2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
);
65 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
);
68 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
69 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
70 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
71 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
73 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
74 * (transition not allowed)
76 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
78 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
81 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
82 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
83 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
85 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
89 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
90 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
91 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
96 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
97 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
98 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
99 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
103 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
104 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
111 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
112 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
113 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
117 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
118 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
124 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
125 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
126 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
132 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
133 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
;
139 /* No valid transition found */
140 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
141 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_READ_TRANSITION
,
142 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
147 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
148 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
149 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
150 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
152 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
153 * (transition not allowed)
155 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
157 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
159 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
160 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
165 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
171 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
172 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
173 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
178 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
180 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
181 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
183 * 2) If we did request one then
184 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
186 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
187 * list if we requested a certificate)
189 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
190 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
191 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
192 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
193 && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
195 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
196 * not going to accept it because we require a client
199 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
,
200 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
);
201 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
,
202 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
205 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
209 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
212 } else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
213 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
214 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
221 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
222 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
227 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
229 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
230 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
231 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
232 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
233 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
236 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| st
->no_cert_verify
) {
237 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
239 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
240 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
241 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
242 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
244 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
248 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
249 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
255 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
256 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
257 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
262 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
264 if (s
->s3
->npn_seen
) {
265 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
) {
266 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
;
271 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
272 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
280 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
281 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
282 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
283 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
289 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
290 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
291 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
298 /* No valid transition found */
299 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
300 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
305 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
307 * Valid return values are:
311 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
313 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
316 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
317 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
318 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
319 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
320 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
323 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)
325 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
329 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
330 || ((alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
))
331 && s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
)
332 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
333 || (alg_k
& (SSL_PSK
& (SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)))
335 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
336 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
337 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
347 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
349 * Valid return values are:
353 static int send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
356 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
357 s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
359 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
360 * during re-negotiation:
362 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
== 0 ||
363 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
))
365 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
366 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
369 && (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
371 * ... except when the application insists on
372 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
375 || (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
376 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
377 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
379 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
382 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aPSK
)) {
390 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
391 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
394 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
396 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
399 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
400 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
403 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
405 /* Shouldn't happen */
406 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
409 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
410 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
;
411 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
413 /* Try to read from the client instead */
414 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
416 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
417 if (s
->hello_retry_request
)
418 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
;
420 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
421 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
423 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
424 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
426 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
427 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
428 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
430 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
432 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
433 else if (send_certificate_request(s
))
434 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
436 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
438 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
440 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
441 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
442 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
445 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
;
446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
448 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
449 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
450 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
452 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
453 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
455 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
457 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
458 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
460 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
461 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
464 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
465 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
467 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
468 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
469 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
;
470 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
474 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
475 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
476 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
477 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
478 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
483 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
484 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
486 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
488 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
491 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
492 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
496 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s
);
498 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
500 /* Shouldn't happen */
501 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
504 if (st
->request_state
== TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
) {
505 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
506 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
;
507 st
->request_state
= TLS_ST_BEFORE
;
508 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
510 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
511 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
512 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
513 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
518 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
519 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
521 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
522 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
523 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
526 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
527 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->d1
->cookie_verified
528 && (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
))
529 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
531 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
532 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
534 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
535 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
537 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
539 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
)
540 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
542 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
544 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
545 /* normal PSK or SRP */
546 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
&
547 (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
548 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
549 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
550 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
551 } else if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
552 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
554 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
560 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
) {
561 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
;
562 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
566 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
567 if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
568 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
569 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
573 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
574 if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
575 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
576 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
580 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
581 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
582 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
584 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
585 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
587 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
589 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
590 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
591 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
592 } else if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
593 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
595 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
597 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
599 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
600 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
601 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
603 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
604 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
605 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
607 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
609 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
611 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
612 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s
, 0);
613 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
618 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
619 * the server to the client.
621 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
623 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
625 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
627 /* No pre work to be done */
630 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
633 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
636 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
638 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
639 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
640 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
645 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
646 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
648 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
649 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
655 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
656 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
657 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
)))
658 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
660 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
662 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
663 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
665 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
666 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
667 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
669 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 0);
670 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
672 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
673 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
679 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
680 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
681 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
682 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
685 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
687 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
688 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
689 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
690 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
694 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
697 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1);
700 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
704 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
705 * server to the client.
