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1 /*
2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 *
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
8 */
9
10 /* We need access to the deprecated low level HMAC APIs */
11 #define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
12
13 #include <stdio.h>
14 #include <stdlib.h>
15 #include <openssl/objects.h>
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
18 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
19 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
20 #include <openssl/conf.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include "internal/nelem.h"
25 #include "internal/evp.h"
26 #include "ssl_local.h"
27 #include <openssl/ct.h>
28
29 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
30 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
31
32 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_enc,
34 tls1_mac,
35 tls1_setup_key_block,
36 tls1_generate_master_secret,
37 tls1_change_cipher_state,
38 tls1_final_finish_mac,
39 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
41 tls1_alert_code,
42 tls1_export_keying_material,
43 0,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
45 tls_close_construct_packet,
46 ssl3_handshake_write
47 };
48
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
50 tls1_enc,
51 tls1_mac,
52 tls1_setup_key_block,
53 tls1_generate_master_secret,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac,
56 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
57 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
58 tls1_alert_code,
59 tls1_export_keying_material,
60 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
61 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
62 tls_close_construct_packet,
63 ssl3_handshake_write
64 };
65
66 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
67 tls1_enc,
68 tls1_mac,
69 tls1_setup_key_block,
70 tls1_generate_master_secret,
71 tls1_change_cipher_state,
72 tls1_final_finish_mac,
73 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
74 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
75 tls1_alert_code,
76 tls1_export_keying_material,
77 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
78 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
79 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
80 tls_close_construct_packet,
81 ssl3_handshake_write
82 };
83
84 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
85 tls13_enc,
86 tls1_mac,
87 tls13_setup_key_block,
88 tls13_generate_master_secret,
89 tls13_change_cipher_state,
90 tls13_final_finish_mac,
91 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
92 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
93 tls13_alert_code,
94 tls13_export_keying_material,
95 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
96 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
97 tls_close_construct_packet,
98 ssl3_handshake_write
99 };
100
101 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
102 {
103 /*
104 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
105 * http, the cache would over fill
106 */
107 return (60 * 60 * 2);
108 }
109
110 int tls1_new(SSL *s)
111 {
112 if (!ssl3_new(s))
113 return 0;
114 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
115 return 0;
116
117 return 1;
118 }
119
120 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
121 {
122 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
123 ssl3_free(s);
124 }
125
126 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
127 {
128 if (!ssl3_clear(s))
129 return 0;
130
131 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
132 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
133 else
134 s->version = s->method->version;
135
136 return 1;
137 }
138
139 /*
140 * Table of group information.
141 */
142 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
143 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] = {
144 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
145 {NID_sect163k1, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0001}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
146 {NID_sect163r1, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0002}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
147 {NID_sect163r2, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0003}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
148 {NID_sect193r1, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0004}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
149 {NID_sect193r2, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0005}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
150 {NID_sect233k1, "EC", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0006}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
151 {NID_sect233r1, "EC", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0007}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
152 {NID_sect239k1, "EC", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0008}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
153 {NID_sect283k1, "EC", 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0009}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
154 {NID_sect283r1, "EC", 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000A}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
155 {NID_sect409k1, "EC", 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000B}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
156 {NID_sect409r1, "EC", 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000C}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
157 {NID_sect571k1, "EC", 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000D}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
158 {NID_sect571r1, "EC", 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000E}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
159 {NID_secp160k1, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x000F}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
160 {NID_secp160r1, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0010}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
161 {NID_secp160r2, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0011}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
162 {NID_secp192k1, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0012}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
163 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, "EC", 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0013}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
164 {NID_secp224k1, "EC", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0014}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
165 {NID_secp224r1, "EC", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0015}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
166 {NID_secp256k1, "EC", 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0016}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
167 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, "EC", 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0017}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
168 {NID_secp384r1, "EC", 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0018}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
169 {NID_secp521r1, "EC", 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0019}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, "EC", 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001A}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, "EC", 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001B}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
172 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, "EC", 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001C}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
173 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, "X25519", 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM, 0x001D}, /* X25519 (29) */
174 {EVP_PKEY_X448, "X448", 224, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM, 0x001E}, /* X448 (30) */
175 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
176 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
177 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, "GOST_2012_256", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0022}, /* GC256A (34) */
178 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, "GOST_2012_256", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0023}, /* GC256B (35) */
179 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, "GOST_2012_256", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0024}, /* GC256C (36) */
180 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD, "GOST_2012_256", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0025}, /* GC256D (37) */
181 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, "GOST_2012_512", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0026}, /* GC512A (38) */
182 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, "GOST_2012_512", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0027}, /* GC512B (39) */
183 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC, "GOST_2012_512", 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0028}, /* GC512C (40) */
184 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_GOST */
185 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
186 /* Security bit values for FFDHE groups are updated as per RFC 7919 */
187 {NID_ffdhe2048, "DH", 103, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0100}, /* ffdhe2048 (0x0100) */
188 {NID_ffdhe3072, "DH", 125, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0101}, /* ffdhe3072 (0x0101) */
189 {NID_ffdhe4096, "DH", 150, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0102}, /* ffdhe4096 (0x0102) */
190 {NID_ffdhe6144, "DH", 175, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0103}, /* ffdhe6144 (0x0103) */
191 {NID_ffdhe8192, "DH", 192, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0104}, /* ffdhe8192 (0x0104) */
192 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
193 };
194 #endif
195
196 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
197 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
198 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
199 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
200 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
201 };
202 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
203
204 /* The default curves */
205 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
206 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
207 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
208 29, /* X25519 (29) */
209 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
210 30, /* X448 (30) */
211 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
212 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
213 # endif
214 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
215 34, /* GC256A (34) */
216 35, /* GC256B (35) */
217 36, /* GC256C (36) */
218 37, /* GC256D (37) */
219 38, /* GC512A (38) */
220 39, /* GC512B (39) */
221 40, /* GC512C (40) */
222 # endif
223 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
224 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
225 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
226 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
227 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
228 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
229 # endif
230 };
231 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
232
233 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
234 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
235 TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
236 TLSEXT_curve_P_384
237 };
238 #endif
239
240 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id)
241 {
242 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
243 size_t i;
244
245 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 FFDHE group from RFC 8446 */
246 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
247 if (nid_list[i].group_id == group_id)
248 return &nid_list[i];
249 }
250 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) */
251 return NULL;
252 }
253
254 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
255 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id)
256 {
257 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = tls1_group_id_lookup(group_id);
258
259 return ginf == NULL ? NID_undef : ginf->nid;
260 }
261
262 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
263 {
264 size_t i;
265
266 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
267 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
268 return nid_list[i].group_id;
269 }
270 return 0;
271 }
272 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
273
274 /*
275 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
276 * the number of groups supported.
