2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
12 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
13 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
19 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
20 #include "statem_locl.h"
21 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509.h>
27 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
28 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
30 int ssl3_do_write(SSL
*s
, int type
)
34 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, type
, &s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
38 if (type
== SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
)
40 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
41 * ignore the result anyway
43 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
,
44 (unsigned char *)&s
->init_buf
->data
[s
->init_off
],
48 if (ret
== s
->init_num
) {
50 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, type
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
51 (size_t)(s
->init_off
+ s
->init_num
), s
,
60 int tls_construct_finished(SSL
*s
, const char *sender
, int slen
)
66 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
68 i
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
70 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
);
73 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
= i
;
74 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, i
);
78 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
81 OPENSSL_assert(i
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
82 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, i
);
83 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= i
;
85 OPENSSL_assert(i
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
86 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md
, i
);
87 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= i
;
90 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_FINISHED
, l
)) {
91 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
98 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
100 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
103 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL
*s
)
108 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
109 * the appropriate error.
111 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
)
114 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
;
115 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
;
117 sender
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label
;
118 slen
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->client_finished_label_len
;
121 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
= s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->final_finish_mac(s
,
124 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
);
128 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
133 remain
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
135 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
136 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
137 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
139 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
140 if ((s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
141 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
+ 1)
142 || (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
143 && remain
!= DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH
- 1)) {
144 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
145 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
146 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
151 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
152 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
,
153 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
158 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
159 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
) {
160 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
165 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 1;
166 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s
)) {
167 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
172 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
173 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_READ
);
175 if (s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
176 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
++;
178 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
180 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
181 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
184 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD
, 1, NULL
);
188 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
190 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
191 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
192 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
195 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_finished(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
199 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
200 if (!s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
) {
201 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
202 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS
);
205 s
->s3
->change_cipher_spec
= 0;
207 i
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md_len
;
209 if ((unsigned long)i
!= PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
210 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
215 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt
), s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
, i
) != 0) {
216 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
217 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED
, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED
);
222 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
225 OPENSSL_assert(i
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
226 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_client_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
, i
);
227 s
->s3
->previous_client_finished_len
= i
;
229 OPENSSL_assert(i
<= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
);
230 memcpy(s
->s3
->previous_server_finished
, s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_finish_md
, i
);
231 s
->s3
->previous_server_finished_len
= i
;
234 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
236 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
237 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
238 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
241 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL
*s
)
245 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
253 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, CERT_PKEY
*cpk
)
256 unsigned long l
= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
);
258 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s
, cpk
, &l
))
261 l
-= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
);
262 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
266 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
, l
)) {
267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
270 return l
+ SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
);
273 WORK_STATE
tls_finish_handshake(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
275 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
278 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
280 ret
= dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
281 if (ret
!= WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
)
286 /* clean a few things up */
287 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s
);
289 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
291 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
292 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
294 BUF_MEM_free(s
->init_buf
);
298 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s
);
302 if (!s
->server
|| s
->renegotiate
== 2) {
303 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
308 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
310 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_accept_good
++;
311 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_accept
;
313 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT
);
315 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_hit
++;
317 s
->handshake_func
= ossl_statem_connect
;
318 s
->ctx
->stats
.sess_connect_good
++;
321 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
322 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
323 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
324 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
327 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
329 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
330 /* done with handshaking */
331 s
->d1
->handshake_read_seq
= 0;
332 s
->d1
->handshake_write_seq
= 0;
333 s
->d1
->next_handshake_write_seq
= 0;
337 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
340 int tls_get_message_header(SSL
*s
, int *mt
)
342 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
343 int skip_message
, i
, recvd_type
, al
;
347 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
350 while (s
->init_num
< SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
) {
351 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, &recvd_type
,
352 &p
[s
->init_num
], SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
- s
->init_num
, 0);
354 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
357 if (recvd_type
== SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
359 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
360 * in the middle of a handshake message.
362 if (s
->init_num
!= 0 || i
!= 1 || p
[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS
) {
363 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
364 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
,
365 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
);
368 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
370 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= i
;
372 } else if (recvd_type
!= SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
) {
373 al
= SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
;
374 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY
);
382 if (p
[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
)
384 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
385 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
386 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
389 if (p
[1] == 0 && p
[2] == 0 && p
[3] == 0) {
394 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
,
395 p
, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
396 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
398 } while (skip_message
);
399 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
402 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
= *(p
++);
404 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
406 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
409 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
410 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
412 l
= RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s
->rlayer
)
413 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
414 if (l
&& !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s
->init_buf
, (int)l
)) {
415 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
418 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
420 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
;
421 s
->init_num
= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
424 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
425 if (l
> (INT_MAX
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
426 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
427 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE
);
430 if (l
&& !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s
->init_buf
,
431 (int)l
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER
, ERR_R_BUF_LIB
);
435 s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
= l
;
437 s
->init_msg
= s
->init_buf
->data
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
443 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
448 int tls_get_message_body(SSL
*s
, unsigned long *len
)
454 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.message_type
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
455 /* We've already read everything in */
456 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
461 n
= s
->s3
->tmp
.message_size
- s
->init_num
;
463 i
= s
->method
->ssl_read_bytes(s
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, NULL
,
464 &p
[s
->init_num
], n
, 0);
466 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
476 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
477 * Finished verification.