707 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
709 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
713 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
715 /* No post work to be done */
718 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
719 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
723 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
724 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
726 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
727 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
732 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
733 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
735 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
736 if (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
&& !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
737 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
741 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
742 * treat like it was the first packet
747 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
749 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
750 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
751 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
754 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
757 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
758 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
760 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
761 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
762 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
764 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
768 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
769 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
773 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
774 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
775 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
776 * something clever in the record layer for this.
778 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
779 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
780 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
781 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
)
782 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
783 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
|SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
))
788 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
790 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->hit
) {
792 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
795 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
799 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
800 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
802 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
807 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
810 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
811 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
815 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
816 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
819 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
821 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
824 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
828 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
829 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
830 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
831 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)
832 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
833 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
838 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
839 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
841 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1))
845 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
846 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && statem_flush(s
) != 1)
851 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
855 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
858 * Valid return values are:
862 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
863 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
865 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
867 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
869 /* Shouldn't happen */
872 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
874 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
876 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
877 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
880 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
881 *confunc
= dtls_construct_hello_verify_request
;
882 *mt
= DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
885 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
886 /* No construction function needed */
888 *mt
= SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
891 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
892 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_hello
;
893 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
897 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_certificate
;
898 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
901 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
902 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
903 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
907 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
908 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_key_exchange
;
909 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
912 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
913 *confunc
= tls_construct_certificate_request
;
914 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
917 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
918 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_done
;
919 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
922 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
923 *confunc
= tls_construct_new_session_ticket
;
924 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
927 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
928 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_status
;
929 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
932 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
933 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
934 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
937 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
938 *confunc
= tls_construct_encrypted_extensions
;
939 *mt
= SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
942 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
943 *confunc
= tls_construct_hello_retry_request
;
944 *mt
= SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
;
947 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
948 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
949 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
957 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
958 * calculated as follows:
960 * 2 + # client_version
961 * 32 + # only valid length for random
962 * 1 + # length of session_id
963 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
964 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
965 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
966 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
967 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
968 * 2 + # length of extensions
969 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
971 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
973 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
974 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
977 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
978 * reading. Excludes the message header.
980 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
982 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
984 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
986 /* Shouldn't happen */
989 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
990 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
993 return s
->max_cert_list
;
995 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
996 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
998 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
999 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1001 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1002 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
1003 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH
;
1006 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
1007 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1009 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
1010 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
1012 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1013 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1018 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1020 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1022 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1024 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1026 /* Shouldn't happen */
1027 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1029 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1030 return tls_process_client_hello(s
, pkt
);
1032 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT
:
1033 return tls_process_client_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1035 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1036 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
1038 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
1039 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
1041 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1042 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
1043 return tls_process_next_proto(s
, pkt
);
1046 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
1047 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
1049 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
1050 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
1052 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1053 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1059 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1062 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1064 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1066 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1068 /* Shouldn't happen */
1071 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1072 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s
, wst
);
1074 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1075 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s
, wst
);
1077 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
1078 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1079 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
1080 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
1081 /* Are we renegotiating? */
1082 && s
->renegotiate
&& BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
1083 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
1084 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
1085 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1086 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
1087 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
1090 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
1093 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1095 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1098 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1099 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
1101 int ret
= SSL_ERROR_NONE
;
1103 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
1105 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
1106 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
1107 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
1109 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1112 ret
= SSL3_AL_FATAL
;
1113 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
1115 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
, al
);
1122 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned char *cookie
,
1125 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1126 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, DTLS1_VERSION
)
1127 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, cookie
, cookie_len
))
1133 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1135 unsigned int cookie_leni
;
1136 if (s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb
== NULL
||
1137 s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1138 &cookie_leni
) == 0 ||
1139 cookie_leni
> 255) {
1140 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
,
1141 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
1144 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_leni
;
1146 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1147 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1155 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1157 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1158 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1159 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1164 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1165 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1166 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1167 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1169 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL
*s
, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
)
1171 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock
[] = {
1172 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1173 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1174 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1175 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1176 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1177 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1179 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1180 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1181 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1182 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1183 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1184 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1185 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1186 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1187 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1188 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1189 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1190 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1191 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1193 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1194 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
= 18;
1199 tmppkt
= hello
->extensions
;
1201 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt
, 2)
1202 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt
, &type
)
1203 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt
, &sni
)) {
1207 if (type
!= TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
1210 ext_len
= TLS1_get_client_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
?