277 */
278 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
279 size_t *pgroupslen)
280 {
281 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
282 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
283 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
284 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
285 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
286 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
287 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
288 break;
289
290 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
291 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
292 *pgroupslen = 1;
293 break;
294
295 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
296 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
297 *pgroupslen = 1;
298 break;
299 # endif
300
301 default:
302 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
303 *pgroups = supported_groups_default;
304 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default);
305 } else {
306 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
307 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
308 }
309 break;
310 }
311 #else
312 *pgroups = NULL;
313 *pgroupslen = 0;
314 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
315 }
316
317 int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int version)
318 {
319 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(group_id);
320
321 if (version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
322 if ((ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_ONLY_FOR_TLS1_3) != 0)
323 return 0;
324 }
325 return 1;
326 }
327
328 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
329 int tls_group_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t group, int op)
330 {
331 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(group);
332 unsigned char gtmp[2];
333
334 if (ginfo == NULL)
335 return 0;
336 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
337 if (ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2)
338 return 0;
339 #endif
340 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH
341 if (ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_FFDHE)
342 return 0;
343 #endif
344 gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
345 gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
346 return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits, ginfo->nid, (void *)gtmp);
347 }
348
349 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
350 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
351 {
352 size_t i;
353 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
354 if (list[i] == id)
355 return 1;
356 return 0;
357 }
358
359 /*-
360 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
361 * if there is no match.
362 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
363 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
364 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
365 */
366 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
367 {
368 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
369 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
370 int k;
371
372 /* Can't do anything on client side */
373 if (s->server == 0)
374 return 0;
375 if (nmatch == -2) {
376 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
377 /*
378 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
379 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
380 */
381 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
382
383 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
384 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
385 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
386 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
387 /* Should never happen */
388 return 0;
389 }
390 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
391 nmatch = 0;
392 }
393 /*
394 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
395 * otherwise peer decides.
396 */
397 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
398 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
399 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
400 } else {
401 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
402 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
403 }
404
405 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
406 uint16_t id = pref[i];
407
408 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
409 || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
410 continue;
411 if (nmatch == k)
412 return id;
413 k++;
414 }
415 if (nmatch == -1)
416 return k;
417 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
418 return 0;
419 }
420
421 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
422 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
423 {
424 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
425 uint16_t *glist;
426 size_t i;
427 /*
428 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
429 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
430 */
431 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
432 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
433 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
434
435 if (ngroups == 0) {
436 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
437 return 0;
438 }
439 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
440 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
441 return 0;
442 }
443 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
444 unsigned long idmask;
445 uint16_t id;
446 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
447 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
448 goto err;
449 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
450 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
451 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
452 goto err;
453 *dup_list |= idmask;
454 glist[i] = id;
455 }
456 OPENSSL_free(*pext);
457 *pext = glist;
458 *pextlen = ngroups;
459 return 1;
460 err:
461 OPENSSL_free(glist);
462 return 0;
463 #else
464 return 0;
465 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
466 }
467
468 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
469 # define MAX_GROUPLIST OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)
470
471 typedef struct {
472 size_t nidcnt;
473 int nid_arr[MAX_GROUPLIST];
474 } nid_cb_st;
475
476 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
477 {
478 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
479 size_t i;
480 int nid = NID_undef;
481 char etmp[20];
482 if (elem == NULL)
483 return 0;
484 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_GROUPLIST)
485 return 0;
486 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
487 return 0;
488 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
489 etmp[len] = 0;
490 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
491 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
492 # endif
493 if (nid == NID_undef)
494 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
495 if (nid == NID_undef)
496 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
497 if (nid == NID_undef)
498 return 0;
499 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
500 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
501 return 0;
502 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
503 return 1;
504 }
505 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
506
507 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
508 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
509 {
510 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
511 nid_cb_st ncb;
512 ncb.nidcnt = 0;
513 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
514 return 0;
515 if (pext == NULL)
516 return 1;
517 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
518 #else
519 return 0;
520 #endif
521 }
522
523 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
524 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
525 {
526 const uint16_t *groups;
527 size_t groups_len;
528
529 if (group_id == 0)
530 return 0;
531
532 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
533 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
534 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
535
536 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
537 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
538 return 0;
539 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
540 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
541 return 0;
542 } else {
543 /* Should never happen */
544 return 0;
545 }
546 }
547
548 if (check_own_groups) {
549 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
550 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
551 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
552 return 0;
553 }
554
555 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
556 return 0;
557
558 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
559 if (!s->server)
560 return 1;
561
562 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
563 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
564
565 /*
566 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
567 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
568 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
569 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
570 */
571 if (groups_len == 0)
572 return 1;
573 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
574 }
575
576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
577 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
578 size_t *num_formats)
579 {
580 /*
581 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
582 */
583 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
584 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
585 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
586 } else {
587 *pformats = ecformats_default;
588 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
589 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
590 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
591 else
592 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
593 }
594 }
595
596 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
597 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
598 {
599 const EC_KEY *ec;
600 const EC_GROUP *grp;
601 unsigned char comp_id;
602 size_t i;
603
604 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
605 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
606 return 1;
607 ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
608 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
609
610 /* Get required compression id */
611 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
612 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
613 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
614 /*
615 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
616 * this check.
617 */
618 return 1;
619 } else {
620 int field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp));
621
622 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
623 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
624 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
625 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
626 else
627 return 0;
628 }
629 /*
630 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
631 * supported (see RFC4492).
632 */
633 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
634 return 1;
635
636 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
637 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
638 return 1;
639 }
640 return 0;
641 }
642
643 /* Return group id of a key */
644 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
645 {
646 int curve_nid = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
647
648 if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
649 return 0;
650 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
651 }
652
653 /*
654 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
655 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
656 */
657 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
658 {
659 uint16_t group_id;
660 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
661 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
662 if (pkey == NULL)
663 return 0;
664 /* If not EC nothing to do */
665 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
666 return 1;
667 /* Check compression */
668 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
669 return 0;
670 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
671 /*
672 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
673 * groups.
