2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types.
25 typedef struct x509err2alert_st
{
30 /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
31 const unsigned char hrrrandom
[] = {
32 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
33 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
34 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
38 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
39 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
41 int ssl3_do_write(SSL
*s
, int type
)
46 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, type
, &s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
47 s
->init_num
, &written
);
50 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
52 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
53 * ignore the result anyway
54 * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added
56 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || (s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
57 && s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
58 && s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
))
59 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
,
60 (unsigned char *)&s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
63 if (written
== s
->init_num
) {
65 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, type
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
66 (size_t)(s
->init_off
+ s
->init_num
), s
,
70 s
->init_off
+= written
;
71 s
->init_num
-= written
;
75 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, int htype
)
79 if ((htype
!= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& !WPACKET_close(pkt
))
80 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, &msglen
)
83 s
->init_num
= (int)msglen
;
89 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL
*s
)
91 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
92 /* SSLfatal() already called */
96 /* Reset any extension flags */
97 memset(s
->ext
.extflags
, 0, sizeof(s
->ext
.extflags
));
100 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
101 int i
, ver_min
, ver_max
, ok
= 0;
104 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
105 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
108 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
, NULL
) != 0) {
109 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
,
110 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
113 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
114 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
116 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
117 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max
, c
->min_dtls
) &&
118 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max
, c
->max_dtls
))
120 } else if (ver_max
>= c
->min_tls
&& ver_max
<= c
->max_tls
) {
127 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE
,
128 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE
);
129 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
133 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
134 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
135 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_accept
);
137 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
138 tsan_counter(&s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_renegotiate
);
140 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 0;
143 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
144 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect
);
146 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_renegotiate
);
148 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
149 memset(s
->s3
->client_random
, 0, sizeof(s
->s3
->client_random
));
152 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
= 0;
155 s
->statem
.use_timer
= 1;
162 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
163 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
165 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
166 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
168 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *tls13tbs
,
169 void **hdata
, size_t *hdatalen
)
171 static const char *servercontext
= "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
172 static const char *clientcontext
= "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
174 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
177 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
178 memset(tls13tbs
, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
);
179 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
180 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
181 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
)
182 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, servercontext
);
184 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE
, clientcontext
);
187 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
188 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
189 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
191 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
192 || s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
) {
193 memcpy(tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
194 s
->cert_verify_hash_len
);
195 hashlen
= s
->cert_verify_hash_len
;
196 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s
, tls13tbs
+ TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
,
197 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &hashlen
)) {
198 /* SSLfatal() already called */
203 *hdatalen
= TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ hashlen
;
208 retlen
= retlen_l
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, hdata
);
210 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA
,
211 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
220 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
222 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
223 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
224 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= NULL
;
225 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
226 size_t hdatalen
= 0, siglen
= 0;
228 unsigned char *sig
= NULL
;
229 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
230 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
;
232 if (lu
== NULL
|| s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
== NULL
) {
233 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
234 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
237 pkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
239 if (pkey
== NULL
|| !tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
)) {
240 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
241 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
245 mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
247 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
248 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
252 /* Get the data to be signed */
253 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
254 /* SSLfatal() already called */
258 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
)) {
259 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
260 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
263 siglen
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
264 sig
= OPENSSL_malloc(siglen
);
266 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
267 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
271 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
272 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
277 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
278 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
279 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
280 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
281 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
286 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
287 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0
288 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
289 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
290 s
->session
->master_key
)
291 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
) <= 0) {
293 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
297 } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx
, sig
, &siglen
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0) {
298 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
305 int pktype
= lu
->sig
;
307 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
308 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
309 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
)
310 BUF_reverse(sig
, NULL
, siglen
);
314 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, sig
, siglen
)) {
315 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY
,
316 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
320 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
321 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
322 /* SSLfatal() already called */
327 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
331 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
335 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
337 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
338 const unsigned char *data
;
339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
340 unsigned char *gost_data
= NULL
;
342 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
346 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
349 unsigned char tls13tbs
[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
350 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
351 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
354 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
355 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
359 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
360 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(peer
);
362 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
363 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
367 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, NULL
) == NULL
) {
368 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
369 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
373 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
376 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &sigalg
)) {
377 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
381 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s
, sigalg
, pkey
) <= 0) {
382 /* SSLfatal() already called */
385 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s
, pkey
)) {
386 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
387 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
391 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalg
, &md
)) {
392 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
393 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
398 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
399 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
400 md
== NULL
? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md
));
403 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
405 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
406 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
409 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)
410 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 64
411 && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
412 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
))
413 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 128