1211 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock
) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
;
1213 s
->s3
->is_probably_safari
= PACKET_equal(&tmppkt
, kSafariExtensionsBlock
,
1216 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1218 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1220 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1224 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1226 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
1228 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
1230 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1231 PACKET session_id
, compression
, extensions
, cookie
;
1232 static const unsigned char null_compression
= 0;
1233 CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello
;
1235 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1236 if (s
->renegotiate
== 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
1241 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
1242 s
->statem
.cleanuphand
= 1;
1245 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1247 memset(&clienthello
, 0, sizeof(clienthello
));
1248 clienthello
.isv2
= RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
);
1249 PACKET_null_init(&cookie
);
1251 if (clienthello
.isv2
) {
1254 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
) || s
->hello_retry_request
) {
1255 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1261 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1262 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1263 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1264 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1266 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1267 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1269 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1270 * 7-8 session_id_length
1271 * 9-10 challenge_length
1275 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mt
)
1276 || mt
!= SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
1278 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1279 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1280 * in the first place
1282 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1287 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &clienthello
.legacy_version
)) {
1288 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1289 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1293 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1294 if (clienthello
.isv2
) {
1296 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1297 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1298 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1300 unsigned int ciphersuite_len
, session_id_len
, challenge_len
;
1303 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ciphersuite_len
)
1304 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &session_id_len
)
1305 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &challenge_len
)) {
1306 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1307 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1308 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1312 if (session_id_len
> SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
) {
1313 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1318 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &clienthello
.ciphersuites
,
1320 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
.session_id
, session_id_len
)
1321 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &challenge
, challenge_len
)
1322 /* No extensions. */
1323 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1324 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1325 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1326 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1329 clienthello
.session_id_len
= session_id_len
;
1331 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1332 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello.random) because that is the limit
1333 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1334 * sizeof(clienthello.random) does.
1336 challenge_len
= challenge_len
> SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1337 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
: challenge_len
;
1338 memset(clienthello
.random
, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1339 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge
,
1340 clienthello
.random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-
1341 challenge_len
, challenge_len
)
1342 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1343 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression
, &null_compression
, 1)) {
1344 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1345 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1349 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
.extensions
);
1351 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1352 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
.random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)
1353 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)
1354 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id
, clienthello
.session_id
,
1355 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
,
1356 &clienthello
.session_id_len
)) {
1357 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1358 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1362 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1363 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookie
)) {
1364 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1368 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie
, clienthello
.dtls_cookie
,
1369 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH
,
1370 &clienthello
.dtls_cookie_len
)) {
1371 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1376 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1377 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1378 * So check cookie length...
1380 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1381 if (clienthello
.dtls_cookie_len
== 0)
1386 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
.ciphersuites
)) {
1387 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1388 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1392 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1393 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1398 /* Could be empty. */
1399 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1400 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
.extensions
);
1402 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
.extensions
)) {
1403 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1410 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression
, clienthello
.compressions
,
1411 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE
,
1412 &clienthello
.compressions_len
)) {
1413 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1414 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1418 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1419 extensions
= clienthello
.extensions
;
1420 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1421 &clienthello
.pre_proc_exts
, &al
,
1422 &clienthello
.pre_proc_exts_len
)) {
1423 /* SSLerr already been called */
1427 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1429 /* Set up the client_random */
1430 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
, clienthello
.random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1432 /* Choose the version */
1434 if (clienthello
.isv2
) {
1435 if (clienthello
.legacy_version
== SSL2_VERSION
1436 || (clienthello
.legacy_version
& 0xff00)
1437 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
<< 8)) {
1439 * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
1442 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1446 s
->client_version
= clienthello
.legacy_version
;
1449 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1450 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1452 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1453 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, &clienthello
);
1454 } else if (s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
&&
1455 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello
.legacy_version
, s
->version
)) {
1456 protverr
= SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1462 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1463 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
1464 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1465 s
->version
= s
->client_version
= clienthello
.legacy_version
;
1467 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1471 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1472 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1473 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1474 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1475 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, clienthello
.dtls_cookie
,
1476 clienthello
.dtls_cookie_len
) == 0) {
1477 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1479 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1481 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1483 /* default verification */
1484 } else if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
!= clienthello
.dtls_cookie_len
1485 || memcmp(clienthello
.dtls_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1486 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) {
1487 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1488 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1491 s
->d1
->cookie_verified
= 1;
1493 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1494 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, &clienthello
);
1495 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1496 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1497 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1498 al
= SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
;
1506 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1507 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret
,
1509 clienthello
.pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0, &al
)) {
1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1515 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1516 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1518 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1519 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1520 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1521 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1522 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1523 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1524 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1525 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1526 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1527 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1530 if (clienthello
