1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
110 /* ====================================================================
111 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
114 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
117 * license provided above.
119 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
120 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
123 /* ====================================================================
124 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
127 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
130 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
131 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
132 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
135 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
136 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
139 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
140 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
141 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
144 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
145 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
146 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "statem_locl.h"
154 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
155 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
156 #include <openssl/rand.h>
157 #include <openssl/objects.h>
158 #include <openssl/evp.h>
159 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
160 #include <openssl/x509.h>
161 #include <openssl/dh.h>
162 #include <openssl/bn.h>
163 #include <openssl/md5.h>
165 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL
*s
,
166 PACKET
*cipher_suites
,
167 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) **skp
,
168 int sslv2format
, int *al
);
171 * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
172 * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
173 * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
174 * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
176 * Valid return values are:
177 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
178 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
180 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
182 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
184 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
186 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
187 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
188 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
193 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
195 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
196 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
198 * 2) If we did request one then
199 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
201 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
202 * list if we requested a certificate)
204 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
205 && (!s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
206 || (!((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
207 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
208 && (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)))) {
209 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
211 } else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
212 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
213 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
220 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
221 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
226 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
228 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
229 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
230 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
231 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
232 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
235 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| st
->no_cert_verify
) {
236 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
238 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
239 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
240 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
241 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
243 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
247 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
248 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
254 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
255 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
256 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
261 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
263 if (s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
) {
264 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
) {
265 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
;
270 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
271 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
280 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
281 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
282 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
288 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
289 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
290 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
299 /* No valid transition found */
304 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
306 * Valid return values are:
310 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
312 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
315 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
316 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
317 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
318 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
319 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
322 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
|SSL_kECDHE
)
324 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
328 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
329 || ((alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
))
330 && s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
)
331 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
332 || (alg_k
& (SSL_PSK
& (SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)))
334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
335 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
336 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
346 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
348 * Valid return values are:
352 static int send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
355 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
356 s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
358 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
359 * during re-negotiation:
361 && ((s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) ||
362 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
))
364 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
365 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
368 && (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
370 * ... except when the application insists on
371 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
374 || (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
375 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
376 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
378 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
381 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aPSK
)) {
389 * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
390 * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
392 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
394 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
396 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
398 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */;
399 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
402 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
403 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
406 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
407 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
408 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
409 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
411 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
412 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->d1
->cookie_verified
413 && (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
))
414 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
416 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
417 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
419 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
420 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
422 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
424 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
)
425 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
427 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
429 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
430 /* normal PSK or SRP */
431 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
&
432 (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
433 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
434 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
435 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
436 } else if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
437 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
439 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
442 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
445 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
) {
446 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
;
447 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
451 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
452 if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
453 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
454 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
458 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
459 if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
460 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
465 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
466 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
467 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
469 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
470 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
472 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
474 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
475 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
476 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
477 } else if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
) {
478 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
480 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
482 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
484 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
485 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
488 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
489 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
490 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
492 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
494 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
496 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
497 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
498 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
501 /* Shouldn't happen */
502 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
507 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
508 * the server to the client.
510 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
512 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
514 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
515 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
518 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s
);
521 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
523 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
524 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s
);
525 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
530 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
531 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
533 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
534 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
540 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
542 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
543 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
545 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
547 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
548 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
550 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
551 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
557 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
558 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
559 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
560 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
563 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
565 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
566 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
567 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
568 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
572 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
575 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
);
578 /* No pre work to be done */
582 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
586 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
587 * server to the client.
589 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
591 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
595 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
596 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
597 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
599 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
602 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
603 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
605 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
606 if (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
)
607 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
);
609 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
610 * treat like it was the first packet
615 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
617 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
618 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
619 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
622 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
625 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
626 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
628 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
629 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
630 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
631 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
635 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
636 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
641 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
642 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
643 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->hit
) {
645 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
648 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
652 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
653 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
)) {
654 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
659 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
662 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
663 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
667 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
668 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
671 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
673 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
676 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
683 /* No post work to be done */
687 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
691 * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.