414 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
))) {
415 len
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
418 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &len
)) {
419 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
420 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
424 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
425 if (((int)len
> j
) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > j
)
426 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
427 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
428 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
431 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, len
)) {
432 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
433 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
437 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s
, tls13tbs
, &hdata
, &hdatalen
)) {
438 /* SSLfatal() already called */
443 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client verify alg %s\n",
444 md
== NULL
? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md
));
446 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
447 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
451 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
453 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
454 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
455 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
456 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
) {
457 if ((gost_data
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
)) == NULL
) {
458 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
459 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
462 BUF_reverse(gost_data
, data
, len
);
468 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s
)) {
469 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
470 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
,
471 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
472 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
477 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
478 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
) <= 0
479 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
480 (int)s
->session
->master_key_length
,
481 s
->session
->master_key
)) {
482 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
486 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx
, data
, len
) <= 0) {
487 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
488 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
492 j
= EVP_DigestVerify(mctx
, data
, len
, hdata
, hdatalen
);
494 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
495 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
501 * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client
502 * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the
503 * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest
504 * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We
505 * want to make sure that SSL_get_peer_certificate() will return the actual
506 * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback.
508 if (!s
->server
&& SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 1)
509 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
511 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
513 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
514 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
515 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
517 OPENSSL_free(gost_data
);
522 int tls_construct_finished(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
524 size_t finish_md_len
;
528 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
529 if (!s
->server
&& s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
530 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
533 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
538 && s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_req
== 0
539 && (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
540 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE
))) {;
541 /* SSLfatal() already called */
546 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
547 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
549 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
550 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
553 finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
555 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
);
556 if (finish_md_len
== 0) {
557 /* SSLfatal() already called */
561 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
= finish_md_len
;
563 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, finish_md_len
)) {
564 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
,
565 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
570 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
571 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
573 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl_log_secret(s
, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL
,
574 s
->session
->master_key
,
575 s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
576 /* SSLfatal() already called */
581 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
583 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)) {
584 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
,
585 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
589 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
591 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
593 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
,
595 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= finish_md_len
;
601 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
603 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->key_update
)) {
604 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE
,
605 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
609 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
;
613 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_key_update(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
615 unsigned int updatetype
;
617 s
->key_update_count
++;
618 if (s
->key_update_count
> MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES
) {
619 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
620 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES
);
621 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
625 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
626 * be on a record boundary.
628 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
629 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
630 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
631 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
634 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &updatetype
)
635 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
636 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
637 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
638 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
642 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
645 if (updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
646 && updatetype
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
) {
647 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE
,
648 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE
);
649 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
653 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
654 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
655 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). We
656 * ignore a request for us to update our sending keys too if we already
659 if (updatetype
== SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
660 && (s
->shutdown
& SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
) == 0)
661 s
->key_update
= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
;
663 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 0)) {
664 /* SSLfatal() already called */
665 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
668 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
672 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
675 int ssl3_take_mac(SSL
*s
)
681 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
682 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
684 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
685 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
688 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
=
689 s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
, sender
, slen
,
690 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
692 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
== 0) {
693 /* SSLfatal() already called */
700 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
704 remain
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
706 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
707 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
708 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
710 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
711 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
712 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
+ 1)
713 || (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
714 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1)) {
715 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
716 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
717 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
718 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
722 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
723 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
724 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
725 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
729 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
730 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
731 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
732 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
733 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
736 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
737 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
)) {
738 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
739 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
740 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
743 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
744 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
746 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
747 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
751 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
752 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
755 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
759 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
762 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_finished(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
767 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
770 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We
771 * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less
774 s
->statem
.enc_read_state
= ENC_READ_STATE_VALID
;
775 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
776 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
777 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
778 /* SSLfatal() already called */
779 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
784 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
785 * message must be on a record boundary.
