2 * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
16 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
17 #include <openssl/conf.h>
18 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
19 #include <openssl/dh.h>
20 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/provider.h>
22 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
23 #include "internal/nelem.h"
24 #include "internal/sizes.h"
25 #include "internal/tlsgroups.h"
26 #include "ssl_local.h"
27 #include <openssl/ct.h>
29 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
);
30 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
);
32 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_enc_data
= {
36 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
37 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
38 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
39 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
40 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
42 tls1_export_keying_material
,
44 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
45 tls_close_construct_packet
,
49 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_1_enc_data
= {
53 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
54 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
55 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
56 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
57 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
59 tls1_export_keying_material
,
60 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
,
61 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
62 tls_close_construct_packet
,
66 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_2_enc_data
= {
70 tls1_generate_master_secret
,
71 tls1_change_cipher_state
,
72 tls1_final_finish_mac
,
73 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
74 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
76 tls1_export_keying_material
,
77 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
78 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS
,
79 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
80 tls_close_construct_packet
,
84 SSL3_ENC_METHOD
const TLSv1_3_enc_data
= {
87 tls13_setup_key_block
,
88 tls13_generate_master_secret
,
89 tls13_change_cipher_state
,
90 tls13_final_finish_mac
,
91 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
92 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST
, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE
,
94 tls13_export_keying_material
,
95 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
,
96 ssl3_set_handshake_header
,
97 tls_close_construct_packet
,
101 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
104 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
105 * http, the cache would over fill
107 return (60 * 60 * 2);
114 if (!s
->method
->ssl_clear(s
))
120 void tls1_free(SSL
*s
)
122 OPENSSL_free(s
->ext
.session_ticket
);
126 int tls1_clear(SSL
*s
)
131 if (s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
)
132 s
->version
= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL
;
134 s
->version
= s
->method
->version
;
139 /* Legacy NID to group_id mapping. Only works for groups we know about */
144 {NID_sect163k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163k1
},
145 {NID_sect163r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r1
},
146 {NID_sect163r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect163r2
},
147 {NID_sect193r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r1
},
148 {NID_sect193r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect193r2
},
149 {NID_sect233k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233k1
},
150 {NID_sect233r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect233r1
},
151 {NID_sect239k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect239k1
},
152 {NID_sect283k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283k1
},
153 {NID_sect283r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect283r1
},
154 {NID_sect409k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409k1
},
155 {NID_sect409r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect409r1
},
156 {NID_sect571k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571k1
},
157 {NID_sect571r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_sect571r1
},
158 {NID_secp160k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160k1
},
159 {NID_secp160r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r1
},
160 {NID_secp160r2
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp160r2
},
161 {NID_secp192k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192k1
},
162 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp192r1
},
163 {NID_secp224k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224k1
},
164 {NID_secp224r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp224r1
},
165 {NID_secp256k1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256k1
},
166 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp256r1
},
167 {NID_secp384r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp384r1
},
168 {NID_secp521r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_secp521r1
},
169 {NID_brainpoolP256r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP256r1
},
170 {NID_brainpoolP384r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP384r1
},
171 {NID_brainpoolP512r1
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_brainpoolP512r1
},
172 {EVP_PKEY_X25519
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x25519
},
173 {EVP_PKEY_X448
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_x448
},
174 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA
, 0x0022},
175 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB
, 0x0023},
176 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC
, 0x0024},
177 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD
, 0x0025},
178 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA
, 0x0026},
179 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB
, 0x0027},
180 {NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC
, 0x0028},
181 {NID_ffdhe2048
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe2048
},
182 {NID_ffdhe3072
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe3072
},
183 {NID_ffdhe4096
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe4096
},
184 {NID_ffdhe6144
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe6144
},
185 {NID_ffdhe8192
, OSSL_TLS_GROUP_ID_ffdhe8192
}
188 static const unsigned char ecformats_default
[] = {
189 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
,
190 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
,
191 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
194 /* The default curves */
195 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default
[] = {
196 29, /* X25519 (29) */
197 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
199 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
200 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
201 34, /* GC256A (34) */
202 35, /* GC256B (35) */
203 36, /* GC256C (36) */
204 37, /* GC256D (37) */
205 38, /* GC512A (38) */
206 39, /* GC512B (39) */
207 40, /* GC512C (40) */
208 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
209 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
210 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
211 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
212 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
215 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves
[] = {
220 struct provider_group_data_st
{
222 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
;
225 #define TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE 10
226 static OSSL_CALLBACK add_provider_groups
;
227 static int add_provider_groups(const OSSL_PARAM params
[], void *data
)
229 struct provider_group_data_st
*pgd
= data
;
230 SSL_CTX
*ctx
= pgd
->ctx
;
231 OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
= pgd
->provider
;
233 TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginf
= NULL
;
234 EVP_KEYMGMT
*keymgmt
;
236 unsigned int is_kem
= 0;
239 if (ctx
->group_list_max_len
== ctx
->group_list_len
) {
240 TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tmp
= NULL
;
242 if (ctx
->group_list_max_len
== 0)
243 tmp
= OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
)
244 * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
246 tmp
= OPENSSL_realloc(ctx
->group_list
,
247 (ctx
->group_list_max_len
248 + TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
)
249 * sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
));
251 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
254 ctx
->group_list
= tmp
;
255 memset(tmp
+ ctx
->group_list_max_len
,
257 sizeof(TLS_GROUP_INFO
) * TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
);
258 ctx
->group_list_max_len
+= TLS_GROUP_LIST_MALLOC_BLOCK_SIZE
;
261 ginf
= &ctx
->group_list
[ctx
->group_list_len
];
263 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME
);
264 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
265 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
268 ginf
->tlsname
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
269 if (ginf
->tlsname
== NULL
) {
270 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
274 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_NAME_INTERNAL
);
275 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
276 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
279 ginf
->realname
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
280 if (ginf
->realname
== NULL
) {
281 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
285 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ID
);
286 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &gid
) || gid
> UINT16_MAX
) {
287 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
290 ginf
->group_id
= (uint16_t)gid
;
292 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_ALG
);
293 if (p
== NULL
|| p
->data_type
!= OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING
) {
294 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
297 ginf
->algorithm
= OPENSSL_strdup(p
->data
);
298 if (ginf
->algorithm
== NULL
) {
299 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
303 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_SECURITY_BITS
);
304 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &ginf
->secbits
)) {
305 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
309 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_IS_KEM
);
310 if (p
!= NULL
&& (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p
, &is_kem
) || is_kem
> 1)) {
311 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
314 ginf
->is_kem
= 1 & is_kem
;
316 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_TLS
);
317 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->mintls
)) {
318 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
322 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_TLS
);
323 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->maxtls
)) {
324 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
328 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MIN_DTLS
);
329 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->mindtls
)) {
330 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
334 p
= OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params
, OSSL_CAPABILITY_TLS_GROUP_MAX_DTLS
);
335 if (p
== NULL
|| !OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p
, &ginf
->maxdtls
)) {
336 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT
);
340 * Now check that the algorithm is actually usable for our property query
341 * string. Regardless of the result we still return success because we have
342 * successfully processed this group, even though we may decide not to use
346 keymgmt
= EVP_KEYMGMT_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, ginf
->algorithm
, ctx
->propq
);
347 if (keymgmt
!= NULL
) {
349 * We have successfully fetched the algorithm - however if the provider
350 * doesn't match this one then we ignore it.