693 * Valid return values are:
697 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL
*s
)
699 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
701 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
702 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
703 return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s
);
705 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
706 return tls_construct_hello_request(s
);
708 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
709 return tls_construct_server_hello(s
);
712 return tls_construct_server_certificate(s
);
714 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
715 return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s
);
717 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
718 return tls_construct_certificate_request(s
);
720 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
721 return tls_construct_server_done(s
);
723 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
724 return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s
);
726 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
727 return tls_construct_cert_status(s
);
729 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
731 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s
);
733 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s
);
735 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
736 return tls_construct_finished(s
,
738 ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label
,
740 ssl3_enc
->server_finished_label_len
);
743 /* Shouldn't happen */
751 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
752 * calculated as follows:
754 * 2 + # client_version
755 * 32 + # only valid length for random
756 * 1 + # length of session_id
757 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
758 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
759 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
760 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
761 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
762 * 2 + # length of extensions
763 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
765 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
767 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
768 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
771 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
772 * reading. Excludes the message header.
774 unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
776 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
778 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
779 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
780 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
783 return s
->max_cert_list
;
785 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
786 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
788 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
789 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
791 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
792 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
793 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH
;
796 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
797 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
799 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
800 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
803 /* Shouldn't happen */
811 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
813 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
815 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
817 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
818 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
819 return tls_process_client_hello(s
, pkt
);
822 return tls_process_client_certificate(s
, pkt
);
824 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
825 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
827 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
828 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
830 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
831 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
832 return tls_process_next_proto(s
, pkt
);
835 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
836 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
838 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
839 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
842 /* Shouldn't happen */
846 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
850 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
853 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
855 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
857 switch(st
->hand_state
) {
858 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
859 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s
, wst
);
861 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
862 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s
, wst
);
864 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
865 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
866 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
867 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
868 /* Are we renegotiating? */
870 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
871 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
872 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
873 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
874 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
875 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
878 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
881 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
887 /* Shouldn't happen */
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
892 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
894 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
896 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
898 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
899 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
900 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
902 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
906 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
908 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
, al
);
915 int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL
*s
)
917 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
, 0)) {
918 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
919 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
926 unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf
,
927 unsigned char *cookie
,
928 unsigned char cookie_len
)
930 unsigned int msg_len
;
934 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
935 *(p
++) = DTLS1_VERSION
>> 8;
936 *(p
++) = DTLS1_VERSION
& 0xFF;
938 *(p
++) = (unsigned char)cookie_len
;
939 memcpy(p
, cookie
, cookie_len
);
946 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL
*s
)
951 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
953 if (s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb
== NULL
||
954 s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
955 &(s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) == 0 ||
956 s
->d1
->cookie_len
> 255) {
957 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
,
958 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
959 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
963 len
= dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf
[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
],
964 s
->d1
->cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie_len
);
966 dtls1_set_message_header(s
, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
, len
, 0,
968 len
+= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
;
970 /* number of bytes to write */
977 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
979 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
980 unsigned int j
, complen
= 0;
983 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
984 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
986 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
988 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
989 PACKET session_id
, cipher_suites
, compression
, extensions
, cookie
;
991 static const unsigned char null_compression
= 0;
993 is_v2_record
= RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
);
995 PACKET_null_init(&cookie
);
996 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
998 unsigned int version
;
1001 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1002 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1003 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1004 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1006 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1007 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1009 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1010 * 7-8 session_id_length
1011 * 9-10 challenge_length
1015 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mt
)
1016 || mt
!= SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
1018 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1019 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1020 * in the first place
1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1026 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &version
)) {
1027 /* No protocol version supplied! */
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1031 if (version
== 0x0002) {
1032 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
1033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1035 } else if ((version
& 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
<< 8)) {
1037 s
->client_version
= version
;
1039 /* No idea what protocol this is */
1040 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1045 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
1046 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
1048 if(!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, (unsigned int *)&s
->client_version
)) {
1049 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1050 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1056 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1057 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1059 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1060 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
);
1061 } else if (s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
&&
1062 DTLS_VERSION_LT(s
->client_version
, s
->version
)) {
1063 protverr
= SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1070 if ((!s