787 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
788 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
789 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
790 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
793 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
794 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
795 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
796 SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
797 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
799 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
801 md_len
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
;
803 if (md_len
!= PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
804 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
805 SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
806 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
809 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt
), s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
811 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
812 SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
);
813 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
817 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
819 if (!ossl_assert(md_len
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
)) {
820 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
,
821 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
822 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
825 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
827 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= md_len
;
829 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
,
831 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= md_len
;
835 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
836 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
838 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
840 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
!= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
&&
841 !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
842 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
843 /* SSLfatal() already called */
844 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
847 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
848 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
849 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)) {
850 /* SSLfatal() already called */
851 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
853 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
854 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ
)) {
855 /* SSLfatal() already called */
856 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
858 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s
)) {
859 /* SSLfatal() already called */
860 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
865 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
868 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
870 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, SSL3_MT_CCS
)) {
871 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
872 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
879 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
880 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, X509
*x
, int chain
)
883 unsigned char *outbytes
;
885 len
= i2d_X509(x
, NULL
);
887 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
,
891 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt
, len
, &outbytes
)
892 || i2d_X509(x
, &outbytes
) != len
) {
893 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET
,
894 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
899 && !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, x
,
901 /* SSLfatal() already called */
908 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
909 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
)
913 STACK_OF(X509
) *extra_certs
;
914 STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
= NULL
;
915 X509_STORE
*chain_store
;
917 if (cpk
== NULL
|| cpk
->x509
== NULL
)
923 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
925 if (cpk
->chain
!= NULL
)
926 extra_certs
= cpk
->chain
;
928 extra_certs
= s
->ctx
->extra_certs
;
930 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN
) || extra_certs
)
932 else if (s
->cert
->chain_store
)
933 chain_store
= s
->cert
->chain_store
;
935 chain_store
= s
->ctx
->cert_store
;
937 if (chain_store
!= NULL
) {
938 X509_STORE_CTX
*xs_ctx
= X509_STORE_CTX_new();
940 if (xs_ctx
== NULL
) {
941 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
,
942 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
945 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx
, chain_store
, x
, NULL
)) {
946 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
947 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
,
952 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
953 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
954 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
955 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
957 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx
);
958 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
960 chain
= X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx
);
961 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, chain
, NULL
, 0);
964 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
);
969 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
970 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
973 chain_count
= sk_X509_num(chain
);
974 for (i
= 0; i
< chain_count
; i
++) {
975 x
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
977 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
)) {
978 /* SSLfatal() already called */
979 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
983 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx
);
985 i
= ssl_security_cert_chain(s
, extra_certs
, x
, 0);
987 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN
, i
);
990 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, 0)) {
991 /* SSLfatal() already called */
994 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(extra_certs
); i
++) {
995 x
= sk_X509_value(extra_certs
, i
);
996 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s
, pkt
, x
, i
+ 1)) {
997 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1005 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
)
1007 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt
)) {
1008 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
,
1009 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1013 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
))
1016 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
1017 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
,
1018 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1026 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
1027 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
1030 WORK_STATE
tls_finish_handshake(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
, int clearbufs
, int stop
)
1032 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
1035 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1037 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
1038 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1040 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
1043 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
)) {
1044 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE
,
1045 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1051 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !s
->server
1052 && s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
)
1053 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT
;
1056 * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3
1057 * post handshake exchange
1059 if (s
->statem
.cleanuphand
) {
1060 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1063 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 0;
1064 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1066 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
1070 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the
1073 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1074 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
1076 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1077 tsan_counter(&s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
);
1078 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_accept
;
1080 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->hit
) {
1082 * We are finishing after the client. We start the timer going
1083 * in case there are any retransmits of our final flight
1086 dtls1_start_timer(s
);
1089 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1091 * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once,
1092 * so we remove this one from the cache.
