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Move the extensions context codes into the public API
[thirdparty/openssl.git] / ssl / statem / statem_srvr.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
12 *
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
15 *
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
18 *
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
21 *
22 */
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
25 *
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
28 * license.
29 *
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
33 *
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
37 *
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
42 *
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
47 * OTHERWISE.
48 */
49
50 #include <stdio.h>
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
63
64 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
65 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
66
67 /*
68 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
69 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
70 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
71 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
72 *
73 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
74 * (transition not allowed)
75 */
76 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
77 {
78 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
79
80 /*
81 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
82 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
83 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
84 */
85 switch (st->hand_state) {
86 default:
87 break;
88
89 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
90 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
91 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
92 return 1;
93 }
94 break;
95
96 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
97 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
98 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
99 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
100 return 1;
101 }
102 break;
103 }
104 /* Fall through */
105
106 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
107 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
108 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
109 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
110 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
111 return 1;
112 }
113 } else {
114 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
115 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
116 return 1;
117 }
118 }
119 break;
120
121 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
122 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
123 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
124 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
125 return 1;
126 }
127 } else {
128 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
129 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
130 return 1;
131 }
132 }
133 break;
134
135 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
136 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
137 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
138 return 1;
139 }
140 break;
141
142 case TLS_ST_OK:
143 /*
144 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
145 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
146 */
147 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
148 break;
149 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
150 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
151 return 1;
152 }
153 break;
154 }
155
156 /* No valid transition found */
157 return 0;
158 }
159
160 /*
161 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
162 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
163 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
164 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
165 *
166 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
167 * (transition not allowed)
168 */
169 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
170 {
171 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
172
173 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
174 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
175 goto err;
176 return 1;
177 }
178
179 switch (st->hand_state) {
180 default:
181 break;
182
183 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
184 case TLS_ST_OK:
185 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
186 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
187 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
188 return 1;
189 }
190 break;
191
192 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
193 /*
194 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
195 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
196 * OR
197 * 2) If we did request one then
198 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
199 * AND
200 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
201 * list if we requested a certificate)
202 */
203 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
204 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
205 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
206 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
207 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
208 /*
209 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
210 * not going to accept it because we require a client
211 * cert.
212 */
213 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
214 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
215 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
216 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
217 return 0;
218 }
219 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
220 return 1;
221 }
222 } else {
223 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
224 return 1;
225 }
226 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
227 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
228 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
229 return 1;
230 }
231 }
232 break;
233
234 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
235 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
236 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
237 return 1;
238 }
239 break;
240
241 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
242 /*
243 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
244 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
245 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
246 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
247 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
248 * set.
249 */
250 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
251 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
252 /*
253 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
254 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
255 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
256 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
257 */
258 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
259 return 1;
260 }
261 } else {
262 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
263 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
264 return 1;
265 }
266 }
267 break;
268
269 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
270 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
271 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
272 return 1;
273 }
274 break;
275
276 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
278 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
279 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
280 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
281 return 1;
282 }
283 } else {
284 #endif
285 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
286 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
287 return 1;
288 }
289 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
290 }
291 #endif
292 break;
293
294 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
295 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
296 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
297 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
298 return 1;
299 }
300 break;
301 #endif
302
303 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
304 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
305 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
306 return 1;
307 }
308 break;
309 }
310
311 err:
312 /* No valid transition found */
313 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
314 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
315 return 0;
316 }
317
318 /*
319 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
320 *
321 * Valid return values are:
322 * 1: Yes
323 * 0: No
324 */
325 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
326 {
327 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
328
329 /*
330 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
331 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
332 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
333 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
334 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
335 * key exchange.
336 */
337 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
338 /*
339 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
340 * provided
341 */
342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
343 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
344 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
345 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
346 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
347 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
348 #endif
349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
350 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
351 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
352 #endif
353 ) {
354 return 1;
355 }
356
357 return 0;
358 }
359
360 /*
361 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
362 *
363 * Valid return values are:
364 * 1: Yes
365 * 0: No
366 */
367 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
368 {
369 if (
370 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
371 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
372 /*
373 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
374 * during re-negotiation:
375 */
376 && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
377 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
378 /*
379 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
380 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
381 * RFC 2246):
382 */
383 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
384 /*
385 * ... except when the application insists on
386 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
387 * this for SSL 3)
388 */
389 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
390 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
391 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
392 /*
393 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
394 * are omitted
395 */
396 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
397 return 1;
398 }
399
400 return 0;
401 }
402
403 /*
404 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
405 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
406 * client.
407 */
408 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
409 {
410 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
411
412 /*
413 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
414 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
415 */
416
417 switch (st->hand_state) {
418 default:
419 /* Shouldn't happen */
420 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
421
422 case TLS_ST_OK:
423 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
424 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
425 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
426 }
427 /* Try to read from the client instead */
428 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
429
430 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
431 if (s->hello_retry_request)
432 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
433 else
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
435 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
436
437 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
438 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
439
440 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
441 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
442 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
443
444 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
445 if (s->hit)
446 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
447 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
448 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
449 else
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
451
452 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
453
454 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
455 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
457
458 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
459 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
461
462 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
463 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
464 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
465
466 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
467 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
468 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
469
470 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
471 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
472
473 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
474 /*
475 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
476 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
477 * immediately.
478 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
479 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
480 * session ticket?
481 */
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
483 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
484
485 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
486 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
487 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
488 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
489 }
490 /* Fall through */
491
492 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
493 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
494 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
495 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
496 }
497 }
498
499 /*
500 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
501 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
502 */
503 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
504 {
505 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
506
507 /*
508 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
509 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
510 */
511
512 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
513 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
514
515 switch (st->hand_state) {
516 default:
517 /* Shouldn't happen */
518 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
519
520 case TLS_ST_OK:
521 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
522 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
523 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
524 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
525 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
526 }
527 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
528 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
529 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
530 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
531 }
532 /* Fall through */
533
534 case TLS_ST_BEFORE:
535 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
536 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
537
538 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
539 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
540 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
541
542 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
543 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
544 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
545 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
546 else
547 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
548 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
549
550 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
551 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
552
553 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
554 if (s->hit) {
555 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
556 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
557 else
558 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
559 } else {
560 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
561 /* normal PSK or SRP */
562 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
563 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
564 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
565 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
567 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
568 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
569 } else {
570 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
571 }
572 }
573 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
574
575 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
576 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
577 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
578 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
579 }
580 /* Fall through */
581
582 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
583 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
584 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
586 }
587 /* Fall through */
588
589 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
590 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
591 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
592 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
593 }
594 /* Fall through */
595
596 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
597 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
598 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
599
600 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
601 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
602
603 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
604 if (s->hit) {
605 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
606 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
607 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
608 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
609 } else {
610 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
611 }
612 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
613
614 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
616 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
617
618 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
619 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
620 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
621
622 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
623 if (s->hit) {
624 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
625 }
626 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
627 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
628 }
629 }
630
631 /*
632 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
633 * the server to the client.