->enc_write_ctx
&& !s
->write_hash
)) {
1072 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1075 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1077 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1081 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1084 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1085 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1086 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
1088 unsigned int cipher_len
, session_id_len
, challenge_len
;
1091 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &cipher_len
)
1092 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &session_id_len
)
1093 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &challenge_len
)) {
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1095 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1096 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1100 if (session_id_len
> SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
) {
1101 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1102 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1106 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &cipher_suites
, cipher_len
)
1107 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &session_id
, session_id_len
)
1108 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &challenge
, challenge_len
)
1109 /* No extensions. */
1110 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1111 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1112 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1113 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1117 /* Load the client random and compression list. */
1118 challenge_len
= challenge_len
> SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
:
1120 memset(s
->s3
->client_random
, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1121 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge
,
1122 s
->s3
->client_random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-
1123 challenge_len
, challenge_len
)
1124 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1125 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression
, &null_compression
, 1)) {
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1127 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1131 PACKET_null_init(&extensions
);
1133 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1134 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, s
->s3
->client_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)
1135 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)) {
1136 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1137 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1141 if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id
) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
) {
1142 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1147 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1148 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookie
)) {
1149 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1154 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1155 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1156 * So check cookie length...
1158 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1159 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie
) == 0)
1164 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &cipher_suites
)
1165 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1166 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1167 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1170 /* Could be empty. */
1174 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1175 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1176 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1177 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1178 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, PACKET_data(&cookie
),
1179 PACKET_remaining(&cookie
)) == 0) {
1180 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1182 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1184 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1186 /* default verification */
1187 } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1188 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1189 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1193 s
->d1
->cookie_verified
= 1;
1195 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1196 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
);
1197 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1199 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1200 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1209 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1210 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1212 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1213 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1214 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1215 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1216 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1217 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1218 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1219 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1220 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1221 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1226 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1227 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1230 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, &extensions
, &session_id
);
1232 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1234 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1235 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1236 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1237 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1238 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1240 if (i
== 1 && s
->version
== s
->session
->ssl_version
) {
1241 /* previous session */
1243 } else if (i
== -1) {
1247 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1252 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, &cipher_suites
, &(ciphers
),
1253 is_v2_record
, &al
) == NULL
) {
1257 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1260 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1263 fprintf(stderr
, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1264 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1266 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1267 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1269 fprintf(stderr
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1270 i
, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1279 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1282 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1284 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1289 complen
= PACKET_remaining(&compression
);
1290 for (j
= 0; j
< complen
; j
++) {
1291 if (PACKET_data(&compression
)[j
] == 0)
1297 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1298 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1302 /* TLS extensions */
1303 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1304 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s
, &extensions
)) {
1305 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1311 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1312 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1313 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1314 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1318 pos
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1319 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0) {
1324 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->tls_session_secret_cb
) {
1325 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1327 s
->session
->master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1328 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1329 &s
->session
->master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1331 s
->tls_session_secret_cb_arg
)) {
1333 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1334 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1338 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1340 pref_cipher
? pref_cipher
: ssl3_choose_cipher(s
,
1345 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1346 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1347 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1351 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1352 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1353 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1354 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1355 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1360 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1361 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1362 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1364 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1366 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1367 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1368 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1370 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1371 /* Can't disable compression */
1372 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1374 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1377 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1378 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
1379 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1380 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
1381 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1385 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1387 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1390 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1391 for (k
= 0; k
< complen
; k
++) {
1392 if (PACKET_data(&compression
)[k
] == comp_id
)
1396 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1398 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1403 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1404 /* See if we have a match */
1405 int m
, nn
, v
, done
= 0;
1408 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1409 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
1410 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1412 for (o
= 0; o
< complen
; o
++) {
1413 if (v
== PACKET_data(&compression
)[o
]) {
1422 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1428 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1429 * using compression.