479 if (*s
->init_buf
->data
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
)
483 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
484 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
)) {
485 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
487 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
488 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
493 s
->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION
, 0, s
->init_buf
->data
,
494 (size_t)s
->init_num
, s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
496 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s
, (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
,
497 s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
)) {
498 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
499 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
504 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
, s
->init_buf
->data
,
505 (size_t)s
->init_num
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
, s
,
506 s
->msg_callback_arg
);
510 * init_num should never be negative...should probably be declared
513 if (s
->init_num
< 0) {
514 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
515 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
519 *len
= (unsigned long)s
->init_num
;
523 int ssl_cert_type(X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
)
526 (pk
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
)) == NULL
)
529 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk
)) {
533 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
;
535 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
;
536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
541 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001
:
542 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
543 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
:
544 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
545 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
:
546 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
;
551 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type
)
556 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT
:
557 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL
:
558 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER
:
559 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
561 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE
:
562 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE
:
563 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY
:
564 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD
:
565 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD
:
566 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD
:
567 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD
:
568 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID
:
569 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID
:
570 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED
:
571 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED
:
572 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH
:
573 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH
:
574 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH
:
575 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH
:
576 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
577 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
:
578 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
:
579 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE
;
581 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
582 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE
:
583 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
585 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED
:
586 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED
:
587 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED
;
589 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED
:
590 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED
;
592 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED
:
593 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM
:
594 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL
:
595 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP
:
596 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
598 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT
:
599 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN
:
600 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY
:
601 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE
:
602 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG
:
603 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED
:
604 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA
:
605 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA
;
607 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION
:
608 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
610 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE
:
611 al
= SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE
;
614 al
= SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN
;
620 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL
*s
)
622 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
)
624 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION
, 0, 0, NULL
);
627 static int version_cmp(const SSL
*s
, int a
, int b
)
629 int dtls
= SSL_IS_DTLS(s
);
634 return a
< b
? -1 : 1;
635 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a
, b
) ? -1 : 1;
640 const SSL_METHOD
*(*cmeth
)(void);
641 const SSL_METHOD
*(*smeth
)(void);
644 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
645 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION.
648 static const version_info tls_version_table
[] = {
649 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
650 { TLS1_2_VERSION
, tlsv1_2_client_method
, tlsv1_2_server_method
},
652 { TLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
655 { TLS1_1_VERSION
, tlsv1_1_client_method
, tlsv1_1_server_method
},
657 { TLS1_1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
660 { TLS1_VERSION
, tlsv1_client_method
, tlsv1_server_method
},
662 { TLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
664 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
665 { SSL3_VERSION
, sslv3_client_method
, sslv3_server_method
},
667 { SSL3_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
672 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
673 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
676 static const version_info dtls_version_table
[] = {
677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
678 { DTLS1_2_VERSION
, dtlsv1_2_client_method
, dtlsv1_2_server_method
},
680 { DTLS1_2_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
683 { DTLS1_VERSION
, dtlsv1_client_method
, dtlsv1_server_method
},
684 { DTLS1_BAD_VER
, dtls_bad_ver_client_method
, NULL
},
686 { DTLS1_VERSION
, NULL
, NULL
},
687 { DTLS1_BAD_VER
, NULL
, NULL
},
693 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
695 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
696 * @method: the intended method.
698 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
700 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_METHOD
*method
)
702 int version
= method
->version
;
704 if ((s
->min_proto_version
!= 0 &&
705 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->min_proto_version
) < 0) ||
706 ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_VERSION
, 0, version
, NULL
) == 0)
707 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
709 if (s
->max_proto_version
!= 0 &&
710 version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->max_proto_version
) > 0)
711 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH
;
713 if ((s
->options
& method
->mask
) != 0)
714 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
715 if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB
) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s
))
716 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE
;
717 else if ((method
->flags
& SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS
) != 0 && FIPS_mode())
718 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE
;
724 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
727 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
728 * @version: Protocol version to test against
730 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
732 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL
*s
, int version
)
734 const version_info
*vent
;
735 const version_info
*table
;
737 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
739 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
740 return version_cmp(s
, version
, s
->version
) == 0;
741 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
742 table
= tls_version_table
;
744 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
745 table
= dtls_version_table
;
750 vent
->version
!= 0 && version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) <= 0;
752 if (vent
->cmeth
!= NULL
&&
753 version_cmp(s
, version
, vent
->version
) == 0 &&
754 ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->cmeth()) == 0) {
762 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
763 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
764 * supported protocol version.
