2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *tick
, int ticklen
,
125 const unsigned char *sess_id
, int sesslen
,
126 SSL_SESSION
**psess
);
127 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL
*s
);
128 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL
*s
);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
133 tls1_setup_key_block
,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH
,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac
,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
142 tls1_export_keying_material
,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
152 tls1_setup_key_block
,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH
,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac
,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
161 tls1_export_keying_material
,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
171 tls1_setup_key_block
,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH
,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac
,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
180 tls1_export_keying_material
,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
191 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
192 * http, the cache would over fill
194 return (60 * 60 * 2);
201 s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
);
205 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
207 OPENSSL_free(s
->tlsext_session_ticket
);
211 void tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
214 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
220 int nid
; /* Curve NID */
221 int secbits
; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
222 unsigned int flags
; /* Flags: currently just field type */
225 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
226 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
228 static const tls_curve_info nid_list
[] = {
229 {NID_sect163k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
230 {NID_sect163r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
231 {NID_sect163r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
232 {NID_sect193r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 {NID_sect193r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 {NID_sect233k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
235 {NID_sect233r1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
236 {NID_sect239k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
237 {NID_sect283k1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
238 {NID_sect283r1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
239 {NID_sect409k1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
240 {NID_sect409r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
241 {NID_sect571k1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
242 {NID_sect571r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
243 {NID_secp160k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
244 {NID_secp160r1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
245 {NID_secp160r2
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
246 {NID_secp192k1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
247 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
248 {NID_secp224k1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
249 {NID_secp224r1
, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
250 {NID_secp256k1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
251 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
252 {NID_secp384r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
253 {NID_secp521r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
254 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
255 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
256 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME
}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
259 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
262 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
265 /* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */
266 static const unsigned char eccurves_auto
[] = {
267 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
268 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
269 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
270 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
271 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
272 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
273 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
274 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
275 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
276 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
277 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
280 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
281 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
282 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
285 static const unsigned char eccurves_all
[] = {
286 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
287 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
288 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
289 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
290 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
291 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
292 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
293 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
294 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
295 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
296 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
297 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
298 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
299 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
300 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
301 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
303 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
304 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
306 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
307 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
308 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
309 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
310 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
311 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
312 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
313 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
314 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
315 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
316 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
317 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
318 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
319 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
320 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
324 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves
[] = {
325 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256
,
326 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
329 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id
)
331 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
332 if ((curve_id
< 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id
> OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
)))
334 return nid_list
[curve_id
- 1].nid
;
337 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid
)
339 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
341 case NID_sect163k1
: /* sect163k1 (1) */
343 case NID_sect163r1
: /* sect163r1 (2) */
345 case NID_sect163r2
: /* sect163r2 (3) */
347 case NID_sect193r1
: /* sect193r1 (4) */
349 case NID_sect193r2
: /* sect193r2 (5) */
351 case NID_sect233k1
: /* sect233k1 (6) */
353 case NID_sect233r1
: /* sect233r1 (7) */
355 case NID_sect239k1
: /* sect239k1 (8) */
357 case NID_sect283k1
: /* sect283k1 (9) */
359 case NID_sect283r1
: /* sect283r1 (10) */
361 case NID_sect409k1
: /* sect409k1 (11) */
363 case NID_sect409r1
: /* sect409r1 (12) */
365 case NID_sect571k1
: /* sect571k1 (13) */
367 case NID_sect571r1
: /* sect571r1 (14) */
369 case NID_secp160k1
: /* secp160k1 (15) */
371 case NID_secp160r1
: /* secp160r1 (16) */
373 case NID_secp160r2
: /* secp160r2 (17) */
375 case NID_secp192k1
: /* secp192k1 (18) */
377 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1
: /* secp192r1 (19) */
379 case NID_secp224k1
: /* secp224k1 (20) */
381 case NID_secp224r1
: /* secp224r1 (21) */
383 case NID_secp256k1
: /* secp256k1 (22) */
385 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1
: /* secp256r1 (23) */
387 case NID_secp384r1
: /* secp384r1 (24) */
389 case NID_secp521r1
: /* secp521r1 (25) */
391 case NID_brainpoolP256r1
: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
393 case NID_brainpoolP384r1
: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
395 case NID_brainpoolP512r1
: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
403 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
405 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
406 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
407 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
408 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
409 * lists in the first place.
410 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
411 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
412 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
414 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL
*s
, int sess
,
415 const unsigned char **pcurves
,
418 size_t pcurveslen
= 0;
420 *pcurves
= s
->session
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist
;
421 pcurveslen
= s
->session
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length
;
423 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
424 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
425 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
426 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
;
427 pcurveslen
= sizeof(suiteb_curves
);
430 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
431 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
;
435 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
436 *pcurves
= suiteb_curves
+ 2;
440 *pcurves
= s
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist
;
441 pcurveslen
= s
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length
;
444 if (!s
->server
|| s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_auto
) {
445 *pcurves
= eccurves_auto
;
446 pcurveslen
= sizeof(eccurves_auto
);
448 *pcurves
= eccurves_all
;
449 pcurveslen
= sizeof(eccurves_all
);
454 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
455 if (pcurveslen
& 1) {
456 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
460 *num_curves
= pcurveslen
/ 2;
465 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
466 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *curve
, int op
)
468 const tls_curve_info
*cinfo
;
471 if ((curve
[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve
[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list
)))
473 cinfo
= &nid_list
[curve
[1] - 1];
474 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
475 if (cinfo
->flags
& TLS_CURVE_CHAR2
)
478 return ssl_security(s
, op
, cinfo
->secbits
, cinfo
->nid
, (void *)curve
);
481 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
482 int tls1_check_curve(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *p
, size_t len
)
484 const unsigned char *curves
;
485 size_t num_curves
, i
;
486 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
487 if (len
!= 3 || p
[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
)
489 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
491 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
494 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
495 if (p
[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
497 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
498 if (p
[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
500 } else /* Should never happen */
503 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
, 0, &curves
, &num_curves
))
505 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++, curves
+= 2) {
506 if (p
[1] == curves
[0] && p
[2] == curves
[1])
507 return tls_curve_allowed(s
, p
+ 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
);
513 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
514 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
515 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
516 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
518 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL
*s
, int nmatch
)
520 const unsigned char *pref
, *supp
;
521 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
, j
;
523 /* Can't do anything on client side */
527 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
529 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
530 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
532 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
533 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
534 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1
; /* P-256 */
535 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
536 return NID_secp384r1
; /* P-384 */
537 /* Should never happen */
540 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
544 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
545 * but s->options is a long...
547 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
548 (s
, (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) != 0, &supp
,
550 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
551 return nmatch
== -1 ? 0 : NID_undef
;
552 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
553 (s
, !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
), &pref
,
555 return nmatch
== -1 ? 0 : NID_undef
;
558 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
561 if (num_supp
== 0 && (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) != 0) {
563 num_supp
= sizeof(eccurves_all
) / 2;
564 } else if (num_pref
== 0 &&
565 (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) == 0) {
567 num_pref
= sizeof(eccurves_all
) / 2;
571 for (i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++, pref
+= 2) {
572 const unsigned char *tsupp
= supp
;
573 for (j
= 0; j
< num_supp
; j
++, tsupp
+= 2) {
574 if (pref
[0] == tsupp
[0] && pref
[1] == tsupp
[1]) {
575 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s
, pref
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
578 int id
= (pref
[0] << 8) | pref
[1];
579 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id
);
587 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
591 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
592 int *curves
, size_t ncurves
)
594 unsigned char *clist
, *p
;
597 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
600 unsigned long dup_list
= 0;
601 clist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves
* 2);
604 for (i
= 0, p
= clist
; i
< ncurves
; i
++) {
605 unsigned long idmask
;
607 id
= tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves
[i
]);
609 if (!id
|| (dup_list
& idmask
)) {
618 *pextlen
= ncurves
* 2;
622 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
626 int nid_arr
[MAX_CURVELIST
];
629 static int nid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
631 nid_cb_st
*narg
= arg
;
637 if (narg
->nidcnt
== MAX_CURVELIST
)
639 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
641 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
643 nid
= EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp
);
644 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
645 nid
= OBJ_sn2nid(etmp
);
646 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
647 nid
= OBJ_ln2nid(etmp
);
648 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
650 for (i
= 0; i
< narg
->nidcnt
; i
++)
651 if (narg
->nid_arr
[i
] == nid
)
653 narg
->nid_arr
[narg
->nidcnt
++] = nid
;
657 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
658 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
663 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, nid_cb
, &ncb
))
667 return tls1_set_curves(pext
, pextlen
, ncb
.nid_arr
, ncb
.nidcnt
);
670 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
671 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id
, unsigned char *comp_id
,
676 const EC_METHOD
*meth
;
679 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
680 grp
= EC_KEY_get0_group(ec
);
683 meth
= EC_GROUP_method_of(grp
);
686 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth
) == NID_X9_62_prime_field
)
690 /* Determine curve ID */
691 id
= EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp
);
692 id
= tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id
);
693 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
696 curve_id
[1] = (unsigned char)id
;
705 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec
) == NULL
)
707 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec
) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED
) {
709 *comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
711 *comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
713 *comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
718 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
719 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL
*s
,
720 unsigned char *curve_id
, unsigned char *comp_id
)
722 const unsigned char *pformats
, *pcurves
;
723 size_t num_formats
, num_curves
, i
;
726 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
727 * supported (see RFC4492).