1431 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1438 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1442 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1443 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
1445 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
1447 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1448 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1449 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
1450 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1451 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1455 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s
)) {
1456 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1461 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1462 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1464 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1466 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1468 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1469 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1473 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1475 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1476 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
;
1478 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
1480 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1481 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
1482 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
1484 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1485 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
1489 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1492 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1494 cipher
= ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1496 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1500 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
1501 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1502 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1503 s
->session
->not_resumable
= s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
1504 ((cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) != 0));
1505 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
1506 /* do not send a session ticket */
1507 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
1509 /* Session-id reuse */
1510 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
1513 if (!(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)) {
1514 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
1515 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1521 * we now have the following setup.
1523 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1524 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1525 * compression - basically ignored right now
1526 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1527 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1528 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1529 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1532 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1533 if (s
->version
>= SSL3_VERSION
) {
1534 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s
) <= 0) {
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1536 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1544 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
1546 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
, &al
)) < 0) {
1548 * callback indicates further work to be done
1550 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1553 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
) {
1555 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1556 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1558 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
1559 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1560 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1567 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
1569 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1570 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1574 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL
*s
)
1577 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
1582 buf
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1584 /* Do the message type and length last */
1585 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1587 *(p
++) = s
->version
>> 8;
1588 *(p
++) = s
->version
& 0xff;
1591 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1592 * tls_process_client_hello()
1594 memcpy(p
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1595 p
+= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
;
1598 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1599 * back in the server hello:
1600 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1601 * we send back the old session ID.
1602 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1603 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1604 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1605 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1607 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1608 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1609 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1610 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1613 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
1614 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1616 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
1618 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1619 if (sl
> (int)sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
1620 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1621 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1625 memcpy(p
, s
->session
->session_id
, sl
);
1628 /* put the cipher */
1629 i
= ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, p
);
1632 /* put the compression method */
1633 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1636 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1639 *(p
++) = s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1642 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1644 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1648 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s
, p
, buf
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
,
1650 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1651 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1652 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1658 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
, l
)) {
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1660 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1667 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL
*s
)
1669 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
, 0)) {
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1671 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1675 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
1676 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
1677 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1684 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
1686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1687 EVP_PKEY
*pkdh
= NULL
;
1689 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1690 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1695 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1696 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
1703 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1705 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
1706 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
1707 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1711 type
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1715 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
1717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1718 if (type
& SSL_PSK
) {
1720 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1723 if (s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
)
1724 n
+= strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
);
1726 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1727 if (type
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
1729 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1730 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1731 if (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
1732 CERT
*cert
= s
->cert
;
1734 EVP_PKEY
*pkdhp
= NULL
;
1737 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
) {
1738 DH
*dhp
= ssl_get_auto_dh(s
);
1739 pkdh
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1740 if (pkdh
== NULL
|| dhp
== NULL
) {
1742 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1743 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1744 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1747 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh
, dhp
);
1750 pkdhp
= cert
->dh_tmp
;
1752 if ((pkdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
1753 DH
*dhp
= s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
, 0, 1024);
1754 pkdh
= ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp
);
1756 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1758 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1763 if (pkdhp
== NULL
) {
1764 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1765 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1766 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
1769 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
1770 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp
), 0, pkdhp
)) {
1771 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1773 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
1776 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
1777 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1778 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1782 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp
, NID_undef
);
1784 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
1785 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1789 dh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
1791 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
1794 DH_get0_pqg(dh
, &r
[0], NULL
, &r
[1]);
1795 DH_get0_key(dh
, &r
[2], NULL
);
1798 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1799 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
1802 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
1803 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1804 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1808 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1809 nid
= tls1_shared_curve(s
, -2);
1810 curve_id
= tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid
);
1811 if (curve_id
== 0) {
1812 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1813 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
1816 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey(NULL
, nid
);
1817 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
1818 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
1819 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
1824 /* Encode the public key. */
1825 encodedlen
= EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
),
1826 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
,
1827 &encodedPoint
, NULL
);
1829 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
1830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
1835 * We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key
1836 * exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to
1837 * encode the entire ServerECDHParams structure.
