2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
14 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/md5.h>
26 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
);
27 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
);
30 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
31 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
32 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
33 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
35 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
36 * (transition not allowed)
38 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
40 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
43 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
44 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
45 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
47 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
51 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
52 if (s
->hello_retry_request
) {
53 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
54 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
58 } else if (s
->ext
.early_data
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
) {
59 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
) {
60 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
;
67 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
68 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
69 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
70 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
71 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
75 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
76 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
83 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
) {
84 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
85 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
89 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
90 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
96 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
97 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
98 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
105 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
106 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
108 if (s
->early_data_state
== SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
)
110 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
) {
111 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
;
117 /* No valid transition found */
122 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
123 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
124 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
125 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
127 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
128 * (transition not allowed)
130 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL
*s
, int mt
)
132 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
134 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
135 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s
, mt
))
140 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
146 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
147 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
148 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
;
153 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
155 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
156 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
158 * 2) If we did request one then
159 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
161 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
162 * list if we requested a certificate)
164 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
165 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
166 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
167 if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
168 && (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
170 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
171 * not going to accept it because we require a client
174 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
175 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
,
176 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
179 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
183 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
186 } else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
187 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
) {
188 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT
;
195 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
) {
196 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
;
201 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
203 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
204 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
205 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
206 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
207 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
210 if (s
->session
->peer
== NULL
|| st
->no_cert_verify
) {
211 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
213 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
214 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
215 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
216 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
218 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
222 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
) {
223 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
;
229 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
230 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
231 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
236 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
238 if (s
->s3
->npn_seen
) {
239 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
) {
240 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
;
245 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
246 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
255 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
256 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_FINISHED
) {
257 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
;
263 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
264 if (mt
== SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
) {
265 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
;
272 /* No valid transition found */
273 SSLfatal(s
, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
274 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION
,
275 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
280 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
282 * Valid return values are:
286 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
)
288 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
291 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
292 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
293 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
294 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
295 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
298 if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)
300 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
304 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
305 || ((alg_k
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
))
306 && s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
)
307 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
308 || (alg_k
& (SSL_PSK
& (SSL_kDHEPSK
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)))
310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
311 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
312 || (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
)
322 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
324 * Valid return values are:
328 static int send_certificate_request(SSL
*s
)
331 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
332 s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
334 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
335 * during re-negotiation:
337 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
== 0 ||
338 !(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
))
340 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
341 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
344 && (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aNULL
)
346 * ... except when the application insists on
347 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
350 || (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
))
351 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
352 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aSRP
)
354 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
357 && !(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aPSK
)) {
365 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
366 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
369 static WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
371 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
374 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
375 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
378 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
380 /* Shouldn't happen */
381 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
382 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
383 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
384 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
387 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
388 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
;
389 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
391 /* Try to read from the client instead */
392 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
394 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
395 if (s
->hello_retry_request
)
396 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
;
398 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
399 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
401 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
402 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
403 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
405 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
406 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
407 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
409 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
411 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
412 else if (send_certificate_request(s
))
413 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
415 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
417 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
419 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
420 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
421 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
424 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
;
425 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
427 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
428 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
431 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
432 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
;
433 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
435 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
436 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
438 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
440 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
441 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
443 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
444 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
447 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
448 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
450 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
451 if (s
->key_update
!= SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
) {
452 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
;
453 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
457 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
458 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
459 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
465 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
466 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
468 WRITE_TRAN
ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL
*s
)
470 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
473 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
474 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
478 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s
);
480 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
482 /* Shouldn't happen */
483 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
484 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_WRITE_TRANSITION
,
485 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
486 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
489 if (st
->request_state
== TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
) {
490 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
491 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
;
492 st
->request_state
= TLS_ST_BEFORE
;
493 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
495 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
496 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s
)) {
497 /* SSLfatal() already called */
498 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR
;
503 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
504 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
506 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
507 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
508 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
510 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
511 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->d1
->cookie_verified
512 && (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
))
513 st
->hand_state
= DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
515 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
;
516 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
518 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
519 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
521 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
523 if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
)
524 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
526 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
528 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
529 /* normal PSK or SRP */
530 if (!(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
&
531 (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
| SSL_aPSK
))) {
532 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT
;
533 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
534 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
535 } else if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
536 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
538 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
541 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
544 if (s
->ext
.status_expected
) {
545 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
;
546 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
550 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
551 if (send_server_key_exchange(s
)) {
552 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
;
553 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
557 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
558 if (send_certificate_request(s
)) {
559 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
;
560 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
564 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
565 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
;
566 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
568 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
569 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
571 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
573 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
574 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
575 } else if (s
->ext
.ticket_expected
) {
576 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
;
578 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
582 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
583 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
;
584 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
586 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
587 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
;
588 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
590 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
592 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED
;
594 st
->hand_state
= TLS_ST_OK
;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE
;
600 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
601 * the server to the client.
603 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
605 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
607 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
609 /* No pre work to be done */
612 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
615 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
618 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
620 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
621 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s
);
622 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
627 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
628 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
630 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
631 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
637 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
638 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
639 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s
))) {
640 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
641 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s
);
644 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
646 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
647 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
649 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
650 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
651 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
653 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
655 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 0);
656 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
658 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
659 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
665 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
666 s
->session
->cipher
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
;
667 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)) {
668 /* SSLfatal() already called */
671 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
673 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
674 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
675 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
676 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
680 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
682 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
683 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
)
684 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
688 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
689 return tls_finish_handshake(s
, wst
, 1);
692 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
696 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
697 * server to the client.
699 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
701 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
705 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
707 /* No post work to be done */
710 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
711 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
715 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
716 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
718 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
719 /* SSLfatal() already called */
724 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
725 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
727 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
728 if (s
->version
!= DTLS1_BAD_VER
&& !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s
)) {
729 /* SSLfatal() already called */
733 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
734 * treat like it was the first packet
739 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
741 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
742 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
743 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
746 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
749 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
750 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
752 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
753 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
754 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
756 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
757 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_WORK
,
758 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
762 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
763 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
767 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
768 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
769 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
770 * something clever in the record layer for this.