1094 if ((s
->session_ctx
->session_cache_mode
1095 & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
) != 0)
1096 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s
->session_ctx
, s
->session
);
1099 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1102 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
1105 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
);
1107 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_connect
;
1108 tsan_counter(&s
->session_ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
);
1110 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1112 * We are finishing after the server. We start the timer going
1113 * in case there are any retransmits of our final flight
1116 dtls1_start_timer(s
);
1120 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1121 /* done with handshaking */
1122 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
= 0;
1123 s
->d1
->handshake_write_seq
= 0;
1124 s
->d1
->next_handshake_write_seq
= 0;
1125 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s
);
1129 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1130 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
1131 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
1132 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
1134 /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */
1135 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
1138 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
1141 /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */
1142 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
1143 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1146 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
1149 int tls_get_message_header(SSL
*s
, int *mt
)
1151 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1152 int skip_message
, i
, recvd_type
;
1154 size_t l
, readbytes
;
1156 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1159 while (s
->init_num
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
1160 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, &recvd_type
,
1162 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- s
->init_num
,
1165 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1168 if (recvd_type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1170 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1171 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1173 if (s
->init_num
!= 0 || readbytes
!= 1 || p
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
) {
1174 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1175 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
1176 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
1179 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
== TLS_ST_BEFORE
1180 && (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS
) != 0) {
1182 * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is
1183 * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos.
1184 * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do
1185 * not return success until we see the second ClientHello
1186 * with a valid cookie.
1190 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
1191 s
->init_num
= readbytes
- 1;
1192 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1193 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= readbytes
;
1195 } else if (recvd_type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
1196 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1197 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
1198 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
1201 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1206 if (s
->statem
.hand_state
!= TLS_ST_OK
1207 && p
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
)
1209 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1210 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1211 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1214 if (p
[1] == 0 && p
[2] == 0 && p
[3] == 0) {
1218 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1219 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
1220 p
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1221 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1223 } while (skip_message
);
1224 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1227 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *(p
++);
1229 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1231 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1234 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1235 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1237 l
= RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s
->rlayer
)
1238 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1239 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1241 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
1242 s
->init_num
= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1245 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1246 if (l
> (INT_MAX
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1247 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
1248 SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
);
1251 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
1253 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
1260 int tls_get_message_body(SSL
*s
, size_t *len
)
1262 size_t n
, readbytes
;
1266 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
1267 /* We've already read everything in */
1268 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
1273 n
= s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
- s
->init_num
;
1275 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, NULL
,
1276 &p
[s
->init_num
], n
, 0, &readbytes
);
1278 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1282 s
->init_num
+= readbytes
;
1287 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1288 * Finished verification.
