2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 #include <openssl/dh.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/md5.h>
27 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
29 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
);
32 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
33 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
34 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
35 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
37 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
38 * (transition not allowed)
40 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
42 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
45 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
46 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
47 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
49 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
53 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
54 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
55 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
56 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
60 } else if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
61 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
) {
62 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
69 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
70 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
71 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
72 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
73 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
77 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
78 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
85 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
86 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
87 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
91 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
92 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
98 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
99 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
100 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
107 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
108 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
110 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
)
113 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
114 && s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
115 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
119 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
120 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
;
126 /* No valid transition found */
131 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
132 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
133 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
134 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
136 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
137 * (transition not allowed)
139 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
141 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
143 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
144 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
149 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
155 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
156 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
157 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
162 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
164 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
165 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
167 * 2) If we did request one then
168 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
170 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
171 * list if we requested a certificate)
173 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
174 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
175 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
176 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
177 && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
179 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
180 * not going to accept it because we require a client
183 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
184 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
,
185 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
188 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
192 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
195 } else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
196 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
197 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
204 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
205 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
210 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
212 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
213 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
214 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
215 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
216 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
219 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| st
->no_cert_verify
) {
220 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
222 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
223 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
224 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
225 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
227 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
231 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
232 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
238 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
239 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
240 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
245 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
247 if (s
->s3
->npn_seen
) {
248 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
) {
249 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
;
254 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
255 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
264 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
265 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
266 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
272 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
273 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
274 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
281 /* No valid transition found */
282 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
286 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
287 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
290 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
291 rbio
= SSL_get_rbio(s
);
292 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio
);
293 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio
);
296 SSLfatal(s
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
297 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
,
298 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
303 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
305 * Valid return values are:
309 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
311 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
314 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
315 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
316 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
317 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
318 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
321 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)
323 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
327 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
328 || ((alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
))
329 && s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
)
330 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
331 || (alg_k
& (SSL_PSK
& (SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)))
333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
334 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
335 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
345 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
347 * Valid return values are:
351 int send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
354 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
355 s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
357 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
358 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
360 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE
)
361 || s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
)
363 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
366 && (s
->certreqs_sent
< 1 ||
367 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
))
369 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
370 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
373 && (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
375 * ... except when the application insists on
376 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
379 || (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
380 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
381 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
383 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
386 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aPSK
)) {
394 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
395 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
398 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
400 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
403 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
404 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
407 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
409 /* Shouldn't happen */
410 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
411 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
412 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
413 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
416 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
417 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
;
418 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
420 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
421 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
422 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
424 /* Try to read from the client instead */
425 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
427 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
428 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
431 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
432 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
433 && s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_COMPLETE
)
434 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
435 else if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
436 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
438 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
441 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
442 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
)
443 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
445 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
448 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
450 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
451 else if (send_certificate_request(s
))
452 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
454 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
458 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
459 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
460 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
;
461 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
463 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
465 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
468 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
;
469 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
471 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
472 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
473 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
475 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
476 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
477 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
479 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
480 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
482 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
484 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
485 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
488 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
489 s
->post_handshake_auth
= SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED
;
490 } else if (!s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
492 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
493 * handshake at this point.
495 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
496 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
498 if (s
->num_tickets
> s
->sent_tickets
)
499 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
501 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
504 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
505 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
506 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
;
507 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
511 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
512 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
513 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
515 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
516 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
517 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
518 * been configured for.
520 if (s
->hit
|| s
->num_tickets
<= s
->sent_tickets
) {
521 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
522 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
529 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
530 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
532 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
534 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
537 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
538 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
542 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s
);
544 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
546 /* Shouldn't happen */
547 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
548 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
549 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
550 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
553 if (st
->request_state
== TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
) {
554 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
555 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
;
556 st
->request_state
= TLS_ST_BEFORE
;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
559 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
560 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
561 /* SSLfatal() already called */
562 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
567 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
568 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
570 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
571 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
572 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
574 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
575 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->d1
->cookie_verified
576 && (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
)) {
577 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
578 } else if (s
->renegotiate
== 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
579 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
580 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
583 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
587 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
588 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
590 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
592 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
)
593 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
595 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
597 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
598 /* normal PSK or SRP */
599 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
&
600 (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
601 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
602 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
603 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
604 } else if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
605 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
607 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
610 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
613 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
) {
614 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
;
615 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
619 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
620 if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
621 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
622 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
626 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
627 if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
628 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
629 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
633 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
634 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
635 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
637 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
638 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
640 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
642 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
643 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
644 } else if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
645 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
647 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
649 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
651 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
652 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
653 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
655 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
656 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
657 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
659 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
661 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
663 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
664 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
669 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
670 * the server to the client.
672 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
674 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
676 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
678 /* No pre work to be done */
681 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
684 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
687 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
689 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
690 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
691 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
696 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
697 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
699 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
700 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
706 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
708 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
709 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
710 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
713 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
715 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
716 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->sent_tickets
== 0) {
718 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
719 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
720 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
722 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
724 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 0, 0);
725 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
727 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
728 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
734 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
737 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
738 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
739 /* SSLfatal() already called */
742 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
744 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
745 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
746 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
747 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
751 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
753 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
754 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
755 && (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS
) == 0)
756 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
760 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
761 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1, 1);
764 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
767 static ossl_inline
int conn_is_closed(void)
769 switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
774 #if defined(ECONNRESET)
784 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
785 * server to the client.