352 * Note: We're cheating a little here. Technically if the same algorithm
353 * is available from more than one provider then it is undefined which
354 * implementation you will get back. Theoretically this could be
355 * different every time...we assume here that you'll always get the
356 * same one back if you repeat the exact same fetch. Is this a reasonable
357 * assumption to make (in which case perhaps we should document this
360 if (EVP_KEYMGMT_provider(keymgmt
) == provider
) {
361 /* We have a match - so we will use this group */
362 ctx
->group_list_len
++;
365 EVP_KEYMGMT_free(keymgmt
);
369 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->tlsname
);
370 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->realname
);
371 OPENSSL_free(ginf
->algorithm
);
372 ginf
->tlsname
= ginf
->realname
= NULL
;
377 static int discover_provider_groups(OSSL_PROVIDER
*provider
, void *vctx
)
379 struct provider_group_data_st pgd
;
382 pgd
.provider
= provider
;
383 return OSSL_PROVIDER_get_capabilities(provider
, "TLS-GROUP",
384 add_provider_groups
, &pgd
);
387 int ssl_load_groups(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
389 size_t i
, j
, num_deflt_grps
= 0;
390 uint16_t tmp_supp_groups
[OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default
)];
392 if (!OSSL_PROVIDER_do_all(ctx
->libctx
, discover_provider_groups
, ctx
))
395 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default
); i
++) {
396 for (j
= 0; j
< ctx
->group_list_len
; j
++) {
397 if (ctx
->group_list
[j
].group_id
== supported_groups_default
[i
]) {
398 tmp_supp_groups
[num_deflt_grps
++] = ctx
->group_list
[j
].group_id
;
404 if (num_deflt_grps
== 0)
407 ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
408 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_deflt_grps
);
410 if (ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
== NULL
) {
411 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
415 memcpy(ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
,
417 num_deflt_grps
* sizeof(tmp_supp_groups
[0]));
418 ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default_len
= num_deflt_grps
;
423 static uint16_t tls1_group_name2id(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const char *name
)
427 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->group_list_len
; i
++) {
428 if (strcmp(ctx
->group_list
[i
].tlsname
, name
) == 0
429 || strcmp(ctx
->group_list
[i
].realname
, name
) == 0)
430 return ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
;
436 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t group_id
)
440 for (i
= 0; i
< ctx
->group_list_len
; i
++) {
441 if (ctx
->group_list
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
442 return &ctx
->group_list
[i
];
448 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id
, int include_unknown
)
456 * Return well known Group NIDs - for backwards compatibility. This won't
457 * work for groups we don't know about.
459 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group
); i
++)
461 if (nid_to_group
[i
].group_id
== group_id
)
462 return nid_to_group
[i
].nid
;
464 if (!include_unknown
)
466 return TLSEXT_nid_unknown
| (int)group_id
;
469 uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid
)
474 * Return well known Group ids - for backwards compatibility. This won't
475 * work for groups we don't know about.
477 for (i
= 0; i
< OSSL_NELEM(nid_to_group
); i
++)
479 if (nid_to_group
[i
].nid
== nid
)
480 return nid_to_group
[i
].group_id
;
487 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
488 * the number of groups supported.
490 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL
*s
, const uint16_t **pgroups
,
493 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
494 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
495 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
496 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
497 *pgroupslen
= OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves
);
500 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
501 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
;
505 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
506 *pgroups
= suiteb_curves
+ 1;
511 if (s
->ext
.supportedgroups
== NULL
) {
512 *pgroups
= s
->ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default
;
513 *pgroupslen
= s
->ctx
->ext
.supported_groups_default_len
;
515 *pgroups
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups
;
516 *pgroupslen
= s
->ext
.supportedgroups_len
;
522 int tls_valid_group(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, int minversion
, int maxversion
,
523 int isec
, int *okfortls13
)
525 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(s
->ctx
, group_id
);
528 if (okfortls13
!= NULL
)
534 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
535 if (ginfo
->mindtls
< 0 || ginfo
->maxdtls
< 0)
537 if (ginfo
->maxdtls
== 0)
540 ret
= DTLS_VERSION_LE(minversion
, ginfo
->maxdtls
);
541 if (ginfo
->mindtls
> 0)
542 ret
&= DTLS_VERSION_GE(maxversion
, ginfo
->mindtls
);
544 if (ginfo
->mintls
< 0 || ginfo
->maxtls
< 0)
546 if (ginfo
->maxtls
== 0)
549 ret
= (minversion
<= ginfo
->maxtls
);
550 if (ginfo
->mintls
> 0)
551 ret
&= (maxversion
>= ginfo
->mintls
);
552 if (ret
&& okfortls13
!= NULL
&& maxversion
== TLS1_3_VERSION
)
553 *okfortls13
= (ginfo
->maxtls
== 0)
554 || (ginfo
->maxtls
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
);
557 || strcmp(ginfo
->algorithm
, "EC") == 0
558 || strcmp(ginfo
->algorithm
, "X25519") == 0
559 || strcmp(ginfo
->algorithm
, "X448") == 0;
564 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
565 int tls_group_allowed(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group
, int op
)
567 const TLS_GROUP_INFO
*ginfo
= tls1_group_id_lookup(s
->ctx
, group
);
568 unsigned char gtmp
[2];
573 gtmp
[0] = group
>> 8;
574 gtmp
[1] = group
& 0xff;
575 return ssl_security(s
, op
, ginfo
->secbits
,
576 tls1_group_id2nid(ginfo
->group_id
, 0), (void *)gtmp
);
579 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
580 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id
, const uint16_t *list
, size_t listlen
)
583 for (i
= 0; i
< listlen
; i
++)
590 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
591 * if there is no match.
592 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
593 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
594 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
596 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL
*s
, int nmatch
)
598 const uint16_t *pref
, *supp
;
599 size_t num_pref
, num_supp
, i
;
602 /* Can't do anything on client side */
606 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
608 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
609 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
611 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
613 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
614 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256
;
615 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
616 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384
;
617 /* Should never happen */
620 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
624 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
625 * otherwise peer decides.
627 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
) {
628 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
629 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
631 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &pref
, &num_pref
);
632 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &supp
, &num_supp
);
635 for (k
= 0, i
= 0; i
< num_pref
; i
++) {
636 uint16_t id
= pref
[i
];
638 if (!tls1_in_list(id
, supp
, num_supp
)
639 || !tls_group_allowed(s
, id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED
))
647 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
651 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
652 int *groups
, size_t ngroups
)
657 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
658 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
660 unsigned long *dup_list
= NULL
;
661 unsigned long dup_list_egrp
= 0;
662 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp
= 0;
665 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH
);
668 if ((glist
= OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups
* sizeof(*glist
))) == NULL
) {
669 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
672 for (i
= 0; i
< ngroups
; i
++) {
673 unsigned long idmask
;
675 id
= tls1_nid2group_id(groups
[i
]);
676 if ((id
& 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
678 idmask
= 1L << (id
& 0x00FF);
679 dup_list
= (id
< 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp
: &dup_list_dhgrp
;
680 if (!id
|| ((*dup_list
) & idmask
))
694 # define GROUPLIST_INCREMENT 40
695 # define GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH 64
703 static int gid_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
705 gid_cb_st
*garg
= arg
;
708 char etmp
[GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH
];
712 if (garg
->gidcnt
== garg
->gidmax
) {
714 OPENSSL_realloc(garg
->gid_arr
, garg
->gidmax
+ GROUPLIST_INCREMENT
);
717 garg
->gidmax
+= GROUPLIST_INCREMENT
;
720 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
722 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
725 gid
= tls1_group_name2id(garg
->ctx
, etmp
);
728 for (i
= 0; i
< garg
->gidcnt
; i
++)
729 if (garg
->gid_arr
[i
] == gid
)
731 garg
->gid_arr
[garg
->gidcnt
++] = gid
;
735 /* Set groups based on a colon separated list */
736 int tls1_set_groups_list(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint16_t **pext
, size_t *pextlen
,
744 gcb
.gidmax
= GROUPLIST_INCREMENT
;
745 gcb
.gid_arr
= OPENSSL_malloc(gcb
.gidmax
* sizeof(*gcb
.gid_arr
));
746 if (gcb
.gid_arr
== NULL
)
749 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, gid_cb
, &gcb
))
757 * gid_cb ensurse there are no duplicates so we can just go ahead and set
760 tmparr
= OPENSSL_memdup(gcb
.gid_arr
, gcb
.gidcnt
* sizeof(*tmparr
));
764 *pextlen
= gcb
.gidcnt
;
767 OPENSSL_free(gcb
.gid_arr
);
771 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
772 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL
*s
, uint16_t group_id
, int check_own_groups
)
774 const uint16_t *groups
;
780 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
781 if (tls1_suiteb(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
!= NULL
) {
782 unsigned long cid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->id
;
784 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
) {
785 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
787 } else if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
) {
788 if (group_id
!= TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
791 /* Should never happen */
796 if (check_own_groups
) {
797 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
798 tls1_get_supported_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
799 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
))
803 if (!tls_group_allowed(s
, group_id
, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK
))
806 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
810 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
811 tls1_get_peer_groups(s
, &groups
, &groups_len
);
814 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
815 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
816 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
817 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
821 return tls1_in_list(group_id
, groups
, groups_len
);
824 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char **pformats
,
828 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
830 if (s
->ext
.ecpointformats
) {
831 *pformats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats
;
832 *num_formats
= s
->ext
.ecpointformats_len
;
834 *pformats
= ecformats_default
;
835 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
837 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
) - 1;
839 *num_formats
= sizeof(ecformats_default
);
843 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
844 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL
*s
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
846 unsigned char comp_id
;
850 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
851 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC"))
855 /* Get required compression id */
856 point_conv
= EVP_PKEY_get_ec_point_conv_form(pkey
);
859 if (point_conv
== POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED
) {
860 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed
;
861 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
863 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
868 int field_type
= EVP_PKEY_get_field_type(pkey
);
870 if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_prime_field
)
871 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime
;
872 else if (field_type
== NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field
)
873 comp_id
= TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
;
878 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
879 * supported (see RFC4492).