1290 if (*(s
->init_buf
->data
) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED
&& !ssl3_take_mac(s
)) {
1291 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1296 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1297 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1298 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1300 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1304 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1305 s
->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION
, 0, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1306 (size_t)s
->init_num
, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1309 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1310 * processing the message
1311 * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished
1314 #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
1315 /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */
1316 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
1317 && s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
)) {
1318 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
!= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
1319 || s
->init_num
< SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1320 || memcmp(hrrrandom
,
1321 s
->init_buf
->data
+ SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET
,
1322 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) != 0) {
1323 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
1324 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
1325 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1331 if (s
->msg_callback
)
1332 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
1333 (size_t)s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
1334 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
1341 static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table
[] = {
1342 {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
},
1343 {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1344 {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1345 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1346 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
},
1347 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1348 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1349 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
},
1350 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
},
1351 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1352 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
},
1353 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1354 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
},
1355 {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1356 {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1357 {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1358 {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1359 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1360 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1361 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1362 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1363 {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1364 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1365 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1366 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
},
1367 {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1368 {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1369 {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1370 {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1371 {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1372 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1373 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1374 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE
, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
},
1375 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1376 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1377 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1378 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1379 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
},
1380 {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
},
1382 /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */
1383 {X509_V_OK
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
}
1386 int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err
)
1388 const X509ERR2ALERT
*tp
;
1390 for (tp
= x509table
; tp
->x509err
!= X509_V_OK
; ++tp
)
1391 if (tp
->x509err
== x509err
)
1396 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL
*s
)
1398 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
1400 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1403 static int version_cmp(const SSL
*s
, int a
, int b
)
1405 int dtls
= SSL_IS_DTLS(s
);
1410 return a
< b
? -1 : 1;
1411 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a
, b
) ? -1 : 1;
1416 const SSL_METHOD
*(*cmeth
) (void);
1417 const SSL_METHOD
*(*smeth
) (void);
1420 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1421 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1424 /* Must be in order high to low */
1425 static const version_info tls_version_table
[] = {
1426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1427 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, tlsv1_3_client_method
, tlsv1_3_server_method
},
1429 {TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1432 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, tlsv1_2_client_method
, tlsv1_2_server_method
},
1434 {TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1436 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1437 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, tlsv1_1_client_method
, tlsv1_1_server_method
},
1439 {TLS1_1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1442 {TLS1_VERSION
, tlsv1_client_method
, tlsv1_server_method
},
1444 {TLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1447 {SSL3_VERSION
, sslv3_client_method
, sslv3_server_method
},
1449 {SSL3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1454 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1455 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1458 /* Must be in order high to low */
1459 static const version_info dtls_version_table
[] = {
1460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1461 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, dtlsv1_2_client_method
, dtlsv1_2_server_method
},
1463 {DTLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1465 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1466 {DTLS1_VERSION
, dtlsv1_client_method
, dtlsv1_server_method
},
1467 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, dtls_bad_ver_client_method
, NULL
},
1469 {DTLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
1470 {DTLS1_BAD_VER
, NULL
, NULL
},
1476 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1478 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1479 * @method: the intended method.
1481 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1483 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_METHOD
*method
)
1485 int version
= method
->version
;
1487 if ((s
->min_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1488 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->min_proto_version
) < 0) ||
1489 ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, version
, NULL
) == 0)
1490 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1492 if (s
->max_proto_version
!= 0 &&
1493 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->max_proto_version
) > 0)
1494 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
;
1496 if ((s
->options
& method
->mask
) != 0)
1497 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1498 if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB
) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s
))
1499 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
;
1505 * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable
1506 * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured. Otherwise
1509 static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL
*s
)
1512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1517 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1518 if (s
->psk_server_callback
!= NULL
)
1522 if (s
->psk_find_session_cb
!= NULL
|| s
->cert
->cert_cb
!= NULL
)
1525 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1526 /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */
1528 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
1529 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
1530 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
1531 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
1536 if (!ssl_has_cert(s
, i
))
1538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1539 if (i
!= SSL_PKEY_ECC
)
1542 * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is
1543 * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this
1544 * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446.
1546 eckey
= EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
].privatekey
);
1549 curve
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey
));
1550 if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s
, curve
))
1561 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1564 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1565 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1567 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1569 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL
*s
, int version
, const SSL_METHOD
**meth
)
1571 const version_info
*vent
;
1572 const version_info
*table
;
1574 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1576 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1577 return version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->version
) == 0;
1578 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1579 table
= tls_version_table
;
1581 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1582 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1587 vent
->version
!= 0 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) <= 0;
1589 if (vent
->cmeth
!= NULL
1590 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) == 0
1591 && ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->cmeth()) == 0
1593 || version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
1594 || is_tls13_capable(s
))) {
1596 *meth
= vent
->cmeth();
1604 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1605 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1606 * supported protocol version.
1608 * @s server SSL handle.
1610 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1612 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL
*s
)
1614 const version_info
*vent
;
1615 const version_info
*table
;
1618 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1619 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1622 if (s
->version
== s
->ctx
->method
->version
)
1626 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1627 * highest protocol version).
