545 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
,
1546 extensions
, NULL
, 0)) {
1547 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1552 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1553 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1554 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1555 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1556 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1557 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1558 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1559 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1560 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1561 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1563 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1564 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->session
->ext
.tick
) {
1565 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1567 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1568 * backwards compat reasons
1570 int master_key_length
;
1571 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1572 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1575 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1576 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1577 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1578 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
?
1579 pref_cipher
: ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, cipherchars
, 0);
1581 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1582 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1587 if (session_id_len
!= 0
1588 && session_id_len
== s
->session
->session_id_length
1589 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id
), s
->session
->session_id
,
1590 session_id_len
) == 0)
1595 if (s
->sid_ctx_length
!= s
->session
->sid_ctx_length
1596 || memcmp(s
->session
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx
, s
->sid_ctx_length
)) {
1597 /* actually a client application bug */
1598 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1599 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1600 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT
);
1605 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1606 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1607 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1608 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1609 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1611 if (s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
1612 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_miss
);
1613 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 0)) {
1614 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1619 s
->session
->ssl_version
= s
->version
;
1621 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1622 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1623 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1624 * used for resumption.
1626 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1627 s
->session
->session_id_length
= session_id_len
;
1628 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1629 if (session_id_len
> 0)
1630 memcpy(s
->session
->session_id
, PACKET_data(&session_id
),
1635 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1636 if (s
->version
!= s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1637 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1638 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH
);
1642 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1645 s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
= s
->version
;
1646 s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
= s
->version
;
1648 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s
, cipherchars
)) {
1649 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1653 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1654 if (compression
!= 0) {
1655 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1656 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1660 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1661 * using compression.
1663 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1664 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1665 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1669 if (s
->hit
&& compression
!= s
->session
->compress_meth
) {
1670 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1671 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED
);
1674 if (compression
== 0)
1676 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1677 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1678 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED
);
1681 comp
= ssl3_comp_find(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, compression
);
1684 if (compression
!= 0 && comp
== NULL
) {
1685 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1686 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1689 s
->s3
.tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1693 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, context
, extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1694 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1698 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1699 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1700 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
1701 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
1705 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1708 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
1709 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
1711 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1712 labellen
= sizeof(labelbuffer
) - 1;
1713 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG
)
1716 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
1717 sizeof(sctpauthkey
),
1719 labellen
, NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1720 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO
,
1721 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1725 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
),
1726 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
1727 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
1732 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1733 * we're done with this message
1736 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
1737 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
1738 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
))) {
1739 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1743 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1744 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1746 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1747 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1750 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
,
1753 RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
= NULL
;
1756 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1757 * should not be used.
1759 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s
->enc_write_ctx
);
1760 s
->enc_write_ctx
= NULL
;
1762 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, extpkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1763 &extensions
, NULL
, 1)
1764 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1765 extensions
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1766 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1770 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1773 if (s
->ext
.tls13_cookie_len
== 0
1774 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1775 && s
->s3
.tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
1779 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1780 * ClientHello will not change
1782 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1783 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
1784 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR
);
1789 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1790 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1792 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0)) {
1793 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1798 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1799 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1800 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1803 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1804 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1805 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1809 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1811 OPENSSL_free(extensions
);
1812 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1815 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1818 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1819 unsigned long cert_list_len
, cert_len
;
1821 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
1822 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
1823 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
1824 size_t chainidx
, certidx
;
1825 unsigned int context
= 0;
1826 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
1828 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
1829 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1830 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1834 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &context
))
1836 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_list_len
)
1837 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != cert_list_len
1838 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1839 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1840 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1843 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt
); chainidx
++) {
1844 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &cert_len
)
1845 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &certbytes
, cert_len
)) {
1846 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1847 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1848 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1852 certstart
= certbytes
;
1853 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, cert_len
);
1855 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
,
1856 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
1859 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ cert_len
)) {
1860 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1861 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1862 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1866 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1867 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
1870 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
1871 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1872 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1876 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
1877 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
1878 NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
1879 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
1880 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
,
1881 PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
1882 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1883 /* SSLfatal already called */
1886 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
1889 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
1890 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1891 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1892 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1898 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
1900 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1901 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1902 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1903 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1904 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1905 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1906 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1907 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1908 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1909 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1910 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1911 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1913 if (s