881 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
== NULL
)
884 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats_len
; i
++) {
885 if (s
->ext
.peer_ecpointformats
[i
] == comp_id
)
891 /* Return group id of a key */
892 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
894 int curve_nid
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey
);
896 if (curve_nid
== NID_undef
)
898 return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid
);
902 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
903 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
905 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int check_ee_md
)
909 pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
912 /* If not EC nothing to do */
913 if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey
, "EC"))
915 /* Check compression */
916 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
))
918 group_id
= tls1_get_group_id(pkey
);
920 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
923 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, group_id
, !s
->server
))
926 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
929 if (check_ee_md
&& tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
933 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
934 if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_256
)
935 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
;
936 else if (group_id
== TLSEXT_curve_P_384
)
937 check_md
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
;
939 return 0; /* Should never happen */
940 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
941 if (check_md
== s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
]->sigandhash
)
950 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
952 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
954 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
955 * is compatible with the client extensions.
957 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
959 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL
*s
, unsigned long cid
)
961 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
963 return tls1_shared_group(s
, 0) != 0;
965 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
968 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
)
969 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_256
, 1);
970 if (cid
== TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
)
971 return tls1_check_group_id(s
, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
, 1);
976 /* Default sigalg schemes */
977 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs
[] = {
978 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
979 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
980 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
981 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
984 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
985 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
986 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
987 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
988 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
989 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
991 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
992 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
993 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
995 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
996 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
998 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
999 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
1001 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
1002 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
1004 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
1005 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
1006 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
1008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1009 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
,
1010 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
,
1011 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
1012 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
1013 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
1018 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs
[] = {
1019 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1020 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
1023 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl
[] = {
1024 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
,
1025 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1026 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256
, NID_X9_62_prime256v1
, 1},
1027 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
,
1028 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1029 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384
, NID_secp384r1
, 1},
1030 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512
,
1031 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1032 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512
, NID_secp521r1
, 1},
1033 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
,
1034 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
,
1035 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1036 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
,
1037 NID_undef
, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
,
1038 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1039 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224
,
1040 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1041 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224
, NID_undef
, 1},
1042 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
,
1043 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_EC
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
,
1044 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
, NID_undef
, 1},
1045 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
,
1046 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1047 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1048 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384
,
1049 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1050 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1051 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512
,
1052 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1053 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1054 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256
,
1055 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1056 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1057 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384
,
1058 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1059 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1060 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512
,
1061 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
,
1062 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1063 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256
,
1064 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1065 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1066 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384
,
1067 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1068 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1069 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512
,
1070 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1071 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1072 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224
,
1073 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1074 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1075 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
,
1076 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1077 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
, NID_undef
, 1},
1078 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256
,
1079 NID_sha256
, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1080 NID_dsa_with_SHA256
, NID_undef
, 1},
1081 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384
,
1082 NID_sha384
, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1083 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1084 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
,
1085 NID_sha512
, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1086 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1087 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224
,
1088 NID_sha224
, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1089 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1090 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
,
1091 NID_sha1
, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
, EVP_PKEY_DSA
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
,
1092 NID_dsaWithSHA1
, NID_undef
, 1},
1093 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1094 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
,
1095 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
1096 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
1097 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1098 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
,
1099 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
1100 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
1101 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1102 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256
,
1103 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256
, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX
,
1104 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
,
1105 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1106 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512
,
1107 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512
, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX
,
1108 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
,
1109 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1},
1110 {NULL
, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
,
1111 NID_id_GostR3411_94
, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX
,
1112 NID_id_GostR3410_2001
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
,
1113 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1}
1116 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
1117 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg
= {
1118 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
1119 NID_md5_sha1
, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX
,
1120 EVP_PKEY_RSA
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
,
1121 NID_undef
, NID_undef
, 1
1125 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
1126 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
1128 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg
[] = {
1129 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
1130 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
1131 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
1132 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1
, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
1133 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
1134 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_intrinsic
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
1135 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_intrinsic
, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
1136 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
1137 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
1140 int ssl_setup_sig_algs(SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
1143 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1144 SIGALG_LOOKUP
*cache
1145 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*lu
) * OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
));
1146 EVP_PKEY
*tmpkey
= EVP_PKEY_new();
1149 if (cache
== NULL
|| tmpkey
== NULL
)
1153 for (i
= 0, lu
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
;
1154 i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
); lu
++, i
++) {
1160 * Check hash is available.
1161 * This test is not perfect. A provider could have support
1162 * for a signature scheme, but not a particular hash. However the hash
1163 * could be available from some other loaded provider. In that case it
1164 * could be that the signature is available, and the hash is available
1165 * independently - but not as a combination. We ignore this for now.
1167 if (lu
->hash
!= NID_undef
1168 && ctx
->ssl_digest_methods
[lu
->hash_idx
] == NULL
) {
1169 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1173 if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(tmpkey
, lu
->sig
)) {
1174 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1177 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx
->libctx
, tmpkey
, ctx
->propq
);
1178 /* If unable to create pctx we assume the sig algorithm is unavailable */
1180 cache
[i
].enabled
= 0;
1181 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
1184 ctx
->sigalg_lookup_cache
= cache
;
1189 OPENSSL_free(cache
);
1190 EVP_PKEY_free(tmpkey
);
1194 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
1195 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_lookup_sigalg(const SSL
*s
, uint16_t sigalg
)
1198 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1200 for (i
= 0, lu
= s
->ctx
->sigalg_lookup_cache
;
1201 /* cache should have the same number of elements as sigalg_lookup_tbl */
1202 i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
1204 if (lu
->sigalg
== sigalg
) {
1212 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
1213 int tls1_lookup_md(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
, const EVP_MD
**pmd
)
1218 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
1219 if (lu
->hash
== NID_undef
) {
1222 md
= ssl_md(ctx
, lu
->hash_idx
);
1232 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
1234 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
1235 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
1236 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
1238 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
1239 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
,
1240 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1246 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx
, lu
, &md
) || md
== NULL
)
1248 if (EVP_PKEY_size(pkey
) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md
))
1254 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
1255 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
1256 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
1257 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
1258 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
1260 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL
*s
, int idx
)
1266 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
1267 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1268 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i
);
1270 if (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) {
1277 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
1279 if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST01
&& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
!= SSL_aGOST01
) {
1282 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST01
;
1284 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
1291 * As both SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 and SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 indices can be used
1292 * with new (aGOST12-only) ciphersuites, we should find out which one is available really.