729 if (comp_id
&& s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
) {
730 pformats
= s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
;
731 num_formats
= s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
;
732 for (i
= 0; i
< num_formats
; i
++, pformats
++) {
733 if (*comp_id
== *pformats
)
736 if (i
== num_formats
)
741 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
742 for (j
= 0; j
<= 1; j
++) {
743 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
, j
, &pcurves
, &num_curves
))
745 if (j
== 1 && num_curves
== 0) {
747 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
748 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
749 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
750 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
751 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
755 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++, pcurves
+= 2) {
756 if (pcurves
[0] == curve_id
[0] && pcurves
[1] == curve_id
[1])
761 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
768 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
772 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
774 if (s
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
) {
775 *pformats
= s
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
;
776 *num_formats
= s
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
;
778 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
779 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
781 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
783 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
788 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
789 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
791 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
793 unsigned char comp_id
, curve_id
[2];
796 pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(x
);
799 /* If not EC nothing to do */
800 if (pkey
->type
!= EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
804 rv
= tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id
, &comp_id
, pkey
->pkey
.ec
);
809 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
812 rv
= tls1_check_ec_key(s
, s
->server
? curve_id
: NULL
, &comp_id
);
816 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
817 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
819 if (set_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
825 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
826 if (curve_id
[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
827 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
828 else if (curve_id
[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
829 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
831 return 0; /* Should never happen */
832 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++)
833 if (check_md
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
].signandhash_nid
)
835 if (i
== c
->shared_sigalgslen
)
837 if (set_ee_md
== 2) {
838 if (check_md
== NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
)
839 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = EVP_sha256();
841 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = EVP_sha384();
847 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
848 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
849 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
851 unsigned char curve_id
[2];
852 EC_KEY
*ec
= s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp
;
853 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
854 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
855 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
)
859 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
862 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
863 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
864 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
865 curve_id
[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256
;
866 else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
867 curve_id
[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384
;
871 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
872 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s
, curve_id
, NULL
))
874 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
875 if (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_auto
|| s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
)
877 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
879 unsigned char curve_tmp
[2];
882 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp
, NULL
, ec
))
884 if (!curve_tmp
[0] || curve_tmp
[1] == curve_id
[1])
890 if (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_auto
) {
891 /* Need a shared curve */
892 if (tls1_shared_curve(s
, 0))
898 if (s
->cert
->ecdh_tmp_cb
)
903 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id
, NULL
, ec
))
905 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
909 return tls1_check_ec_key(s
, curve_id
, NULL
);
912 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
916 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int set_ee_md
)
921 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
924 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
925 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
928 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
929 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
931 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
934 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
935 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
937 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
941 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
943 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
946 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
947 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
948 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
949 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
951 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
952 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512
)
953 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384
)
954 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256
)
955 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224
)
956 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1
)
959 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
960 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
961 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256
)
962 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384
)
965 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **psigs
)
968 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
971 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
972 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
973 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
974 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
975 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs
);
977 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
978 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
981 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
982 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 2;
986 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
987 if (s
->server
&& s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
) {
988 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
989 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
990 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
991 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
992 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
994 *psigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
995 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs
);
1000 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1001 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
1003 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD
**pmd
, SSL
*s
,
1004 const unsigned char *sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1006 const unsigned char *sent_sigs
;
1007 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
;
1008 int sigalg
= tls12_get_sigid(pkey
);
1009 /* Should never happen */
1012 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1013 if (sigalg
!= (int)sig
[1]) {
1014 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1017 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1018 if (pkey
->type
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
1019 unsigned char curve_id
[2], comp_id
;
1020 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1021 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id
, &comp_id
, pkey
->pkey
.ec
))
1023 if (!s
->server
&& !tls1_check_ec_key(s
, curve_id
, &comp_id
)) {
1024 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1027 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1028 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1031 if (curve_id
[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256
) {
1032 if (sig
[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256
) {
1033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1034 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST
);
1037 } else if (curve_id
[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384
) {
1038 if (sig
[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384
) {
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
,
1040 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST
);
1046 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
))
1050 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1051 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &sent_sigs
);
1052 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
+= 2, sent_sigs
+= 2) {
1053 if (sig
[0] == sent_sigs
[0] && sig
[1] == sent_sigs
[1])
1056 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1057 if (i
== sent_sigslen
1058 && (sig
[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1059 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1063 *pmd
= tls12_get_hash(sig
[0]);
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
1068 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1069 if (!ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
,
1070 EVP_MD_size(*pmd
) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd
),
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1076 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1078 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_md
= *pmd
;
1083 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1084 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1085 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1088 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL
*s
)
1090 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
1091 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
1092 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1093 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s
))
1094 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_ssl
= SSL_TLSV1_2
;
1096 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_ssl
= 0;
1097 /* Disable TLS 1.0 ciphers if using SSL v3 */
1098 if (s
->client_version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
1099 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_ssl
|= SSL_TLSV1
;
1100 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
1102 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1105 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
& SSL_aRSA
)
1106 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kDHr
| SSL_kECDHr
;
1107 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
& SSL_aDSS
)
1108 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kDHd
;
1109 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
& SSL_aECDSA
)
1110 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kECDHe
;
1111 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1112 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1113 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
1114 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
1115 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
1117 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1119 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1120 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
1121 s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
1126 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
, int op
)
1128 if (c
->algorithm_ssl
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_ssl
1129 || c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_k
1130 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
->tmp
.mask_a
)
1132 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
1135 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL
*s
)
1137 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
)
1139 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1142 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *buf
,
1143 unsigned char *limit
, int *al
)
1146 unsigned char *orig
= buf
;
1147 unsigned char *ret
= buf
;
1148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1149 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1151 if (s
->version
>= TLS1_VERSION
|| SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1153 unsigned long alg_k
, alg_a
;
1154 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *cipher_stack
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
1156 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack
); i
++) {
1157 SSL_CIPHER
*c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack
, i
);
1159 alg_k
= c
->algorithm_mkey
;
1160 alg_a
= c
->algorithm_auth
;
1161 if ((alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)
1162 || (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
))) {
1173 return NULL
; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1175 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1176 if (s
->renegotiate
) {
1179 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s
, 0, &el
, 0)) {
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1184 if ((limit
- ret
- 4 - el
) < 0)
1187 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
, ret
);
1190 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s
, ret
, &el
, el
)) {
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1197 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1198 if (s
->client_version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
1201 if (s
->tlsext_hostname
!= NULL
) {
1202 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1203 unsigned long size_str
;
1207 * check for enough space.
1208 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1209 * 2 for servernamelist length
1210 * 1 for the hostname type
1211 * 2 for hostname length
1215 if ((lenmax
= limit
- ret
- 9) < 0
1217 strlen(s
->tlsext_hostname
)) > (unsigned long)lenmax
)
1220 /* extension type and length */
1221 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
, ret
);
1222 s2n(size_str
+ 5, ret
);
1224 /* length of servername list */
1225 s2n(size_str
+ 3, ret
);
1227 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1228 *(ret
++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
;
1230 memcpy(ret
, s
->tlsext_hostname
, size_str
);
1233 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1234 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1235 if (s
->srp_ctx
.login
!= NULL
) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1236 * Client Hello message */
1238 int login_len
= strlen(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
1239 if (login_len
> 255 || login_len
== 0) {
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1245 * check for enough space.