1839 n
+= 4 + encodedlen
;
1842 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1843 * can set these to NULLs
1850 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1851 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1852 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
1853 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
1854 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
1855 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
1856 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1857 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
1860 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
1861 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
1862 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
1863 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
1867 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1868 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1869 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
1872 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
1873 nr
[i
] = BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]);
1874 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1875 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
))
1882 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
|SSL_aSRP
))
1883 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)) {
1884 if ((pkey
= ssl_get_sign_pkey(s
, s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, &md
))
1886 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1889 kn
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
1895 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf
, n
+ SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + kn
)) {
1896 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_BUF
);
1899 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
1901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1902 if (type
& SSL_PSK
) {
1903 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1904 if (s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
) {
1905 s2n(strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
), p
);
1906 strncpy((char *)p
, s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
,
1907 strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
));
1908 p
+= strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
);
1915 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
1916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1917 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1928 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
1930 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1931 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1932 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1933 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1935 *p
= NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
;
1943 memcpy(p
, encodedPoint
, encodedlen
);
1944 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
1945 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
1953 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1954 * points to the space at the end.
1957 /* send signature algorithm */
1958 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1959 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p
, pkey
, md
)) {
1960 /* Should never happen */
1961 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1963 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1969 fprintf(stderr
, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
1971 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx
, md
, NULL
) <= 0
1972 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
1973 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1974 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
1975 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
1976 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx
, d
, n
) <= 0
1977 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx
, &(p
[2]),
1978 (unsigned int *)&i
, pkey
) <= 0) {
1979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_LIB_EVP
);
1980 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1985 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
1988 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1989 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
1991 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE
);
1996 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, n
)) {
1997 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2002 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2005 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2007 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2008 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2010 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2011 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2013 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2014 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2018 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
2020 unsigned char *p
, *d
;
2021 int i
, j
, nl
, off
, n
;
2022 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
= NULL
;
2028 d
= p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
2030 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2032 n
= ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, p
);
2037 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2038 const unsigned char *psigs
;
2039 unsigned char *etmp
= p
;
2040 nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &psigs
);
2041 /* Skip over length for now */
2043 nl
= tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, p
, psigs
, nl
);
2044 /* Now fill in length */
2054 sk
= SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2057 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++) {
2058 name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
, i
);
2059 j
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
);
2060 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2061 (buf
, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + n
+ j
+ 2)) {
2062 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2066 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + n
;
2068 i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &p
);
2073 /* else no CA names */
2074 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + off
;
2077 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, n
)) {
2078 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2082 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
2086 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2090 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2093 unsigned long alg_k
;
2094 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2097 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2098 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
2100 PACKET enc_premaster
;
2101 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt
= NULL
;
2103 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2105 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2106 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2107 if (alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) {
2108 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2110 PACKET psk_identity
;
2112 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity
)) {
2113 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2114 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2117 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2118 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2119 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2120 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2123 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2124 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2125 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2126 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2130 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity
, &s
->session
->psk_identity
)) {
2131 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2132 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2136 psklen
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity
,
2139 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2140 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2141 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2143 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2145 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2147 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2148 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2149 al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2153 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2154 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2155 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2157 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2158 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2159 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2163 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2165 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2166 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2167 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2168 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2169 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2172 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2173 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, NULL
, 0, 0)) {
2174 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2175 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2181 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2182 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2184 unsigned char decrypt_good
, version_good
;
2187 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2188 rsa
= EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
].privatekey
);
2190 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2191 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2192 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2196 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2197 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2198 enc_premaster
= *pkt
;
2200 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &enc_premaster
)