1294 else if (idx
== SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
) {
1297 for (real_idx
= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
; real_idx
>= SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
;
1299 if (s
->cert
->pkeys
[real_idx
].privatekey
!= NULL
) {
1306 idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
1309 if (idx
< 0 || idx
>= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg
))
1311 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
) || idx
!= SSL_PKEY_RSA
) {
1312 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, tls_default_sigalg
[idx
]);
1316 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, NULL
))
1318 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
1322 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, &legacy_rsa_sigalg
))
1324 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg
;
1326 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
1327 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL
*s
, const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1330 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1332 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
1334 lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, idx
);
1337 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1341 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL
*s
, int sent
, const uint16_t **psigs
)
1344 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1347 switch (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1348 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS
:
1349 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1350 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs
);
1352 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY
:
1353 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
;
1356 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS
:
1357 *psigs
= suiteb_sigalgs
+ 1;
1361 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1362 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1363 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1365 if ((s
->server
== sent
) && s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
1366 *psigs
= s
->cert
->client_sigalgs
;
1367 return s
->cert
->client_sigalgslen
;
1368 } else if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1369 *psigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1370 return s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1372 *psigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
1373 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
1378 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1379 * specified EC curve.
1381 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL
*s
, int curve
)
1383 const uint16_t *sigs
;
1386 if (s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
) {
1387 sigs
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgs
;
1388 siglen
= s
->cert
->conf_sigalgslen
;
1390 sigs
= tls12_sigalgs
;
1391 siglen
= OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs
);
1394 for (i
= 0; i
< siglen
; i
++) {
1395 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, sigs
[i
]);
1399 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
1400 && lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
1401 && curve
== lu
->curve
)
1409 * Return the number of security bits for the signature algorithm, or 0 on
1412 static int sigalg_security_bits(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
1414 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1417 if (!tls1_lookup_md(ctx
, lu
, &md
))
1421 int md_type
= EVP_MD_type(md
);
1423 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1424 secbits
= EVP_MD_size(md
) * 4;
1426 * SHA1 and MD5 are known to be broken. Reduce security bits so that
1427 * they're no longer accepted at security level 1. The real values don't
1428 * really matter as long as they're lower than 80, which is our
1430 * https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014 puts a chosen-prefix attack for
1431 * SHA1 at 2^63.4 and MD5+SHA1 at 2^67.2
1432 * https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf
1433 * puts a chosen-prefix attack for MD5 at 2^39.
1435 if (md_type
== NID_sha1
)
1437 else if (md_type
== NID_md5_sha1
)
1439 else if (md_type
== NID_md5
)
1442 /* Values from https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8032#section-8.5 */
1443 if (lu
->sigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519
)
1445 else if (lu
->sigalg
== TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448
)
1452 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1453 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1456 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL
*s
, uint16_t sig
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
1458 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1459 const EVP_MD
*md
= NULL
;
1461 size_t sent_sigslen
, i
, cidx
;
1463 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
1466 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
);
1467 /* Should never happen */
1470 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1471 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1472 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
) {
1473 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1476 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1477 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
1478 pkeyid
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
1480 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, sig
);
1482 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1483 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1486 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
|| lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
))
1487 || (pkeyid
!= lu
->sig
1488 && (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
|| pkeyid
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
))) {
1489 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1492 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1493 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey
), &cidx
)
1494 || lu
->sig_idx
!= (int)cidx
) {
1495 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1499 if (pkeyid
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
1501 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1502 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s
, pkey
)) {
1503 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
1504 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION
);
1508 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1509 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) || tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1510 int curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(pkey
);
1512 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
) {
1513 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1517 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
1518 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1519 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s
, tls1_get_group_id(pkey
), 1)) {
1520 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE
);
1523 if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1524 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1525 if (sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1526 && sig
!= TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
) {
1527 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1528 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1533 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s
)) {
1534 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1538 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1539 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1540 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
1541 if (sig
== *sent_sigs
)
1544 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1545 if (i
== sent_sigslen
&& (lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
1546 || s
->cert
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)) {
1547 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1550 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, &md
)) {
1551 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST
);
1555 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1556 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1558 sigalgstr
[0] = (sig
>> 8) & 0xff;
1559 sigalgstr
[1] = sig
& 0xff;
1560 secbits
= sigalg_security_bits(s
->ctx
, lu
);
1562 !ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK
, secbits
,
1563 md
!= NULL
? EVP_MD_type(md
) : NID_undef
,
1564 (void *)sigalgstr
)) {
1565 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
1568 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1569 s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
= lu
;
1573 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1575 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
== NULL
)
1577 *pnid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalg
->sig
;
1581 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL
*s
, int *pnid
)
1583 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
== NULL
)
1585 *pnid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
->sig
;
1590 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1591 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1592 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1594 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1597 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1599 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL
*s
)
1601 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
= 0;
1602 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
= 0;
1603 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
, s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK
);
1604 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
,
1605 &s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
, NULL
) != 0)
1607 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1608 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1609 if (!s
->psk_client_callback
) {
1610 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aPSK
;
1611 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_PSK
;
1613 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1614 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1615 if (!(s
->srp_ctx
.srp_Mask
& SSL_kSRP
)) {
1616 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
|= SSL_aSRP
;
1617 s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
|= SSL_kSRP
;
1624 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1625 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1626 * @c: cipher to check
1627 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1628 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1630 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1632 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL
*s
, const SSL_CIPHER
*c
, int op
, int ecdhe
)
1634 if (c
->algorithm_mkey
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_k
1635 || c
->algorithm_auth
& s
->s3
.tmp
.mask_a
)
1637 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
== 0)
1639 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s
)) {
1640 int min_tls
= c
->min_tls
;
1643 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1644 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1646 if (min_tls
== TLS1_VERSION
&& ecdhe
1647 && (c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kECDHE
| SSL_kECDHEPSK
)) != 0)
1648 min_tls
= SSL3_VERSION
;
1650 if ((min_tls
> s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
) || (c
->max_tls
< s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
))
1653 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c
->min_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
)
1654 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c
->max_dtls
, s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
)))
1657 return !ssl_security(s
, op
, c
->strength_bits
, 0, (void *)c
);
1660 int tls_use_ticket(SSL
*s
)
1662 if ((s
->options
& SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
))
1664 return ssl_security(s
, SSL_SECOP_TICKET
, 0, 0, NULL
);
1667 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
1671 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1672 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
1673 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
1674 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
1675 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1676 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
1677 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = 0;
1679 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1680 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1682 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
== NULL
1683 && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
== NULL
) {
1684 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
1685 size_t sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
1687 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++) {
1688 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, i
);
1693 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1694 for (j
= 0; j
< sent_sigslen
; j
++) {
1695 if (lu
->sigalg
== sent_sigs
[j
]) {
1696 s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[i
] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
1704 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s
)) {
1705 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR
);
1708 if (s
->shared_sigalgs
!= NULL
)
1711 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1712 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
1713 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS
);
1718 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1720 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1721 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1722 * point to the resulting session.
1724 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL
*s
, CLIENTHELLO_MSG
*hello
,
1728 RAW_EXTENSION
*ticketext
;
1731 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 0;
1734 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1735 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1738 if (s
->version
<= SSL3_VERSION
|| !tls_use_ticket(s
))
1739 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1741 ticketext
= &hello
->pre_proc_exts
[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket
];
1742 if (!ticketext
->present
)
1743 return SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1745 size
= PACKET_remaining(&ticketext
->data
);
1747 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s
, PACKET_data(&ticketext
->data
), size
,
1748 hello
->session_id
, hello
->session_id_len
, ret
);
1752 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1754 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1755 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1756 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1757 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1760 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1761 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1762 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1763 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1764 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1765 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1767 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1768 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1769 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1770 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1771 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1772 * point to the resulting session.