1246 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1247 * 1 for the srp user identity
1248 * + srp user identity length
1250 if ((limit
- ret
- 5 - login_len
) < 0)
1253 /* fill in the extension */
1254 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp
, ret
);
1255 s2n(login_len
+ 1, ret
);
1256 (*ret
++) = (unsigned char)login_len
;
1257 memcpy(ret
, s
->srp_ctx
.login
, login_len
);
1262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1265 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1268 const unsigned char *pcurves
, *pformats
;
1269 size_t num_curves
, num_formats
, curves_list_len
;
1271 unsigned char *etmp
;
1273 tls1_get_formatlist(s
, &pformats
, &num_formats
);
1275 if ((lenmax
= limit
- ret
- 5) < 0)
1277 if (num_formats
> (size_t)lenmax
)
1279 if (num_formats
> 255) {
1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1284 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats
, ret
);
1285 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1286 s2n(num_formats
+ 1, ret
);
1287 *(ret
++) = (unsigned char)num_formats
;
1288 memcpy(ret
, pformats
, num_formats
);
1292 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1294 pcurves
= s
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist
;
1295 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s
, 0, &pcurves
, &num_curves
))
1298 if ((lenmax
= limit
- ret
- 6) < 0)
1300 if (num_curves
> (size_t)lenmax
/ 2)
1302 if (num_curves
> 65532 / 2) {
1303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1307 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves
, ret
);
1309 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1310 for (i
= 0; i
< num_curves
; i
++, pcurves
+= 2) {
1311 if (tls_curve_allowed(s
, pcurves
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED
)) {
1312 *etmp
++ = pcurves
[0];
1313 *etmp
++ = pcurves
[1];
1317 curves_list_len
= etmp
- ret
- 4;
1319 s2n(curves_list_len
+ 2, ret
);
1320 s2n(curves_list_len
, ret
);
1321 ret
+= curves_list_len
;
1323 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1325 if (tls_use_ticket(s
)) {
1327 if (!s
->new_session
&& s
->session
&& s
->session
->tlsext_tick
)
1328 ticklen
= s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
;
1329 else if (s
->session
&& s
->tlsext_session_ticket
&&
1330 s
->tlsext_session_ticket
->data
) {
1331 ticklen
= s
->tlsext_session_ticket
->length
;
1332 s
->session
->tlsext_tick
= OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen
);
1333 if (s
->session
->tlsext_tick
== NULL
)
1335 memcpy(s
->session
->tlsext_tick
,
1336 s
->tlsext_session_ticket
->data
, ticklen
);
1337 s
->session
->tlsext_ticklen
= ticklen
;
1340 if (ticklen
== 0 && s
->tlsext_session_ticket
&&
1341 s
->tlsext_session_ticket
->data
== NULL
)
1344 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1347 if ((long)(limit
- ret
- 4 - ticklen
) < 0)
1349 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
, ret
);
1352 memcpy(ret
, s
->session
->tlsext_tick
, ticklen
);
1358 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
1360 const unsigned char *salg
;
1361 unsigned char *etmp
;
1362 salglen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &salg
);
1363 if ((size_t)(limit
- ret
) < salglen
+ 6)
1365 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms
, ret
);
1367 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1369 salglen
= tls12_copy_sigalgs(s
, ret
, salg
, salglen
);
1370 /* Fill in lengths */
1371 s2n(salglen
+ 2, etmp
);
1376 if (s
->tlsext_status_type
== TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
1378 long extlen
, idlen
, itmp
;
1382 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
); i
++) {
1383 id
= sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
, i
);
1384 itmp
= i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id
, NULL
);
1390 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
) {
1391 extlen
= i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
, NULL
);
1397 if ((long)(limit
- ret
- 7 - extlen
- idlen
) < 0)
1399 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
, ret
);
1400 if (extlen
+ idlen
> 0xFFF0)
1402 s2n(extlen
+ idlen
+ 5, ret
);
1403 *(ret
++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
;
1405 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
); i
++) {
1406 /* save position of id len */
1407 unsigned char *q
= ret
;
1408 id
= sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
, i
);
1409 /* skip over id len */
1411 itmp
= i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id
, &ret
);
1417 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
, &ret
);
1419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1420 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1421 if ((limit
- ret
- 4 - 1) < 0)
1423 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat
, ret
);
1427 * 1: peer may send requests
1428 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1430 if (s
->tlsext_heartbeat
& SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS
)
1431 *(ret
++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS
;
1433 *(ret
++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
;
1436 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1437 if (s
->ctx
->next_proto_select_cb
&& !s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
) {
1439 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1440 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1442 if (limit
- ret
- 4 < 0)
1444 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
, ret
);
1449 if (s
->alpn_client_proto_list
&& !s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
) {
1450 if ((size_t)(limit
- ret
) < 6 + s
->alpn_client_proto_list_len
)
1452 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
, ret
);
1453 s2n(2 + s
->alpn_client_proto_list_len
, ret
);
1454 s2n(s
->alpn_client_proto_list_len
, ret
);
1455 memcpy(ret
, s
->alpn_client_proto_list
, s
->alpn_client_proto_list_len
);
1456 ret
+= s
->alpn_client_proto_list_len
;
1458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1459 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s
)) {
1462 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1463 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s
, 0, &el
, 0)) {
1464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1468 if ((limit
- ret
- 4 - el
) < 0)
1471 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp
, ret
);
1474 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s
, ret
, &el
, el
)) {
1475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1481 custom_ext_init(&s
->cert
->cli_ext
);
1482 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1483 if (!custom_ext_add(s
, 0, &ret
, limit
, al
))
1485 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1486 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
, ret
);
1489 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret
, ret
);
1493 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1494 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1495 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1498 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING
) {
1499 int hlen
= ret
- (unsigned char *)s
->init_buf
->data
;
1501 if (hlen
> 0xff && hlen
< 0x200) {
1502 hlen
= 0x200 - hlen
;
1508 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
, ret
);
1510 memset(ret
, 0, hlen
);
1517 if ((extdatalen
= ret
- orig
- 2) == 0)
1520 s2n(extdatalen
, orig
);
1524 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *buf
,
1525 unsigned char *limit
, int *al
)
1528 unsigned char *orig
= buf
;
1529 unsigned char *ret
= buf
;
1530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1531 int next_proto_neg_seen
;
1533 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1534 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
1535 unsigned long alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
1536 int using_ecc
= (alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
))
1537 || (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
);
1538 using_ecc
= using_ecc
&& (s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
!= NULL
);
1543 return NULL
; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1545 if (s
->s3
->send_connection_binding
) {
1548 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s
, 0, &el
, 0)) {
1549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1553 if ((limit
- ret
- 4 - el
) < 0)
1556 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
, ret
);
1559 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s
, ret
, &el
, el
)) {
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1567 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1568 if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
)
1571 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->servername_done
== 1
1572 && s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
!= NULL
) {
1573 if ((long)(limit
- ret
- 4) < 0)
1576 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
, ret
);
1579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1581 const unsigned char *plist
;
1584 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1588 tls1_get_formatlist(s
, &plist
, &plistlen
);
1590 if ((lenmax
= limit
- ret
- 5) < 0)
1592 if (plistlen
> (size_t)lenmax
)
1594 if (plistlen
> 255) {
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1599 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats
, ret
);
1600 s2n(plistlen
+ 1, ret
);
1601 *(ret
++) = (unsigned char)plistlen
;
1602 memcpy(ret
, plist
, plistlen
);
1607 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1610 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1612 if (s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
&& tls_use_ticket(s
)) {
1613 if ((long)(limit
- ret
- 4) < 0)
1615 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
, ret
);
1619 if (s
->tlsext_status_expected
) {
1620 if ((long)(limit
- ret
- 4) < 0)
1622 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
, ret
);
1626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1627 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->srtp_profile
) {
1630 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1631 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s
, 0, &el
, 0)) {
1632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1635 if ((limit
- ret
- 4 - el
) < 0)
1638 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp
, ret
);
1641 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s
, ret
, &el
, el
)) {
1642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1649 if (((s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
& 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1650 || (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->id
& 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1651 && (SSL_get_options(s
) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG
)) {
1652 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext
[36] = {
1653 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1654 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1655 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1656 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1657 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1658 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1660 if (limit
- ret
< 36)
1662 memcpy(ret
, cryptopro_ext
, 36);
1666 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1667 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1668 if (s
->tlsext_heartbeat
& SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
) {
1669 if ((limit
- ret
- 4 - 1) < 0)
1671 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat
, ret
);
1675 * 1: peer may send requests
1676 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1678 if (s
->tlsext_heartbeat
& SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS
)
1679 *(ret
++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS
;
1681 *(ret
++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
;
1686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1687 next_proto_neg_seen
= s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
;
1688 s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
= 0;
1689 if (next_proto_neg_seen
&& s
->ctx
->next_protos_advertised_cb
) {
1690 const unsigned char *npa
;
1691 unsigned int npalen
;
1694 r
= s
->ctx
->next_protos_advertised_cb(s
, &npa
, &npalen
,
1696 ctx
->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg
);
1697 if (r
== SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
1698 if ((long)(limit
- ret
- 4 - npalen
) < 0)
1700 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
, ret
);
1702 memcpy(ret
, npa
, npalen
);
1704 s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
= 1;
1708 if (!custom_ext_add(s
, 1, &ret
, limit
, al
))
1710 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1711 if (s
->s3
->flags
& TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
) {
1713 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1714 * for other cases too.