634 */
635 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
636 {
637 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
638
639 switch (st->hand_state) {
640 default:
641 /* No pre work to be done */
642 break;
643
644 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
645 s->shutdown = 0;
646 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
647 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
648 break;
649
650 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
651 s->shutdown = 0;
652 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
653 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
654 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
655 st->use_timer = 0;
656 }
657 break;
658
659 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
660 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
661 /*
662 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
663 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
664 */
665 st->use_timer = 1;
666 }
667 break;
668
669 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
671 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
672 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
673 #endif
674 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
675
676 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
677 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
678 /*
679 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
680 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
681 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
682 */
683 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0);
684 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
685 /*
686 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
687 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
688 */
689 st->use_timer = 0;
690 }
691 break;
692
693 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
694 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
695 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
696 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
697 return WORK_ERROR;
698 }
699 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
700 /*
701 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
702 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
703 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
704 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
705 */
706 st->use_timer = 0;
707 }
708 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
709
710 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
711 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING)
712 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
713 /* Fall through */
714
715 case TLS_ST_OK:
716 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
717 }
718
719 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
720 }
721
722 /*
723 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
724 * server to the client.
725 */
726 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
727 {
728 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
729
730 s->init_num = 0;
731
732 switch (st->hand_state) {
733 default:
734 /* No post work to be done */
735 break;
736
737 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
738 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
739 return WORK_MORE_A;
740 break;
741
742 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
743 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
744 return WORK_MORE_A;
745 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
746 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
747 return WORK_ERROR;
748 }
749 break;
750
751 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
752 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
753 return WORK_MORE_A;
754 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
755 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
756 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
757 return WORK_ERROR;
758 }
759 /*
760 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
761 * treat like it was the first packet
762 */
763 s->first_packet = 1;
764 break;
765
766 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
767 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
768 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
769 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
770 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
771
772 /*
773 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
774 * SCTP used.
775 */
776 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
777 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
778
779 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
780 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
781 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
782 0) <= 0) {
783 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
784 return WORK_ERROR;
785 }
786
787 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
788 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
789 }
790 #endif
791 /*
792 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
793 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
794 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
795 * something clever in the record layer for this.
796 */
797 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
798 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
799 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
800 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
801 return WORK_ERROR;
802
803 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
804 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
805 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
806 return WORK_ERROR;
807 }
808 break;
809
810 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
812 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
813 /*
814 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
815 * no SCTP used.
816 */
817 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
818 0, NULL);
819 }
820 #endif
821 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
822 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
823 {
824 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
825 return WORK_ERROR;
826 }
827
828 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
829 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
830 break;
831
832 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
833 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
834 return WORK_MORE_A;
835 break;
836
837 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
838 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
839 return WORK_MORE_A;
840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
841 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
842 /*
843 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
844 * no SCTP used.
845 */
846 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
847 0, NULL);
848 }
849 #endif
850 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
851 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
852 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
853 &s->session->master_key_length)
854 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
855 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
856 return WORK_ERROR;
857 }
858 break;
859
860 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
861 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
862 return WORK_MORE_A;
863 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
864 return WORK_ERROR;
865 break;
866
867 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
868 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
869 return WORK_MORE_A;
870 break;
871 }
872
873 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
874 }
875
876 /*
877 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
878 * server
879 *
880 * Valid return values are:
881 * 1: Success
882 * 0: Error
883 */
884 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
885 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
886 {
887 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
888
889 switch (st->hand_state) {
890 default:
891 /* Shouldn't happen */
892 return 0;
893
894 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
895 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
896 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
897 else
898 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
899 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
900 break;
901
902 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
903 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
904 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
905 break;
906
907 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
908 /* No construction function needed */
909 *confunc = NULL;
910 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
911 break;
912
913 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
914 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
915 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
916 break;
917
918 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
919 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
920 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
921 break;
922
923 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
924 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
925 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
926 break;
927
928
929 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
930 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
931 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
932 break;
933
934 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
935 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
936 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
937 break;
938
939 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
940 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
941 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
942 break;
943
944 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
945 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
946 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
947 break;
948
949 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
950 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
951 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
952 break;
953
954 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
955 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
956 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
957 break;
958
959 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
960 *confunc = NULL;
961 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
962 break;
963
964 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
965 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
966 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
967 break;
968
969 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
970 *confunc = tls_construct_hello_retry_request;
971 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
972 break;
973
974 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
975 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
976 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
977 break;
978 }
979
980 return 1;
981 }
982
983 /*
984 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
985 * calculated as follows:
986 *
987 * 2 + # client_version
988 * 32 + # only valid length for random
989 * 1 + # length of session_id
990 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
991 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
992 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
993 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
994 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
995 * 2 + # length of extensions
996 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
997 */
998 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
999
1000 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1001 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1002
1003 /*
1004 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1005 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1006 */
1007 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1008 {
1009 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1010
1011 switch (st->hand_state) {
1012 default:
1013 /* Shouldn't happen */
1014 return 0;
1015
1016 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1017 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1018
1019 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1020 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1021
1022 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1023 return s->max_cert_list;
1024
1025 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1026 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1027
1028 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1029 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1030
1031 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1032 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1033 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1034 #endif
1035
1036 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1037 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1038
1039 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1040 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1041
1042 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1043 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1044 }
1045 }
1046
1047 /*
1048 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1049 */
1050 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1051 {
1052 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1053
1054 switch (st->hand_state) {
1055 default:
1056 /* Shouldn't happen */
1057 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1058
1059 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1060 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1061
1062 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1063 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1064
1065 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1066 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1067
1068 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1069 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1070
1071 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1072 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1073
1074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1075 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1076 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1077 #endif
1078
1079 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1080 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1081
1082 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1083 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1084