2201 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2202 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2203 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2204 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2210 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2211 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2212 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2213 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2215 if (RSA_size(rsa
) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2216 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2217 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2218 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL
);
2222 rsa_decrypt
= OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa
));
2223 if (rsa_decrypt
== NULL
) {
2224 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2230 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2231 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2232 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2233 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2234 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2237 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret
,
2238 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0) {
2242 decrypt_len
= RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster
),
2243 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster
),
2244 rsa_decrypt
, rsa
, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING
);
2248 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2249 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2252 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len
, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
);
2255 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2256 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2257 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2258 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2259 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2260 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2263 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[0],
2264 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
>> 8));
2266 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[1],
2267 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
& 0xff));
2270 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2271 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2272 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2273 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2274 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2275 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2278 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) {
2279 unsigned char workaround_good
;
2281 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[0], (unsigned)(s
->version
>> 8));
2283 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[1],
2284 (unsigned)(s
->version
& 0xff));
2285 version_good
|= workaround_good
;
2289 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2290 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2292 decrypt_good
&= version_good
;
2295 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2296 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2297 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2298 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2300 for (j
= 0; j
< sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); j
++) {
2302 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good
, rsa_decrypt
[j
],
2303 rand_premaster_secret
[j
]);
2306 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, rsa_decrypt
,
2307 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
), 0)) {
2308 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2309 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2312 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt
);
2316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2317 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2318 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
2322 const unsigned char *data
;
2324 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
)) {
2325 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2326 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2327 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2328 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2333 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != i
) {
2334 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2335 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2338 skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
2340 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2341 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2342 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2346 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2347 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2348 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2349 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2352 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2353 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2354 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2356 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2359 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2360 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2364 cdh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2365 pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
);
2367 if (pub_key
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_key(cdh
, pub_key
, NULL
)) {
2368 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2369 if (pub_key
!= NULL
)
2374 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
) == 0) {
2375 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2380 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2382 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2383 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
2388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2389 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2390 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
2392 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2393 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2394 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2395 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2396 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2400 const unsigned char *data
;
2403 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2404 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2407 /* Get encoded point length */
2408 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &i
)) {
2409 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2410 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2411 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2414 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)
2415 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2416 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2419 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2420 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) <= 0) {
2421 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2424 if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey
), data
, i
,
2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2431 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
) == 0) {
2432 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2437 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2439 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2440 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
2442 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2446 if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2448 const unsigned char *data
;
2450 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
)
2451 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2452 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2453 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2456 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
2457 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2460 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0
2461 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
2462 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2464 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
2467 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2468 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2469 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2470 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2474 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s
)) {
2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2479 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2481 if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2482 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2483 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2484 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32];
2485 const unsigned char *start
;
2486 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
2487 unsigned long alg_a
;
2491 const unsigned char *data
;
2493 /* Get our certificate private key */
2494 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2495 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST12
) {
2497 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2499 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
;
2501 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
].privatekey
;
2504 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2506 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
) {
2507 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2510 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
, NULL
);
2511 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2512 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2516 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
2517 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2518 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2522 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2523 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2524 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2525 * client certificate for authorization only.