->verify_mode
!= SSL_VERIFY_NONE
&& i
<= 0) {
1914 SSLfatal(s
, ssl_x509err2alert(s
->verify_result
),
1915 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1916 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
1919 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1921 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1922 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
1926 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
1928 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1929 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1931 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
1934 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
1936 if (pkey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey
)) {
1938 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1939 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS
);
1943 if ((clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &certidx
)) == NULL
) {
1945 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1946 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1947 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1951 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1952 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1955 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1956 if ((clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0) {
1958 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1959 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
,
1960 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
1964 s
->session
->peer_type
= certidx
;
1966 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
1968 s
->session
->peer
= x
;
1969 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
1972 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1974 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
1975 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
1976 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
1977 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1981 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
1985 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
1989 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1992 PACKET psk_identity_hint
;
1994 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1996 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity_hint
)) {
1997 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
1998 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2003 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2004 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2005 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2008 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2009 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2010 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2011 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2015 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint
) == 0) {
2016 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
);
2017 s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
= NULL
;
2018 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint
,
2019 &s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
)) {
2020 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2021 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2027 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2028 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2033 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2036 PACKET prime
, generator
, salt
, server_pub
;
2038 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
2039 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
2040 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &salt
)
2041 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &server_pub
)) {
2042 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
2043 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2047 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
2049 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
),
2050 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
)) == NULL
2052 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
),
2053 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
), NULL
)) == NULL
2055 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt
),
2056 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt
), NULL
)) == NULL
2058 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub
),
2059 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub
), NULL
)) == NULL
) {
2060 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
2065 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s
)) {
2066 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2070 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2071 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2072 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2076 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP
,
2077 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2082 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2084 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2085 PACKET prime
, generator
, pub_key
;
2086 EVP_PKEY
*peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2089 BIGNUM
*p
= NULL
, *g
= NULL
, *bnpub_key
= NULL
;
2093 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &prime
)
2094 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &generator
)
2095 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &pub_key
)) {
2096 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2097 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2101 peer_tmp
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2104 if (peer_tmp
== NULL
|| dh
== NULL
) {
2105 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2106 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2110 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2111 p
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime
), NULL
);
2112 g
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator
), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator
),
2114 bnpub_key
= BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key
),
2115 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key
), NULL
);
2116 if (p
== NULL
|| g
== NULL
|| bnpub_key
== NULL
) {
2117 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2122 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2123 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key
)) {
2124 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2125 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2129 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh
, p
, NULL
, g
)) {
2130 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2136 if (DH_check_params(dh
, &check_bits
) == 0 || check_bits
!= 0) {
2137 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2138 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE
);
2142 if (!DH_set0_key(dh
, bnpub_key
, NULL
)) {
2143 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2149 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
, DH_security_bits(dh
), 0, dh
)) {
2150 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2151 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2155 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp
, dh
) == 0) {
2156 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2161 s
->s3
.peer_tmp
= peer_tmp
;
2164 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2165 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2167 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
))
2168 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2169 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2178 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp
);
2182 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE
,
2183 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2188 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, EVP_PKEY
**pkey
)
2190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2192 unsigned int curve_type
, curve_id
;
2195 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2196 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2197 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2199 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &curve_type
) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &curve_id
)) {
2200 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2201 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2205 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2206 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2208 if (curve_type
!= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2209 || !tls1_check_group_id(s
, curve_id
, 1)) {
2210 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2215 if ((s
->s3
.peer_tmp
= ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id
)) == NULL
) {
2216 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2217 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS
);
2221 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encoded_pt
)) {
2222 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2223 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2227 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
.peer_tmp
,
2228 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt
),
2229 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt
))) {
2230 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2236 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2237 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2240 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aECDSA
)
2241 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2242 else if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aRSA
)
2243 *pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2244 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2248 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE
,
2249 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2254 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2257 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2258 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= NULL
;
2259 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2260 PACKET save_param_start
, signature
;
2262 alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2264 save_param_start
= *pkt
;
2266 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2267 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
.peer_tmp
);
2268 s
->s3
.peer_tmp
= NULL
;
2271 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2272 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
)) {
2273 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2278 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2279 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2280 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2281 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2282 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2285 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2286 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2287 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2290 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2291 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &pkey
)) {
2292 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2296 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2297 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
2301 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2305 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2311 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2312 * equals the length of the parameters.