1085 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1086 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1087
1088 }
1089 }
1090
1091 /*
1092 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1093 * from the client
1094 */
1095 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1096 {
1097 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1098
1099 switch (st->hand_state) {
1100 default:
1101 /* Shouldn't happen */
1102 return WORK_ERROR;
1103
1104 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1105 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1106
1107 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1108 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1109
1110 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1112 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
1113 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
1114 /* Are we renegotiating? */
1115 && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
1116 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1117 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1118 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1119 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1120 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
1121 return WORK_MORE_A;
1122 } else {
1123 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
1124 }
1125 #endif
1126 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1127 }
1128 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1129 }
1130
1131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1132 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
1133 {
1134 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
1135
1136 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1137
1138 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1139 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1140 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1141 /*
1142 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1143 * login name
1144 */
1145 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
1146 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
1147 } else {
1148 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
1149 }
1150 }
1151 return ret;
1152 }
1153 #endif
1154
1155 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1156 size_t cookie_len)
1157 {
1158 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1159 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1160 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1161 return 0;
1162
1163 return 1;
1164 }
1165
1166 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1167 {
1168 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1169 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1170 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1171 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1172 cookie_leni > 255) {
1173 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1174 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1175 return 0;
1176 }
1177 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1178
1179 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1180 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1182 return 0;
1183 }
1184
1185 return 1;
1186 }
1187
1188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1189 /*-
1190 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1191 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1192 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1193 * SNI,
1194 * elliptic_curves
1195 * ec_point_formats
1196 *
1197 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1198 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1199 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1200 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1201 */
1202 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1203 {
1204 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1205 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1206 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1207 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1208 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1209 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1210 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1211
1212 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1213 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1214 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1215 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1216 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1217 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1218 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1219 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1220 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1221 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1222 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1223 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1224 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1225 };
1226 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1227 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1228 unsigned int type;
1229 PACKET sni, tmppkt;
1230 size_t ext_len;
1231
1232 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1233
1234 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1235 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1236 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1237 return;
1238 }
1239
1240 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1241 return;
1242
1243 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1244 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1245
1246 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1247 ext_len);
1248 }
1249 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1250
1251 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1252 {
1253 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1254 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1255 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1256 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1257 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello;
1258
1259 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1260 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1262 goto err;
1263 }
1264 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1265 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1266 s->renegotiate = 1;
1267 s->new_session = 1;
1268 }
1269
1270 /*
1271 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1272 */
1273 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1274 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1275
1276 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1277 unsigned int mt;
1278
1279 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) || s->hello_retry_request) {
1280 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1281 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1282 goto f_err;
1283 }
1284
1285 /*-
1286 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1287 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1288 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1289 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1290 * Byte Content
1291 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1292 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1293 * 3-4 version
1294 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1295 * 7-8 session_id_length
1296 * 9-10 challenge_length
1297 * ... ...
1298 */
1299
1300 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1301 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1302 /*
1303 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1304 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1305 * in the first place
1306 */
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1308 goto err;
1309 }
1310 }
1311
1312 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1313 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1315 goto err;
1316 }
1317
1318 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1319 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1320 /*
1321 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1322 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1323 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1324 */
1325 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1326 PACKET challenge;
1327
1328 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1329 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1330 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1332 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1333 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1334 goto f_err;
1335 }
1336
1337 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1338 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1339 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1340 goto f_err;
1341 }
1342
1343 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1344 ciphersuite_len)
1345 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1346 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1347 /* No extensions. */
1348 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1349 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1350 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1351 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1352 goto f_err;
1353 }
1354 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1355
1356 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1357 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1358 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1359 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1360 */
1361 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1362 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1363 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1364 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1365 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1366 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1367 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1368 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1369 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1370 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1371 goto f_err;
1372 }
1373
1374 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1375 } else {
1376 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1377 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1378 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1379 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1380 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1381 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1382 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1383 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1384 goto f_err;
1385 }
1386
1387 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1388 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1389 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1390 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1391 goto f_err;
1392 }
1393 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1394 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1395 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1396 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1398 goto f_err;
1399 }
1400 /*
1401 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1402 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1403 * So check cookie length...
1404 */
1405 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1406 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1407 return 1;
1408 }
1409 }
1410
1411 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1412 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1414 goto f_err;
1415 }
1416
1417 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1418 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1419 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1420 goto f_err;
1421 }
1422
1423 /* Could be empty. */
1424 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1425 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1426 } else {
1427 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)) {
1428 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1430 goto f_err;
1431 }
1432 }
1433 }
1434
1435 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1436 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1437 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1438 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1439 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1440 goto f_err;
1441 }
1442
1443 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1444 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1445 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1446 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts, &al,
1447 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len)) {
1448 /* SSLerr already been called */
1449 goto f_err;
1450 }
1451 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1452
1453 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1454 f_err:
1455 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1456 err:
1457 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1458
1459 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1460 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1461
1462 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1463 }
1464
1465 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, int *al)
1466 {
1467 unsigned int j;
1468 int i;
1469 int protverr;
1470 size_t loop;
1471 unsigned long id;
1472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1473 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1474 #endif
1475 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1476 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1477 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1478 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1479 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1480
1481 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1482 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1483 /* Give the early callback a crack at things */
1484 if (s->ctx->early_cb != NULL) {
1485 int code;
1486 /* A failure in the early callback terminates the connection. */
1487 code = s->ctx->early_cb(s, al, s->ctx->early_cb_arg);
1488 if (code == 0)
1489 goto err;
1490 if (code < 0) {
1491 s->rwstate = SSL_EARLY_WORK;
1492 return code;
1493 }
1494 }
1495
1496 /* Set up the client_random */
1497 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1498
1499 /* Choose the version */
1500
1501 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1502 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1503 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1504 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1505 /*
1506 * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
1507 * support it.