674 */
675 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
676 return 0;
677 /*
678 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
679 * SHA384+P-384.
680 */
681 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
682 int check_md;
683 size_t i;
684
685 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
686 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
687 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
688 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
689 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
690 else
691 return 0; /* Should never happen */
692 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
693 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
694 return 1;;
695 }
696 return 0;
697 }
698 return 1;
699 }
700
701 /*
702 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
703 * @s: SSL connection
704 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
705 *
706 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
707 * is compatible with the client extensions.
708 *
709 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
710 */
711 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
712 {
713 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
714 if (!tls1_suiteb(s))
715 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
716 /*
717 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
718 * curves permitted.
719 */
720 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
721 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
722 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
723 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
724
725 return 0;
726 }
727
728 #else
729
730 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
731 {
732 return 1;
733 }
734
735 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
736
737 /* Default sigalg schemes */
738 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
740 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
741 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
742 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
743 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
744 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
745 #endif
746
747 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
748 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
749 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
750 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
751 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
752 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
753
754 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
755 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
756 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
757
758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
759 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
760 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
761 #endif
762 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
763 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
765 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
766 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
767
768 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
769 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
770 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
771 #endif
772 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
773 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
774 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
775 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
776 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
777 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
778 #endif
779 };
780
781 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
782 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
783 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
784 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
785 };
786 #endif
787
788 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
790 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
791 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
792 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
793 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
794 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
795 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
796 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
797 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
798 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
799 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
800 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
801 NID_undef, NID_undef},
802 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
803 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
804 NID_undef, NID_undef},
805 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
806 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
807 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
808 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
809 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
810 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
811 #endif
812 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
813 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
814 NID_undef, NID_undef},
815 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
816 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
817 NID_undef, NID_undef},
818 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
819 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
820 NID_undef, NID_undef},
821 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
822 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
823 NID_undef, NID_undef},
824 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
825 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
826 NID_undef, NID_undef},
827 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
828 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
829 NID_undef, NID_undef},
830 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
831 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
832 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
833 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
834 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
835 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
836 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
837 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
838 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
839 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
840 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
841 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
842 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
843 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
844 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
846 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
847 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
848 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
849 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
850 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
851 NID_undef, NID_undef},
852 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
853 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
854 NID_undef, NID_undef},
855 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
856 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
857 NID_undef, NID_undef},
858 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
859 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
860 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
861 #endif
862 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
863 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic,
864 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
865 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
866 NID_undef, NID_undef},
867 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic,
868 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
869 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
870 NID_undef, NID_undef},
871 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
872 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
873 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
874 NID_undef, NID_undef},
875 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
876 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
877 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
878 NID_undef, NID_undef},
879 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
880 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
881 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
882 NID_undef, NID_undef}
883 #endif
884 };
885 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
886 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
887 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
888 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
889 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
890 NID_undef, NID_undef
891 };
892
893 /*
894 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
895 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
896 */
897 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
898 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
899 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
900 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
901 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
902 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
903 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
904 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
905 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
906 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
907 };
908
909 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
910 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
911 {
912 size_t i;
913 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
914
915 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
916 i++, s++) {
917 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
918 return s;
919 }
920 return NULL;
921 }
922 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
923 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
924 {
925 const EVP_MD *md;
926 if (lu == NULL)
927 return 0;
928 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
929 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
930 md = NULL;
931 } else {
932 md = ssl_md(ctx, lu->hash_idx);
933 if (md == NULL)
934 return 0;
935 }
936 if (pmd)
937 *pmd = md;
938 return 1;
939 }
940
941 /*
942 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
943 *
944 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
945 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
946 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
947 */
948 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
949 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
950 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
951 {
952 const EVP_MD *md;
953
954 if (pkey == NULL)
955 return 0;
956 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md) || md == NULL)
957 return 0;
958 if (EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
959 return 0;
960 return 1;
961 }
962
963 /*
964 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
965 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
966 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
967 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
968 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
969 */
970 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
971 {
972 if (idx == -1) {
973 if (s->server) {
974 size_t i;
975
976 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
977 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
978 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
979
980 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
981 idx = i;
982 break;
983 }
984 }
985
986 /*
987 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
988 * */
989 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
990 int real_idx;
991
992 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
993 real_idx--) {
994 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
995 idx = real_idx;
996 break;
997 }
998 }
999 }
1000 } else {
1001 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
1002 }
1003 }
1004 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
1005 return NULL;
1006 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
1007 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
1008
1009 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
1010 return NULL;
1011 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1012 return NULL;
1013 return lu;
1014 }
1015 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
1016 return NULL;
1017 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
1018 }
1019 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1020 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1021 {
1022 size_t idx;
1023 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1024
1025 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
1026 return 0;
1027 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
1028 if (lu == NULL)
1029 return 0;
1030 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1031 return 1;
1032 }
1033
1034 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
1035 {
1036 /*
1037 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1038 * preferences.
1039 */
1040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1041 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1042 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1043 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1044 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
1045
1046 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1047 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1048 return 1;
1049
1050 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1051 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
1052 return 1;
1053 }
1054 #endif
1055 /*
1056 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1057 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1058 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1059 */
1060 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
1061 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1062 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1063 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1064 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1065 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1066 } else {
1067 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1068 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1069 }
1070 }
1071
1072 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1073 /*
1074 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1075 * specified EC curve.
1076 */
1077 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
1078 {
1079 const uint16_t *sigs;
1080 size_t siglen, i;
1081
1082 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1083 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1084 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1085 } else {
1086 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1087 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1088 }
1089
1090 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1091 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigs[i]);
1092
1093 if (lu == NULL)
1094 continue;
1095 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1096 && lu->curve != NID_undef
1097 && curve == lu->curve)
1098 return 1;
1099 }
1100
1101 return 0;
1102 }
1103 #endif
1104
1105 /*
1106 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1107 * error.
1108 */
1109 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1110 {
1111 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1112 int secbits = 0;
1113
1114 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx, lu, &md))
1115 return 0;
1116 if (md != NULL)
1117 {
1118 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1119 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
1120 } else {
1121 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1122 if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519)
1123 secbits = 128;
1124 else if (lu->sigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448)
1125 secbits = 224;
1126 }
1127 return secbits;
1128 }
1129
1130 /*
1131 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1132 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1133 * s.