.isv2
||
1532 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1533 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1536 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, &clienthello
, &al
);
1538 /* previous session */
1540 } else if (i
== -1) {
1544 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1))
1549 if (bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, &clienthello
.ciphersuites
, &ciphers
,
1550 clienthello
.isv2
, &al
) == NULL
) {
1554 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1557 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1560 fprintf(stderr
, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1562 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1563 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1565 fprintf(stderr
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1566 i
, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1575 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1578 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1579 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1580 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1585 for (loop
= 0; loop
< clienthello
.compressions_len
; loop
++) {
1586 if (clienthello
.compressions
[loop
] == 0)
1590 if (loop
>= clienthello
.compressions_len
) {
1592 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1593 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1598 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
)
1599 ssl_check_for_safari(s
, &clienthello
);
1600 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1602 /* TLS extensions */
1603 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1604 clienthello
.pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0, &al
)) {
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT
);
1610 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1611 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1612 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1613 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1617 pos
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1618 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0) {
1623 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
&& s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1624 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1626 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1627 * backwards compat reasons
1629 int master_key_length
;
1631 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1632 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1633 &master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1635 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1636 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1637 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1639 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1640 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1644 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1645 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1646 pref_cipher
= ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
,
1647 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1648 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1649 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1654 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1655 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1656 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1657 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1658 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1663 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1664 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1665 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1667 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1668 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1669 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1670 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1671 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1673 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1674 /* Can't disable compression */
1675 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1677 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1680 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1681 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
1682 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1683 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
1684 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1688 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
1689 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1690 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1693 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1694 for (k
= 0; k
< clienthello
.compressions_len
; k
++) {
1695 if (clienthello
.compressions
[k
] == comp_id
)
1698 if (k
>= clienthello
.compressions_len
) {
1699 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1701 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1706 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1707 /* See if we have a match */
1708 int m
, nn
, v
, done
= 0;
1711 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1712 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
1713 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1715 for (o
= 0; o
< clienthello
.compressions_len
; o
++) {
1716 if (v
== clienthello
.compressions
[o
]) {
1725 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1731 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1732 * using compression.
1734 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1741 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1745 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1746 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
1748 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
1750 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1751 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1752 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
1753 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1758 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s
)) {
1759 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1764 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1765 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
.pre_proc_exts
);
1766 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1768 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1770 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1772 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1773 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
.pre_proc_exts
);
1775 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1779 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1780 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
1782 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL
*s
, int *al
)
1784 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
1787 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1788 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1789 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1790 * influence which certificate is sent
1792 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
&& s
->ctx
!= NULL
1793 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
1796 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1797 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
!= NULL
) {
1799 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1800 * et al can pick it up.
1802 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
;
1803 ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
1805 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1806 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
1807 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
1809 /* status request response should be sent */
1810 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
:
1811 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
)
1812 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 1;
1814 /* something bad happened */
1815 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
1817 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1826 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1828 int al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
1829 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
;
1831 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
1833 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1834 if (s
->cert
->cert_cb
) {
1835 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
1837 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1838 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1839 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
1843 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1846 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
1849 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1851 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
1852 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1853 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1856 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
1857 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, &al
))
1859 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1860 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
1861 s
->session
->not_resumable
=
1862 s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
, ((cipher
->algorithm_mkey
1863 & (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
))
1865 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
1866 /* do not send a session ticket */
1867 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1869 /* Session-id reuse */
1870 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
1874 * we now have the following setup.
1876 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1877 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1878 * compression - basically ignored right now
1879 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1880 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1881 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1882 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1886 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
1887 * certificate callbacks etc above.