1716 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mac
== SSL_AEAD
1717 || s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
== SSL_RC4
)
1718 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
;
1720 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
, ret
);
1725 if (!s
->hit
&& s
->session
->flags
& SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS
) {
1726 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret
, ret
);
1730 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
) {
1731 const unsigned char *selected
= s
->s3
->alpn_selected
;
1732 unsigned len
= s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
;
1734 if ((long)(limit
- ret
- 4 - 2 - 1 - len
) < 0)
1736 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
, ret
);
1740 memcpy(ret
, selected
, len
);
1746 if ((extdatalen
= ret
- orig
- 2) == 0)
1749 s2n(extdatalen
, orig
);
1754 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1755 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1756 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1757 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1760 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
1762 unsigned int data_len
;
1763 unsigned int proto_len
;
1764 const unsigned char *selected
;
1765 unsigned char *data
;
1766 unsigned char selected_len
;
1769 if (s
->ctx
->alpn_select_cb
== NULL
)
1773 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1774 * length-prefixed strings.
1776 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &data_len
)
1777 || PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != data_len
1778 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt
, &data
, data_len
))
1782 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &proto_len
)
1784 || !PACKET_forward(pkt
, proto_len
))
1786 } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
));
1788 r
= s
->ctx
->alpn_select_cb(s
, &selected
, &selected_len
, data
, data_len
,
1789 s
->ctx
->alpn_select_cb_arg
);
1790 if (r
== SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
1791 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
);
1792 s
->s3
->alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len
);
1793 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
1794 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
1797 memcpy(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
, selected
, selected_len
);
1798 s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
= selected_len
;
1803 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
1807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1809 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1810 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1811 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1816 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1817 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1818 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1819 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1821 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL
*s
, const PACKET
*pkt
)
1823 unsigned int type
, size
;
1824 unsigned char *eblock1
, *eblock2
;
1827 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock
[] = {
1828 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1829 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1830 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1831 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1832 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1833 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1835 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1836 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1837 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1838 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1841 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1842 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock
[] = {
1843 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1844 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1845 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1846 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1847 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1848 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1849 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1850 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1855 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt
, 2)
1856 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt
, &type
)
1857 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt
, &size
)
1858 || !PACKET_forward(&tmppkt
, size
))
1861 if (type
!= TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
)
1864 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
1865 const size_t len1
= sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock
);
1866 const size_t len2
= sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock
);
1868 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt
, &eblock1
, len1
)
1869 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt
, &eblock2
, len2
)
1870 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt
))
1872 if (memcmp(eblock1
, kSafariExtensionsBlock
, len1
) != 0)
1874 if (memcmp(eblock2
, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock
, len2
) != 0)
1877 const size_t len
= sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock
);
1879 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt
, &eblock1
, len
)
1880 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt
))
1882 if (memcmp(eblock1
, kSafariExtensionsBlock
, len
) != 0)
1886 s
->s3
->is_probably_safari
= 1;
1888 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1890 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
1895 unsigned char *data
;
1896 int renegotiate_seen
= 0;
1898 s
->servername_done
= 0;
1899 s
->tlsext_status_type
= -1;
1900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1901 s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
= 0;
1904 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
);
1905 s
->s3
->alpn_selected
= NULL
;
1906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1907 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
&= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
|
1908 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS
);
1911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1912 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG
)
1913 ssl_check_for_safari(s
, pkt
);
1914 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1916 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1917 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
);
1918 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1919 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1920 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
;
1923 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1924 OPENSSL_free(s
->srp_ctx
.login
);
1925 s
->srp_ctx
.login
= NULL
;
1928 s
->srtp_profile
= NULL
;
1930 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) == 0)
1933 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &len
))
1936 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != len
)
1939 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &type
) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &size
)) {
1942 if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt
, &data
, size
))
1945 if (s
->tlsext_debug_cb
)
1946 s
->tlsext_debug_cb(s
, 0, type
, data
, size
, s
->tlsext_debug_arg
);
1948 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &subpkt
, size
))
1951 if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
) {
1952 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s
, &subpkt
, al
))
1954 renegotiate_seen
= 1;
1955 } else if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
1958 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1960 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1961 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1962 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1963 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1964 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1965 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1966 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1967 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1968 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1969 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1970 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1971 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1972 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1973 * the value of the Host: field.