1134 */
1135 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1136 {
1137 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1138 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1139 char sigalgstr[2];
1140 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1141 int pkeyid = -1;
1142 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1143 int secbits = 0;
1144
1145 /*
1146 * TODO(3.0) Remove this when we adapted this function for provider
1147 * side keys. We know that EVP_PKEY_get0() downgrades an EVP_PKEY
1148 * to contain a legacy key.
1149 *
1150 * THIS IS TEMPORARY
1151 */
1152 EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey);
1153 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_NONE)
1154 return 0;
1155
1156 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
1157 /* Should never happen */
1158 if (pkeyid == -1)
1159 return -1;
1160 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1161 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1162 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1163 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1164 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1165 return 0;
1166 }
1167 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1168 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1169 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1170 }
1171 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
1172 /*
1173 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1174 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1175 */
1176 if (lu == NULL
1177 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1178 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1179 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1180 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1181 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1182 return 0;
1183 }
1184 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1185 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey), &cidx)
1186 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1187 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1188 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1189 return 0;
1190 }
1191
1192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1193 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1194
1195 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1196 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1197 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1198 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1199 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1200 return 0;
1201 }
1202
1203 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1204 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1205 int curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
1206
1207 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1208 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1209 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1210 return 0;
1211 }
1212 }
1213 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1214 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1215 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1216 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1217 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1218 return 0;
1219 }
1220 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1221 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1222 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1223 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1225 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1226 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1227 return 0;
1228 }
1229 }
1230 }
1231 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1232 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1233 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1234 return 0;
1235 }
1236 #endif
1237
1238 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1239 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1240 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1241 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1242 break;
1243 }
1244 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1245 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1246 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1248 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1249 return 0;
1250 }
1251 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, &md)) {
1252 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1253 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1254 return 0;
1255 }
1256 /*
1257 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1258 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1259 */
1260 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1261 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1262 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
1263 if (secbits == 0 ||
1264 !ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, secbits,
1265 md != NULL ? EVP_MD_type(md) : NID_undef,
1266 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1267 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1268 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1269 return 0;
1270 }
1271 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1272 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1273 return 1;
1274 }
1275
1276 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1277 {
1278 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1279 return 0;
1280 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1281 return 1;
1282 }
1283
1284 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1285 {
1286 if (s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1287 return 0;
1288 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
1289 return 1;
1290 }
1291
1292 /*
1293 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1294 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1295 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1296 *
1297 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1298 * by the client.
1299 *
1300 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1301 */
1302 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1303 {
1304 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
1305 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
1306 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1307 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
1308 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1309 return 0;
1310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1311 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1312 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1313 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1314 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1315 }
1316 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1318 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1319 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1320 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1321 }
1322 #endif
1323 return 1;
1324 }
1325
1326 /*
1327 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1328 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1329 * @c: cipher to check
1330 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1331 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1332 *
1333 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1334 */
1335 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1336 {
1337 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
1338 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
1339 return 1;
1340 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
1341 return 1;
1342 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1343 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1344
1345 /*
1346 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1347 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1348 */
1349 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1350 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1351 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1352
1353 if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
1354 return 1;
1355 }
1356 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
1357 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
1358 return 1;
1359
1360 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1361 }
1362
1363 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1364 {
1365 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1366 return 0;
1367 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1368 }
1369
1370 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1371 {
1372 size_t i;
1373
1374 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1375 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1376 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1377 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1378 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1379 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1380 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1381 /*
1382 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1383 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1384 */
1385 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1386 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1387 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1388 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1389
1390 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1391 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1392 size_t j;
1393
1394 if (lu == NULL)
1395 continue;
1396 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1397 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1398 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1399 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1400 break;
1401 }
1402 }
1403 }
1404 return 1;
1405 }
1406
1407 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1408 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1409 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1410 return 0;
1411 }
1412 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1413 return 1;
1414
1415 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1417 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1418 return 0;
1419 }
1420
1421 /*-
1422 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1423 *
1424 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1425 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1426 * point to the resulting session.
1427 */
1428 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1429 SSL_SESSION **ret)
1430 {
1431 size_t size;
1432 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1433
1434 *ret = NULL;
1435 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1436
1437 /*
1438 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1439 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1440 * resumption.
1441 */
1442 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1443 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1444
1445 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1446 if (!ticketext->present)
1447 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1448
1449 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1450
1451 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1452 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1453 }
1454
1455 /*-
1456 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1457 *
1458 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1459 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1460 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1461 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1462 *
1463 * Side effects:
1464 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1465 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1466 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1467 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1468 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1469 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1470 *
1471 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1472 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1473 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1474 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1475 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1476 * point to the resulting session.
1477 */
1478 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1479 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1480 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1481 {
1482 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1483 unsigned char *sdec;
1484 const unsigned char *p;
1485 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1486 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1487 size_t mlen;
1488 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1489 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
1490 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1491 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1492
1493 if (eticklen == 0) {
1494 /*
1495 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1496 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1497 */
1498 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1499 goto end;
1500 }
1501 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1502 /*
1503 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1504 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1505 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1506 * calculate the master secret later.
1507 */
1508 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1509 goto end;
1510 }
1511
1512 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1513 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1514 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1515 goto end;
1516 }
1517
1518 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1519 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
1520 if (hctx == NULL) {
1521 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1522 goto end;
1523 }
1524 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1525 if (ctx == NULL) {
1526 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1527 goto end;
1528 }
1529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1530 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1531 #else
1532 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1533 #endif
1534 {
1535 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1536 int rv = 0;
1537
1538 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
1539 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(s, nctick,
1540 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1541 ctx,
1542 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
1543 0);
1544 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1545 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
1546 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1547 rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1548 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1549 ctx, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 0);
1550 #endif
1551 if (rv < 0) {
1552 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1553 goto end;
1554 }
1555 if (rv == 0) {
1556 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1557 goto end;
1558 }
1559 if (rv == 2)
1560 renew_ticket = 1;
1561 } else {
1562 EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
1563
1564 /* Check key name matches */
1565 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1566 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1567 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1568 goto end;
1569 }
1570
1571 aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
1572 s->ctx->propq);
1573 if (aes256cbc == NULL
1574 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1575 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1576 "SHA256") <= 0
1577 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
1578 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1579 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1580 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1581 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1582 goto end;
1583 }
1584 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
1585 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1586 renew_ticket = 1;
1587 }
1588 /*
1589 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1590 * checks on ticket.