1629 if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== TLS_method()->version
)
1630 table
= tls_version_table
;
1631 else if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== DTLS_method()->version
)
1632 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1634 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1638 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1639 if (vent
->smeth
!= NULL
&& ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->smeth()) == 0)
1640 return s
->version
== vent
->version
;
1646 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1647 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1648 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1649 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1651 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1652 * @version: the intended limit.
1653 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1655 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1657 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version
, int version
, int *bound
)
1665 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1666 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1667 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1669 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1670 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1671 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1672 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1673 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1675 switch (method_version
) {
1678 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1679 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1680 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1681 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1686 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1687 if (version
< SSL3_VERSION
|| version
> TLS_MAX_VERSION
)
1691 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1692 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version
, DTLS_MAX_VERSION
) ||
1693 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version
, DTLS1_BAD_VER
))
1702 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL
*s
, int vers
, DOWNGRADE
*dgrd
)
1704 if (vers
== TLS1_2_VERSION
1705 && ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_3_VERSION
, NULL
)) {
1706 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2
;
1707 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)
1708 && vers
< TLS1_2_VERSION
1710 * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2
1711 * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still
1712 * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and
1713 * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is
1714 * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not.
1716 && ssl_version_supported(s
, TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
)) {
1717 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1
;
1719 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1724 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1725 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1726 * the version specific method.
1728 * @s: server SSL handle.
1730 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1732 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
, DOWNGRADE
*dgrd
)
1735 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1737 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1738 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1740 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1743 int server_version
= s
->method
->version
;
1744 int client_version
= hello
->legacy_version
;
1745 const version_info
*vent
;
1746 const version_info
*table
;
1748 RAW_EXTENSION
*suppversions
;
1750 s
->client_version
= client_version
;
1752 switch (server_version
) {
1754 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1755 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, s
->version
) < 0)
1756 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
1757 *dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1759 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1760 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1761 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1762 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1763 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1768 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1769 * a HelloRetryRequest
1772 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1773 table
= tls_version_table
;
1775 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1776 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1780 suppversions
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions
];
1782 /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
1783 if (!suppversions
->present
&& s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
)
1784 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1786 if (suppversions
->present
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1787 unsigned int candidate_vers
= 0;
1788 unsigned int best_vers
= 0;
1789 const SSL_METHOD
*best_method
= NULL
;
1790 PACKET versionslist
;
1792 suppversions
->parsed
= 1;
1794 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions
->data
, &versionslist
)) {
1795 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1796 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1800 * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION.
1801 * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3:
1802 * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with
1803 * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to
1804 * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert."
1805 * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower.
1806 * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1.
1808 if (client_version
<= SSL3_VERSION
)
1809 return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION
;
1811 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist
, &candidate_vers
)) {
1812 if (version_cmp(s
, candidate_vers
, best_vers
) <= 0)
1814 if (ssl_version_supported(s
, candidate_vers
, &best_method
))
1815 best_vers
= candidate_vers
;
1817 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist
) != 0) {
1818 /* Trailing data? */
1819 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
;
1822 if (best_vers
> 0) {
1823 if (s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
) {
1825 * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
1826 * negotiated TLSv1.3
1828 if (best_vers
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
1829 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1832 check_for_downgrade(s
, best_vers
, dgrd
);
1833 s
->version
= best_vers
;
1834 s
->method
= best_method
;
1837 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
1841 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1842 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1844 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, TLS1_3_VERSION
) >= 0)
1845 client_version
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
1848 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1851 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1852 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1854 if (vent
->smeth
== NULL
||
1855 version_cmp(s
, client_version
, vent
->version
) < 0)
1857 method
= vent
->smeth();
1858 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
1859 check_for_downgrade(s
, vent
->version
, dgrd
);
1860 s
->version
= vent
->version
;
1866 return disabled
? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
: SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1870 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1871 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1872 * the version specific method.
1874 * @s: client SSL handle.