2314 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start
, ¶ms
,
2315 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start
) -
2316 PACKET_remaining(pkt
))) {
2317 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2318 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2322 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2323 unsigned int sigalg
;
2325 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
2326 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2327 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
2330 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
) <=0) {
2331 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2334 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
2335 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2336 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2340 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
2341 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2342 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2345 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2346 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2347 md
== NULL
? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md
));
2349 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &signature
)
2350 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2351 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2352 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2355 maxsig
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2357 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2358 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2363 * Check signature length
2365 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature
) > (size_t)maxsig
) {
2366 /* wrong packet length */
2367 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2368 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH
);
2372 md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2373 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2374 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2375 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2379 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2380 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2384 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
2385 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2386 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
2387 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2388 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2389 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2393 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
, PACKET_data(¶ms
),
2394 PACKET_remaining(¶ms
));
2396 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2400 rv
= EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx
, PACKET_data(&signature
),
2401 PACKET_remaining(&signature
), tbs
, tbslen
);
2404 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2405 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2408 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2411 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2412 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
))
2413 && !(alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)) {
2414 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2415 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2416 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2419 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2422 /* still data left over */
2423 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2424 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2425 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE
);
2430 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2432 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2433 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2436 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2440 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2441 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2442 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2444 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2445 PACKET reqctx
, extensions
;
2446 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
2448 if ((s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) != 0) {
2450 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2451 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2454 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2457 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2458 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
);
2459 s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
= NULL
;
2460 s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
= 0;
2461 OPENSSL_free(s
->pha_context
);
2462 s
->pha_context
= NULL
;
2464 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &reqctx
) ||
2465 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx
, &s
->pha_context
, &s
->pha_context_len
)) {
2466 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2467 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2468 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2469 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2472 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)) {
2473 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2474 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2476 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2478 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
2479 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2481 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2482 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2483 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2484 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2485 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2487 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
2488 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2489 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2490 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2492 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2497 /* get the certificate types */
2498 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &ctypes
)) {
2499 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2500 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2501 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2502 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2505 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
)) {
2506 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2507 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2508 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2509 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2512 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2515 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &sigalgs
)) {
2516 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2517 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2518 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2519 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2523 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2524 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2526 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
, 0)) {
2527 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2528 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2529 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR
);
2530 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2532 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2533 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2534 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2535 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2536 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2540 /* get the CA RDNs */
2541 if (!parse_ca_names(s
, pkt
)) {
2542 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2543 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2547 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2548 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2549 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2550 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2551 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2554 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2555 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
= 1;
2558 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2559 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2560 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2561 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2562 * SSL_get_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2565 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
2566 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2568 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2571 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2573 unsigned int ticklen
;
2574 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint
, age_add
= 0;
2575 unsigned int sess_len
;
2576 RAW_EXTENSION
*exts
= NULL
;
2579 PACKET_null_init(&nonce
);
2581 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &ticket_lifetime_hint
)
2583 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt
, &age_add
)
2584 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &nonce
)))
2585 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ticklen
)
2586 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? (ticklen
== 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) < ticklen
)
2587 : PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != ticklen
)) {
2588 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2589 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2594 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2595 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2596 * be 0 here in that instance
2599 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2602 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2603 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2604 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2605 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2606 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2609 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->session
->session_id_length
> 0) {
2610 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
;
2613 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2616 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
2617 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2618 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2619 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2623 if ((s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) != 0