1591 */
1592 mlen = ssl_hmac_size(hctx);
1593 if (mlen == 0) {
1594 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1595 goto end;
1596 }
1597
1598 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1599 if (eticklen <=
1600 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1601 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1602 goto end;
1603 }
1604 eticklen -= mlen;
1605 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1606 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1607 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL, sizeof(tick_hmac)) <= 0) {
1608 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1609 goto end;
1610 }
1611
1612 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1613 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1614 goto end;
1615 }
1616 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1617 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1618 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1619 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1620 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1621 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1622 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1623 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
1624 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1625 goto end;
1626 }
1627 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1628 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
1629 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1630 goto end;
1631 }
1632 slen += declen;
1633 p = sdec;
1634
1635 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1636 slen -= p - sdec;
1637 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
1638 if (sess) {
1639 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1640 if (slen != 0) {
1641 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1642 sess = NULL;
1643 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1644 goto end;
1645 }
1646 /*
1647 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1648 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1649 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1650 * standard.
1651 */
1652 if (sesslen) {
1653 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1654 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1655 }
1656 if (renew_ticket)
1657 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1658 else
1659 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1660 goto end;
1661 }
1662 ERR_clear_error();
1663 /*
1664 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1665 */
1666 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1667
1668 end:
1669 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1670 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
1671
1672 /*
1673 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1674 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1675 * performs any action
1676 */
1677 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
1678 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1679 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1680 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1681 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
1682 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
1683 int retcb;
1684
1685 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
1686 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
1687 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
1688 ret,
1689 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
1690 switch (retcb) {
1691 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
1692 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1693 break;
1694
1695 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
1696 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1697 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1698 sess = NULL;
1699 break;
1700
1701 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
1702 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1703 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1704 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
1705 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1706 sess = NULL;
1707 break;
1708
1709 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
1710 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
1711 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1712 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
1713 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1714 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
1715 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1716 else
1717 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1718 break;
1719
1720 default:
1721 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1722 }
1723 }
1724
1725 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1726 switch (ret) {
1727 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1728 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1729 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
1730 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1731 }
1732 }
1733
1734 *psess = sess;
1735
1736 return ret;
1737 }
1738
1739 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1740 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1741 {
1742 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1743 int secbits;
1744
1745 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1746 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
1747 return 0;
1748 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1749 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1750 return 0;
1751 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1752 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
1753 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1754 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1755 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
1756 return 0;
1757
1758 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1759 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
1760 return 0;
1761
1762 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
1763 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
1764 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
1765 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
1766 if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1767 return 0;
1768 if (!s->server
1769 && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1770 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1771 int i, num;
1772 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1773
1774 /*
1775 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
1776 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
1777 * ciphersuites enabled.
1778 */
1779
1780 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
1781 return 0;
1782
1783 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1784 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
1785 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
1786 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1787
1788 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1789 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
1790 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
1791 continue;
1792
1793 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kGOST) != 0)
1794 break;
1795 }
1796 if (i == num)
1797 return 0;
1798 }
1799 }
1800
1801 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1802 secbits = sigalg_security_bits(s->ctx, lu);
1803 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
1804 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
1805 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
1806 }
1807
1808 /*
1809 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1810 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1811 * disabled.
1812 */
1813
1814 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1815 {
1816 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1817 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1818 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
1819 /*
1820 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1821 * in disabled_mask.
1822 */
1823 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1824 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
1825 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
1826 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1827
1828 if (lu == NULL)
1829 continue;
1830
1831 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
1832 if (clu == NULL)
1833 continue;
1834
1835 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1836 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
1837 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1838 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
1839 }
1840 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
1841 }
1842
1843 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1844 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1845 {
1846 size_t i;
1847 int rv = 0;
1848
1849 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1850 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1851
1852 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1853 continue;
1854 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1855 return 0;
1856 /*
1857 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1858 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1859 */
1860 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1861 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
1862 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
1863 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
1864 rv = 1;
1865 }
1866 if (rv == 0)
1867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
1868 return rv;
1869 }
1870
1871 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1872 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1873 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1874 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1875 {
1876 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1877 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1878 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1879 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1880
1881 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1882 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
1883 continue;
1884 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1885 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1886 nmatch++;
1887 if (shsig)
1888 *shsig++ = lu;
1889 break;
1890 }
1891 }
1892 }
1893 return nmatch;
1894 }
1895
1896 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1897 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1898 {
1899 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1900 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1901 size_t nmatch;
1902 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1903 CERT *c = s->cert;
1904 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1905
1906 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1907 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1908 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1909 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1910 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1911 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1912 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1913 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1914 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1915 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1916 } else
1917 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1918 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1919 pref = conf;
1920 preflen = conflen;
1921 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1922 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1923 } else {
1924 allow = conf;
1925 allowlen = conflen;
1926 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1927 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1928 }
1929 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1930 if (nmatch) {
1931 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
1932 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1933 return 0;
1934 }
1935 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1936 } else {
1937 salgs = NULL;
1938 }
1939 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1940 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1941 return 1;
1942 }
1943
1944 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
1945 {
1946 unsigned int stmp;
1947 size_t size, i;
1948 uint16_t *buf;
1949
1950 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1951
1952 /* Invalid data length */
1953 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
1954 return 0;
1955
1956 size >>= 1;
1957
1958 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
1959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1960 return 0;
1961 }
1962 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1963 buf[i] = stmp;
1964
1965 if (i != size) {
1966 OPENSSL_free(buf);
1967 return 0;
1968 }
1969
1970 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
1971 *pdest = buf;
1972 *pdestlen = size;
1973
1974 return 1;
1975 }
1976
1977 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
1978 {
1979 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1980 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1981 return 1;
1982 /* Should never happen */
1983 if (s->cert == NULL)
1984 return 0;
1985
1986 if (cert)
1987 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
1988 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
1989 else
1990 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
1991 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
1992
1993 }
1994
1995 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1996
1997 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1998 {
1999 size_t i;
2000 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
2001
2002 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
2003 return 0;
2004
2005 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2006 pvalid[i] = 0;
2007
2008 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2009 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2010 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
2011
2012 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2013 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2014 continue;