787 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
789 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
793 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
795 /* No post work to be done */
798 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
799 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
801 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
802 /* SSLfatal() already called */
807 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
808 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
810 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
811 if (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
&& !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
812 /* SSLfatal() already called */
816 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
817 * treat like it was the first packet
822 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
823 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
824 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) == 0
825 && statem_flush(s
) != 1)
829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
830 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
831 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
832 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
835 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
838 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
839 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
841 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
842 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
843 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
845 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
846 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK
,
847 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
851 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
852 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
856 || ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT
) != 0
857 && s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_COMPLETE
))
861 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
862 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
863 if (!statem_flush(s
))
868 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
869 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
870 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
871 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
)) {
872 /* SSLfatal() already called */
876 if (s
->ext
.early_data
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
877 && !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
878 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
|SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
879 /* SSLfatal() already called */
883 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
884 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
885 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
887 s
->statem
.enc_read_state
= ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS
;
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
892 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->hit
) {
894 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
897 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
901 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
902 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
904 /* SSLfatal() already called */
909 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
912 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
913 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
917 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
918 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
921 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
923 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
926 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
930 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
931 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
932 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
933 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)
934 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
935 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
936 /* SSLfatal() already called */
941 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
942 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
943 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
948 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
949 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
951 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1)) {
952 /* SSLfatal() already called */
957 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
959 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && statem_flush(s
) != 1) {
960 if (SSL_get_error(s
, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
961 && conn_is_closed()) {
963 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
964 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
965 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
966 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
967 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
969 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
978 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
982 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
985 * Valid return values are:
989 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
990 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
992 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
994 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
996 /* Shouldn't happen */
997 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
998 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE
,
999 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
1002 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
1004 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
1006 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
1007 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
1010 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
1011 *confunc
= dtls_construct_hello_verify_request
;
1012 *mt
= DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
1015 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
1016 /* No construction function needed */
1018 *mt
= SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
1021 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
1022 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_hello
;
1023 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
1026 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT
:
1027 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_certificate
;
1028 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
1031 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
1032 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
1033 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
1037 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
1038 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_key_exchange
;
1039 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
1042 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
1043 *confunc
= tls_construct_certificate_request
;
1044 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
1047 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
1048 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_done
;
1049 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
1052 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
1053 *confunc
= tls_construct_new_session_ticket
;
1054 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
1057 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
1058 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_status
;
1059 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
1062 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
1063 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
1064 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
1067 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
1069 *mt
= SSL3_MT_DUMMY
;
1072 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
1073 *confunc
= tls_construct_encrypted_extensions
;
1074 *mt
= SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
1077 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
1078 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
1079 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
1087 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1088 * calculated as follows:
1090 * 2 + # client_version
1091 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1092 * 1 + # length of session_id
1093 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1094 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1095 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1096 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1097 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1098 * 2 + # length of extensions
1099 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1101 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1103 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1104 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1107 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1108 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1110 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
1112 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1114 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1116 /* Shouldn't happen */
1119 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1120 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
1122 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
1123 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH
;
1125 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT
:
1126 return s
->max_cert_list
;
1128 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1129 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
1131 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
1132 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1134 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1135 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
1136 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH
;
1139 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
1140 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1142 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
1143 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
1145 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1146 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1151 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1153 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1155 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1157 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1159 /* Shouldn't happen */
1160 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1161 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1162 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1163 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1165 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1166 return tls_process_client_hello(s
, pkt
);
1168 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
1169 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s
, pkt
);
1171 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT
:
1172 return tls_process_client_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1174 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1175 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
1177 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
1178 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
1180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1181 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
1182 return tls_process_next_proto(s
, pkt
);
1185 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
1186 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
1188 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
1189 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
1191 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1192 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1198 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1201 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1203 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1205 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1207 /* Shouldn't happen */
1208 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1209 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1210 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1213 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1214 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s
, wst
);
1216 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1217 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s
, wst
);
1221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1222 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1223 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
)
1226 int al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
1228 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
1229 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
1230 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
1232 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1235 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
,
1236 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO
,
1237 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
1240 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
, &al
);
1243 if (ret
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
1244 SSLfatal(s
, al
, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO
,
1245 al
== SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1246 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1247 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1256 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned char *cookie
,
1259 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1260 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, DTLS1_VERSION
)
1261 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, cookie
, cookie_len
))
1267 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1269 unsigned int cookie_leni
;
1270 if (s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb
== NULL
||
1271 s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1272 &cookie_leni
) == 0 ||
1273 cookie_leni
> 255) {
1274 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
,
1275 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
1278 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_leni
;
1280 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1281 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1282 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
,
1283 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1292 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1293 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1294 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1298 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1300 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1301 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1302 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1303 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1305 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL
*s
, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
)
1307 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock
[] = {
1308 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1309 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1310 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1311 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1312 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1313 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1315 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1316 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1317 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1318 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1319 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1320 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1321 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1322 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1323 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1324 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1325 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1326 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1327 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1329 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1330 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
= 18;
1335 tmppkt
= hello
->extensions
;
1337 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt
, 2)
1338 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt
, &type
)
1339 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt
, &sni
)) {
1343 if (type
!= TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
1346 ext_len
= TLS1_get_client_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
?