772 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
773 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->setup_key_block(s
)
774 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
775 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
)) {
776 /* SSLfatal() already called */
780 if (s
->ext
.early_data
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
781 && !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
782 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
|SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
783 /* SSLfatal() already called */
789 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
790 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
791 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && !s
->hit
) {
793 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
796 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
800 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
801 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
803 /* SSLfatal() already called */
808 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s
, SSL3_CC_WRITE
);
811 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
812 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
816 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
817 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
820 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->hit
) {
822 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
825 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY
,
829 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
830 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->generate_master_secret(s
,
831 s
->master_secret
, s
->handshake_secret
, 0,
832 &s
->session
->master_key_length
)
833 || !s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
834 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE
))
835 /* SSLfatal() already called */
840 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
841 if (statem_flush(s
) != 1)
843 if (!tls13_update_key(s
, 1)) {
844 /* SSLfatal() already called */
849 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
850 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && statem_flush(s
) != 1)
855 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
859 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
862 * Valid return values are:
866 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
867 confunc_f
*confunc
, int *mt
)
869 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
871 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
873 /* Shouldn't happen */
874 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
875 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE
,
876 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE
);
879 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE
:
881 *confunc
= dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
883 *confunc
= tls_construct_change_cipher_spec
;
884 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
;
887 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
:
888 *confunc
= dtls_construct_hello_verify_request
;
889 *mt
= DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
;
892 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ
:
893 /* No construction function needed */
895 *mt
= SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST
;
898 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO
:
899 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_hello
;
900 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
;
904 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_certificate
;
905 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE
;
908 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY
:
909 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_verify
;
910 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY
;
914 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH
:
915 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_key_exchange
;
916 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
;
919 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ
:
920 *confunc
= tls_construct_certificate_request
;
921 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
;
924 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE
:
925 *confunc
= tls_construct_server_done
;
926 *mt
= SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE
;
929 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
:
930 *confunc
= tls_construct_new_session_ticket
;
931 *mt
= SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
;
934 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
:
935 *confunc
= tls_construct_cert_status
;
936 *mt
= SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
;
939 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED
:
940 *confunc
= tls_construct_finished
;
941 *mt
= SSL3_MT_FINISHED
;
944 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA
:
949 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
:
950 *confunc
= tls_construct_encrypted_extensions
;
951 *mt
= SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
;
954 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
:
955 *confunc
= tls_construct_hello_retry_request
;
956 *mt
= SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
;
959 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE
:
960 *confunc
= tls_construct_key_update
;
961 *mt
= SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
;
969 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
970 * calculated as follows:
972 * 2 + # client_version
973 * 32 + # only valid length for random
974 * 1 + # length of session_id
975 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
976 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
977 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
978 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
979 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
980 * 2 + # length of extensions
981 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
983 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
985 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
986 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
989 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
990 * reading. Excludes the message header.
992 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL
*s
)
994 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
996 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
998 /* Shouldn't happen */
1001 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1002 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH
;
1004 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
1005 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH
;
1007 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT
:
1008 return s
->max_cert_list
;
1010 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1011 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH
;
1013 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
1014 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
;
1016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1017 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
1018 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH
;
1021 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
1022 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH
;
1024 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
1025 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH
;
1027 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1028 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH
;
1033 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1035 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1037 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1039 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1041 /* Shouldn't happen */
1042 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1043 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1044 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1045 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1047 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1048 return tls_process_client_hello(s
, pkt
);
1050 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
:
1051 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s
, pkt
);
1053 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT
:
1054 return tls_process_client_certificate(s
, pkt
);
1056 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1057 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s
, pkt
);
1059 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY
:
1060 return tls_process_cert_verify(s
, pkt
);
1062 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1063 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO
:
1064 return tls_process_next_proto(s
, pkt
);
1067 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE
:
1068 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s
, pkt
);
1070 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED
:
1071 return tls_process_finished(s
, pkt
);
1073 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE
:
1074 return tls_process_key_update(s
, pkt
);
1080 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1083 WORK_STATE
ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
1085 OSSL_STATEM
*st
= &s
->statem
;
1087 switch (st
->hand_state
) {
1089 /* Shouldn't happen */
1090 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1091 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE
,
1092 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1095 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO
:
1096 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s
, wst
);
1098 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH
:
1099 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s
, wst
);
1101 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
1104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1105 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1106 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL
*s
)
1109 int al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
1111 if ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kSRP
) &&
1112 (s
->srp_ctx
.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback
!= NULL
)) {
1113 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
== NULL
) {
1115 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1118 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
,
1119 SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO
,
1120 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
1123 ret
= SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s
, &al
);
1126 if (ret
== SSL3_AL_FATAL
) {
1127 SSLfatal(s
, al
, SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRP_EXT_CLIENTHELLO
,
1128 al
== SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1129 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1130 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1139 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET
*pkt
, unsigned char *cookie
,
1142 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1143 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, DTLS1_VERSION
)
1144 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, cookie
, cookie_len
))
1150 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
1152 unsigned int cookie_leni
;
1153 if (s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb
== NULL
||
1154 s
->ctx
->app_gen_cookie_cb(s
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1155 &cookie_leni
) == 0 ||
1156 cookie_leni
> 255) {
1157 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
,
1158 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE
);
1161 s
->d1
->cookie_len
= cookie_leni
;
1163 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1164 s
->d1
->cookie_len
)) {
1165 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
, SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST
,
1166 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1175 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1176 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1177 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1181 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1183 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1184 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1185 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1186 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1188 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL
*s
, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
)
1190 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock
[] = {
1191 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1192 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1193 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1194 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1195 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1196 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1198 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1199 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1200 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1201 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1202 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1203 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1204 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1205 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1206 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1207 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1208 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1209 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1210 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1212 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1213 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
= 18;
1218 tmppkt
= hello
->extensions
;
1220 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt
, 2)
1221 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt
, &type
)
1222 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt
, &sni
)) {
1226 if (type
!= TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
1229 ext_len
= TLS1_get_client_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
?