1774 SSL_TICKET_STATUS
tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL
*s
, const unsigned char *etick
,
1775 size_t eticklen
, const unsigned char *sess_id
,
1776 size_t sesslen
, SSL_SESSION
**psess
)
1778 SSL_SESSION
*sess
= NULL
;
1779 unsigned char *sdec
;
1780 const unsigned char *p
;
1781 int slen
, renew_ticket
= 0, declen
;
1782 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1784 unsigned char tick_hmac
[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
];
1785 SSL_HMAC
*hctx
= NULL
;
1786 EVP_CIPHER_CTX
*ctx
= NULL
;
1787 SSL_CTX
*tctx
= s
->session_ctx
;
1789 if (eticklen
== 0) {
1791 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1792 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1794 ret
= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
;
1797 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
) {
1799 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1800 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1801 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1802 * calculate the master secret later.
1804 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1808 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1809 if (eticklen
< TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH
) {
1810 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1814 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1815 hctx
= ssl_hmac_new(tctx
);
1817 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1820 ctx
= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1822 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
;
1825 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1826 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
|| tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
1828 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
1831 unsigned char *nctick
= (unsigned char *)etick
;
1834 if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
!= NULL
)
1835 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb(s
, nctick
,
1836 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
1838 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx
),
1840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1841 else if (tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
)
1842 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
1843 rv
= tctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb(s
, nctick
,
1844 nctick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
,
1845 ctx
, ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx
), 0);
1848 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1852 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1858 EVP_CIPHER
*aes256cbc
= NULL
;
1860 /* Check key name matches */
1861 if (memcmp(etick
, tctx
->ext
.tick_key_name
,
1862 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) != 0) {
1863 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1867 aes256cbc
= EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s
->ctx
->libctx
, "AES-256-CBC",
1869 if (aes256cbc
== NULL
1870 || ssl_hmac_init(hctx
, tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
,
1871 sizeof(tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_hmac_key
),
1873 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx
, aes256cbc
, NULL
,
1874 tctx
->ext
.secure
->tick_aes_key
,
1875 etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
) <= 0) {
1876 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc
);
1877 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1880 EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc
);
1881 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
1885 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1888 mlen
= ssl_hmac_size(hctx
);
1890 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1894 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1896 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
) + mlen
) {
1897 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1901 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1902 if (ssl_hmac_update(hctx
, etick
, eticklen
) <= 0
1903 || ssl_hmac_final(hctx
, tick_hmac
, NULL
, sizeof(tick_hmac
)) <= 0) {
1904 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1908 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac
, etick
+ eticklen
, mlen
)) {
1909 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1912 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1913 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1914 p
= etick
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1915 eticklen
-= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx
);
1916 sdec
= OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen
);
1917 if (sdec
== NULL
|| EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx
, sdec
, &slen
, p
,
1918 (int)eticklen
) <= 0) {
1920 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1923 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx
, sdec
+ slen
, &declen
) <= 0) {
1925 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1931 sess
= d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL
, &p
, slen
);
1935 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1937 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1939 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1943 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1944 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1945 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1949 memcpy(sess
->session_id
, sess_id
, sesslen
);
1950 sess
->session_id_length
= sesslen
;
1953 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
1955 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
1960 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1962 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
1965 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx
);
1966 ssl_hmac_free(hctx
);
1969 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1970 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1971 * performs any action
1973 if (s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb
!= NULL
1974 && (ret
== SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1975 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1976 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1977 || ret
== SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)) {
1978 size_t keyname_len
= eticklen
;
1981 if (keyname_len
> TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
)
1982 keyname_len
= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH
;
1983 retcb
= s
->session_ctx
->decrypt_ticket_cb(s
, sess
, etick
, keyname_len
,
1985 s
->session_ctx
->ticket_cb_data
);
1987 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT
:
1988 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
1991 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE
:
1992 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NONE
;
1993 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
1997 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW
:
1998 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
&& ret
!= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
)
1999 ret
= SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
;
2000 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
2001 SSL_SESSION_free(sess
);
2005 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
:
2006 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW
:
2007 if (ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
2008 && ret
!= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
)
2009 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2010 else if (retcb
== SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE
)
2011 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
;
2013 ret
= SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
;
2017 ret
= SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER
;
2021 if (s
->ext
.session_secret_cb
== NULL
|| SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2023 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
:
2024 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW
:
2025 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
:
2026 s
->ext
.ticket_expected
= 1;
2035 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
2036 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL
*s
, int op
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
2038 unsigned char sigalgstr
[2];
2041 if (lu
== NULL
|| !lu
->enabled
)
2043 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
2044 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
)
2047 * At some point we should fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello as per TLS 1.3
2050 if (!s
->server
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
2051 && (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
|| lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
2052 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
2053 || lu
->hash_idx
== SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX
))
2056 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
2057 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(s
->ctx
, lu
->sig_idx
))
2060 if (lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2061 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
2062 || lu
->sig
== NID_id_GostR3410_2001
) {
2063 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
2064 if (s
->server
&& SSL_IS_TLS13(s
))
2067 && s
->method
->version
== TLS_ANY_VERSION
2068 && s
->s3
.tmp
.max_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
) {
2070 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER
) *sk
;
2073 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
2074 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
2075 * ciphersuites enabled.
2078 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.min_ver
>= TLS1_3_VERSION
)
2081 sk
= SSL_get_ciphers(s
);
2082 num
= sk
!= NULL
? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk
) : 0;
2083 for (i
= 0; i
< num
; i
++) {
2084 const SSL_CIPHER
*c
;
2086 c
= sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk
, i
);
2087 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
2088 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s
, c
, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED
, 0))
2091 if ((c
->algorithm_mkey
& (SSL_kGOST
| SSL_kGOST18
)) != 0)
2099 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
2100 secbits
= sigalg_security_bits(s
->ctx
, lu
);
2101 sigalgstr
[0] = (lu
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff;
2102 sigalgstr
[1] = lu
->sigalg
& 0xff;
2103 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, lu
->hash
, (void *)sigalgstr
);
2107 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
2108 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
2112 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a
, SSL
*s
, int op
)
2114 const uint16_t *sigalgs
;
2115 size_t i
, sigalgslen
;
2116 uint32_t disabled_mask
= SSL_aRSA
| SSL_aDSS
| SSL_aECDSA
;
2118 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
2121 sigalgslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sigalgs
);
2122 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++, sigalgs
++) {
2123 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *sigalgs
);
2124 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
;
2129 clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu
->sig_idx
);
2133 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
2134 if ((clu
->amask
& disabled_mask
) != 0
2135 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, op
, lu
))
2136 disabled_mask
&= ~clu
->amask
;
2138 *pmask_a
|= disabled_mask
;
2141 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, WPACKET
*pkt
,
2142 const uint16_t *psig
, size_t psiglen
)
2147 for (i
= 0; i
< psiglen
; i
++, psig
++) {
2148 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *psig
);
2151 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED
, lu
))
2153 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt
, *psig
))
2156 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
2157 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
2159 if (rv
== 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)
2160 || (lu
->sig
!= EVP_PKEY_RSA
2161 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha1
2162 && lu
->hash
!= NID_sha224
)))
2166 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
2170 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