1347 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock
) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
;
1349 s
->s3
->is_probably_safari
= PACKET_equal(&tmppkt
, kSafariExtensionsBlock
,
1352 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1354 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1356 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1357 PACKET session_id
, compression
, extensions
, cookie
;
1358 static const unsigned char null_compression
= 0;
1359 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*clienthello
= NULL
;
1361 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1362 if (s
->renegotiate
== 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
1363 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))) {
1364 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1365 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1368 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
) != 0
1369 || (!s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
1371 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
) == 0)) {
1372 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1373 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1379 clienthello
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello
));
1380 if (clienthello
== NULL
) {
1381 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1382 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1387 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1389 clienthello
->isv2
= RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
);
1390 PACKET_null_init(&cookie
);
1392 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1395 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)
1396 || s
->hello_retry_request
!= SSL_HRR_NONE
) {
1397 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1398 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1403 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1404 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1405 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1406 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1408 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1409 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1411 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1412 * 7-8 session_id_length
1413 * 9-10 challenge_length
1417 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mt
)
1418 || mt
!= SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
1420 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1421 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1422 * in the first place
1424 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1425 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1430 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->legacy_version
)) {
1431 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1432 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1436 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1437 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1439 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1440 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1441 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1443 unsigned int ciphersuite_len
, session_id_len
, challenge_len
;
1446 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ciphersuite_len
)
1447 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &session_id_len
)
1448 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &challenge_len
)) {
1449 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1450 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1454 if (session_id_len
> SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
) {
1455 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1456 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1460 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
,
1462 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
->session_id
, session_id_len
)
1463 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &challenge
, challenge_len
)
1464 /* No extensions. */
1465 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1466 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1467 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1470 clienthello
->session_id_len
= session_id_len
;
1472 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1473 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1474 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1475 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1477 challenge_len
= challenge_len
> SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1478 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
: challenge_len
;
1479 memset(clienthello
->random
, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1480 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge
,
1481 clienthello
->random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-
1482 challenge_len
, challenge_len
)
1483 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1484 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression
, &null_compression
, 1)) {
1485 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1486 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1490 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
->extensions
);
1492 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1493 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
->random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)
1494 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)
1495 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id
, clienthello
->session_id
,
1496 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
,
1497 &clienthello
->session_id_len
)) {
1498 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1499 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1503 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1504 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookie
)) {
1505 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1506 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1509 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie
, clienthello
->dtls_cookie
,
1510 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH
,
1511 &clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
)) {
1512 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1513 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1517 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1518 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1519 * So check cookie length...
1521 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1522 if (clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
== 0) {
1523 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
);
1524 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1529 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
)) {
1530 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1531 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1535 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1536 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1537 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1541 /* Could be empty. */
1542 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1543 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
->extensions
);
1545 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->extensions
)
1546 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1547 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1548 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1554 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression
, clienthello
->compressions
,
1555 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE
,
1556 &clienthello
->compressions_len
)) {
1557 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1558 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1562 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1563 extensions
= clienthello
->extensions
;
1564 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1565 &clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
,
1566 &clienthello
->pre_proc_exts_len
, 1)) {
1567 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1570 s
->clienthello
= clienthello
;
1572 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1575 if (clienthello
!= NULL
)
1576 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
1577 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
);
1579 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1582 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
1585 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1589 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1590 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
1592 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1593 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
1594 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *scsvs
= NULL
;
1595 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*clienthello
= s
->clienthello
;
1596 DOWNGRADE dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1598 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1599 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1600 if (s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb
!= NULL
) {
1601 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1602 switch (s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb(s
, &al
, s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb_arg
)) {
1603 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS
:
1605 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY
:
1606 s
->rwstate
= SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB
;
1608 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR
:
1611 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1612 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
1617 /* Set up the client_random */
1618 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
, clienthello
->random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1620 /* Choose the version */
1622 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1623 if (clienthello
->legacy_version
== SSL2_VERSION
1624 || (clienthello
->legacy_version
& 0xff00)
1625 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
<< 8)) {
1627 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1630 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1631 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1632 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1636 s
->client_version
= clienthello
->legacy_version
;
1639 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1640 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1642 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1643 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, clienthello
, &dgrd
);
1644 } else if (s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
&&
1645 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello
->legacy_version
, s
->version
)) {
1646 protverr
= SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1652 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
1653 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1654 s
->version
= s
->client_version
= clienthello
->legacy_version
;
1656 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1657 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1661 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1662 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1663 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1664 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1665 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1669 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1670 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1671 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1672 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1673 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, clienthello
->dtls_cookie
,
1674 clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
) == 0) {
1675 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1676 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1677 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1679 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1681 /* default verification */
1682 } else if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
!= clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
1683 || memcmp(clienthello
->dtls_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1684 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) {
1685 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1686 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1687 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1690 s
->d1
->cookie_verified
= 1;
1692 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1693 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, clienthello
, &dgrd
);
1694 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1695 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1696 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1697 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1705 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
,
1706 clienthello
->isv2
) ||
1707 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
, &ciphers
, &scsvs
,
1708 clienthello
->isv2
, 1)) {
1709 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1713 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 0;
1714 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1715 if (scsvs
!= NULL
) {
1716 for(i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs
); i
++) {
1717 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs
, i
);
1718 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c
) == SSL3_CK_SCSV
) {
1719 if (s
->renegotiate
) {
1720 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1721 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1722 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1723 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING
);
1726 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 1;
1727 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c
) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
&&
1728 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s
)) {
1730 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1731 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1732 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1733 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1734 * an insecure downgrade.