1889 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s
, &al
)) {
1890 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1891 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1897 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1898 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
1900 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
, &al
)) < 0) {
1902 * callback indicates further work to be done
1904 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
1907 if (ret
!= SSL_ERROR_NONE
) {
1909 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1910 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1912 if (al
!= TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
)
1913 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1914 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1916 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1917 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
1923 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
1925 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
1926 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
1930 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1932 int compm
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1936 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
1937 version
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
: s
->version
;
1938 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, version
)
1940 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1941 * tls_process_client_hello()
1943 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
1944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1949 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1950 * back in the server hello:
1951 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1952 * we send back the old session ID.
1953 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1954 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1955 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1956 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1958 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1959 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1960 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1961 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1964 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
1965 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
1967 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
1969 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
1970 if (sl
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1975 /* set up the compression method */
1976 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1979 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
1982 compm
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
1985 if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
1986 && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
, sl
))
1987 || !s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, pkt
, &len
)
1988 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
1989 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, compm
))
1990 || !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
1992 ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1993 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
,
1995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1999 if (!(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
2000 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2001 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2007 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2011 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2013 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
2014 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2015 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2022 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2024 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2025 EVP_PKEY
*pkdh
= NULL
;
2027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2028 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2029 size_t encodedlen
= 0;
2032 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
;
2033 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, i
;
2036 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2037 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2038 size_t paramlen
, paramoffset
;
2040 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, ¶moffset
)) {
2041 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2045 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2046 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2050 type
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2052 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
2053 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2054 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2055 if (type
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2057 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2058 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2059 if (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2060 CERT
*cert
= s
->cert
;
2062 EVP_PKEY
*pkdhp
= NULL
;
2065 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
) {
2066 DH
*dhp
= ssl_get_auto_dh(s
);
2067 pkdh
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2068 if (pkdh
== NULL
|| dhp
== NULL
) {
2070 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2071 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2074 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh
, dhp
);
2077 pkdhp
= cert
->dh_tmp
;
2079 if ((pkdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
2080 DH
*dhp
= s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
, 0, 1024);
2081 pkdh
= ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp
);
2083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2084 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2089 if (pkdhp
== NULL
) {
2090 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2092 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2095 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
2096 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp
), 0, pkdhp
)) {
2097 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2098 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2099 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2102 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2103 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2104 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2108 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp
);
2110 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2111 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2115 dh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2117 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2120 DH_get0_pqg(dh
, &r
[0], NULL
, &r
[1]);
2121 DH_get0_key(dh
, &r
[2], NULL
);
2124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2125 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2128 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2129 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2130 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2134 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2135 nid
= tls1_shared_group(s
, -2);
2136 curve_id
= tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid
);
2137 if (curve_id
== 0) {
2138 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2139 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
2142 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id
);
2143 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2144 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2145 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2149 /* Encode the public key. */
2150 encodedlen
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
,
2152 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
2153 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2158 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2159 * can set these to NULLs
2166 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2168 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2169 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
2170 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
2171 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
2172 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2173 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
2176 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
2177 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
2178 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
2179 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
2183 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2184 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2185 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
2189 if (((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) != 0)
2190 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)) != 0) {
2192 } else if (lu
== NULL
) {
2193 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2198 if (type
& SSL_PSK
) {
2199 size_t len
= (s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2200 ? 0 : strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
);
2203 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2204 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2206 if (len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2207 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
,
2209 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2210 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2216 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
2217 unsigned char *binval
;
2220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2221 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
2222 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
);
2225 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
);
2228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2229 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2233 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2235 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2236 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2239 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
))) {
2240 size_t len
= BN_num_bytes(r
[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r
[2]);
2243 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &binval
)) {
2244 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2245 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2248 memset(binval
, 0, len
);
2252 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]), &binval
)
2253 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2254 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2255 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2259 BN_bn2bin(r
[i
], binval
);
2262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2263 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2265 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2266 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2267 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2270 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
)
2271 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)
2272 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, curve_id
)
2273 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encodedlen
)) {
2274 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2275 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2278 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2279 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2285 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
2286 const EVP_MD
*md
= ssl_md(lu
->hash_idx
);
2287 unsigned char *sigbytes1
, *sigbytes2
;
2290 if (pkey
== NULL
|| md
== NULL
) {
2291 /* Should never happen */
2292 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2294 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2298 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2299 * points to the space at the end.