1508 */
1509 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1510 goto err;
1511 }
1512 /* SSLv3/TLS */
1513 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1514 }
1515 /*
1516 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1517 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1518 */
1519 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1520 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1521 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1522 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1523 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1524 } else {
1525 protverr = 0;
1526 }
1527
1528 if (protverr) {
1529 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1530 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1531 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1532 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1533 }
1534 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1535 goto err;
1536 }
1537
1538 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1539 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1540 *al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1541 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1542 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1543 goto err;
1544 }
1545
1546 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1547 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1548 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1549 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1550 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1551 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1552 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1553 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1554 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1555 goto err;
1556 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1557 }
1558 /* default verification */
1559 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1560 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1561 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1562 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1563 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1564 goto err;
1565 }
1566 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1567 }
1568 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1569 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1570 if (protverr != 0) {
1571 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1572 s->version = s->client_version;
1573 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1574 goto err;
1575 }
1576 }
1577 }
1578
1579 s->hit = 0;
1580
1581 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1582 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1583 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1584 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, al)) {
1585 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1586 goto err;
1587 }
1588
1589 /*
1590 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1591 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1592 *
1593 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1594 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1595 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1596 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1597 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1598 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1599 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1600 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1601 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1602 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1603 * ignored.
1604 */
1605 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1606 (s->new_session &&
1607 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1608 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1609 goto err;
1610 } else {
1611 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello, al);
1612 if (i == 1) {
1613 /* previous session */
1614 s->hit = 1;
1615 } else if (i == -1) {
1616 goto err;
1617 } else {
1618 /* i == 0 */
1619 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1620 goto err;
1621 }
1622 }
1623
1624 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1625 clienthello->isv2, al) ||
1626 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1627 clienthello->isv2, al)) {
1628 goto err;
1629 }
1630
1631 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
1632 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1633 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1634 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1635 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1636 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1637 if (s->renegotiate) {
1638 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1639 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1640 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1641 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1642 goto err;
1643 }
1644 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1645 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1646 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1647 /*
1648 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1649 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1650 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1651 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1652 * an insecure downgrade.
1653 */
1654 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1655 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1656 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
1657 goto err;
1658 }
1659 }
1660 }
1661
1662 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1663 if (s->hit) {
1664 j = 0;
1665 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1666
1667 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1668 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1669 #endif
1670 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1671 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1672 #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1673 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1674 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1675 #endif
1676 if (c->id == id) {
1677 j = 1;
1678 break;
1679 }
1680 }
1681 if (j == 0) {
1682 /*
1683 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1684 * to reuse it
1685 */
1686 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1687 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1688 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1689 goto err;
1690 }
1691 }
1692
1693 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1694 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1695 break;
1696 }
1697
1698 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1699 /* no compress */
1700 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1702 goto err;
1703 }
1704
1705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1706 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1707 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1708 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1709
1710 /* TLS extensions */
1711 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1712 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, al)) {
1713 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1714 goto err;
1715 }
1716
1717 /*
1718 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1719 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1720 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1721 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1722 */
1723 {
1724 unsigned char *pos;
1725 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1726 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1727 goto err;
1728 }
1729 }
1730
1731 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1732 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1733 /*
1734 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1735 * backwards compat reasons
1736 */
1737 int master_key_length;
1738
1739 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1740 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1741 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1742 &pref_cipher,
1743 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1744 && master_key_length > 0) {
1745 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1746 s->hit = 1;
1747 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1748 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1749
1750 ciphers = NULL;
1751
1752 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1753 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1754 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1755 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1756 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1757 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1759 goto err;
1760 }
1761
1762 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1763 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1764 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1765 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1766 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1767 }
1768 }
1769
1770 /*
1771 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1772 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1773 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1774 */
1775 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1776 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1777 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1778 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1779 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1780 unsigned int k;
1781 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1782 /* Can't disable compression */
1783 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1784 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1785 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1786 goto err;
1787 }
1788 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1789 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1790 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1791 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1792 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1793 break;
1794 }
1795 }
1796 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1798 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1799 goto err;
1800 }
1801 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1802 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1803 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1804 break;
1805 }
1806 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1807 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1808 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1809 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1810 goto err;
1811 }
1812 } else if (s->hit) {
1813 comp = NULL;
1814 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods
1815 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1816 /* See if we have a match */
1817 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1818 unsigned int o;
1819
1820 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1821 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1822 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1823 v = comp->id;
1824 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
1825 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
1826 done = 1;
1827 break;
1828 }
1829 }
1830 if (done)
1831 break;
1832 }
1833 if (done)
1834 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1835 else
1836 comp = NULL;
1837 }
1838 #else
1839 /*
1840 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1841 * using compression.
1842 */
1843 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1844 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1845 goto err;
1846 }
1847 #endif
1848
1849 /*
1850 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1851 */
1852
1853 if (!s->hit || s->hello_retry_request) {
1854 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1855 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1856 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1857 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1858 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1859 goto err;
1860 }
1861 ciphers = NULL;
1862 }
1863
1864 if (!s->hit) {
1865 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1866 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1867 #else
1868 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1869 #endif
1870 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1871 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1872 goto err;
1873 }
1874 }
1875
1876 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1877 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1878 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1879 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1880 s->clienthello = NULL;
1881 return 1;
1882 err:
1883 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1884
1885 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1886 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1887 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1888 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1889 s->clienthello = NULL;
1890
1891 return 0;
1892 }
1893
1894 /*
1895 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1896 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
1897 */
1898 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s, int *al)
1899 {
1900 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1901
1902 /*
1903 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1904 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1905 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1906 * influence which certificate is sent
1907 */
1908 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
1909 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
1910 int ret;
1911
1912 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1913 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
1914 /*
1915 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1916 * et al can pick it up.