1974 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1975 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1976 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1978 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1982 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
) {
1983 unsigned char *sdata
;
1984 unsigned int servname_type
;
1988 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt
, &dsize
)
1989 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt
, &ssubpkt
, dsize
))
1992 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt
) > 3) {
1993 if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt
, &servname_type
)
1994 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt
, &len
)
1995 || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt
) < len
)
1998 if (s
->servername_done
== 0)
1999 switch (servname_type
) {
2000 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
:
2002 if (s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
)
2005 if (len
> TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name
) {
2006 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
2009 if ((s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
=
2010 OPENSSL_malloc(len
+ 1)) == NULL
) {
2011 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2014 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt
,
2015 (unsigned char *)s
->session
2018 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2021 s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
[len
] = '\0';
2022 if (strlen(s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
) != len
) {
2023 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
);
2024 s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
= NULL
;
2025 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
2028 s
->servername_done
= 1;
2031 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt
, &sdata
, len
)) {
2032 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2035 s
->servername_done
= s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
2036 && strlen(s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
) == len
2037 && strncmp(s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
,
2038 (char *)sdata
, len
) == 0;
2047 /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */
2048 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt
) != 0)
2052 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2053 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_srp
) {
2054 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt
, &len
)
2055 || s
->srp_ctx
.login
!= NULL
)
2058 if ((s
->srp_ctx
.login
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
+ 1)) == NULL
)
2060 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt
, (unsigned char *)s
->srp_ctx
.login
,
2063 s
->srp_ctx
.login
[len
] = '\0';
2065 if (strlen(s
->srp_ctx
.login
) != len
2066 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt
))
2071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2072 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats
) {
2073 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length
;
2075 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt
, &ecpointformatlist_length
)
2076 || ecpointformatlist_length
== 0)
2080 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
);
2081 s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
= NULL
;
2082 s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
= 0;
2083 if ((s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
=
2084 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length
)) == NULL
) {
2085 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2088 s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
=
2089 ecpointformatlist_length
;
2090 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt
,
2091 s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
,
2092 ecpointformatlist_length
))
2094 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt
, ecpointformatlist_length
)) {
2097 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2098 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt
)) {
2099 *al
= TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2102 } else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves
) {
2103 unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length
;
2105 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */
2106 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt
, &ellipticcurvelist_length
)
2107 || ellipticcurvelist_length
== 0
2108 || (ellipticcurvelist_length
& 1) != 0)
2112 if (s
->session
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist
)
2115 s
->session
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length
= 0;
2116 if ((s
->session
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist
=
2117 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length
)) == NULL
) {
2118 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2121 s
->session
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length
=
2122 ellipticcurvelist_length
;
2123 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt
,
2124 s
->session
->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist
,
2125 ellipticcurvelist_length
))
2127 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt
, ellipticcurvelist_length
)) {
2130 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2131 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt
)) {
2135 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2136 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
) {
2137 if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt
, size
)
2138 || (s
->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb
&&
2139 !s
->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s
, data
, size
,
2140 s
->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg
))) {
2141 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2144 } else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms
) {
2147 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
2148 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt
, &dsize
)
2151 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt
, &data
, dsize
)
2152 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt
) != 0
2153 || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s
, data
, dsize
)) {
2156 } else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
) {
2159 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt
,
2160 (unsigned int *)&s
->tlsext_status_type
))
2163 if (s
->tlsext_status_type
== TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp
) {
2164 const unsigned char *sdata
;
2166 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2167 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt
, &dsize
)
2168 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt
, &ssubpkt
, dsize
))
2171 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt
)) {
2173 unsigned int idsize
;
2175 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt
) < 4
2176 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt
, &idsize
)
2177 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt
, &data
, idsize
)) {
2182 id
= d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL
, &sdata
, idsize
);
2185 if (data
!= sdata
) {
2186 OCSP_RESPID_free(id
);
2189 if (!s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2190 && !(s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
=
2191 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2192 OCSP_RESPID_free(id
);
2193 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2196 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s
->tlsext_ocsp_ids
, id
)) {
2197 OCSP_RESPID_free(id
);
2198 *al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2203 /* Read in request_extensions */
2204 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt
, &dsize
)
2205 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt
, &data
, dsize
)
2206 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt
)) {
2211 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
,
2212 X509_EXTENSION_free
);
2213 s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
=
2214 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL
, &sdata
, dsize
);
2215 if (!s
->tlsext_ocsp_exts
|| (data
+ dsize
!= sdata
))
2220 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2223 s
->tlsext_status_type
= -1;
2225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2226 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat
) {
2227 unsigned int hbtype
;
2229 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt
, &hbtype
)
2230 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt
)) {
2231 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2235 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2236 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
|= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
;
2238 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2239 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
|= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
;
2240 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
|= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS
;
2243 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2248 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2249 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
&&
2250 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
== 0 &&
2251 s
->s3
->alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
2253 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2256 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2257 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2258 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2259 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2260 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2261 * anything like that, but this might change).
2263 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2264 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2265 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2266 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2267 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2269 s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
= 1;
2273 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
&&
2274 s
->ctx
->alpn_select_cb
&& s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
== 0) {
2275 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s
, &subpkt
, al
) != 0)
2277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2278 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2279 s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
= 0;
2283 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2284 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2285 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s
)
2286 && type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp
) {
2287 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s
, &subpkt
, al
))
2291 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2292 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
)
2293 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
;
2295 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret
) {
2297 s
->session
->flags
|= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS
;
2300 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2301 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2302 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2303 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2304 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2307 if (custom_ext_parse(s
, 1, type
, data
, size
, al
) <= 0)
2312 /* Spurious data on the end */
2313 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0)
2318 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2320 if (!renegotiate_seen
&& s
->renegotiate
&&
2321 !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
2322 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
,
2324 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
2330 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2334 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2337 custom_ext_init(&s
->cert
->srv_ext
);
2338 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s
, pkt
, &al
) <= 0) {
2339 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2343 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s
) <= 0) {
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT
);
2350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2352 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2353 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2354 * fill the length of the block.
2356 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET
*pkt
)
2360 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt
)) {
2361 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt
, &len
)
2362 || !PACKET_forward(pkt
, len
))
2370 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int *al
)
2372 unsigned int length
, type
, size
;
2373 int tlsext_servername
= 0;
2374 int renegotiate_seen
= 0;
2376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2377 s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
= 0;
2379 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
2381 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
);
2382 s
->s3
->alpn_selected
= NULL
;
2383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2384 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
&= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
|
2385 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS
);
2388 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2389 s
->s3
->flags
&= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
;
2392 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &length
))
2395 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != length
) {
2396 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2400 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &type
) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &size
)) {
2401 unsigned char *data
;
2404 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt
, &spkt
, size
)
2405 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt
, &data
, size
))
2408 if (s
->tlsext_debug_cb
)
2409 s
->tlsext_debug_cb(s
, 1, type
, data
, size
, s
->tlsext_debug_arg
);
2411 if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate
) {
2412 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s
, &spkt
, al
))
2414 renegotiate_seen
= 1;
2415 } else if (s
->version
== SSL3_VERSION
) {
2416 } else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name
) {
2417 if (s
->tlsext_hostname
== NULL
|| size
> 0) {
2418 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
2421 tlsext_servername
= 1;
2423 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2424 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats
) {
2425 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length
;
2426 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt
, &ecpointformatlist_length
)
2427 || ecpointformatlist_length
!= size
- 1) {
2428 *al
= TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2432 s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
= 0;
2433 OPENSSL_free(s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
);
2434 if ((s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
=
2435 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length
)) == NULL
) {
2436 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2439 s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
=
2440 ecpointformatlist_length
;
2441 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt
,
2442 s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
,
2443 ecpointformatlist_length
)) {
2444 *al
= TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2450 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2452 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
) {
2453 if (s
->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb
&&
2454 !s
->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s
, data
, size
,
2455 s
->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg
))
2457 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2460 if (!tls_use_ticket(s
) || (size
> 0)) {
2461 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
;
2464 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 1;
2466 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
) {
2468 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2471 if ((s
->tlsext_status_type
== -1) || (size
> 0)) {
2472 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
;
2475 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2476 s
->tlsext_status_expected
= 1;
2478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2479 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
&&
2480 s
->s3
->tmp
.finish_md_len
== 0) {
2481 unsigned char *selected
;
2482 unsigned char selected_len
;
2483 /* We must have requested it. */
2484 if (s
->ctx
->next_proto_select_cb
== NULL
) {
2485 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
;
2488 /* The data must be valid */
2489 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt
)) {
2490 *al
= TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2494 ctx
->next_proto_select_cb(s
, &selected
, &selected_len
, data
,
2496 s
->ctx
->next_proto_select_cb_arg
) !=
2497 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
) {
2498 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2501 s
->next_proto_negotiated
= OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len
);
2502 if (s
->next_proto_negotiated
== NULL
) {
2503 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2506 memcpy(s
->next_proto_negotiated
, selected
, selected_len
);
2507 s
->next_proto_negotiated_len
= selected_len
;
2508 s
->s3
->next_proto_neg_seen
= 1;
2512 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
) {
2514 /* We must have requested it. */
2515 if (s
->alpn_client_proto_list
== NULL
) {
2516 *al
= TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION
;
2520 * The extension data consists of:
2521 * uint16 list_length
2522 * uint8 proto_length;
2523 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2525 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt
, &len
)
2526 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) != len
2527 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt
, &len
)
2528 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt
) != len
) {
2529 *al
= TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2532 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->alpn_selected
);
2533 s
->s3
->alpn_selected
= OPENSSL_malloc(len
);
2534 if (s
->s3
->alpn_selected
== NULL
) {
2535 *al
= TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2538 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt
, s
->s3
->alpn_selected
, len
)) {
2539 *al
= TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2542 s
->s3
->alpn_selected_len
= len
;
2544 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2545 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat
) {
2546 unsigned int hbtype
;
2547 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt
, &hbtype
)) {
2548 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2552 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2553 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
|= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
;
2555 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2556 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
|= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
;
2557 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
|= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS
;
2560 *al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2566 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp
) {
2567 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s
, &spkt
, al
))
2571 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2572 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
) {
2573 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2574 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mac
!= SSL_AEAD
2575 && s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_enc
!= SSL_RC4
)
2576 s
->s3
->flags
|= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
;
2579 else if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret
) {
2581 s
->session
->flags
|= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS
;
2584 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2585 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2587 else if (custom_ext_parse(s
, 0, type
, data
, size
, al
) <= 0)
2591 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt
) != 0) {
2592 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2596 if (!s
->hit
&& tlsext_servername
== 1) {
2597 if (s
->tlsext_hostname
) {
2598 if (s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
== NULL
) {
2599 s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
= BUF_strdup(s
->tlsext_hostname
);
2600 if (!s
->session
->tlsext_hostname
) {
2601 *al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
2605 *al
= SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR
;
2614 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2615 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2616 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2617 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2618 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2619 * initial connect only.