2302 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2303 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, ¶mlen
)) {
2304 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2305 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2308 /* send signature algorithm */
2309 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
))
2312 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2313 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2314 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2317 siglen
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2318 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes1
)
2319 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2321 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2324 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
2325 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2326 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2327 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2332 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->client_random
[0]),
2333 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2334 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx
, &(s
->s3
->server_random
[0]),
2335 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
) <= 0
2336 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx
,
2337 s
->init_buf
->data
+ paramoffset
,
2339 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx
, sigbytes1
, &siglen
) <= 0
2340 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes2
)
2341 || sigbytes1
!= sigbytes2
) {
2342 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2343 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2348 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2351 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2354 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2357 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2359 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2363 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2366 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *sk
= NULL
;
2368 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2369 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
2370 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, pkt
)
2371 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2376 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2377 const uint16_t *psigs
;
2378 size_t nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &psigs
);
2380 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
2381 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, pkt
, psigs
, nl
)
2382 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2383 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2384 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2389 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2390 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)) {
2391 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2395 sk
= SSL_get_client_CA_list(s
);
2397 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(sk
); i
++) {
2398 unsigned char *namebytes
;
2399 X509_NAME
*name
= sk_X509_NAME_value(sk
, i
);
2403 || (namelen
= i2d_X509_NAME(name
, NULL
)) < 0
2404 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, namelen
,
2406 || i2d_X509_NAME(name
, &namebytes
) != namelen
) {
2407 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2408 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2413 /* else no CA names */
2415 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2416 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2420 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
2424 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2428 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2430 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2431 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2433 PACKET psk_identity
;
2435 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity
)) {
2436 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2440 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2441 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2445 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2446 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2447 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2451 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity
, &s
->session
->psk_identity
)) {
2452 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2453 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2457 psklen
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity
,
2460 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2461 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2462 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2464 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2466 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2468 *al
= SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
;
2469 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2470 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2474 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2475 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2476 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2478 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2479 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2484 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2488 /* Should never happen */
2489 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2495 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2498 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2500 unsigned char decrypt_good
, version_good
;
2501 size_t j
, padding_len
;
2502 PACKET enc_premaster
;
2504 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt
= NULL
;
2507 rsa
= EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA
].privatekey
);
2509 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2510 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2514 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2515 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2516 enc_premaster
= *pkt
;
2518 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &enc_premaster
)
2519 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2520 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2527 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2528 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2529 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2530 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2532 if (RSA_size(rsa
) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2533 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL
);
2538 rsa_decrypt
= OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa
));
2539 if (rsa_decrypt
== NULL
) {
2540 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2546 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2547 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2548 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2549 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2550 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2553 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret
, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0)
2557 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2558 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2560 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2561 decrypt_len
= (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster
),
2562 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster
),
2563 rsa_decrypt
, rsa
, RSA_NO_PADDING
);
2564 if (decrypt_len
< 0)
2567 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2570 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2571 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2572 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2574 if (decrypt_len
< 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2575 *al
= SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
;
2576 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2580 padding_len
= decrypt_len
- SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2581 decrypt_good
= constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[0], 0) &
2582 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[1], 2);
2583 for (j
= 2; j
< padding_len
- 1; j
++) {
2584 decrypt_good
&= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[j
]);
2586 decrypt_good
&= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
- 1]);
2589 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2590 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2591 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2592 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2593 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2594 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2597 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
2598 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
>> 8));
2600 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
2601 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
& 0xff));
2604 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2605 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2606 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2607 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2608 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2609 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2612 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) {
2613 unsigned char workaround_good
;
2614 workaround_good
= constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
2615 (unsigned)(s
->version
>> 8));
2617 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
2618 (unsigned)(s
->version
& 0xff));
2619 version_good
|= workaround_good
;
2623 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2624 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2626 decrypt_good
&= version_good
;
2629 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2630 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2631 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2632 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2634 for (j
= 0; j
< sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); j
++) {
2635 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
] =
2636 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good
,
2637 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
],
2638 rand_premaster_secret
[j
]);
2641 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, rsa_decrypt
+ padding_len
,
2642 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
), 0)) {
2643 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2650 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt
);
2653 /* Should never happen */
2654 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2655 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2660 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2663 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
2667 const unsigned char *data
;
2668 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
2671 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
) || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != i
) {
2672 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2673 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
2674 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2677 skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
2679 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2680 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2684 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2685 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2686 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2689 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2690 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2691 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2692 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2695 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2696 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, SSL_R_BN_LIB
);
2700 cdh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2701 pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
);
2703 if (pub_key
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_key(cdh
, pub_key
, NULL
)) {
2704 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2705 if (pub_key