1917 */
1918 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
1919 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
1920 switch (ret) {
1921 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1922 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1923 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1924 break;
1925 /* status request response should be sent */
1926 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1927 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
1928 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1929 break;
1930 /* something bad happened */
1931 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1932 default:
1933 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1934 return 0;
1935 }
1936 }
1937 }
1938
1939 return 1;
1940 }
1941
1942 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1943 {
1944 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1945 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1946
1947 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1948 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s, &al);
1949 if (rv == 0) {
1950 /* SSLErr() was already called */
1951 goto f_err;
1952 }
1953 if (rv < 0)
1954 return WORK_MORE_A;
1955 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
1956 }
1957 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1958 if (!s->hit || s->hello_retry_request) {
1959 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1960 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1961 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1962 if (rv == 0) {
1963 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1965 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1966 goto f_err;
1967 }
1968 if (rv < 0) {
1969 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1970 return WORK_MORE_B;
1971 }
1972 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1973 }
1974 cipher =
1975 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1976
1977 if (cipher == NULL) {
1978 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1979 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1980 goto f_err;
1981 }
1982 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1983 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id) {
1984 /*
1985 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1986 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1987 */
1988 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
1990 goto f_err;
1991 }
1992 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1993 if (!s->hit) {
1994 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, &al))
1995 goto f_err;
1996 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1997 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1998 s->session->not_resumable =
1999 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, ((cipher->algorithm_mkey
2000 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
2001 != 0));
2002 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2003 /* do not send a session ticket */
2004 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2005 }
2006 } else {
2007 /* Session-id reuse */
2008 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2009 }
2010
2011 /*-
2012 * we now have the following setup.
2013 * client_random
2014 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2015 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2016 * compression - basically ignored right now
2017 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2018 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2019 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2020 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2021 */
2022
2023 /*
2024 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2025 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2026 */
2027 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s, &al)) {
2028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2029 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2030 goto f_err;
2031 }
2032
2033 wst = WORK_MORE_C;
2034 }
2035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2036 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2037 int ret;
2038 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
2039 /*
2040 * callback indicates further work to be done
2041 */
2042 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2043 return WORK_MORE_C;
2044 }
2045 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
2046 /*
2047 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
2048 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
2049 */
2050 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
2051 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2052 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2053 else
2054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2055 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2056 goto f_err;
2057 }
2058 }
2059 #endif
2060
2061 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2062 f_err:
2063 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2064 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2065 return WORK_ERROR;
2066 }
2067
2068 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2069 {
2070 int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2071 size_t sl, len;
2072 int version;
2073
2074 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
2075 version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version;
2076 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2077 /*
2078 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2079 * tls_process_client_hello()
2080 */
2081 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2082 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2083 goto err;
2084 }
2085
2086 /*-
2087 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2088 * back in the server hello:
2089 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2090 * we send back the old session ID.
2091 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2092 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2093 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2094 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2095 * session ID.
2096 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2097 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2098 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2099 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2100 * to send back.
2101 */
2102 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2103 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2104 && !s->hit))
2105 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2106
2107 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2108 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2110 goto err;
2111 }
2112
2113 /* set up the compression method */
2114 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2115 compm = 0;
2116 #else
2117 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2118 compm = 0;
2119 else
2120 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2121 #endif
2122
2123 if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2124 && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl))
2125 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2126 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2127 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm))
2128 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2129 SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2130 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2131 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
2132 NULL, 0, &al)) {
2133 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2134 goto err;
2135 }
2136
2137 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2138 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2139 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2140 goto err;
2141 }
2142
2143 return 1;
2144 err:
2145 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2146 return 0;
2147 }
2148
2149 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2150 {
2151 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2152 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2153 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2154 return 0;
2155 }
2156 }
2157 return 1;
2158 }
2159
2160 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2161 {
2162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2163 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2164 #endif
2165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2166 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2167 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2168 int curve_id = 0;
2169 #endif
2170 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2171 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
2172 unsigned long type;
2173 const BIGNUM *r[4];
2174 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2175 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2176 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2177
2178 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &paramoffset)) {
2179 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2180 goto f_err;
2181 }
2182
2183 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2184 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2185 goto f_err;
2186 }
2187
2188 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2189
2190 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2191 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2192 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2193 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2194 } else
2195 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2197 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2198 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2199
2200 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2201 DH *dh;
2202
2203 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2204 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2205 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2206 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2207 DH_free(dhp);
2208 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2209 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2210 goto f_err;
2211 }
2212 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2213 pkdhp = pkdh;
2214 } else {
2215 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2216 }
2217 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2218 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2219 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2220 if (pkdh == NULL) {
2221 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2222 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2223 goto f_err;
2224 }
2225 pkdhp = pkdh;
2226 }
2227 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2228 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2230 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2231 goto f_err;
2232 }
2233 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2234 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2235 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2237 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2238 goto f_err;
2239 }
2240 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2241 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2242 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2243 goto err;
2244 }
2245
2246 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2247
2248 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2249 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2250 goto err;
2251 }
2252
2253 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2254
2255 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2256 pkdh = NULL;
2257
2258 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2259 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2260 } else
2261 #endif
2262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2263 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2264 int nid;
2265
2266 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2268 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2269 goto err;
2270 }
2271
2272 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2273 nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2274 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
2275 if (curve_id == 0) {
2276 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2277 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2278 goto err;
2279 }
2280 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
2281 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2282 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2283 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2284 goto f_err;
2285 }
2286
2287 /* Encode the public key. */
2288 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2289 &encodedPoint);
2290 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2292 goto err;
2293 }
2294
2295 /*
2296 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2297 * can set these to NULLs
2298 */
2299 r[0] = NULL;
2300 r[1] = NULL;
2301 r[2] = NULL;
2302 r[3] = NULL;
2303 } else
2304 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2305 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2306 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2307 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2308 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2309 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2310 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2311 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2312 goto err;
2313 }
2314 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2315 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2316 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2317 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2318 } else
2319 #endif
2320 {
2321 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2322 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2323 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2324 goto f_err;
2325 }
2326
2327 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2328 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2329 lu = NULL;
2330 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2331 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2332 goto f_err;
2333 }
2334
2335 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2336 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2337 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2338 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2339
2340 /*
2341 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2342 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2343 */
2344 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2345 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2346 len)) {
2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2348 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2349 goto f_err;
2350 }
2351 }
2352 #endif
2353
2354 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2355 unsigned char *binval;
2356 int res;
2357
2358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2359 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2360 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2361 } else
2362 #endif
2363 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2364
2365 if (!res) {
2366 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2367 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2368 goto f_err;
2369 }
2370
2371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2372 /*-
2373 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2374 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2375 * as the prime
2376 */
2377 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2378 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2379
2380 if (len > 0) {
2381 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2382 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2383 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2384 goto f_err;
2385 }
2386 memset(binval, 0, len);
2387 }
2388 }
2389 #endif
2390 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2391 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2392 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2393 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2394 goto f_err;
2395 }
2396
2397 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2398 }
2399
2400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2401 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2402 /*
2403 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2404 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2405 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2406 * point itself
2407 */
2408 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2409 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2410 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2411 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2412 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2413 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2414 goto f_err;
2415 }
2416 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2417 encodedPoint = NULL;
2418 }
2419 #endif
2420
2421 /* not anonymous */
2422 if (lu != NULL) {
2423 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2424 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
2425 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
2426 size_t siglen;
2427
2428 if (pkey == NULL || md == NULL) {
2429 /* Should never happen */
2430 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2431 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2432 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2433 goto f_err;
2434 }
2435 /*
2436 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2437 * points to the space at the end.