1230 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock
) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength
;
1232 s
->s3
->is_probably_safari
= PACKET_equal(&tmppkt
, kSafariExtensionsBlock
,
1235 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1237 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
1239 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1240 PACKET session_id
, compression
, extensions
, cookie
;
1241 static const unsigned char null_compression
= 0;
1242 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*clienthello
;
1244 clienthello
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello
));
1245 if (clienthello
== NULL
) {
1246 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1247 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1250 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1251 if (s
->renegotiate
== 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
1252 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
1253 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION
);
1261 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1263 clienthello
->isv2
= RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s
->rlayer
);
1264 PACKET_null_init(&cookie
);
1266 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1269 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
) || s
->hello_retry_request
) {
1270 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1271 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
1276 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1277 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1278 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1279 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1281 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1282 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1284 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1285 * 7-8 session_id_length
1286 * 9-10 challenge_length
1290 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &mt
)
1291 || mt
!= SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
) {
1293 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1294 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1295 * in the first place
1297 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1298 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1303 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->legacy_version
)) {
1304 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1305 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT
);
1309 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1310 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1312 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1313 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1314 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1316 unsigned int ciphersuite_len
, session_id_len
, challenge_len
;
1319 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &ciphersuite_len
)
1320 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &session_id_len
)
1321 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &challenge_len
)) {
1322 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1323 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1327 if (session_id_len
> SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
) {
1328 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1329 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1333 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
,
1335 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
->session_id
, session_id_len
)
1336 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &challenge
, challenge_len
)
1337 /* No extensions. */
1338 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1339 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1340 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1343 clienthello
->session_id_len
= session_id_len
;
1345 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1346 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1347 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1348 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1350 challenge_len
= challenge_len
> SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1351 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
: challenge_len
;
1352 memset(clienthello
->random
, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1353 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge
,
1354 clienthello
->random
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
-
1355 challenge_len
, challenge_len
)
1356 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1357 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression
, &null_compression
, 1)) {
1358 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1359 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1363 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
->extensions
);
1365 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1366 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt
, clienthello
->random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)
1367 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &session_id
)
1368 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id
, clienthello
->session_id
,
1369 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH
,
1370 &clienthello
->session_id_len
)) {
1371 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1372 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1376 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1377 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &cookie
)) {
1378 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1379 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1382 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie
, clienthello
->dtls_cookie
,
1383 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH
,
1384 &clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
)) {
1385 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1386 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1390 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1391 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1392 * So check cookie length...
1394 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1395 if (clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
== 0)
1396 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING
;
1400 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
)) {
1401 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1402 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1406 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &compression
)) {
1407 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1408 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1412 /* Could be empty. */
1413 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0) {
1414 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello
->extensions
);
1416 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &clienthello
->extensions
)
1417 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
1418 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1419 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
1425 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression
, clienthello
->compressions
,
1426 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE
,
1427 &clienthello
->compressions_len
)) {
1428 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1429 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1433 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1434 extensions
= clienthello
->extensions
;
1435 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1436 &clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
,
1437 &clienthello
->pre_proc_exts_len
, 1)) {
1438 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1441 s
->clienthello
= clienthello
;
1443 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
1446 if (clienthello
!= NULL
)
1447 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
1448 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
);
1450 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
1453 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
)
1456 int i
, al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1461 SSL_COMP
*comp
= NULL
;
1463 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
1464 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *ciphers
= NULL
;
1465 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *scsvs
= NULL
;
1466 CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*clienthello
= s
->clienthello
;
1467 DOWNGRADE dgrd
= DOWNGRADE_NONE
;
1469 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1470 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1471 if (s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb
!= NULL
) {
1472 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1473 switch (s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb(s
, &al
, s
->ctx
->client_hello_cb_arg
)) {
1474 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS
:
1476 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY
:
1477 s
->rwstate
= SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB
;
1479 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR
:
1482 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1483 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
1488 /* Set up the client_random */
1489 memcpy(s
->s3
->client_random
, clienthello
->random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
);
1491 /* Choose the version */
1493 if (clienthello
->isv2
) {
1494 if (clienthello
->legacy_version
== SSL2_VERSION
1495 || (clienthello
->legacy_version
& 0xff00)
1496 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR
<< 8)) {
1498 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1501 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1502 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1503 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
);
1507 s
->client_version
= clienthello
->legacy_version
;
1510 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1511 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1513 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1514 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, clienthello
, &dgrd
);
1515 } else if (s
->method
->version
!= DTLS_ANY_VERSION
&&
1516 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello
->legacy_version
, s
->version
)) {
1517 protverr
= SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW
;
1523 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s
)) {
1524 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1525 s
->version
= s
->client_version
= clienthello
->legacy_version
;
1527 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1528 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1532 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1533 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
1534 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
1535 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1536 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
1540 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1541 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1542 if (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE
) {
1543 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb
!= NULL
) {
1544 if (s
->ctx
->app_verify_cookie_cb(s
, clienthello
->dtls_cookie
,
1545 clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
) == 0) {
1546 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1547 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1548 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1550 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1552 /* default verification */
1553 } else if (s
->d1
->cookie_len
!= clienthello
->dtls_cookie_len
1554 || memcmp(clienthello
->dtls_cookie
, s
->d1
->cookie
,
1555 s
->d1
->cookie_len
) != 0) {
1556 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1557 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1558 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH
);
1561 s
->d1
->cookie_verified
= 1;
1563 if (s
->method
->version
== DTLS_ANY_VERSION
) {
1564 protverr
= ssl_choose_server_version(s
, clienthello
, &dgrd
);
1565 if (protverr
!= 0) {
1566 s
->version
= s
->client_version
;
1567 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION
,
1568 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
, protverr
);
1576 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
,
1577 clienthello
->isv2
) ||
1578 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s
, &clienthello
->ciphersuites
, &ciphers
, &scsvs
,
1579 clienthello
->isv2
, 1)) {
1580 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1584 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 0;
1585 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1586 if (scsvs
!= NULL
) {
1587 for(i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs
); i
++) {
1588 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs
, i
);
1589 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c
) == SSL3_CK_SCSV
) {
1590 if (s
->renegotiate
) {
1591 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1592 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1593 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1594 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING
);
1597 s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
= 1;
1598 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c
) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV
&&
1599 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s
)) {
1601 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1602 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1603 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1604 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1605 * an insecure downgrade.