1736 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
,
1737 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1738 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
1744 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1745 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1746 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
=
1747 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1749 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
1750 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1751 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1752 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1755 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
1756 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
1757 || s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= cipher
->id
)) {
1759 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1760 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1762 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1763 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1767 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
1770 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1771 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret
,
1772 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1773 clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0)) {
1774 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1779 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1780 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1782 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1783 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1784 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1785 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1786 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1787 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1788 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1789 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1790 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1791 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1794 if (clienthello
->isv2
||
1796 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1797 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1)) {
1798 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1802 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, clienthello
);
1804 /* previous session */
1806 } else if (i
== -1) {
1807 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1811 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1)) {
1812 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1818 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1819 memcpy(s
->tmp_session_id
, s
->clienthello
->session_id
,
1820 s
->clienthello
->session_id_len
);
1821 s
->tmp_session_id_len
= s
->clienthello
->session_id_len
;
1825 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1826 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1828 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1830 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1833 fprintf(stderr
, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1835 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1836 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1838 fprintf(stderr
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1839 i
, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1848 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1851 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1852 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1853 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1858 for (loop
= 0; loop
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; loop
++) {
1859 if (clienthello
->compressions
[loop
] == 0)
1863 if (loop
>= clienthello
->compressions_len
) {
1865 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1866 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1867 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1872 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
)
1873 ssl_check_for_safari(s
, clienthello
);
1874 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1876 /* TLS extensions */
1877 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1878 clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1879 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1884 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1885 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1886 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1887 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1891 pos
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1892 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
, dgrd
) <= 0) {
1893 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1894 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1895 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1901 && s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1904 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1905 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1907 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1908 * backwards compat reasons
1910 int master_key_length
;
1912 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1913 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1914 &master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1916 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1917 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1918 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1920 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1921 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1925 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1926 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1927 pref_cipher
= ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
,
1928 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1929 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1930 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1931 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1932 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1936 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1937 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1938 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1939 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1940 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1945 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1946 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1947 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1949 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1950 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1952 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1953 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1954 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1956 if (clienthello
->compressions_len
!= 1) {
1957 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1958 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1959 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1964 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1965 else if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1966 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1968 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1969 /* Can't disable compression */
1970 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1971 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1972 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1973 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1976 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1977 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
1978 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1979 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
1980 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1984 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
1985 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1986 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1987 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1990 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1991 for (k
= 0; k
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; k
++) {
1992 if (clienthello
->compressions
[k
] == comp_id
)
1995 if (k
>= clienthello
->compressions_len
) {
1996 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1997 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1998 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
2001 } else if (s
->hit
) {
2003 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
2004 /* See if we have a match */
2005 int m
, nn
, v
, done
= 0;
2008 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
2009 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
2010 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
2012 for (o
= 0; o
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; o
++) {
2013 if (v
== clienthello
->compressions
[o
]) {
2022 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
2028 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
2029 * using compression.
2031 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
2032 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2033 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2034 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
2040 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2043 if (!s
->hit
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2044 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
2045 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
2046 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
2047 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2048 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2049 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2056 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2057 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
2059 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
2063 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
2064 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs
);
2065 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
2066 OPENSSL_free(s
->clienthello
);
2067 s
->clienthello
= NULL
;
2070 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
2071 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs
);
2072 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
2073 OPENSSL_free(s
->clienthello
);
2074 s
->clienthello
= NULL
;
2080 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2081 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2083 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL
*s
)
2085 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
2088 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2089 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2090 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2091 * influence which certificate is sent
2093 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
&& s
->ctx
!= NULL
2094 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
2097 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2098 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
!= NULL
) {
2100 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2101 * et al can pick it up.
2103 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
;
2104 ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
2106 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2107 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
2108 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
2110 /* status request response should be sent */
2111 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
:
2112 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
)
2113 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 1;
2115 /* something bad happened */
2116 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
2118 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2119 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST
,
2120 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
2130 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2131 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2133 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL
*s
)
2135 const unsigned char *selected
= NULL
;
2136 unsigned char selected_len
= 0;
2138 if (s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->s3
->alpn_proposed
!= NULL
) {
2139 int r
= s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb(s
, &selected
, &selected_len
,
2140 s
->s3
->alpn_proposed
,
2141 (unsigned int)s
->s3
->alpn_proposed_len
,
2142 s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb_arg
);
2144 if (r
== SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
2145 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
);
2146 s
->s3
->alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_memdup(selected
, selected_len
);
2147 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
2148 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN
,
2149 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2152 s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
= selected_len
;
2153 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2154 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2155 s
->s3
->npn_seen
= 0;
2158 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2159 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
2160 || selected_len
!= s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
2161 || memcmp(selected
, s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
,
2162 selected_len
) != 0) {
2163 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2164 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;
2168 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2169 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2172 if (!ossl_assert(s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
)) {
2173 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2174 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN
,
2175 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2178 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_memdup(selected
,
2180 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
2181 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2182 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN
,
2183 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2186 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= selected_len
;
2191 } else if (r
!= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
) {
2192 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN
,
2193 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
);
2197 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2202 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2203 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
!= NULL
) {
2204 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2205 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;
2211 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2213 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
;
2215 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2216 int rv
= tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s
);
2218 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2225 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
2226 if (!s
->hit
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2227 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2229 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
!= NULL
) {
2230 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
2232 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2233 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2234 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
2238 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2241 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2243 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s
)) {
2244 /* SSLfatal already called */
2249 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2250 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2252 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
2254 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
2255 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2256 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2257 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
2260 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
2263 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, 1)) {
2264 /* SSLfatal already called */
2267 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2268 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
2269 s
->session
->not_resumable
=
2270 s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
2271 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
2272 & (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) != 0));
2273 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
2274 /* do not send a session ticket */
2275 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
2278 /* Session-id reuse */
2279 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
2283 * we now have the following setup.
2285 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2286 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2287 * compression - basically ignored right now
2288 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2289 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2290 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2291 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2295 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2296 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2298 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s
)) {
2299 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2303 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2304 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2305 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2306 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2308 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !tls_handle_alpn(s
)) {
2309 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2316 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_C
) {
2318 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
)) == 0) {
2320 * callback indicates further work to be done
2322 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2326 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2332 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
2337 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2342 unsigned char *session_id
;
2343 int usetls13
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
;
2345 version
= usetls13
? TLS1_2_VERSION
: s
->version
;
2346 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, version
)
2348 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2349 * tls_process_client_hello()
2351 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
,
2352 s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
2353 ? hrrrandom
: s
->s3
->server_random
,
2354 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
2355 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
,
2356 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2361 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2362 * back in the server hello:
2363 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2364 * we send back the old session ID.