2438 */
2439
2440 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2441 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &paramlen)) {
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2443 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2444 goto f_err;
2445 }
2446 /* send signature algorithm */
2447 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg))
2448 return 0;
2449 /*
2450 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2451 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2452 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2453 * afterwards.
2454 */
2455 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2456 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2457 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2459 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2460 goto f_err;
2461 }
2462 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2463 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2464 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2465 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2466 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2467 goto f_err;
2468 }
2469 }
2470 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2471 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2472 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2473 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2474 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx,
2475 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2476 paramlen) <= 0
2477 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen) <= 0
2478 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2479 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2481 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2482 goto f_err;
2483 }
2484 }
2485
2486 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2487 return 1;
2488 f_err:
2489 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2490 err:
2491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2492 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2493 #endif
2494 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2495 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2496 #endif
2497 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2498 return 0;
2499 }
2500
2501 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2502 {
2503 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2504
2505 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2506 /* TODO(TLS1.3) for now send empty request context */
2507 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2509 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2510 goto err;
2511 }
2512
2513 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2514 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2515 0, &al)) {
2516 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2517 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2518 goto err;
2519 }
2520 goto done;
2521 }
2522
2523 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2524 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2525 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2527 goto err;
2528 }
2529
2530 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2531 const uint16_t *psigs;
2532 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2533
2534 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2535 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2536 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2537 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2538 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2539 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2540 goto err;
2541 }
2542 }
2543
2544 if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2545 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2546 goto err;
2547 }
2548
2549 done:
2550 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2551 return 1;
2552 err:
2553 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2554 return 0;
2555 }
2556
2557 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2558 {
2559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2560 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2561 size_t psklen;
2562 PACKET psk_identity;
2563
2564 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2565 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2567 return 0;
2568 }
2569 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2570 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2571 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2572 return 0;
2573 }
2574 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2575 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2576 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2577 return 0;
2578 }
2579
2580 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2581 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2582 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2583 return 0;
2584 }
2585
2586 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2587 psk, sizeof(psk));
2588
2589 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2590 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2591 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2592 return 0;
2593 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2594 /*
2595 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2596 */
2597 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2598 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2599 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2600 return 0;
2601 }
2602
2603 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2604 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2605 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2606
2607 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2608 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2610 return 0;
2611 }
2612
2613 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2614
2615 return 1;
2616 #else
2617 /* Should never happen */
2618 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2619 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2620 return 0;
2621 #endif
2622 }
2623
2624 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2625 {
2626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2627 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2628 int decrypt_len;
2629 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2630 size_t j, padding_len;
2631 PACKET enc_premaster;
2632 RSA *rsa = NULL;
2633 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2634 int ret = 0;
2635
2636 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2637 if (rsa == NULL) {
2638 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2640 return 0;
2641 }
2642
2643 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2644 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2645 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2646 } else {
2647 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2648 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2649 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2651 return 0;
2652 }
2653 }
2654
2655 /*
2656 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2657 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2658 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2659 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2660 */
2661 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2662 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2663 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2664 return 0;
2665 }
2666
2667 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2668 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2669 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2670 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2671 return 0;
2672 }
2673
2674 /*
2675 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2676 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2677 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2678 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2679 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2680 */
2681
2682 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2683 goto err;
2684
2685 /*
2686 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2687 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2688 */
2689 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2690 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2691 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2692 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2693 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2694 goto err;
2695
2696 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2697
2698 /*
2699 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2700 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2701 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2702 */
2703 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2704 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2705 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2706 goto err;
2707 }
2708
2709 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2710 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2711 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2712 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2713 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2714 }
2715 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2716
2717 /*
2718 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2719 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2720 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2721 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2722 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2723 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2724 */
2725 version_good =
2726 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2727 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2728 version_good &=
2729 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2730 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2731
2732 /*
2733 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2734 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2735 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2736 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2737 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2738 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2739 * clients.