1607 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
,
1608 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1609 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK
);
1615 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1616 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1617 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
=
1618 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1620 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
1621 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1622 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1623 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1626 if (s
->hello_retry_request
1627 && (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
== NULL
1628 || s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
!= cipher
->id
)) {
1630 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1631 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1633 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1634 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1638 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
1641 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1642 if (!tls_parse_extension(s
, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret
,
1643 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1644 clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0)) {
1645 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1650 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1651 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1653 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1654 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1655 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1656 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1657 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1658 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1659 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1660 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1661 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1662 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1665 if (clienthello
->isv2
||
1667 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
))) {
1668 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1)) {
1669 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1673 i
= ssl_get_prev_session(s
, clienthello
);
1675 /* previous session */
1677 } else if (i
== -1) {
1678 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1682 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s
, 1)) {
1683 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1690 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1691 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1693 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->hit
) {
1695 id
= s
->session
->cipher
->id
;
1698 fprintf(stderr
, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
));
1700 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
); i
++) {
1701 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers
, i
);
1703 fprintf(stderr
, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1704 i
, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers
), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c
));
1713 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1716 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1717 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1718 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING
);
1723 for (loop
= 0; loop
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; loop
++) {
1724 if (clienthello
->compressions
[loop
] == 0)
1728 if (loop
>= clienthello
->compressions_len
) {
1730 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
1731 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1732 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED
);
1736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1737 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
)
1738 ssl_check_for_safari(s
, clienthello
);
1739 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1741 /* TLS extensions */
1742 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1743 clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
, NULL
, 0, 1)) {
1744 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1749 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1750 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1751 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1752 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1756 pos
= s
->s3
->server_random
;
1757 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s
, 1, pos
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
, dgrd
) <= 0) {
1758 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1759 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1760 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1766 && s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
1769 && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1770 const SSL_CIPHER
*pref_cipher
= NULL
;
1772 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1773 * backwards compat reasons
1775 int master_key_length
;
1777 master_key_length
= sizeof(s
->session
->master_key
);
1778 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb(s
, s
->session
->master_key
,
1779 &master_key_length
, ciphers
,
1781 s
->ext
.session_secret_cb_arg
)
1782 && master_key_length
> 0) {
1783 s
->session
->master_key_length
= master_key_length
;
1785 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1786 s
->session
->verify_result
= X509_V_OK
;
1790 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1791 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
)
1792 pref_cipher
= ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
,
1793 SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
1794 if (pref_cipher
== NULL
) {
1795 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1796 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1797 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
1801 s
->session
->cipher
= pref_cipher
;
1802 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list
);
1803 s
->cipher_list
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1804 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->cipher_list_by_id
);
1805 s
->cipher_list_by_id
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1810 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1811 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1812 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1814 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= NULL
;
1815 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1817 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1818 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1819 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1821 if (clienthello
->compressions_len
!= 1) {
1822 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1823 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1824 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1828 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1829 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1830 else if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1831 int m
, comp_id
= s
->session
->compress_meth
;
1833 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1834 /* Can't disable compression */
1835 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s
)) {
1836 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1837 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1838 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1841 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1842 for (m
= 0; m
< sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
); m
++) {
1843 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1844 if (comp_id
== comp
->id
) {
1845 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1849 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
) {
1850 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1851 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1852 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM
);
1855 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1856 for (k
= 0; k
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; k
++) {
1857 if (clienthello
->compressions
[k
] == comp_id
)
1860 if (k
>= clienthello
->compressions_len
) {
1861 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1862 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1863 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING
);
1866 } else if (s
->hit
) {
1868 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s
) && s
->ctx
->comp_methods
) {
1869 /* See if we have a match */
1870 int m
, nn
, v
, done
= 0;
1873 nn
= sk_SSL_COMP_num(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
);
1874 for (m
= 0; m
< nn
; m
++) {
1875 comp
= sk_SSL_COMP_value(s
->ctx
->comp_methods
, m
);
1877 for (o
= 0; o
< clienthello
->compressions_len
; o
++) {
1878 if (v
== clienthello
->compressions
[o
]) {
1887 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
= comp
;
1893 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1894 * using compression.
1896 if (s
->session
->compress_meth
!= 0) {
1897 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1898 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1899 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION
);
1905 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1908 if (!s
->hit
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1909 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s
->session
->ciphers
);
1910 s
->session
->ciphers
= ciphers
;
1911 if (ciphers
== NULL
) {
1912 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1913 SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
1914 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1921 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1922 s
->session
->compress_meth
= 0;
1924 s
->session
->compress_meth
= (comp
== NULL
) ? 0 : comp
->id
;
1926 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s
)) {
1927 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1932 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1933 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs
);
1934 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
1935 OPENSSL_free(s
->clienthello
);
1936 s
->clienthello
= NULL
;
1939 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers
);
1940 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs
);
1941 OPENSSL_free(clienthello
->pre_proc_exts
);
1942 OPENSSL_free(s
->clienthello
);
1943 s
->clienthello
= NULL
;
1949 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1950 * Upon failure, returns 0.
1952 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL
*s
)
1954 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
1957 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1958 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1959 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1960 * influence which certificate is sent
1962 if (s
->ext
.status_type
!= TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
&& s
->ctx
!= NULL
1963 && s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb
!= NULL
) {
1966 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1967 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
!= NULL
) {
1969 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1970 * et al can pick it up.
1972 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
;
1973 ret
= s
->ctx
->ext
.status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->ext
.status_arg
);
1975 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1976 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
1977 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 0;
1979 /* status request response should be sent */
1980 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
:
1981 if (s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
)
1982 s
->ext
.status_expected
= 1;
1984 /* something bad happened */
1985 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
1987 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
1988 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_STATUS_REQUEST
,
1989 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
1999 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2000 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2002 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL
*s
)
2004 const unsigned char *selected
= NULL
;
2005 unsigned char selected_len
= 0;
2007 if (s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb
!= NULL
&& s
->s3
->alpn_proposed
!= NULL
) {
2008 int r
= s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb(s
, &selected
, &selected_len
,
2009 s
->s3
->alpn_proposed
,
2010 (unsigned int)s
->s3
->alpn_proposed_len
,
2011 s
->ctx
->ext
.alpn_select_cb_arg
);
2013 if (r
== SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
2014 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
);
2015 s
->s3
->alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_memdup(selected
, selected_len
);
2016 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
2017 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN
,
2018 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2021 s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
= selected_len
;
2022 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2023 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2024 s
->s3
->npn_seen
= 0;
2027 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2028 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
2029 || selected_len
!= s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
2030 || memcmp(selected
, s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
,
2031 selected_len
) != 0) {
2032 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2033 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;
2036 /* If a new session update it with the new ALPN value */
2037 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_memdup(selected
,
2039 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
2040 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2041 SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN
,
2042 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2045 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= selected_len
;
2050 } else if (r
!= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
) {
2051 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
, SSL_F_TLS_HANDLE_ALPN
,
2052 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL
);
2056 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2061 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2062 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
!= NULL
) {
2063 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2064 s
->ext
.early_data_ok
= 0;
2070 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
2072 const SSL_CIPHER
*cipher
;
2074 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
2075 int rv
= tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s
);
2077 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2084 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_B
) {
2085 if (!s
->hit
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2086 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2087 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->cert
->cert_cb
!= NULL
) {
2088 int rv
= s
->cert
->cert_cb(s
, s
->cert
->cert_cb_arg
);
2090 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2091 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2092 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR
);
2096 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2099 s
->rwstate
= SSL_NOTHING
;
2102 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2103 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2105 ssl3_choose_cipher(s
, s
->session
->ciphers
, SSL_get_ciphers(s
));
2107 if (cipher
== NULL
) {
2108 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2109 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO
,
2110 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER
);
2113 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= cipher
;
2116 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s
, 1)) {
2117 /* SSLfatal already called */
2120 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2121 if (s
->not_resumable_session_cb
!= NULL
)
2122 s
->session
->not_resumable
=
2123 s
->not_resumable_session_cb(s
,
2124 ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
2125 & (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kECDHE
)) != 0));
2126 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
)
2127 /* do not send a session ticket */
2128 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
2131 /* Session-id reuse */
2132 s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
= s
->session
->cipher
;
2136 * we now have the following setup.