2365 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2366 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2367 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2368 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2370 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2371 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2372 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2374 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2375 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2378 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
2379 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
2381 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
2384 sl
= s
->tmp_session_id_len
;
2385 session_id
= s
->tmp_session_id
;
2387 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
2388 session_id
= s
->session
->session_id
;
2391 if (sl
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
2392 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
,
2393 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2397 /* set up the compression method */
2398 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2401 if (usetls13
|| s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
2404 compm
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
2407 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, session_id
, sl
)
2408 || !s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, pkt
, &len
)
2409 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, compm
)) {
2410 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
,
2411 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2415 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
2416 s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
2417 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2419 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2420 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
),
2422 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2426 if (s
->hello_retry_request
== SSL_HRR_PENDING
) {
2427 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2428 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
2433 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2434 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2436 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
, NULL
, 0, NULL
, 0)) {
2437 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2440 } else if (!(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
2441 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2442 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2449 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2451 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
2452 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2453 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2460 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2463 EVP_PKEY
*pkdh
= NULL
;
2465 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2466 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2467 size_t encodedlen
= 0;
2470 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
;
2474 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2475 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2476 size_t paramlen
, paramoffset
;
2478 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, ¶moffset
)) {
2479 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2480 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2484 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2485 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2486 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2490 type
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2492 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
2493 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2494 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2495 if (type
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2497 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2499 if (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2500 CERT
*cert
= s
->cert
;
2502 EVP_PKEY
*pkdhp
= NULL
;
2505 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
) {
2506 DH
*dhp
= ssl_get_auto_dh(s
);
2507 pkdh
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2508 if (pkdh
== NULL
|| dhp
== NULL
) {
2510 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2511 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2512 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2515 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh
, dhp
);
2518 pkdhp
= cert
->dh_tmp
;
2520 if ((pkdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
2521 DH
*dhp
= s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
, 0, 1024);
2522 pkdh
= ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp
);
2524 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2525 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2526 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2531 if (pkdhp
== NULL
) {
2532 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2533 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2534 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2537 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
2538 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp
), 0, pkdhp
)) {
2539 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2540 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2541 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2544 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2545 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2546 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2547 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2551 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp
);
2552 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2553 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2557 dh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2559 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2560 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2561 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2565 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2568 DH_get0_pqg(dh
, &r
[0], NULL
, &r
[1]);
2569 DH_get0_key(dh
, &r
[2], NULL
);
2572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2573 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2575 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2576 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2577 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2578 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2582 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2583 curve_id
= tls1_shared_group(s
, -2);
2584 if (curve_id
== 0) {
2585 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2586 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2587 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
2590 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey_group(s
, curve_id
);
2591 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2592 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2593 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2597 /* Encode the public key. */
2598 encodedlen
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
,
2600 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
2601 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2602 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2607 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2608 * can set these to NULLs
2615 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2617 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2618 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
2619 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
2620 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
2621 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2622 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2623 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
2626 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
2627 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
2628 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
2629 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
2633 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2634 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2635 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
2639 if (((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) != 0)
2640 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)) != 0) {
2642 } else if (lu
== NULL
) {
2643 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2644 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2648 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2649 if (type
& SSL_PSK
) {
2650 size_t len
= (s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2651 ? 0 : strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
);
2654 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2655 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2657 if (len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2658 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
,
2660 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2661 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2662 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2668 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
2669 unsigned char *binval
;
2672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2673 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
2674 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
);
2677 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
);
2680 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2681 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2682 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2688 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2689 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2692 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
))) {
2693 size_t len
= BN_num_bytes(r
[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r
[2]);
2696 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &binval
)) {
2697 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2698 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2699 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2702 memset(binval
, 0, len
);
2706 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]), &binval
)
2707 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2708 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2709 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2710 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2714 BN_bn2bin(r
[i
], binval
);
2717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2718 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2720 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2721 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2722 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2725 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
)
2726 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)
2727 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, curve_id
)
2728 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encodedlen
)) {
2729 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2730 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2731 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2734 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2735 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2741 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
2743 unsigned char *sigbytes1
, *sigbytes2
, *tbs
;
2744 size_t siglen
, tbslen
;
2747 if (pkey
== NULL
|| !tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
)) {
2748 /* Should never happen */
2749 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2750 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2751 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2754 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2755 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, ¶mlen
)) {
2756 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2757 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2758 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2761 /* send signature algorithm */
2762 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
)) {
2763 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2764 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2765 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2769 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2770 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2771 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2774 siglen
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2775 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes1
)
2776 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2777 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2778 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2779 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2782 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
2783 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2784 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2785 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2786 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2791 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
,
2792 s
->init_buf
->data
+ paramoffset
,
2795 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2798 rv
= EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx
, sigbytes1
, &siglen
, tbs
, tbslen
);
2800 if (rv
<= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes2
)
2801 || sigbytes1
!= sigbytes2
) {
2802 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2803 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2804 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2809 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2812 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2813 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2816 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2818 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2822 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2824 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2825 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2826 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING
) {
2827 OPENSSL_free(s
->pha_context
);
2828 s
->pha_context_len
= 32;
2829 if ((s
->pha_context
= OPENSSL_malloc(s
->pha_context_len
)) == NULL
2830 || RAND_bytes(s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
) <= 0
2831 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
)) {
2832 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2833 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2834 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2837 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2838 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s
)) {
2839 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2843 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
2844 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2845 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2846 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2851 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
2852 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, NULL
,