2015 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2016 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
2017 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2018 }
2019 return 1;
2020 }
2021
2022 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2023 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2024 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2025 {
2026 uint16_t *psig = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
2027 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
2028 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
2029 return 0;
2030 if (idx >= 0) {
2031 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2032
2033 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
2034 return 0;
2035 psig += idx;
2036 if (rhash != NULL)
2037 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
2038 if (rsig != NULL)
2039 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
2040 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
2041 if (psign != NULL)
2042 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
2043 if (phash != NULL)
2044 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
2045 if (psignhash != NULL)
2046 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
2047 }
2048 return (int)numsigalgs;
2049 }
2050
2051 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
2052 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
2053 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
2054 {
2055 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
2056 if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
2057 || idx < 0
2058 || idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
2059 || s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
2060 return 0;
2061 shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
2062 if (phash != NULL)
2063 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
2064 if (psign != NULL)
2065 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
2066 if (psignhash != NULL)
2067 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
2068 if (rsig != NULL)
2069 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
2070 if (rhash != NULL)
2071 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
2072 return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
2073 }
2074
2075 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2076 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2077
2078 typedef struct {
2079 size_t sigalgcnt;
2080 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2081 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
2082 } sig_cb_st;
2083
2084 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
2085 {
2086 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
2087 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2088 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
2089 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
2090 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
2091 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2092 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2093 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2094 } else {
2095 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
2096 if (*phash == NID_undef)
2097 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
2098 }
2099 }
2100 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2101 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2102
2103 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
2104 {
2105 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
2106 size_t i;
2107 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
2108 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
2109 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2110 if (elem == NULL)
2111 return 0;
2112 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
2113 return 0;
2114 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2115 return 0;
2116 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2117 etmp[len] = 0;
2118 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2119 /*
2120 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2121 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2122 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2123 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2124 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2125 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2126 * in the table.
2127 */
2128 if (p == NULL) {
2129 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2130 i++, s++) {
2131 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
2132 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2133 break;
2134 }
2135 }
2136 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2137 return 0;
2138 } else {
2139 *p = 0;
2140 p++;
2141 if (*p == 0)
2142 return 0;
2143 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2144 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2145 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2146 return 0;
2147 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2148 i++, s++) {
2149 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2150 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2151 break;
2152 }
2153 }
2154 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2155 return 0;
2156 }
2157
2158 /* Reject duplicates */
2159 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2160 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2161 sarg->sigalgcnt--;
2162 return 0;
2163 }
2164 }
2165 return 1;
2166 }
2167
2168 /*
2169 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2170 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2171 */
2172 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2173 {
2174 sig_cb_st sig;
2175 sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
2176 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2177 return 0;
2178 if (c == NULL)
2179 return 1;
2180 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2181 }
2182
2183 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2184 int client)
2185 {
2186 uint16_t *sigalgs;
2187
2188 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2189 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2190 return 0;
2191 }
2192 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2193
2194 if (client) {
2195 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2196 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2197 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2198 } else {
2199 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2200 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2201 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2202 }
2203
2204 return 1;
2205 }
2206
2207 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2208 {
2209 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2210 size_t i;
2211
2212 if (salglen & 1)
2213 return 0;
2214 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2215 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2216 return 0;
2217 }
2218 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2219 size_t j;
2220 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2221 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2222 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2223
2224 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2225 j++, curr++) {
2226 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2227 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2228 break;
2229 }
2230 }
2231
2232 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2233 goto err;
2234 }
2235
2236 if (client) {
2237 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2238 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2239 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2240 } else {
2241 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2242 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2243 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2244 }
2245
2246 return 1;
2247
2248 err:
2249 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2250 return 0;
2251 }
2252
2253 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2254 {
2255 int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
2256 size_t i;
2257 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
2258 size_t sigalgslen;
2259 if (default_nid == -1)
2260 return 1;
2261 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2262 if (default_nid)
2263 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2264
2265 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2266 /*
2267 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2268 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2269 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2270 */
2271 sigalgslen = s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
2272 use_pc_sigalgs = 1;
2273 } else {
2274 sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
2275 }
2276 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
2277 sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
2278 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
2279 : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2280 if (sigalg != NULL && sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
2281 return 1;
2282 }
2283 return 0;
2284 }
2285
2286 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2287 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2288 {
2289 const X509_NAME *nm;
2290 int i;
2291 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2292 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2293 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2294 return 1;
2295 }
2296 return 0;
2297 }
2298
2299 /*
2300 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2301 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2302 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2303 * attempting to use them.
2304 */
2305
2306 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2307
2308 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2309 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2310 /* Strict mode flags */
2311 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2312 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2313 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2314
2315 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
2316 int idx)
2317 {
2318 int i;
2319 int rv = 0;
2320 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2321 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2322 CERT *c = s->cert;
2323 uint32_t *pvalid;
2324 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2325 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2326 if (idx != -1) {
2327 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2328 if (idx == -2) {
2329 cpk = c->key;
2330 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2331 } else
2332 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2333 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2334 x = cpk->x509;
2335 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2336 chain = cpk->chain;
2337 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2338 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2339 if (!x || !pk)
2340 goto end;
2341 } else {
2342 size_t certidx;
2343
2344 if (!x || !pk)
2345 return 0;
2346
2347 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2348 return 0;
2349 idx = certidx;
2350 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2351
2352 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2353 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2354 else
2355 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2356 strict_mode = 1;
2357 }
2358
2359 if (suiteb_flags) {
2360 int ok;
2361 if (check_flags)
2362 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2363 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2364 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2365 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2366 else if (!check_flags)
2367 goto end;
2368 }
2369
2370 /*
2371 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2372 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2373 */
2374 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2375 int default_nid;
2376 int rsign = 0;
2377 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2378 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2379 default_nid = 0;
2380 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2381 } else {
2382 switch (idx) {
2383 case SSL_PKEY_RSA:
2384 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2385 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2386 break;
2387
2388 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2389 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2390 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2391 break;
2392
2393 case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
2394 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2395 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2396 break;
2397
2398 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2399 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2400 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2401 break;
2402
2403 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2404 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2405 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2406 break;
2407
2408 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2409 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2410 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2411 break;
2412
2413 default:
2414 default_nid = -1;
2415 break;
2416 }
2417 }
2418 /*
2419 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2420 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2421 */
2422 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2423 size_t j;
2424 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2425 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2426 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
2427
2428 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2429 break;
2430 }
2431 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2432 if (check_flags)
2433 goto skip_sigs;
2434 else
2435 goto end;
2436 }
2437 }
2438 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2439 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2440 /*
2441 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2442 * so check_flags is always set.