2138 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2139 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2140 * compression - basically ignored right now
2141 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2142 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2143 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2144 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2148 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2149 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2151 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s
)) {
2152 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2156 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2157 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2158 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2159 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2161 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !tls_handle_alpn(s
)) {
2162 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2169 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_C
) {
2171 if ((ret
= ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s
)) == 0) {
2173 * callback indicates further work to be done
2175 s
->rwstate
= SSL_X509_LOOKUP
;
2179 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2185 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP
;
2190 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2196 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
2197 version
= SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
: s
->version
;
2198 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, version
)
2200 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2201 * tls_process_client_hello()
2203 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, s
->s3
->server_random
, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
)) {
2204 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
,
2205 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2210 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2211 * back in the server hello:
2212 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2213 * we send back the old session ID.
2214 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2215 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2216 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2217 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2219 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2220 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2221 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2222 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2225 if (s
->session
->not_resumable
||
2226 (!(s
->ctx
->session_cache_mode
& SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER
)
2228 s
->session
->session_id_length
= 0;
2230 sl
= s
->session
->session_id_length
;
2231 if (sl
> sizeof(s
->session
->session_id
)) {
2232 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO
,
2233 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2237 /* set up the compression method */
2238 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2241 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
== NULL
)
2244 compm
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_compression
->id
;
2247 if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
2248 && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->session
->session_id
, sl
))
2249 || !s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, pkt
, &len
)
2250 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
2251 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, compm
))
2252 || !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
2254 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2255 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
,
2257 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2261 if (!(s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
)
2262 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2263 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2270 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2272 if (!s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
) {
2273 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
2274 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2281 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2283 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2284 EVP_PKEY
*pkdh
= NULL
;
2286 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2287 unsigned char *encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2288 size_t encodedlen
= 0;
2291 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= s
->s3
->tmp
.sigalg
;
2295 EVP_MD_CTX
*md_ctx
= EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2296 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2297 size_t paramlen
, paramoffset
;
2299 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, ¶moffset
)) {
2300 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2301 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2305 if (md_ctx
== NULL
) {
2306 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2307 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2311 type
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2313 r
[0] = r
[1] = r
[2] = r
[3] = NULL
;
2314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2315 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2316 if (type
& (SSL_kPSK
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
2318 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2319 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2320 if (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
2321 CERT
*cert
= s
->cert
;
2323 EVP_PKEY
*pkdhp
= NULL
;
2326 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
) {
2327 DH
*dhp
= ssl_get_auto_dh(s
);
2328 pkdh
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2329 if (pkdh
== NULL
|| dhp
== NULL
) {
2331 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2332 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2333 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2336 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh
, dhp
);
2339 pkdhp
= cert
->dh_tmp
;
2341 if ((pkdhp
== NULL
) && (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb
!= NULL
)) {
2342 DH
*dhp
= s
->cert
->dh_tmp_cb(s
, 0, 1024);
2343 pkdh
= ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp
);
2345 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2346 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2347 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2352 if (pkdhp
== NULL
) {
2353 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2354 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2355 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2358 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH
,
2359 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp
), 0, pkdhp
)) {
2360 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2361 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2362 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL
);
2365 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2366 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2367 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2368 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2372 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp
);
2373 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2374 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2378 dh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2380 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2383 DH_get0_pqg(dh
, &r
[0], NULL
, &r
[1]);
2384 DH_get0_key(dh
, &r
[2], NULL
);
2387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2388 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2390 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
!= NULL
) {
2391 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2392 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2393 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2397 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2398 curve_id
= tls1_shared_group(s
, -2);
2399 if (curve_id
== 0) {
2400 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
2401 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2402 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE
);
2405 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= ssl_generate_pkey_group(s
, curve_id
);
2406 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2407 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
== NULL
) {
2408 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2412 /* Encode the public key. */
2413 encodedlen
= EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
,
2415 if (encodedlen
== 0) {
2416 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2417 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_EC_LIB
);
2422 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2423 * can set these to NULLs
2430 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2432 if (type
& SSL_kSRP
) {
2433 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.N
== NULL
) ||
2434 (s
->srp_ctx
.g
== NULL
) ||
2435 (s
->srp_ctx
.s
== NULL
) || (s
->srp_ctx
.B
== NULL
)) {
2436 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2437 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2438 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM
);
2441 r
[0] = s
->srp_ctx
.N
;
2442 r
[1] = s
->srp_ctx
.g
;
2443 r
[2] = s
->srp_ctx
.s
;
2444 r
[3] = s
->srp_ctx
.B
;
2448 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2449 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2450 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE
);
2454 if (((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aSRP
)) != 0)
2455 || ((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_PSK
)) != 0) {
2457 } else if (lu
== NULL
) {
2458 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
2459 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2464 if (type
& SSL_PSK
) {
2465 size_t len
= (s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
== NULL
)
2466 ? 0 : strlen(s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
);
2469 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2470 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2472 if (len
> PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2473 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt
, s
->cert
->psk_identity_hint
,
2475 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2476 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2477 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2483 for (i
= 0; i
< 4 && r
[i
] != NULL
; i
++) {
2484 unsigned char *binval
;
2487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2488 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
2489 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
);
2492 res
= WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
);
2495 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2496 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2497 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2501 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2503 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2504 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2507 if ((i
== 2) && (type
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
))) {
2508 size_t len
= BN_num_bytes(r
[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r
[2]);
2511 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &binval
)) {
2512 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2513 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2514 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2517 memset(binval
, 0, len
);
2521 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, BN_num_bytes(r
[i
]), &binval
)
2522 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2523 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2524 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2525 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2529 BN_bn2bin(r
[i
], binval
);
2532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2533 if (type
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
2535 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2536 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2537 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2540 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
)
2541 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)
2542 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, curve_id
)
2543 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, encodedPoint
, encodedlen
)) {
2544 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2545 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2546 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2549 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2550 encodedPoint
= NULL
;
2556 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
->privatekey
;
2558 unsigned char *sigbytes1
, *sigbytes2
, *tbs
;
2559 size_t siglen
, tbslen
;
2562 if (pkey
== NULL
|| !tls1_lookup_md(lu
, &md
)) {
2563 /* Should never happen */
2564 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2565 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2566 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2570 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2571 * points to the space at the end.