2621 if (!renegotiate_seen
&& !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT
)
2622 && !(s
->options
& SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
)) {
2623 *al
= SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
;
2624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
,
2625 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED
);
2632 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL
*s
)
2638 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL
*s
)
2643 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL
*s
)
2645 int ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
;
2646 int al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
2648 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2650 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2651 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2654 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2655 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2659 if (s
->ctx
!= NULL
&& s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback
!= 0)
2661 s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback(s
, &al
,
2662 s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_arg
);
2663 else if (s
->initial_ctx
!= NULL
2664 && s
->initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback
!= 0)
2666 s
->initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback(s
, &al
,
2668 initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_arg
);
2671 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
2672 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2675 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING
:
2676 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, al
);
2679 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
2680 s
->servername_done
= 0;
2685 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2686 static void ssl_set_default_md(SSL
*s
)
2688 const EVP_MD
**pmd
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
;
2689 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2690 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
] = EVP_sha1();
2692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2693 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
] = EVP_sha1();
2694 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = EVP_sha1();
2696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2697 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = EVP_sha1();
2701 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
2705 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2706 OPENSSL_free(s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
);
2707 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
2708 s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
2709 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2710 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
2711 s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[i
] = NULL
;
2712 s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
2715 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2716 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
) {
2717 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
2718 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2719 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2722 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2723 if (!s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
) {
2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS
,
2725 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
2726 al
= SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
;
2730 ssl_set_default_md(s
);
2734 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2738 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL
*s
)
2740 int ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
;
2741 int al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2744 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2745 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2746 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2747 * influence which certificate is sent
2749 if ((s
->tlsext_status_type
!= -1) && s
->ctx
&& s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
) {
2751 CERT_PKEY
*certpkey
;
2752 certpkey
= ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
2753 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2754 if (certpkey
== NULL
) {
2755 s
->tlsext_status_expected
= 0;
2759 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2760 * et al can pick it up.
2762 s
->cert
->key
= certpkey
;
2763 r
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
2765 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2766 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
2767 s
->tlsext_status_expected
= 0;
2769 /* status request response should be sent */
2770 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
:
2771 if (s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
)
2772 s
->tlsext_status_expected
= 1;
2774 s
->tlsext_status_expected
= 0;
2776 /* something bad happened */
2777 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
2778 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
;
2779 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2783 s
->tlsext_status_expected
= 0;
2787 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
2788 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2791 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING
:
2792 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, al
);
2800 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL
*s
)
2802 int ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
;
2803 int al
= SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME
;
2805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2807 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2808 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2809 * must contain uncompressed.
2811 unsigned long alg_k
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
;
2812 unsigned long alg_a
= s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
;
2813 if ((s
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
!= NULL
)
2814 && (s
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
> 0)
2815 && (s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
!= NULL
)
2816 && (s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
> 0)
2817 && ((alg_k
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHr
| SSL_kECDHe
))
2818 || (alg_a
& SSL_aECDSA
))) {
2819 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2821 unsigned char *list
;
2822 int found_uncompressed
= 0;
2823 list
= s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist
;
2824 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->session
->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length
; i
++) {
2825 if (*(list
++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
) {
2826 found_uncompressed
= 1;
2830 if (!found_uncompressed
) {
2831 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
,
2832 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST
);
2836 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
;
2837 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2839 if (s
->ctx
!= NULL
&& s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback
!= 0)
2841 s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback(s
, &al
,
2842 s
->ctx
->tlsext_servername_arg
);
2843 else if (s
->initial_ctx
!= NULL
2844 && s
->initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback
!= 0)
2846 s
->initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_callback(s
, &al
,
2848 initial_ctx
->tlsext_servername_arg
);
2851 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2854 if ((s
->tlsext_status_type
!= -1) && !(s
->tlsext_status_expected
)
2855 && s
->ctx
&& s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb
) {
2858 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2861 OPENSSL_free(s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
);
2862 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resp
= NULL
;
2863 s
->tlsext_ocsp_resplen
= -1;
2864 r
= s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_cb(s
, s
->ctx
->tlsext_status_arg
);
2866 al
= SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE
;
2867 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
;
2870 al
= SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
;
2871 ret
= SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
;
2876 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL
:
2877 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2880 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING
:
2881 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_WARNING
, al
);
2884 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK
:
2885 s
->servername_done
= 0;
2891 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
)
2894 if (s
->version
< SSL3_VERSION
)
2896 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s
, pkt
, &al
) <= 0) {
2897 ssl3_send_alert(s
, SSL3_AL_FATAL
, al
);
2901 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s
) <= 0) {
2902 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT
);
2909 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2910 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2911 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2913 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2914 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2915 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2916 * point to the resulting session.
2918 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2919 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2920 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2923 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2924 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2925 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2926 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2927 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2928 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2929 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2932 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2933 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2934 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2935 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2936 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2937 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2939 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL
*s
, const PACKET
*ext
, const PACKET
*session_id
,
2943 PACKET local_ext
= *ext
;
2947 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 0;
2950 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2953 if (!tls_use_ticket(s
))
2955 if ((s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
))
2958 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext
, &i
)) {
2962 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext
) >= 4) {
2963 unsigned int type
, size
;
2965 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext
, &type
)
2966 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext
, &size
)) {
2967 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2971 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext
) < size
) {
2975 if (type
== TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
) {
2977 unsigned char *etick
;
2981 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2984 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 1;
2988 if (s
->tls_session_secret_cb
) {
2990 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2991 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2992 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2993 * calculate the master secret later.
2998 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext
, &etick
, size
)) {
2999 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3003 r
= tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, etick
, size
, PACKET_data(session_id
),
3004 PACKET_remaining(session_id
), ret
);
3006 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3007 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 1;
3010 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3013 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3014 s
->tlsext_ticket_expected
= 1;
3017 default: /* fatal error */
3023 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext
, size
)) {
3035 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3037 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3038 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3039 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3040 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3041 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3042 * point to the resulting session.