2854 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2860 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2861 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
2862 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2863 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2864 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2868 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2869 const uint16_t *psigs
;
2870 size_t nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &psigs
);
2872 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
2873 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt
, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH
)
2874 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, pkt
, psigs
, nl
)
2875 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2876 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2877 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2878 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2883 if (!construct_ca_names(s
, get_ca_names(s
), pkt
)) {
2884 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2890 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
2894 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2897 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2899 PACKET psk_identity
;
2901 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity
)) {
2902 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2903 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2906 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2907 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2908 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2911 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2912 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2913 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2917 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity
, &s
->session
->psk_identity
)) {
2918 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2919 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2923 psklen
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity
,
2926 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2927 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2928 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2930 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2932 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2934 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
,
2935 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2936 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2940 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2941 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2942 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2944 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2945 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2946 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2950 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2954 /* Should never happen */
2955 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2956 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2961 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2964 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2966 unsigned char decrypt_good
, version_good
;
2967 size_t j
, padding_len
;
2968 PACKET enc_premaster
;
2970 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt
= NULL
;
2973 rsa
= EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA
].privatekey
);
2975 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2976 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2980 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2981 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2982 enc_premaster
= *pkt
;
2984 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &enc_premaster
)
2985 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2986 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2987 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2993 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2994 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2995 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2996 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2998 if (RSA_size(rsa
) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2999 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
3000 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL
);
3004 rsa_decrypt
= OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa
));
3005 if (rsa_decrypt
== NULL
) {
3006 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
3007 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3012 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
3013 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
3014 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
3015 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
3016 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
3019 if (RAND_priv_bytes(rand_premaster_secret
,
3020 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0) {
3021 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
3022 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3027 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
3028 * the timing-sensitive code below.
3030 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3031 decrypt_len
= (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster
),
3032 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster
),
3033 rsa_decrypt
, rsa
, RSA_NO_PADDING
);
3034 if (decrypt_len
< 0) {
3035 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
3036 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3040 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
3043 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
3044 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
3045 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
3047 if (decrypt_len
< 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
3048 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
3049 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3053 padding_len
= decrypt_len
- SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
3054 decrypt_good
= constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[0], 0) &
3055 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[1], 2);
3056 for (j
= 2; j
< padding_len
- 1; j
++) {
3057 decrypt_good
&= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[j
]);
3059 decrypt_good
&= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
- 1]);
3062 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
3063 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
3064 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
3065 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
3066 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
3067 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
3070 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
3071 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
>> 8));
3073 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
3074 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
& 0xff));
3077 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
3078 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
3079 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
3080 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
3081 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
3082 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
3085 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) {
3086 unsigned char workaround_good
;
3087 workaround_good
= constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
3088 (unsigned)(s
->version
>> 8));
3090 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
3091 (unsigned)(s
->version
& 0xff));
3092 version_good
|= workaround_good
;
3096 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
3097 * remain non-zero (0xff).
3099 decrypt_good
&= version_good
;
3102 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
3103 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
3104 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
3105 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
3107 for (j
= 0; j
< sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); j
++) {
3108 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
] =
3109 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good
,
3110 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
],
3111 rand_premaster_secret
[j
]);
3114 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, rsa_decrypt
+ padding_len
,
3115 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
), 0)) {
3116 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3122 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt
);
3125 /* Should never happen */
3126 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
3127 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3132 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3134 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3135 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
3139 const unsigned char *data
;
3140 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
3143 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
) || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != i
) {
3144 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3145 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
3148 skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
3150 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3151 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3155 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
3156 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3157 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
3160 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
3161 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3162 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3163 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3166 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
3167 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
3168 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3173 cdh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
3174 pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
);
3175 if (pub_key
== NULL
|| cdh
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_key(cdh
, pub_key
, NULL
)) {
3176 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3177 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3182 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
3183 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3188 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
3189 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
3191 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3194 /* Should never happen */
3195 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
3196 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3201 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3204 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
3205 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
3208 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
3209 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3210 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3211 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
3215 const unsigned char *data
;
3218 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3219 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3222 /* Get encoded point length */
3223 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &i
) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)
3224 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3225 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3226 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3230 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3231 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
3235 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
3236 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) <= 0) {
3237 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3241 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, data
, i
) == 0) {
3242 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3248 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
3249 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3254 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
3255 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
3257 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3261 /* Should never happen */
3262 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3263 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3268 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3272 const unsigned char *data
;
3274 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
)
3275 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
3276 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3277 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
3280 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
3281 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3285 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
3286 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3287 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
3290 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3291 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3292 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3293 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3294 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3298 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s
)) {
3299 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3305 /* Should never happen */
3306 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3307 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3312 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3315 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
3316 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
3317 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32];
3318 const unsigned char *start
;
3319 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
3320 unsigned long alg_a
;
3321 unsigned int asn1id
, asn1len
;
3325 /* Get our certificate private key */
3326 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3327 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST12
) {
3329 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3331 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
;
3333 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
].privatekey
;
3336 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
3338 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
) {
3339 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
3342 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
, NULL
);
3343 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3344 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3345 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3348 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
3349 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3350 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3354 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3355 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3356 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3357 * client certificate for authorization only.