2574 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2575 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt
, ¶mlen
)) {
2576 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2577 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2578 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2581 /* send signature algorithm */
2582 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, lu
->sigalg
)) {
2583 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2584 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2585 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2589 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2590 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2591 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2594 siglen
= EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
);
2595 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes1
)
2596 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx
, &pctx
, md
, NULL
, pkey
) <= 0) {
2597 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2598 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2599 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2602 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
2603 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx
, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING
) <= 0
2604 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx
, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
) <= 0) {
2605 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2606 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2611 tbslen
= construct_key_exchange_tbs(s
, &tbs
,
2612 s
->init_buf
->data
+ paramoffset
,
2615 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2618 rv
= EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx
, sigbytes1
, &siglen
, tbs
, tbslen
);
2620 if (rv
<= 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt
, siglen
, &sigbytes2
)
2621 || sigbytes1
!= sigbytes2
) {
2622 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2623 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
2624 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2629 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2633 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh
);
2635 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2636 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint
);
2638 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx
);
2642 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
2644 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2645 /* TODO(TLS1.3) for now send empty request context */
2646 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
2647 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2648 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2649 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2653 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
2654 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, NULL
,
2656 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2662 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2663 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt
)
2664 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s
, pkt
) || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2665 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2666 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2670 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
2671 const uint16_t *psigs
;
2672 size_t nl
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &psigs
);
2674 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
2675 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt
, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH
)
2676 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, pkt
, psigs
, nl
)
2677 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
2678 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2679 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
,
2680 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2685 if (!construct_ca_names(s
, pkt
)) {
2686 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2691 s
->s3
->tmp
.cert_request
= 1;
2695 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2698 unsigned char psk
[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
];
2700 PACKET psk_identity
;
2702 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &psk_identity
)) {
2703 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2704 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2707 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity
) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
) {
2708 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2709 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG
);
2712 if (s
->psk_server_callback
== NULL
) {
2713 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2714 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB
);
2718 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity
, &s
->session
->psk_identity
)) {
2719 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2720 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2724 psklen
= s
->psk_server_callback(s
, s
->session
->psk_identity
,
2727 if (psklen
> PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
) {
2728 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2729 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2731 } else if (psklen
== 0) {
2733 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2735 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
,
2736 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2737 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
);
2741 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
);
2742 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= OPENSSL_memdup(psk
, psklen
);
2743 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk
, psklen
);
2745 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
== NULL
) {
2746 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
2747 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2751 s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
= psklen
;
2755 /* Should never happen */
2756 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE
,
2757 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2762 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2765 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret
[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
];
2767 unsigned char decrypt_good
, version_good
;
2768 size_t j
, padding_len
;
2769 PACKET enc_premaster
;
2771 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt
= NULL
;
2774 rsa
= EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_RSA
].privatekey
);
2776 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2777 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE
);
2781 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2782 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
|| s
->version
== DTLS1_BAD_VER
) {
2783 enc_premaster
= *pkt
;
2785 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt
, &enc_premaster
)
2786 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2787 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2788 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
2794 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2795 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2796 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2797 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2799 if (RSA_size(rsa
) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2800 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2801 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL
);
2805 rsa_decrypt
= OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa
));
2806 if (rsa_decrypt
== NULL
) {
2807 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2808 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2813 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2814 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2815 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2816 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2817 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2820 if (ssl_randbytes(s
, rand_premaster_secret
,
2821 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
)) <= 0) {
2822 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2823 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2828 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2829 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2831 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2832 decrypt_len
= (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster
),
2833 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster
),
2834 rsa_decrypt
, rsa
, RSA_NO_PADDING
);
2835 if (decrypt_len
< 0) {
2836 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2837 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2841 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2844 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2845 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2846 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2848 if (decrypt_len
< 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
) {
2849 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2850 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
2854 padding_len
= decrypt_len
- SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
;
2855 decrypt_good
= constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[0], 0) &
2856 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt
[1], 2);
2857 for (j
= 2; j
< padding_len
- 1; j
++) {
2858 decrypt_good
&= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[j
]);
2860 decrypt_good
&= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
- 1]);
2863 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2864 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2865 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2866 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2867 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2868 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2871 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
2872 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
>> 8));
2874 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
2875 (unsigned)(s
->client_version
& 0xff));
2878 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2879 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2880 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2881 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2882 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2883 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2886 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
) {
2887 unsigned char workaround_good
;
2888 workaround_good
= constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
],
2889 (unsigned)(s
->version
>> 8));
2891 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ 1],
2892 (unsigned)(s
->version
& 0xff));
2893 version_good
|= workaround_good
;
2897 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2898 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2900 decrypt_good
&= version_good
;
2903 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2904 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2905 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2906 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2908 for (j
= 0; j
< sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
); j
++) {
2909 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
] =
2910 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good
,
2911 rsa_decrypt
[padding_len
+ j
],
2912 rand_premaster_secret
[j
]);
2915 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, rsa_decrypt
+ padding_len
,
2916 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret
), 0)) {
2917 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2923 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt
);
2926 /* Should never happen */
2927 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA
,
2928 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2933 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2935 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2936 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= NULL
;
2940 const unsigned char *data
;
2941 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
2944 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
) || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != i
) {
2945 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
2946 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG
);
2949 skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
2951 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
2952 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2956 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
2957 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
2958 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY
);
2961 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
2962 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2963 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
2964 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2967 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
2968 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) == 0) {
2969 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
2973 cdh
= EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey
);
2974 pub_key
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
);
2976 if (pub_key
== NULL
|| !DH_set0_key(cdh
, pub_key
, NULL
)) {
2977 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
2978 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
2979 if (pub_key
!= NULL
)
2984 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
2985 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2990 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
2991 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
2993 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
2996 /* Should never happen */
2997 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE
,
2998 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3003 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3005 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3006 EVP_PKEY
*skey
= s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
;
3007 EVP_PKEY
*ckey
= NULL
;
3010 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0L) {
3011 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3012 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3013 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY
);
3017 const unsigned char *data
;
3020 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3021 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3024 /* Get encoded point length */
3025 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &i
) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)
3026 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3027 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3028 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3031 ckey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
3032 if (ckey
== NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey
, skey
) <= 0) {
3033 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3037 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey
, data
, i
) == 0) {
3038 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3044 if (ssl_derive(s
, skey
, ckey
, 1) == 0) {
3045 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3050 EVP_PKEY_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
);
3051 s
->s3
->tmp
.pkey
= NULL
;
3053 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey
);
3057 /* Should never happen */
3058 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE
,
3059 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3064 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3066 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3068 const unsigned char *data
;
3070 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &i
)
3071 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, i
)) {
3072 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3073 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH
);
3076 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.A
= BN_bin2bn(data
, i
, NULL
)) == NULL
) {
3077 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3081 if (BN_ucmp(s
->srp_ctx
.A
, s
->srp_ctx
.N
) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s
->srp_ctx
.A
)) {
3082 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3083 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS
);
3086 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->srp_username
);
3087 s
->session
->srp_username
= OPENSSL_strdup(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
3088 if (s
->session
->srp_username
== NULL
) {
3089 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3090 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3094 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s
)) {
3095 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3101 /* Should never happen */
3102 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP
,
3103 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3108 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3110 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3111 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pkey_ctx
;
3112 EVP_PKEY
*client_pub_pkey
= NULL
, *pk
= NULL
;
3113 unsigned char premaster_secret
[32];
3114 const unsigned char *start
;
3115 size_t outlen
= 32, inlen
;
3116 unsigned long alg_a
;
3119 size_t sess_key_len
;
3120 const unsigned char *data
;
3123 /* Get our certificate private key */
3124 alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
3125 if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST12
) {
3127 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3129 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
].privatekey
;
3131 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
].privatekey
;
3134 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
3136 } else if (alg_a
& SSL_aGOST01
) {
3137 pk
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_GOST01
].privatekey
;
3140 pkey_ctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk
, NULL
);
3141 if (pkey_ctx
== NULL
) {
3142 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3143 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3146 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx
) <= 0) {
3147 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3148 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3152 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3153 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3154 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3155 * client certificate for authorization only.