2624 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2626 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2627 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2628 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2630 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
2633 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2634 s
->session
= new_sess
;
2638 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2639 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2641 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
2643 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.tick
);
2644 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= NULL
;
2645 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= 0;
2647 s
->session
->ext
.tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
2648 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick
== NULL
) {
2649 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2650 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2653 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
)) {
2654 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2655 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2659 s
->session
->ext
.tick_lifetime_hint
= ticket_lifetime_hint
;
2660 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add
;
2661 s
->session
->ext
.ticklen
= ticklen
;
2663 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2666 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extpkt
)
2667 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2668 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2669 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2670 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2674 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extpkt
,
2675 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, &exts
,
2677 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
,
2678 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2679 exts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
2680 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2686 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2687 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2688 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2689 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2690 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2691 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2692 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2693 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2694 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2697 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2698 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2700 if (!EVP_Digest(s
->session
->ext
.tick
, ticklen
,
2701 s
->session
->session_id
, &sess_len
,
2702 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
2703 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2707 s
->session
->session_id_length
= sess_len
;
2708 s
->session
->not_resumable
= 0;
2710 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2711 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2712 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
2713 int hashleni
= EVP_MD_size(md
);
2715 static const unsigned char nonce_label
[] = "resumption";
2717 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2718 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni
>= 0)) {
2719 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2720 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
2721 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2724 hashlen
= (size_t)hashleni
;
2726 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, s
->resumption_master_secret
,
2728 sizeof(nonce_label
) - 1,
2729 PACKET_data(&nonce
),
2730 PACKET_remaining(&nonce
),
2731 s
->session
->master_key
,
2733 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2736 s
->session
->master_key_length
= hashlen
;
2739 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
2740 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2743 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2746 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2750 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2751 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2753 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2758 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &type
)
2759 || type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2760 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2761 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE
);
2764 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt
, &resplen
)
2765 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != resplen
) {
2766 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2767 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2770 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
= OPENSSL_malloc(resplen
);
2771 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
== NULL
) {
2772 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2773 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2776 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
, resplen
)) {
2777 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
2778 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2781 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
= resplen
;
2787 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_status(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2789 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
2790 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2791 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2794 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2798 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2799 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2800 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2803 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL
*s
)
2806 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2809 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s
)) {
2810 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2815 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2816 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2817 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2819 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2820 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2821 int ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2824 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
,
2825 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2826 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE
);
2830 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2831 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT
,
2832 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2837 if (s
->ct_validation_callback
!= NULL
) {
2838 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2839 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s
) && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
2840 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2849 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_server_done(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2851 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
2852 /* should contain no data */
2853 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2854 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2855 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2857 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2858 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2859 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s
) <= 0) {
2860 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE
,
2862 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2867 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
)) {
2868 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2869 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2872 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
2875 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2880 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2881 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2884 char identity
[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
+ 1];
2885 size_t identitylen
= 0;
2886 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2887 unsigned char *tmppsk
= NULL
;
2888 char *tmpidentity
= NULL
;
2891 if (s
->psk_client_callback
== NULL
) {
2892 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2893 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB
);
2897 memset(identity
, 0, sizeof(identity
));
2899 psklen
= s
->psk_client_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity_hint
,
2900 identity
, sizeof(identity
) - 1,
2903 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2904 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2905 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2907 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2908 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2909 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2910 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2914 identitylen
= strlen(identity
);
2915 if (identitylen
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2916 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2917 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2921 tmppsk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2922 tmpidentity
= OPENSSL_strdup(identity
);
2923 if (tmppsk
== NULL
|| tmpidentity
== NULL
) {
2924 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2925 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2929 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
);
2930 s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
= tmppsk
;
2931 s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2933 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->psk_identity
);
2934 s
->session
->psk_identity
= tmpidentity
;
2937 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, identity
, identitylen
)) {
2938 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2939 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2946 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2947 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity
, sizeof(identity
));
2948 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk
, psklen
);
2949 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity
, identitylen
);
2953 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2954 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2959 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2961 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2962 unsigned char *encdata