2171 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**shsig
,
2172 const uint16_t *pref
, size_t preflen
,
2173 const uint16_t *allow
, size_t allowlen
)
2175 const uint16_t *ptmp
, *atmp
;
2176 size_t i
, j
, nmatch
= 0;
2177 for (i
= 0, ptmp
= pref
; i
< preflen
; i
++, ptmp
++) {
2178 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *ptmp
);
2180 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
2182 || !tls12_sigalg_allowed(s
, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED
, lu
))
2184 for (j
= 0, atmp
= allow
; j
< allowlen
; j
++, atmp
++) {
2185 if (*ptmp
== *atmp
) {
2196 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
2197 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
2199 const uint16_t *pref
, *allow
, *conf
;
2200 size_t preflen
, allowlen
, conflen
;
2202 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
**salgs
= NULL
;
2204 unsigned int is_suiteb
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2206 OPENSSL_free(s
->shared_sigalgs
);
2207 s
->shared_sigalgs
= NULL
;
2208 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= 0;
2209 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
2210 if (!s
->server
&& c
->client_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
2211 conf
= c
->client_sigalgs
;
2212 conflen
= c
->client_sigalgslen
;
2213 } else if (c
->conf_sigalgs
&& !is_suiteb
) {
2214 conf
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2215 conflen
= c
->conf_sigalgslen
;
2217 conflen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 0, &conf
);
2218 if (s
->options
& SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
|| is_suiteb
) {
2221 allow
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2222 allowlen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2226 pref
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2227 preflen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2229 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, NULL
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
2231 if ((salgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch
* sizeof(*salgs
))) == NULL
) {
2232 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2235 nmatch
= tls12_shared_sigalgs(s
, salgs
, pref
, preflen
, allow
, allowlen
);
2239 s
->shared_sigalgs
= salgs
;
2240 s
->shared_sigalgslen
= nmatch
;
2244 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET
*pkt
, uint16_t **pdest
, size_t *pdestlen
)
2250 size
= PACKET_remaining(pkt
);
2252 /* Invalid data length */
2253 if (size
== 0 || (size
& 1) != 0)
2258 if ((buf
= OPENSSL_malloc(size
* sizeof(*buf
))) == NULL
) {
2259 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2262 for (i
= 0; i
< size
&& PACKET_get_net_2(pkt
, &stmp
); i
++)
2270 OPENSSL_free(*pdest
);
2277 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, PACKET
*pkt
, int cert
)
2279 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2280 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
))
2282 /* Should never happen */
2283 if (s
->cert
== NULL
)
2287 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
,
2288 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
);
2290 return tls1_save_u16(pkt
, &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
,
2291 &s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
);
2295 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2297 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL
*s
)
2300 uint32_t *pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
;
2302 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s
))
2305 for (i
= 0; i
< SSL_PKEY_NUM
; i
++)
2308 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2309 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigptr
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2310 int idx
= sigptr
->sig_idx
;
2312 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
2313 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && sigptr
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
2315 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
2316 if (pvalid
[idx
] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(s
->ctx
, idx
))
2317 pvalid
[idx
] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2322 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
2323 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
2324 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
2326 uint16_t *psig
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
;
2327 size_t numsigalgs
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgslen
;
2328 if (psig
== NULL
|| numsigalgs
> INT_MAX
)
2331 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
2333 if (idx
>= (int)numsigalgs
)
2337 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((*psig
>> 8) & 0xff);
2339 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(*psig
& 0xff);
2340 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *psig
);
2342 *psign
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sig
: NID_undef
;
2344 *phash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->hash
: NID_undef
;
2345 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
2346 *psignhash
= lu
!= NULL
? lu
->sigandhash
: NID_undef
;
2348 return (int)numsigalgs
;
2351 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL
*s
, int idx
,
2352 int *psign
, int *phash
, int *psignhash
,
2353 unsigned char *rsig
, unsigned char *rhash
)
2355 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*shsigalgs
;
2356 if (s
->shared_sigalgs
== NULL
2358 || idx
>= (int)s
->shared_sigalgslen
2359 || s
->shared_sigalgslen
> INT_MAX
)
2361 shsigalgs
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[idx
];
2363 *phash
= shsigalgs
->hash
;
2365 *psign
= shsigalgs
->sig
;
2366 if (psignhash
!= NULL
)
2367 *psignhash
= shsigalgs
->sigandhash
;
2369 *rsig
= (unsigned char)(shsigalgs
->sigalg
& 0xff);
2371 *rhash
= (unsigned char)((shsigalgs
->sigalg
>> 8) & 0xff);
2372 return (int)s
->shared_sigalgslen
;
2375 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
2376 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
2380 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
2381 uint16_t sigalgs
[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
];
2384 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig
, int *phash
, const char *str
)
2386 if (strcmp(str
, "RSA") == 0) {
2387 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2388 } else if (strcmp(str
, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str
, "PSS") == 0) {
2389 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
;
2390 } else if (strcmp(str
, "DSA") == 0) {
2391 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2392 } else if (strcmp(str
, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2393 *psig
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2395 *phash
= OBJ_sn2nid(str
);
2396 if (*phash
== NID_undef
)
2397 *phash
= OBJ_ln2nid(str
);
2400 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2401 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2403 static int sig_cb(const char *elem
, int len
, void *arg
)
2405 sig_cb_st
*sarg
= arg
;
2407 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*s
;
2408 char etmp
[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN
], *p
;
2409 int sig_alg
= NID_undef
, hash_alg
= NID_undef
;
2412 if (sarg
->sigalgcnt
== TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT
)
2414 if (len
> (int)(sizeof(etmp
) - 1))
2416 memcpy(etmp
, elem
, len
);
2418 p
= strchr(etmp
, '+');
2420 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2421 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2422 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2423 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2424 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2425 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2429 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2431 if (s
->name
!= NULL
&& strcmp(etmp
, s
->name
) == 0) {
2432 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2436 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2443 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, etmp
);
2444 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg
, &hash_alg
, p
);
2445 if (sig_alg
== NID_undef
|| hash_alg
== NID_undef
)
2447 for (i
= 0, s
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; i
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2449 if (s
->hash
== hash_alg
&& s
->sig
== sig_alg
) {
2450 sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
++] = s
->sigalg
;
2454 if (i
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2458 /* Reject duplicates */
2459 for (i
= 0; i
< sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1; i
++) {
2460 if (sarg
->sigalgs
[i
] == sarg
->sigalgs
[sarg
->sigalgcnt
- 1]) {
2469 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2470 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2472 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT
*c
, const char *str
, int client
)
2476 if (!CONF_parse_list(str
, ':', 1, sig_cb
, &sig
))
2480 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c
, sig
.sigalgs
, sig
.sigalgcnt
, client
);
2483 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const uint16_t *psigs
, size_t salglen
,
2488 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc(salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
2489 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2492 memcpy(sigalgs
, psigs
, salglen
* sizeof(*sigalgs
));
2495 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2496 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2497 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2499 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2500 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2501 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
;
2507 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT
*c
, const int *psig_nids
, size_t salglen
, int client
)
2509 uint16_t *sigalgs
, *sptr
;
2514 if ((sigalgs
= OPENSSL_malloc((salglen
/ 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs
))) == NULL
) {
2515 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
2518 for (i
= 0, sptr
= sigalgs
; i
< salglen
; i
+= 2) {
2520 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*curr
;
2521 int md_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2522 int sig_id
= *psig_nids
++;
2524 for (j
= 0, curr
= sigalg_lookup_tbl
; j
< OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
);
2526 if (curr
->hash
== md_id
&& curr
->sig
== sig_id
) {
2527 *sptr
++ = curr
->sigalg
;
2532 if (j
== OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl
))
2537 OPENSSL_free(c
->client_sigalgs
);
2538 c
->client_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2539 c
->client_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2541 OPENSSL_free(c
->conf_sigalgs
);
2542 c
->conf_sigalgs
= sigalgs
;
2543 c
->conf_sigalgslen
= salglen
/ 2;
2549 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs
);
2553 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, int default_nid
)
2555 int sig_nid
, use_pc_sigalgs
= 0;
2557 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sigalg
;
2559 if (default_nid
== -1)
2561 sig_nid
= X509_get_signature_nid(x
);
2563 return sig_nid
== default_nid
? 1 : 0;
2565 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
) && s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2567 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2568 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2569 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2571 sigalgslen
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
;
2574 sigalgslen
= s
->shared_sigalgslen
;
2576 for (i
= 0; i
< sigalgslen
; i
++) {
2577 sigalg
= use_pc_sigalgs
2578 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
])
2579 : s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
2580 if (sigalg
!= NULL
&& sig_nid
== sigalg
->sigandhash
)
2586 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2587 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *names
, X509
*x
)
2589 const X509_NAME
*nm
;
2591 nm
= X509_get_issuer_name(x
);
2592 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_NAME_num(names
); i
++) {
2593 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm
, sk_X509_NAME_value(names
, i
)))
2600 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2601 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2602 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2603 * attempting to use them.