766 * @s server SSL handle.
768 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
770 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL
*s
)
772 const version_info
*vent
;
773 const version_info
*table
;
776 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
777 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
780 if (s
->version
== s
->ctx
->method
->version
)
784 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
785 * highest protocol version).
787 if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== TLS_method()->version
)
788 table
= tls_version_table
;
789 else if (s
->ctx
->method
->version
== DTLS_method()->version
)
790 table
= dtls_version_table
;
792 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
796 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
797 if (vent
->smeth
!= NULL
&&
798 ssl_method_error(s
, vent
->smeth()) == 0)
799 return s
->version
== vent
->version
;
805 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
806 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
807 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
808 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
810 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
811 * @version: the intended limit.
812 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
814 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
816 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version
, int version
, int *bound
)
824 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
825 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
826 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
828 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
829 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
830 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
831 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
832 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
834 switch (method_version
) {
837 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
838 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
839 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
840 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
845 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
846 if (version
< SSL3_VERSION
|| version
> TLS_MAX_VERSION
)
850 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
851 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version
, DTLS_MAX_VERSION
) ||
852 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version
, DTLS1_BAD_VER
))
862 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
863 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
864 * the version specific method.
866 * @s: server SSL handle.
868 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
870 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL
*s
)
873 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
875 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
876 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
878 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
881 int server_version
= s
->method
->version
;
882 int client_version
= s
->client_version
;
883 const version_info
*vent
;
884 const version_info
*table
;
887 switch (server_version
) {
889 if (version_cmp(s
, client_version
, s
->version
) < 0)
890 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
892 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
893 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
894 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
895 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
896 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
899 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
900 table
= tls_version_table
;
902 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
903 table
= dtls_version_table
;
907 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
908 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
910 if (vent
->smeth
== NULL
||
911 version_cmp(s
, client_version
, vent
->version
) < 0)
913 method
= vent
->smeth();
914 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) == 0) {
915 s
->version
= vent
->version
;
921 return disabled
? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
: SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
925 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
926 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
927 * the version specific method.
929 * @s: client SSL handle.
930 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
932 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
934 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL
*s
, int version
)
936 const version_info
*vent
;
937 const version_info
*table
;
939 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
941 if (version
!= s
->version
)
942 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION
;
944 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
945 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
946 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
947 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
948 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
951 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
952 table
= tls_version_table
;
954 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
955 table
= dtls_version_table
;
959 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
960 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
963 if (version
!= vent
->version
)
965 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
)
967 method
= vent
->cmeth();
968 err
= ssl_method_error(s
, method
);
972 s
->version
= version
;
976 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL
;
980 * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
981 * @s: The SSL connection
982 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
983 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
985 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
986 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
987 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
988 * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
989 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
991 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
992 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
993 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
995 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
996 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
998 int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL
*s
, int *min_version
, int *max_version
)
1002 const SSL_METHOD
*single
= NULL
;
1003 const SSL_METHOD
*method
;
1004 const version_info
*table
;
1005 const version_info
*vent
;
1007 switch (s
->method
->version
) {
1010 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1011 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1012 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1013 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1014 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1016 *min_version
= *max_version
= s
->version
;
1018 case TLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1019 table
= tls_version_table
;
1021 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION
:
1022 table
= dtls_version_table
;
1027 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1028 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1029 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1030 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1032 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1033 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1034 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1036 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1037 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1038 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1040 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1041 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1042 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1043 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1044 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1045 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1047 *min_version
= version
= 0;
1049 for (vent
= table
; vent
->version
!= 0; ++vent
) {
1051 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1052 * "version capability" vector.
1054 if (vent
->cmeth
== NULL
) {
1058 method
= vent
->cmeth();
1059 if (ssl_method_error(s
, method
) != 0) {
1063 *min_version
= method
->version
;
1065 version
= (single
= method
)->version
;
1066 *min_version
= version
;
1071 *max_version
= version
;
1073 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1075 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE
;
1081 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1082 * the initial ClientHello.
1084 * @s: client SSL handle.
1086 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1088 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL
*s
)
1090 int ver_min
, ver_max
, ret
;
1092 ret
= ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s
, &ver_min
, &ver_max
);
1097 s
->client_version
= s
->version
= ver_max
;