1875 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1876 * @extensions: The extensions received
1878 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
1880 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL
*s
, int version
, RAW_EXTENSION
*extensions
)
1882 const version_info
*vent
;
1883 const version_info
*table
;
1884 int ret
, ver_min
, ver_max
, real_max
, origv
;
1887 s
->version
= version
;
1889 /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
1890 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions
,
1891 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1892 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
, extensions
,
1898 if (s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
1899 && s
->version
!= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
1901 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1902 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
1906 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1908 if (s
->version
!= s
->method
->version
) {
1910 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1911 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1912 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
);
1916 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1917 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1918 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1919 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1920 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1923 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1924 table
= tls_version_table
;
1926 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1927 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1931 ret
= ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
, &real_max
);
1934 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1935 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
, ret
);
1938 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s
->version
, ver_min
)
1939 : s
->version
< ver_min
) {
1941 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1942 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
);
1944 } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s
->version
, ver_max
)
1945 : s
->version
> ver_max
) {
1947 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1948 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
);
1952 if ((s
->mode
& SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV
) == 0)
1955 /* Check for downgrades */
1956 if (s
->version
== TLS1_2_VERSION
&& real_max
> s
->version
) {
1957 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade
,
1958 s
->s3
->server_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1959 - sizeof(tls12downgrade
),
1960 sizeof(tls12downgrade
)) == 0) {
1962 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1963 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1964 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
1967 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)
1968 && s
->version
< TLS1_2_VERSION
1969 && real_max
> s
->version
) {
1970 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade
,
1971 s
->s3
->server_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1972 - sizeof(tls11downgrade
),
1973 sizeof(tls11downgrade
)) == 0) {
1975 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1976 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1977 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
1982 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1983 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
|| s
->version
!= vent
->version
)
1986 s
->method
= vent
->cmeth();
1991 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION
,
1992 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
);
1997 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
1998 * @s: The SSL connection
1999 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
2000 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
2001 * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole
2002 * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled
2005 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
2006 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
2007 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
2008 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
2009 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
2011 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
2012 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
2013 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
2015 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
2016 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
2018 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL
*s
, int *min_version
, int *max_version
,
2021 int version
, tmp_real_max
;
2023 const SSL_METHOD
*single
= NULL
;
2024 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
2025 const version_info
*table
;
2026 const version_info
*vent
;
2028 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
2031 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2032 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2033 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2034 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2035 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2037 *min_version
= *max_version
= s
->version
;
2039 * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version
2042 if (!ossl_assert(real_max
== NULL
))
2043 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2045 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
2046 table
= tls_version_table
;
2048 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
2049 table
= dtls_version_table
;
2054 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
2055 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
2056 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
2057 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
2059 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
2060 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
2061 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
2063 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
2064 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
2065 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
2067 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
2068 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
2069 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
2070 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
2071 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
2072 * selected, as we start from scratch.
2074 *min_version
= version
= 0;
2076 if (real_max
!= NULL
)
2079 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
2081 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
2082 * "version capability" vector.
2084 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
) {
2089 method
= vent
->cmeth();
2091 if (hole
== 1 && tmp_real_max
== 0)
2092 tmp_real_max
= vent
->version
;
2094 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) != 0) {
2098 *min_version
= method
->version
;
2100 if (real_max
!= NULL
&& tmp_real_max
!= 0)
2101 *real_max
= tmp_real_max
;
2102 version
= (single
= method
)->version
;
2103 *min_version
= version
;
2108 *max_version
= version
;
2110 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
2112 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
;
2118 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
2119 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
2121 * @s: client SSL handle.
2123 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
2125 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL
*s
)
2127 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ret
;
2130 * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent
2131 * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated.