!= NULL
)
2710 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
2711 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2717 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2718 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
2720 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2723 /* Should never happen */
2724 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2730 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2733 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
2734 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
2737 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2738 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2739 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
2744 const unsigned char *data
;
2747 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2748 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2751 /* Get encoded point length */
2752 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &i
) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)
2753 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2754 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2755 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2758 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2759 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) <= 0) {
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EVP_LIB
);
2763 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, data
, i
) == 0) {
2764 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2765 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2770 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
2771 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2772 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2777 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2778 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
2780 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2784 /* Should never happen */
2785 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2786 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2791 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2793 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2795 const unsigned char *data
;
2797 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
)
2798 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2799 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2800 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
2803 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
2804 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_BN_LIB
);
2807 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
2808 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2809 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
2812 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
2813 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
2814 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
2815 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2819 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s
)) {
2820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2826 /* Should never happen */
2827 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2833 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2835 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2836 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
2837 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
2838 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32];
2839 const unsigned char *start
;
2840 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
2841 unsigned long alg_a
;
2844 size_t sess_key_len
;
2845 const unsigned char *data
;
2848 /* Get our certificate private key */
2849 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2850 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST12
) {
2852 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2854 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
;
2856 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
].privatekey
;
2859 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2861 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
) {
2862 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
2865 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
, NULL
);
2866 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
2867 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2868 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2871 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
2872 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2873 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2877 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2878 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2879 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2880 * client certificate for authorization only.
2882 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
2883 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
2884 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
2887 /* Decrypt session key */
2888 sess_key_len
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
2889 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, sess_key_len
)) {
2890 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2891 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2894 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2895 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data
, &Tlen
, &Ttag
,
2896 &Tclass
, (long)sess_key_len
) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2897 || Ttag
!= V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
|| Tclass
!= V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL
) {
2898 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2899 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2904 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2905 (pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
, inlen
) <= 0) {
2906 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2907 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2910 /* Generate master secret */
2911 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, premaster_secret
,
2912 sizeof(premaster_secret
), 0)) {
2913 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2917 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2918 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2919 (pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2, NULL
) > 0)
2920 s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
= 1;
2924 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
2927 /* Should never happen */
2928 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2929 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2934 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2937 unsigned long alg_k
;
2939 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2941 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2942 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2945 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
2946 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2947 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2948 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2950 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2953 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2954 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, NULL
, 0, 0)) {
2955 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2959 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2960 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2962 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2963 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2965 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2966 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2968 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2969 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2971 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
2972 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s
, pkt
, &al
))
2975 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2976 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2977 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
2981 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
2984 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2985 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2986 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
2987 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
2989 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
2990 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
2993 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2995 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2996 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2997 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
2998 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
2999 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3001 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3004 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3005 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3007 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3008 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3009 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
3011 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3015 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3016 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3021 if ((wst
== WORK_MORE_B
)
3023 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))
3024 /* Are we renegotiating? */
3026 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
3027 && (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
)
3028 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s
))) {
3029 s
->s3
->in_read_app_data
= 2;
3030 s
->rwstate
= SSL_READING
;
3031 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
3032 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s
));
3033 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 1);
3036 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s
, 0);
3040 if (s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
|| !s
->session
->peer
) {
3042 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3043 * the handshake_buffer
3045 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3046 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3049 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3051 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
3052 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3053 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3054 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3058 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3059 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3061 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3062 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3067 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3070 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3072 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3074 unsigned long l
, llen
;
3075 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
3076 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
3077 PACKET spkt
, context
;
3080 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3085 /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
3086 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &context
))
3087 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &llen
)
3088 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &spkt
, llen
)
3089 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3090 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3095 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) > 0; chainidx
++) {
3096 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt
, &l
)
3097 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt
, &certbytes
, l
)) {
3098 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3099 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3100 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3104 certstart
= certbytes
;
3105 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, l
);
3107 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3110 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ l
)) {