3045 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3046 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3047 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3048 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3050 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *etick
,
3051 int eticklen
, const unsigned char *sess_id
,
3052 int sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
3055 unsigned char *sdec
;
3056 const unsigned char *p
;
3057 int slen
, mlen
, renew_ticket
= 0;
3058 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
3061 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->initial_ctx
;
3062 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3065 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3066 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx
);
3067 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx
);
3068 if (tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb
) {
3069 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
3070 int rv
= tctx
->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s
, nctick
, nctick
+ 16,
3079 /* Check key name matches */
3080 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_key_name
, 16))
3082 if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx
, tctx
->tlsext_tick_hmac_key
, 16,
3083 EVP_sha256(), NULL
) <= 0
3084 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx
, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL
,
3085 tctx
->tlsext_tick_aes_key
,
3091 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3094 mlen
= HMAC_size(&hctx
);
3099 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3100 if (HMAC_Update(&hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
3101 || HMAC_Final(&hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
) <= 0) {
3104 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3105 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
3106 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3109 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3110 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3111 p
= etick
+ 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3112 eticklen
-= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx
);
3113 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
3115 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
, eticklen
) <= 0) {
3116 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3119 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &mlen
) <= 0) {
3120 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3125 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3128 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &p
, slen
);
3132 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3133 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3134 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3138 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
3139 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
3148 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3152 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx
);
3153 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx
);
3157 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3164 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md
[] = {
3165 {NID_md5
, TLSEXT_hash_md5
},
3166 {NID_sha1
, TLSEXT_hash_sha1
},
3167 {NID_sha224
, TLSEXT_hash_sha224
},
3168 {NID_sha256
, TLSEXT_hash_sha256
},
3169 {NID_sha384
, TLSEXT_hash_sha384
},
3170 {NID_sha512
, TLSEXT_hash_sha512
}
3173 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig
[] = {
3174 {EVP_PKEY_RSA
, TLSEXT_signature_rsa
},
3175 {EVP_PKEY_DSA
, TLSEXT_signature_dsa
},
3176 {EVP_PKEY_EC
, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa
}
3179 static int tls12_find_id(int nid
, const tls12_lookup
*table
, size_t tlen
)
3182 for (i
= 0; i
< tlen
; i
++) {
3183 if (table
[i
].nid
== nid
)
3189 static int tls12_find_nid(int id
, const tls12_lookup
*table
, size_t tlen
)
3192 for (i
= 0; i
< tlen
; i
++) {
3193 if ((table
[i
].id
) == id
)
3194 return table
[i
].nid
;
3199 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p
, const EVP_PKEY
*pk
,
3205 md_id
= tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md
), tls12_md
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md
));
3208 sig_id
= tls12_get_sigid(pk
);
3211 p
[0] = (unsigned char)md_id
;
3212 p
[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id
;
3216 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY
*pk
)
3218 return tls12_find_id(pk
->type
, tls12_sig
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig
));
3224 const EVP_MD
*(*mfunc
) (void);
3227 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info
[] = {
3228 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3231 {NID_md5
, 64, EVP_md5
},
3233 {NID_sha1
, 80, EVP_sha1
},
3234 {NID_sha224
, 112, EVP_sha224
},
3235 {NID_sha256
, 128, EVP_sha256
},
3236 {NID_sha384
, 192, EVP_sha384
},
3237 {NID_sha512
, 256, EVP_sha512
}
3240 static const tls12_hash_info
*tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg
)
3244 if (hash_alg
> OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info
))
3246 return tls12_md_info
+ hash_alg
- 1;
3249 const EVP_MD
*tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg
)
3251 const tls12_hash_info
*inf
;
3252 if (hash_alg
== TLSEXT_hash_md5
&& FIPS_mode())
3254 inf
= tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg
);
3255 if (!inf
|| !inf
->mfunc
)
3257 return inf
->mfunc();
3260 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg
)
3263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3264 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa
:
3265 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
;
3267 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3268 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa
:
3269 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
;
3271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3272 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa
:
3273 return SSL_PKEY_ECC
;
3279 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3280 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid
, int *psign_nid
,
3281 int *psignhash_nid
, const unsigned char *data
)
3283 int sign_nid
= 0, hash_nid
= 0;
3284 if (!phash_nid
&& !psign_nid
&& !psignhash_nid
)
3286 if (phash_nid
|| psignhash_nid
) {
3287 hash_nid
= tls12_find_nid(data
[0], tls12_md
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md
));
3289 *phash_nid
= hash_nid
;
3291 if (psign_nid
|| psignhash_nid
) {
3292 sign_nid
= tls12_find_nid(data
[1], tls12_sig
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig
));
3294 *psign_nid
= sign_nid
;
3296 if (psignhash_nid
) {
3297 if (sign_nid
&& hash_nid
)
3298 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid
, hash_nid
, sign_nid
);
3300 *psignhash_nid
= NID_undef
;
3304 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3305 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL
*s
, int op
, const unsigned char *ptmp
)
3307 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3308 const tls12_hash_info
*hinf
= tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp
[0]);
3309 if (!hinf
|| !hinf
->mfunc
)
3311 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3312 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp
[1]) == -1)
3314 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3315 return ssl_security(s
, op
, hinf
->secbits
, hinf
->nid
, (void *)ptmp
);
3319 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3320 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3324 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL
*s
, int op
)
3326 const unsigned char *sigalgs
;
3327 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
3328 int have_rsa
= 0, have_dsa
= 0, have_ecdsa
= 0;
3330 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3331 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3332 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3334 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &sigalgs
);
3335 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
+= 2, sigalgs
+= 2) {
3336 switch (sigalgs
[1]) {
3337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3338 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa
:
3339 if (!have_rsa
&& tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, sigalgs
))
3343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3344 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa
:
3345 if (!have_dsa
&& tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, sigalgs
))
3349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3350 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa
:
3351 if (!have_ecdsa
&& tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, sigalgs
))
3358 *pmask_a
|= SSL_aRSA
;
3360 *pmask_a
|= SSL_aDSS
;
3362 *pmask_a
|= SSL_aECDSA
;
3365 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *out
,
3366 const unsigned char *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
3368 unsigned char *tmpout
= out
;
3370 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
+= 2, psig
+= 2) {
3371 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, psig
)) {
3372 *tmpout
++ = psig
[0];
3373 *tmpout
++ = psig
[1];
3376 return tmpout
- out
;
3379 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3380 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, TLS_SIGALGS
*shsig
,
3381 const unsigned char *pref
, size_t preflen
,
3382 const unsigned char *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
3384 const unsigned char *ptmp
, *atmp
;
3385 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
3386 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
+= 2, ptmp
+= 2) {
3387 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3388 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, ptmp
))
3390 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
+= 2, atmp
+= 2) {
3391 if (ptmp
[0] == atmp
[0] && ptmp
[1] == atmp
[1]) {
3394 shsig
->rhash
= ptmp
[0];
3395 shsig
->rsign
= ptmp
[1];
3396 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig
->hash_nid
,
3398 &shsig
->signandhash_nid
, ptmp
);
3408 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3409 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
3411 const unsigned char *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
3412 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
3414 TLS_SIGALGS
*salgs
= NULL
;
3416 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
3418 OPENSSL_free(c
->shared_sigalgs
);
3419 c
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
3420 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
3421 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3422 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
3423 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
3424 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
3425 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
3426 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
3427 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
3429 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, &conf
);
3430 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
3433 allow
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
3434 allowlen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
3438 pref
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
3439 preflen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
3441 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
3443 salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS
));
3446 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
3450 c
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
3451 c
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
3455 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3457 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *data
, int dsize
)
3460 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3461 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
3463 /* Should never happen */
3467 OPENSSL_free(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
);
3468 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(dsize
);
3469 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
)
3471 s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
= dsize
;
3472 memcpy(s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
, data
, dsize
);
3476 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
3481 const EVP_MD
**pmd
= s
->s3
->tmp
.md
;
3482 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
;
3484 TLS_SIGALGS
*sigptr
;
3485 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
3488 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3489 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
) {
3491 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3492 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3494 const unsigned char *sigs
= NULL
;
3496 sigs
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
3498 sigs
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
3500 idx
= tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs
[1]);
3501 md
= tls12_get_hash(sigs
[0]);
3503 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
3504 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
) {
3505 pvalid
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
3506 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = md
;
3512 for (i
= 0, sigptr
= c
->shared_sigalgs
;
3513 i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++, sigptr
++) {
3514 idx
= tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr
->rsign
);
3515 if (idx
> 0 && pmd
[idx
] == NULL
) {
3516 md
= tls12_get_hash(sigptr
->rhash
);
3518 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
3519 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
) {
3520 pvalid
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
3521 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = md
;
3527 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3528 * the certificate for signing.
3530 if (!(s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
3532 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3533 * supported it stays as NULL.