= NULL
;
2963 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2964 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2966 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
2969 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
2971 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2973 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2974 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2978 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2979 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey
) == NULL
) {
2980 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2981 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2985 pmslen
= SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2986 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
2988 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2989 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2993 pms
[0] = s
->client_version
>> 8;
2994 pms
[1] = s
->client_version
& 0xff;
2995 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2996 if (RAND_bytes(pms
+ 2, (int)(pmslen
- 2)) <= 0) {
2997 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
2998 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3002 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3003 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
3004 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
3005 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3008 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey
, NULL
);
3009 if (pctx
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx
) <= 0
3010 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, NULL
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3011 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
3015 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, enclen
, &encdata
)
3016 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx
, encdata
, &enclen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3017 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
3018 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT
);
3021 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3024 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3025 if (s
->version
> SSL3_VERSION
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
3026 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
3027 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3031 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
3032 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s
, encdata
, enclen
, pms
, pmslen
)) {
3033 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3037 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3038 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3042 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3043 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
3047 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA
,
3048 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3053 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3055 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3057 const BIGNUM
*pub_key
;
3058 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
3059 unsigned char *keybytes
= NULL
;
3061 skey
= s
->s3
.peer_tmp
;
3063 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3064 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3068 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
3070 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3071 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3075 dh_clnt
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
3077 if (dh_clnt
== NULL
) {
3078 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3079 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3083 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
3084 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3088 /* send off the data */
3089 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt
, &pub_key
, NULL
);
3090 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(pub_key
),
3092 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3093 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3097 BN_bn2bin(pub_key
, keybytes
);
3098 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3102 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3105 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE
,
3106 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3111 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3114 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
3115 size_t encoded_pt_len
= 0;
3116 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
, *skey
= NULL
;
3119 skey
= s
->s3
.peer_tmp
;
3121 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3122 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3126 ckey
= ssl_generate_pkey(skey
);
3128 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3129 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3133 if (ssl_derive(s
, ckey
, skey
, 0) == 0) {
3134 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3138 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3139 encoded_pt_len
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, &encodedPoint
);
3141 if (encoded_pt_len
== 0) {
3142 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3147 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encoded_pt_len
)) {
3148 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3149 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3155 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
3156 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3159 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE
,
3160 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3165 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3168 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3169 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
= NULL
;
3172 unsigned int md_len
;
3173 unsigned char shared_ukm
[32], tmp
[256];
3174 EVP_MD_CTX
*ukm_hash
= NULL
;
3175 int dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94
;
3176 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3179 if ((s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aGOST12
) != 0)
3180 dgst_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
;
3183 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3185 peer_cert
= s
->session
->peer
;
3187 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3188 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER
);
3192 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert
), NULL
);
3193 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3194 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3195 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3199 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3200 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3201 * certificate key for key exchange
3204 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3206 pms
= OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen
);
3208 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3209 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3213 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0
3214 /* Generate session key
3215 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3217 || RAND_bytes(pms
, (int)pmslen
) <= 0) {
3218 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3219 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3223 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3226 ukm_hash
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3227 if (ukm_hash
== NULL
3228 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash
, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid
)) <= 0
3229 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
.client_random
,
3230 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3231 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash
, s
->s3
.server_random
,
3232 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
3233 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash
, shared_ukm
, &md_len
) <= 0) {
3234 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3235 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3238 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3240 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT
,
3241 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV
, 8, shared_ukm
) < 0) {
3242 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3246 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3248 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3251 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx
, tmp
, &msglen
, pms
, pmslen
) <= 0) {
3252 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3257 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
3258 || (msglen
>= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0x81))
3259 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tmp
, msglen
)) {
3260 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3261 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3265 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3266 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= pms
;
3267 s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
= pmslen
;
3271 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3272 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3273 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash
);
3276 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST
,
3277 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3282 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3284 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3285 unsigned char *abytes
= NULL
;
3287 if (s
->srp_ctx
.A
== NULL
3288 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(s
->srp_ctx
.A
),
3290 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3291 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3294 BN_bn2bin(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, abytes
);
3296 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3297 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3298 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3299 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3300 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3306 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP
,
3307 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3312 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3314 unsigned long alg_k
;
3316 alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3319 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3320 * no need to do so here.