2443 */
2444 if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
2445 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2446 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2447 if (!check_flags)
2448 goto end;
2449 } else
2450 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2451 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2452 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2453 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2454 if (check_flags) {
2455 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2456 break;
2457 } else
2458 goto end;
2459 }
2460 }
2461 }
2462 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2463 else if (check_flags)
2464 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2465 skip_sigs:
2466 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2467 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2468 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2469 else if (!check_flags)
2470 goto end;
2471 if (!s->server)
2472 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2473 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2474 else if (strict_mode) {
2475 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2476 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2477 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2478 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2479 if (check_flags) {
2480 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2481 break;
2482 } else
2483 goto end;
2484 }
2485 }
2486 }
2487 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2488 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2489 int check_type = 0;
2490
2491 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
2492 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2493 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
2494 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2495 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
2496 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2497
2498 if (check_type) {
2499 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
2500 size_t j;
2501
2502 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2503 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2504 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2505 break;
2506 }
2507 }
2508 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2509 goto end;
2510 } else {
2511 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2512 }
2513
2514 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
2515
2516 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2517 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2518
2519 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2520 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2521 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2522 }
2523 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2524 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2525 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2526 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2527 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2528 break;
2529 }
2530 }
2531 }
2532 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2533 goto end;
2534 } else
2535 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2536
2537 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2538 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2539
2540 end:
2541
2542 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2543 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2544 else
2545 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2546
2547 /*
2548 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2549 * chain is invalid.
2550 */
2551 if (!check_flags) {
2552 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2553 *pvalid = rv;
2554 } else {
2555 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2556 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2557 return 0;
2558 }
2559 }
2560 return rv;
2561 }
2562
2563 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2564 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2565 {
2566 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2567 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2568 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2569 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2570 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2571 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2572 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2573 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2574 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2575 }
2576
2577 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2578 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2579 {
2580 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2581 }
2582
2583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2584 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2585 {
2586 int dh_secbits = 80;
2587 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2588 return DH_get_1024_160();
2589 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2590 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2591 dh_secbits = 128;
2592 else
2593 dh_secbits = 80;
2594 } else {
2595 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
2596 return NULL;
2597 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
2598 }
2599
2600 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2601 DH *dhp = DH_new();
2602 BIGNUM *p, *g;
2603 if (dhp == NULL)
2604 return NULL;
2605 g = BN_new();
2606 if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) {
2607 DH_free(dhp);
2608 BN_free(g);
2609 return NULL;
2610 }
2611 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2612 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2613 else
2614 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2615 if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2616 DH_free(dhp);
2617 BN_free(p);
2618 BN_free(g);
2619 return NULL;
2620 }
2621 return dhp;
2622 }
2623 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2624 return DH_get_2048_224();
2625 return DH_get_1024_160();
2626 }
2627 #endif
2628
2629 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2630 {
2631 int secbits = -1;
2632 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2633 if (pkey) {
2634 /*
2635 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2636 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2637 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2638 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2639 */
2640 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2641 }
2642 if (s)
2643 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2644 else
2645 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2646 }
2647
2648 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2649 {
2650 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2651 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2652 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2653 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2654 return 1;
2655 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2656 secbits = -1;
2657 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2658 if (nid == NID_undef)
2659 nid = pknid;
2660 if (s)
2661 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2662 else
2663 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2664 }
2665
2666 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2667 {
2668 if (vfy)
2669 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2670 if (is_ee) {
2671 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2672 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2673 } else {
2674 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2675 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2676 }
2677 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2678 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2679 return 1;
2680 }
2681
2682 /*
2683 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2684 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2685 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2686 */
2687
2688 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2689 {
2690 int rv, start_idx, i;
2691 if (x == NULL) {
2692 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2693 start_idx = 1;
2694 } else
2695 start_idx = 0;
2696
2697 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2698 if (rv != 1)
2699 return rv;
2700
2701 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2702 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2703 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2704 if (rv != 1)
2705 return rv;
2706 }
2707 return 1;
2708 }
2709
2710 /*
2711 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2712 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2713 */
2714
2715 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2716 {
2717 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2718 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
2719
2720 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2721 if (clu == NULL
2722 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
2723 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
2724 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
2725 return -1;
2726
2727 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
2728 }
2729
2730 /*
2731 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
2732 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
2733 * the key.
2734 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
2735 */
2736 static int check_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
2737 EVP_PKEY *pkey)
2738 {
2739 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2740 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
2741 size_t i;
2742
2743 /*
2744 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot supporting signing with this sigalg,
2745 * the answer is simply 'no'.
2746 */
2747 ERR_set_mark();
2748 supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(pkey, sig->hash);
2749 ERR_pop_to_mark();
2750 if (supported == 0)
2751 return 0;
2752
2753 /*
2754 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
2755 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
2756 */
2757 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2758 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
2759 return 0;
2760 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
2761 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
2762 if (lu == NULL)
2763 continue;
2764
2765 /*
2766 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
2767 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
2768 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
2769 * signing certificate.
2770 */
2771 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
2772 return 1;
2773 }
2774 return 0;
2775 }
2776
2777 /*
2778 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
2779 * a viable public key is permitted.
2780 */
2781 return 1;
2782 }
2783
2784 /*
2785 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
2786 * with signature scheme |sig|.