3535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3536 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
] == NULL
)
3537 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
] = EVP_sha1();
3539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3540 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
] == NULL
) {
3541 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
] = EVP_sha1();
3542 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
] = EVP_sha1();
3545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3546 if (pmd
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] == NULL
)
3547 pmd
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
] = EVP_sha1();
3553 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
3554 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
3555 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
3557 const unsigned char *psig
= s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
3562 if (idx
>= (int)s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
)
3569 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash
, psign
, psignhash
, psig
);
3571 return s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
/ 2;
3574 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
3575 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
3576 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
3578 TLS_SIGALGS
*shsigalgs
= s
->cert
->shared_sigalgs
;
3579 if (!shsigalgs
|| idx
>= (int)s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
)
3583 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash_nid
;
3585 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sign_nid
;
3587 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->signandhash_nid
;
3589 *rsig
= shsigalgs
->rsign
;
3591 *rhash
= shsigalgs
->rhash
;
3592 return s
->cert
->shared_sigalgslen
;
3595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3596 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL
*s
, unsigned char *p
, unsigned int length
)
3599 unsigned short hbtype
;
3600 unsigned int payload
;
3601 unsigned int padding
= 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3603 if (s
->msg_callback
)
3604 s
->msg_callback(0, s
->version
, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT
,
3606 s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
3608 /* Read type and payload length first */
3609 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length
)
3610 return 0; /* silently discard */
3613 if (1 + 2 + payload
+ 16 > length
)
3614 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3617 if (hbtype
== TLS1_HB_REQUEST
) {
3618 unsigned char *buffer
, *bp
;
3622 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3623 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3625 buffer
= OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload
+ padding
);
3626 if (buffer
== NULL
) {
3627 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3632 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3633 *bp
++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE
;
3635 memcpy(bp
, pl
, payload
);
3637 /* Random padding */
3638 if (RAND_bytes(bp
, padding
) <= 0) {
3639 OPENSSL_free(buffer
);
3643 r
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT
, buffer
,
3644 3 + payload
+ padding
);
3646 if (r
>= 0 && s
->msg_callback
)
3647 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT
,
3648 buffer
, 3 + payload
+ padding
,
3649 s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
3651 OPENSSL_free(buffer
);
3655 } else if (hbtype
== TLS1_HB_RESPONSE
) {
3659 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3660 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3664 if (payload
== 18 && seq
== s
->tlsext_hb_seq
) {
3666 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 0;
3673 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL
*s
)
3675 unsigned char *buf
, *p
;
3677 unsigned int payload
= 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3678 unsigned int padding
= 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3680 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3681 if (!(s
->tlsext_heartbeat
& SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED
) ||
3682 s
->tlsext_heartbeat
& SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS
) {
3683 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT
, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT
);
3687 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3688 if (s
->tlsext_hb_pending
) {
3689 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT
, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING
);
3693 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3694 if (SSL_in_init(s
) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s
)) {
3695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT
, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE
);
3700 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3701 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3702 * some random stuff.
3703 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3704 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3705 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3706 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3709 buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload
+ padding
);
3711 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
3716 *p
++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST
;
3717 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3719 /* Sequence number */
3720 s2n(s
->tlsext_hb_seq
, p
);
3721 /* 16 random bytes */
3722 if (RAND_bytes(p
, 16) <= 0) {
3723 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3727 /* Random padding */
3728 if (RAND_bytes(p
, padding
) <= 0) {
3729 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
3733 ret
= ssl3_write_bytes(s
, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT
, buf
, 3 + payload
+ padding
);
3735 if (s
->msg_callback
)
3736 s
->msg_callback(1, s
->version
, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT
,
3737 buf
, 3 + payload
+ padding
,
3738 s
, s
->msg_callback_arg
);
3740 s
->tlsext_hb_pending
= 1;
3749 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3753 int sigalgs
[MAX_SIGALGLEN
];
3756 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
3758 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
3759 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
3760 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
3761 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
3762 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3763 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
3765 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
3766 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
3767 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
3771 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
3773 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
3776 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
3779 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== MAX_SIGALGLEN
)
3781 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
3783 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
3785 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
3793 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
3794 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
3796 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| hash_alg
== NID_undef
)
3799 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
; i
+= 2) {
3800 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sig_alg
&& sarg
->sigalgs
[i
+ 1] == hash_alg
)
3803 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = hash_alg
;
3804 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = sig_alg
;
3809 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3810 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3812 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
3816 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
3820 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
3823 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
,
3826 unsigned char *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
3831 sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(salglen
);
3832 if (sigalgs
== NULL
)
3834 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
3835 rhash
= tls12_find_id(*psig_nids
++, tls12_md
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md
));
3836 rsign
= tls12_find_id(*psig_nids
++, tls12_sig
, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig
));
3838 if (rhash
== -1 || rsign
== -1)
3845 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
3846 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
3847 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
3849 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
3850 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
3851 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
3857 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
3861 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT
*c
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
3865 if (default_nid
== -1)
3867 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
3869 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
3870 for (i
= 0; i
< c
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++)
3871 if (sig_nid
== c
->shared_sigalgs
[i
].signandhash_nid
)
3876 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3877 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
3881 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
3882 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
3883 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
3890 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3891 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3892 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3893 * attempting to use them.
3896 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3898 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3899 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3900 /* Strict mode flags */
3901 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3902 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3903 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3905 int tls1_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
3910 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
3911 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
3914 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
3915 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3917 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3920 idx
= cpk
- c
->pkeys
;
3922 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
3923 pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
3925 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
3927 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
3928 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3931 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3932 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3933 if (s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
) {
3934 rv
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
|
3935 CERT_PKEY_VALID
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
3943 idx
= ssl_cert_type(x
, pk
);
3946 pvalid
= s
->s3
->tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
3948 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
3949 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
3951 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
3958 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
3959 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
3960 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
3961 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
3962 else if (!check_flags
)
3967 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3968 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3970 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& strict_mode
) {
3972 unsigned char rsign
= 0;
3973 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.peer_sigalgs
)
3975 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3978 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
:
3979 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
:
3980 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA
:
3981 rsign
= TLSEXT_signature_rsa
;
3982 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
3985 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
3986 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA
:
3987 rsign
= TLSEXT_signature_dsa
;
3988 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
3992 rsign
= TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa
;
3993 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
4002 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4003 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4005 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
4007 const unsigned char *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
4008 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
+= 2, p
+= 2) {
4009 if (p
[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1
&& p
[1] == rsign
)
4012 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
4019 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4020 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, x
, default_nid
)) {
4024 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
4025 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
4026 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
4027 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
4029 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
4036 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4037 else if (check_flags
)
4038 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
4040 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4041 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, check_flags
? 1 : 2))
4042 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
4043 else if (!check_flags
)
4046 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
4047 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4048 else if (strict_mode
) {
4049 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
4050 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
4051 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
4052 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
4054 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
4061 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
4062 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
4066 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
4069 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
4072 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
4077 int cert_type
= X509_certificate_type(x
, pk
);
4078 if (cert_type
& EVP_PKS_RSA
)
4079 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH
;
4080 if (cert_type
& EVP_PKS_DSA
)
4081 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH
;
4085 const unsigned char *ctypes
;
4089 ctypelen
= (int)c
->ctype_num
;
4091 ctypes
= (unsigned char *)s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype
;
4092 ctypelen
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ctype_num
;
4094 for (i
= 0; i
< ctypelen
; i
++) {
4095 if (ctypes
[i
] == check_type
) {
4096 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
4100 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
4103 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
4105 ca_dn
= s
->s3
->tmp
.ca_names
;
4107 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
))
4108 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
4110 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
4111 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
4112 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
4114 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
4115 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
4116 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
4117 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
4118 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
4123 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
4126 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
4128 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
4129 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
4133 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
) {
4134 if (*pvalid
& CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
)
4135 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
4136 else if (s
->s3
->tmp
.md
[idx
] != NULL
)
4137 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
4139 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
4142 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4146 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
)
4149 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4150 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
4157 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4158 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL
*s
)
4160 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC
);
4161 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN
);
4162 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
4163 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA
);
4164 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA
);
4165 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
4168 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4169 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
4171 return tls1_check_chain(s
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
4175 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4176 DH
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL
*s
)
4178 int dh_secbits
= 80;
4179 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
== 2)
4180 return DH_get_1024_160();
4181 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
4182 if (s
->s3
->tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
4187 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s
);
4188 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk
->privatekey
);
4191 if (dh_secbits
>= 128) {
4197 BN_set_word(dhp
->g
, 2);
4198 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
4199 dhp
->p
= get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
4201 dhp
->p
= get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
4202 if (dhp
->p
== NULL
|| dhp
->g
== NULL
) {
4208 if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
4209 return DH_get_2048_224();
4210 return DH_get_1024_160();
4214 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
4217 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get_pubkey(x
);
4219 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
);
4220 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey
);
4224 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
4226 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
4229 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
4231 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4232 int secbits
= -1, md_nid
= NID_undef
, sig_nid
;
4233 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
4234 if (sig_nid
&& OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid
, &md_nid
, NULL
)) {
4236 if (md_nid
&& (md
= EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid
)))
4237 secbits
= EVP_MD_size(md
) * 4;
4240 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, md_nid
, x
);
4242 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, md_nid
, x
);
4245 int ssl_security_cert(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
, int is_ee
)
4248 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
4250 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
4251 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
4253 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
4254 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
4256 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
4257 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
4262 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4263 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4264 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4267 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
, int vfy
)
4269 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
4271 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
4276 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
4280 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
4281 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
4282 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);