2740 */
2741 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2742 unsigned char workaround_good;
2743 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2744 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2745 workaround_good &=
2746 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2747 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2748 version_good |= workaround_good;
2749 }
2750
2751 /*
2752 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2753 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2754 */
2755 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2756
2757 /*
2758 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2759 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2760 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2761 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2762 */
2763 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2764 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2765 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2766 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2767 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2768 }
2769
2770 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2771 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2772 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2774 goto err;
2775 }
2776
2777 ret = 1;
2778 err:
2779 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2780 return ret;
2781 #else
2782 /* Should never happen */
2783 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2784 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2785 return 0;
2786 #endif
2787 }
2788
2789 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2790 {
2791 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2792 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2793 DH *cdh;
2794 unsigned int i;
2795 BIGNUM *pub_key;
2796 const unsigned char *data;
2797 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2798 int ret = 0;
2799
2800 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2801 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2802 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2803 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2804 goto err;
2805 }
2806 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2807 if (skey == NULL) {
2808 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2809 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2810 goto err;
2811 }
2812
2813 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2814 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2815 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2816 goto err;
2817 }
2818 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2819 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2820 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2822 goto err;
2823 }
2824 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2825 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2826 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2827 goto err;
2828 }
2829 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2830 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2831
2832 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2833 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2834 if (pub_key != NULL)
2835 BN_free(pub_key);
2836 goto err;
2837 }
2838
2839 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2840 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2841 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2842 goto err;
2843 }
2844
2845 ret = 1;
2846 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2847 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2848 err:
2849 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2850 return ret;
2851 #else
2852 /* Should never happen */
2853 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2854 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2855 return 0;
2856 #endif
2857 }
2858
2859 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2860 {
2861 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2862 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2863 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2864 int ret = 0;
2865
2866 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2867 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2868 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2869 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2870 goto err;
2871 } else {
2872 unsigned int i;
2873 const unsigned char *data;
2874
2875 /*
2876 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2877 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2878 */
2879
2880 /* Get encoded point length */
2881 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2882 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2883 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2884 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2885 goto err;
2886 }
2887 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2888 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2889 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2890 goto err;
2891 }
2892 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2893 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2894 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2895 goto err;
2896 }
2897 }
2898
2899 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2900 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2901 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2902 goto err;
2903 }
2904
2905 ret = 1;
2906 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2907 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2908 err:
2909 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2910
2911 return ret;
2912 #else
2913 /* Should never happen */
2914 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2915 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2916 return 0;
2917 #endif
2918 }
2919
2920 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2921 {
2922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2923 unsigned int i;
2924 const unsigned char *data;
2925
2926 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2927 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2928 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2929 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2930 return 0;
2931 }
2932 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2934 return 0;
2935 }
2936 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2937 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2938 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2939 return 0;
2940 }
2941 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2942 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2943 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2945 return 0;
2946 }
2947
2948 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2950 return 0;
2951 }
2952
2953 return 1;
2954 #else
2955 /* Should never happen */
2956 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2957 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2958 return 0;
2959 #endif
2960 }
2961
2962 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2963 {
2964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2965 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2966 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2967 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2968 const unsigned char *start;
2969 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2970 unsigned long alg_a;
2971 int Ttag, Tclass;
2972 long Tlen;
2973 size_t sess_key_len;
2974 const unsigned char *data;
2975 int ret = 0;
2976
2977 /* Get our certificate private key */
2978 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2979 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2980 /*
2981 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2982 */
2983 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2984 if (pk == NULL) {
2985 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2986 }
2987 if (pk == NULL) {
2988 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2989 }
2990 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2991 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2992 }
2993
2994 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2995 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2996 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2997 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2998 return 0;
2999 }
3000 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3001 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3003 return 0;
3004 }
3005 /*
3006 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3007 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3008 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3009 * client certificate for authorization only.
3010 */
3011 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3012 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3013 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3014 ERR_clear_error();
3015 }
3016 /* Decrypt session key */
3017 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
3018 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
3019 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3020 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3021 goto err;
3022 }
3023 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3024 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
3025 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
3026 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
3027 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3029 goto err;
3030 }
3031 start = data;
3032 inlen = Tlen;
3033 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
3034 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
3035 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3037 goto err;
3038 }
3039 /* Generate master secret */
3040 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3041 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3042 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3044 goto err;
3045 }
3046 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3047 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
3048 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
3049 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3050
3051 ret = 1;
3052 err:
3053 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3054 return ret;
3055 #else
3056 /* Should never happen */
3057 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3058 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3059 return 0;
3060 #endif
3061 }
3062
3063 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3064 {
3065 int al = -1;
3066 unsigned long alg_k;
3067
3068 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3069
3070 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3071 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3072 goto err;
3073
3074 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3075 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3076 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3077 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3078 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3079 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3080 goto err;
3081 }
3082 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3083 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3084 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3085 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3086 goto err;
3087 }
3088 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3089 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3090 goto err;
3091 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3092 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3093 goto err;
3094 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3095 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3096 goto err;
3097 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3098 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3099 goto err;
3100 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3101 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3102 goto err;
3103 } else {
3104 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3105 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3106 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3107 goto err;
3108 }
3109
3110 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3111 err:
3112 if (al != -1)
3113 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3114 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3115 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3116 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3117 #endif
3118 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3119 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3120 }
3121
3122 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3123 {
3124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3125 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3126 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3127 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3128 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3129 /*
3130 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3131 * used.
3132 */
3133 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3134 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3135
3136 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3137 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3138 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
3139 0) <= 0) {
3140 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3141 return WORK_ERROR;
3142 }
3143
3144 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3145 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3146 }
3147 wst = WORK_MORE_B;
3148 }
3149
3150 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
3151 /* Is this SCTP? */
3152 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
3153 /* Are we renegotiating? */
3154 && s->renegotiate
3155 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
3156 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
3157 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
3158 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
3159 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
3160 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
3161 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
3162 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
3163 return WORK_MORE_B;
3164 } else {
3165 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
3166 }
3167 #endif
3168
3169 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3170 /*
3171 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3172 * the handshake_buffer
3173 */
3174 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3175 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3176 return WORK_ERROR;
3177 }
3178 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3179 } else {
3180 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3181 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3182 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3183 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3184 return WORK_ERROR;
3185 }
3186 /*
3187 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3188 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3189 */
3190 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3191 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3192 return WORK_ERROR;
3193 }
3194 }
3195
3196 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3197 }
3198
3199 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3200 {
3201 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3202 X509 *x = NULL;
3203 unsigned long l, llen;
3204 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3205 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3206 PACKET spkt, context;
3207 size_t chainidx;
3208
3209 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3210 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3211 goto f_err;
3212 }
3213
3214 /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
3215 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context))
3216 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
3217 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
3218 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3219 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3221 goto f_err;
3222 }
3223
3224 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3225 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3226 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3227 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3229 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3230 goto f_err;
3231 }
3232
3233 certstart = certbytes;
3234 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3235 if (x == NULL) {
3236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3237 goto f_err;