2787 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
2788 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
2789 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
2790 */
2791 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
2792 {
2793 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
2794 if (idx == -1)
2795 idx = sig->sig_idx;
2796 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
2797 return 0;
2798
2799 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
2800 s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
2801 }
2802
2803 /*
2804 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
2805 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
2806 */
2807 static int is_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
2808 EVP_PKEY *pkey)
2809 {
2810 size_t idx;
2811
2812 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
2813 return 0;
2814
2815 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
2816 if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
2817 return 0;
2818
2819 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
2820 }
2821
2822 /*
2823 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
2824 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
2825 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
2826 */
2827 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
2828 {
2829 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2830 size_t i;
2831 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2832 int curve = -1;
2833 #endif
2834 EVP_PKEY *tmppkey;
2835
2836 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
2837 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2838 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2839
2840 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2841 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
2842 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
2843 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
2844 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2845 continue;
2846 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
2847 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, lu, NULL))
2848 continue;
2849 if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
2850 || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
2851 continue;
2852
2853 tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
2854 : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
2855
2856 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2857 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2858 if (curve == -1)
2859 curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(tmppkey);
2860 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
2861 continue;
2862 #else
2863 continue;
2864 #endif
2865 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2866 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2867 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, tmppkey, lu))
2868 continue;
2869 }
2870 break;
2871 }
2872
2873 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
2874 return NULL;
2875
2876 return lu;
2877 }
2878
2879 /*
2880 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2881 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2882 *
2883 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
2884 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
2885 *
2886 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2887 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2888 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2889 */
2890 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
2891 {
2892 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2893 int sig_idx = -1;
2894
2895 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
2896 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
2897
2898 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2899 lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
2900 if (lu == NULL) {
2901 if (!fatalerrs)
2902 return 1;
2903 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2904 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2905 return 0;
2906 }
2907 } else {
2908 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2909 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
2910 return 1;
2911 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
2912 return 1;
2913
2914 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2915 size_t i;
2916 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2917 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2918 int curve = -1;
2919
2920 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2921 if (tls1_suiteb(s))
2922 curve =
2923 evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
2924 .privatekey);
2925 #endif
2926
2927 /*
2928 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2929 * cert type
2930 */
2931 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2932 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2933
2934 if (s->server) {
2935 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
2936 continue;
2937 } else {
2938 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
2939
2940 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2941 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
2942 continue;
2943 }
2944 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
2945 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
2946 continue;
2947 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2948 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2949 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
2950
2951 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s->ctx, pkey, lu))
2952 continue;
2953 }
2954 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2955 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
2956 #endif
2957 break;
2958 }
2959 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2960 /*
2961 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
2962 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
2963 * we have to assume GOST support.
2964 */
2965 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) {
2966 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2967 if (!fatalerrs)
2968 return 1;
2969 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2970 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2971 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2972 return 0;
2973 } else {
2974 i = 0;
2975 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2976 }
2977 }
2978 #endif
2979 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
2980 if (!fatalerrs)
2981 return 1;
2982 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2983 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2984 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2985 return 0;
2986 }
2987 } else {
2988 /*
2989 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2990 */
2991 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2992 size_t sent_sigslen;
2993
2994 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2995 if (!fatalerrs)
2996 return 1;
2997 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2998 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2999 return 0;
3000 }
3001
3002 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3003 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
3004 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
3005 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
3006 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
3007 break;
3008 }
3009 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
3010 if (!fatalerrs)
3011 return 1;
3012 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
3013 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3014 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
3015 return 0;
3016 }
3017 }
3018 } else {
3019 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
3020 if (!fatalerrs)
3021 return 1;
3022 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
3023 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
3024 return 0;
3025 }
3026 }
3027 }
3028 if (sig_idx == -1)
3029 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
3030 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
3031 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3032 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
3033 return 1;
3034 }
3035
3036 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
3037 {
3038 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3039 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
3041 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3042 return 0;
3043 }
3044
3045 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3046 return 1;
3047 }
3048
3049 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
3050 {
3051 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3052 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
3053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
3054 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
3055 return 0;
3056 }
3057
3058 ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
3059 return 1;
3060 }
3061
3062 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
3063 {
3064 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;
3065 }
3066
3067 /*
3068 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3069 */
3070 SSL_HMAC *ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
3071 {
3072 SSL_HMAC *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
3073 EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
3074
3075 if (ret == NULL)
3076 return NULL;
3077 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3078 if (ctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb == NULL
3079 && ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL) {
3080 ret->old_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3081 if (ret->old_ctx == NULL)
3082 goto err;
3083 return ret;
3084 }
3085 #endif
3086 mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx->libctx, "HMAC", NULL);
3087 if (mac == NULL || (ret->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL)
3088 goto err;
3089 EVP_MAC_free(mac);
3090 return ret;
3091 err:
3092 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret->ctx);
3093 EVP_MAC_free(mac);
3094 OPENSSL_free(ret);
3095 return NULL;
3096 }
3097
3098 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3099 {
3100 if (ctx != NULL) {
3101 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
3102 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3103 HMAC_CTX_free(ctx->old_ctx);
3104 #endif
3105 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
3106 }
3107 }
3108
3109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3110 HMAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3111 {
3112 return ctx->old_ctx;
3113 }
3114 #endif
3115
3116 EVP_MAC_CTX *ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3117 {
3118 return ctx->ctx;
3119 }
3120
3121 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC *ctx, void *key, size_t len, char *md)
3122 {
3123 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
3124
3125 if (ctx->ctx != NULL) {
3126 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, md, 0);
3127 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, key, len);
3128 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3129 if (EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx->ctx, params) && EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx))
3130 return 1;
3131 }
3132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3133 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3134 return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx->old_ctx, key, len,
3135 EVP_get_digestbyname(md), NULL);
3136 #endif
3137 return 0;
3138 }
3139
3140 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC *ctx, const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
3141 {
3142 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3143 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx->ctx, data, len);
3144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3145 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3146 return HMAC_Update(ctx->old_ctx, data, len);
3147 #endif
3148 return 0;
3149 }
3150
3151 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t *len,
3152 size_t max_size)
3153 {
3154 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3155 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx->ctx, md, len, max_size);
3156 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3157 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL) {
3158 unsigned int l;
3159
3160 if (HMAC_Final(ctx->old_ctx, md, &l) > 0) {
3161 if (len != NULL)
3162 *len = l;
3163 return 1;
3164 }
3165 }
3166 #endif
3167 return 0;
3168 }
3169
3170 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC *ctx)
3171 {
3172 if (ctx->ctx != NULL)
3173 return EVP_MAC_size(ctx->ctx);
3174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3175 if (ctx->old_ctx != NULL)
3176 return HMAC_size(ctx->old_ctx);
3177 #endif
3178 return 0;
3179 }
3180
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