3359 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
3360 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
3361 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
3364 /* Decrypt session key */
3365 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &asn1id
)
3366 || asn1id
!= (V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
)
3367 || !PACKET_peek_1(pkt
, &asn1len
)) {
3368 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3369 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3372 if (asn1len
== 0x81) {
3374 * Long form length. Should only be one byte of length. Anything else
3376 * We did a successful peek before so this shouldn't fail
3378 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt
, 1)) {
3379 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3380 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3383 } else if (asn1len
>= 0x80) {
3385 * Indefinite length, or more than one long form length bytes. We don't
3388 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3389 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3391 } /* else short form length */
3393 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &encdata
)) {
3394 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3395 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3398 inlen
= PACKET_remaining(&encdata
);
3399 start
= PACKET_data(&encdata
);
3401 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
,
3403 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3404 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3407 /* Generate master secret */
3408 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, premaster_secret
,
3409 sizeof(premaster_secret
), 0)) {
3410 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3413 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3414 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2,
3416 s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
= 1;
3420 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3423 /* Should never happen */
3424 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3425 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3430 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3432 unsigned long alg_k
;
3434 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3436 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3437 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
)) {
3438 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3442 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
3443 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3444 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3445 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3446 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3447 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3450 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3451 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, NULL
, 0, 0)) {
3452 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3455 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3456 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
)) {
3457 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3460 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3461 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
)) {
3462 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3465 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3466 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
)) {
3467 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3470 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3471 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s
, pkt
)) {
3472 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3475 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3476 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s
, pkt
)) {
3477 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3481 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3482 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3483 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
3487 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
3489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3490 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
3491 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3493 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3496 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3499 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3500 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3501 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3502 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3504 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3507 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3508 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3510 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3511 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3512 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
3514 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3515 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3516 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3520 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3521 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3526 if (s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
|| !s
->session
->peer
) {
3528 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3529 * the handshake_buffer
3531 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3532 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3535 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3537 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
3538 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3539 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3540 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3544 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3545 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3547 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3548 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3553 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3556 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3559 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3562 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
3563 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
3564 PACKET spkt
, context
;
3566 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
= NULL
;
3569 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3570 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less than
3573 s
->statem
.enc_read_state
= ENC_READ_STATE_VALID
;
3575 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3576 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3577 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3581 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &context
)
3582 || (s
->pha_context
== NULL
&& PACKET_remaining(&context
) != 0)
3583 || (s
->pha_context
!= NULL
&&
3584 !PACKET_equal(&context
, s
->pha_context
, s
->pha_context_len
)))) {
3585 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3586 SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT
);
3590 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt
, &spkt
)
3591 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3592 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3593 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3597 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) > 0; chainidx
++) {
3598 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt
, &l
)
3599 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt
, &certbytes
, l
)) {
3600 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3601 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3602 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3606 certstart
= certbytes
;
3607 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, l
);
3609 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3610 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3613 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ l
)) {
3614 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3615 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3616 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3620 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3621 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3624 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt
, &extensions
)) {
3625 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3626 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3630 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3631 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
3632 NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
3633 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
3634 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
,
3635 PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) == 0)) {
3636 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3639 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3642 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
3643 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3644 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3645 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3651 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
3652 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3653 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3654 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3655 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3656 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3659 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3660 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3661 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3662 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED
,
3663 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3664 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3667 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3668 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3669 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3674 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
3676 SSLfatal(s
, ssl_x509err2alert(s
->verify_result
),
3677 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3678 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
3682 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3683 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
3686 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk
, 0));
3688 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3689 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3690 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
3696 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3697 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3698 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3699 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3700 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3703 if (s
->post_handshake_auth
== SSL_PHA_REQUESTED
) {
3704 if ((new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0)) == 0) {
3705 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3706 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3707 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3711 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
3712 s
->session
= new_sess
;
3715 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3716 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3717 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3719 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->peer_chain
, X509_free
);
3720 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
3723 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3726 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3727 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3732 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3733 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3737 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3738 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3739 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
3740 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
3741 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
3742 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3746 /* Resend session tickets */
3747 s
->sent_tickets
= 0;
3750 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3754 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
3758 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3760 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
;
3763 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3764 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3769 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3770 * for the server Certificate message
3772 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
3773 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3774 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3777 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
)) {
3778 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3785 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, uint32_t age_add
,
3786 unsigned char *tick_nonce
)
3789 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3790 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3791 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3794 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
,
3795 (s
->hit
&& !SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
3796 ? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
)) {
3797 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL
,
3798 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3802 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3803 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, age_add
)
3804 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, tick_nonce
, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE
)) {
3805 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL
,
3806 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3811 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3812 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
3813 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CREATE_TICKET_PREQUEL
,
3814 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3821 static int construct_stateless_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, uint32_t age_add
,
3822 unsigned char *tick_nonce
)
3824 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
3825 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
3826 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