2527 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2528 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
2529 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2532 /* Decrypt session key */
2533 sess_key_len
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
2534 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, sess_key_len
)) {
2535 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2539 if (ASN1_get_object ((const unsigned char **)&data
, &Tlen
, &Ttag
,
2540 &Tclass
, sess_key_len
) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2541 || Ttag
!= V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2542 || Tclass
!= V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL
) {
2543 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2544 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2545 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2550 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2551 (pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
, inlen
) <= 0) {
2552 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2554 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2557 /* Generate master secret */
2558 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, premaster_secret
,
2559 sizeof(premaster_secret
), 0)) {
2560 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2564 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2565 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2566 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2567 s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
= 1;
2569 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2570 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2572 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2577 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2578 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2582 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2584 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2585 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2588 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2589 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2591 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt
);
2592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2593 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
2594 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
2596 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2597 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2600 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2603 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2604 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2605 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
2606 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
2608 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2611 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
2612 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
2614 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
2615 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
2616 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0, 0) <= 0) {
2617 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2621 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
2622 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
2627 if ((wst
== WORK_MORE_B
)
2629 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
2630 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2632 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2633 && (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
)
2634 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
2635 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
2636 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
2637 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
2638 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
2639 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
2642 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
2646 if (s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
) {
2647 /* No certificate verify so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
2648 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
2649 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
2650 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2652 if (!s
->session
->peer
) {
2653 /* No peer certificate so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
2654 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
2655 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2657 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2659 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2660 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2664 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2665 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2667 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
2668 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2673 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
2676 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_cert_verify(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2678 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= NULL
;
2679 const unsigned char *sig
, *data
;
2680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2681 unsigned char *gost_data
= NULL
;
2683 int al
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2687 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
2691 EVP_MD_CTX
*mctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2694 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2695 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2699 peer
= s
->session
->peer
;
2700 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(peer
);
2701 type
= X509_certificate_type(peer
, pkey
);
2703 if (!(type
& EVP_PKT_SIGN
)) {
2704 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
,
2705 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE
);
2706 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2710 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2712 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2713 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2715 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2716 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 64
2717 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
2722 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2725 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &sig
, 2)) {
2726 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2729 rv
= tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md
, s
, sig
, pkey
);
2731 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2733 } else if (rv
== 0) {
2734 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2738 fprintf(stderr
, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2741 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2742 int idx
= ssl_cert_type(NULL
, pkey
);
2744 md
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[idx
];
2746 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2751 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &len
)) {
2752 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2753 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2757 j
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2758 if (((int)len
> j
) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > j
)
2759 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)) {
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE
);
2761 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2764 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, len
)) {
2765 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2766 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2770 hdatalen
= BIO_get_mem_data(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
, &hdata
);
2771 if (hdatalen
<= 0) {
2772 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2773 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2777 fprintf(stderr
, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md
));
2779 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx
, md
, NULL
)
2780 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx
, hdata
, hdatalen
)) {
2781 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2782 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2788 int pktype
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
2789 if (pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2790 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2791 || pktype
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
) {
2792 if ((gost_data
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
)) == NULL
) {
2793 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2794 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2797 BUF_reverse(gost_data
, data
, len
);
2803 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
2804 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx
, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET
,
2805 s
->session
->master_key_length
,
2806 s
->session
->master_key
)) {
2807 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2808 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2812 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx
, data
, len
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2813 al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2814 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY
, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE
);
2818 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2821 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2822 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2824 BIO_free(s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
);
2825 s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
= NULL
;
2826 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx
);
2827 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2828 OPENSSL_free(gost_data
);
2833 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2835 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2837 unsigned long l
, llen
;
2838 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
2839 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
2842 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
2843 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2847 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &llen
)
2848 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &spkt
, llen
)
2849 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2850 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2851 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2855 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) > 0) {
2856 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt
, &l
)
2857 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt
, &certbytes
, l
)) {
2858 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2859 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2860 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2864 certstart
= certbytes
;
2865 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, l
);
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
2870 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ l
)) {
2871 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2873 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2876 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
2877 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2883 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
2884 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2885 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
2886 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2888 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
2891 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2892 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
2893 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
2894 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2895 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