2133 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
))
2136 ret
= ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
, NULL
);
2141 s
->version
= ver_max
;
2143 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
2144 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && ver_max
> TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2145 ver_max
= TLS1_2_VERSION
;
2147 s
->client_version
= ver_max
;
2152 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
2153 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
2154 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
2155 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
2157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2158 int check_in_list(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, const uint16_t *groups
,
2159 size_t num_groups
, int checkallow
)
2163 if (groups
== NULL
|| num_groups
== 0)
2166 for (i
= 0; i
< num_groups
; i
++) {
2167 uint16_t group
= groups
[i
];
2169 if (group_id
== group
2171 || tls_curve_allowed(s
, group
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))) {
2180 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2181 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *hashval
,
2182 size_t hashlen
, const unsigned char *hrr
,
2185 unsigned char hashvaltmp
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
2186 unsigned char msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
];
2188 memset(msghdr
, 0, sizeof(msghdr
));
2190 if (hashval
== NULL
) {
2191 hashval
= hashvaltmp
;
2193 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2194 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)
2195 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, hashvaltmp
, sizeof(hashvaltmp
),
2197 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2202 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2203 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
2204 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2208 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2209 msghdr
[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH
;
2210 msghdr
[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen
;
2211 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, msghdr
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)
2212 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, hashval
, hashlen
)) {
2213 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2218 * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
2219 * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
2220 * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
2223 && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, hrr
, hrrlen
)
2224 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
2225 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
2226 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
))) {
2227 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2234 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME
*const *a
, const X509_NAME
*const *b
)
2236 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a
, *b
);
2239 int parse_ca_names(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2241 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp
);
2242 X509_NAME
*xn
= NULL
;
2245 if (ca_sk
== NULL
) {
2246 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2247 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2250 /* get the CA RDNs */
2251 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cadns
)) {
2252 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2253 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2257 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns
)) {
2258 const unsigned char *namestart
, *namebytes
;
2259 unsigned int name_len
;
2261 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns
, &name_len
)
2262 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) {
2263 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2264 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2268 namestart
= namebytes
;
2269 if ((xn
= d2i_X509_NAME(NULL
, &namebytes
, name_len
)) == NULL
) {
2270 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2274 if (namebytes
!= (namestart
+ name_len
)) {
2275 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2276 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2280 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk
, xn
)) {
2281 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES
,
2282 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2288 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_ca_names
, X509_NAME_free
);
2289 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_ca_names
= ca_sk
;
2294 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk
, X509_NAME_free
);
2299 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *get_ca_names(SSL
*s
)
2301 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
= NULL
;;
2304 ca_sk
= SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2305 if (ca_sk
!= NULL
&& sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk
) == 0)
2310 ca_sk
= SSL_get0_CA_list(s
);
2315 int construct_ca_names(SSL
*s
, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_sk
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2317 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2318 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2319 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES
,
2320 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2324 if (ca_sk
!= NULL
) {
2327 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk
); i
++) {
2328 unsigned char *namebytes
;
2329 X509_NAME
*name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk
, i
);
2333 || (namelen
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
)) < 0
2334 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, namelen
,
2336 || i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &namebytes
) != namelen
) {
2337 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES
,
2338 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2344 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2345 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES
,
2346 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2353 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2354 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL
*s
, unsigned char **ptbs
,
2355 const void *param
, size_t paramlen
)
2357 size_t tbslen
= 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
+ paramlen
;
2358 unsigned char *tbs
= OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen
);
2361 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS
,
2362 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2365 memcpy(tbs
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2366 memcpy(tbs
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
2368 memcpy(tbs
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
* 2, param
, paramlen
);
2375 * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth,
2376 * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once
2378 int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL
*s
)
2380 if (s
->pha_dgst
== NULL
) {
2381 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1))
2382 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2385 s
->pha_dgst
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2386 if (s
->pha_dgst
== NULL
) {
2387 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2388 SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA
,
2389 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2392 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s
->pha_dgst
,
2393 s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
)) {
2394 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2395 SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA
,
2396 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2404 * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest
2405 * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request
2407 int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL
*s
)
2409 if (s
->pha_dgst
== NULL
) {
2410 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2411 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA
,
2412 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2415 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s
->s3
->handshake_dgst
,
2417 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2418 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA
,
2419 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);