3827 unsigned char *p
, *encdata1
, *encdata2
, *macdata1
, *macdata2
;
3828 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3829 int len
, slen_full
, slen
, lenfinal
;
3832 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
3833 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3834 unsigned char key_name
[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
];
3836 size_t macoffset
, macendoffset
;
3838 /* get session encoding length */
3839 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3841 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3844 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00) {
3845 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3846 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3849 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3851 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3852 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3856 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3857 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
3858 if (ctx
== NULL
|| hctx
== NULL
) {
3859 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3860 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3865 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
)) {
3866 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3867 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3872 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3875 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3877 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3878 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3882 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3883 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) {
3884 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3885 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3886 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3887 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3891 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
3892 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3893 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3894 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3897 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3900 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3901 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3903 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
) {
3904 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3905 int ret
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, ctx
,
3910 /* Put timeout and length */
3911 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, 0)
3912 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
3913 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3914 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3915 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3919 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3920 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3924 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3925 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
3928 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
3930 const EVP_CIPHER
*cipher
= EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3932 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher
);
3933 if (RAND_bytes(iv
, iv_len
) <= 0
3934 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx
, cipher
, NULL
,
3935 tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_aes_key
, iv
)
3936 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
,
3937 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
),
3938 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
3939 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3940 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3943 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
3944 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
));
3947 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s
, pkt
, age_add
, tick_nonce
)) {
3948 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3952 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macoffset
)
3953 /* Output key name */
3954 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, key_name
, sizeof(key_name
))
3956 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, iv
, iv_len
)
3957 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
,
3959 /* Encrypt session data */
3960 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx
, encdata1
, &len
, senc
, slen
)
3961 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &encdata2
)
3962 || encdata1
!= encdata2
3963 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx
, encdata1
+ len
, &lenfinal
)
3964 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, lenfinal
, &encdata2
)
3965 || encdata1
+ len
!= encdata2
3966 || len
+ lenfinal
> slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3967 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macendoffset
)
3968 || !HMAC_Update(hctx
,
3969 (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ macoffset
,
3970 macendoffset
- macoffset
)
3971 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &macdata1
)
3972 || !HMAC_Final(hctx
, macdata1
, &hlen
)
3973 || hlen
> EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3974 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, hlen
, &macdata2
)
3975 || macdata1
!= macdata2
) {
3976 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3977 SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3981 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
3982 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
3983 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATELESS_TICKET
,
3984 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3991 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3992 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3996 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
, uint32_t age_add
,
3997 unsigned char *tick_nonce
)
3999 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s
, pkt
, age_add
, tick_nonce
)) {
4000 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4004 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
,
4005 s
->session
->session_id_length
)
4006 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
4007 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_STATEFUL_TICKET
,
4008 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4015 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
4017 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
4018 unsigned char tick_nonce
[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE
];
4020 unsigned char age_add_c
[sizeof(uint32_t)];
4024 age_add_u
.age_add
= 0;
4026 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
4029 static const unsigned char nonce_label
[] = "resumption";
4030 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_handshake_md(s
);
4031 void (*cb
) (const SSL
*ssl
, int type
, int val
) = NULL
;
4032 int hashleni
= EVP_MD_size(md
);
4034 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
4035 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni
>= 0)) {
4036 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
4037 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
4038 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4041 hashlen
= (size_t)hashleni
;
4043 if (s
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
4044 cb
= s
->info_callback
;
4045 else if (s
->ctx
->info_callback
!= NULL
)
4046 cb
= s
->ctx
->info_callback
;
4050 * We don't start and stop the handshake in between each ticket when
4051 * sending more than one - but it should appear that way to the info
4054 if (s
->sent_tickets
!= 0) {
4055 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
4056 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE
, 1);
4057 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 1);
4059 cb(s
, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
, 1);
4062 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
4063 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
4064 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
4066 if (s
->sent_tickets
!= 0 || s
->hit
) {
4067 SSL_SESSION
*new_sess
= ssl_session_dup(s
->session
, 0);
4069 if (new_sess
== NULL
) {
4070 /* SSLfatal already called */
4074 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
4075 s
->session
= new_sess
;
4078 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s
, s
->session
)) {
4079 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4082 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u
.age_add_c
, sizeof(age_add_u
)) <= 0) {
4083 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
4084 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
4085 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4088 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add_u
.age_add
;
4090 nonce
= s
->next_ticket_nonce
;
4091 for (i
= TICKET_NONCE_SIZE
; i
> 0; i
--) {
4092 tick_nonce
[i
- 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce
& 0xff);
4096 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s
, md
, s
->resumption_master_secret
,
4098 sizeof(nonce_label
) - 1,
4101 s
->session
->master_key
,
4103 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4106 s
->session
->master_key_length
= hashlen
;
4108 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
4109 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
!= NULL
) {
4110 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
);
4111 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
=
4112 OPENSSL_memdup(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
, s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
);
4113 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
4114 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
4115 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
4116 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
4119 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
;
4121 s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
= s
->max_early_data
;
4124 if (tctx
->generate_ticket_cb
!= NULL
&&
4125 tctx
->generate_ticket_cb(s
, tctx
->ticket_cb_data
) == 0)
4129 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
4130 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
4131 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
4134 && ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
) != 0
4135 || (s
->max_early_data
> 0
4136 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY
) == 0))) {
4137 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s
, pkt
, age_add_u
.age_add
, tick_nonce
)) {
4138 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4141 } else if (!construct_stateless_ticket(s
, pkt
, age_add_u
.age_add
,
4143 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4147 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
4148 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
4149 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
4151 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4155 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
4156 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4157 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not.
4160 s
->next_ticket_nonce
++;
4161 ssl_update_cache(s
, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
);
4170 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4171 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4173 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
4175 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.status_type
)
4176 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
,
4177 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
)) {
4178 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
4179 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4186 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
4188 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
4189 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4198 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4199 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4201 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_next_proto(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
4203 PACKET next_proto
, padding
;
4204 size_t next_proto_len
;
4207 * The payload looks like:
4209 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4210 * uint8 padding_len;
4211 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4213 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &next_proto
)
4214 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &padding
)
4215 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
4216 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO
,
4217 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
4218 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4221 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto
, &s
->ext
.npn
, &next_proto_len
)) {
4223 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO
,
4224 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4225 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4228 s
->ext
.npn_len
= (unsigned char)next_proto_len
;
4230 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
4234 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
4236 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
4238 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4245 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
4247 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
4248 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
4249 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
4250 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4253 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4254 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY
) {
4255 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
4256 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
4257 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4261 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4262 * a record boundary.
4264 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
4265 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
4266 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
4267 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
4268 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4271 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING
;
4272 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
4273 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
4274 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4275 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
4278 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;