2606 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2608 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2609 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2610 /* Strict mode flags */
2611 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2612 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2613 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2615 int tls1_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
,
2620 int check_flags
= 0, strict_mode
;
2621 CERT_PKEY
*cpk
= NULL
;
2624 unsigned int suiteb_flags
= tls1_suiteb(s
);
2625 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2627 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2630 idx
= (int)(cpk
- c
->pkeys
);
2632 cpk
= c
->pkeys
+ idx
;
2633 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2635 pk
= cpk
->privatekey
;
2637 strict_mode
= c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
;
2638 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2647 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk
, &certidx
) == NULL
)
2650 pvalid
= s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
+ idx
;
2652 if (c
->cert_flags
& SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT
)
2653 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS
;
2655 check_flags
= CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS
;
2662 check_flags
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2663 ok
= X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL
, x
, chain
, suiteb_flags
);
2664 if (ok
== X509_V_OK
)
2665 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB
;
2666 else if (!check_flags
)
2671 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2672 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2674 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
&& strict_mode
) {
2677 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
2678 || s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
2680 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2684 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_RSA
;
2685 default_nid
= NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption
;
2688 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
:
2689 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_DSA
;
2690 default_nid
= NID_dsaWithSHA1
;
2694 rsign
= EVP_PKEY_EC
;
2695 default_nid
= NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1
;
2698 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01
:
2699 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2001
;
2700 default_nid
= NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001
;
2703 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
:
2704 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
;
2705 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256
;
2708 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
:
2709 rsign
= NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
;
2710 default_nid
= NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512
;
2719 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2720 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2722 if (default_nid
> 0 && c
->conf_sigalgs
) {
2724 const uint16_t *p
= c
->conf_sigalgs
;
2725 for (j
= 0; j
< c
->conf_sigalgslen
; j
++, p
++) {
2726 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, *p
);
2728 if (lu
!= NULL
&& lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
&& lu
->sig
== rsign
)
2731 if (j
== c
->conf_sigalgslen
) {
2738 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2739 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
2741 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2742 * so check_flags is always set.
2744 if (find_sig_alg(s
, x
, pk
) != NULL
)
2745 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2746 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, x
, default_nid
)) {
2750 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
;
2751 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2752 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2753 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s
, sk_X509_value(chain
, i
), default_nid
)) {
2755 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2762 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2763 else if (check_flags
)
2764 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE
| CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE
;
2766 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2767 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s
, x
, 1))
2768 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM
;
2769 else if (!check_flags
)
2772 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2773 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2774 else if (strict_mode
) {
2775 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2776 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2777 X509
*ca
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2778 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s
, ca
, 0)) {
2780 rv
&= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM
;
2787 if (!s
->server
&& strict_mode
) {
2788 STACK_OF(X509_NAME
) *ca_dn
;
2791 if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "RSA"))
2792 check_type
= TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN
;
2793 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "DSA"))
2794 check_type
= TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN
;
2795 else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk
, "EC"))
2796 check_type
= TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN
;
2799 const uint8_t *ctypes
= s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype
;
2802 for (j
= 0; j
< s
->s3
.tmp
.ctype_len
; j
++, ctypes
++) {
2803 if (*ctypes
== check_type
) {
2804 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2808 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
) && !check_flags
)
2811 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2814 ca_dn
= s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_ca_names
;
2816 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn
))
2817 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2819 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2820 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, x
))
2821 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2823 if (!(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
)) {
2824 for (i
= 0; i
< sk_X509_num(chain
); i
++) {
2825 X509
*xtmp
= sk_X509_value(chain
, i
);
2826 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn
, xtmp
)) {
2827 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
;
2832 if (!check_flags
&& !(rv
& CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
))
2835 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME
| CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE
;
2837 if (!check_flags
|| (rv
& check_flags
) == check_flags
)
2838 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_VALID
;
2842 if (TLS1_get_version(s
) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
)
2843 rv
|= *pvalid
& (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
);
2845 rv
|= CERT_PKEY_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
;
2848 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2852 if (rv
& CERT_PKEY_VALID
) {
2855 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2856 *pvalid
&= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN
| CERT_PKEY_SIGN
;
2863 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2864 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL
*s
)
2866 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA
);
2867 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN
);
2868 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN
);
2869 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ECC
);
2870 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST01
);
2871 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
);
2872 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512
);
2873 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED25519
);
2874 tls1_check_chain(s
, NULL
, NULL
, NULL
, SSL_PKEY_ED448
);
2877 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2878 int SSL_check_chain(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pk
, STACK_OF(X509
) *chain
)
2880 return tls1_check_chain(s
, x
, pk
, chain
, -1);
2883 EVP_PKEY
*ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL
*s
)
2885 EVP_PKEY
*dhp
= NULL
;
2887 int dh_secbits
= 80;
2888 EVP_PKEY_CTX
*pctx
= NULL
;
2889 OSSL_PARAM_BLD
*tmpl
= NULL
;
2890 OSSL_PARAM
*params
= NULL
;
2892 if (s
->cert
->dh_tmp_auto
!= 2) {
2893 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aNULL
| SSL_aPSK
)) {
2894 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->strength_bits
== 256)
2899 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
== NULL
)
2901 dh_secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
->privatekey
);
2905 if (dh_secbits
>= 192)
2906 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL
);
2907 else if (dh_secbits
>= 152)
2908 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_4096(NULL
);
2909 else if (dh_secbits
>= 128)
2910 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL
);
2911 else if (dh_secbits
>= 112)
2912 p
= BN_get_rfc3526_prime_2048(NULL
);
2914 p
= BN_get_rfc2409_prime_1024(NULL
);
2918 pctx
= EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(s
->ctx
->libctx
, "DH", s
->ctx
->propq
);
2920 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(pctx
) != 1)
2923 tmpl
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
2925 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P
, p
)
2926 || !OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_uint(tmpl
, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G
, 2))
2929 params
= OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl
);
2931 || EVP_PKEY_fromdata(pctx
, &dhp
, EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS
, params
) != 1)
2935 OSSL_PARAM_free(params
);
2936 OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl
);
2937 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx
);
2942 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2945 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= X509_get0_pubkey(x
);
2948 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2949 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2950 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2951 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2953 secbits
= EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey
);
2956 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2958 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, 0, x
);
2961 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int op
)
2963 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2964 int secbits
, nid
, pknid
;
2965 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2966 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x
) & EXFLAG_SS
) != 0)
2968 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &nid
, &pknid
, &secbits
, NULL
))
2970 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2971 if (nid
== NID_undef
)
2974 return ssl_security(s
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2976 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx
, op
, secbits
, nid
, x
);
2979 int ssl_security_cert(SSL
*s
, SSL_CTX
*ctx
, X509
*x
, int vfy
, int is_ee
)
2982 vfy
= SSL_SECOP_PEER
;
2984 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY
| vfy
))
2985 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2987 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY
| vfy
))
2988 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL
;
2990 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s
, ctx
, x
, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD
| vfy
))
2991 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK
;
2996 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2997 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2998 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
3001 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL
*s
, STACK_OF(X509
) *sk
, X509
*x
, int vfy
)
3003 int rv
, start_idx
, i
;
3005 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, 0);
3010 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 1);
3014 for (i
= start_idx
; i
< sk_X509_num(sk
); i
++) {
3015 x
= sk_X509_value(sk
, i
);
3016 rv
= ssl_security_cert(s
, NULL
, x
, vfy
, 0);
3024 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
3025 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
3028 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
)
3030 int sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3031 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP
*clu
= ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx
);
3033 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
3035 || (clu
->amask
& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
) == 0
3036 || (clu
->nid
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
3037 && (s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_mkey
& SSL_kRSA
) != 0))
3040 return s
->s3
.tmp
.valid_flags
[sig_idx
] & CERT_PKEY_VALID
? sig_idx
: -1;
3044 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
3045 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
3047 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
3049 static int check_cert_usable(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, X509
*x
,
3052 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
;
3053 int mdnid
, pknid
, supported
;
3057 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot supporting signing with this sigalg,
3058 * the answer is simply 'no'.