2896 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2899 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
2900 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2905 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
2907 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
2908 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2909 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
2913 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
2914 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2917 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk
, 0));
2919 al
= SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2920 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
2921 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
2926 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
2927 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
2928 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
2930 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->peer_chain
, X509_free
);
2931 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
2933 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
2934 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
2937 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
2941 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2942 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2945 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
2949 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL
*s
)
2953 cpk
= ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
2955 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2956 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2960 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, cpk
)) {
2961 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2962 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2969 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
)
2971 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
2972 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
;
2973 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
2974 unsigned char *p
, *macstart
;
2975 const unsigned char *const_p
;
2976 int len
, slen_full
, slen
;
2979 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
2980 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
2981 unsigned char key_name
[16];
2983 /* get session encoding length */
2984 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
2986 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
2989 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00) {
2990 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2993 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
2995 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2999 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3000 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
3003 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
))
3007 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3010 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3013 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3015 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3016 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3017 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3021 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
3022 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3025 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3028 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3029 * follows handshake_header_length +
3030 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3031 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3032 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3033 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3035 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
,
3036 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s
) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+
3037 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+ slen
))
3040 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3042 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3043 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3045 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
) {
3046 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, ctx
, hctx
, 1) < 0)
3049 if (RAND_bytes(iv
, 16) <= 0)
3051 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3052 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
, iv
))
3054 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
,
3055 sizeof(tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
),
3056 EVP_sha256(), NULL
))
3058 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
,
3059 sizeof(tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
));
3063 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3064 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3065 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3067 l2n(s
->hit
? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
, p
);
3069 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3071 /* Output key name */
3073 memcpy(p
, key_name
, 16);
3076 memcpy(p
, iv
, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
));
3077 p
+= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
3078 /* Encrypt session data */
3079 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx
, p
, &len
, senc
, slen
))
3082 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx
, p
, &len
))
3086 if (!HMAC_Update(hctx
, macstart
, p
- macstart
))
3088 if (!HMAC_Final(hctx
, p
, &hlen
))
3091 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3092 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3097 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3099 len
= p
- ssl_handshake_start(s
);
3100 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3101 p
= ssl_handshake_start(s
) + 4;
3103 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s
, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
, len
))
3110 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3111 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3112 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3116 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL
*s
)
3120 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3121 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3122 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3125 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s
->init_buf
, 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
)) {
3126 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3130 p
= (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
3133 *(p
++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
3134 /* message length */
3135 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
+ 4, p
);
3137 *(p
++) = s
->tlsext_status_type
;
3138 /* length of OCSP response */
3139 l2n3(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
, p
);
3140 /* actual response */
3141 memcpy(p
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
, s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
);
3142 /* number of bytes to write */
3143 s
->init_num
= 8 + s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
;
3149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3151 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3152 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3154 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_next_proto(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3156 PACKET next_proto
, padding
;
3157 size_t next_proto_len
;
3160 * The payload looks like:
3162 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3163 * uint8 padding_len;
3164 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3166 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &next_proto
)
3167 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &padding
)
3168 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3169 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3173 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto
, &s
->next_proto_negotiated
,
3175 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= 0;
3179 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= (unsigned char)next_proto_len
;
3181 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3183 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3184 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3188 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3190 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL
*s
,
3191 PACKET
*cipher_suites
,
3192 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) **skp
,
3193 int sslv2format
, int *al
3196 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
3197 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
3199 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3200 unsigned char cipher
[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN
];
3202 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 0;
3204 n
= sslv2format
? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN
: TLS_CIPHER_LEN
;
3206 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) == 0) {
3207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED
);
3208 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
3212 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) % n
!= 0) {
3213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3214 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST
);
3215 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3219 if ((skp
== NULL
) || (*skp
== NULL
)) {
3220 sk
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3223 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3228 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk
);
3231 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites
, &s
->s3
->tmp
.ciphers_raw
,
3232 &s
->s3
->tmp
.ciphers_rawlen
)) {
3233 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3237 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites
, cipher
, n
)) {
3239 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3240 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3241 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3243 if (sslv2format
&& cipher
[0] != '\0')
3246 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3247 if ((cipher
[n
- 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV
>> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3248 (cipher
[n
- 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV
& 0xff))) {
3249 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3250 if (s
->renegotiate
) {
3251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3252 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING
);
3253 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3256 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 1;
3260 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3261 if ((cipher
[n
- 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
>> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3262 (cipher
[n
- 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
& 0xff))) {
3264 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3265 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3268 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s
)) {
3269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
,
3270 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
3271 *al
= SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
;
3277 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3278 c
= ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s
, sslv2format
? &cipher
[1] : cipher
);
3280 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk
, c
)) {
3281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3282 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3287 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites
) > 0) {
3288 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3297 if ((skp
== NULL
) || (*skp
== NULL
))
3298 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk
);