3157 client_pub_pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(s
->session
->peer
);
3158 if (client_pub_pkey
) {
3159 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx
, client_pub_pkey
) <= 0)
3162 /* Decrypt session key */
3163 sess_key_len
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
3164 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt
, &data
, sess_key_len
)) {
3165 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3166 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3169 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3170 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data
, &Tlen
, &Ttag
,
3171 &Tclass
, (long)sess_key_len
) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
3172 || Ttag
!= V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
|| Tclass
!= V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL
) {
3173 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3174 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3179 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx
, premaster_secret
, &outlen
, start
,
3181 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3182 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED
);
3185 /* Generate master secret */
3186 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, premaster_secret
,
3187 sizeof(premaster_secret
), 0)) {
3188 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3191 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3192 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx
, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY
, 2,
3194 s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
= 1;
3198 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx
);
3201 /* Should never happen */
3202 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST
,
3203 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3208 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3210 unsigned long alg_k
;
3212 alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
3214 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3215 if ((alg_k
& SSL_PSK
) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s
, pkt
)) {
3216 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3220 if (alg_k
& SSL_kPSK
) {
3221 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3222 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3223 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3224 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3225 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3228 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3229 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s
, NULL
, 0, 0)) {
3230 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3233 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kRSA
| SSL_kRSAPSK
)) {
3234 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s
, pkt
)) {
3235 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3238 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kDHE
| SSL_kDHEPSK
)) {
3239 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s
, pkt
)) {
3240 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3243 } else if (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) {
3244 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s
, pkt
)) {
3245 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3248 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kSRP
) {
3249 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s
, pkt
)) {
3250 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3253 } else if (alg_k
& SSL_kGOST
) {
3254 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s
, pkt
)) {
3255 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3259 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3260 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3261 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE
);
3265 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING
;
3267 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3268 OPENSSL_clear_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
, s
->s3
->tmp
.psklen
);
3269 s
->s3
->tmp
.psk
= NULL
;
3271 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3274 WORK_STATE
tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL
*s
, WORK_STATE wst
)
3276 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3277 if (wst
== WORK_MORE_A
) {
3278 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
3279 unsigned char sctpauthkey
[64];
3280 char labelbuffer
[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
)];
3282 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3285 memcpy(labelbuffer
, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
,
3286 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL
));
3288 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s
, sctpauthkey
,
3289 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), labelbuffer
,
3290 sizeof(labelbuffer
), NULL
, 0,
3292 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3293 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3294 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3298 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s
), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY
,
3299 sizeof(sctpauthkey
), sctpauthkey
);
3304 if (s
->statem
.no_cert_verify
|| !s
->session
->peer
) {
3306 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3307 * the handshake_buffer
3309 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3310 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3313 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3315 if (!s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
) {
3316 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3317 SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
,
3318 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3322 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3323 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3325 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3326 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3331 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE
;
3334 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_client_certificate(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3337 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret
= MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3339 unsigned long l
, llen
;
3340 const unsigned char *certstart
, *certbytes
;
3341 STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
= NULL
;
3342 PACKET spkt
, context
;
3345 if ((sk
= sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL
) {
3346 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3347 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3351 /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
3352 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &context
))
3353 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt
, &llen
)
3354 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &spkt
, llen
)
3355 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3356 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3357 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3361 for (chainidx
= 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) > 0; chainidx
++) {
3362 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt
, &l
)
3363 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt
, &certbytes
, l
)) {
3364 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3365 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3366 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3370 certstart
= certbytes
;
3371 x
= d2i_X509(NULL
, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes
, l
);
3373 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3374 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB
);
3377 if (certbytes
!= (certstart
+ l
)) {
3378 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3379 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3380 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3384 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3385 RAW_EXTENSION
*rawexts
= NULL
;
3388 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt
, &extensions
)) {
3389 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
,
3390 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3394 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s
, &extensions
,
3395 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
, &rawexts
,
3396 NULL
, chainidx
== 0)
3397 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
,
3398 rawexts
, x
, chainidx
,
3399 PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) == 0)) {
3400 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3403 OPENSSL_free(rawexts
);
3406 if (!sk_X509_push(sk
, x
)) {
3407 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3408 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3409 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3415 if (sk_X509_num(sk
) <= 0) {
3416 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3417 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
3418 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3419 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3420 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED
);
3423 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3424 else if ((s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_PEER
) &&
3425 (s
->verify_mode
& SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
)) {
3426 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED
,
3427 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3428 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE
);
3431 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3432 if (s
->s3
->handshake_buffer
&& !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 0)) {
3433 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3438 i
= ssl_verify_cert_chain(s
, sk
);
3440 SSLfatal(s
, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s
->verify_result
),
3441 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3442 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED
);
3446 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3447 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
, i
);
3450 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk
, 0));
3452 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3453 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE
,
3454 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
);
3459 X509_free(s
->session
->peer
);
3460 s
->session
->peer
= sk_X509_shift(sk
);
3461 s
->session
->verify_result
= s
->verify_result
;
3463 sk_X509_pop_free(s
->session
->peer_chain
, X509_free
);
3464 s
->session
->peer_chain
= sk
;
3467 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3470 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s
, 1)) {
3471 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3476 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3477 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3481 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3483 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s
, s
->cert_verify_hash
,
3484 sizeof(s
->cert_verify_hash
),
3485 &s
->cert_verify_hash_len
)) {
3486 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3490 ret
= MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3494 sk_X509_pop_free(sk
, X509_free
);
3498 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3500 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= s
->s3
->tmp
.cert
;
3503 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3504 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3509 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3510 * for the server Certificate message
3512 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, 0)) {
3513 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3514 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3517 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s
, pkt
, cpk
)) {
3518 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3525 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3527 unsigned char *senc
= NULL
;
3528 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
3529 HMAC_CTX
*hctx
= NULL
;
3530 unsigned char *p
, *encdata1
, *encdata2
, *macdata1
, *macdata2
;
3531 const unsigned char *const_p
;
3532 int len
, slen_full
, slen
, lenfinal
;
3535 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
3536 unsigned char iv
[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
];
3537 unsigned char key_name
[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
];
3539 size_t macoffset
, macendoffset
;
3541 unsigned char age_add_c
[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3545 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3546 if (ssl_randbytes(s
, age_add_u
.age_add_c
, sizeof(age_add_u
)) <= 0) {
3547 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3548 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3549 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3552 s
->session
->ext
.tick_age_add
= age_add_u
.age_add
;
3554 * ticket_nonce is set to a single 0 byte because we only ever send a
3555 * single ticket per connection. IMPORTANT: If we ever support multiple
3556 * tickets per connection then this will need to be changed.