3111 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3112 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3113 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3117 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3118 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3121 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt
, &extensions
)) {
3122 al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
3123 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
3126 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
3127 &rawexts
, &al
, NULL
)
3128 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
3129 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
, &al
)) {
3130 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3133 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3136 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
3137 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3143 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
3144 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3145 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3146 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3147 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3148 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3151 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3152 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3153 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3154 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3155 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3156 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3159 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3160 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3165 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
3167 al
= ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
);
3168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3169 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
3173 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
3174 al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3177 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk
, 0));
3179 al
= SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
3180 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3181 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
3186 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3187 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3188 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3190 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->peer_chain
, X509_free
);
3191 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
3194 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3197 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3198 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3199 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3204 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3205 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3209 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3211 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
3212 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
3213 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
3214 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3215 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3219 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3223 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3224 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3227 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
3231 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3233 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
;
3234 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3237 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3242 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3243 * for the server Certificate message
3245 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0))
3246 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
, &al
)) {
3247 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3248 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3255 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3257 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
3258 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
3259 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
3260 unsigned char *p
, *encdata1
, *encdata2
, *macdata1
, *macdata2
;
3261 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3262 int len
, slen_full
, slen
, lenfinal
;
3265 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
3266 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3267 unsigned char key_name
[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
];
3268 int iv_len
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3269 size_t macoffset
, macendoffset
;
3271 unsigned char age_add_c
[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3275 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3276 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u
.age_add_c
, sizeof(age_add_u
)) <= 0)
3278 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add_u
.age_add
;
3281 /* get session encoding length */
3282 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3284 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3287 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00) {
3288 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3291 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3293 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3297 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3298 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
3299 if (ctx
== NULL
|| hctx
== NULL
) {
3300 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3305 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
))
3309 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3312 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3315 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3317 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3318 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3319 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3323 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
3324 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3327 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3330 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3331 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3333 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
) {
3334 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3335 int ret
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, ctx
,
3340 /* Put timeout and length */
3341 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, 0)
3342 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
3343 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3344 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3348 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3349 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3354 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
3356 const EVP_CIPHER
*cipher
= EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3358 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher
);
3359 if (RAND_bytes(iv
, iv_len
) <= 0)
3361 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx
, cipher
, NULL
,
3362 tctx
->ext
.tick_aes_key
, iv
))
3364 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
,
3365 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
),
3366 EVP_sha256(), NULL
))
3368 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
3369 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
));
3373 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3374 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3375 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3377 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, s
->hit
? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
)
3379 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, age_add_u
.age_add
))
3380 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3381 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
3382 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macoffset
)
3383 /* Output key name */
3384 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, key_name
, sizeof(key_name
))
3386 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, iv
, iv_len
)
3387 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
,
3389 /* Encrypt session data */
3390 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx
, encdata1
, &len
, senc
, slen
)
3391 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &encdata2
)
3392 || encdata1
!= encdata2
3393 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx
, encdata1
+ len
, &lenfinal
)
3394 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, lenfinal
, &encdata2
)
3395 || encdata1
+ len
!= encdata2
3396 || len
+ lenfinal
> slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3397 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macendoffset
)
3398 || !HMAC_Update(hctx
,
3399 (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ macoffset
,
3400 macendoffset
- macoffset
)
3401 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &macdata1
)
3402 || !HMAC_Final(hctx
, macdata1
, &hlen
)
3403 || hlen
> EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3404 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, hlen
, &macdata2
)
3405 || macdata1
!= macdata2
3406 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)
3408 && !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
3409 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3411 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3414 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3415 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3421 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3422 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3423 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3428 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3429 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3431 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3433 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.status_type
)
3434 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
,
3435 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
)) {
3436 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3443 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3445 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
3446 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3455 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3456 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3458 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_next_proto(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3460 PACKET next_proto
, padding
;
3461 size_t next_proto_len
;
3464 * The payload looks like:
3466 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3467 * uint8 padding_len;
3468 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3470 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &next_proto
)
3471 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &padding
)
3472 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3473 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3477 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto
, &s
->ext
.npn
, &next_proto_len
)) {
3482 s
->ext
.npn_len
= (unsigned char)next_proto_len
;
3484 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3486 ossl_statem_set_error(s
);
3487 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3491 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3495 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3497 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3498 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3499 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3506 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3508 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
3511 * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release
3512 * (should be s->version)
3514 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
3515 || !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
3517 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3518 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
3522 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
3523 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);