3322 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
)
3323 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
))
3326 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3327 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
))
3329 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3330 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
))
3332 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3333 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
))
3335 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3336 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s
, pkt
))
3338 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3339 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s
, pkt
))
3341 } else if (!(alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3342 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3343 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3349 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
, s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
);
3350 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3351 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3352 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
.tmp
.psklen
);
3353 s
->s3
.tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3358 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL
*s
)
3360 unsigned char *pms
= NULL
;
3363 pms
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
;
3364 pmslen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.pmslen
;
3366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3368 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3369 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s
)) {
3370 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3377 if (pms
== NULL
&& !(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kPSK
)) {
3378 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3379 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3382 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, pms
, pmslen
, 1)) {
3383 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3384 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3393 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3394 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3395 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3399 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3402 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3403 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3405 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3406 labellen
= sizeof(labelbuffer
) - 1;
3407 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG
)
3410 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3411 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3412 labellen
, NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3413 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3414 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK
,
3415 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3419 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3420 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3426 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms
, pmslen
);
3427 s
->s3
.tmp
.pms
= NULL
;
3432 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3433 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3434 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3436 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL
*s
)
3438 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3439 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, 0) || s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
3442 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3443 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3445 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
&&
3446 !tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, -2))
3451 WORK_STATE
tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3454 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
3457 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3458 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3459 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
3460 i
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
3462 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3466 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3467 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3468 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
3471 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3473 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
)) {
3474 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
3475 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
3477 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3480 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3484 /* We need to get a client cert */
3485 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
3487 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3488 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3490 i
= ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s
, &x509
, &pkey
);
3492 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
3495 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
3496 if ((i
== 1) && (pkey
!= NULL
) && (x509
!= NULL
)) {
3497 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s
, x509
) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s
, pkey
))
3499 } else if (i
== 1) {
3501 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3502 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK
);
3506 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
3507 if (i
&& !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s
))
3510 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3511 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
3512 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE
);
3513 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3515 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
= 2;
3516 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3517 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3523 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
3524 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
3525 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3528 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3529 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3530 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3534 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3536 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3537 if (s
->pha_context
== NULL
) {
3538 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3539 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
3540 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3541 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3544 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
)) {
3545 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3546 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3550 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
,
3551 (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert_req
== 2) ? NULL
3553 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3558 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
3559 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
3560 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {
3562 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3563 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3565 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3566 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER
);
3573 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL
*s
)
3575 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
3579 alg_k
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3580 alg_a
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3582 /* we don't have a certificate */
3583 if (!(alg_a
& SSL_aCERT
))
3586 /* This is the passed certificate */
3587 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
), &idx
);
3589 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3590 if (clu
== NULL
|| (alg_a
& clu
->amask
) == 0) {
3591 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3592 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3593 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT
);
3597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3598 if (clu
->amask
& SSL_aECDSA
) {
3599 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s
->session
->peer
, s
))
3601 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3602 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT
);
3606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3607 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
) && idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
3608 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3609 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3610 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT
);
3614 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3615 if ((alg_k
& SSL_kDHE
) && (s
->s3
.peer_tmp
== NULL
)) {
3616 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM
,
3617 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3626 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3628 size_t len
, padding_len
;
3629 unsigned char *padding
= NULL
;
3631 len
= s
->ext
.npn_len
;
3632 padding_len
= 32 - ((len
+ 2) % 32);
3634 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.npn
, len
)
3635 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt
, padding_len
, &padding
)) {
3636 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO
,
3637 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3641 memset(padding
, 0, padding_len
);
3647 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_hello_req(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3649 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3650 /* should contain no data */
3651 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ
,
3652 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3653 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3656 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
3657 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
3658 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3662 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3663 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3664 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3665 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3666 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3671 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s
);
3673 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
3676 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3679 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3681 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &extensions
)
3682 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3683 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3684 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3688 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3689 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, &rawexts
,
3691 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3692 rawexts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
3693 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3697 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3698 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3701 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3702 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3705 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL
*s
, X509
**px509
, EVP_PKEY
**ppkey
)
3708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3709 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
) {
3710 i
= ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s
->ctx
->client_cert_engine
, s
,
3711 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
),
3712 px509
, ppkey
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
);
3717 if (s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb
)
3718 i
= s
->ctx
->client_cert_cb(s
, px509
, ppkey
);
3722 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3725 size_t totlen
= 0, len
, maxlen
, maxverok
= 0;
3726 int empty_reneg_info_scsv
= !s
->renegotiate
;
3728 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3729 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s
)) {
3730 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3731 SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
);
3736 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3737 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3741 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3742 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3743 # error Max cipher length too short
3746 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3747 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3750 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
3751 maxlen
= OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
& ~1;
3754 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3757 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
)
3759 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
)
3762 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) && totlen
< maxlen
; i
++) {
3763 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3765 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
3766 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3767 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
3770 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(c
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3771 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3772 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3776 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3778 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3779 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
3780 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
))
3783 if (c
->max_tls
>= s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
3784 && c
->min_tls
<= s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
3792 if (totlen
== 0 || !maxverok
) {
3793 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
,
3794 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
3797 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3804 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv
) {
3805 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3806 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3808 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3809 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3810 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3814 if (s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) {
3815 static SSL_CIPHER scsv
= {
3816 0, NULL
, NULL
, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3818 if (!s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv
, pkt
, &len
)) {
3819 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3820 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3829 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3831 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3832 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
) {
3833 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3834 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
3835 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED
);
3839 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
;