3558 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce
);
3559 s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(char));
3560 if (s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce
== NULL
) {
3561 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3562 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3563 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3566 s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce_len
= 1;
3567 s
->session
->time
= (long)time(NULL
);
3568 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
!= NULL
) {
3569 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
);
3570 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
=
3571 OPENSSL_memdup(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
, s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
);
3572 if (s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
3573 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3574 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3575 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3578 s
->session
->ext
.alpn_selected_len
= s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
;
3580 s
->session
->ext
.max_early_data
= s
->max_early_data
;
3583 /* get session encoding length */
3584 slen_full
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, NULL
);
3586 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3589 if (slen_full
== 0 || slen_full
> 0xFF00) {
3590 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3591 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3594 senc
= OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full
);
3596 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3597 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3601 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3602 hctx
= HMAC_CTX_new();
3603 if (ctx
== NULL
|| hctx
== NULL
) {
3604 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3605 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3610 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s
->session
, &p
)) {
3611 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3612 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3617 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3620 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &const_p
, slen_full
);
3622 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3623 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3626 sess
->session_id_length
= 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3628 slen
= i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, NULL
);
3629 if (slen
== 0 || slen
> slen_full
) {
3630 /* shouldn't ever happen */
3631 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3632 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3633 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3637 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess
, &p
)) {
3638 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3639 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3640 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3643 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
3646 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3647 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3649 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
) {
3650 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3651 int ret
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, key_name
, iv
, ctx
,
3656 /* Put timeout and length */
3657 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, 0)
3658 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, 0)) {
3659 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3660 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3661 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3665 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3666 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3670 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3671 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3672 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED
);
3675 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
3677 const EVP_CIPHER
*cipher
= EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3679 iv_len
= EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher
);
3680 if (ssl_randbytes(s
, iv
, iv_len
) <= 0
3681 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx
, cipher
, NULL
,
3682 tctx
->ext
.tick_aes_key
, iv
)
3683 || !HMAC_Init_ex(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
,
3684 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_hmac_key
),
3685 EVP_sha256(), NULL
)) {
3686 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3687 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3688 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3691 memcpy(key_name
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
3692 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
));
3696 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3697 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3698 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3701 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
,
3702 (s
->hit
&& !SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
3703 ? 0 : s
->session
->timeout
)
3705 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt
, age_add_u
.age_add
)
3706 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt
, s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce
,
3707 s
->session
->ext
.tick_nonce_len
)))
3708 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3709 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt
)
3710 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macoffset
)
3711 /* Output key name */
3712 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, key_name
, sizeof(key_name
))
3714 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt
, iv
, iv_len
)
3715 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
,
3717 /* Encrypt session data */
3718 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx
, encdata1
, &len
, senc
, slen
)
3719 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, len
, &encdata2
)
3720 || encdata1
!= encdata2
3721 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx
, encdata1
+ len
, &lenfinal
)
3722 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, lenfinal
, &encdata2
)
3723 || encdata1
+ len
!= encdata2
3724 || len
+ lenfinal
> slen
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3725 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt
, &macendoffset
)
3726 || !HMAC_Update(hctx
,
3727 (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
+ macoffset
,
3728 macendoffset
- macoffset
)
3729 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt
, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
, &macdata1
)
3730 || !HMAC_Final(hctx
, macdata1
, &hlen
)
3731 || hlen
> EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3732 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt
, hlen
, &macdata2
)
3733 || macdata1
!= macdata2
3734 || !WPACKET_close(pkt
)) {
3735 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3736 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3740 && !tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
,
3741 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET
,
3743 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3746 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3747 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3753 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
3754 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx
);
3759 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3760 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3762 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3764 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt
, s
->ext
.status_type
)
3765 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt
, s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp
,
3766 s
->ext
.ocsp
.resp_len
)) {
3767 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY
,
3768 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3775 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3777 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s
, pkt
)) {
3778 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3787 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3788 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3790 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_next_proto(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3792 PACKET next_proto
, padding
;
3793 size_t next_proto_len
;
3796 * The payload looks like:
3798 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3799 * uint8 padding_len;
3800 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3802 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &next_proto
)
3803 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt
, &padding
)
3804 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) > 0) {
3805 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO
,
3806 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3807 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3810 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto
, &s
->ext
.npn
, &next_proto_len
)) {
3812 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO
,
3813 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3814 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3817 s
->ext
.npn_len
= (unsigned char)next_proto_len
;
3819 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;
3823 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3825 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
,
3827 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3834 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
)
3839 * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release
3840 * (should be s->version)
3842 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
)
3843 || !s
->method
->put_cipher_by_char(s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
, pkt
,
3845 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3846 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3850 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s
, pkt
, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
,
3852 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3856 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
3857 SSL_SESSION_free(s
->session
);
3862 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
3863 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
3865 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s
)) {
3866 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3873 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN
tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
3875 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
3876 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
3877 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH
);
3878 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3881 if (s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
3882 && s
->early_data_state
!= SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY
) {
3883 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
3884 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3885 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3889 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
3890 * a record boundary.
3892 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s
->rlayer
)) {
3893 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
,
3894 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
,
3895 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY
);
3896 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3899 s
->early_data_state
= SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING
;
3900 if (!s
->method
->ssl3_enc
->change_cipher_state(s
,
3901 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ
)) {
3902 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3903 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR
;
3906 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING
;