3061 supported
= EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(pkey
, sig
->hash
);
3067 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
3068 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
3070 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3071 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x
, &mdnid
, &pknid
, NULL
, NULL
))
3073 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3074 lu
= tls1_lookup_sigalg(s
, s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_cert_sigalgs
[i
]);
3079 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
3080 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
3081 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
3082 * signing certificate.
3084 if (mdnid
== lu
->hash
&& pknid
== lu
->sig
)
3091 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
3092 * a viable public key is permitted.
3098 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
3099 * with signature scheme |sig|.
3100 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
3101 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
3102 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
3104 static int has_usable_cert(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, int idx
)
3106 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
3109 if (!ssl_has_cert(s
, idx
))
3112 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].x509
,
3113 s
->cert
->pkeys
[idx
].privatekey
);
3117 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
3118 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
3120 static int is_cert_usable(SSL
*s
, const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*sig
, X509
*x
,
3125 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey
, &idx
) == NULL
)
3128 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
3129 if ((int)idx
!= sig
->sig_idx
)
3132 return check_cert_usable(s
, sig
, x
, pkey
);
3136 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
3137 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
3138 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
3140 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*find_sig_alg(SSL
*s
, X509
*x
, EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
3142 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
3147 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
3148 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3149 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3151 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
3152 if (lu
->hash
== NID_sha1
3153 || lu
->hash
== NID_sha224
3154 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_DSA
3155 || lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA
)
3157 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
3158 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s
->ctx
, lu
, NULL
))
3160 if ((pkey
== NULL
&& !has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, -1))
3161 || (pkey
!= NULL
&& !is_cert_usable(s
, lu
, x
, pkey
)))
3164 tmppkey
= (pkey
!= NULL
) ? pkey
3165 : s
->cert
->pkeys
[lu
->sig_idx
].privatekey
;
3167 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_EC
) {
3169 curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(tmppkey
);
3170 if (lu
->curve
!= NID_undef
&& curve
!= lu
->curve
)
3172 } else if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
3173 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3174 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s
->ctx
, tmppkey
, lu
))
3180 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
)
3187 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
3188 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
3190 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
3191 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
3193 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
3194 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
3195 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
3197 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL
*s
, int fatalerrs
)
3199 const SIGALG_LOOKUP
*lu
= NULL
;
3202 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= NULL
;
3203 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= NULL
;
3205 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s
)) {
3206 lu
= find_sig_alg(s
, NULL
, NULL
);
3210 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3211 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3215 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
3216 if (!(s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& SSL_aCERT
))
3218 if (!s
->server
&& !ssl_has_cert(s
, s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
))
3221 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s
)) {
3223 if (s
->s3
.tmp
.peer_sigalgs
!= NULL
) {
3226 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
3228 curve
= ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s
->cert
->pkeys
[SSL_PKEY_ECC
]
3232 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
3235 for (i
= 0; i
< s
->shared_sigalgslen
; i
++) {
3236 lu
= s
->shared_sigalgs
[i
];
3239 if ((sig_idx
= tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s
, lu
)) == -1)
3242 int cc_idx
= s
->cert
->key
- s
->cert
->pkeys
;
3244 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3245 if (cc_idx
!= sig_idx
)
3248 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
3249 if (!has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, sig_idx
))
3251 if (lu
->sig
== EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
) {
3252 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
3253 EVP_PKEY
*pkey
= s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
].privatekey
;
3255 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(s
->ctx
, pkey
, lu
))
3258 if (curve
== -1 || lu
->curve
== curve
)
3261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3263 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
3264 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
3265 * we have to assume GOST support.
3267 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
&& s
->s3
.tmp
.new_cipher
->algorithm_auth
& (SSL_aGOST01
| SSL_aGOST12
)) {
3268 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3271 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3272 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3276 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3280 if (i
== s
->shared_sigalgslen
) {
3283 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE
,
3284 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3289 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
3291 const uint16_t *sent_sigs
;
3292 size_t sent_sigslen
;
3294 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3297 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3298 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3302 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
3303 sent_sigslen
= tls12_get_psigalgs(s
, 1, &sent_sigs
);
3304 for (i
= 0; i
< sent_sigslen
; i
++, sent_sigs
++) {
3305 if (lu
->sigalg
== *sent_sigs
3306 && has_usable_cert(s
, lu
, lu
->sig_idx
))
3309 if (i
== sent_sigslen
) {
3312 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER
,
3313 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE
);
3318 if ((lu
= tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s
, -1)) == NULL
) {
3321 SSLfatal(s
, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR
,
3322 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
);
3328 sig_idx
= lu
->sig_idx
;
3329 s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
= &s
->cert
->pkeys
[sig_idx
];
3330 s
->cert
->key
= s
->s3
.tmp
.cert
;
3331 s
->s3
.tmp
.sigalg
= lu
;
3335 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX
*ctx
, uint8_t mode
)
3337 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3338 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
3339 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
3343 ctx
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
3347 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL
*ssl
, uint8_t mode
)
3349 if (mode
!= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
3350 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode
)) {
3351 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL
, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
);
3355 ssl
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
= mode
;
3359 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION
*session
)
3361 return session
->ext
.max_fragment_len_mode
;
3365 * Helper functions for HMAC access with legacy support included.
3367 SSL_HMAC
*ssl_hmac_new(const SSL_CTX
*ctx
)
3369 SSL_HMAC
*ret
= OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret
));
3370 EVP_MAC
*mac
= NULL
;
3374 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3375 if (ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_evp_cb
== NULL
3376 && ctx
->ext
.ticket_key_cb
!= NULL
) {
3377 if (!ssl_hmac_old_new(ret
))
3382 mac
= EVP_MAC_fetch(ctx
->libctx
, "HMAC", ctx
->propq
);
3383 if (mac
== NULL
|| (ret
->ctx
= EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac
)) == NULL
)
3388 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ret
->ctx
);
3394 void ssl_hmac_free(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3397 EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx
->ctx
);
3398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3399 ssl_hmac_old_free(ctx
);
3405 EVP_MAC_CTX
*ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3410 int ssl_hmac_init(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, void *key
, size_t len
, char *md
)
3412 OSSL_PARAM params
[2], *p
= params
;
3414 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
) {
3415 *p
++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST
, md
, 0);
3416 *p
= OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3417 if (EVP_MAC_init(ctx
->ctx
, key
, len
, params
))
3420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3421 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3422 return ssl_hmac_old_init(ctx
, key
, len
, md
);
3427 int ssl_hmac_update(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, const unsigned char *data
, size_t len
)
3429 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3430 return EVP_MAC_update(ctx
->ctx
, data
, len
);
3431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3432 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3433 return ssl_hmac_old_update(ctx
, data
, len
);
3438 int ssl_hmac_final(SSL_HMAC
*ctx
, unsigned char *md
, size_t *len
,
3441 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3442 return EVP_MAC_final(ctx
->ctx
, md
, len
, max_size
);
3443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3444 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3445 return ssl_hmac_old_final(ctx
, md
, len
);
3450 size_t ssl_hmac_size(const SSL_HMAC
*ctx
)
3452 if (ctx
->ctx
!= NULL
)
3453 return EVP_MAC_CTX_get_mac_size(ctx
->ctx
);
3454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
3455 if (ctx
->old_ctx
!= NULL
)
3456 return ssl_hmac_old_size(ctx
);
3461 int ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(const EVP_PKEY
*pkey
)
3463 char gname
[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE
];
3465 if (EVP_PKEY_get_group_name(pkey
, gname
, sizeof(gname
), NULL
) > 0)
3466 return OBJ_txt2nid(gname
);