3238 }
3239 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3240 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3241 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3242 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3243 goto f_err;
3244 }
3245
3246 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3247 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3248 PACKET extensions;
3249
3250 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3251 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3252 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3253 goto f_err;
3254 }
3255 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3256 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3257 &al, NULL)
3258 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3259 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
3260 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3261 goto f_err;
3262 }
3263 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3264 }
3265
3266 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3268 goto f_err;
3269 }
3270 x = NULL;
3271 }
3272
3273 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3274 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3275 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3276 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3278 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3279 goto f_err;
3280 }
3281 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3282 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3283 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3284 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3285 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3286 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED;
3287 goto f_err;
3288 }
3289 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3290 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3291 goto f_err;
3292 }
3293 } else {
3294 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
3295 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3296 if (i <= 0) {
3297 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3298 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3299 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3300 goto f_err;
3301 }
3302 if (i > 1) {
3303 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3304 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3305 goto f_err;
3306 }
3307 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3308 if (pkey == NULL) {
3309 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3310 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3311 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3312 goto f_err;
3313 }
3314 }
3315
3316 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3317 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3318 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3319
3320 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3321 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3322
3323 /*
3324 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3325 * message
3326 */
3327 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3328 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3329 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3330 goto f_err;
3331 }
3332
3333 /*
3334 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3335 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3336 */
3337 sk = NULL;
3338
3339 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3340 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
3341 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3342 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3343 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3344 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3345 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3346 goto f_err;
3347 }
3348
3349 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3350 goto done;
3351
3352 f_err:
3353 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3354 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3355 done:
3356 X509_free(x);
3357 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3358 return ret;
3359 }
3360
3361 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3362 {
3363 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3364 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3365
3366 if (cpk == NULL) {
3367 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3368 return 0;
3369 }
3370
3371 /*
3372 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3373 * for the server Certificate message
3374 */
3375 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3376 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &al)) {
3377 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3378 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3379 return 0;
3380 }
3381
3382 return 1;
3383 }
3384
3385 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3386 {
3387 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3388 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3389 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3390 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3391 const unsigned char *const_p;
3392 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3393 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3394 unsigned int hlen;
3395 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3396 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3397 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3398 int iv_len, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3399 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3400 union {
3401 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3402 uint32_t age_add;
3403 } age_add_u;
3404
3405 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3406 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0)
3407 goto err;
3408 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
3409 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
3410 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
3411 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
3412 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
3413 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
3414 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
3415 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3416 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3417 goto err;
3418 }
3419 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
3420 }
3421 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
3422 }
3423
3424 /* get session encoding length */
3425 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3426 /*
3427 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3428 * long
3429 */
3430 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3431 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3432 goto err;
3433 }
3434 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3435 if (senc == NULL) {
3436 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3437 goto err;
3438 }
3439
3440 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3441 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3442 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3443 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3444 goto err;
3445 }
3446
3447 p = senc;
3448 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3449 goto err;
3450
3451 /*
3452 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3453 */
3454 const_p = senc;
3455 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3456 if (sess == NULL)
3457 goto err;
3458 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3459
3460 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3461 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3462 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3463 goto err;
3464 }
3465 p = senc;
3466 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3467 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3468 goto err;
3469 }
3470 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3471
3472 /*
3473 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3474 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3475 */
3476 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3477 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3478 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3479 hctx, 1);
3480
3481 if (ret == 0) {
3482
3483 /* Put timeout and length */
3484 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3485 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3486 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3487 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3488 goto err;
3489 }
3490 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3491 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3492 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3493 return 1;
3494 }
3495 if (ret < 0)
3496 goto err;
3497 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3498 } else {
3499 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3500
3501 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3502 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3503 goto err;
3504 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3505 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv))
3506 goto err;
3507 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
3508 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
3509 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3510 goto err;
3511 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3512 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3513 }
3514
3515 /*
3516 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3517 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3518 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3519 * timeout.
3520 */
3521 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3522 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3523 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3524 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
3525 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add))
3526 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3527 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3528 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3529 /* Output key name */
3530 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3531 /* output IV */
3532 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3533 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3534 &encdata1)
3535 /* Encrypt session data */
3536 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3537 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3538 || encdata1 != encdata2
3539 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3540 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3541 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3542 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3543 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3544 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3545 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3546 macendoffset - macoffset)
3547 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3548 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3549 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3550 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3551 || macdata1 != macdata2
3552 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
3553 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
3554 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3555 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3556 NULL, 0, &al))) {
3557 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3558 goto err;
3559 }
3560 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3561 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3562 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3563
3564 return 1;
3565 err:
3566 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3567 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3568 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3569 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3570 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3571 return 0;
3572 }
3573
3574 /*
3575 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3576 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3577 */
3578 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3579 {
3580 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
3581 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
3582 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
3583 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3584 return 0;
3585 }
3586
3587 return 1;
3588 }
3589
3590 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3591 {
3592 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
3593 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3594 return 0;
3595 }
3596
3597 return 1;
3598 }
3599
3600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3601 /*
3602 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3603 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3604 */
3605 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3606 {
3607 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3608 size_t next_proto_len;
3609
3610 /*-
3611 * The payload looks like:
3612 * uint8 proto_len;
3613 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3614 * uint8 padding_len;
3615 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3616 */
3617 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3618 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3619 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3620 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3621 goto err;
3622 }
3623
3624 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
3625 s->ext.npn_len = 0;
3626 goto err;
3627 }
3628
3629 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3630
3631 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3632 err:
3633 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3634 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3635 }
3636 #endif
3637
3638 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3639 {
3640 int al;
3641
3642 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3643 NULL, 0, &al)) {
3644 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3646 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3647 return 0;
3648 }
3649
3650 return 1;
3651 }
3652
3653 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3654 {
3655 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3656 size_t len = 0;
3657
3658 /*
3659 * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release
3660 * (should be s->version)
3661 */
3662 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
3663 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
3664 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3665 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
3666 NULL, 0, &al)) {
3667 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3668 goto err;
3669 }
3670
3671 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
3672 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3673 s->session = NULL;
3674 s->hit = 0;
3675
3676 /*
3677 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
3678 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
3679 */
3680 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s))
3681 goto err;
3682
3683 return 1;
3684 err:
3685 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3686 return 0;
3687 }
3688
3689 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3690 {
3691 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3692
3693 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3694 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3696 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3697 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3698 }
3699
3700 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
3701 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
3702 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3703 goto err;
3704 }
3705
3706 /*
3707 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
3708 * a record boundary.
3709 */
3710 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
3711 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3713 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
3714 goto err;
3715 }
3716
3717 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
3718 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3719 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
3720 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3721 goto err;
3722 }
3723
3724 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3725 err:
3726 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3727 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3728 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3729 }
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